Muller Report - Searchable

U.S.
Department of Justice
Attorney Work Product // May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
Report On The Investigation Into

Russian Interference In The
2016 Presidential Election
Volume I of II
Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III

Submitted Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 600.8(c)
Washington, D.C.
March 2019
U.S. Department of Justice
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TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOLUME I
INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME I ...................................................................................................... 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME I ........................................................................................ 4
I. THE SPECIAL COUNSEL'S INVESTIGATION ......................................................................... 11
II. RUSSIAN "ACTIVE MEASURES" SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN .......................................... 14
A. Structure of the Internet Research Agency ....................................................................... 15
B. Funding and Oversight from Concord and Prigozhin ...................................................... 16
C. The IRA Targets U.S. Elections ...................................................................................... 19
1. The IRA Ramps Up U.S. Operations As Early As 2014 ............................................. 19
2. U.S. Operations Through IRA-Controlled Social Media Accounts .............................. 22
3. U.S. Operations Through Facebook.............................................................................. 24
4. U.S. Operations Through Twitter ................................................................................. 26
a. Individualized Accounts........................................................................................ 26
b. IRA Botnet Activities ........................................................................................... 28
5. U.S. Operations Involving Political Rallies .................................................................. 29
6. Targeting and Recruitment of U.S. Persons ............................................................... 31
7. Interactions and Contacts with the Trump Campaign ................................................... 33
a. Trump Campaign Promotion of IRA Political Materials ...................................... 33
b. Contact with Trump Campaign Officials in Connection to Rallies ..................... 35
III. RUSSIAN HACKING AND DUMPING OPERATIONS ........................................................... 36
A. GRU Hacking Directed at the Clinton Campaign ............................................................. 36
1. GRU Units Target the Clinton Campaign .................................................................. 36
2. Intrusions into the DCCC and DNC Networks .......................................................... 38
a. Initial Access ......................................................................................................... 38
b. Implantation of Malware on DCCC and DNC Networks ..................................... 38
c. Theft of Documents from DNC and DCCC Networks ......................................... 40
B. Dissemination of the Hacked Materials............................................................................. 41
1. DCLeaks ..................................................................................................................... 41
2. Guccifer 2.0 ................................................................................................................ 42
3. Use of WikiLeaks ....................................................................................................... 44
a. WikiLeaks's Expressed Opposition Toward the Clinton Campaign ..................... 44
b. WikiLeaks's First Contact with Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeaks ................................. 45
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c. The GRU's Transfer of Stolen Materials to WikiLeaks ..........................................45

d. WikiLeaks Statements Dissembling About the Source of Stolen
Materials ...............................................................................................................48
C. Additional GRU Cyber Operations ....................................................................................49
1. Summer and Fall 2016 Operations Targeting Democrat-Linked Victims ..................49
2. Intrusions Targeting the Administration of U.S. Elections .........................................50
D. Trump Campaign and the Dissemination of Hacked Materials ........................................ 51
1, HOM ............................................................................................................. 51
a. Background ..........................................................................................................51
c. Harm to Ongoing Matter
b. Contacts with the Campaign about WikiLeaks...................................................................................................................52

54
d. WikiLeaks's October 7, 2016 Release of Stolen Podesta Emails............................58
e. Donald Trump Jr. Interaction with WikiLeaks .......................................................59
2. Other Potential Campaign Interest in Russian Hacked Materials ................................61
a. Henry Oknyansky (a/k/a Henry Greenberg) ...........................................................61
b. Campaign Efforts to Obtain Deleted Clinton Emails ..............................................62
IV. RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT LINKS To AND CONTACTS WITH THE TRUMP CAMPAIGN 66
A. Campaign Period (September 2015 — November 8, 2016) ..............................................66
1. Trump Tower Moscow Project ....................................................................................67
a. Trump Tower Moscow Venture with the Crocus Group (2013-2014)....................67
b. Communications with I.C. Expert Investment Company and Giorgi
Rtskhiladze (Summer and Fall 2015) ...................................................................69
c. Letter of Intent and Contacts to Russian Government (October 2015 -
January 2016) .......................................................................................................70
i. Trump Signs the Letter of Intent on behalf of the Trump Organization ...... 70
ii. Post-LOI Contacts with Individuals in Russia ...............................................72
d. Discussions about Russia Travel by Michael Cohen or Candidate Trump
(December 2015-June 2016) ................................................................................76
i. Sater's Overtures to Cohen to Travel to Russia..............................................76
ii. Candidate Trump's Opportunities to Travel to Russia ...................................78
2. George Papadopoulos...................................................................................................80
a. Origins of Campaign Work ..................................................................................81
b. Initial Russia-Related Contacts ............................................................................82
c. March 31 Foreign Policy Team Meeting ............................................................. 85
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d. George Papadopoulos Learns That Russia Has "Dirt" in the Form of

Clinton Emails ................................................................................................... 86
e. Russia-Related Communications With The Campaign ........................................ 89
f. Trump Campaign Knowledge of "Dirt" ............................................................... 93
g. Additional George Papadopoulos Contact ........................................................... 94
3. Carter Page ................................................................................................................... 95
a. Background .......................................................................................................... 96
b. Origins of and Early Campaign Work .................................................................. 97
c. Carter Page's July 2016 Trip To Moscow ............................................................ 98
d. Later Campaign Work and Removal from the Campaign .................................. 102
4. Dimitri Simes and the Center for the National Interest ............................................. 103
a. CNI and Dimitri Simes Connect with the Trump Campaign ............................. 103
b. National Interest Hosts a Foreign Policy Speech at the Mayflower Hotel
........................................................................................................................ 105
c. Jeff Sessions's Post-Speech Interactions with CNI ............................................ 107
d. Jared Kushner's Continuing Contacts with Simes .............................................. 108
5. June 9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower ...................................................................... 110
a. Setting Up the June 9 Meeting............................................................................ 110
i. Outreach to Donald Trump Jr ...................................................................... 110
ii. Awareness of the Meeting Within the Campaign ....................................... 114
b. The Events of June 9, 2016 ................................................................................ 116
i. Arrangements for the Meeting .................................................................... 116
ii. Conduct of the Meeting .............................................................................. 117
c. Post-June 9 Events .............................................................................................. 120
6. Events at the Republican National Convention ........................................................ 123
a. Ambassador Kislyak's Encounters with Senator Sessions and J.D.
Gordon the Week of the RNC ......................................................................... 123
b. Change to Republican Party Platform ............................................................... 124
7. Post-Convention Contacts with Kislyak ................................................................... 127
a. Ambassador Kislyak Invites J.D. Gordon to Breakfast at the
Ambassador's Residence................................................................................. 127
b. Senator Sessions's September 2016 Meeting with Ambassador Kislyak .......... 127
8. Paul Manafort............................................................................................................ 129
a. Paul Manafort's Ties to Russia and Ukraine ....................................................... 131
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1. Oleg Deripaska Consulting Work ............................................................... 131

ii. Political Consulting Work ........................................................................ 132
iii. Konstantin Kilimnik ................................................................................ 132
b. Contacts during Paul Manafort's Time with the Trump Campaign ...................... 134
i. Paul Manafort Joins the Campaign ............................................................ 134
ii. Paul Manafort's Campaign-Period Contacts ............................................. 135
iii. Paul Manafort's Two Campaign-Period Meetings with Konstantin
Kilimnik in the United States. ................................................................. 138
c. Post-Resignation Activities ................................................................................. 141
B. Post-Election and Transition-Period Contacts ................................................................. 144
1. Immediate Post-Election Activity .............................................................................. 144
a. Outreach from the Russian Government ............................................................. 145
b. High-Level Encouragement of Contacts through Alternative Channels ............ 146
2. Kirill Dmitriev's Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Administration .............. 147
a. Background........................................................................................................... 147
b. K i r il l Dmi t r i ev's P ost -El ect i on Cont act s Wi t h t he Inco mi ng
Administration................................................................................................ 149
c. Erik Prince and Kirill Dmitriev Meet in the Seychelles ..................................... 151
i. George Nader and Erik Prince Arrange Seychelles Meeting with
Dmitriev ................................................................................................... 151
ii. The Seychelles Meetings ......................................................................... 153
iii. Erik Prince's Meeting with Steve Bannon after the Seychelles Trip ....... 155
d. Kirill Dmitriev's Post-Election Contact with Rick Gerson Regarding
U.S.-Russia Relations..................................................................................... 156
3. Ambassador Kislyak's Meeting with Jared Kushner and Michael Flynn in
Trump Tower Following the Election ..................................................................... 159
4. Jared Kushner's Meeting with Sergey Gorkov............................................................ 161
5. Petr Aven's Outreach Efforts to the Transition Team ................................................. 163
6. Carter Page Contact with Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich .................... 166
7. Contacts With and Through Michael T. Flynn ........................................................... 167
a. United Nations Vote on Israeli Settlements ........................................................ 167
b. U.S. Sanctions Against Russia ........................................................................... 168
V. PROSECUTION AND DECLINATION DECISIONS .............................................................. 174
A. Russian "Active Measures" Social Media Campaign ....................................................... 174
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B. Russian Hacking and Dumping Operations .................................................................... 175

1. Section 1030 Computer-Intrusion Conspiracy .......................................................... 175
a. Background ........................................................................................................175
b. C h a r g i n g D e c i s i o n A s t o H a r m t o O n g o i n g M a t t e r 176
2. Potential Section 1030 Violation By 179
C. Russian Government Outreach and Contacts .................................................................. 180
1. Potential Coordination: Conspiracy and Collusion ................................................... 180
2. Potential Coordination: Foreign Agent Statutes (FARA and 18 U.S.C. § 951) ....... 181
a. Governing Law ...................................................................................................181
b. Application ........................................................................................................ 182
3. Campaign Finance..................................................................................................... 183
a. Overview Of Governing Law ..............................................................................184
b. Application to June 9 Trump Tower Meeting .................................................... 185
i. Thing-of-Value Element ............................................................................ 186
ii. Willfulness ................................................................................................. 187
iii. Difficulties in Valuing Promised Information ............................................188
c. Application to WikiLeaks HOM 188
i. Suestions Over Harm to Ongoing Matter
189
ii. Willfulness ............................................................................................................................ 190
iv. Analysis HOM
iii. Constitutional Considerations ............................................................................................... 190

190
4. False Statements and Obstruction of the Investigation ............................................. 191
a. Overview Of Governing Law .............................................................................. 191
b. Application to Certain Individuals ..................................................................... 192
i. George Papadopoulos ................................................................................. 192
ii. 194
iii. Michael Flynn ............................................................................................. 194
iv. Michael Cohen............................................................................................. 195
v. HOM .............................................................................................. 196
vi. Jeff Sessions ............................................................................................... 197
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vii. Others Interviewed During the Investigation ........................................... 198
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INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME I
This report is submitted to the Attorney General pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 600.8(c), which
states that, "[a]t the conclusion of the Special Counsel's work, he . . . shall provide the Attorney
General a confidential report explaining the prosecution or declination decisions [the Special
Counsel] reached."
The Russian government interfered in the 2016 presidential election in sweeping and
systematic fashion. Evidence of Russian government operations began to surface in mid-2016. In
June, the Democratic National Committee and its cyber response team publicly announced that
Russian hackers had compromised its computer network. Releases of hacked materials—hacks
that public reporting soon attributed to the Russian government—began that same month.
Additional releases followed in July through the organization WikiLeaks, with further releases in
October and November.
In late July 2016, soon after WikiLeaks's first release of stolen documents, a foreign
government contacted the FBI about a May 2016 encounter with Trump Campaign foreign policy
advisor George Papadopoulos. Papadopoulos had suggested to a representative of that foreign
government that the Trump Campaign had received indications from the Russian government that
it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information damaging to
Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. That information prompted the FBI on July 31,
2016, to open an investigation into whether individuals associated with the Trump Campaign were
coordinating with the Russian government in its interference activities.
That fall, two federal agencies jointly announced that the Russian government "directed
recent compromises of e-mails from US persons and institutions, including US political
organizations," and, "[t]hese thefts and disclosures are intended to interfere with the US election
process." After the election, in late December 2016, the United States imposed sanctions on Russia
for having interfered in the election. By early 2017, several congressional committees were
examining Russia's interference in the election.
Within the Executive Branch, these investigatory efforts ultimately led to the May 2017
appointment of Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III. The order appointing the Special Counsel
authorized him to investigate "the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016
presidential election," including any links or coordination between the Russian government and
individuals associated with the Trump Campaign.
As set forth in detail in this report, the Special Counsel's investigation established that Russia
interfered in the 2016 presidential election principally through two operations. First, a Russian entity
carried out a social media campaign that favored presidential candidate Donald J. Trump and
disparaged presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. Second, a Russian intelligence service conducted
computer-intrusion operations against entities, employees, and volunteers working on the Clinton
Campaign and then released stolen documents. The investigation also identified numerous links
between the Russian government and the Trump Campaign. Although the investigation established
that the Russian government perceived it would benefit from a Trump presidency and worked to
secure that outcome, and that the Campaign expected it would benefit
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electorally from information stolen and released through Russian efforts, the investigation did not
establish that members of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian
government in its election interference activities.
* * *
Below we describe the evidentiary considerations underpinning statements about the

results of our investigation and the Special Counsel's charging decisions, and we then provide an
overview of the two volumes of our report.
The report describes actions and events that the Special Counsel's Office found to be
supported by the evidence collected in our investigation. In some instances, the report points out
the absence of evidence or conflicts in the evidence about a particular fact or event. In other
instances, when substantial, credible evidence enabled the Office to reach a conclusion with
confidence, the report states that the investigation established that certain actions or events
occurred. A statement that the investigation did not establish particular facts does not mean there
was no evidence of those facts.
In evaluating whether evidence about collective action of multiple individuals constituted a

crime, we applied the framework of conspiracy law, not the concept of "collusion." In so doing, the
Office recognized that the word "collud[e]" was used in communications with the Acting Attorney
General confirming certain aspects of the investigation's scope and that the term has frequently been
invoked in public reporting about the investigation. But collusion is not a specific offense or theory
of liability found in the United States Code, nor is it a term of art in federal criminal law. For those
reasons, the Office's focus in analyzing questions of joint criminal liability was on conspiracy as
defined in federal law. In connection with that analysis, we addressed the factual question whether
members of the Trump Campaign "coordinat[ed]" —a term that appears in the appointment order—
with Russian election interference activities. Like collusion, "coordination" does not have a settled
definition in federal criminal law. We understood coordination to require an agreement—tacit or
express—between the Trump Campaign and the Russian government on election interference. That
requires more than the two parties taking actions that were informed by or responsive to the other's
actions or interests. We applied the term coordination in that sense when stating in the report that the
investigation did not establish that the Trump Campaign coordinated with the Russian government
in its election interference activities.
* * *
The report on our investigation consists of two volumes:
Volume I describes the factual results of the Special Counsel's investigation of Russia's
interference in the 2016 presidential election and its interactions with the Trump Campaign. Section
I describes the scope of the investigation. Sections II and III describe the principal ways Russia
interfered in the 2016 presidential election. Section IV describes links between the Russian
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government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign. Section V sets forth the Special
Counsel's charging decisions.
Volume II addresses the President's actions towards the FBI's investigation into Russia's
interference in the 2016 presidential election and related matters, and his actions towards the Special
Counsel's investigation. Volume II separately states its framework and the considerations that guided
that investigation.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME I
RUSSIAN SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN
The Internet Research Agency (IRA) carried out the earliest Russian interference
operations identified by the investigation—a social media campaign designed to provoke and
amplify political and social discord in the United States. The IRA was based in St. Petersburg,
Russia, and received funding from Russian oligarch Yevgeniy Prigozhin and companies he
controlled. Pri ozhin is widel re sorted to have ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin,
Harm to Ongoing Matter
In mid-2014, the IRA sent em lo ees to the United States on an intelli ence- atherin
mission with instructions Harm to Ongoing Matter
The IRA later used social media accounts and interest groups to sow discord in the U.S.
political system through what it termed "information warfare." The campaign evolved from a
generalized program designed in 2014 and 2015 to undermine the U.S. electoral system, to a
targeted operation that by early 2016 favored candidate Trump and disparaged candidate Clinton.
The IRA's operation also included the purchase of political advertisements on social media in the
names of U.S. persons and entities, as well as the staging of political rallies inside the United States.
To organize those rallies, IRA employees posed as U.S. grassroots entities and persons and made
contact with Trump supporters and Trump Campaign officials in the United States. The
investigation did not identify evidence that any U.S. persons conspired or coordinated with the
IRA. Section II of this report details the Office's investigation of the Russian social media
campaign.
RUSSIAN HACKING OPERATIONS
At the same time that the IRA operation began to focus on supporting candidate Trump in
early 2016, the Russian government employed a second form of interference: cyber intrusions
(hacking) and releases of hacked materials damaging to the Clinton Campaign. The Russian
intelligence service known as the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian
Army (GRU) carried out these operations.
In March 2016, the GRU began hacking the email accounts of Clinton Campaign volunteers
and employees, including campaign chairman John Podesta. In April 2016, the GRU hacked into
the computer networks of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) and the
Democratic National Committee (DNC). The GRU stole hundreds of thousands of documents from
the compromised email accounts and networks. Around the time that the DNC announced in mid-
June 2016 the Russian government's role in hacking its network, the GRU began disseminating
stolen materials through the fictitious online personas "DCLeaks" and "Guccifer 2.0." The GRU
later released additional materials through the organization WikiLeaks.
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The presidential campaign of Donald J. Trump ("Trump Campaign" or "Campaign")

showed interest in WikiLeaks's releases of documents and welcomed their •otential to damage
candidate Clinton. Beginning in June 2016, Harm to Ongoing Matter forecast to
senior Campaign officials that WikiLeaks would release information damaging to candidate
Clinton. WikiLeaks's first release came in July 2016. Around the same time, candidate Trump
announced that he hoped Russia would recover emails described as missing from a private server
used b Clinton when she was
Secreta of State he later said

that he was s • eakin! sarcasticall
WikiLeaks began releasing Podesta's stolen emails on October 7, 2016, less than one hour after a
U.S. media outlet released video considered damaging to candidate Trump. Section III of this
Report details the Office's investigation into the Russian hacking operations, as well as other efforts
by Trump Campaign supporters to obtain Clinton-related emails.
RUSSIAN CONTACTS WITH THE CAMPAIGN
The social media campaign and the GRU hacking operations coincided with a series of
contacts between Trump Campaign officials and individuals with ties to the Russian government.
The Office investigated whether those contacts reflected or resulted in the Campaign conspiring or
coordinating with Russia in its election-interference activities. Although the investigation
established that the Russian government perceived it would benefit from a Trump presidency and
worked to secure that outcome, and that the Campaign expected it would benefit electorally from
information stolen and released through Russian efforts, the investigation did not establish that
members of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its
election interference activities.
The Russian contacts consisted of business connections, offers of assistance to the

Campaign, invitations for candidate Trump and Putin to meet in person, invitations for Campaign
officials and representatives of the Russian government to meet, and policy positions seeking
improved U.S.-Russian relations. Section IV of this Report details the contacts between Russia and
the Trump Campaign during the campaign and transition periods, the most salient of which are
summarized below in chronological order.
2015. Some of the earliest contacts were made in connection with a Trump Organization
real-estate project in Russia known as Trump Tower Moscow. Candidate Trump signed a Letter of
Intent for Trump Tower Moscow by November 2015, and in January 2016 Trump Organization
executive Michael Cohen emailed and spoke about the project with the office of Russian government
press secretary Dmitry Peskov. The Trump Organization pursued the project through at least June
2016, including by considering travel to Russia by Cohen and candidate Trump.
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Spring 2016. Campaign foreign policy advisor George Papadopoulos made early contact
with Joseph Mifsud, a London-based professor who had connections to Russia and traveled to
Moscow in April 2016. Immediately upon his return to London from that trip, Mifsud told
Papadopoulos that the Russian government had "dirt" on Hillary Clinton in the form of thousands
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of emails. One week later, in the first week of May 2016, Papadopoulos suggested to a
representative of a foreign government that the Trump Campaign had received indications from
the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of
information damaging to candidate Clinton. Throughout that period of time and for several months
thereafter, Papadopoulos worked with Mifsud and two Russian nationals to arrange a meeting
between the Campaign and the Russian government. No meeting took place.
Summer 2016. Russian outreach to the Trump Campaign continued into the summer of
2016, as candidate Trump was becoming the presumptive Republican nominee for President. On
June 9, 2016, for example, a Russian lawyer met with senior Trump Campaign officials Donald
Trump Jr., Jared Kushner, and campaign chairman Paul Manafort to deliver what the email
proposing the meeting had described as "official documents and information that would
incriminate Hillary." The materials were offered to Trump Jr. as "part of Russia and its
government's support for Mr. Trump." The written communications setting up the meeting showed
that the Campaign anticipated receiving information from Russia that could assist candidate
Trump's electoral prospects, but the Russian lawyer's presentation did not provide such
information.
Days after the June 9 meeting, on June 14, 2016, a cybersecurity firm and the DNC
announced that Russian government hackers had infiltrated the DNC and obtained access to
opposition research on candidate Trump, among other documents.
In July 2016, Campaign foreign policy advisor Carter Page traveled in his personal capacity
to Moscow and gave the keynote address at the New Economic School. Page had lived and worked
in Russia between 2003 and 2007. After returning to the United States, Page became acquainted
with at least two Russian intelligence officers, one of whom was later charged in 2015 with
conspiracy to act as an unregistered agent of Russia. Page's July 2016 trip to Moscow and his
advocacy for pro-Russian foreign policy drew media attention. The Campaign then distanced itself
from Page and, by late September 2016, removed him from the Campaign.
July 2016 was also the month WikiLeaks first released emails stolen by the GRU from the
DNC. On July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks posted thousands of internal DNC documents revealing
information about the Clinton Campaign. Within days, there was public reporting that U.S.
intelligence agencies had "high confidence" that the Russian government was behind the theft of
emails and documents from the DNC. And within a week of the release, a foreign government
informed the FBI about its May 2016 interaction with Papadopoulos and his statement that the
Russian government could assist the Trump Campaign. On July 31, 2016, based on the foreign
government reporting, the FBI opened an investigation into potential coordination between the
Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign.
Separately, on August 2, 2016, Trump campaign chairman Paul Manafort met in New York
City with his long-time business associate Konstantin Kilimnik, who the FBI assesses to have ties to
Russian intelligence. Kilimnik requested the meeting to deliver in person a peace plan for Ukraine
that Manafort acknowledged to the Special Counsel's Office was a "backdoor" way for Russia to
control part of eastern Ukraine; both men believed the plan would require candidate Trump's assent
to succeed (were he to be elected President). They also discussed the status of the
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Trump Campaign and Manafort's strategy for winning Democratic votes in Midwestern states.
Months before that meeting, Manafort had caused internal polling data to be shared with Kilimnik,
and the sharing continued for some period of time after their August meeting.
Fall 2016. On October 7, 2016, the media released video of candidate Trump speaking in
graphic terms about women years earlier, which was considered damaging to his candidacy. Less
than an hour later, WikiLeaks made its second release: thousands of John Podesta's emails that had
been stolen by the GRU in late March 2016. The FBI and other U.S. government institutions were
at the time continuing their investigation of suspected Russian government efforts to interfere in
the presidential election. That same day, October 7, the Department of Homeland Security and the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued a joint public statement "that the Russian
Government directed the recent compromises of e-mails from US persons and institutions,
including from US political organizations." Those "thefts" and the "disclosures" of the hacked
materials through online platforms such as WikiLeaks, the statement continued, "are intended to
interfere with the US election process."
Post-2016 Election. Immediately after the November 8 election, Russian government

officials and prominent Russian businessmen began trying to make inroads into the new
administration. The most senior levels of the Russian government encouraged these efforts. The
Russian Embassy made contact hours after the election to congratulate the President-Elect and to
arrange a call with President Putin. Several Russian businessmen picked up the effort from there.
Kirill Dmitriev, the chief executive officer of Russia's sovereign wealth fund, was among
the Russians who tried to make contact with the incoming administration. In early December, a
business associate steered Dmitriev to Erik Prince, a supporter of the Trump Campaign and an
associate of senior Trump advisor Steve Bannon. Dmitriev and Prince later met face-to-face in
January 2017 in the Seychelles and discussed U.S.-Russia relations. During the same period, another
business associate introduced Dmitriev to a friend of Jared Kushner who had not served on the
Campaign or the Transition Team. Dmitriev and Kushner's friend collaborated on a short written
reconciliation plan for the United States and Russia, which Dmitriev implied had been cleared
through Putin. The friend gave that proposal to Kushner before the inauguration, and Kushner later
gave copies to Bannon and incoming Secretary of State Rex Tillerson.
On December 29, 2016, then-President Obama imposed sanctions on Russia for having
interfered in the election. Incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn called Russian
Ambassador Sergey Kislyak and asked Russia not to escalate the situation in response to the
sanctions. The following day, Putin announced that Russia would not take retaliatory measures in
response to the sanctions at that time. Hours later, President-Elect Trump tweeted, "Great move on
delay (by V. Putin)." The next day, on December 31, 2016, Kislyak called Flynn and told him the
request had been received at the highest levels and Russia had chosen not to retaliate as a result of
Flynn's request.
* * *
On January 6, 2017, members of the intelligence community briefed President-Elect Trump

on a joint assessment—drafted and coordinated among the Central Intelligence Agency, FBI, and
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National Security Agency—that concluded with high confidence that Russia had intervened in the
election through a variety of means to assist Trump's candidacy and harm Clinton's. A declassified
version of the assessment was publicly released that same day.
Between mid-January 2017 and early February 2017, three congressional committees—the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence (SSCI), and the Senate Judiciary Committee (SJC)—announced that they would
conduct inquiries, or had already been conducting inquiries, into Russian interference in the
election. Then-FBI Director James Comey later confirmed to Congress the existence of the FBI's
investigation into Russian interference that had begun before the election. On March 20, 2017, in
open-session testimony before HPSCI, Comey stated:
I have been authorized by the Department of Justice to confirm that the FBI, as part
of our counterintelligence mission, is investigating the Russian government's efforts
to interfere in the 2016 presidential election, and that includes investigating the
nature of any links between individuals associated with the Trump campaign and the
Russian government and whether there was any coordination between the campaign
and Russia's efforts. . . . As with any counterintelligence investigation, this will also
include an assessment of whether any crimes were committed.
The investigation continued under then-Director Comey for the next seven weeks until May 9,
2017, when President Trump fired Comey as FBI Director—an action which is analyzed in Volume
II of the report.
On May 17, 2017, Acting Attorney General Rod Rosenstein appointed the Special Counsel
and authorized him to conduct the investigation that Comey had confirmed in his congressional
testimony, as well as matters arising directly from the investigation, and any other matters within
the scope of 28 C.F.R. § 600.4(a), which generally covers efforts to interfere with or obstruct the
investigation.
President Trump reacted negatively to the Special Counsel's appointment. He told advisors
that it was the end of his presidency, sought to have Attorney General Jefferson (Jeff) Sessions
unrecuse from the Russia investigation and to have the Special Counsel removed, and engaged in
efforts to curtail the Special Counsel's investigation and prevent the disclosure of evidence to it,
including through public and private contacts with potential witnesses. Those and related actions
are described and analyzed in Volume II of the report.
* * *
THE SPECIAL COUNSEL'S CHARGING DECISIONS
In reaching the charging decisions described in Volume I of the report, the Office
determined whether the conduct it found amounted to a violation of federal criminal law chargeable
under the Principles of Federal Prosecution. See Justice Manual § 9-27.000 et seq. (2018). The
standard set forth in the Justice Manual is whether the conduct constitutes a crime; if so, whether
admissible evidence would probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction;
9
AttoftterWefk-Pfeeluet II May Contain Material Protected Undcr Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
and whether prosecution would serve a substantial federal interest that could not be adequately
served by prosecution elsewhere or through non-criminal alternatives. See Justice Manual § 9-
27.220.
Section V of the report provides detailed explanations of the Office's charging decisions,
which contain three main components.
First, the Office determined that Russia's two principal interference operations in the 2016
U.S. presidential election—the social media campaign and the hacking-and-dumping operations—
violated U.S. criminal law. Many of the individuals and entities involved in the social media
campaign have been charged with participating in a conspiracy to defraud the United States by
undermining through deceptive acts the work of federal agencies charged with regulating foreign
influence in U.S. elections, as well as related counts of identity theft. See United States v. Internet
Research Agency, et al., No. 18-cr-32 (D.D.C.). Separately, Russian intelligence officers who
carried out the hacking into Democratic Party computers and the personal email accounts of
individuals affiliated with the Clinton Campaign conspired to violate, among other federal laws,
the federal computer-intrusion statute, and the have been so char:ed. See United States v. Ne ksho,
et al., No. 18-cr-215 D.D.C. Harm to Ongoing Matter
Second, while the investigation identified numerous links between individuals with ties to
the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign, the evidence was
not sufficient to support criminal charges. Among other things, the evidence was not sufficient to
charge any Campaign official as an unregistered agent of the Russian government or other Russian
principal. And our evidence about the June 9, 2016 meeting and WikiLeaks's releases of hacked
materials was not sufficient to charge a criminal campaign-finance violation. Further, the evidence
was not sufficient to charge that any member of the Trump Campaign conspired with
representatives of the Russian government to interfere in the 2016 election.
Third, the investigation established that several individuals affiliated with the Trump
Campaign lied to the Office, and to Congress, about their interactions with Russian-affiliated
individuals and related matters. Those lies materially impaired the investigation of Russian election
interference. The Office charged some of those lies as violations of the federal false-statements
statute. Former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn pleaded guilty to lying about his
interactions with Russian Ambassador Kislyak during the transition period. George Papadopoulos,
a foreign policy advisor during the campaign period, pleaded guilty to lying to investigators about,
inter alia, the nature and timing of his interactions with Joseph Mifsud, the professor who told
Papadopoulos that the Russians had dirt on candidate Clinton in the form of thousands of emails.
Former Trump Organization attorney Michael Cohen .leaded :uilt to makin: false statements to
Congress about the Trum• Moscow •ro ect. arm to Ongoing
Matter
And in February 2019, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found that
10
Attorney Work Product // May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
Manafort lied to the Office and the grand jury concerning his interactions and communications
with Konstantin Kilimnik about Trump Campaign polling data and a peace plan for Ukraine.
* * *
The Office investigated several other events that have been publicly reported to involve
potential Russia-related contacts. For example, the investigation established that interactions
between Russian Ambassador Kislyak and Trump Campaign officials both at the candidate's April
2016 foreign policy speech in Washington, D.C., and during the week of the Republican National
Convention were brief, public, and non-substantive. And the investigation did not establish that
one Campaign official's efforts to dilute a portion of the Republican Party platform on providing
assistance to Ukraine were undertaken at the behest of candidate Trump or Russia. The
investigation also did not establish that a meeting between Kislyak and Sessions in September 2016
at Sessions's Senate office included any more than a passing mention of the presidential campaign.
The investigation did not always yield admissible information or testimony, or a complete
picture of the activities undertaken by subjects of the investigation. Some individuals invoked their
Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination and were not, in the Office's judgment,
appropriate candidates for grants of immunity. The Office limited its pursuit of other witnesses and
information—such as information known to attorneys or individuals claiming to be members of the
media—in light of internal Department of Justice policies. See, e.g., Justice Manual §§ 9-13.400,
13.410. Some of the information obtained via court process, moreover, was presumptively covered
by legal privilege and was screened from investigators by a filter (or "taint") team. Even when
individuals testified or agreed to be interviewed, they sometimes provided information that was
false or incomplete, leading to some of the false-statements charges described above. And the Office
faced practical limits on its ability to access relevant evidence as well—numerous witnesses and
subjects lived abroad, and documents were held outside the United States.
Further, the Office learned that some of the individuals we interviewed or whose conduct
we investigated—including some associated with the Trump Campaign—deleted relevant
communications or communicated during the relevant period using applications that feature
encryption or that do not provide for long-term retention of data or communications records. In
such cases, the Office was not able to corroborate witness statements through comparison to
contemporaneous communications or fully question witnesses about statements that appeared
inconsistent with other known facts.
Accordingly, while this report embodies factual and legal determinations that the Office
believes to be accurate and complete to the greatest extent possible, given these identified gaps,
the Office cannot rule out the possibility that the unavailable information would shed additional
light on (or cast in a new light) the events described in the report.
11
I. THE SPECIAL COUNSEL'S INVESTIGATION
On May 17, 2017, Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein—then serving as Acting
Attorney General for the Russia investigation following the recusal of former Attorney General
Jeff Sessions on March 2, 2016—appointed the Special Counsel "to investigate Russian
interference with the 2016 presidential election and related matters." Office of the Deputy Att'y
Gen., Order No. 3915-2017, Appointment of Special Counsel to Investigate Russian Interference
with the 2016 Presidential Election and Related Matters, May 17, 2017) ("Appointment Order").
Relying on "the authority vested" in the Acting Attorney General, "including 28 U.S.C. §§ 509,
510, and 515," the Acting Attorney General ordered the appointment of a Special Counsel "in order
to discharge [the Acting Attorney General's] responsibility to provide supervision and management
of the Department of Justice, and to ensure a full and thorough investigation of the Russian
government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election." Appointment Order
(introduction). "The Special Counsel," the Order stated, "is authorized to conduct the investigation
confirmed by then-FBI Director James B. Comey in testimony before the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence on March 20, 2017," including:
(i) any links and/or coordination between the Russian government and individuals
associated with the campaign of President Donald Trump; and
(ii)any matters that arose or may arise directly from the investigation; and
(iii) any other matters within the scope of 28 C.F.R. § 600.4(a).
Appointment Order ¶ (b). Section 600.4 affords the Special Counsel "the authority to investigate and
prosecute federal crimes committed in the course of, and with intent to interfere with, the Special
Counsel's investigation, such as perjury, obstruction of justice, destruction of evidence, and
intimidation of witnesses." 28 C.F.R. § 600.4(a). The authority to investigate "any matters that arose
. . . directly from the investigation," Appointment Order ¶ (b)(ii), covers similar crimes that may have
occurred during the course of the FBI's confirmed investigation before the Special Counsel's
appointment. "If the Special Counsel believes it is necessary and appropriate," the Order further
provided, "the Special Counsel is authorized to prosecute federal crimes arising from the
investigation of these matters." Id. ¶ (c). Finally, the Acting Attorney General made applicable
"Sections 600.4 through 600.10 of Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations." Id. ¶ (d).
The Acting Attorney General further clarified the scope of the Special Counsel's
investigatory authority in two subsequent memoranda. A memorandum dated August 2, 2017,
explained that the Appointment Order had been "worded categorically in order to permit its public
release without confirming specific investigations involving specific individuals." It then confirmed
that the Special Counsel had been authorized since his appointment to investigate allegations that
three Trump campaign officials—Carter Page, Paul Manafort, and George Papadopoulos—
"committed a crime or crimes by colluding with Russian government officials with respect to the
Russian government's efforts to interfere with the 2016 presidential election." The memorandum also
confirmed the Special Counsel's authority to investigate certain other matters, including two
additional sets of allegations involving Manafort (crimes arising from payments he received from the
Ukrainian government and crimes arising from his receipt of loans
12
from a bank whose CEO was then seeking a position in the Trump Administration); allegations
that Papadopoulos committed a crime or crimes by acting as an unregistered agent of the Israeli
government; and four sets of allegations involving Michael Flynn, the former National Security
Advisor to President Trump.
On October 20, 2017, the Acting Attorney General confirmed in a memorandum the
Special Counsel's investigative authority as to several individuals and entities. First, "as part of a
full and thorough investigation of the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016
presidential election," the Special Counsel was authorized to investigate "the pertinent activities
I
of Michael Cohen, Richard Gates, , Roger Stone, and
" "Confirmation of the authorization to investigate such individuals," the memorandum stressed,
"does not suggest that the Special Counsel has made a determination that any of them has
committed a crime." Second, with respect to Michael Cohen, the memorandum recognized the
Special Counsel's authority to investigate "leads relate[d] to Cohen's establishment and use of
Essential Consultants LLC to, inter alia, receive funds from Russian-backed entities." Third, the
memorandum memorialized the Special Counsel's authority to investigate individuals and entities
who were possibly engaged in "jointly undertaken activity" with existing subjects of the
investigation, including Paul Manafort. Finally, the memorandum described an FBI investigation
opened before the Special Counsel's appointment into "allegations that [then-Attorney General Jeff
Sessions] made false statements to the United States Senate[,]" and confirmed the Special
Counsel's authority to investigate that matter.
The Special Counsel structured the investigation in view of his power and authority "to
exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions of any United States Attorney." 28 C.F.R. §
600.6. Like a U.S. Attorney's Office, the Special Counsel's Office considered a range of classified
and unclassified information available to the FBI in the course of the Office's Russia investigation,
and the Office structured that work around evidence for possible use in prosecutions of federal crimes
(assuming that one or more crimes were identified that warranted prosecution). There was substantial
evidence immediately available to the Special Counsel at the inception of the investigation in May
2017 because the FBI had, by that time, already investigated Russian election interference for nearly
10 months. The Special Counsel's Office exercised its judgment regarding what to investigate and
did not, for instance, investigate every public report of a contact between the Trump Campaign and
Russian-affiliated individuals and entities.
The Office has concluded its investigation into links and coordination between the Russian
government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign. Certain proceedings associated
with the Office's work remain ongoing. After consultation with the Office of the Deputy Attorney
General, the Office has transferred responsibility for those remaining issues to other components
of the Department of Justice and FBI. Appendix D lists those transfers.
Two district courts confirmed the breadth of the Special Counsel's authority to investigate
Russia election interference and links and/or coordination with the Trump Campaign. See United
States v. Manafort, 312 F. Supp. 3d 60, 79-83 (D.D.C. 2018); United States v. Manafort, 321 F.
Supp. 3d 640, 650-655 (E.D. Va. 2018). In the course of conducting that investigation, the Office
periodically identified evidence of potential criminal activity that was outside the scope of the
Special Counsel's authority established by the Acting Attorney General. After consultation with
13
the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the Office referred that evidence to appropriate law
enforcement authorities, principally other components of the Department of Justice and to the FBI.
Appendix D summarizes those referrals.
* * *
To carry out the investigation and prosecution of the matters assigned to him, the Special
Counsel assembled a team that at its high point included 19 attorneys—five of whom joined the
Office from private practice and 14 on detail or assigned from other Department of Justice
components. These attorneys were assisted by a filter team of Department lawyers and FBI
personnel who screened materials obtained via court process for privileged information before
turning those materials over to investigators; a support staff of three paralegals on detail from the
Department's Antitrust Division; and an administrative staff of nine responsible for budget,
finance, purchasing, human resources, records, facilities, security, information technology, and
administrative support. The Special Counsel attorneys and support staff were co-located with and
worked alongside approximately 40 FBI agents, intelligence analysts, forensic accountants, a
paralegal, and professional staff assigned by the FBI to assist the Special Counsel's investigation.
Those "assigned" FBI employees remained under FBI supervision at all times; the matters on which
they assisted were supervised by the Special Counsel.'
During its investigation the Office issued more than 2,800 subpoenas under the auspices of
a grand jury sitting in the District of Columbia; executed nearly 500 search-and-seizure warrants;
obtained more than 230 orders for communications records under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d); obtained
almost 50 orders authorizing use of pen registers; made 13 requests to foreign governments
pursuant to Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties; and interviewed approximately 500 witnesses,
including almost 80 before a grand jury.
* * *
From its inception, the Office recognized that its investigation could identify foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence information relevant to the FBI's broader national security
mission. FBI personnel who assisted the Office established procedures to identify and convey such
information to the FBI. The FBI's Counterintelligence Division met with the Office regularly for
that purpose for most of the Office's tenure. For more than the past year, the FBI also embedded
personnel at the Office who did not work on the Special Counsel's investigation, but whose purpose
was to review the results of the investigation and to send—in writing—summaries of foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence information to FBIHQ and FBI Field Offices. Those
communications and other correspondence between the Office and the FBI contain information
derived from the investigation, not all of which is contained in this Volume. This Volume is a
summary. It contains, in the Office's judgment, that information necessary to account for the Special
Counsel's prosecution and declination decisions and to describe the investigation's main factual
results.
I FBI personnel assigned to the Special Counsel's Office were required to adhere to all applicable
federal law and all Department and FBI regulations, guidelines, and policies. An FBI attorney worked on
FBI-related matters for the Office, such as FBI compliance with all FBI policies and procedures, including
the FBI's Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG). That FBI attorney worked under FBI legal
supervision, not the Special Counsel's supervision.
14
II. RUSSIAN "ACTIVE MEASURES" SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN
The first form of Russian election influence came principally from the Internet Research
Agency, LLC (IRA), a Russian organization funded by Yevgeniy Viktorovich Prigozhin and
companies he controlled, including Concord Management and Consulting LLC and Concord Catering
(collectively "Concord").2 The IRA conducted social media operations targeted at large U.S. audiences
with the goal of sowing discord in the U.S. political system.3 These operations constituted "active
measures" (aKrmilime meponpium450, a term that typically refers to operations conducted by Russian
security services aimed at influencing the course of international affairs.4
The IRA and its employees began operations targeting the United States as early as 2014.
Using fictitious U.S. personas, IRA employees operated social media accounts and group pages
designed to attract U.S. audiences. These groups and accounts, which addressed divisive U.S.
political and social issues, falsely claimed to be controlled by U.S. activists. Over time, these social
media accounts became a means to reach large U.S. audiences. IRA employees travelled to the
United States in mid-2014 on an intelligence-gathering mission to obtain information and
photographs for use in their social media posts.
IRA employees posted derogatory information about a number of candidates in the 2016
U.S. presidential election. By early to mid-2016, IRA operations included supporting the Trump
Campaign and disparaging candidate Hillary Clinton. The IRA made various expenditures to carry
out those activities, including buying political advertisements on social media in the names of U.S.
persons and entities. Some IRA employees, posing as U.S. persons and without revealing their
Russian association, communicated electronically with individuals associated with the Trump
Campaign and with other political activists to seek to coordinate political activities, including the
staging of political rallies.5 The investigation did not identify evidence that any U.S. persons
knowingly or intentionally coordinated with the IRA's interference operation.
By the end of the 2016 U.S. election, the IRA had the ability to reach millions of U.S.
persons through their social media accounts. Multiple IRA-controlled Facebook groups and
2
The Office is aware of reports that other Russian entities engaged in similar active measures
operations targeting the United States. Some evidence collected by the Office corroborates those reports,
and the Office has shared that evidence with other offices in the Department of Justice and FBI.
3 Harm to Ongoing Matter
see also SM-2230634, serial 44 (analysis). The FBI case number cited here, and other FBI case numbers
identified in the report, should be treated as law enforcement sensitive given the context. The report contains
additional law enforcement sensitive information.
4
As discussed in Part V below, the active measures investigation has resulted in criminal charges
against 13 individual Russian nationals and three Russian entities, principally for conspiracy to defraud the
United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. See Volume 1, Section V.A, infra; Indictment, United States
v. Internet Research Agency, et al., 1:18-cr-32 (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2018), Doc. 1 ("Internet Research Agency
Indictment").
5
Internet Research A:enc Indictment 1152, 54, 55 a , 56, 74; Harm to Ongoing
Matter
15
Instagram accounts had hundreds of thousands of U.S. participants. IRA-controlled Twitter
accounts separately had tens of thousands of followers, including multiple U.S. political figures
who retweeted IRA-created content. In November 2017, a Facebook representative testified that
Facebook had identified 470 IRA-controlled Facebook accounts that collectively made 80,000
posts between January 2015 and August 2017. Facebook estimated the IRA reached as many as
126 million persons through its Facebook accounts.6 In January 2018, Twitter announced that it
had identified 3,814 IRA-controlled Twitter accounts and notified approximately 1.4 million
people Twitter believed may have been in contact with an IRA-controlled account.'
A. Structure of the Internet Research Agency
The .rowth of the or: anization also led to a more detailed or anizational structure.
Harm to Ongoing Matter 8
Harm to Ongoing
Matter
•
The or anization • uickl  r w . Harm to Ongoing Matter
6
Social Media Influence in the 2016 U.S. Election, Hearing Before the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, 115th Cong. 13 (11/1/17) (testimony of Colin Stretch, General Counsel of Facebook) ("We
estimate that roughly 29 million people were served content in their News Feeds directly from the IRA's
80,000 posts over the two years. Posts from these Pages were also shared, liked, and followed by people on
Facebook, and, as a result, three times more people may have been exposed to a story that originated from
the Russian operation. Our best estimate is that approximately 126 million people may have been served
content from a Page associated with the IRA at some point during the two-year period."). The Facebook
representative also testified that Facebook had identified 170 Instagram accounts that posted approximately
120,000 pieces of content during that time. Facebook did not offer an estimate of the audience reached via
Instagram.
' Twitter, Update on Twitter's Review of the 2016 US Election (Jan. 31,
2018). See SM-2230634, serial 92.

8
arm to Ongoing Matter
9Harm to Ongoing Matter
10
" See SM-2230634, serial 86 Harm to Ongoing Matter

16
Two individuals headed the IRA's mana ement: its !eneral director Mikhail B strov, and
its executive director, Mikhail Burchik. Harm to Ongoing Matter
As earl as the s irin: of 2014, th e IRA bean to hide its fundm! and activities.
The IRA's U.S. o eerations are .art of a lar er set of interlockin 0 • erations known as
"Pro ect Lakhta," Harm to Ongoing Matter
iiHarm to Ongoing Matter
B. Funding and Oversight from Concord and Prigozhin
Until at least February 2018, Yevgeniy Viktorovich Prigozhin and two Concord companies
funded the IRA. Prigozhin is a wealthy Russian businessman who served as the head of Concord.

14
See, e.g., SM-2230634, serials 9, 113 & 180 Harm to Ongoing Matter

See SM-2230634, serials

131 & 204.
1 7 Harm to Ongoing Matter
17

Pri.ozhin was sanctioned b the U.S. Treasu De • artment in December 2016,
Harm to ongoing Matter
NE Harm to Ongoing Matter
Numerous media
sources have reported on Prigozhin's ties to Putin, and the two have appeared together in public
photographs.22
igHarm to Ongoing Matter
'Warm to Ongoing Matter
UHarm to Ongoing Matter
19
U.S. Treasury Department, "Treasury Sanctions Individuals and Entities in Connection with
Russia's Occupation of Crimea and the Conflict in Ukraine" (Dec. 20, 2016).
See, e.g., Neil MacFarquhar, Yevgeny Prigozhin, Russian Oligarch Indicted by U.S., Is
22
Known as "Putin's Cook", New York Times (Feb. 16, 2018).


see also SM-
Harm to Ongoing
25
2230634, serial
Matter113
HOM
18

Attorney __Work Pferelttet // Ma
isHarm to Ongoing Matter
am
28
The term "troll" refers to internet users—in this context, paid operatives—who post inflammatory or
otherwise disruptive content on social media or other websites.
19
IRA em lo ees were aware ha Pri:ozhin was involved in the IRA's U.S. operations,

In May
2016, IRA employees, claiming to be U.S. social activists and administrators of Facebook groups,
recruited U.S. persons to hold signs (including one in front of the White House) that read "Happy
55th Birthda Dear Boss," as an homa • e to Pri:ozhin whose 55th birthda was on June 1, 2016 3l
C. The IRA Targets U.S. Elections
1. The IRA Ramps Up U.S. Operations As Early As 2014
The IRA's U.S. operations sought to influence public opinion through online media and
forums. By the spring of 2014, the IRA began to consolidate U.S. operations within a sin:le :eneral
department, known internall as the "Translator" He
Harm to Ongoing Matter eBoxillx de p artment.
IRA subdivided the Translator Department into different

responsibilities, ranging from operations on different social media platforms to analytics to
29
Investigative Technique See SM-2230634,
serials 131 & 204.
3°
See SM-2230634, serial 156.
Internet Research Agency Indictment ¶ 12 b ; see also 5/26/16 Facebook Messages, ID
31
1479936895656747 (United Muslims of America) &

see also SM-2230634, serial 189. Harm to Ongoing Matter
20
Attorney__________ Work Predttet II May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
graphics and IT.
miHarm to
Ongoing Matter

34
See SM-2230634, serial 204 Harm to Ongoing Matter
21
_____________________ Attorney Work Product // May Contain Material Protcctcd Undcr
Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter
37
IRA employees also traveled to the United States on intelligence-gathering missions. In

June 2014, four IRA employees applied to the U.S. Department of State to enter the United States,
while lying about the purpose of their trip and claiming to be four friends who had met at a party.'
Ultimately, two IRA employees—Anna Bogacheva and Aleksandra Krylova—received visas and
entered the United States on June 4, 2014.
Prior to traveling, Krylova and Bogacheva compiled itineraries and instructions for the trip.


38
See SM-2230634, serials 150 & 172 Harm to Ongoing Matter
22
_____________________ Attorney Work Product // May Contain Material Protcctcd Undcr
2. U.S. Operations Through IRA-Controlled Social Media Accounts
Dozens of IRA employees were responsible for operating accounts and personas on
different U.S. social media platforms. The IRA referred to employees assigned to operate the social
media accounts as "specialists."42 Starting as early as 2014, the IRA's U.S. operations included
social media specialists focusing on Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter.43 The IRA later added
specialists who operated on Tumblr and Instagram accounts.44
Initially, the IRA created social media accounts that pretended to be the personal accounts
of U.S. persons.45 By early 2015, the IRA began to create larger social media groups or public
social media pages that claimed (falsely) to be affiliated with U.S. political and grassroots
organizations. In certain cases, the IRA created accounts that mimicked real U.S. organizations.
For example, one IRA-controlled Twitter account, @TEN_GOP, purported to be connected to the
Tennessee Republican Party.46 More commonly, the IRA created accounts in the names of
fictitious U.S. organizations and grassroots groups and used these accounts to pose as anti-
immigration groups, Tea Party activists, Black Lives Matter protestors, and other U.S. social and
political activists.
The IRA closel monitored the activit of its social media accounts.
40
41
42
43
44 serial 179
45
See, e.g., Facebook IDHarm to Ongoing Matter
100011390466802 (Alex Anderson);
Facebook ID 100009626173204 (Andrea Hansen); Facebook ID 100009728618427 (Gary Williams);
Facebook ID 100013640043337 (Lakisha Richardson).
The account claimed to be the "Unofficial Twitter of Tennessee Republicans" and made posts that
46
appeared to be endorsements of the state political party. See, e.g., @TEN_GOP, 4/3/16 Tweet ("Tennessee
GOP backs @realDonaldTrump period #makeAmericagreatagain #tngop #tennessee #gop").
23
_____________________ Attorney Work Product // May Contain Material Protcctcd Undcr Fcd.
R. Crim. P. 6(c)
The focus on the U.S. presidential campaign continued throughout 2016. In HOM 2016
internal HOM reviewing the IRA-controlled Facebook group "Secured Borders," the
By February 2016, internal IRA documents referred to su I ort for the Trump Campaign
and opposition to candidate Clinton.49 For exam le, HOM o directions to IRA
serators Harm to Ongoing Matter
"Main idea: Use any opportunit to criticize Hillar Clinton and the rest exce
Sanders and Trum .- we sus sort them "5° Harm to Ongoing Matter
See, e.g., SM-2230634 serial 131 HOM

48
The IRA posted content about the Clinton candidacy before Clinton officially announced her
49
presidential campaign. IRA-controlled social media accounts criticized Clinton's record as Secretar of
State and romoted various criti ues of her candidac . The IRA also used other techni. ues.
. •
24
Attorney Work Product /1 May Contain Material Protcctcd Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
author criticized the "lower number of posts dedicated to criticizing Hillary Clinton" and reminded
the Facebook specialist "it is imperative to intensify criticizing Hillary Clinton."51
IRA employees also acknowled .:ed that their work focused on influencin: the U.S.
residential election. Harm to Ongoing Matter
3. U.S. Operations Through Facebook
Man IRA oser t.ons used Faceboolc accounts created and o terated b its s. ecialists.
e
I
Facebook groups active

during the 2016 campaign covered a range of political issues and included purported conservative

52
53
54 Harm to Ongoing Matter 2 5

Attorney _____________ Work Product II May Contain Material Protected Undcr Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
groups (with names such as "Being Patriotic," "Stop All Immigrants," "Secured Borders," and "Tea
Party News"), purported Black social justice groups ("Black Matters," "Blacktivist," and "Don't
Shoot Us"), LGBTQ groups ("LGBT United"), and religious groups ("United Muslims of
America").
Throughout 2016, IRA accounts published an increasing number of materials supporting

the Trump Campaign and opposing the Clinton Campaign. For example, on May 31, 2016, the
operational account "Matt Skiber" began to privately message dozens of pro-Trump Facebook
groups asking them to help plan a "pro-Trump rally near Trump Tower."55
To reach larger U.S. audiences, the IRA purchased advertisements from Facebook that
promoted the IRA groups on the newsfeeds of U.S. audience members. According to Facebook,
the IRA purchased over 3,500 advertisements, and the expenditures totaled approximately
$100,000.56
During the U.S. presidential campaign, many IRA-purchased advertisements explicitly

supported or opposed a presidential candidate or promoted U.S. rallies organized by the IRA
(discussed below). As early as March 2016, the IRA purchased advertisements that overtly opposed
the Clinton Campaign. For example, on March 18, 2016, the IRA purchased an advertisement
depicting candidate Clinton and a caption that read in part, "If one day God lets this liar enter the
White House as a president — that day would be a real national tragedy."57 Similarly, on April 6,
2016, the IRA purchased advertisements for its account "Black Matters" calling for a "flashmob"
of U.S. persons to "take a photo with #HillaryClintonForPrison2016 or #nohillary2016." 58 IRA-
purchased advertisements featuring Clinton were, with very few exceptions, negative. 59
IRA-purchased advertisements referencing candidate Trump largely supported his

campaign. The first known IRA advertisement explicitly endorsing the Trump Campaign was
purchased on April 19, 2016. The IRA bought an advertisement for its Instagram account "Tea
Party News" asking U.S. persons to help them "make a patriotic team of young Trump supporters"
by uploading photos with the hashtag "#KIDS4TRUMP." 6° In subsequent months, the IRA
purchased dozens of advertisements supporting the Trump Campaign, predominantly through the
Facebook groups "Being Patriotic," "Stop All Invaders," and "Secured Borders."
55
5/31/16 Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to ID
5/31/16 Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 Matt Skiber) to ID
56 Social Media Influence in the 2016 U.S. Election, Hearing Before the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, 115th Cong. 13 (11/1/17) (testimony of Colin Stretch, General Counsel of Facebook).
57
3/18/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6045505152575.
58
59
See SM-2230634, serial 213 (documenting politically-oriented advertisements from the
larger set provided by Facebook).
60
26
Attorney _____________Work Product II May Contain Material Protected Undcr Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
Collectively, the IRA's social media accounts reached tens of millions of U.S. persons.
Individual IRA social media accounts attracted hundreds of thousands of followers. For example,
at the time they were deactivated by Facebook in mid-2017, the IRA's "United Muslims of
America" Facebook group had over 300,000 followers, the "Don't Shoot Us" Facebook group had
over 250,000 followers, the "Being Patriotic" Facebook group had over 200,000 followers, and the
"Secured Borders" Facebook group had over 130,000 followers.61 According to Facebook, in total
the IRA-controlled accounts made over 80,000 posts before their deactivation in August 2017, and
these posts reached at least 29 million U.S persons and "may have reached an estimated 126 million
people."62
4. U.S. Operations Through Twitter
A number of IRA em .lo ees assi • ned to the Translator De p artment served as Twitter s
ecialists. Harm to Ongoing Matter
The IRA's Twitter operations involved two strate ies. First IRA s ecialists os erated
certain Twitter accounts to create Harm to Ongoing Matter
individual U.S. •ersonas,
Separately, the IRA operated a network of automated Twitter accounts

(commonly referred to as a bot network) that enabled the IRA to amplify existing content on
Twitter.
a. Individualized Accounts
 Harm to Ongoing Matter
See Facebook ID 1479936895656747 (United Muslims of America); Facebook ID

61
1157233400960126 (Don't Shoot); Facebook ID 1601685693432389 Bein• Patriotic ; Facebook
ID 757183957716200 (Secured Borders). Harm to Ongoing Matter


62
Social Media Influence in the 2016 U.S. Election, Hearing Before the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, 115th Cong. 13 (11/1/17) (testimony of Colin Stretch, General Counsel of
6 3 1 Facebook).
64
27
The IRA operated individualized Twitter accounts similar to the operation of its Facebook
accounts, by continuously posting original content to the accounts while also communicating with
U.S. Twitter users directly (through public tweeting or Twitter's private messaging).
The IRA used many of these accounts to attempt to influence U.S. audiences on the
election. Individualized accounts used to influence the U.S. presidential election included @TEN
GOP (described above); @jenn abrams (claiming to be a Virginian Trump supporter with 70,000
followers); @Pamela_Moore 13 (claiming to be a Texan Trump supporter with 70,000 followers);
and @America_l st_ (an anti-immigration persona with 24,000 followers).67 In May 2016, the IRA
created the Twitter account @march_for_trump, which promoted IRA-organized rallies in support
of the Trump Campaign (described below).68
Using these accounts and others, the IRA provoked reactions from users and the media. Multiple IRA-
posted tweets gained popularity.70 U.S. media outlets also quoted tweets from IRA-controlled accounts
and attributed them to the reactions of real U.S. persons.71 Similarly, numerous high-

Other individualized accounts included @MissouriNewsUS (an account with 3,800
67
followers that posted pro-Sanders and anti-Clinton material).

68
See @march_for_trump, 5/30/16 Tweet (first post from account).
For example, one IRA account tweeted, "To those people, who hate the Confederate flag. Did you
70
know that the flag and the war wasn't about slavery, it was all about money." The tweet received over 40,000
responses. @Jenn_Abrams 4/24/17 (2:37 p.m.) Tweet.
71
Josephine Lukito & Chris Wells, Most Major Outlets Have Used Russian Tweets as Sources for
Partisan Opinion: Study, Columbia Journalism Review (Mar. 8, 2018); see also Twitter Steps Up to Explain
#NewYorkValues to Ted Cruz, Washington Post (Jan. 15, 2016) (citing IRA tweet); People Are Slamming the
CIA for Claiming Russia Tried to Help Donald Trump, U.S. News & World Report (Dec. 12, 2016).
28
profile U.S. persons, including former Ambassador Michael McFaul, 72 Roger Stone,73 Sean
Hannity,74 and Michael Flynn Jr.,' retweeted or responded to tweets posted to these IRA-controlled
accounts. Multiple individuals affiliated with the Trump Campaign also promoted IRA tweets
(discussed below).
b. IRA Botnet Activities
In January 2018, Twitter publicly identified 3,814 Twitter accounts associated with the
IRA.79 According to Twitter, in the ten weeks before the 2016 U.S. presidential election, these
accounts posted approximately 175,993 tweets, "approximately 8.4% of which were election-
72
@McFaul 4/30/16 Tweet (responding to tweet by @Jenn_Abrams).
73
@RogerJStoneJr 5/30/16 Tweet (retweeting @Pamela_Moore13); @RogerJStoneJr 4/26/16
Tweet (same).
74
@seanhannity 6/21/17 Tweet (retweeting @Pamela_Moore13).
75
@mflynnJR 6/22/17 Tweet ("RT @Jenn_Abrams: This is what happens when you add
the voice over of an old documentary about mental illness onto video of SJWs. . .").
76
A botnet refers to a network of private computers or accounts controlled as a group to
send specific automated messages. On the Twitter network, botnets can be used to promote and
republish ("retweet") specific tweets or hashtags in order for them to gain larger audiences.
Eli Rosenberg, Twitter to Tell 677,000 Users they Were Had by the Russians. Some Signs
79
Show the Problem Continues, Washington Post (Jan. 19, 2019).
29
related."8° Twitter also announced that it had notified approximately 1.4 million people who Twitter
believed may have been in contact with an IRA-controlled account.81
5. U.S. Operations Involving Political Rallies
The IRA organized and promoted political rallies inside the United States while posing as
U.S. grassroots activists. First, the IRA used one of its preexisting social media personas (Facebook
groups and Twitter accounts, for example) to announce and promote the event. The IRA then sent
a large number of direct messages to followers of its social media account asking them to attend
the event. From those who responded with interest in attending, the IRA then sought a U.S. person
to serve as the event's coordinator. In most cases, the IRA account operator would tell the U.S.
person that they personally could not attend the event due to some preexisting conflict or because
they were somewhere else in the United States.82 The IRA then further promoted the event by
contacting U.S. media about the event and directing them to speak with the coordinator." After the
event, the IRA posted videos and photographs of the event to the IRA's social media accounts."
The Office identified dozens of U.S. rallies organized by the IRA. The earliest evidence of
a rally was a "confederate rally" in November 2015.85 The IRA continued to organize rallies even
after the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The attendance at rallies varied. Some rallies appear to
have drawn few (if any) participants, while others drew hundreds. The reach and success of these
rallies was closel monitored Harm to Ongoing Matter
80
Twitter, "Update on Twitter's Review of the 2016 US Election" (updated Jan. 31, 2018). Twitter
also reported identifying 50,258 automated accounts connected to the Russian government, which tweeted
more than a million times in the ten weeks before the election.
81
Twitter, "Update on Twitter's Review of the 2016 US Election" (updated Jan. 31, 2018).
82
83
See, e.g., 7/21/16 Email, 'oshmilton024 gmail.com to ; 7/21/16 Email,
[email protected] to
84
@march_for_trump 6/25/16 Tweet (posting photos from rally outside Trump Tower).
85
Instagram ID 2228012168 (Stand For Freedom) 11/3/15 Post ("Good evening buds! Well I am
planning to organize a confederate rally [. . .] in Houston on the 14 of November and I want more people to
attend.").
30
31
Attorney ____________ Work Product II May Contain Material Protected Undcr Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
From June 2016 until the end of the presidential campaign,

almost all of the U.S. rallies organized by the IRA focused on the
U.S. election, often promoting the Trump Campaign and opposing
) the Clinton Campaign. Pro-Trump rallies included three in New
York; a series of pro-Trump rallies in Florida in August 2016; and a
series of pro-Trump rallies in October 2016 in Pennsylvania. The
Florida rallies drew the attention of the Trump Campaign, which
MINERS FOR TRUMP posted about the Miami rally on candidate Trump's Facebook
BRING BACK OUR JOBS account (as discussed below).86
Many of the same IRA employees who oversaw the IRA's

HELP MR. TRUMP FIX IT! social media accounts also conducted the day-to-da recruitin:
WHEN: OCTOBER 2. AT 2PM olitical rallies inside the United States. for
WHERE. STEEL PLAZA, PITTSBURGH Harm to Ongoing Matter
MARCONY PLAZA, PHILLY
IITRUMPPENCE21116
IRA Poster for Pennsylvania

Rallies organized by the IRA
6. Targeting and Recruitment of U.S. Persons
As early as 2014, the IRA instructed its employees to target U.S. persons who could be used
to advance its operational goals. Initial! , recruitment focused on U.S. •ersons who could
am • lif the content • osted b the IRA. Harm to Ongoing Matter
IRA employees frequently used Investigative Technique Twitter, Facebook, and

Instagram to contact and recruit U.S. persons who followed the group. The IRA recruited U.S.
 ersons from across the •olitical s sectrum.
For example, the IRA targeted the family of
and a number of black social justice activists
86 The pro-Trump rallies were organized through multiple Facebook, Twitter, and email accounts.
See, e.g., Facebook ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber); Facebook ID 1601685693432389 (Being

Patriotic); Twitter Account @march_for_trump; [email protected]. (Rallies were organized in
New York on June 25, 2016; Florida on August 20, 2016; and Pennsylvania on October 2, 2016.)
87
32
Attorney_____________ Work Product II May Contain Material Protected Undcr Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
while posing as a grassroots group called "Black Matters US." 89 In February 2017, the persona
"Black Fist" (purporting to want to teach African-Americans to protect themselves when contacted
by law enforcement) hired a self-defense instructor in New York to offer classes sponsored by
Black Fist. The IRA also recruited moderators of conservative social media groups to promote
IRA-generated content,9° as well as recruited individuals to perform political acts (such as walking
around New York City dressed up as Santa Claus with a Trump mask).91
"'Harm to Ongoing Matter

miHarm to Ongoing
Matter
HOM as the IRA's online audience became larger, the IRA tracked U.S.
persons with whom they communicated and had successfully tasked with tasks ran!m_ from or
anizin rallies to takin: ictures with certain .olitical messa es . arm to Ongoing
Matter
89
3/11/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6045078289928, 5/6/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6051652423528,
10/26/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6055238604687; 10/27/16 Facebook Message, ID & ID
100011698576461 (Taylor Brooks).
90
12/8/16 Email, [email protected] to [email protected] (confirming Craigslist

91
advertisement).
92
8/18-19/16 Twitter DMs, @march_for_trump &
93
See, e. 11/11-27/16 Facebook Messa es, ID 100011698576461 (Taylor Brooks) &
I (arranging to pay for plane tickets and for a
bull horn).
See, e. ., 9/10/16 Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) & (discussing
94
payment for rally supplies); 8/18/16 Twitter DM,

@march_for_trump to (discussing payment for construction materials).
33
Attorney _____________ Work Product // May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
Harm to Ongoing Matter .
7. Interactions and Contacts with the Trump Campaign
The investigation identified two different forms of connections between the IRA and
members of the Trump Campaign. (The investigation identified no similar connections between
the IRA and the Clinton Campaign.) First, on multiple occasions, members and surrogates of the
Trump Campaign promoted—typically by linking, retweeting, or similar methods of reposting—
pro-Trump or anti-Clinton content published by the IRA through IRA-controlled social media
accounts. Additionally, in a few instances, IRA employees represented themselves as U.S. persons
to communicate with members of the Trump Campaign in an effort to seek assistance and
coordination on IRA-organized political rallies inside the United States.
a. Trump Campaign Promotion of IRA Political Materials
Among the U.S. "leaders of public opinion" targeted by the IRA were various members
and surrogates of the Trump Campaign. In total, Trump Campaign affiliates promoted dozens of
tweets, posts, and other political content created by the IRA.
- Posts from the IRA-controlled Twitter account @TEN_GOP were cited or retweeted by multiple
Trump Campaign officials and surrogates, including Donald J. Trump Jr.,96 Eric
96
See, e.g., @DonaldJTrumpJr 10/26/16 Tweet ("RT @TEN_GOP: BREAKING Thousands of
names changed on voter rolls in Indiana. Police investigating #VoterFraud. #DrainTheSwamp.");
@DonaldJTrumpJr 11/2/16 Tweet ("RT @TEN_GOP: BREAKING: #VoterFraud by counting tens of
thousands of ineligible mail in Hillary votes being reported in Broward County, Florida.");
@DonaldJTrumpJr 11/8/16 Tweet ("RT @TEN_GOP: This vet passed away last month before he could
vote for Trump. Here he is in his #MAGA hat. #voted #ElectionDay."). Trump Jr. retweeted additional
@TEN_GOP content subsequent to the election.
34
Attorney _____________ Work Product // May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
Harm to Ongoing Matter .
Trump," Kellyanne Conway," Brad Parscale,99 and Michael T. Flynn.m These posts included
allegations of voter fraud,1°1 as well as allegations that Secretary Clinton had mishandled
classified information.1°2
gp Donald J. Trump
A November 7, 2016 post from the IRA-controlled THANK YOU for your support Miami! My learn just shared photos from your
TRUMP SIGN WAVING DAY. yesterday! I love you - and there is no question
Twitter account @Pamela_Moore 13 was retweeted by - TOGETHER. WE WILL MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN!
Donald J. Trump Jr.1°3
On September 19, 2017, President Trump's personal

account @realDonaldTrump responded to a tweet from
the IRA-controlled account @10_gop (the backup
account of @TEN_GOP, which had already been
deactivated by Twitter). The tweet read: "We love you,
Mr. President!"104
IRA employees monitored the reaction of the Trump

Campaign and, later, Trump Administration officials to their
tweets. For example, on August 23, 2016, the IRA-controlled
persona "Matt Skiber" Facebook account sent a message to a
U.S. Tea Party activist, writing that "Mr. Trump posted about 00'1 Yoo rd 33K ease Teo Comment, •
our event in Miami! This is great!"105 The IRA employee
included a screenshot of candidate Trump's Facebook Screenshot of Trump Facebook
account, which included a post about the August 20, 2016 Account (from Matt Skiber)
political rallies organized by the IRA.
97
@EricTrump 10/20/16 Tweet ("RT @TEN_GOP: BREAKING Hillary shuts down press
conference when asked about DNC Operatives corruption & #VoterFraud #debatenight #TrumpB").
98
@KellyannePolls 11/6/16 Tweet ("RT @TEN_GOP: Mother of jailed sailor: 'Hold
Hillary to same standards as my son on Classified info' #hillarysemail #WeinerGate.").
99
@parscale 10/15/16 Tweet ("Thousands of deplorables chanting to the media: 'Tell The
Truth!' RT if you are also done w/ biased Media! #FridayFeeling").
100 @GenFlynn 11/7/16 (retweeting @TEN_GOP post that included in part "@realDonaldTrump &
@mike_pence will be our next POTUS & VPOTUS.").
1°1 @TEN_GOP 10/11/16 Tweet ("North Carolina finds 2,214 voters over the age of 110!!").
102 @TEN_GOP 11/6/16 Tweet ("Mother of jailed sailor: 'Hold Hillary to same standards
as my son on classified info #hillaryemail #WeinerGate.'").
@DonaldJTrumpJr 11/7/16 Tweet ("RT @Pamela_Moore13: Detroit residents speak out
103
against the failed policies of Obama, Hillary & democrats . . .").

104 @realDonaldTrump 9/19/17 (7:33 p.m.) Tweet ("THANK YOU for your support Miami! My team
just shared photos from your TRUMP SIGN WAVING DAY, yesterday! I love you — and there is no question
— TOGETHER, WE WILL MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN!").
105
35
Attorney __________________ Work Product II May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
b. Contact with Trump Campaign Officials in Connection to Rallies
Starting in June 2016, the IRA contacted different U.S. persons affiliated with the Trump
Campaign in an effort to coordinate pro-Trump IRA-organized rallies inside the United States. In all
cases, the IRA contacted the Campaign while claiming to be U.S. political activists working on behalf
of a conservative grassroots organization. The IRA's contacts included requests for signs and other
materials to use at rallies,m as well as requests to promote the rallies and help coordinate logistics.108
While certain campaign volunteers agreed to provide the requested support (for example, agreeing
to set aside a number of signs), the investigation has not identified evidence that any Trump
Campaign official understood the requests were coming from foreign nationals.
* * *
In sum, the investigation established that Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election
through the "active measures" social media campaign carried out by the IRA, an organization
funded by Prigozhin and companies that he controlled. As explained further in Volume I, Section
V.A, infra, the Office concluded (and a grand jury has alleged) that Prigozhin, his companies, and
IRA employees violated U.S. law through these operations, principally by undermining through
deceptive acts the work of federal agencies charged with regulating foreign influence in U.S.
elections.
See, e.g., 8/16/16 Email, joshmilton024@gmail,com to [email protected] (asking

107
for Trump/Pence signs for Florida rally); 8/18/16 Email, [email protected] to

@donaldtrump.com (askit &II for Trump/Pence signs for Florida rally); 8/12/16 Email,
[email protected] to [email protected] (asking for "contact phone numbers for
Trump Campaign affiliates" in various Florida cities and signs).
8/15/16 Email,
108
to joshmilton024 :mail.com askin to add to
locations to the "Florida Goes Trump," list); 8/16/16 Email, to
[email protected] (volunteering to send an email blast to followers)
36
III. RUSSIAN HACKING AND DUMPING OPERATIONS
Beginning in March 2016, units of the Russian Federation's Main Intelligence Directorate of
the General Staff (GRU) hacked the computers and email accounts of organizations, employees, and
volunteers supporting the Clinton Campaign, including the email account of campaign chairman John
Podesta. Starting in April 2016, the GRU hacked into the computer networks of the Democratic
Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) and the Democratic National Committee (DNC). The
GRU targeted hundreds of email accounts used by Clinton Campaign employees, advisors, and
volunteers. In total, the GRU stole hundreds of thousands of documents from the compromised email
accounts and networks.109 The GRU later released stolen Clinton Campaign and DNC documents
through online personas, "DCLeaks" and "Guccifer 2.0," and later through the organization
WikiLeaks. The release of the documents was designed and timed to interfere with the 2016 U.S.
presidential election and undermine the Clinton Campaign.
The Trum. Cam .aLtn showed interest in the WikiLeaks releases and, in the summer and
fall of 2016, Harm to Ongoing Matter
After
HOM WikiLeaks's first Clinton-related release HOM , the Trump Campaign
sta ed in contact HOM about WikiLeaks's activities. The investigation was unable to resolve
Harm to Ongoing MatterWikiLeaks's release of the stolen Podesta
emails on October 7,
2016, the same day a video from years earlier was published of Trump using graphic language
about women.
A. GRU Hacking Directed at the Clinton Campaign
1. GRU Units Target the Clinton Campaign
Two military units of the GRU carried out the computer intrusions into the Clinton
Campaign, DNC, and DCCC: Military Units 26165 and 74455.11° Military Unit 26165 is a GRU
cyber unit dedicated to targeting military, political, governmental, and non-governmental
organizations outside of Russia, including in the United States." The unit was sub-divided into
departments with different specialties. One department, for example, developed specialized
malicious software "malware" while another de artment conducted large-scale spearphishing
campaigns.112 Investigative Technique a bitcoin mining operation to
As discussed in Section V below, our Office charged 12 GRU officers for crimes arising from the
109
hacking of these computers, principally with conspiring to commit computer intrusions, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§1030 and 371. See Volume I, Section V.B, infra; Indictment, United States v. Netyksho, No. 1:18-
cr-215 (D.D.C. July 13, 2018), Doc. 1 ("Netyksho Indictment").
11° Netyksho Indictment ¶ 1.
111
Separate from this Office's indictment of GRU officers, in October 2018 a grand jury sitting in the
Western District of Pennsylvania returned an indictment charging certain members of Unit 26165 with
hacking the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, the World Anti-Doping Agency, and other international sport
associations. United States v. Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, No. 18-263 (W.D. Pa.).
37
112
A spearphishing email is designed to appear as though it originates from a trusted source, and
solicits information to enable the sender to gain access to an account or network, or causes the recipient to
Atterney-Werk-Fireeleet // May Contain Material Protcctcd Undcr Fcd. R. Crim. F. 6(c)
secure bitcoins used to purchase computer infrastructure used in hacking operations.113
Military Unit 74455 is a related GRU unit with multiple departments that engaged in cyber
operations. Unit 74455 assisted in the release of documents stolen by Unit 26165, the promotion
of those releases, and the publication of anti-Clinton content on social media accounts operated by
the GRU. Officers from Unit 74455 separately hacked computers belonging to state boards of
elections, secretaries of state, and U.S. companies that supplied software and other technology
related to the administration of U.S. elections.114
Beginning in mid-March 2016, Unit 26165 had primary responsibility for hacking the DCCC
and DNC, as well as email accounts of individuals affiliated with the Clinton Campaign:115
- Unit 26165 used IT to learn about Investigative Technique

different democrats.or_, hilla clinton.com, dnc.or and
Investigative Technique
Democratic
websites,
includin dccc.or
began before the GRU had obtained any credentials or gained access to these networks, indicating
that the later DCCC and DNC intrusions were not crimes of opportunity but rather the result
of targeting.116
GRU officers also sent hundreds of spearphishing emails to the work and personal email
accounts of Clinton Campaign employees and volunteers. Between March 10, 2016 and March
15, 2016, Unit 26165 appears to have sent approximately 90 spearphishing emails to email
accounts at hillaryclinton.com. Starting on March 15, 2016, the GRU began targeting Google
email accounts used by Clinton Campaign employees, along with a smaller number of dnc.org
email accounts.117
The GRU spearphishing operation enabled it to gain access to numerous email accounts of
Clinton Campaign employees and volunteers, including campaign chairman John Podesta, junior
volunteers assigned to the Clinton Campaign's advance team, informal Clinton Campaign advisors,
and a DNC employee.118 GRU officers stole tens of thousands of emails from spearphishing
victims, including various Clinton Campaign-related communications.
download malware that enables the sender to gain access to an account or network. Netyksho
Indictment ¶ 10.
Bitcoin mining consists of unlocking new bitcoins by solving computational problems. OM kept
113
its newly mined coins in an account on the bitcoin exchange platform CEX.io. To make purchases,
the GRU routed funds into other accounts through transactions designed to obscure the source of
funds. Netyksho Indictment 1162.
114 Netyksho Indictment ¶ 69.
115
Netyksho Indictment ¶ 9.
116
See SM-2589105, serials 144 & 495.
39
118 Investigative Technique

Attorney___________________ Worlc Product // May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
2. Intrusions into the DCCC and DNC Networks
a. Initial Access
By no later than April 12, 2016, the GRU had gained access to the DCCC computer network
using the credentials stolen from a DCCC employee who had been successfully spearphished the
week before. Over the ensuing weeks, the GRU traversed the network, identifying different
computers connected to the DCCC network. By stealing network access credentials along the way
(including those of IT administrators with unrestricted access to the system), the GRU compromised
approximately 29 different computers on the DCCC network.119
Approximately six days after first hacking into the DCCC network, on April 18, 2016, GRU
officers gained access to the DNC network via a virtual private network (VPN) connection12° between
the DCCC and DNC networks.121 Between April 18, 2016 and June 8, 2016, Unit 26165 compromised
more than 30 computers on the DNC network, including the DNC mail server and shared file server.122
b. Implantation of Malware on DCCC and DNC Networks
Unit 26165 implanted on the DCCC and DNC networks two types of customized malware,123
known as "X-Agent" and "X-Tunnel"; Mimikatz, a credential-harvesting tool; and rar.exe, a tool used
in these intrusions to compile and compress materials for exfiltration. X-Agent was a multi-function
hacking tool that allowed Unit 26165 to log keystrokes, take screenshots, and gather other data about
the infected computers (e.g., file directories, operating systems).124 )(- Tunnel was a hacking tool that
created an encrypted connection between the victim DCCC/DNC computers and GRU-controlled
computers outside the DCCC and DNC networks that was capable of large-scale data transfers.125
GRU officers then used X-Tunnel to exfiltrate stolen data from the victim computers.
120
A VPN extends a private network, allowing users to send and receive data across public networks
(such as the internet) as if the connecting computer was directly connected to the private network. The VPN
in this case had been created to give a small number of DCCC employees access to certain databases housed
on the DNC network. Therefore, while the DCCC employees were outside the DNC's private network, they
could access parts of the DNC network from their DCCC computers.
SM-2589105-HACK, serial 5.
121
M-2589105-HACK, serial 5.
123
"Malware" is short for malicious software, and here refers to software designed to
122
allow a third party to infiltrate a computer without the consent or knowledge of the computer's
user or operator.
41
Attorney __________________ Work Product II May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
To operate X-Agent and X-Tunnel on the DCCC and DNC networks, Unit 26165 officers set
up a group of computers outside those networks to communicate with the implanted malware.126 The
first set of GRU-controlled computers, known by the GRU as "middle servers," sent and received
messages to and from malware on the DNC/DCCC networks. The middle servers, in turn, relayed
messages to a second set of GRU-controlled com euters, labeled internally
by the GRU as an "AMS Panel." The AMS Panel Investigative Technique served as a
nerve center through which GRU officers monitored and directed the malware's operations on the
DNC/DCCC networks.127
The AMS Panel used to control X-A ent during the DCCC and DNC intrusions was housed
on a leased corn • uter located near Arizona.128 Investigative Technique
126
In connection with these intrusions, the GRU used computers (virtual private networks, dedicated
servers operated by hosting companies, etc.) that it leased from third-party providers located all over the
world. The investitation identified rental atreements and payments for computers located in, inter
alia, Investigative Technique all of which were used in the operations
targeting the U.S. election.
127
128 Netyksho Indictment ¶ 24(c).
129 Netyksho Indictment ¶ 24(b).
42
Attemey-Werk-fireelttet II May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
The Arizona-based AMS Panel also stored thousands of files containing keylogging
sessions captured through X-Agent. These sessions were captured as GRU officers monitored
DCCC and DNC employees' work on infected computers regularly between April 2016 and June
2016. Data captured in these keylogging sessions included passwords, internal communications
between employees, banking information, and sensitive personal information.
c. Theft of Documents from DNC and DCCC Networks
Officers from Unit 26165 stole thousands of documents from the DCCC and DNC
networks, including significant amounts of data pertaining to the 2016 U.S. federal elections.
Stolen documents included internal strategy documents, fundraising data, opposition research, and
emails from the work inboxes of DNC employees.13°
The GRU began stealing DCCC data shortly after it gained access to the network. On April 14,
2016 (approximately three days after the initial intrusion) GRU officers downloaded rar.exe onto the
DCCC's document server. The following day, the GRU searched one compromised DCCC computer
for files containing search terms that included "Hillary," "DNC," "Cruz," and "Trump."131 On April
25, 2016, the GRU collected and compressed PDF and Microsoft documents from folders on the
DCCC's shared file server that pertained to the 2016 election.132 The GRU appears to have compressed
and exfiltrated over 70 gigabytes of data from this file server.133
The GRU also stole documents from the DNC network shortly after gaining access. On
April 22, 2016, the GRU copied files from the DNC network to GRU-controlled computers. Stolen
documents included the DNC's opposition research into candidate Trump.134 Between
approximately May 25, 2016 and June 1, 2016, GRU officers accessed the DNC's mail server from
a GRU-controlled computer leased inside the United States.135 During these connections,
13°
Netyksho Indictment in 27-29; Investigative Technique
SM-2589105-HACK, serial 5. Investigative Technique
See SM-2589105-GJ, serial 649. As part of its investigation, the FBI later received images of DNC
servers and copies of relevant traffic logs. Netyksho Indictment ¶¶ 28-29.
43
Unit 26165 officers appear to have stolen thousands of emails and attachments, which were later
released by WikiLeaks in July 2016.136
B. Dissemination of the Hacked Materials
The GRU's operations extended beyond stealing materials, and included releasing
documents stolen from the Clinton Campaign and its supporters. The GRU carried out the
anonymous release through two fictitious online personas that it created—DCLeaks and Guccifer
2.0—and later through the organization WikiLeaks.
1. DCLeaks
The GRU began planning the releases at least as early as April 19, 2016, when Unit 26165
registered the domain dcleaks.com through a service that anonymized the registrant.137 Unit 26165
paid for the registration using a pool of bitcoin that it had mined.138 The dcleaks.com landing page
pointed to different tranches of stolen documents, arranged by victim or subject matter. Other
dcleaks.com pages contained indexes of the stolen emails that were being released (bearing the sender,
recipient, and date of the email). To control access and the timing of releases, pages were sometimes
password-protected for a period of time and later made unrestricted to the public.
Starting in June 2016, the GRU posted stolen documents onto the website dcleaks.com,
including documents stolen from a number of individuals associated with the Clinton Campaign.
These documents appeared to have originated from personal email accounts (in particular, Google
and Microsoft accounts), rather than the DNC and DCCC computer networks. DCLeaks victims
included an advisor to the Clinton Campaign, a former DNC employee and Clinton Campaign
employee, and four other campaign volunteers.139 The GRU released through dcleaks.com
thousands of documents, including personal identifying and financial information, internal
correspondence related to the Clinton Campaign and prior political jobs, and fundraising files and
information.140
Netyksho Indictment ¶ 29. The last-in-time DNC email released by WikiLeaks was dated
136
May 25, 2016, the same period of time during which the GRU gained access to the DNC's email
server. Netyksho Indictment 1145.
137
Netyksho Indictment ¶ 35. Approximately a week before the registration of dcleaks.com,
the same actors attem sted to retister the website electionleaks.com using the same domain
registration service. Investigative Technique
138
See SM-2589105, serial 181; Netyksho Indictment ¶ 21(a).
140 See, e.g., Internet Archive, "htt s://dcleaks.com/" archive date Nov. 10, 2016). Additionally,
DCLeaks released documents relating to , emails belonging
to , and emails from 2015 relating to Republican Party employees (under the portfolio name
"The United States Republican Party"). "The United States Republican Party" portfolio contained
approximately 300 emails from a variety of GOP members, PACs, campaigns, state parties, and businesses
dated between May and October 2015. According to open-source reporting, these victims shared the same
44
Attorney ______________ Work Product II May Contain Material Protcctcd Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
GRU officers operated a Facebook page under the DCLeaks moniker, which they primarily
used to promote releases of materials.141 The Facebook page was administered through a small
number of preexisting GRU-controlled Facebook accounts.'42
GRU officers also used the DCLeaks Facebook account, the Twitter account @dcleaks_,
and the email account [email protected] to communicate privately with reporters and
other U.S. persons. GRU officers using the DCLeaks persona gave certain reporters early access
to archives of leaked files by sending them links and passwords to pages on the dcleaks.com
website that had not yet become public. For example, on July 14, 2016, GRU officers operating
under the DCLeaks persona sent a link and password for a non-public DCLeaks webpage to a U.S.
reporter via the Facebook account.143 Similarly, on September 14, 2016, GRU officers sent
reporters Twitter direct messages from @dcleaks_, with a password to another non-public part of
the dcleaks.com website.144
The DCLeaks.com website remained operational and public until March 2017.
2. Guccifer 2.0
On June 14, 2016, the DNC and its cyber-response team announced the breach of the DNC
network and suspected theft of DNC documents. In the statements, the cyber-response team
alleged that Russian state-sponsored actors (which they referred to as "Fancy Bear") were
responsible for the breach.145 Apparently in response to that announcement, on June 15, 2016,
GRU officers using the persona Guccifer 2.0 created a WordPress blog. In the hours leading up to
the launch of that WordPress blog, GRU officers logged into a Moscow-based server used and
managed by Unit 74455 and searched for a number of specific words and phrases in English,
including "some hundred sheets," "illuminati," and "worldwide known." Approximately two hours
after the last of those searches, Guccifer 2.0 published its first post, attributing the DNC server
hack to a lone Romanian hacker and using several of the unique English words and phrases that
the GRU officers had searched for that day.146
Tennessee-based web-hosting company, called Smartech Corporation. William Bastone, RNC E-

Mail Was, In Fact, Hacked By Russians, The Smoking Gun (Dec. 13, 2016).
141
142 See,
e.g., Facebook Account 100008825623541 (Alice Donovan).
143
7/14/16 Facebook Message, ID 793058100795341 (DC Leaks) to ID
See, e. 9/14/16 Twitter DM, dcleaks_ to
144
; 9/14/16 Twitter DM,
@dcleaks_ to The messages read: "Hi https://t.co/QTvKUjQcOx pass:
KvFsg%*14@gPgu& enjoy ;)."
145
Dmitri Alperovitch, Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee,
CrowdStrike Blog (June 14, 2016). CrowdStrike updated its post after the June 15, 2016 post by Guccifer
2.0 claiming responsibility for the intrusion.
146
Netyksho Indictment ¶¶ 41-42.
45
That same day, June 15, 2016, the GRU also used the Guccifer 2.0 WordPress blog to begin
releasing to the public documents stolen from the DNC and DCCC computer networks. The
Guccifer 2.0 persona ultimately released thousands of documents stolen from the DNC and DCCC
in a series of blog posts between June 15, 2016 and October 18, 2016.147 Released documents
included opposition research performed by the DNC (including a memorandum analyzing potential
criticisms of candidate Trump), internal policy documents (such as recommendations on how to
address politically sensitive issues), analyses of specific congressional races, and fundraising
documents. Releases were organized around thematic issues, such as specific states (e.g., Florida
and Pennsylvania) that were perceived as competitive in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
Beginning in late June 2016, the GRU also used the Guccifer 2.0 persona to release
documents directly to reporters and other interested individuals. Specifically, on June 27, 2016,
Guccifer 2.0 sent an email to the news outlet The Smoking Gun offering to provide "exclusive
access to some leaked emails linked [to] Hillary Clinton's staff.„148 The GRU later sent the reporter
a password and link to a locked portion of the dcleaks.com website that contained an archive of
emails stolen by Unit 26165 from a Clinton Campaign volunteer in March 2016. 149 That the
Guccifer 2.0 persona provided reporters access to a restricted portion of the DCLeaks website tends
to indicate that both personas were operated by the same or a closely-related group of people.15°
The GRU continued its release efforts through Guccifer 2.0 into August 2016. For example,
on August 15, 2016, the Guccifer 2.0 persona sent a candidate for the U.S. Congress documents
related to the candidate's opponent.151 On August 22, 2016, the Guccifer 2.0 persona transferred
approximately 2.5 gigabytes of Florida-related data stolen from the DCCC to a U.S. blogger
covering Florida politics.152 On August 22, 2016, the Guccifer 2.0 persona sent a U.S. reporter
documents stolen from the DCCC pertaining to the Black Lives Matter movement.153
147
Releases of documents on the Guccifer 2.0 blog occurred on June 15, 2016; June 20, 2016; June
21, 2016; July 6, 2016; July 14, 2016; August 12, 2016; August 15, 2016; August 21, 2016; August 31, 2016;
September 15, 2016; September 23, 2016; October 4, 2016; and October 18, 2016.
148
6/27/16 Email, [email protected] to
149
6/27/16 Email, [email protected] (subject "leaked mails"); ■
to
(subject "leaked emails” ; see

also 6/27/16 Email, [email protected] to
(subject "leaked emails"); (claiming DCLeaks was a "Wikileaks
sub project").
150 Before sending the reporter the link and password to the closed DCLeaks website, and in an
apparent effort to deflect attention from the fact that DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0 were operated by the same
organization, the Guccifer 2.0 persona sent the reporter an email stating that DCLeaks was a "Wikileaks sub
project" and that Guccifer 2.0 had asked DCLeaks to release the leaked emails with "closed access" to give
reporters a preview of them.
151
Netyksho Indictment ¶ 43(a).
46
152
Netyksho Indictment ¶ 43(b).
153
Netyksho Indictment ¶ 43(c).
Atterftey-Werk-Preekiet II May Contain Matcrial Protcctcd Undcr Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
The GRU was also in contact throu h the ersona with a former
Guccifer 2.0
U
Trum.
Cam al tn member
HOM
In early August 2016, HOM Twitter's suspension of the

Guccifer 2.0 Twitter account. After it was reinstated, GRU officers posing as Guccifer 2.0 wrote via
private message, "thank u for writing back . . . do u find anyt[h]ing interesting in the docs i HOM
posted?" On August 17, 2016, the GRU added, "please tell me if i can help u anyhow . . . it would be
a great pleasure to me." On September 9, 2016, the GRU—a ain posing as Guccifer 2.0—referred to
a stolen DCCC document posted online and asked HOM "what do u
think of the info on the turnout model for the democrats entire presidential campaign."
responded, "pretty standard." 55 The investigation did not identify evidence of other
communications between HOM and Guccifer 2.0.
3. Use of WikiLeaks
In order to expand its interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the GRU units
transferred many of the documents they stole from the DNC and the chairman of the Clinton
Campaign to WikiLeaks. GRU officers used both the DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0 personas to
communicate with WikiLeaks through Twitter private messaging and through encrypted channels,
including possibly through WikiLeaks's private communication system.
a. WikiLeaks's Expressed Opposition Toward the Clinton Campaign
WikiLeaks, and particularly its founder Julian Assange, privately expressed opposition to
candidate Clinton well before the first release of stolen documents. In November 2015, Assange
wrote to other members and associates of WikiLeaks that "[w]e believe it would be much better for
GOP to win . . . Dems+Media+liberals woudl [sic] then form a block to reign in their worst
qualities. . . . With Hillary in charge, GOP will be pushing for her worst qualities.,
dems+media+neoliberals will be mute. . . . She's a bright, well connected, sadisitic sociopath."156
In March 2016, WikiLeaks released a searchable archive of approximately 30,000 Clinton

emails that had been obtained through FOIA litigation.'' While designing the archive, one
WikiLeaks member explained the reason for building the archive to another associate:
154
155
HOM
11/19/15 Twitter Group Chat, Group ID 594242937858486276, @WikiLeaks et al. Assange also
156
wrote that, "GOP will generate a lot oposition [sic], including through dumb moves. Hillary will do the same
thing, but co-opt the liberal opposition and the GOP opposition. Hence hillary has greater freedom to start
wars than the GOP and has the will to do so." Id.
157
WikiLeaks, "Hillary Clinton Email Archive," available at https://wikileaks.org/clinton-emails/.
44
Atterney-Wefk-Pfeyelttet // May Contain Material Protected Undcr Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
[W]e want this repository to become "the place" to search for background on hillary's plotting
at the state department during 2009-2013. . . . Firstly because its useful and will annoy Hillary,
but secondly because we want to be seen to be a resource/player in the US election, because eit
[sic] may en[]courage people to send us even more important leaks.158
b. WikiLeaks's First Contact with Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeaks
Shortly after the GRU's first release of stolen documents through dcleaks.com in June 2016,
GRU officers also used the DCLeaks persona to contact WikiLeaks about possible coordination
in the future release of stolen emails. On June 14, 2016, @dcleaks_ sent a direct message to
@WikiLeaks, noting, "You announced your organization was preparing to publish more Hillary's
emails. We are ready to support you. We have some sensitive information too, in particular, her
financial documents. Let's do it to ether. What do ou think about sublishin! our info at the same
moment? Thank ou."159 Investigative Technique
Around the same time, WikiLeaks initiated communications with the GRU persona
Guccifer 2.0 shortly after it was used to release documents stolen from the DNC. On June 22,
2016, seven days after Guccifer 2.0's first releases of stolen DNC documents, WikiLeaks used
Twitter's direct message function to contact the Guccifer 2.0 Twitter account and suggest that
Guccifer 2.0 "[s]end any new material [stolen from the DNC] here for us to review and it will have
a much higher impact than what you are doing.',160
On July 6, 2016, WikiLeaks again contacted Guccifer 2.0 through Twitter's private messaging
function, writing, "if you have anything hillary related we want it in the next tweo [sic] days prefable
[sic] because the DNC is approaching and she will solidify bernie supporters behind
her after." The Guccifer 2.0 persona responded, "ok i see." WikiLeaks also explained, "we
think trump has only a 25% chance of winning against hillary . . . so conflict between bernie and
hillary is interesting."161
c. The GRU's Transfer of Stolen Materials to WikiLeaks
Both the GRU and WikiLeaks sought to hide their communications, which has limited the
Office's ability to collect all of the communications between them. Thus, although it is clear that
the stolen DNC and Podesta documents were transferred from the GRU to WikiLeaks,
3/14/16 Twitter DM, @WikiLeaks to

158
Less than two weeks earlier, the same
account had been used to send a private message opposing the idea of Clinton "in whitehouse with her
bloodlutt and amitions [sic] of empire with hawkish liberal-interventionist appointees." 11/19/15 Twitter
Group Chat, Group ID 594242937858486276, @WikiLeaks et al.
159
6/14/16 Twitter DM, @dcleaks_ to @WikiLeaks.
160
Netyksho Indictment ¶ 47(a).
161
7/6/16 Twitter DMs, @WikiLeaks & @guccifer_2.
45
The Office was able to identify when the GRU (operating through its personas Guccifer
2.0 and DCLeaks) transferred some of the stolen documents to WikiLeaks through online archives
set up by the GRU. Assan:e had access to the internet from the Ecuadorian Embass in London, En
land. Investigative Technique
On July 14, 2016, GRU officers used a Guccifer 2.0 email account to send WikiLeaks an
email bearing the subject "big archive" and the message "a new attempt."163 The email contained an
encrypted attachment with the name "wk dnc link/ .txt.gpg."I64 Using the Guccifer 2.0 Twitter
account, GRU officers sent WikiLeaks an encrypted file and instructions on how to open 1065 On
July 18, 2016, WikiLeaks confirmed in a direct message to the Guccifer 2.0 account that it had "the
1Gb or so archive" and would make a release of the stolen documents "this week."166 On July 22,
2016, WikiLeaks released over 20,000 emails and other documents stolen from the DNC computer
networks.167 The Democratic National Convention began three days later.
Similar communications occurred between WikiLeaks and the GRU-operated persona

DCLeaks. On September 15, 2016, @dcleaks wrote to @WikiLeaks, "hi there! I'm from DC
Leaks. How could we discuss some submission-related issues? Am trying to reach out to you via
your secured chat but getting no response. I've got something that might interest you. You won't
be disappointed, I promise."168 The WikiLeaks account responded, "Hi there," without further
elaboration. The @dcleaks_ account did not respond immediately.
The same day, the Twitter account @guccifer_2 sent @dcleaks_ a direct message, which
is the first known contact between the personas.169 During subsequent communications, the
This was not the GRU's first attempt at transferring data to WikiLeaks. On June 29, 2016, the
163
GRU used a Guccifer 2.0 email account to send a lar e enc ted file to a WikiLeaks email account.
6/29/16 Email, [email protected] (The email appears to have been
undelivered.)
164
See SM-2589105-DCLEAKS, serial 28 (analysis).
165
6/27/16 Twitter DM, @Guccifer_2 to @WikiLeaks.
166
7/18/16 Twitter DM, @Guccifer_2 & @WikiLeaks.
167
"DNC Email Archive," WikiLeaks (Jul. 22, 2016), available athttps://wikilealcs.org/dnc-emails.
168
9/15/16 Twitter DM, @dcleaks_ to @WikiLeaks.
169
9/15/16 Twitter DM, @guccifer_2 to @dcleaks_.
46
Guccifer 2.0 persona informed DCLeaks that WikiLeaks was trying to contact DCLeaks and
arrange for a way to speak through encrypted emails.17°
An analysis of the metadata collected from the WikiLeaks site revealed that the stolen
Podesta emails show a creation date of September 19, 2016.171 Based on information about
Assange's computer and its possible operating system, this date may be when the GRU staged the
stolen Podesta emails for transfer to WikiLeaks (as the GRU had previously done in July 2016 for
the DNC emails).172 The WikiLeaks site also released PDFs and other documents taken from
Podesta that were attachments to emails in his account; these documents had a creation date of
October 2, 2016, which appears to be the date the attachments were separately staged by WikiLeaks
on its site.173
Beginning on September 20, 2016, WikiLeaks and DCLeaks resumed communications in a

brief exchange. On September 22, 2016, a DCLeaks email account [email protected] sent
an email to a WikiLeaks account with the subject "Submission" and the message "Hi from
DCLeaks." The email contained a PGP-encr ted message with the filename
"wiki_mail.tx.t.gpg."174 Investigative Technique The email, however, bears a
number of similarities to the July 14, 2016 email in which GRU officers used the Guccifer 2.0
persona to give WikiLeaks access to the archive of DNC files. On September 22, 2016 (the same
day of DCLeaks' email to WikiLeaks), the Twitter account dcleaks sent a sin:le message to
WikiLeaks with the strin: of characters
The Office cannot rule out that stolen documents were transferred to WikiLeaks through
intermediaries who visited during the summer of 2016. For example, public reporting identified
Andrew Miiller-Maguhn as a WikiLeaks associate who ma have assisted with the transfer of these
stolen documents to WikiLeaks.175 Investigative Technique
At See SM-2589105-DCLEAKS, serial 28; 9/15/16 Twitter DM,

170
@Guccifer_2 & @WikiLeaks.

171
See SM-2284941, serials 63 & 64 Investigative Technique
the time, certain Apple operating systems used a setting that left a downloaded file's creation date
the same as the creation date shown on the host computer. This would explain why the creation
date on WikiLeaks's version of the files was still September 19, 2016. See SM-2284941, serial 62
When WikiLeaks saved attachments separately from the stolen emails, its computer
173
system appears to have treated each attachment as a new file and given it a new creation date. See
SM-2284941, serials 63 & 64.
47
See 9/22/16 Email, [email protected]
174 IT
Ellen Nakashima et al., A German Hacker Offers a Rare Look Inside the Secretive
175
World of Julian Assange and WikiLeaks, Washington Post (Jan. 17, 2018).
48
On October 7, 2016,
WikiLeaks released the first emails stolen from the Podesta email account. In total, WikiLeaks
released 33 tranches of stolen emails between October 7, 2016 and November 7, 2016. The
releases included private speeches given by Clinton;177 internal communications between Podesta
and other high-ranking members of the Clinton Campaign;178 and correspondence related to the
Clinton Foundation.179 In total, WikiLeaks released over 50,000 documents stolen from Podesta's
personal email account. The last-in-time email released from Podesta's account was dated March
21, 2016, two days after Podesta received a spearphishing email sent by the GRU.
d. WikiLeaks Statements Dissembling About the Source of Stolen Materials
As reports attributing the DNC and DCCC hacks to the Russian government emerged,
WikiLeaks and Assange made several public statements apparently designed to obscure the source
of the materials that WikiLeaks was releasing. The file-transfer evidence described above and
other information uncovered during the investigation discredit WikiLeaks's claims about the
source of material that it posted.
Beginning in the summer of 2016, Assange and WikiLeaks made a number of statements
about Seth Rich, a former DNC staff member who was killed in July 2016. The statements about
Rich implied falsely that he had been the source of the stolen DNC emails. On August 9, 2016, the
@WikiLeaks Twitter account posted: "ANNOUNCE: WikiLeaks has decided to issue a US$20k
reward for information leading to conviction for the murder of DNC staffer Seth Rich."18° Likewise,
on August 25, 2016, Assange was asked in an interview, "Why are you so interested in Seth Rich's
killer?" and responded, "We're very interested in anything that might be a threat to alleged Wikileaks
sources." The interviewer responded to Assange's statement by commenting,
"I know you don't want to reveal your source, but it certainly sounds like you're suggesting a man
who leaked information to WikiLeaks was then murdered." Assange replied, "If there's someone
who's potentially connected to our publication, and that person has been murdered in suspicious
176 In ves ti ga ti ve Tech ni que
177
178
179
180
@WikiLeaks 8/9/16 Tweet.
49
circumstances, it doesn't necessarily mean that the two are connected. But it is a very serious
matter...that type of allegation is very serious, as it's taken very seriously by us." 181
After the U.S. intelligence community publicly announced its assessment that Russia was
behind the hacking operation, Assange continued to deny that the Clinton materials released by
WikiLeaks had come from Russian hacking. According to media reports, Assange told a U.S.
congressman that the DNC hack was an "inside job," and purported to have "physical proof' that
Russians did not give materials to Assange.182
C. Additional GRU Cyber Operations
While releasing the stolen emails and documents through DCLeaks, Guccifer 2.0, and
WikiLeaks, GRU officers continued to target and hack victims linked to the Democratic campaign
and, eventually, to target entities responsible for election administration in several states.
1. Summer and Fall 2016 Operations Targeting Democrat-Linked Victims
On July 27, 2016, Unit 26165 targeted email accounts connected to candidate Clinton's
personal office . Earlier that day, candidate Trump made public statements that
included the following: "Russia, if you're listening, I hope you're able to find the 30,000 emails
that are missing. I think you will probably be rewarded mightily by our press." 1" The "30,000
emails" were apparently a reference to emails described in media accounts as having been stored
on a personal server that candidate Clinton had used while serving as Secretary of State.
Within approximately five hours of Trump's statement, GRU officers targeted for the first
time Clinton's personal office. After candidate Trump's remarks, Unit 26165 created and sent
malicious links targeting 15 email accounts at the domain including an email
account belonging to Clinton aide The investigation did not find evidence of earlier
GRU attempts to compromise accounts hosted on this domain. It is unclear how the GRU was able
to identify these email accounts, which were not public.'84
Unit 26165 officers also hacked into a DNC account hosted on a cloud-computing service
On September 20, 2016, the GRU began to generate
copies of the DNC data usin: function designed to
allow users to produce backups of
databases (referred to as "snapshots"). The GRU then stole those snapshots by moving
"1 See Assange: "Murdered DNC Staffer Was 'Potential' WikiLeaks Source," Fox News
(Aug. 25, 2016)(containing video of Assange interview by Megyn Kelly).
182 M. Raju & Z. Cohen, A GOP Congressman's Lonely Quest Defending Julian Assange,
CNN (May 23, 2018).
183
"Donald Trump on Russian & Missing Hillary Clinton Emails," YouTube Channel C-SPAN, Posted
7/27/16, available at https://vvww.youtube.com/watch?v=31o(G8uJUsWU (starting at 0:41).
50
them to account that they controlled; from there, the copies were moved to GRU-
controlled computers. The GRU stole approximately 300 gigabytes of data from the DNC cloud-
based account.' 85
2. Intrusions Targeting the Administration of U.S. Elections
In addition to targeting individuals involved in the Clinton Campaign, GRU officers also
targeted individuals and entities involved in the administration of the elections. Victims included
U.S. state and local entities, such as state boards of elections (SBOEs), secretaries of state, and
county governments, as well as individuals who worked for those entities.186 The GRU also targeted
private technology firms responsible for manufacturing and administering election-related software
and hardware, such as voter registration software and electronic polling stations.'" The GRU
continued to target these victims through the elections in November 2016. While the investigation
identified evidence that the GRU targeted these individuals and entities, the Office did not
investigate further. The Office did not, for instance, obtain or examine servers or other relevant
items belonging to these victims. The Office understands that the FBI, the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, and the states have separately investigated that activity.
By at least the summer of 2016, GRU officers sought access to state and local computer
networks by exploiting known software vulnerabilities on websites of state and local governmental
entities. GRU officers, for example, targeted state and local databases of registered voters using a
technique known as "SQL injection," by which malicious code was sent to the state or local website
in order to run commands (such as exfiltrating the database contents).188 In one instance in
approximately June 2016, the GRU compromised the computer network of the Illinois State Board
of Elections by exploiting a vulnerability in the SBOE's website. The GRU then gained access to a
database containing information on millions of registered Illinois voters,189 and extracted data related
to thousands of U.S. voters before the malicious activity was identified.19°
GRU officers Investigative Technique scanned state and local websites for
vulnerabilities. For exam • le, over a two-da eriod in July 2016, GRU officers
Investigative Technique for vulnerabilities on websites of more than
two dozen states. Investigative Technique
185
Netyksho Indictment 1134; see also SM-2589105-HACK, serial 29 Investigative
Technique
186
Netyksho Indictment 169.
1 " Net ksho Indictment I 69; Investigative Technique
188
189
190
51
Attefftey-Werlt-Pfedttet I/ May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
Similar IT for vulnerabilities continued through the election.
Unit 74455 also sent spearphishing emails to public officials involved in election
administration and personnel at com anies involved in voting technology. In August 2016, GRU
officers targeted employees of , a voting technology company that developed software
used by numerous U.S. counties to manage voter rolls, and installed malware on the company
network. Similarly, in November 2016, the GRU sent spearphishing emails to over 120 email
accounts used by Florida county officials responsible for administering the 2016 U.S. election.I91
The spearphishing emails contained an attached Word document coded with malicious software
(commonly referred to as a Trojan) that permitted the GRU to access the infected computer.' The
FBI was separately responsible for this investigation. We understand the FBI believes that this
operation enabled the GRU to gain access to the network of at least one Florida county government.
The Office did not independently verify that belief and, as explained above, did not undertake the
investigative steps that would have been necessary to do so.
D. Trump Campaign and the Dissemination of Hacked Materials
The Trump Campaign showed interest in WikiLeaks's releases of hacked materials

throuathout the summer and fall of Harm to Ongoing Matter
20
1. HOM
a. Background
191 Ne ksho Indictment 176• Investigative Technique
52
b. Contacts with the Campaign about WikiLeaks
On June 12, 2016, Assange claimed in a televised interview to "have emails relating
to Hillary Clinton which are pending publication," 194 but provided no additional context.
In debriefin s with the Office, former de ut cam ai tn chairman Rick Gates said that,
Gates recalled candidate

Trump being generally frustrated that the Clinton emails had not been found. 196
Paul Manafort who would late become cam.ai:n chairman, Harm to Ongoing Matter 197
194Harm
See to Ongoing
Mahita Matter
Gajanan, Julian Assange Timed DNC Email Release for Democratic Convention,
Time (July 27, 2016) (quoting the June 12, 2016 television interview).
195
In February 2018, Gates pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to a superseding criminal
information charging him with conspiring to defraud and commit multiple offenses (i.e., tax fraud, failure to
report foreign bank accounts, and acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign principal) against the United
States, as well as making false statements to our Office. Superseding Criminal Information, United States v.
Richard W. Gates III, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 195 ("Gates Superseding Criminal
Information"); Plea Agreement, United States v. Richard W. Gates III, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018),
Doc. 205 ("Gates Plea Agreement"). Gates has provided information and in-court testimony that the Office
has deemed to be reliable.
196
Gates 10/25/18 302, at 1-2.
As explained further in Volume I, Section IV.A.8, infra, Manafort entered into a plea agreement
197
with our Office. We determined that he breached the agreement by being untruthful in proffer sessions and
before the grand jury. We have generally recounted his version of events in this report only when his
statements are sufficiently corroborated to be trustworthy; to identify issues on which Manafort's untruthful
responses may themselves be of evidentiary value; or to provide Manafort's explanations for certain events,
even when we were unable to determine whether that explanation was credible. His account appears here
principally because it aligns with those of other witnesses.
19 8
53
Michael Cohen, former executive vice president of the Trump Organization and special
counsel to Donald J. Trump,199 told the Office that he recalled an incident in which he was in
candidate Trum 's office in Trum. Tower Harm to Ongoing Matter
' Cohen further told the Office that, after WikiLeaks's subsequent release of
stolen DNC emails in July 2016, candidate Trump said to Cohen something to the effect HOM
of,
202

release HOM According to Gates, Manafort expressed excitement about the 203
WikiLeaks's Jul Manafort, for his part, told the Office that, short/ after 22 release,
Manafort also s s oke with candidate Trum •
=Harm to Ongoing Matter
Manafort also HOM wanted to be kept apprised of any
199
In November 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to a single-count
information charging him with making false statements to Congress, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) &
(c). He had previously pleaded guilty to several other criminal charges brought by the U.S. Attorney's Office
in the Southern District of New York, after a referral from this Office. In the months leading up to his false-
statements guilty plea, Cohen met with our Office on multiple occasions for interviews and provided
information that the Office has generally assessed to be reliable and that is included in this report.
200
HOM
202
Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 10. Harm to Ongoing Matter
203
Gates 10/25/18 302 (serial 241), at 4.
204
54
U
.S. Department of Justice
Atterney-Wefk-Pfeyelttet //
May Contain Material Protected Undcr
205
55
developments with WikiLeaks and separately told Gates to keep in touch HOM about future
WikiLeaks releases.206
According to Gates, by the late summer of 2016, the Trump Campaign was planning a press
strategy, a communications cam •ai:n, and messa:in: based on the sossible release of Clinton emails b
WikiLeaks.2°7 Harm to Ongoing Matter
while Trum and Gates were drivin to LaGuardia Airport. ,

Harm to ongoing matter shortly after the call
candidate Trump told
Gates that more releases of damaging information would be coming. 209
Corsi is an author who holds a doctorate in olitical science. In 2016, Corsi also worked for the
media outlet WorldNetDail WND Harm to Ongoing Matter
206
208
210
211
207
Gates 4/10/18 302, at 3; Gates 4/11/18 302, at 1-2 (SM-2180998); Gates 10/25/18 302, at 2.
HOM
209
Gates 10/25/18 302 (serial 241), at 4.
HOM
HOM
56
212
Corsi first rose to public prominence in August 2004 when he published his book Unfit for
Command: Swift Boat Veterans Speak Out Against John Kerry. In the 2008 election cycle, Corsi gained
prominence for being a leading proponent of the allegation that Barack Obama was not born in the United
States. Corsi told the Office that Donald Trump expressed interest in his writings, and that he spoke with
Trump on the phone on at least six occasions. Corsi 9/6/18 302, at 3.
Corsi 10/31/18 302, at 2;
213
Corsi was first
interviewed on September 6, 2018 at the Special Counsel's offices in Washington, D.C. He was accompanied
by counsel throughout the interview. Corsi was subsequently interviewed on September 17, 2018; September
21, 2018; October 31, 2018; November 1, 2018; and November 2, 2018. Counsel was
57
Corsi told the Office durin
215
interviews that he "must have" reviousl discussed Assan e with Malloch.
rig Harm to Ongoing Matter
According to Malloch, Corsi asked him to put Corsi in touch with Assange, whom Corsi
wished to interview. Malloch recalled that Corsi also suggested that individuals in the "orbit" of
U.K. politician Nigel Farage might be able to contact Assange and asked if Malloch knew them.
Malloch told Corsi that he would think about the request but made no actual attempt to connect
Corsi with Assange.218
present for all interviews, and the interviews beginning on September 21, 2018 were conducted pursuant to
a proffer agreement that precluded affirmative use of his statements against him in limited circumstances.
HOM
Corsi 10/31/18 302, at 4.
215
HOM
214
HOM
218 Malloch denied ever communicating with Assange
or WikiLeaks, stating that he did not ursue the re uest to contact Assange because he believed he had no
216 connections to Assange.
2 1 7 219 HOM
58
Malloch stated to investigators that beginnin: in or about August 2016, he and Corsi had multiple
FaceTime discussions about WikiLeaks Harm to Ongoing Matter
had made a connection to Assange and that the hacked emails of John Podesta would be released prior to
Election Day and would be helpful to the Trump Campaign. In one conversation in or around August or
September 2016, Corsi told Malloch that the release of the Podesta emails was coming, after which "we"
were going to be in the driver's seat.221
waHarm to Ongoing Matter

al Harm to Ongoing Matter
La Harm to Ongoing Matter
 Harm to Ongoing Matter
221

22 3
22 4
225
22 7 HOM
22 8
22 9
59
256
gliHarm to Ongoing
Matter

EraHarm to Ongoing Matter
griHarm to Ongoing Matter


H OM
230
231
232
234
235
236
237
H OM
238
60
d. WikiLeaks's October 7, 2016 Release of Stolen Podesta Emails
On October 7, 2016, four days after the Assange press conference HOM
, the Washington Post published an Access Hollywood video that
captured comments by candidate Trump some years earlier and that was expected to adversely
affect the Campaign.239 Less than an hour after the video's publication, WikiLeaks released the first
set of emails stolen by the GRU from the account of Clinton Campaign chairman John Podesta.
umHarm to Ongoing Matter

Corsi said that, because he had no direct means of communicating with

WikiLeaks, he told members of the news site WND—who were participating on a conference call
with him that day—to reach Assange immediately.244 Corsi claimed that the pressure was
239
Candidate Trump can be heard off camera making graphic statements about women.
240 HOM
241 HOM
242
HOM
HOM
243
In a later November 2018 interview, Corsi stated Harm to Ongoing Matter that
244
he believed Malloch was on the call but then focused on other individuals who were on the call-
invitation, which Malloch was not. (Separate travel records show that at the time of the call,
Malloch was aboard a transatlantic flight). Corsi at one point stated that after WikiLeaks's
release of stolen emails on October 7, 2016, he concluded Malloch had gotten in contact with
Assange. Corsi 11/1/18 302, at 6.
61
enormous and recalled telling the conference call the Access Hollywood tape was coming.245 Corsi
stated that he was convinced that his efforts had caused WikiLeaks to release the emails when they
did.246 In a later November 2018 interview, Corsi stated that he thought that he had told people on
a WND conference call about the forthcoming tape and had sent out a tweet asking whether anyone
could contact Assange, but then said that maybe he had done nothing.247
The Office investigated Corsi's allegations about the events of October 7 2016 but found
little corroboration for his allegations about the da 248 Harm to Ongoing Matter
'• Harm to Ongoing Matter
However, the phone records

themselves do not indicate that the conversation was with any of the reporters who broke the Access
Hollywood sto , and the Office has not otherwise been able to identif the substance of the
conversation. Harm to
Ongoing Matter
However, the Office has not identified any conference call participant, or anyone who spoke to Corsi
that day, who says that they received non-public information about the tape from Corsi or
acknowledged having contacted a member of WikiLeaks on October 7, 2016 after a conversation
with Corsi.
e. Donald Trump Jr. Interaction with WikiLeaks
Donald Trump Jr. had direct electronic communications with WikiLeaks during the
campaign period. On September 20, 2016, an individual named Jason Fishbein sent WikiLeaks the
password for an unlaunched website focused on Trump's "unprecedented and dangerous" ties
During the same interview, Corsi also suggested that he may have sent out public tweets because he
245
knew Assange was reading his tweets. Our Office was unable to find evidence of any such tweets.
248 246
Corsi 9/21/18 302, at 6-7.
247
Corsi 11/1/18 302, at 6.
249
62
251 HOM
63
Attorney _________________ Work Product // May Contain Material Protcctcd Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
to Russia, PutinTrump.org.252 WikiLeaks publicly tweeted: 'Let's bomb Iraq' Progress for America
PAC to launch "PutinTrump.org' at 9:30am. Oops pw is `putintrump' putintrump.org." Several
hours later, WikiLeaks sent a Twitter direct message to Donald Trump Jr., "A PAC run anti-Trump
site putintrump.org is about to launch. The PAC is a recycled pro-Iraq war PAC. We have guessed
the password. It is `putintrump.' See 'About' for who is behind it. Any comments?"253
Several hours later, Trump Jr. emailed a variety of senior campaign staff:
Guys I got a weird Twitter DM from wikileaks. See below. I tried the password and it
works and the about section they reference contains the next pie in terms of who is behind
it. Not sure if this is anything but it seems like it's really wikileaks asking me as I follow
them and it is a DM. Do you know the people mentioned and what the conspiracy they are
looking for could be? These are just screen shots but it's a fully built out page claiming to
be a PAC let me know your thoughts and if we want to look into it.254
Trump Jr. attached a screenshot of the "About" page for the unlaunched site PutinTrump.org. The
next day (after the website had launched publicly), Trump Jr. sent a direct message to WikiLeaks:
"Off the record, I don't know who that is but 1'11 ask around. Thanks."255
On October 3, 2016, WikiLeaks sent another direct message to Trump Jr., asking "you
guys" to help disseminate a link alleging candidate Clinton had advocated using a drone to target
Julian Assange. Trump Jr. responded that he already "had done so," and asked, "what's behind this
Wednesday leak I keep reading about?"256 WikiLeaks did not respond.
On October 12, 2016, WikiLeaks wrote again that it was "great to see you and your dad
talking about our publications. Strongly suggest your dad tweets this link if he mentions us
wlsearch.tk."257 WikiLeaks wrote that the link would help Trump in "digging through" leaked
emails and stated, "we just released Podesta emails Part 4." 258 Two days later, Trump Jr. publicly
tweeted the wlsearch.tk link.259
252
9/20/16 Twitter DM, JasonFishbein to @WikiLeaks; see JF00587 (9/21/16 Messages,
@jabber.cryptoparty.is @jabber.cryptoparty.is); Fishbein 9/5/18 302, at 4. When
interviewed by our Office, Fishbein produced what he claimed to be logs from a chatroom in which the
participants discussed U.S. politics; one of the other participants had posted the website and password that
Fishbein sent to WikiLeaks.
253
9/20/16 Twitter DM, @WikiLeaks to @DonaldJTrumpJr.
TRUMPORG_28_000629-33 (9/21/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Conway et al. (subject
254
"Wikileaks")).
255
9/21/16 Twitter DM, @DonaldJTrumpJr to @WikiLeaks.
256
10/3/16 Twitter DMs, @DonaldJTrumpJr & @WikiLeaks.
257
At the time, the link took users to a WikiLeaks archive of stolen Clinton Campaign documents.
258
10/12/16 Twitter DM, @WikiLeaks to @DonaldJTrumpJr.
259
@DonaldJTrumpJr 10/14/16 (6:34 a.m.) Tweet.
64
Atteftier Wer-k-Pretteet II May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
2. Other Potential Campaign Interest in Russian Hacked Materials
Throughout 2016, the Trump Campaign expressed interest in Hillary Clinton's private email
server and whether approximately 30,000 emails from that server had in fact been permanently
destroyed, as reported by the media. Several individuals associated with the Campaign were
contacted in 2016 about various efforts to obtain the missing Clinton emails and other stolen
material in support of the Trump Campaign. Some of these contacts were met with skepticism, and
nothing came of them; others were pursued to some degree. The investigation did not find evidence
that the Trump Campaign recovered any such Clinton emails, or that these contacts were part of a
coordinated effort between Russia and the Trump Campaign.
a. Henry Oknyansky (a/k/a Henry Greenberg)
In the spring of 2016, Trump Campaign advisor Michael Caputo learned through a Florida-
based Russian business partner that another Florida-based Russian, Henry Oknyansky (who also
went by the name Henry Greenberg), claimed to have information pertaining to Hillary Clinton.
Caputo notified Roger Stone and brokered communication between Stone and Oknyansky.
Oknyansky and Stone set up a May 2016 in-person meeting.26°
Oknyansky was accompanied to the meeting by Alexei Rasin, a Ukrainian associate involved
in Florida real estate. At the meeting, Rasin offered to sell Stone derogatory information on Clinton
that Rasin claimed to have obtained while working for Clinton. Rasin claimed to possess financial
statements demonstrating Clinton's involvement in money laundering with Rasin's companies.
According to Oknyansky, Stone asked if the amounts in question totaled millions of dollars but was
told it was closer to hundreds of thousands. Stone refused the offer, stating that Trump would not
pay for opposition research.261
Oknyansky claimed to the Office that Rasin's motivation was financial. According to
Oknyansky, Rasin had tried unsuccessfully to shop the Clinton information around to other
interested parties, and Oknyansky would receive a cut if the information was sold. 262 Rasin is
noted in public source documents as the director and/or registered agent for a number of Florida
companies, none of which appears to be connected to Clinton. The Office found no other evidence
that Rasin worked for Clinton or any Clinton-related entities.
In their statements to investigators, Oknyansky and Caputo had contradictory recollections

about the meeting. Oknyansky claimed that Caputo accompanied Stone to the meeting and provided
an introduction, whereas Caputo did not tell us that he had attended and claimed that he was never
told what information Oknyansky offered. Caputo also stated that he was unaware Oknyansky
sought to be paid for the information until Stone informed him after the fact.263
260
Caputo 5/2/18 302, at 4; Oknyansky 7/13/18 302, at 1.
261
Oknyansky 7/13/18 302, at 1-2.
262
Oknyansky 7/13/18 302, at 2.
263
Caputo 5/2/18 302, at 4; Oknyansky 7/13/18 302, at 1.
65
The Office did not locate Rasin in the United States, although the Office confirmed Rasin
had been issued a Florida driver's license. The Office otherwise was unable to determine the
content and origin of the information he purportedly offered to Stone. Finally, the investigation
did not identify evidence of a connection between the outreach or the meeting and Russian
interference efforts.
b. Campaign Efforts to Obtain Deleted Clinton Emails
After candidate Trump stated on July 27, 2016, that he hoped Russia would "find the 30,000
emails that are missing," Trump asked individuals affiliated with his Campaign to find the deleted
Clinton emails.264 Michael Flynn—who would later serve as National Security Advisor in the
Trump Administration—recalled that Trump made this request repeatedly, and Flynn
subsequently contacted multiple people in an effort to obtain the emails.265
Barbara Ledeen and Peter Smith were among the people contacted by Flynn. Ledeen, a long-
time Senate staffer who had previously sought the Clinton emails, provided updates to Flynn about
her efforts throughout the summer of 2016.266 Smith, an investment advisor who was active in
Republican politics, also attempted to locate and obtain the deleted Clinton emails.267
Ledeen began her efforts to obtain the Clinton emails before Flynn's request, as early as
December 2015.268 On December 3, 2015, she emailed Smith a proposal to obtain the emails,
stating, "Here is the proposal I briefly mentioned to you. The person I described to you would be
happy to talk with you either in person or over the phone. The person can get the emails which 1.
Were classified and 2. Were purloined by our enemies. That would demonstrate what needs to be
demonstrated."269
Attached to the email was a 25-page proposal stating that the "Clinton email server was, in all
likelihood, breached long ago," and that the Chinese, Russian, and Iranian intelligence services could
"re-assemble the server's email content."27° The proposal called for a three-phase approach. The first
two phases consisted of open-source analysis. The third phase consisted of checking with certain
intelligence sources "that have access through liaison work with various foreign services" to
determine if any of those services had gotten to the server. The proposal noted, "Even if a single email
was recovered and the providence [sic] of that email was a foreign service, it would be catastrophic
to the Clinton campaign[.]" Smith forwarded the email to two colleagues and
264
Flynn 4/25/18 302, at 5-6; Flynn 5/1/18 302, at 1-3.
265
Flynn 5/1/18 302, at 1-3.
266
Flynn 4/25/18 302, at 7; Flynn 5/4/18 302, at 1-2; Flynn 11/29/17 302, at 7-8.
267
Flynn 11/29/17 302, at 7.
268
Szobocsan 3/29/17 302, at 1.
269
12/3/15 Email, Ledeen to Smith.
270
12/3/15 Email, Ledeen to Smith (attachment).
66
Attorney ______________ Work Product // May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
wrote, "we can discuss to whom it should be referred."271 On December 16, 2015, Smith informed
Ledeen that he declined to participate in her "initiative." According to one of Smith's business
associates, Smith believed Ledeen's initiative was not viable at that time.272
Just weeks after Trump's July 2016 request to find the Clinton emails, however, Smith tried
to locate and obtain the emails himself. He created a company, raised tens of thousands of dollars,
and recruited security experts and business associates. Smith made claims to others involved in the
effort (and those from whom he sought funding) that he was in contact with hackers with "ties and
affiliations to Russia" who had access to the emails, and that his efforts were coordinated with the
Trump Campaign.273
On August 28, 2016, Smith sent an email from an encrypted account with the subject "Sec.
Clinton's unsecured private email server" to an undisclosed list of recipients, including Campaign co-
chairman Sam Clovis. The email stated that Smith was "[j]ust finishing two days of sensitive meetings
here in DC with involved groups to poke and probe on the above. It is clear that the Clinton's home-
based, unprotected server was hacked with ease by both State-related players, and private mercenaries.
Parties with varying interests, are circling to release ahead of the election."'
On September 2, 2016, Smith directed a business associate to establish KLS Research LLC
in furtherance of his search for the deleted Clinton emails.275 One of the purposes of KLS Research
was to manage the funds Smith raised in support of his initiative.276 KLS Research received over
$30,000 during the presidential campaign, although Smith represented that he raised even more
money.'
Smith recruited multiple people for his initiative, including security experts to search for and
authenticate the emails.278 In early September 2016, as part of his recruitment and fundraising effort,
Smith circulated a document stating that his initiative was "in coordination" with the Trump
Campaign, "to the extent permitted as an independent expenditure organization."279 The document
listed multiple individuals affiliated with the Trump Campaign, including Flynn, Clovis, Bannon,
271 12/3/15 Email, Smith to Szobocsan & Safron.

272 Szobocsan 3/29/18 302, at 1.
273 8/31/16 Email, Smith to Smith.
274 8/28/16 Email, Smith to Smith.
275 Incorporation papers of KLS Research LLC, 7/26/17
Szobocsan 3/29/18 302, at 2.
276 Szobocsan 3/29/18 302, at 3.
277 Financial Institution Record of Peter Smith and KLS Research LLC, 10/31/17
10/11/16 Email, Smith to
278 Tait 8/22/17 302, at 3; York 7/12/17 302, at 1-2; York 11/22/17 302, at 1.
279 York 7/13/17 302 (attachment KLS Research, LLC, "Clinton Email Reconnaissance
Initiative," Sept. 9, 2016).
67
and Kellyanne Conway.28° The investigation established that Smith communicated with at least
Flynn and Clovis about his search .for the deleted Clinton emails,281 but the Office did not identify
evidence that any of the listed individuals initiated or directed Smith's efforts.
In September 2016, Smith and Ledeen got back in touch with each other about their
respective efforts. Ledeen wrote to Smith, "wondering if you had some more detailed reports or
memos or other data you could share because we have come a long way in our efforts since we
last visited. . . . We would need as much technical discussion as possible so we could marry it
against the new data we have found and then could share it back to you 'your eyes only.,),282
Ledeen claimed to have obtained a trove of emails (from what she described as the "dark
web") that purported to be the deleted Clinton emails. Ledeen wanted to authenticate the emails
and solicited contributions to fund that effort. Erik Prince provided funding to hire a tech advisor
to ascertain the authenticity of the emails. According to Prince, the tech advisor determined that
the emails were not authentic.283
A backup of Smith's computer contained two files that had been downloaded from
WikiLeaks and that were originally attached to emails received by John Podesta. The files on
Smith's computer had creation dates of October 2, 2016, which was prior to the date of their release
by WikiLeaks. Forensic examination, however, established that the creation date did not reflect
when the files were downloaded to Smith's computer. (It appears the creation date was when
WikiLeaks staged the document for release, as discussed in Volume I, Section III.B.3.c, supra.284)
The investigation did not otherwise identify evidence that Smith obtained the files before their
release by WikiLeaks.
Smith continued to send emails to an undisclosed recipient list about Clinton's deleted emails
until shortly before the election. For example, on October 28, 2016, Smith wrote that there was a
"tug-of-war going on within WikiLeaks over its planned releases in the next few days," and that
WikiLeaks "has maintained that it will save its best revelations for last, under the theory this allows
little time for response prior to the U.S. election November 8."285 An attachment to the
280 The same recruitment document listed Jerome Corsi under "Independent
Groups/Organizations/Individuals," and described him as an "established author and writer from
the right on President Obama and Sec. Clinton."
Flynn 11/29/17 302, at 7-8; 10/15/16 Email, Smith to Flynn et al.; 8/28/16 Email, Smith
281
to Smith (bcc: Clovis et al.).

282
9/16/16 Email, Ledeen to Smith.
283
Prince 4/4/18 302, at 4-5.
284
The forensic analysis of Smith's computer devices found that Smith used an older Apple operating
system that would have preserved that October 2, 2016 creation date when it was downloaded (no matter
what day it was in fact downloaded by Smith). See Volume I, Section III.B.3.c, supra. The Office tested this
theory in March 2019 by downloading the two files found on Smith's computer from WikiLealcs's site using
the same Apple operating system on Smith's computer; both files were successfully downloaded and retained
the October 2, 2016 creation date. See SM-2284941, serial 62.
285
10/28/16 Email, Smith to Smith.
68
Atterney-Werk-Prefittet II May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
email claimed that WikiLeaks would release "All 33k deleted Emails" by "November 1st." No
emails obtained from Clinton's server were subsequently released.
Smith drafted multiple emails stating or intimating that he was in contact with Russian
hackers. For example, in one such email, Smith claimed that, in August 2016, KLS Research had
organized meetings with parties who had access to the deleted Clinton emails, including parties with
"ties and affiliations to Russia."286 The investigation did not identify evidence that any such meetings
occurred. Associates and security experts who worked with Smith on the initiative did not believe
that Smith was in contact with Russian hackers and were aware of no such connection.287 The
investigation did not establish that Smith was in contact with Russian hackers or that Smith, Ledeen,
or other individuals in touch with the Trump Campaign ultimately obtained the deleted Clinton
emails.
* * *
In sum, the investigation established that the GRU hacked into email accounts of persons
affiliated with the Clinton Campaign, as well as the computers of the DNC and DCCC. The GRU
then exfiltrated data related to the 2016 election from these accounts and computers, and
disseminated that data through fictitious online personas (DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0) and later
through WikiLeaks. The investigation also established that the Trum • Cam aitn dis la ed interest in
the
WikiLeaks releases, and that Harm to Ongoing Matter
As explained in Volume I, Section V.B, infra, the evidence was sufficient to support computer-
intrusion and other char:es a:ainst GRU officers for their role in election-related hackin• . Harm
to Ongoing Matter
286
8/31/16 Email, Smith to Smith.
69
287
Safron 3/20/18 302, at 3; Szobocsan 3/29/18 302, at 6.
Atter-tivi-Week--Pfeeluet II May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
IV. RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT LINKS To AND CONTACTS WITH THE TRUMP CAMPAIGN
The Office identified multiple contacts—"links," in the words of the Appointment Order—
between Trump Campaign officials and individuals with ties to the Russian government. The
Office investigated whether those contacts constituted a third avenue of attempted Russian
interference with or influence on the 2016 presidential election. In particular, the investigation
examined whether these contacts involved or resulted in coordination or a conspiracy with the
Trump Campaign and Russia, including with respect to Russia providing assistance to the
Campaign in exchange for any sort of favorable treatment in the future. Based on the available
information, the investigation did not establish such coordination.
This Section describes the principal links between the Trump Campaign and individuals
with ties to the Russian government, including some contacts with Campaign officials or
associates that have been publicly reported to involve Russian contacts. Each subsection begins
with an overview of the Russian contact at issue and then describes in detail the relevant facts,
which are generally presented in chronological order, beginning with the early months of the
Campaign and extending through the post-election, transition period.
A. Campaign Period (September 2015 - November 8, 2016)
Russian-government-connected individuals and media entities began showing interest in

Trump's campaign in the months after he announced his candidacy in June 2015. 288 Because
Trump's status as a public figure at the time was attributable in large part to his prior business and
entertainment dealings, this Office investigated whether a business contact with Russia-linked
individuals and entities during the campaign period—the Trump Tower Moscow project, see
Volume I, Section IV.A. 1, infra—led to or involved coordination of election assistance.
Outreach from individuals with ties to Russia continued in the spring and summer of 2016,
when Trump was moving toward—and eventually becoming—the Republican nominee for
President. As set forth below, the Office also evaluated a series of links during this period: outreach
to two of Trump's then-recently named foreign policy advisors, including a representation that
Russia had "dirt" on Clinton in the form of thousands of emails (Volume I, Sections IV.A.2 &
IV.A.3); dealings with a D.C.-based think tank that specializes in Russia and has connections with
its government (Volume I, Section IV.A.4); a meeting at Trump Tower between the Campaign and
a Russian lawyer promising dirt on candidate Clinton that was "part of Russia and its government's
support for [Trump]" (Volume I, Section IV.A.5); events at the Republican National Convention
(Volume I, Section IV.A.6); post-Convention contacts between Trump Campaign officials and
Russia's ambassador to the United States (Volume I, Section IV.A.7); and contacts through
campaign chairman Paul Manafort, who had previously worked for a Russian oligarch and a pro-
Russian political party in Ukraine (Volume I, Section IV.A.8).
For example, on August 18, 2015, on behalf of the editor-in-chief of the internet newspaper
288
Vzglyad, Georgi Asatryan emailed campaign press secretary Hope Hicks asking for a phone or in-person
candidate interview. 8/18/15 Email, Asatryan to Hicks. One day earlier, the publication's founder (and
former Russian parliamentarian) Konstantin Rykov had registered two Russian websites—Trump2016.ru
and DonaldTrump2016.ru. No interview took place.
71
1. Trump Tower Moscow Project
The Trump Organization has pursued and completed projects outside the United States as
part of its real estate portfolio. Some projects have involved the acquisition and ownership
(through subsidiary corporate structures) of property. In other cases, the Trump Organization has
executed licensing deals with real estate developers and management companies, often local to
the country where the project was located.289
Between at least 2013 and 2016, the Trump Organization explored a similar licensing deal
in Russia involving the construction of a Trump-branded property in Moscow. The project,
commonly referred to as a "Trump Tower Moscow" or "Trump Moscow" project, anticipated a
combination of commercial, hotel, and residential properties all within the same building. Between
2013 and June 2016, several employees of the Trump Organization, including then-president of
the organization Donald J. Trump, pursued a Moscow deal with several Russian counterparties.
From the fall of 2015 until the middle of 2016, Michael Cohen spearheaded the Trump
Organization's pursuit of a Trump Tower Moscow project, including by reporting on the project's
status to candidate Trump and other executives in the Trump Organization.29°
a. Trump Tower Moscow Venture with the Crocus Group (2013-2014)
The Trump Organization and the Crocus Group, a Russian real estate conglomerate owned
and controlled by Aras Agalarov, began discussing a Russia-based real estate project shortly after the
conclusion of the 2013 Miss Universe pageant in Moscow.291 Donald J. Trump Jr. served as the
primary negotiator on behalf of the Trump Organization; Emin Agalarov (son of Aras Agalarov) and
Irakli "Ike" Kaveladze represented the Crocus Group during negotiations,292 with the occasional
assistance of Robert Goldstone.293
In December 2013, Kaveladze and Trump Jr. negotiated and signed preliminary terms of
See, e.g., Interview of Donald J Trump, Jr, Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong.
289
151-52 (Sept. 7, 2017) (discussing licensing deals of specific projects).

290
As noted in Volume I, Section III.D.1, supra, in November 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty to making
false statements to Congress concerning, among other things, the duration of the Trump Tower Moscow
project. See Information ¶ 7(a), United States v. Michael Cohen, 1:18-cr-850 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2018),
Doc. 2 ("Cohen Information").
291
See Interview of Donald J. Trump, Jr, Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 13 (Sept. 7, 2017)
("Following the pageant the Trump Organization and Mr. Agalarov's company, Crocus Group, began
preliminarily discussion [sic] potential real estate projects in Moscow."). As has been widely reported, the
Miss Universe pageant—which Trump co-owned at the time—was held at the Agalarov-owned Crocus City
Hall in Moscow in November 2013. Both groups were involved in organizing the pageant, and Aras
Agalarov's son Emin was a musical performer at the event, which Trump attended.
292
Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 2, 4-6;
OSC
-KAV_00385 (12/6/13 Email, Trump Jr. to Kaveladze & E. Agalarov).
293
72
Attorney __________________Work Product II May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. p. 6(e)
Atter-tieerk-Preeluet // May Contain Material Protected Undcr Fcel. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
an agreement for the Trump Tower Moscow project.294 On December 23, 2013, after discussions
with Donald J. Trump, the Trump Organization agreed to accept an arrangement whereby the
organization received a flat 3.5% commission on all sales, with no licensing fees or incentives.295
The parties negotiated a letter of intent during January and February 2014.296
From January 2014 through November 2014, the Trump Organization and Crocus Group
discussed development plans for the Moscow project. Some time before January 24, 2014, the
Crocus Group sent the Trump Organization a proposal for a 800-unit, 194-meter building to be
constructed at an Agalarov-owned site in Moscow called "Crocus City," which had also been the
site of the Miss Universe pageant.297 In February 2014, Ivanka Trump met with Emin Agalarov
and toured the Crocus City site during a visit to Moscow.298 From March 2014 through July 2014,
the groups discussed "design standards" and other architectural elements.299 For example, in July
2014, members of the Trump Organization sent Crocus Group counterparties questions about the
"demographics of these prospective buyers" in the Crocus City area, the development of
neighboring parcels in Crocus City, and concepts for redesigning portions of the building. 300 In
August 2014, the Trump Organization requested specifications for a competing Marriott-branded
tower being built in Crocus City.301
Beginning in September 2014, the Trump Organization stopped responding in a timely

fashion to correspondence and proposals from the Crocus Group.302 Communications between the
two groups continued through November 2014 with decreasing frequency; what appears to be the
last communication is dated November 24, 2014.303 The project appears not to have developed
past the planning stage, and no construction occurred.
294
295
OSC-KAV_00452 (12/23/13 Email, Trump Jr. to Kaveladze & E. Agalarov).
See, e.g., OSC-KAV_01158 (Letter agreement signed by Trump Jr. & E. Agalarov);
296
OSC-KAV_01147 (1/20/14 Email, Kaveladze to Trump Jr. et al.).

See, e.g., OSC-KAV_00972 (10/14/14 Email, McGee to Khoo et al.) (email from Crocus Group
297
contractor about specifications); OSC-KAV_00540 (1/24/14 Email, McGee to Trump Jr. et al.).
See OSC-KAV_00631 (2/5/14 Email, E. A talarov to Ivanka Trum•, Trump Jr. &
298
Kaveladze); Goldstone Facebook post, 2/4/14 (8:01 a.m.) Investigative Technique

299
See, e.g., OSC-KAV_00791 (6/3/14 Email, Kaveladze to Trump Jr. et al.; OSC-KAV_00799
(6/10/14 Email, Trump Jr. to Kaveladze et al.); OSC-KAV_00817 (6/16/14 Email, Trump Jr. to Kaveladze
et al.).
300
OSC-KAV_00870 (7/17/14 Email, Khoo to McGee et al.).
301 OSC-KAV_00855 (8/4/14 Email, Khoo to McGee et al.).
OSC-KAV_00903 (9/29/14 Email, Tropea to McGee & Kaveladze (noting last response was on
302
August 26, 2014)); OSC-KAV_00906 (9/29/14 Email, Kaveladze to Tropea & McGee (suggesting silence
"proves my fear that those guys are bailing out of the project")); OSC-KAV_00972 (10/14/14 Email, McGee
to Khoo et al.) (email from Crocus Group contractor about development specifications)).
303 OSC-KAV_01140 (11/24/14 Email, Khoo to McGee et al.).
73
b. Communications with I.C. Expert Investment Company and Giorgi

Rtskhiladze (Summer and Fall 2015)
In the late summer of 2015, the Trump Organization received a new inquiry about pursuing
a Trump Tower project in Moscow. In approximately September 2015, Felix Sater, a New York-
based real estate advisor, contacted Michael Cohen, then-executive vice president of the Trump
Organization and special counsel to Donald J. Trump.304 Sater had previously worked with the
Trump Organization and advised it on a number of domestic and international projects. Sater had
explored the possibility of a Trump Tower project in Moscow while working with the Trump
Organization and therefore knew of the organization's general interest in completing a deal there.305
Sater had also served as an informal agent of the Trump Organization in Moscow previously and
had accompanied Ivanka Trump and Donald Trump Jr. to Moscow in the mid-2000s.306
Sater contacted Cohen on behalf of I.C. Expert Investment Company (I.C. Expert), a Russian
real-estate development corporation controlled by Andrei Vladimirovich Rozov.307 Sater had known
Rozov since approximately 2007 and, in 2014, had served as an agent on behalf of Rozov during
Rozov's purchase of a building in New York City.308 Sater later contacted Rozov and proposed that
I.C. Expert pursue a Trump Tower Moscow project in which I.C. Expert would license the name and
brand from the Trump Organization but construct the building on its own. Sater worked on the deal
with Rozov and another employee of I.C. Expert.309
Cohen was the only Trump Organization representative to negotiate directly with I.C. Expert
or its agents. In approximately September 2015, Cohen obtained approval to negotiate with I.C.
Expert from candidate Trump, who was then president of the Trump Organization. Cohen provided
updates directly to Trump about the project throughout 2015 and into 2016, assuring him the project
was continuing.310 Cohen also discussed the Trump Moscow project with Ivanka Trump as to
design elements (such as possible architects to use for the project311) and Donald J. Trump Jr. (about
his experience in Moscow and possible involvement in the project312) during the fall of 2015.
304 Sater rovided information to our Office in two 2017 interviews conducted under a
proffer agreement
305
306 Sater 9/19/17 302, at 1-2, 5.

307 Sater 9/19/17 302, at 3.
308 Rozov 1/25/18 302, at 1.
309 Rozov 1/25/18 302, at 1; see also 11/2/15 Email, Cohen to Rozov et al. (sending letter of intent).
310 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 1-2, 4-6.
311 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 5.
312 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 4-5.
74
Attorney_____________ Work Product II May Contain Material Protcctcd Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
Also during the fall of 2015, Cohen communicated about the Trump Moscow proposal with
Giorgi Rtskhiladze, a business executive who previously had been involved in a development deal
with the Trump Organization in Batumi, Georgia.' Cohen stated that he spoke to Rtskhiladze in part
because Rtskhiladze had pursued business ventures in Moscow, including a licensing deal with the
Agalarov-owned Crocus Group.314 On September 22, 2015, Cohen forwarded a preliminary design
study for the Trump Moscow project to Rtskhiladze, adding "I look forward to your reply about this
spectacular project in Moscow." Rtskhiladze forwarded Cohen's email to an associate and wrote, "[i]f
we could organize the meeting in New York at the highest level of the Russian Government and Mr.
Trump this project would definitely receive the worldwide attention."315
On September 24, 2015, Rtskhiladze sent Cohen an attachment that he described as a proposed
"Metter to the Mayor of Moscow from Trump org," explaining that "[w]e need to send this letter to the
Mayor of Moscow (second guy in Russia) he is aware of the potential project and will pledge his
support."316 In a second email to Cohen sent the same day, Rtskhiladze provided a translation of the
letter, which described the Trump Moscow project as a "symbol of stronger economic, business and
cultural relationships between New York and Moscow and therefore United States and the Russian
Federation."317 On September 27, 2015, Rtskhiladze sent another email to Cohen, proposing that the
Trump Organization partner on the Trump Moscow project with "Global Development Group LLC,"
which he described as being controlled by Michail Posikhin, a Russian architect, and Simon
Nizharadze.318 Cohen told the Office that he ultimately declined the proposal and instead continued to
work with I.C. Expert, the company represented by Felix Sater.319
c. Letter of Intent and Contacts to Russian Government (October 2015-January

2016)
i. Trump Signs the Letter of Intent on behalf of the Trump Organization
Between approximately October 13, 2015 and November 2, 2015, the Trump Organization
(through its subsidiary Trump Acquisition, LLC) and I.C. Expert completed a letter of intent (LOI)
for a Trump Moscow property. The LOI, signed by Trump for the Trump Organization and Rozov
on behalf of I.C. Expert, was "intended to facilitate further discussions" in order to "attempt to
313
Rtskhiladze was a U.S.-based executive of the Georgian company Silk Road Group. In
approximately 2011, Silk Road Group and the Trump Organization entered into a licensing agreement
to build a Trump-branded property in Batumi, Georgia. Rtskhiladze was also involved in discussions for
a Truro -branded ro'ect in Astana, Kazakhstan. The Office twice interviewed Rtskhiladze,
314
Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 12; see also Rtskhiladze 5/10/18 302, at 1.
315
9/22/15 Email, Rtskhiladze to Nizharadze.
316
9/24/15 Email, Rtskhiladze to Cohen.
317
9/24/15 Email, Rtskhiladze to Cohen.
318
9/27/15 Email, Rtslchiladze to Cohen.
319
Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 12.
75
Attorney _____________Work Product II May Contain Material Protcctcd Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
enter into a mutually acceptable agreement" related to the Trump-branded project in Moscow.32° The
LOI contemplated a development with residential, hotel, commercial, and office components, and
called for "[a]pproximately 250 first class, luxury residential condominiums," as well as "[o]ne first
class, luxury hotel consisting of approximately 15 floors and containing not fewer than 150 hotel
rooms."321 For the residential and commercial portions of the project, the Trump Organization would
receive between 1% and 5% of all condominium sales,322 plus 3% of all rental and other revenue.323
For the project's hotel portion, the Trump Organization would receive a base fee of 3% of gross
operating revenues for the first five years and 4% thereafter, plus a separate incentive fee of 20% of
operating profit. 324 Under the LOI, the Trump Organization also would receive a $4 million "up-front
fee" prior to groundbreaking.325 Under these terms, the Trump Organization stood to earn substantial
sums over the lifetime of the project, without assuming significant liabilities or financing
commitments.326
On November 3, 2015, the day after the Trump Organization transmitted the LOI, Sater
emailed Cohen suggesting that the Trump Moscow project could be used to increase candidate
Trump's chances at being elected, writing:
Buddy our boy can become President of the USA and we can engineer it. I will get all of
Putins team to buy in on this, I will manage this process. . . . Michael, Putin gets on stage
with Donald for a ribbon cutting for Trump Moscow, and Donald owns the republican
nomination. And possibly beats Hillary and our boy is in. . . . We will manage this process
better than anyone. You and I will get Donald and Vladimir on a stage together very shortly.
That the game changer.327
Later that day, Sater followed up:
Donald doesn't stare down, he negotiates and understands the economic issues and Putin
only want to deal with a pragmatic leader, and a successful business man is a good
candidate for someone who knows how to negotiate. "Business, politics, whatever it all is
the same for someone who knows how to deal"
320 11/2/15 Email, Cohen to Rozov et al. (attachment) (hereinafter "LOI"); see also 10/13/15 Email,
Sater to Cohen & Davis (attaching proposed letter of intent).
321
LOI, p. 2.
The LOI called for the Trump Organization to receive 5% of all gross sales up to $100 million;
322
4% of all gross sales from $100 million to $250 million; 3% of all gross sales from $250 million to $500
million; 2% of all gross sales from $500 million to $1 billion; and 1% of all gross sales over $1 billion. LOI,
Schedule 2.
323
LOI, Schedule 2.
324
LOI, Schedule 1.
325
LOI, Schedule 2.
326
Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 3.
327
11/3/15 Email, Sater to Cohen (12:14 p.m.).
76
Attorney______________Work Product II May Contain Material Protcctcd Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
I think I can get Putin to say that at the Trump Moscow press conference.
If he says it we own this election. Americas most difficult adversary agreeing that Donald
is a good guy to negotiate. . . .
We can own this election.
Michael my next steps are very sensitive with Putins very very close people, we can pull
this off.
Michael lets go. 2 boys from Brooklyn getting a USA president elected. This is good really
good.328
According to Cohen, he did not consider the political import of the Trump Moscow project
to the 2016 U.S. presidential election at the time. Cohen also did not recall candidate Trump or
anyone affiliated with the Trump Campaign discussing the political implications of the Trump
Moscow project with him. However, Cohen recalled conversations with Trump in which the
candidate suggested that his campaign would be a significant "infomercial" for Trump-branded
properties.329
ii. Post-LOI Contacts with Individuals in Russia
Given the size of the Trump Moscow project, Sater and Cohen believed the project required
approval (whether express or implicit) from the Russian national government, including from the
Presidential Administration of Russia.33° Sater stated that he therefore began to contact the
Presidential Administration through another Russian business contact.33I In early negotiations with
the Trump Organization, Sater had alluded to the need for government approval and his attempts to
set up meetings with Russian officials. On October 12, 2015, for example, Sater wrote to Cohen that
"all we need is Putin on board and we are golden," and that a "meeting with Putin
and top deputy is tentatively set for the 14th [of October]." 332 this meeting
was being coordinated by associates in Russia and that he had no direct interaction with the
Russian government.333
Approximately a month later, after the LOI had been signed, Lana Erchova emailed Ivanka
Trump on behalf of Erchova's then-husband Dmitry Klokov, to offer Klokov's assistance to the
Trump Campaign.334 Klokov was at that time Director of External Communications for PJSC
Federal Grid Company of Unified Energy System, a large Russian electricity transmission
328
329
Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 3-4; Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 15.
330 Sater 12/15/17 302, at 2.
331
Sater 12/15/17 302, at 3-4.
332
10/12/15 Email, Sater to Cohen (8:07 a.m.).
333
334
Ivanka Trump received an email from a woman who identified herself as "Lana E. Alexander," which said
in part, "If you ask anyone who knows Russian to google my husband Dmitry Klokov, you'll see who he
is close to and that he has done Putin's political campaigns." 11/16/15 Email, Erchova to I. Trump.
77
company, and had been previously employed as an aide and press secretary to Russia's energy
minister. Ivanka Trump forwarded the email to Cohen.335 He told the Office that, after receiving
this inquiry, he had conducted an internet search for Klokov's name and concluded (incorrectly)
that Klokov was a former Olympic weightlifter.336
Between November 18 and 19, 2015,' Klokov and Cohen had at least one telephone call
and exchanged several emails. Describing himself in emails to Cohen as a "trusted person" who
could offer the Campaign "political synergy" and "synergy on a government level," Klokov
recommended that Cohen travel to Russia to speak with him and an unidentified intermediary.
Klokov said that those conversations could facilitate a later meeting in Russia between the
candidate and an individual Klokov described as "our person of interest."' In an email to the Office,
Erchova later identified the "person of interest" as Russian President Vladimir Putin. 338
In the telephone call and follow-on emails with Klokov, Cohen discussed his desire to use
a near-term trip to Russia to do site surveys and talk over the Trump Moscow project with local
developers. Cohen registered his willingness also to meet with Klokov and the unidentified
intermediary, but was emphatic that all meetings in Russia involving him or candidate Trump—
including a possible meeting between candidate Trump and Putin—would need to be "in
conjunction with the development and an official visit" with the Trump Organization receiving a
formal invitation to visit.339 (Klokov had written previously that "the visit [by candidate Trump to
Russia] has to be informal.")340
Klokov had also previously recommended to Cohen that he separate their negotiations over a
possible meeting between Trump and "the person of interest" from any existing business track.341 Re-
emphasizing that his outreach was not done on behalf of any business, Klokov added in second email
to Cohen that, if publicized well, such a meeting could have "phenomenal" impact "in a business
dimension" and that the "person of interestr sr "most important support" could have significant
ramifications for the "level of projects and their capacity." Klokov concluded by telling
335
11/16/15 Email, I. Trump to Cohen.
336
Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 17. During his interviews with the Office, Cohen still appeared to believe that
the Klokov he spoke with was that Olympian. The investigation, however, established that the email address
used to communicate with Cohen belongs to a different Dmitry Klokov, as described above.
337
11/18/15 Email, Klokov to Cohen (6:51 a.m.).
338
In July 2018, the Office received an unsolicited email purporting to be from Erchova, in which she
wrote that "[a]t the end of 2015 and beginning of 2016 I was asked by my ex-husband to contact Ivanka
Trump . . . and offer cooperation to Trump's team on behalf of the Russian officials." 7/27/18 Email, Erchova
to Special Counsel's Office. The email claimed that the officials wanted to offer candidate Trump "land in
Crimea among other things and unofficial meeting with Putin." Id. In order to vet the email's claims, the
Office responded requesting more details. The Office did not receive any reply.
339
11/18/15 Email, Cohen to Klokov (7:15 a.m.).
340
11/18/15 Email, Klokov to Cohen (6:51 a.m.).
341
11/18/15 Email, Klokov to Cohen (6:51 a.m.) ("I would suggest separating your negotiations and
our proposal to meet. I assure you, after the meeting level of projects and their capacity can be completely
different, having the most important support.").
78
Attorney______________Work Product II May Contain Material Protcctcd Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
Cohen that there was "no bigger warranty in any project than [the] consent of the person of interest."342
Cohen rejected the proposal, saying that "[c]urrently our LOI developer is in talks with VP's Chief of
Staff and arranging a formal invite for the two to meet."343 This email appears to be their final
exchange, and the investigation did not identify evidence that Cohen brought Klokov's initial offer of
assistance to the Campaign's attention or that anyone associated with the Trump Organization or the
Campaign dealt with Klokov at a later date. Cohen explained that he did not pursue the proposed
meeting because he was already working on the Moscow Project with Sater, who Cohen understood
to have his own connections to the Russian government.344
By late December 2015, however, Cohen was complaining that Sater had not been able to
use those connections to set up the promised meeting with Russian government officials. Cohen
told Sater that he was "setting up the meeting myself."345 On January 11, 2016, Cohen emailed the
office of Dmitry Peskov, the Russian government's press secretary, indicating that he desired
contact with Sergei Ivanov, Putin's chief of staff. Cohen erroneously used the email address
"[email protected]" instead of "[email protected]," so the email apparently
did not go through.346 On January 14, 2016, Cohen emailed a different address
([email protected]) with the following message:
Dear Mr. Peskov,

Over the past few months, I have been working with a company based in Russia regarding
the development of a Trump Tower-Moscow project in Moscow City.
Without getting into lengthy specifics, the communication between our two sides has
stalled. As this project is too important, I am hereby requesting your assistance.
I respectfully request someone, preferably you; contact me so that I might discuss the
specifics as well as arranging meetings with the appropriate individuals.
I thank you in advance for your assistance and look forward to hearing from you soon.347
Two days later, Cohen sent an email to [email protected], repeating his request to speak
with Sergei Ivanov.348
Cohen testified to Congress, and initially told the Office, that he did not recall receiving a
response to this email inquiry and that he decided to terminate any further work on the Trump
Moscow project as of January 2016. Cohen later admitted that these statements were false. In
342 11/19/15 Email, Klokov to Cohen (7:40 a.m.).

343 11/19/15 Email, Cohen to Klokov (12:56 p.m.).
344 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 12.
345 FS00004 (12/30/15 Text Message, Cohen to Sater (6:17 p.m.)).
346 1/11/16 Email, Cohen to [email protected] (9:12 a.m.).
79
fact, Cohen had received (and recalled receiving) a response to his inquiry, and he continued to
work on and update candidate Trump on the project through as late as June 2016.349
On January 20, 2016, Cohen received an email from Elena Poliakova, Peskov's personal
assistant. Writing from her personal email account, Poliakova stated that she had been trying to reach
Cohen and asked that he call her on the personal number that she provided.350 Shortly after receiving
Poliakova's email, Cohen called and spoke to her for 20 minutes.351 Cohen described to Poliakova his
position at the Trump Organization and outlined the proposed Trump Moscow project, including
information about the Russian counterparty with which the Trump Organization had partnered.
Cohen requested assistance in moving the project forward, both in securing land to build the project
and with financing. According to Cohen, Poliakova asked detailed questions and took notes, stating
that she would need to follow up with others in Russia.352
Cohen could not recall any direct follow-up from Poliakova or from any other representative
of the Russian government, nor did the Office identify any evidence of direct follow-up. However,
the day after Cohen's call with Poliakova, Sater texted Cohen, asking him to "[c]all me when you
have a few minutes to chat . . . It's about Putin they called today."353 Sater then sent a draft invitation
for Cohen to visit Moscow to discuss the Trump Moscow project,354 along with a note to "[t]ell me if
the letter is good as amended by me or make whatever changes you want and send it back to me."355
After a further round of edits, on January 25, 2016, Sater sent Cohen an invitation—signed by Andrey
Ryabinskiy of the company MHJ—to travel to "Moscow for a working visit" about the "prospects of
development and the construction business in Russia," "the various land plots available suited for
construction of this enormous Tower," and "the opportunity to co-ordinate a follow up visit to
Moscow by Mr. Donald Trump."356 According
Cohen Information in 4, 7. Cohen's interactions with President Trump and the President's lawyers
349
when preparing his congressional testimony are discussed further in Volume II. See Vol. II, Section II.K.3,
infra.
/20/16 Email, Poliakova to Cohen (5:57 a.m.) ("Mr. Cohen[,] I can't get through to both
350 1
your phones. Pls, call me.").

351
Telephone records show a 20-minute call on January 20, 2016 between Cohen and the number
Poliakova provided in her email. Call Records of Michael Cohen After
the call, Cohen saved Poliakova's contact information in his Trump Organization Outlook contact
list. 1/20/16 Cohen Microsoft Outlook Entry (6:22 a.m.).
352
Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 2-3.
353
FS00011 (1/21/16 Text Messages, Sater to Cohen).
The invitation purported to be from Genbank, a Russian bank that was, according to Sater, working
354
at the behest of a larger bank, VTB, and would consider providing financing. FS00008 (12/31/15 Text
Messages, Sater & Cohen). Additional information about Genbank can be found infra.
FS00011 (1/21/16 Text Message, Sater to Cohen (7:44 p.m.)); 1/21/16 Email, Sater to
355
Cohen (6:49 p.m.).

356
1/25/16 Email, Sater to Cohen (12:01 p.m.) (attachment).
80
to Cohen, he elected not to travel at the time because of concerns about the lack of concrete
proposals about land plots that could be considered as options for the project.357
d. Discussions about Russia Travel by Michael Cohen or Candidate Trump

(December 2015-June 2016)
i. Sater's Overtures to Cohen to Travel to Russia
The late January communication was neither the first nor the last time that Cohen
contemplated visiting Russia in pursuit of the Trump Moscow project. Beginning in late 2015,
Sater repeatedly tried to arrange for Cohen and candidate Trump, as representatives of the Trump
Organization, to travel to Russia to meet with Russian government officials and possible financing
partners. In December 2015, Sater sent Cohen a number of emails about logistics for traveling to
Russia for meetings.358 On December 19, 2015, Sater wrote:
Please call me I have Evgeney [Dvoskin] on the other line.[359] He needs a copy of your
and Donald's passports they need a scan of every page of the passports. Invitations & Visas
will be issued this week by VTB Bank to discuss financing for Trump Tower Moscow.
Politically neither Putins office nor Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot issue invite, so they
are inviting commercially/ business. VTB is Russia's 2 biggest bank and VTB Bank CEO
Andrey Kostin, will be at all meetings with Putin so that it is a business meeting not
political. We will be invited to Russian consulate this week to receive invite & have visa
issued.36°
In response, Cohen texted Sater an image of his own passport.361 Cohen told the Office that at one
point he requested a copy of candidate Trump's passport from Rhona Graff, Trump's executive
assistant at the Trump Organization, and that Graff later brought Trump's passport to Cohen's
357
Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 6-7.
See, e.g., 12/1/15 Email, Sater to Cohen (12:41 p.m.) ("Please scan and send me a copy
358
of your passport for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.").

359
Toll records show that Sater was speaking to Evgeny Dvoskin. Call Records of Felix Sater Dvoskin is an
executive of Genbank, a large bank with lending focused in Crimea, Ukraine. At the time that Sater
provided this financing letter to Cohen, Genbank was subject to U.S. government sanctions, see
Russia/Ukraine-related Sanctions and Identifications, Office of Foreign Assets Control (Dec. 22, 2015),
available at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-
Enforcement/Pages/20151222.aspx. Dvoskin, who had been deported from the United States in 2000 for
criminal activity, was under indictment in the United States for stock fraud under the aliases Eugene
Slusker and Gene Shustar. See United States v. Rizzo, et al., 2:03-cr-63 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2003).
12/19/15 Email, Sater to Cohen (10:50 a.m.); FS00002 (12/19/15 Text Messages, Sater
36°
to Cohen, (10:53 a.m.).

FS00004 (12/19/15 Text Message, Cohen to Sater); ERT_0198-256 (12/19/15 Text
361
Messages, Cohen & Sater).
81
office.362 The investigation did not, however, establish that the passport was forwarded to Sater.363
Into the spring of 2016, Sater and Cohen continued to discuss a trip to Moscow in connection
with the Trump Moscow project. On April 20, 2016, Sater wrote Cohen, "[t]he People wanted to know
when you are coming?"364 On May 4, 2016, Sater followed up:
I had a chat with Moscow. ASSUMING the trip does happen the question is before or after the
convention. I said I believe, but don't know for sure, that's it's probably after the convention.
Obviously the pre-meeting trip (you only) can happen anytime you want but the 2 big guys
where [sic] the question. I said I would confirm and revert. . . . Let me know about If I was
right by saying I believe after Cleveland and also when you want to speak to them and possibly
fly over.365
Cohen responded, "My trip before Cleveland. Trump once he becomes the nominee after the
convention."366
The day after this exchange, Sater tied Cohen's travel to Russia to the St. Petersburg
International Economic Forum ("Forum"), an annual event attended by prominent Russian politicians
and businessmen. Sater told the Office that he was informed by a business associate that Peskov wanted
to invite Cohen to the Forum.367 On May 5, 2016, Sater wrote to Cohen:
Peskov would like to invite you as his guest to the St. Petersburg Forum which is Russia's
Davos it's June 16-19. He wants to meet there with you and possibly introduce you to either
Putin or Medvedev, as they are not sure if 1 or both will be there.
This is perfect. The entire business class of Russia will be there as well.
He said anything you want to discuss including dates and subjects are on the table to
discuss[.]368
The following day, Sater asked Cohen to confirm those dates would work for him to travel; Cohen
wrote back, "[w]orks for me."369
362
Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 5.
On December 21, 2015, Sater sent Cohen a text message that read, "They need a copy of DJT
363
passport," to which Cohen responded, "After I return from Moscow with you with a date for him."
FS00004 (12/21/15 Text Messages, Cohen & Sater).
364
FS00014 (4/20/16 Text Message, Sater to Cohen (9:06 p.m.)).
365
FS00015 (5/4/16 Text Message, Sater to Cohen (7:38 p.m.)).
366
FS00015 (5/4/16 Text Message, Cohen to Sater (8:03 p.m.)).
367
Sater 12/15/17 302, at 4.
368
FS00016 (5/5/16 Text Messages, Sater to Cohen (6:26 & 6:27 a.m.)).
369
FS00016 (5/6/16 Text Messages, Cohen & Sater).
82
On June 9, 2016, Sater sent Cohen a notice that he (Sater) was completing the badges for
the Forum, adding, "Putin is there on the 17th very strong chance you will meet him as well." 37°
On June 13, 2016, Sater forwarded Cohen an invitation to the Forum signed by the Director of the
Roscongress Foundation, the Russian entity organizing the Forum. 371 Sater also sent Cohen a
Russian visa application and asked him to send two passport photos.372 According to Cohen, the
invitation gave no indication that Peskov had been involved in inviting him. Cohen was concerned
that Russian officials were not actually involved or were not interested in meeting with him (as
Sater had alleged), and so he decided not to go to the Forum. 373 On June 14, 2016, Cohen met
Sater in the lobby of the Trump Tower in New York and informed him that he would not be
traveling at that time.374
ii. Candidate Trump's Opportunities to Travel to Russia
The investigation identified evidence that, during the period the Trump Moscow project was
under consideration, the possibility of candidate Trump visiting Russia arose in two contexts.
First, in interviews with the Office, Cohen stated that he discussed the subject of traveling to
Russia with Trump twice: once in late 2015; and again in spring 2016.375 According to Cohen, Trump
indicated a willingness to travel if it would assist the project significantly. On one occasion, Trump
told Cohen to speak with then-campaign manager Corey Lewandowski to coordinate the candidate's
schedule. Cohen recalled that he spoke with Lewandowski, who suggested that they speak again when
Cohen had actual dates to evaluate. Cohen indicated, however, that he knew that travel prior to the
Republican National Convention would be impossible given the candidate's preexisting commitments
to the Campaign.376
Second, like Cohen, Trump received and turned down an invitation to the St. Petersburg
International Economic Forum. In late December 2015, Mira Duma—a contact of Ivanka Trump's
from the fashion industry—first passed along invitations for Ivanka Trump and candidate Trump
from Sergei Prikhodko, a Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation.' On January 14, 2016,
Rhona Graff sent an email to Duma stating that Trump was "honored to be asked to participate in the
highly prestigious" Forum event, but that he would "have to decline" the invitation given his "very
grueling and full travel schedule" as a presidential candidate.378 Graff
370
FS00018 (6/9/16 Text Messages, Sater & Cohen).
371
372
FS00018 (6/13/16 Text Message, Sater to Cohen (2:20 p.m.)); 6/13/16 Email, Sater to Cohen.
373
Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 6-8.
374
FS00019 (6/14/16 Text Messages, Cohen & Sater (12:06 and 2:50 p.m.)).
375
Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 2.
376
Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 7.
12/21/15 Email, Mira to Ivanka Trump (6:57 a.m.) (attachments); TRUMPORG_16_000057
377
(1/7/16 Email, I. Trump to Graff (9:18 a.m.)).

378
1/14/16 Email, Graff to Mira.
83
asked Duma whether she recommended that Graff "send a formal note to the Deputy Prime
Minister" declining his invitation; Duma replied that a formal note would be "great." 379
It does not appear that Graff prepared that note immediately. According to written answers
from President Trump,38° Graff received an email from Deputy Prime Minister Prikhodko on March
17, 2016, again inviting Trump to participate in the 2016 Forum in St. Petersburg.381 Two weeks
later, on March 31, 2016, Graff prepared for Trump's signature a two-paragraph letter declining the
invitation.382 The letter stated that Trump's "schedule has become extremely demanding" because of
the presidential campaign, that he "already ha[d] several commitments in the United States" for the
time of the Forum, but that he otherwise "would have gladly given every consideration to attending
such an important event."383 Graff forwarded the letter to another executive assistant at the Trump
Organization with instructions to print the document on letterhead for Trump to sign.384
At approximately the same time that the letter was being prepared, Robert Foresman—a
New York-based investment banker—began reaching out to Graff to secure an in-person meeting
with candidate Trump. According to Foresman, he had been asked by Anton Kobyakov, a Russian
presidential aide involved with the Roscongress Foundation, to see if Trump could speak at the
Forum.385 Foresman first emailed Graff on March 31, 2016, following a phone introduction
brokered through Trump business associate Mark Burnett (who produced the television show The
Apprentice). In his email, Foresman referenced his long-standing personal and professional
expertise in Russia and Ukraine, his work setting up an early "private channel" between Vladimir
Putin and former U.S. President George W. Bush, and an "approach" he had received from "senior
Kremlin officials" about the candidate. Foresman asked Graff for a meeting with the candidate,
Corey Lewandowski, or "another relevant person" to discuss this and other "concrete things"
Foresman felt uncomfortable discussing over "unsecure email."386 On April 4, 2016, Graff
forwarded Foresman's meeting request to Jessica Macchia, another executive assistant to Trump.387
379
1/15/16 Email, Mira to Graff.
38°
As explained in Volume II and Appendix C, on September 17, 2018, the Office sent written
questions to the President's counsel. On November 20, 2018, the President provided written answers to those
questions through counsel.
381
Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 17 (Response to Question IV,
Part (e)) ("[D]ocuments show that Ms. Graff prepared for my signature a brief response declining
the invitation.").
382
Part (e)); see also TRUMPORG_16_000134 (unsigned letter dated March 31, 2016).
383
TRUMPORG_16_000134 (unsigned letter).
384
TRUMPORG_16_000133 (3/31/16 Email, Graff to Macchia).
385
Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 3-4.
See TRUMPORG_16_00136 (3/31/16 Email, Foresman to Graff); see also Foresman
386
10/17/18 302, at 3-4.

387
See TRUMPORG_16_00136 (4/4/16 Email, Graff to Macchia).
84
With no response forthcoming, Foresman twice sent reminders to Graff—first on April 26

and again on April 30, 2016.388 Graff sent an apology to Foresman and forwarded his April 26
email (as well as his initial March 2016 email) to Lewandowski. 389 On May 2, 2016, Graff
forwarded Foresman's April 30 email—which suggested an alternative meeting with Donald
Trump Jr. or Eric Trump so that Foresman could convey to them information that "should be
conveyed to [the candidate] personally or [to] someone [the candidate] absolutely trusts"—to
policy advisor Stephen Miller.390
No communications or other evidence obtained by the Office indicate that the Trump
Campaign learned that Foresman was reaching out to invite the candidate to the Forum or that the
Campaign otherwise followed up with Foresman until after the election, when he interacted with the
Transition Team as he pursued a possible position in the incoming Administration."' When
interviewed by the Office, Foresman denied that the specific "approach" from "senior Kremlin
officials" noted in his March 31, 2016 email was anything other than Kobyakov's invitation to
Roscongress. According to Foresman, the "concrete things" he referenced in the same email were a
combination of the invitation itself, Foresman's personal perspectives on the invitation and Russia
policy in general, and details of a Ukraine plan supported by a U.S. think tank (EastWest Institute).
Foresman told the Office that Kobyakov had extended similar invitations through him to another
Republican presidential candidate and one other politician. Foresman also said that Kobyakov had
asked Foresman to invite Trump to speak after that other presidential candidate withdrew from the
race and the other politician's participation did not work out.392 Finally, Foresman claimed to have
no plans to establish a back channel involving Trump, stating the reference to his involvement in the
Bush-Putin back channel was meant to burnish his credentials to the Campaign. Foresman
commented that he had not recognized any of the experts announced as Trump's foreign policy team
in March 2016, and wanted to secure an in-person meeting with the candidate to share his
professional background and policy views, including that Trump should decline Kobyakov's
invitation to speak at the Forum.393
2. George Papadopoulos
George Papadopoulos was a foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign from March
388
See TRUMPORG_16_00137 (4/26/16 Email, Foresman to Graff); TRUMPORG_16_00141
(4/30/16 Email, Foresman to Graff).
389
See TRUMPORG_16_00139 (4/27/16 Email, Graff to Foresman); TRUMPORG_16_00137
(4/27/16 Email, Graff to Lewandowski).
TRUMPORG_16_00142 (5/2/16 Email, Graff to S. Miller); see also TRUMPORG_16_00143
390
(5/2/16 Email, Graff to S. Miller) (forwarding March 2016 email from Foresman).
391
Foresman's contacts during the transition period are discussed further in Volume I,
Section IV.B.3, infra.
Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 4.
392
393
Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 8-9.
85
2016 to early October 2016.394 In late April 2016, Papadopoulos was told by London-based
professor Joseph Mifsud, immediately after Mifsud's return from a trip to Moscow, that the
Russian government had obtained "dirt" on candidate Clinton in the form of thousands of emails.
One week later, on May 6, 2016, Papadopoulos suggested to a representative of a foreign
government that the Trump Campaign had received indications from the Russian government that
it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information that would be
damaging to candidate Clinton.
Papadopoulos shared information about Russian "dirt" with people outside of the
Campaign, and the Office investigated whether he also provided it to a Campaign official.
Papadopoulos and the Campaign officials with whom he interacted told the Office that they did
not recall that Papadopoulos passed them the information. Throughout the relevant period of time
and for several months thereafter, Papadopoulos worked with Mifsud and two Russian nationals
to arrange a meeting between the Campaign and the Russian government. That meeting never
came to pass.
a. Origins of Campaign Work
In March 2016, Papadopoulos became a foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign.'
As early as the summer of 2015, he had sought a role as a policy advisor to the Campaign but, in
a September 30, 2015 email, he was told that the Campaign was not hiring policy advisors. 396 In
late 2015, Papadopoulos obtained a paid position on the campaign of Republican presidential
candidate Ben Carson.397
Although Carson remained in the presidential race until early March 2016, Papadopoulos
had stopped actively working for his campaign by early February 2016.398 At that time,
Papadopoulos reached out to a contact at the London Centre of International Law Practice (LCILP),
which billed itself as a "unique institution . . comprising high-level professional international law
practitioners, dedicated to the advancement of global legal knowledge and the practice of
international law."399 Papadopoulos said that he had finished his role with the Carson
Papadopoulos met with our Office for debriefings on several occasions in the summer and fall of
394
2017, after he was arrested and charged in a sealed criminal complaint with making false statements in a
January 2017 FBI interview about, inter alia, the timing, extent, and nature of his interactions and
communications with Joseph Mifsud and two Russian nationals: Olga Polonskaya and Ivan Timofeev.
Papadopoulos later pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to an information charging him with
making false statements to the FBI, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
A Transcript of Donald Trump's Meeting with the Washington Post Editorial Board,
395
Washington Post (Mar. 21, 2016).

7/15/15 Linkedln Message, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (6:57 a.m.); 9/30/15 Email,
396
Glassner to Papadopoulos (7:42:21 a.m.).

397
Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2.
398
Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2; 2/4/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Idris.
399
London Centre of International Law Practice, at https://www.lcilp.org/ (via web.archive.org).
86
campaign and asked if LCILP was hiring.400 In early February, Papadopoulos agreed to join LCILP
and arrived in London to begin work.4°1
As he was taking his position at LCILP, Papadopoulos contacted Trump campaign manager
Corey Lewandowski via LinkedIn and emailed campaign official Michael Glassner about his
interest in joining the Trump Campaign.402 On March 2, 2016, Papadopoulos sent Glassner another
message reiterating his interest.403 Glassner passed along word of Papadopoulos's interest to another
campaign official, Joy Lutes, who notified Papadopoulos by email that she had been told by Glassner
to introduce Papadopoulos to Sam Clovis, the Trump Campaign's national co-chair and chief policy
advisor.4°4
At the time of Papadopoulos's March 2 email, the media was criticizing the Trump Campaign
for lack of experienced foreign policy or national security advisors within its ranks.405 To address that
issue, senior Campaign officials asked Clovis to put a foreign policy team together on short notice.406
After receiving Papadopoulos's name from Lutes, Clovis performed a Google search on
Papadopoulos, learned that he had worked at the Hudson Institute, and believed that he had credibility
on energy issues.407 On March 3, 2016, Clovis arranged to speak with Papadopoulos by phone to
discuss Papadopoulos joining the Campaign as a foreign policy advisor, and on March 6, 2016, the
two spoke.408 Papadopoulos recalled that Russia was mentioned as a topic, and he understood from
the conversation that Russia would be an important aspect of the Campaign's foreign policy.409 At the
end of the conversation, Clovis offered Papadopoulos a role as a foreign policy advisor to the
Campaign, and Papadopoulos accepted the offer.41°
b. Initial Russia-Related Contacts
Approximately a week after signing on as a foreign policy advisor, Papadopoulos traveled
400
2/4/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Idris.
2/5/16 Email, Idris to Papadopoulos (6:11:25 p.m.); 2/6/16 Email, Idris to Papadopoulos
401
(5:34:15 p.m.).
402 2/4/16 LinkedIn Message, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (1:28 p.m.); 2/4/16 Email,
Papadopoulos to Glassner (2:10:36 p.m.).
3/2/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Glassner (11:17:23 a.m.).
403
4°4
3/2/16 Email, Lutes to Papadopoulos (10:08:15 p.m.).
405 Clovis 10/3/17 302 (1 of 2), at 4.
406 Clovis 10/3/17 302 (1 of 2), at 4.
407 ; 3/3/16 Email, Lutes to Clovis & Papadopoulos
(6:05:47 p.m.).
408
3/6/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis (4:24:21 p.m.).
409
Statement of Offense ¶ 4, United States v. George Papadopoulos, 1:17-cr-182 (D.D.C.
Oct. 5, 2017), Doc. 19 ("Papadopoulos Statement of Offense").
410 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2.
87
Attorney __________________ Work Product II May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. p. 6(e)
Atterite,--Weeit-Pradttet // May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
to Rome, Italy, as part of his duties with LCILP.411 The purpose of the trip was to meet officials
affiliated with Link Campus University, a for-profit institution headed by a former Italian
government officia1.412 During the visit, Papadopoulos was introduced to Joseph Mifsud.
Mifsud is a Maltese national who worked as a professor at the London Academy of Diplomacy
in London, England.413 Although Mifsud worked out of London and was also affiliated with LCILP,
the encounter in Rome was the first time that Papadopoulos met him.414 Mifsud maintained various
Russian contacts while living in London, as described further below. Among
his contacts was IT , a one-time employee of the IRA, the entity that carried out
415
the Russian social media campaign (see Volume I, Section II, supra). In January and February
2016, Mifsud and IT discussed IT possibly meeting in Russia. The
investigation did not identi evidence of them meeting. Later, in the spring of 2016, IT
was also in contact that was linked to an employee of the Russian
Ministry of Defense, and that account had overlapping contacts with a group of Russian military-
controlled Facebook accounts that included accounts used to promote the DCLeaks releases in the
course of the GRU's hack-and-release operations (see Volume I, Section III.B.1, supra).
According to Papadopoulos, Mifsud at first seemed uninterested in Papadopoulos when they

met in Rome.416 After Papadopoulos informed Mifsud about his role in the Trump Campaign,
however, Mifsud appeared to take greater interest in Papadopoulos.417 The two discussed Mifsud's
European and Russian contacts and had a general discussion about Russia; Mifsud also offered to
introduce Papadopoulos to European leaders and others with contacts to the Russian government.418
Papadopoulos told the Office that Mifsud's claim of substantial connections with Russian government
officials interested Papadopoulos, who thought that such connections could increase his importance
as a policy advisor to the Trump Campaign.419
411 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2-3; Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ¶ 5.

412 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2-3; Stephanie Kirchgaessner et al., Joseph Mifsud: more
questions than answers about mystery professor linked to Russia, The Guardian (Oct. 31, 2017) ("Link
Campus University . . . is headed by a former Italian interior minister named Vincenzo Scotti.").
413
Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ¶ 5.
415
See, e. Investigative Technique
(Harm to Ongoing Matter
416 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ¶ 5.

418 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 3; Papadopoulos 8/11/17 302, at 2.
88
Afterney-Werek-Preduet II May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
On March 17, 2016, Papadopoulos returned to London.42° Four days later, candidate Trump
publicly named him as a member of the foreign policy and national security advisory team chaired
by Senator Jeff Sessions, describing Papadopoulos as "an oil and energy consultant" and an
"[e]xcellent guy."421
On March 24, 2016, Papadopoulos met with Mifsud in London.422 Mifsud was
accompanied by a Russian female named Olga Polonskaya. Mifsud introduced Polonskaya as a
former student of his who had connections to Vladimir Putin.423 Papadopoulos understood at the
time that Polonskaya may have been Putin's niece but later learned that this was not true.424 During
the meeting, Polonskaya offered to help Papadopoulos establish contacts in Russia and stated that
the Russian ambassador in London was a friend of hers.425 Based on this interaction, Papadopoulos
expected Mifsud and Polonskaya to introduce him to the Russian ambassador in London, but that
did not occur.426
Following his meeting with Mifsud, Papadopoulos sent an email to members of the Trump
Campaign's foreign policy advisory team. The subject line of the message was "Meeting with
Russian leadership--including Putin."427 The message stated in pertinent part:
I just finished a very productive lunch with a good friend of mine, Joseph Mifsud, the director
of the London Academy of Diplomacy--who introduced me to both Putin's niece and the
Russian Ambassador in London--who also acts as the Deputy Foreign Minister.428
The topic of the lunch was to arrange a meeting between us and the Russian leadership to
discuss U.S.-Russia ties under President Trump. They are keen to host us in a "neutral"
city, or directly in Moscow. They said the leadership, including Putin, is ready to meet with
us and Mr. Trump should there be interest. Waiting for everyone's thoughts on moving
forward with this very important issue.429

421 Phillip Rucker & Robert Costa, Trump Questions Need for NATO, Outlines Noninterventionist
Foreign Policy, Washington Post (Mar. 21, 2016).
422
Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 3; 3/24/16 Text Messages, Mifsud & Papadopoulos.
423
424
Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 3; Papadopoulos 2/10/17 302, at 2-3; Papadopoulos Internet
Search History (3/24/16) (revealing late-morning and early-afternoon searches on March 24, 2016 for
"putin's niece," "olga putin," and "russian president niece olga," among other terms).
425
426
Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ¶ 8 n.1.
427
3/24/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Page et al. (8:48:21 a.m.).
428 Papadopoulos's statements to the Campaign were false. As noted above, the woman he met was
not Putin's niece, he had not met the Russian Ambassador in London, and the Ambassador did not also
serve as Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister.
429
3/24/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Page et al. (8:48:21 a.m.).
89
Papadopoulos's message came at a time when Clovis perceived a shift in the Campaign's approach
toward Russia—from one of engaging with Russia throw h the NATO framework and takin a strong
stance on Russian aggression in Ukraine,
Clovis's response to Papadopoulos, however, did not reflect that shift. Replying to
Papadopoulos and the other members of the foreign policy advisory team copied on the initial email,
Clovis wrote:
This is most informative. Let me work it through the campaign. No commitments until we see
how this plays out. My thought is that we probably should not go forward with any meetings
with the Russians until we have had occasion to sit with our NATO allies, especially France,
Germany and Great Britain. We need to reassure our allies that we are not going to advance
anything with Russia until we have everyone on the same page.
More thoughts later today. Great work.431
c. March 31 Foreign Policy Team Meeting
The Campaign held a meeting of the foreign policy advisory team with Senator Sessions and
candidate Trump approximately one week later, on March 31, 2016, in Washington, D.C. 432 The
meeting—which was intended to generate press coverage for the Campaign433—took place at the
Trump International Hote1.434 Papadopoulos flew to Washington for the event. At the meeting, Senator
Sessions sat at one end of an oval table, while Trump sat at the other. As reflected in the photograph
below (which was posted to Trump's Instagram account), Papadopoulos sat between the two, two seats
to Sessions's left:
430
431
3/24/16 Email, Clovis to Papadopoulos et al. (8:55:04 a.m.).

432
Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 4; Papadopoulos 8/11/17 302, at 3.
433
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 16-17.
434
90
March 31, 2016 Meeting of Foreign Policy Team, with Papadopoulos (Fourth from Right of Candidate Trump)
During the meeting, each of the newly announced foreign policy advisors introduced
themselves and briefly described their areas of experience or expertise. 435 Papadopoulos spoke
about his previous work in the energy sector and then brought up a potential meeting with Russian
officials.436 Specifically, Papadopoulos told the group that he had learned through his contacts in
London that Putin wanted to meet with candidate Trump and that these connections could help
arrange that meeting.4"
Trump and Sessions both reacted to Papadopoulos's statement. Papadopoulos and

Campaign advisor J.D. Gordon—who told investigators in an interview that he had a "crystal clear"
recollection of the meeting—have stated that Trump was interested in and receptive to the idea of
a meeting with Putin.' Papadopoulos understood Sessions to be similarly supportive of his efforts
to arrange a meeting.439 Gordon and two other attendees, however, recall that Sessions generally
opposed the proposal, though they differ in their accounts of the concerns he voiced or the strength
of the opposition he expressed.44°
d. George Papadopoulos Learns That Russia Has "Dirt" in the Form of

Clinton Emails
Whatever Sessions'.s precise words at the March 31 meeting, Papadopoulos did not
understand Sessions or anyone else in the Trump Campaign to have directed that he refrain from
435
436
437
Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ¶ 9; see Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 14; Carafano 9/12/17
302, at 2; Hoskins 9/14/17 302, at 1.
438
Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 4-5; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 4-5.
439
Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 5; Papadopoulos 8/11/17 302, at 3.
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 17; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 5; Hoskins 9/14/17 302, at 1; Carafano
44°
9/12/17 302, at 2.
91
making further efforts to arrange a meeting between the Campaign and the Russian government.
To the contrary, Papadopoulos told the Office that he understood the Campaign to be supportive
of his efforts to arrange such a meeting.441 Accordingly, when he returned to London,
Papadopoulos resumed those efforts.442
Throughout April 2016, Papadopoulos continued to correspond with, meet with, and seek
Russia contacts through Mifsud and, at times, Polonskaya.443 For example, within a week of her
initial March 24 meeting with him, Polonskaya attempted to send Papadopoulos a text message—
which email exchanges show to have been drafted or edited by Mifsud—addressing Papadopoulos's
"wish to engage with the Russian Federation."444 When Papadopoulos learned from Mifsud that
Polonskaya had tried to message him, he sent her an email seeking another meeting.445 Polonskaya
responded the next day that she was "back in St. Petersburg" but "would be very pleased to support
[Papadopoulos's] initiatives between our two countries" and "to meet [him] again."446 Papadopoulos
stated in reply that he thought "a good step" would be to introduce him to "the Russian Ambassador
in London," and that he would like to talk to the ambassador, "or anyone else you recommend, about
a potential foreign policy trip to Russia."447
Mifsud, who had been copied on the email exchanges, replied on the morning of April 11,
2016. He wrote, "This is already been agreed. I am flying to Moscow on the 18th for a Valdai meeting,
plus other meetings at the Duma. We will talk tomorrow."448 The two bodies referenced by Mifsud
are part of or associated with the Russian government: the Duma is a Russian legislative assembly,449
while "Valdai" refers to the Valdai Discussion Club, a Moscow-based group that "is close to Russia's
foreign-policy establishment."45° Papadopoulos thanked Mifsud and said that he would see him
"tomorrow."451 For her part, Polonskaya responded that she had "already alerted my personal links to
our conversation and your request," that "we are all very excited the possibility of a good relationship
with Mr. Trump," and that "[t]he Russian Federation would love to welcome him once his candidature
would be officially announced."452
441 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 4-5; Papadopoulos 8/11/17 302, at 3; Papadopoulos 9/20/17 302,
at 2.
443 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense in 10-15.
444
3/29/16 Emails, Mifsud to Polonskaya (3:39 a.m. and 5:36 a.m.).
445
4/10/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Polonskaya (2:45:59 p.m.).
446
4/11/16 Email, Polonskaya to Papadopoulos (3:11:24 a.m.).
447
4/11/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Polonskaya (9:21:56 a.m.).
448
4/11/16 Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos (11:43:53).
449
Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ¶ 10(c).
Anton Troianovski, Putin Ally Warns of Arms Race as Russia Considers Response to U.S.
450
Nuclear Stance, Washington Post (Feb. 10, 2018).

451
4/11/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud (11:51:53 a.m.).
452
4/12/16 Email, Polonskaya to Papadopoulos (4:47:06 a.m.).
92
Papadopoulos's and Mifsud's mentions of seeing each other "tomorrow" referenced a

meeting that the two had scheduled for the next morning, April 12, 2016, at the Andaz Hotel in
London. Papadopoulos acknowledged the meeting during interviews with the Office, 453 and
records from Papadopoulos's UK cellphone and his internet-search history all indicate that the
meeting took place.454
Following the meeting, Mifsud traveled as planned to Moscow.455 On April 18, 2016, while in
Russia, Mifsud introduced Papadopoulos over email to Ivan Timofeev, a member of the Russian
International Affairs Council (RIAC).456 Mifsud had described Timofeev as having connections with
the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA),457 the executive entity in Russia responsible for
Russian foreign relations.458 Over the next several weeks, Papadopoulos and Timofeev had multiple
conversations over Skype and email about setting "the groundwork" for a "potential" meeting between
the Campaign and Russian government officials.459 Papadopoulos told the Office that, on one Skype
call, he believed that his conversation with Timofeev was being monitored or supervised by an
unknown third party, because Timofeev spoke in an official manner and Papadopoulos heard odd
noises on the line.460 Timofeev also told Papadopoulos in an April 25, 2016 email that he had just
spoken "to Igor Ivanov[,] the President of RIAC and former Foreign Minister of Russia," and conveyed
Ivanov's advice about how best to arrange a "Moscow visit."461
After a stop in Rome, Mifsud returned to England on April 25, 2016.462 The next day,
Papadopoulos met Mifsud for breakfast at the Andaz Hotel (the same location as their last
453
454
4/12/16 Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos (5:44:39 a.m.) (forwarding Libya-related document);
4/12/16 Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos & Obaid (10:28:20 a.m.); Papadopoulos Internet Search History
(Apr. 11, 2016 10:56:49 p.m.) (search for "andaz hotel liverpool street"); 4/12/16 Text Messages, Mifsud &
Papadopoulos.
455
See, e.g., 4/18/16 Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos (8:04:54 a.m.).
456
457
458
During the campaign period, Papadopoulos connected over LinkedIn with several MFA-affiliated
individuals in addition to Timofeev. On April 25, 2016, he connected with Dmitry Andreyko, publicly
identified as a First Secretary at the Russian Embassy in Ireland. In July 2016, he connected with Yuriy
Melnik, the spokesperson for the Russian Embassy in Washington and with Alexey Krasilnikov, publicly
identified as a counselor with the MFA. And on September 16, 2016, he connected with Ser ei Nalobin, also
identified as an MFA official. See Papadopoulos Linkedln Connections
459
460 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 5; Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 10.
461
4/25/16 Email, Timofeev to Papadopoulos (8:16:35 a.m.).
462
4/22/16 Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos (12:41:01 a.m.).
93
meeting).463 During that meeting, Mifsud told Papadopoulos that he had met with high-level Russian
government officials during his recent trip to Moscow. Mifsud also said that, on the trip, he learned
that the Russians had obtained "dirt" on candidate Hillary Clinton. As Papadopoulos later stated to
the FBI, Mifsud said that the "dirt" was in the form of "emails of Clinton," and that they "have
thousands of emails."464 On May 6, 2016, 10 days after that meeting with Mifsud, Papadopoulos
suggested to a representative of a foreign government that the Trump Campaign had received
indications from the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous
release of information that would be damaging to Hillary Clinton.465
e. Russia-Related Communications With The Campaign
While he was discussing with his foreign contacts a potential meeting of campaign officials
with Russian government officials, Papadopoulos kept campaign officials apprised of his efforts. On
April 25, 2016, the day before Mifsud told Papadopoulos about the emails, Papadopoulos wrote to
senior policy advisor Stephen Miller that "[t]he Russian government has an open invitation by Putin
for Mr. Trump to meet him when he is ready," and that "[t]he advantage of being in London is that
these governments tend to speak a bit more openly in 'neutral' cities."466 On April 27, 2016, after his
meeting with Mifsud, Papadopoulos wrote a second message to Miller stating that "some interesting
messages [were] coming in from Moscow about a trip when the time is right."467 The same day,
Papadopoulos sent a similar email to campaign manager Corey Lewandowski, telling Lewandowski
that Papadopoulos had "been receiving a lot of calls over the last month about Putin wanting to host
[Trump] and the team when the time is right."468
Papadopoulos's Russia-related communications with Campaign officials continued

throughout the spring and summer of 2016. On May 4, 2016, he forwarded to Lewandowski an
email from Timofeev raising the possibility of a meeting in Moscow, asking Lewandowski whether
that was "something we want to move forward with."469 The next day, Papadopoulos forwarded
the same Timofeev email to Sam Clovis, adding to the top of the email "Russia update." 4" He
included the same email in a May 21, 2016 message to senior Campaign official Paul Manafort,
under the subject line "Request from Russia to meet Mr. Trump," stating that "Russia has been
eager to meet Mr. Trump for quite sometime and have been reaching out to me
463 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ¶ 14; 4/25/16 Text Messages, Mifsud & Papadopoulos.
465
This information is contained in the FBI case-opening document and related materials. The
information is law enforcement 3en3itive (LES) and mu3t be treated accordingly in any external
disseittiftErtierh. The foreign government conveyed this information to the U.S. government on July 26, 2016,
a few days after WikiLeaks's release of Clinton-related emails. The FBI opened its investigation of potential
coordination between Russia and the Trump Campaign a few days later based on the information.
466
4/25/16 Email, Papadopoulos to S. Miller (8:12:44 p.m.).
467
4/27/16 Email, Papadopoulos to S. Miller (6:55:58 p.m.).
468
4/27/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (7:15:14 p.m.).
469
5/4/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (8:14:49 a.m.).
470
5/5/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis (7:15:21 p.m.).
94
to discuss."471 Manafort forwarded the message to another Campaign official, without including
Papadopoulos, and stated: "Let[']s discuss. We need someone to communicate that [Trump] is not
doing these trips. It should be someone low level in the Campaign so as not to send any signal."472
On June 1, 2016, Papadopoulos replied to an earlier email chain with Lewandowski about
a Russia visit, asking if Lewandowski "want[ed] to have a call about this topic" and whether "we
were following up with it."473 After Lewandowski told Papadopoulos to "connect with" Clovis
because he was "running point," Papadopoulos emailed Clovis that "the Russian MFA" was asking
him "if I\4r. Trump is interested in visiting Russia at some point."474 Papadopoulos wrote in an
email that he "[w]anted to pass this info along to you for you to decide what's best to do with it and
what message I should send (or to ignore)."475
After several email and Skype exchanges with Timofeev,476 Papadopoulos sent one more
email to Lewandowski on June 19, 2016, Lewandowski's last day as campaign manager.477 The email
stated that "[t]he Russian ministry of foreign affairs" had contacted him and asked whether, if Mr.
Trump could not travel to Russia, a campaign representative such as Papadopoulos could attend
meetings.478 Papadopoulos told Lewandowski that he was "willing to make the trip off the record if
it's in the interest of Mr. Trump and the campaign to meet specific people."479
Following Lewandowski's departure from the Campaign, Papadopoulos communicated with

Clovis and Walid Phares, another member of the foreign policy advisory team, about an off-the-
record meeting between the Campaign and Russian government officials or with Papadopoulos's
other Russia connections, Mifsud and Timofeev.48° Papadopoulos also interacted
471
5/21/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Manafort (2:30:14 p.m.).
472 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ¶ 19 n.2.
473
6/1/16 Email, Lewandowski to Papadopoulos (3:20:03 p.m.); 6/1/16 Email, Papadopoulos
474
to Clovis (3:29:14 p.m.).

47$
6/1/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis (3:29:14 p.m.). Papadopoulos's email coincided in time with
another message to Clovis suggesting a Trump-Putin meeting. First, on May 15, 2016, David Klein—a distant
relative of then-Trump Organization lawyer Jason Greenblatt—emailed Clovis about a potential Campaign
meeting with Berel Lazar, the Chief Rabbi of Russia. The email stated that Klein had contacted Lazar in
February about a possible Trump-Putin meeting and that Lazar was "a very close confidante of Putin."
DJTFP00011547 (5/15/16 Email, Klein to Clovis (5:45:24 p.m.)). The investigation did not find evidence that
Clovis responded to Klein's email or that any further contacts of significance came out of Klein's subsequent
meeting with Greenblatt and Rabbi Lazar at Trump Tower. Klein 8/30/18 302, at 2.
476 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ¶ 21(a).
477
478
479
480 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ¶ 21; 7/14/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Timofeev (11:57:24
p.m.); 7/15/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud; 7/27/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud (2:14:18 p.m.).
95
directly with Clovis and Phares in connection with the summit of the Transatlantic Parliamentary
Group on Counterterrorism (TAG), a group for which Phares was co-secretary genera1.481 On July
16, 2016, Papadopoulos attended the TAG summit in Washington, D.C., where he sat next to
Clovis (as reflected in the photograph below).482
George Papadopoulos (far right) and Sam Clovis (second from right)
Although Clovis claimed to have no recollection of attending the TAG summit, 483
Papadopoulos remembered discussing Russia and a foreign policy trip with Clovis and Phares
during the event.484 Papadopoulos's recollection is consistent with emails sent before and after the
TAG summit. The pre-summit messages included a July 11, 2016 email in which Phares suggested
meeting Papadopoulos the day after the summit to chat,485 and a July 12 message in the same chain
in which Phares advised Papadopoulos that other summit attendees "are very nervous about Russia.
So be aware."486 Ten days after the summit, Papadopoulos sent an email to Mifsud listing Phares
and Clovis as other "participants" in a potential meeting at the London Academy of Diplomacy.487
Finally, Papadopoulos's recollection is also consistent with handwritten notes from a
481 Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 16-17; 9th TAG Summit in Washington DC,
Transatlantic Parliament Group on Counter Terrorism.

482
9th TAG Summit in Washington DC, Transatlantic Parliament Group on Counter Terrorism.
483
484 Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 16-17.

485
7/11/16 Email, Phares to Papadopoulos.
486
7/12/16 Email, Phares to Papadopoulos (14:52:29).
487
7/27/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud (14:14:18).
96
Attorney _____________ Work Product // May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
journal that he kept at the time.488 Those notes, which are reprinted in part below, appear to refer to potential
September 2016 meetings in London with representatives of the "office of Putin," and suggest that Phares,
Clovis, and Papadopoulos ("Walid/Sam me") would attend without the official backing of the Campaign
("no official letter/no message from Trump").489
September:
Have an exploratory meeting to
or lose. In September — if allowed they
will blast Mr. Trump.
We want the meeting in
London/England
Walid/Sam me
No official letter/no message
from Trump
They are talking to us.
-It is a lot of risk.  4 4 .'5 10 (A
-Office of Putin. ft- 7 14- r t,
-Explore: we are a campaign.
tcpt<,r__ Lt c‘. v` iet
off Israel! EGYPT .5r-k f6-1-C

Willingness to meet the FM sp _rA4 101.-5
with Walid/Sam
-FM coming ts.,V1514119
(
-Useful to have a session with w,w

him.
fi „
5 -
ki/11,
." •
Later communications indicate that Clovis determined that he (Clovis) could not travel. On
August 15, 2016, Papadopoulos emailed Clovis that he had received requests from multiple foreign
governments, "even Russian," for "closed door workshops/consultations abroad," and asked whether
there was still interest for Clovis, Phares, and Papadopoulos "to go on that trip." 490 Clovis copied
Phares on his response, which said that he could not "travel before the election" but that he "would
encourage [Papadopoulos] and Walid to make the trips, if it is feasible." 49I

489 Papadopoulos declined to assist in deciphering his notes, telling investigators that he could not
read his own handwriting from the journal. Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 21. The notes, however, appear
to read as listed in the column to the left of the image above.
490
8/15/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis (11:59:07 a.m.).
97
491
8/15/16 Email, Clovis to Papadopoulos (12:01:45 p.m.).
Affeeney-Werk-Preyeitte+ // May Contain Material Protected Undcr Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
Papadopoulos was dismissed from the Trump Campaign in early October 2016, after an
interview he gave to the Russian news agency Interfax generated adverse publicity.492
f Trump Campaign Knowledge of "Dirt"
Papadopoulos admitted telling at least one individual outside of the Campaign—

specifically, the then-Greek foreign minister—about Russia's obtaining Clinton-related emails.493
In addition, a different foreign government informed the FBI that, 10 days after meeting with
Mifsud in late April 2016, Papadopoulos suggested that the Trump Campaign had received
indications from the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous
release of information that would be damaging to Hillary Clinton.494 (This conversation occurred
after the GRU spearphished Clinton Campaign chairman John Podesta and stole his emails, and the
GRU hacked into the DCCC and DNC, see Volume I, Sections III.A & III.B, supra.) Such
disclosures raised questions about whether Papadopoulos informed any Trump Campaign official
about the emails.
When interviewed, Papadopoulos and the Campaign officials who interacted with him told
the Office that they could not recall Papadopoulos's sharing the information that Russia had
obtained "dirt" on candidate Clinton in the form of emails or that Russia could assist the Campaign
through the anonymous release of information about Clinton. Papadopoulos stated that he could
not clearly recall having told anyone on the Campaign and wavered about whether he accurately
remembered an incident in which Clovis had been upset after hearing Papadopoulos tell Clovis that
Papadopoulos thought "they have her emails."495 The Campaign officials who interacted or
corresponded with Papadopoulos have similarly stated, with varying degrees of certainty, that he
did not tell them. Senior policy advisor Stephen Miller, for example, did not remember hearing
anything from Papadopoulos or Clovis about Russia having emails of or dirt on candidate
Clinton.496 Clovis stated that he did not recall anyone, including Papadopoulos, having given him
non-public information that a foreign overnment mi ht be in •ossession of material dama m to Hillar
Clinton.497
George Papadopoulos: Sanctions Have Done Little More Than to Turn Russia Towards
492
China, Interfax (Sept. 30, 2016).

Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 14-15; Def. Sent. Mem., United States v. George Papadopoulos,
493
1:17-cr-182 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 2018), Doc. 45.

See footnote 465 of Volume I, Section IV.A.2.d, supra.
494
495
Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 5; Papadopoulos 8/11/17 302, at 5; Papadopoulos 9/20/17
302, at 2.
496
S. Miller 12/14/17 302, at 10.
497
498
99
Attorney-Werk-Prefittet II May Contain Material Protectcd Undcr Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
No documentary evidence, and nothing in the email accounts or other

communications facilities reviewed by the Office, shows that
Papadopoulos shared this information with the Campaign.
g. Additional George Papadopoulos Contact
The Office investigated another Russia-related contact with Papadopoulos. The Office was
not fully able to explore the contact because the individual at issue—Sergei Millian—remained out
of the country since the inception of our investigation and declined to meet with members of the
Office despite our repeated efforts to obtain an interview.
Papadopoulos first connected with Millian via Linkedln on July 15, 2016, shortly after
Papadopoulos had attended the TAG Summit with Clovis.5°° Millian, an American citizen who is a
native of Belarus, introduced himself "as president of [the] New York-based Russian American
Chamber of Commerce," and claimed that through that position he had "insider knowledge and direct
access to the top hierarchy in Russian politics."501 Papadopoulos asked Timofeev whether he had
heard of Millian.502 Although Timofeev said no,503 Papadopoulos met Millian in New York City.504
The meetings took place on July 30 and August 1, 2016.5°5 Afterwards, Millian invited Papadopoulos
to attend—and potentially speak at—two international energy conferences, including one that was to
be held in Moscow in September 2016.506 Papadopoulos ultimately did not attend either conference.
On July 31, 2016, following his first in-person meeting with Millian, Papadopoulos emailed
Trump Campaign official Bo Denysyk to say that he had been contacted "by some leaders of Russian-
American voters here in the US about their interest in voting for Mr. Trump," and to ask whether he
should "put you in touch with their group (US-Russia chamber of commerce)."507 Denysyk thanked
Papadopoulos "for taking the initiative," but asked him to "hold off with
499
500 7/15/16 Linkedln Message, Millian to Papadopoulos.

5°1
7/15/16 Linkedln Message, Millian to Papadopoulos.
"2 7/22/16 Facebook Message, Papadopoulos to Timofeev (7:40:23 p.m.); 7/26/16
Facebook Message, Papadopoulos to Timofeev (3:08:57 p.m.).
7/23/16 Facebook Message, Timofeev to Papadopoulos (4:31:37 a.m.); 7/26/16
5°3
Facebook Message, Timofeev to Papadopoulos (3:37:16 p.m.).

504 7/16/16 Text Messages, Papadopoulos & Millian (7:55:43 p.m.).
7/30/16 Text Messages, Papadopoulos & Millian (5:38 & 6:05 p.m.); 7/31/16 Text Messages,
5°5
Millian & Papadopoulos (3:48 & 4:18 p.m.); 8/1/16 Text Message, Millian to Papadopoulos (8:19 p.m.).
"6 8/2/16 Text Messages, Millian & Papadopoulos (3:04 & 3:05 p.m.); 8/3/16 Facebook
Messages, Papadopoulos & Millian (4:07:37 a.m. & 1:11:58 p.m.).
5°7
7/31/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Denysyk (12:29:59 p.m.).
100
Attefite,44Lefleilrettuet // May Contain Material Protected Undcr Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
outreach to Russian-Americans" because "too many articles" had already portrayed the Campaign,
then-campaign chairman Paul Manafort, and candidate Trump as "being pro-Russian."508
On August 23, 2016, Millian sent a Facebook message to Papadopoulos promising that he
would "share with you a disruptive technology that might be instrumental in your political work
for the campaign."509 Papadopoulos claimed to have no recollection of this matter.51°
On November 9, 2016, shortly after the election, Papadopoulos arranged to meet Millian in
Chicago to discuss business opportunities, including potential work with Russian "billionaires who
are not under sanctions."511 The meeting took place on November 14, 2016, at the Trump Hotel and
Tower in Chicago.512 According to Papadopoulos, the two men discussed partnering on business
deals, but Papadopoulos perceived that Millian's attitude toward him changed when Papadopoulos
stated that he was only pursuing private-sector opportunities and was not interested in a job in the
Administration.513 The two remained in contact, however, and had extended online discussions about
possible business opportunities in Russia.514 The two also arranged to meet at a Washington, D.C. bar
when both attended Trump's inauguration in late January 2017.515
3. Carter Page
Carter Page worked for the Trump Campaign from January 2016 to September 2016. He was
formally and publicly announced as a foreign policy advisor by the candidate in March 2016.516
Page had lived and worked in Russia, and he had been approached by Russian intelligence officers
several years before he volunteered for the Trump Campaign. During his time with the Campaign,
Page advocated pro-Russia foreign policy positions and traveled to Moscow in his personal capacity.
Russian intelligence officials had formed relationships with Page in 2008 and 2013 and Russian
officials may have focused on Page in 2016 because of his affiliation with the Campaign. However,
the investigation did not establish that Page coordinated with the Russian government in its efforts
to interfere with the 2016 presidential election.
508 7/31/16 Email, Denysyk to Papadopoulos (21:54:52).

509 8/23/16 Facebook Message, Millian to Papadopoulos (2:55:36 a.m.).
511 11/10/16 Facebook Message, Millian to Papadopoulos (9:35:05 p.m.).
512 11/14/16 Facebook Message, Millian to Papadopoulos (1:32:11 a.m.).
513 Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 19.
514 E.g., 11/29/16 Facebook Messages, Papadopoulos & Millian (5:09 - 5:11 p.m.); 12/7/16
Facebook Message, Millian to Papadopoulos (5:10:54 p.m.).
515
1/20/17 Facebook Messages, Papadopoulos & Millian (4:37-4:39 a.m.).
516 Page was interviewed b the FBI durin five •
meetin• s in March 2017, before the Special
Counsel's appointment.
101
Atterfter Wer-k-Pfeelttet II May Contain Matcrial Protected Undcr Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
a. Background
Before he began working for the Campaign in January 2016, Page had substantial prior
experience studying Russian policy issues and living and working in Moscow. From 2004 to 2007,
Page was the deputy branch manager of Merrill Lynch's Moscow office.517 There, he worked on
transactions involving the Russian energy company Gazprom and came to know Gazprorn's
deputy chief financial officer, Sergey Yatsenko.518
In 2008, Page founded Global Energy Capital LLC (GEC), an investment mana ement and
advisor firm focused on the ener sector in emerging markets.519
520 The company otherwise had no sources of income, and
Page was forced to draw down his life savings to support himself and pursue his business
venture.521 Pa e asked Yatsenko to work with him at GEC as a senior advisor on a contin enc
basis,
In 2008, Page met Alexander Bulatov, a Russian government official who worked at the
Russian Consulate in New York.523 Pa e later learned that Bulatov was a Russian intelli ence
officer, .524
In 2013, Victor Podobnyy, another Russian intelligence officer working covertly in the
United States under diplomatic cover, formed a relationship with Page.525 Podobnyy met Page at an
energy symposium in New York City and began exchanging emails with him.526 Podobnyy and Page
also met in person on multiple occasions, during which Page offered his outlook on the future of the
energy industry and provided documents to Podobnyy about the energy business.' In a recorded
conversation on April 8, 2013, Podobnyy told another intelligence officer that Page was interested
in business opportunities in Russia.528 In Podobnyy's words, Page "got hooked on
Testimony of Carter Page, Hearing Before the US. House of Representatives, Permanent Select
517
Committee on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 40 (Nov. 2, 2017) (exhibit).

518
Page 3/30/17 302, at 10.
519
520
521
522
Page 3/30/17 302, at 10;
523
524
525 Complaint ¶¶ 22, 24, 32, United States v. Buryakov,

1:15-mj-215 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2015), Doe. 1 ("Buryakov Complaint").
526
Buryakov Complaint ¶ 34.
527
Buryakov Complaint ¶ 34.
528 Buryakov Complaint ¶ 32.
102
Gazprom thinking that if they have a project, he could . . . rise up. Maybe he can. . . . [I]t's obvious that
he wants to earn lots of money."529 Podobnyy said that he had led Page on by "feed[ing] him empty
promises" that Podobnyy would use his Russian business connections to help Page.53° Podobnyy told
the other intelligence officer that his method of recruiting foreign sources was to promise them favors
and then discard them once he obtained relevant information from them.531
In 2015, Podobnyy and two other Russian intelligence officers were charged with conspiracy
to act as an unregistered agent of a foreign government.532 The criminal complaint detailed Podobnyy's
interactions with and conversations about Page, who was identified only as "Male-1."533 Based on the
criminal complaint's description of the interactions, Page was aware that he was the individual
described as "Male-1."534 Page later spoke with a Russian government official at the United Nations
General Assembly and identified himself so that the official would understand he was "Male-1" from
the Podobn com laint.535 Pa: ,e told the official that he "didn't
do anything" .536
In interviews with the FBI before the Office's•opening, Page acknowledged that he
understood that the individuals he had associated with were members of the Russian intelligence
services, but he stated that he had only provided immaterial non-public information to them and that
he did not view this relationship as a backchanne1.537 Page told investigating agents that "the more
immaterial non-public information I give them, the better for this country."538
b. Origins of and Early Campaign Work
In January 2016, Page began volunteering on an informal, unpaid basis for the Trump
Campaign after Ed Cox, a state Republican Party official, introduced Page to Trump Campaign
officials.539 Page told the Office that his goal in working on the Campaign was to help candidate
Trump improve relations with Russia.54° To that end, Page emailed Campaign officials offering his
thoughts on U.S.-Russia relations, prepared talking points and briefing memos on Russia, and
529 Buryakov Complaint.

53°
Buryakov Complaint.
Buryakov Complaint.
531
See Buryakov Com laint; see also Indictment United States v. Buryakov, 1 15-cr-73
532
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2015), Doc. 10;

533
Buryakov Complaint ¶1132-34;
534
535
Page 3/16/17 302, at 4;
536
Page 3/16/17 302, at 4;

537
Page 3/30/17 302, at 6; Page 3/31/17 302, at 1.
538
Page 3/31/17 302, at 1.
539
Page 3/16/17 302, at 1;
54°
Page 3/10/17 302, at 2.
103
proposed that candidate Trump meet with President Vladimir Putin in Moscow.541
In communications with Campaign officials, Page also repeatedly touted his high-level
contacts in Russia and his ability to forge connections between candidate Trump and senior
Russian governmental officials. For example, on January 30, 2016, Page sent an email to senior
Campaign officials stating that he had "spent the past week in Europe and ha[d] been in discussions
with some individuals with close ties to the Kremlin" who recognized that Trump could have a
"game-changing effect . . . in bringing the end of the new Cold War." 542 The email stated that
"[t]hrough [his] discussions with these high level contacts," Page believed that "a direct meeting
in Moscow between Mr[.] Trump and Putin could be arran ed."543 Pa e closed the email b
criticizing U.S. sanctions on Russia.544
On March 21, 2016, candidate Trump formally and publicly identified Page as a member of
his foreign policy team to advise on Russia and the energy sector.546 Over the next several months,
Page continued providing policy-related work product to Campaign officials. For example, in April
2016, Page provided feedback on an outline for a foreign policy speech that the candidate gave at the
Mayflower Hote1,547 see Volume I, Section IV.A.4, infra. In May 2016, Page prepared an outline of
an energy policy speech for the Campaign and then traveled to Bismarck, North Dakota, to watch the
candidate deliver the speech.548 Chief policy advisor Sam Clovis expressed appreciation for Page's
work and praised his work to other Campaign officials.549
c. Carter Page's July 2016 Trip To Moscow
Page's affiliation with the Trump Campaign took on a higher profile and drew the attention
of Russian officials after the candidate named him a foreign policy advisor. As a result, in late April
2016, Page was invited to give a speech at the July 2016 commencement ceremony at the
See, e.g., 1/30/16 Email, Page to Glassner et al.; 3/17/16 Email, Page to Clovis (attaching a
541
"President's Daily Brief" prepared by Page that discussed the "severe de radation of U.S.-Russia relations
following Washington's meddling" in Ukraine);
542 1
/30/16 Email, Page to Glassner et al.
543
1/30/16 Email, Page to Glassner et al.
544
1/30/16 Email, Page to Glassner et al.
545
A Transcript of Donald Trum 's Meetin with the Washington Post Editorial Board,
546
Washington Post (Mar. 21, 2016);.

547
548
549
See, e.g., 3/28/16 Email, Clovis to Lewandowski et al. (forwarding notes.prepared by Page and
stating, "I wanted to let you know the type of work some of our advisors are capable of.").
104
Attorney __________________ Work Product II May Contain Material Protcctcd Undcr Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
New Economic School (NES) in Moscow.55° The NES commencement ceremony generally featured
high-profile speakers; for example, President Barack Obama delivered a commencement address at
the school in 2009.551 NES officials told the Office that the interest in inviting Page to speak at NES
was based entirely on his status as a Trump Campaign advisor who served as the candidate's Russia
expert.552 Andrej Krickovic, an associate of Page's and assistant professor at the Higher School of
Economics in Russia, recommended that NES rector Shlomo Weber invite Page to give the
commencement address based on his connection to the Trump Campaign.553 Denis Klimentov, an
employee of NES, said that when Russians learned of Page's involvement in the Trump Campaign in
March 2016, the excitement was palpable.554 Weber recalled that in summer 2016 there was
substantial interest in the Trump Campaign in Moscow, and he felt that bringing a member of the
Campaign to the school would be beneficia1.555
Page was eager to accept the invitation to speak at NES, and he sought approval from
Trump Campaign officials to make the trip to Russia.556 On May 16, 2016, while that request was
still under consideration, Page emailed Clovis, J.D. Gordon, and Walid Phares and suggested that
candidate Trump take his place speaking at the commencement ceremony in Moscow.557 On June
19, 2016, Page followed up again to request approval to speak at the NES event and to reiterate
that NES "would love to have Mr. Trump speak at this annual celebration" in Page's place. 558
Campaign manager Corey Lewandowski responded the same day, saying, "If you want to do this,
it would be out side [sic] of your role with the DJT for President campaign. I am certain Mr. Trump
will not be able to attend."559
In early July 2016, Page traveled to Russia for the NES events. On July 5, 2016, Denis
Klimentov, copying his brother, Dmitri Klimentov,56° emailed Maria Zakharova, the Director of the
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Information and Press Department, about Page's visit and his
connection to the Trump Campaign.561 Denis Klimentov said in the email that he wanted to draw the
Russian government's attention to Page's visit in Moscow.562 His message to Zakharova
550 Page 3/16/17 302, at 2-3; Page 3/10/17 302, at 3.

551 S. Weber 7/28/17 302, at 3.
552 Y. Weber 6/1/17 302, at 4-5; S. Weber 7/28/17 302, at 3.
553 See Y. Weber 6/1/17 302, at 4; S. Weber 7/28/17 302, at 3.
554 De. Klimentov 6/9/17 302, at 2.
555 S. Weber 7/28/17 302, at 3.
556 See 5/16/16 Email, Page to Phares et al. (referring to submission of a "campaign advisor request
form").
557 ; 5/16/16 Email, Page to Phares et al.
558
6/19/16 Email, Page to Gordon et al.
559
6/19/16 Email, Lewandowski to Page et al.
56°
Dmitri Klimentov is a New York-based public relations consultant.
561
7/5/16 Email, Klimentov to Zakharova (translated).
562
105
Attorney Work Product II May Contain Material Protected Undcr Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
continued: "Page is Trump's adviser on foreign policy. He is a known businessman; he used to

work in Russia. . . . If you have any questions, I will be happy to help contact him." 563 Dmitri
Klimentov then contacted Russian Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov about Page's visit to see if
Peskov wanted to introduce Page to any Russian government officials.564 The following day,
Peskov responded to what appears to have been the same Denis Klimentov-Zakharova email
thread. Peskov wrote, "I have read about [Page]. Specialists say that he is far from being the main
one. So I better not initiate a meeting in the Kremlin."565
On July 7, 2016, Page delivered the first of his two speeches in Moscow at NES.566 In the
speech, Page criticized the U.S. government's foreign policy toward Russia, stating that
"Washington and other Western capitals have impeded potential progress through their often
hypocritical focus on ideas such as democratization, inequality, corruption and regime change."567
On July 8, 2016, Page delivered a speech during the NES commencement.568 After Page delivered
his commencement address, Russian Deputy Prime Minister and NES board member Arkady
Dvorkovich spoke at the ceremony and stated that the sanctions the United States had imposed on
Russia had hurt the NES.569 Page and Dvorkovich shook hands at the commencement ceremony,
and Weber recalled that Dvorkovich made statements to Pa e about workin to ether in the future.57°
Page said that, during his time in Moscow, he met with friends and associates he knew from
when he lived in Russia, including Andrey Baranov, a former Gazprom employee who had become
the head of investor relations at Rosneft, a Russian energy company.' Page stated that he and Baranov
talked about "immaterial non-public" information.573 Page believed he and Baranov discussed
Rosneft president Igor Sechin, and he thought Baranov might have mentioned
563
564
Dm. Klimentov 11/27/18 302, at 1-2.
565
7/6/16 Email, Peskov to Klimentov (translated).
566
Page 3/10/17 302, at 3.
567
See Carter W. Page, The Lecture of Trump's Advisor Carter Page in Moscow, YouTube
Channel Katehon Think Tank, Posted July 7, 2016, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?
time_continue=28&v=1CYF29saA9w. Page also provided the FBI with a copy of his speech and slides
from the speech. See Carter Page, "The Evolution of the World Economy: Trends and Potential," Speech at
National Economic Speech (July 7, 2016).
568 Page 3/10/17 302, at 3.
569
Page 3/16/17 302, at 3.
57°
S. Weber 7/28/17 302, at 4.
571
572
Page 3/10/17 302, at 3; Page 3/30/17 302, at 3; Page 3/31/17 302, at 2.

573
Page 3/30/17 302, at 3.
106
the possibility of a sale of a stake in Rosneft in passing.574 Page recalled mentioning his involvement
in the Trump Campaign with Baranov, although he did not remember details of the conversation. 5'
Page also met with individuals from Tatneft, a Russian energy company, to discuss possible business
deals, including having Page work as a consultant.576
On July 8, 2016, while he was in Moscow, Page emailed several Campaign officials and stated
he would send "a readout soon regarding some incredible insights and outreach I've received from a
few Russian legislators and senior members of the Presidential Administration here."' On July 9, 2016,
Page emailed Clovis, writing in pertinent part:
Russian Deputy Prime minister and NES board member Arkady Dvorkovich also spoke before
the event. In a private conversation, Dvorkovich expressed strong support for Mr. Trump and
a desire to work together toward devising better solutions in response to the vast range of
current international problems. Based on feedback from a diverse array of other sources close
to the Presidential Administration, it was readily apparent that this sentiment is widely held at
all levels of government.'
Des ite these re.resentations to the am • al :n, y
rand Ju.ny
The Office was unable to obtain additional evidenceor testimony about who Page may
have met or communicated with in Moscow; thus, Page's activities in Russia—as described in his
emails with the Campaign—were not fully explained.
574
Pa e 3/30/17 302 at 9.
575 Page 3/30/17 302, at 3.

576
Page 3/10/17 302, at 3; Page 3/30/17 302, at 7; Page 3/31/17 302, at 2.
577 7/8/16 Email, Page to Dahl & Gordon.
578 7/9/16 Email, Page to Clovis.
579
580
581
582
107
d. Later Campaign Work and Removal from the Campaign
In July 2016, after returning from Russia, Page traveled to the Republican National
Convention in Cleveland.583 While there, Page met Russian Ambassador to the United States
Sergey Kislyak; that interaction is described in Volume I, Section IV.A.6.a, infra.'" Page later
emailed Campaign officials with feedback he said he received from ambassadors he had met at the
Convention, and he wrote that Ambassador Kisl ak was ver worried about candidate Clinton's
world views.585
Following the Convention, Page's trip to Moscow and his advocacy for pro-Russia foreign
policy drew the media's attention and began to generate substantial press coverage. The Campaign
responded by distancing itself from Page, describing him as an "informal foreign policy advisor"
who did "not speak for Mr. Trump or the campaign."587 On September 23, 2016, Yahoo! News
reported that U.S. intelligence officials were investigating whether Page had opened private
communications with senior Russian officials to discuss U.S. sanctions policy under a possible
Trump Administration.'" A Campaign spokesman told Yahoo! News that Page had "no role" in the
Campaign and that the Campaign was "not aware of any of his activities, past or present."589 On
September 24, 2016, Page was formally removed from the Campaign.59°
Although Page had been removed from the Campaign, after the election he sought a position
in the Trump Administration.591 On November 14, 2016, he submitted an application to the
Transition Team that inflated his credentials and experiences, stating that in his capacity as a Trump
Campaign foreign policy advisor he had met with "top world leaders" and "effectively
583
Page 3/10/17 302, at 4; Page 3/16/17 302, at 3.
584
Page 3/10/17 302, at 4; Page 3/16/17 302, at 3.
585 ; 7/23/16 Email, Page to Clovis; 7/25/16
Email, Page to Gordon & Schmitz.
586
See, e.g., Steven Mufson & Tom Hamburger, Trump Advisor's Public Comments, Ties to
587
Moscow Stir Unease in Both Parties, Washington Post (Aug. 5, 2016).

Michael Isikoff, U.S. Intel Officials Probe Ties Between Trump Adviser and Kremlin,
588
Yahoo! News (Sept. 23, 2016).

589
Michael Isikoff, U.S. Intel Officials Probe Ties Between Trump Adviser and. Kremlin, Yahoo!
News (Sept. 23, 2016); see also 9/25/16 Email, Hicks to Conway & Bannon (instructing that inquiries about
Page should be answered with "[h]e was announced as an informal adviser in March. Since then he has had
no role or official contact with the campaign. We have no knowledge of activities past or present and he now
officially has been removed from all lists etc.").
Page 3/16/17 302, at 2; see, e.g., 9/23/16 Email, J. Miller to Bannon & S. Miller
59°
(discussing plans to remove Page from the campaign).

591 , "Transition Online Form," 11/14/16 (.1.1
108
Attorney ___________ Work Product // tcd Undcr Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
responded to diplomatic outreach efforts from senior government officials in Asia, Europe, the
Middle East, Africa, [and] the Americas."592 Page received no response from the Transition Team.
When Page took a personal trip to Moscow in December 2016, he met again with at least one
Russian government official. That interaction and a discussion of the December trip are set forth
in Volume I, Section IV.B.6, infra.
4. Dimitri Simes and the Center for the National Interest
Members of the Trump Campaign interacted on several occasions with the Center for the
National Interest (CNI), principally through its President and Chief Executive Officer, Dimitri
Simes. CNI is a think tank with expertise in and connections to the Russian government. Simes was
born in the former Soviet Union and immigrated to the United States in the 1970s. In April 2016,
candidate Trump delivered his first speech on foreign policy and national security at an event hosted
by the National Interest, a publication affiliated with CNI. Then-Senator Jeff Sessions and Russian
Ambassador Kislyak both attended the event and, as a result, it gained some attention in relation to
Sessions's confirmation hearings to become Attorney General. Sessions had various other contacts
with CNI during the campaign period on foreign-policy matters, including Russia. Jared Kushner
also interacted with Simes about Russian issues during the campaign. The investigation did not
identify evidence that the Campaign passed or received any messages to or from the Russian
government through CNI or Simes.
a. CNI and Dimitri Simes Connect with the Trump Campaign
CNI is a Washington-based non-profit organization that grew out of a center founded by

former President Richard Nixon.593 CNI describes itself "as a voice for strategic realism in U.S.
foreign policy," and publishes a bi-monthly foreign policy magazine, the National Interest.594 CNI
is overseen by a board of directors and an advisory council that is largely honorary and whose
members at the relevant time included Sessions, who served as an advisor to candidate Trump on
national security and foreign policy issues.595
Dimitri Simes is president and CEO of CNI and the publisher and CEO of the National
Interest.596 Simes was born in the former Soviet Union, emigrated to the United States in the early
1970s, and joined CNI's predecessor after working at the Carnegie Endowment for International
592 , "Transition Online Form," 11/14/16
593
Simes 3/8/18 302, at 1-2.
594
About the Center, CNI, available at https://cftni.org/about/.
595
Advisory Counsel, CNI, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20161030025331/
http://cftni.org/about/advisory-council/; Simes 3/8/18 302, at 3-4; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 4;
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 16.
596
Simes 3/8/18 302, at 2.
109
Attertley-Werk--Preduet II May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
Peace.597 Simes personally has many contacts with current and former Russian government
officials,598 as does CNI collectively. As CNI stated when seeking a grant from the Carnegie
Corporation in 2015, CNI has "unparalleled access to Russian officials and politicians among
Washington think tanks,"599 in part because CNI has arranged for U.S. delegations to visit Russia
and for Russian delegations to visit the United States as part of so-called "Track II" diplomatic
efforts.60°
On March 14, 2016, CNI board member Richard Plepler organized a luncheon for CNI and
its honorary chairman, Henry Kissinger, at the Time Warner Building in New York.60I The idea
behind the event was to generate interest in CNI's work and recruit new board members for CNI.602
Along with Simes, attendees at the event included Jared Kushner, son-in-law of candidate Trump.6°3
Kushner told the Office that the event came at a time when the Trump Campaign was having trouble
securing support from experienced foreign policy professionals and that, as a result, he decided to
seek Simes's assistance during the March 14 event.604
Simes and Kushner spoke again on a March 24, 2016 telephone cal1,605 three days after
Trump had publicly named the team of foreign policy advisors that had been put together on short
notice.606 On March 31, 2016, Simes and Kushner had an in-person, one-on-one meeting in
Kushner's New York office.607 During that meeting, Simes told Kushner that the best way to handle
foreign-policy issues for the Trump Campaign would be to organize an advisory group of experts to
meet with candidate Trump and develop a foreign policy approach that was consistent with Trump's
voice.608 Simes believed that Kushner was receptive to that suggestion.609
Simes also had contact with other individuals associated with the Trump Campaign regarding
the Campaign's foreign policy positions. For example, on June 17, 2016, Simes sent J.D. Gordon an
email with a "memo to Senator Sessions that we discussed at our recent meeting"
597
Simes 3/8/18 302, at 1-2; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 19.
598
Simes 3/27/18 302, at 10-15.
599
C00011656 (Rethinking U.S.-Russia Relations, CNI (Apr. 18, 2015)).
600
Simes 3/8/18 302, at 5; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 29-30; Zakheim 1/25/18 302, at 3.
601
Simes 3/8/18 302, at 6; C00006784 (3/11/16 Email, Gilbride to Saunders (3:43:12 p.m.); cf.
Zakheim 1/25/18 302, at 1 (Kissinger was CNI's "Honorary Chairman of the Board"); Boyd 1/24/18 302, at
2; P. Sanders 2/15/18 302, at 5.
602
Simes 3/8/18 302, at 5-6; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 2.
603 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 6; Kushner 4/11/18 302 at 2.
604 Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 2.
605
Simes 3/8/18 302, at 6-7.
606 see Volume I, Section IV.A.2, supra.
Simes 3/8/18 302, at 7-9.
607
608
Simes 3/8/18 302, at 7-8.
609
Simes 3/8/18 302, at 8; see also Boyd 1/24/18 302, at 2.
110
and asked Gordon to both read it and share it with Sessions. The memorandum proposed building
a "small and carefully selected group of experts" to assist Sessions with the Campaign, operating
under the assumption "that Hillary Clinton is very vulnerable on national security and foreign
policy issues." The memorandum outlined key issues for the Campaign, including a "new
beginning with Russia."61°
b. National Interest Hosts a Foreign Policy Speech at the Mayflower Hotel
During both their March 24 phone call and their March 31 in-person meeting, Simes and
Kushner discussed the possibility of CNI hosting a foreign policy speech by candidate Trump.6I I
Following those conversations, Simes agreed that he and others associated with CNI would
provide behind-the-scenes input on the substance of the foreign-policy speech and that CNI
officials would coordinate the logistics of the speech with Sessions and his staff, including
Sessions's chief of staff, Rick Dearborn.612
In mid-April 2016, Kushner put Simes in contact with senior policy advisor Stephen Miller
and forwarded to Simes an outline of the foreign-policy speech that Miller had prepared.613 Simes
sent back to the Campaign bullet points with ideas for the speech that he had drafted with CNI
Executive Director Paul Saunders and board member Richard Burt.614 Simes received subsequent
draft outlines from Miller, and he and Saunders spoke to Miller by phone about substantive changes
to the speech.615 It is not clear, however, whether CNI officials received an actual draft of the speech
for comment; while Saunders recalled having received an actual draft, Simes did not, and the emails
that CNI produced to this Office do not contain such a draft.616
After board members expressed concern to Simes that CNI's hosting the speech could be
perceived as an endorsement of a particular candidate, CNI decided to have its publication, the
National Interest, serve as the host and to have the event at the National Press Club.617 Kushner
later requested that the event be moved to the Mayflower Hotel, which was another venue that
Simes had mentioned during initial discussions with the Campaign, in order to address concerns
about security and capacity.618
610 C00008187 (6/17/16 Email, Simes to Gordon (3:35:45 p.m.)).

611 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 7.
612 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 8-11; C00008923 (4/6/16 Email, Simes to Burt (2:22:28 p.m.));
Burt 2/9/18 302, at 7.

C00008551 (4/17/16 Email, Kushner to Simes (2:44:25 p.m.)); C00006759 (4/14/16
613
Email Kushner to Simes & S. Miller (12:30 p.m.)).

614 Burt 2/9/18 302, at 7; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 7-8.
615 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 13; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 7-8.
616 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 13; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 7-8.

617 Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 8; Simes 3/8/18 302, at 12; C00003834-43 (4/22/16 Email,
Simes to Boyd et al. (8:47 a.m.)).

618
Simes 3/8/18 302, at 12, 18; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 11.
111
On April 25, 2016, Saunders booked event rooms at the Mayflower to host both the speech
and a VIP reception that was to be held beforehand.619 Saunders understood that the reception—at
which invitees would have the chance to meet candidate Trump—would be a small event.620
Saunders decided who would attend by looking at the list of CNI's invitees to the speech itself and
then choosing a subset for the reception.621 CNI's invitees to the reception included Sessions and
Kislyak.622 The week before the speech Simes had informed Kislyak that he would be invited to the
speech, and that he would have the opportunity to meet Trump.623
When the pre-speech reception began on April 27, a receiving line was quickly organized so
that attendees could meet Trump.624 Sessions first stood next to Trump to introduce him to the
members of Congress who were in attendance.625 After those members had been introduced, Simes
stood next to Trump and introduced him to the CNI invitees in attendance, including Kislyak.626
Simes perceived the introduction to be positive and friendly, but thought it clear that Kislyak and
Trump had just met for the first time.627 Kislyak also met Kushner during the pre-speech reception.
The two shook hands and chatted for a minute or two, during which Kushner recalled Kislyak saying,
"we like what your candidate is saying . . . it's refreshing."628
Several public reports state that, in addition to speaking to Kushner at the pre-speech
reception, Kislyak also met or conversed with Sessions at that time. 629 Sessions stated to
investigators, however, that he did not remember any such conversation.630 Nor did anyone else
affiliated with CNI or the National Interest specifically recall a conversation or meeting between
Sessions and Kislyak at the pre-speech reception.631 It appears that, if a conversation occurred at
the pre-speech reception, it was a brief one conducted in public view, similar to the exchange
between Kushner and Kislyak.
619 Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 11-12; C00006651-57 (Mayflower Group Sales Agreement).
620 Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 12-13.
621 Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 12.
622 C00002575 (Attendee List); C00008536 (4/25/16 Email, Simes to Kushner (4:53:45 p.m.)).
623
Simes 3/8/18 302, at 19-20.
624
Simes 3/8/18 302, at 21.
625
Simes 3/8/18 302, at 21.
626
Simes 3/8/18 302, at 21.
627
Simes 3/8/18 302, at 21.
Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 4.
628
See, e.g., Ken Dilanian, Did Trump, Kushner, Sessions Have an Undisclosed Meeting
629
With Russian?, NBC News (June 1, 2016); Julia Ioffe, Why Did Jeff Sessions Really Meet With
Sergey Kislyak, The Atlantic (June 13, 2017).
630
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22.
631
Simes 3/8/18 302, at 21; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 14, 21; Boyd 1/24/18 302, at 3-4; Heilbrunn
2/1/18 302, at 6; Statement Regarding President Trump's April 27, 2016 Foreign Policy Speech at the Center
for the National Interest, CNI (Mar. 8, 2017).
112
The Office found no evidence that Kislyak conversed with either Trump or Sessions after
the speech, or would have had the opportunity to do so. Simes, for example, did not recall seeing
Kislyak at the post-speech luncheon,632 and the only witness who accounted for Sessions's
whereabouts stated that Sessions may have spoken to the press after the event but then departed
for Capitol Hi11.633 Saunders recalled, based in part on a food-related request he received from a
Campaign staff member, that Trump left the hotel a few minutes after the speech to go to the
airport.634
c. Jeff Sessions's Post-Speech Interactions with CNI
In the wake of Sessions's confirmation hearings as Attorney General, questions arose about
whether Sessions's campaign-period interactions with CNI apart from the Mayflower speech
included any additional meetings with Ambassador Kislyak or involved Russian-related matters.
With respect to Kislyak contacts, on May 23, 2016, Sessions attended CNI's Distinguished Service
Award dinner at the Four Seasons Hotel in Washington, D.C.635 Sessions attended a pre-dinner
reception and was seated at one of two head tables for the event.636 A seating chart prepared by
Saunders indicates that Sessions was scheduled to be seated next to Kislyak, who appears to have
responded to the invitation by indicating he would attend the event.637 Sessions, however, did not
remember seeing, speaking with, or sitting next to Kislyak at the dinner.638 Although CNI board
member Charles Boyd said he may have seen Kislyak at the dinner,639 Simes, Saunders, and Jacob
Heilbrunn—editor of the National Interest—all had no recollection of seeing Kislyak at the May
23 event.64° Kislyak also does not appear in any of the photos from the event that the Office
obtained.
In the summer of 2016, CNI organized at least two dinners in Washington, D.C. for Sessions
to meet with experienced foreign policy professionals.641 The dinners included CNI-affiliated
individuals, such as Richard Burt and Zalmay Khalilzad, a former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan
and Iraq and the person who had introduced Trump before the April 27, 2016 foreign-
632 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 22; Heilbrunn 2/1/18 302, at 7.

633 Luff 1/30/18 302, at 4.
634 Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 15.
635 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 17.
636 Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 17; C00004779-80 (5/23/16 Email, Cantelmo to Saunders &
Hagberg (9:30:12 a.m.); C00004362 (5/23/16 Email, Bauman to Cantelmo et al. (2:02:32 a.m.).
637 C00004362 (5/23/16 Email Bauman to Cantelmo et al. (2:02:32 a.m.).
638 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22.
639 Boyd 1/24/18 302, at 4.

640Simes 3/8/18 302, at 23; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 18; Heilbrunn 2/1/18 302, at 7.
641 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 31; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 19; Burt 2/9/18 302, at 9-10; Khalilzad
1/9/18 302, at 5.
113
policy speech.642 Khalilzad also met with Sessions one-on-one separately from the dinners.643 At the
dinners and in the meetings, the participants addressed U.S. relations with Russia, including how U.S.
relations with NATO and European countries affected U.S. policy toward Russia.644 But the
discussions were not exclusively focused on Russia.645 Khalilzad, for example, recalled discussing
"nation-building" and violent extremism with Sessions.646 In addition, Sessions asked Saunders (of
CNI) to draft two memoranda not specific to Russia: one on Hillary Clinton's foreign policy
shortcomings and another on Egypt.647
d. Jared Kushner's Continuing Contacts with Simes
Between the April 2016 speech at the Mayflower Hotel and the presidential election, Jared
Kushner had periodic contacts with Simes.648 Those contacts consisted of both in-person meetings and
phone conversations, which concerned how to address issues relating to Russia in the Campaign and
how to move forward with the advisory group of foreign policy experts that Simes had proposed.64'
Simes recalled that he, not Kushner, initiated all conversations about Russia, and that Kushner never
asked him to set up back-channel conversations with Russians.65° According to Simes, after the
Mayflower speech in late April, Simes raised the issue of Russian contacts with Kushner, advised that
it was bad optics for the Campaign to develop hidden Russian contacts, and told Kushner both that the
Campaign should not highlight Russia as an issue and should handle any contacts with Russians with
care.651 Kushner generally provided a similar account of his interactions with Simes.652
Among the Kushner-Simes meetings was one held on August 17, 2016, at Simes's request,
in Kushner's New York office. The meeting was to address foreign policy advice that CNI was
providing and how to respond to the Clinton Campaign's Russia-related attacks on candidate
642 Burt 2/9/18 302, at 9-10; Khalilzad 1/9/18 302, at 1-2, 5.

643 Khalilzad 1/9/18 302, at 5-6.
644 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 31; Burt 2/9/18 302, at 9-10; Khalilzad 1/9/18 302, at 5.
645 Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 20.
646 Khalilzad 1/9/18 302, at 6.
647 Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 19-20.
648 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 27.
649 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 27.
650 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 27.
651 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 27. During this period of time, the Campaign received a request for a high-
level Campaign official to meet with an officer at a Russian state-owned bank "to discuss an offer [that officer]
claims to be carrying from President Putin to meet with" candidate Trump. NOSC00005653 (5/17/16 Email,
Dearborn to Kushner (8:12 a.m.)). Copying Manafort and Gates, Kushner responded, "Pass on this. A lot of
people come claiming to carry messages. Very few are able to verify. For now I think we decline such
meetings. Most likely these people go back home and claim they have special access to gain importance for
themselves. Be careful." NOSC00005653 (5/17/16 Email, Kushner to Dearborn).
652
Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 11-13.
114
At-tenter Werk-Preektet II May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
Trump.653 In advance of the meeting, Simes sent Kushner a "Russia Policy Memo" laying out
"what Mr. Trump may want to say about Russia."654 In a cover email transmitting that memo and
a phone call to set up the meeting, Simes mentioned "a well-documented story of highly
questionable connections between Bill Clinton" and the Russian government, "parts of [which]"
(according to Simes) had even been "discussed with the CIA and the FBI in the late 1990s and
shared with the [Independent Counsel] at the end of the Clinton presidency." 655 Kushner forwarded
the email to senior Trump Campaign officials Stephen Miller, Paul Manafort, and Rick Gates,
with the note "suggestion only."656 Manafort subsequently forwarded the email to his assistant and
scheduled a meeting with Simes.657 (Manafort was on the verge of leaving the Campaign by the
time of the scheduled meeting with Simes, and Simes ended up meeting only with Kushner).
During the August 17 meeting, Simes provided Kushner the Clinton-related information
that he had .romised 658 Simes told Kushner that,
Simes claimed that he had received this information from former

CIA and Reagan White House official Fritz Ermarth, who claimed to have learned it from U.S.
intelligence sources, not from Russians.66°
Simes perceived that Kushner did not find the information to be of interest or use to the
Campaign because it was, in Simes's words, "old news."661 When interviewed by the Office, Kushner
stated that he believed that there was little chance of something new being revealed about the Clintons
given their long career as public figures, and that he never received from Simes information that could
be "operationalized" for the Trump Campaign.662 Despite Kushner's
653
Simes 3/8/18 302, at 29-30; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 6; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 12; C00007269
(8/10/16 Meeting Invitation, Vargas to Simes et al.); DJTFP00023484 (8/11/16 Email, Hagan to Manafort
(5:57:15 p.m.)).
654
C00007981-84 (8/9/16 Email, Simes to Kushner (6:09:21 p.m.)). The memorandum
recommended "downplaying Russia as a U.S. foreign policy priority at this time" and suggested that "some
tend to exaggerate Putin's flaws." The memorandum also recommended approaching general Russian-
related questions in the framework of "how to work with Russia to advance important U.S. national interests"
and that a Trump Administration "not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy." The memorandum did
not discuss sanctions but did address how to handle Ukraine-related questions, including questions about
Russia's invasion and annexation of Crimea.
655
C00007981 (8/9/16 Email, Simes to Kushner (6:09:21 p.m.)).
656
DJTFP00023459 (8/10/16 Email, Kushner to S. Miller et al. (11:30:13 a.m.)).
657
DJTFP00023484 (8/11/16 Email, Hagan to Manafort (5:57:15 p.m.)).
658
Simes 3/8/18 302, at 29-30; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 6; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 12.
659
Simes 3/8/18 302, at 30; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 6.
660
Simes 3/8/18 302, at 30.
661
Simes 3/8/18 302, at 30; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 6.
662
Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 12.
115
At4erney--Werk--fkredttet I/ May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
reaction, Simes believed that he provided the same information at a small group meeting of foreign
policy experts that CNI organized for Sessions.663
5. June 9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower
On June 9, 2016, senior representatives of the Trump Campaign met in Trump Tower with
a Russian attorney expecting to receive derogatory information about Hillary Clinton from the
Russian government. The meeting was proposed to Donald Trump Jr. in an email from Robert
Goldstone, at the request of his then-client Emin Agalarov, the son of Russian real-estate
developer Aras Agalarov. Goldstone relayed to Trump Jr. that the "Crown prosecutor of Russia .
. . offered to provide the Trump Campaign with some official documents and information that
would incriminate Hillary and her dealings with Russia" as "part of Russia and its government's
support for Mr. Trump." Trump Jr. immediately responded that "if it's what you say I love it," and
arranged the meeting through a series of emails and telephone calls.
Trump Jr. invited campaign chairman Paul Manafort and senior advisor Jared Kushner to
attend the meeting, and both attended. Members of the Campaign discussed the meeting before it
occurred, and Michael Cohen recalled that Trump Jr. may have told candidate Trump about an
upcoming meeting to receive adverse information about Clinton, without linking the meeting to
Russia. According to written answers submitted by President Trump, he has no recollection of
learning of the meeting at the time, and the Office found no documentary evidence showing that he
was made aware of the meeting—or its Russian connection—before it occurred.
The Russian attorney who spoke at the meeting, Natalia Veselnitskaya, had previously worked
for the Russian government and maintained a relationship with that government throughout this
period of time. She claimed that funds derived from illegal activities in Russia were provided to
Hillary Clinton and other Democrats. Trump Jr. requested evidence to support those claims, but
Veselnitskaya did not provide such information. She and her associates then turned to a critique of
the origins of the Magnitsky Act, a 2012 statute that imposed financial and travel sanctions on Russian
officials and that resulted in a retaliatory ban on adoptions of Russian children. Trump Jr. suggested
that the issue could be revisited when and if candidate Trump was elected. After the election,
Veselnitskaya made additional efforts to follow up on the meeting, but the Trump Transition Team
did not engage.
a. Setting Up the June 9 Meeting
Outreach to Donald Trump Jr.
Aras Agalarov is a Russian real-estate developer with ties to Putin and other members of the
Russian government, including Russia's Prosecutor General, Yuri Chaika.664 Aras Agalarov is the
president of the Crocus Group, a Russian enterprise that holds substantial Russian government
construction contracts and that—as discussed above, Volume I, Section IV.A.1, supra
663
Simes 3/8/18 302, at 30.
664
Goldstone 2/8/18 302,
at 4.
116
Attorncy _____________Work Product // May Contain Matcrial Protcctcd Undcr Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
—worked with Trump in connection with the 2013 Miss Universe pageant in Moscow and a potential
Trump Moscow real-estate project.665 The relationship continued over time, as the parties pursued the
Trump Moscow project in 2013-2014 and exchanged gifts and letters in 2016.666 For example, in
April 2016, Trump responded to a letter from Aras Agalarov with a handwritten note.667 Aras
Agalarov expressed interest in Trump's campaign, passed on "congratulations" for winning in the
primary and—according to one email drafted by Goldstone—an "offer" of his "support and that of
many of his important Russian friends and colleagues[,] especially with reference to U.S./Russian
relations."668
On June 3, 2016, Emin Agalarov called Goldstone, Emin's then-publicist.669 Goldstone is a

music and events promoter who represented Emin Agalarov from approximately late 2012 until late
2016.670 While representing Emin Agalarov, Goldstone facilitated the ongoing contact between the
Trumps and the Agalarovs—including an invitation that Trump sent to Putin to attend the 2013 Miss
Universe Pageant in Moscow.671
Goldstone understood a Russian political

connection, and Emin Agalarov indicated that the attorney was a prosecutor. 73 Goldstone
recalled that the information that mi:ht interest the Trum s involved Hillar Clinton
674
665 Kaveladze
11/16/17 302, at 3; Shugart 9/25/17 302, at 2-3;
66 Goldstone2/8/18302,at10;Kaveladze11/16/17302,at5-6;4/25/16Email,GraftoGoldstone.
667
RG000033-34 (4/25/16 Email, Graff to Goldstone (attachment)).
668
DJTJR00008 2/29/16 Email , Goldstone to Trum. Jr. et al. ;
669
Call Records of Robert Goldstone
Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 6.
670
Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 1-2; Beniaminov 1/6/18 302,
at 3.
Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 1-5;
671
DJTJR00008
(2/29/19 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.); Beniaminov 1/6/18 302, at 3; Shugart 9/25/17 302, at 2;
TRUMPORG_18_001325 (6/21/13 Email, Goldstone to Graff); TRUMPORG_18_001013 (6/24/13
Email, Goldstone to Graff); TRUMPORG_18_001014 (6/24/13 Email, Graff to Shugart);
TRUMPORG_18_001018 (6/26/13 Email, Graff to Goldstone); TRUMPORG_18_001022 (6/27/13
Email, Graff to L. Kelly); TRUMPORG_18_001333 (9/12/13 Email, Goldstone to Graff, Shugart);
MU000004289 (7/27/13 Email, Goldstone to Graff, Shugart).
672 see Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 6-7.
673
674
117
Attorncy _____________Work Product // May Contain Matcrial Protcctcd Undcr Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
The mentioned by Emin Agalarov was Natalia
Veselnitskaya.' ' From approximately 1998 until 2001, Veselnitskaya worked as a prosecutor for the
Central Administrative District of the Russian Prosecutor's Office, 677 and she continued to perform
government-related work and maintain ties to the Russian government following her departure. 678
She lobbied and testified about the Magnitsky Act, which imposed financial sanctions and travel
restrictions on Russian officials and which was named for a Russian tax specialist who exposed a
fraud and later died in a Russian prison. 679 Putin called the statute "a purely political, unfriendly act,"
and Russia responded by barring a list of current and former U.S. officials from entering Russia and
by halting the adoption of Russian children by U.S. citizens.68° Veselnitskaya performed legal work
for Denis Katsyv, 681 the son of Russian businessman Peter Katsyv, and for his company Prevezon
Holdings Ltd., which was a defendant in a civil-forfeiture action alleging the laundering of proceeds
from the fraud exposed by Magnitsky. 682 She also
675
In December 2018, a grand jury in the Southern District of New York returned an indictment
676
charging Veselnitskaya with obstructing the Prevezon litigation discussed in the text above. See Indictment,
United States v. Natalia Vladimirovna Veselnitskaya, No. 18-cr-904 (S.D.N.Y.). The indictment alleges,
among other things, that Veselnitskaya lied to the district court about her relationship to the Russian
Prosecutor General's Office and her involvement in responding to a U.S. document request sent to the
Russian government.
677
Veselnitska a 11/20/17 Statement to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, at 2;
Testimony of Natalia Veselnitskaya Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary (Nov. 20, 2017) at
678
33; Keir Simmons & Rachel Elbaum, Russian Lawyer Veselnitskaya Says She Didn't Give Trump Jr. Info
on Clinton, NBC News (July 11, 2017); Maria Tsvetkova & Jack Stubbs, Moscow Lawyer Who Met Trump
Jr. Had Russian Spy Agency As Client, Reuters (July 21, 2017); Andrew E. Kramer & Sharon LaFraniere,
Lawyer Who Was Said to Have Dirt on Clinton Had Closer Ties to Kremlin than She Let On, New York
Times (Apr. 27, 2018).
See Pub. L. No. 112-208 §§ 402, 404(a)(1), 126 Stat. 1502, 1502-1506. Sergei Magnitsky was a
679
Russian tax specialist who worked for William Browder, a former investment fund manager in Russia.
Browder hired Magnitsky to investigate tax fraud by Russian officials, and Magnitsky was charged with
helping Browder embezzle money. After Magnitsky died in a Russian prison, Browder lobbied Congress to
pass the Magnitsky Act. See, e.g., Andrew E. Kramer, Turning Tables in Magnitsky Case, Russia Accuses
Nemesis of Murder, New York Times (Oct. 22, 2017); Testimony of Natalia Veselnitskaya Before the Senate
Committee on Judiciary (Nov. 20, 2017), Exhibits at 1-4; Rosie Gray, Bill Browder's Testimony to the Senate
Judiciary Committee, The Atlantic (July 25, 2017).
Ellen Barry, Russia Bars 18 Americans After Sanctions by US, New York Times (Apr. 13, 2013);
680
Tom Porter, Supporters of the Magnitsky Act Claim They've Been Targets of Russian Assassination and
Kidnapping Bids, Newsweek (July 16, 2017).
681
Testimony of Natalia Veselnitskaya Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary (Nov. 20, 2017),
at 21.
See Veselnitskaya Decl., United States v. Prevezon Holdings, Ltd., No. 13-cv-6326 (S.D.N.Y.);
682
see Prevezon Holdings, Second Amended Complaint; Prevezon Holdings, Mem. and Order; Prevezon
Holdings, Deposition of Oleg Lurie.
118
Attorncy_____________ Work Product // May Contain Matcrial Protcctcd Undcr Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
appears to have been involved in an April 2016 approach to a U.S. congressional delegation in Moscow
offering "confidential information" from "the Prosecutor General of Russia" about "interactions
between certain political forces in our two countries."683
Shortly after his June 3 call with Emin Agalarov, Goldstone emailed Trump Jr.684 The email
stated:
Good morning
Emin just called and asked me to contact you with something very Interesting.
The CrownprosecutorofRussiamet withhisfatherArasthismorning and intheirmeeting offeredto provide the Trump campaignwith
some official documentsand informationthat would incriminate Hillaryand herdealingswithRussiaand would be veryuseful to yourfather.
Thisisobviouslyveryhighlevel and sensitive informationbut ispart ofRUSSIEtand itsgovernment'ssupport forMr.Trump-helped along by
Arasand Emin.
What do you think is the best way to handle this information and would you be able to speak to Emin about it directly?
I can also send this info to your father via Rhona, but it is ultra sensitive so wanted to send to you first.
Best
Rob Goldstone
Within minutes of this email, Trump Jr. responded, emailing back: "Thanks Rob I appreciate that.
I am on the road at the moment but perhaps I just speak to Emin first. Seems we have some time and if
it's what you say I love it especially later in the summer. Could we do a call first thing next week when
I am back?"685 Goldstone conveyed Trump Jr.'s interest to Emin Agalarov, emailing that Trump Jr.
"wants to speak personally on the issue."686
On June 6, 2016, Emin Agalarov asked Goldstone if there was "[a]ny news," and Goldstone
explained that Trump Jr. was likely still traveling for the "final elections . . . where [T]rump will be
'crowned' the official nominee."687 On the same day, Goldstone again emailed Trump Jr. and asked
when Trump Jr. was "free to talk with Emin about this Hillary info."688 Trump Jr. asked if
See Gribbin 8/31/17 302, at 1-2 & 1A (undated one-page document given to congressional
683
delegation). The Russian Prosecutor General is an official with broad national responsibilities in the
Russian legal system. See Federal Law on the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation (1992, amended
2004).
RG000061 (6/3/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.); DJTJR00446 (6/3/16 Email, Goldstone
684
to Donald Trump Jr.); @DonaldJTrumpJr 07/11/17 (11:00) Tweet.
DJTJR00446 (6/3/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone); @DonaldJTrumpJr 07/11/17 (11:00)

685
Tweet; RG000061 (6/3/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone).
686 RG000062 (6/3/16 Email, Goldstone & Trump Jr.).

RG000063 (6/6/16 Email, A. Agalarov to Goldstone); RG000064 (6/6/16 Email, Goldstone
687
to A. Agalarov).
RG000065 (6/6/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.); DJTJR00446 (6/6/16 Email, Goldstone
688
to Trump Jr.).
119
Attorncy _____________ Work Product // May Contain Matcrial Protcctcd Undcr Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
they could "speak now," and Goldstone arranged a call between Trump Jr. and Emin Agalarov.689
On June 6 and June 7, Trump Jr. and Emin Agalarov had multiple brief calls.690
Also on June 6, 2016, Aras Agalarov called Ike Kaveladze and asked him to attend a
meeting in New York with the Trump Organization.691 Kaveladze is a Georgia-born, naturalized
U.S. citizen who worked in the United States for the Crocus Group and reported to Aras
Agalarov.692 Kaveladze told the Office that, in a second phone call on June 6, 2016, Aras Agalarov
asked Kaveladze if he knew anything about the Magnitsky Act, and Aras sent him a short synopsis
for the meeting and Veselnitskaya's business card. According to Kaveladze, Aras Agalarov said
the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the Magnitsky Act, and he asked Kaveladze to
translate.693
ii. Awareness of the Meeting Within the Campaign
On June 7, Goldstone emailed Trump Jr. and said that "Emin asked that I schedule a meeting
with you and [t]he Russian government attorney who is flying over from Moscow."694 Trump Jr.
replied that Manafort (identified as the "campaign boss"), Jared Kushner, and Trump Jr. would likely
attend.695 Goldstone was sur prised to learn that Trump Jr., Manafort, and Kushner
would attend.696 Kaveladze "puzzled" by the list of attendees and that he
checked with one of Emin Agalarov's assistants, Roman Beniaminov, who said that the purpose
of the meeting was for Veselnitskaya to convey "negative information on Hillary Clinton." 697
Beniaminov, however, stated that he did not recall having known or said that.698
Early on June 8, 2016 Kushner emailed his assistant, asking her to discuss a 3:00 p.m.
DJTJR00445 6/6/16 Email, Goldstone and Trump Jr.);

6 8 9
RG000065-67 (6/6/16 Email, Goldstone and Trump Jr.);

6" DJTJR00499 Call Records of Donald Trump Jr.
); Call Records
o f D o n a l d T r u m p J r .
691
Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 6;
692
Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 1-2; Beniaminov 1/6/18
302, at 2-3;
693
Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 6.
DJTJR00467 (6/7/16 Email, Goldstone to Trum Jr. ; DonaldJTrum Jr
6 9 4
07/11/17 11:00) Tweet; RG000068 (6/7/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.);

DJTJR00469 (6/7/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone); @DonaldJTrumpJr 07/11/17 (11:00) Tweet;
695
RG000071 6/7/16 Email, Trum Jr. to Goldstone); OSC-KAV_00048 (6/7/16 Email, Goldstone to Kaveladze);
696
Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 7;
697
KAV_00048 (6/7/16 Email, Goldstone to Kaveladze).

see Kaveladze 11/16/17 302 at 7; OSC-
698
Beniaminov 1/6/18 302, at 3.
120
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meeting the following day with Trump Jr.699 Later that day, Trump Jr. forwarded the entirety of
his email correspondence regarding the meeting with Goldstone to Manafort and Kushner, under
the subject line "FW: Russia - Clinton — private and confidential," adding a note that the
"[m]eeting got moved to 4 tomorrow at my offices."70° Kushner then sent his assistant a second
email, informing her that the "[m]eeting with don jr is 4pm now."701 Manafort responded, "See
you then. P."702
Rick Gates, who was the deputy campaign chairman, stated during interviews with the Office
that in the days before June 9, 2016 Trump Jr. announced at a regular morning meeting of senior
campaign staff and Trump family members that he had a lead on negative information about the
Clinton Foundation?" Gates believed that Trump Jr. said the information was coming from a group
in Kyrgyzstan and that he was introduced to the group by a friend.704 Gates recalled that the meeting
was attended by Trump Jr., Eric Trump, Paul Manafort, Hope Hicks, and, joining late, Ivanka Trump
and Jared Kushner. According to Gates, Manafort warned the group that the meeting likely would
not yield vital information and they should be careful?05 Hicks denied any knowledge of the June 9
meeting before 2017,706 and Kushner did not recall if the planned June 9 meeting came up at all
earlier that week.'
Michael Cohen recalled being in Donald J. Trump's office on June 6 or 7 when Trump Jr. told
his father that a meeting to obtain adverse information about Clinton was going forward?" Cohen did
not recall Trump Jr. stating that the meeting was connected to Russia.709 From the tenor of the
conversation, Cohen believed that Trump Jr. had previously discussed the meeting with his father,
although Cohen was not involved in any such conversation.710 In an interview with the Senate Judiciary
Committee, however, Trump Jr. stated that he did not inform his father about the
699
NOSC0000007-08 (6/8/18 Email, Kushner to Vargas).
NOSC00000039-42 (6/8/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Kushner & Manafort); DJTJR00485
700
(6/8/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Kushner & Manafort).

701
NOSC0000004 (6/8/16 Email, Kushner to Vargas).
702
6/8/16 Email, Manafort to Trump Jr.
Gates 1/30/18 302, at 7; Gates 3/1/18 302, at 3-4. Although the March 1 302 refers to
703
"June 19," that is likely a typographical error; external emails indicate that a meeting with those
participants occurred on June 6. See NOSC00023603 (6/6/16 Email, Gates to Trump Jr. et al.).
704 Gates 1/30/18 302, at 7. Aras Agalarov is originally from Azerbaijan, and public reporting
indicates that his company, the Crocus Group, has done substantial work in Kyrgyzstan. See Neil
MacFarquhar, A Russian Developer Helps Out the Kremlin on Occasion. Was He a Conduit to Trump?,
New York Times (July 16, 2017).
705 Gates 3/1/18 302, at 3-4.
706
Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 6.
707
Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 8.
708
Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 4-6.
709
Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 4-5.
710 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 15-16.
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emails or the upcoming meeting: 711 Similarly, neither Manafort nor Kushner recalled anyone
informing candidate Trump of the meeting, including Trump Jr. 712 President Trump has stated to
this Office, in written answers to questions, that he has "no recollection of learning at the time" that
his son, Manafort, or "Kushner was considering participating in a meeting in June 2016 concerning
potentially negative information about Hillary Clinton." 713
b. The Events of June 9, 2016
i. Arrangements for the Meeting
Veselnitskaya was in New York on June 9, 2016, for appellate proceedings in the Prevezon civil
forfeiture liti ation.714 That da , Veselnitskaya called Rinat Akhmetshin, a Soviet-born U.S.
lobbyist, and when she learned that he was in New York, invited him
to lunch. Akhmetshin told the Office that he had worked on issues relating to the Magnitsky
Act and had worked on the Prevezon litigation. 7 16 Kaveladze and Anatoli Samochornov, a
711
Interview of Donald J. Trump, Jr., Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 28-29, 84, 94-95
(Sept. 7, 2017). The Senate Judiciary Committee interview was not under oath, but Trump Jr. was advised
that it is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 to make materially false statements in a congressional investigation.
Id. at 10-11.
712
Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 3-4; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 10.
713
Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 8 (Response to Question I, Parts (a)-(c)).
We considered whether one sequence of events suggested that candidate Trump had contemporaneous
knowledge of the June 9 meeting. On June 7, 2016 Trump announced his intention to give "a major speech"
"probably Monday of next week"—which would have been June 13—about "all of the things that have taken
place with the Clintons." See, e.g., Phillip Bump, What we know about the Trump Tower meeting, Washington
Post (Aug. 7, 2018). Following the June 9 meeting, Trump changed the subject of his planned speech to national
security. But the Office did not find evidence that the original idea for the speech was connected to the
anticipated June 9 meeting or that the change of topic was attributable to the failure of that meeting to produce
concrete evidence about Clinton. Other events, such as the Pulse nightclub shooting on June 12, could well
have caused the change. The President's written answers to our questions state that the speech's focus was
altered "[i]n light of the Pulse nightclub shooting. See Written Responses, supra. As for the original topic of
the June 13 speech, Trump has said that "he expected to give a speech referencing the publicly available,
negative information about the Clintons," and that the draft of the speech prepared by Campaign staff "was
based on publicly available material, including, in particular, information from the book Clinton Cash by Peter
Schweizer." Written Responses, supra. In a later June 22 speech, Trump did speak extensively about
allegations that Clinton was corrupt, drawing from the Clinton Cash book. See Full Transcript: Donald Trump
NYC Speech on Stakes of the Election, politico.com (June 22, 2016).
Testimony of Natalia Veselnitskaya Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary (Nov. 20, 2017)
714
at 41, 42; Alison Frankel, How Did Russian Lawyer Veselnitskaya Get into U.S. for Trump Tower Meeting?
Reuters, (Nov. 6, 2017); Michael Kranish et al., Russian Lawyer who Met with Trump Jr. Has Long History
Fighting Sanctions, Washington Post (July 11, 2017); see OSC-KAV00113 (6/8/16 Email, Goldstone to
Kaveladze); RG000073 (6/8/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.); Lieberman 12/13/17 302, at 5; see also
Prevezon Holdings Order (Oct. 17, 2016).
715
716
Akhmetshin 11/14/17 302, at 4-6;
122
Russian-born translator who had assisted Veselnitska a with Ma nitsky-related lobbying and the
Prevezon case, also attended the lunch.717 Veselnitska a said she was
meeting and
asked Akhmetshin what she should tell him. According to several participants in the lunch,
Veselnitskaya showed Akhmetshin a document alleging financial misconduct by Bill Browder and the
Ziff brothers (Americans with business in Russia , and those individuals subse uentl makin olitical
donations to the DNC.719
The group then went to Trump Tower for the meeting.721
ii. Conduct of the Meeting
Trump Jr., Manafort, and Kushner participated on the Trump side, while Kaveladze,
Samochornov, Akhmetshin, and Goldstone attended with Veselnitskaya.722 The Office spoke to every
participant except Veselnitska a and Trum Jr., the latter of whom declined to be voluntaril
interviewed by the Office
The meetin • lasted a..roximatel 20 minutes. 723
Goldstone recalled that Trump Jr. invited Veselnitskaya to begin but did not say
anything about the subject of the meeting.725 Participants agreed that Veselnitskaya stated that the Ziff
brothers had broken Russian laws and had donated their profits to the DNC or the Clinton Campaign.726
She asserted that the Ziff brothers had engaged in tax evasion and money laundering
Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 7;

717
Samochornov
7/13/17 302, at 2, 4;
718
719 Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 7;

Samochornov did not recall the planned
subject matter of the Trump Tower meeting coming up at lunch.
 Samochornov 7/12/17 302, at 4. In her later Senate statement and interactions with the press,
Veselnitskaya produced what she claimed were the talking points that she brought to the June 9 meeting.
720
721
E.g., Samochornov 7/12/17 302, at 4.

722
E.g., Samochornov 7/12/17 302, at 4.
723
E.g., Samochornov 7/12/17 302, at 4; Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 9.
724
725
726
123
Attorney ______________ Work Product II May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
in both the United States and Russia, 727

According to Akhmetshin, Trump Jr. asked follow-up
728
questions about how the alleged payments could be tied specifically to the Clinton Campaign, but
Veselnitskaya indicated that she could not trace the money once it entered the United States. 729
Kaveladze similarly recalled that Trump Jr. asked what they have on Clinton, and Kushner became
aggravated and asked "[w]hat are we doing here?"73°
Akhmetshin then spoke about U.S. sanctions imposed under the Magnitsky Act and Russia's
response prohibiting U.S. adoption of Russian children.731 Several participants recalled that Trump
Jr. commented that Trump is a private citizen, and there was nothing they could do at that time. 732
Trump Jr. also said that they could revisit the issue if and when they were in government.733 Notes
that Manafort took on his phone reflect the general flow of the conversation, although not all of its
details.734
At some point in the meeting, Kushner sent an iMessage to Manafort stating "waste of time,"
followed immediately by two separate emails to assistants at Kushner Companies with requests that
727
728
729 Akhmetshin 11/14/17 302, at

12. 73° Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 8;
731
Samochornov 7/13/17 302, at 3;
732
E.g., Akhmetshin 11/14/17 302, at 12-13;
Akhmetshin 11/14/17 302, at 12-13;
733
Samochornov
7/13/17 302, at 3. Trump Jr. confirmed this in a statement he made in July 2017 after news of the June
2016 meeting broke. Interview of Donald J Trump, Jr., Senate Judiciary Committee U.S. Senate
Washington DC, 115th Cong. 57 (Sept. 7, 2017).
734
Manafort's notes state:
Bill browder
Offshore - Cyprus
133m shares
Companies
Not invest - loan
Value in Cyprus as inter
lllicl
Active sponsors of RNC
Browder hired Joanna Glover
Tied into Cheney
Russian adoption by American families
PJM-SJC-00000001-02 (Notes Produced to Senate Judiciary Committee).
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they call him to give him an excuse to leave.735 Samochornov recalled that Kushner departed the
meeting before it concluded; Veselnitskaya recalled the same when interviewed by the press in
July 2017.736
Veselnitskaya's press interviews and written statements to Congress differ materially from
other accounts. In a July 2017 press interview, Veselnitskaya claimed that she has no connection to
the Russian government and had not referred to any derogatory information concerning the Clinton
Campaign when she met with Trump Campaign officials.737 Veselnitskaya's November 2017 written
submission to the Senate Judiciary Committee stated that the purpose of the June 9 meeting was not
to connect with "the Trump Campaign" but rather to have "a private meeting with Donald Trump
Jr.—a friend of my good acquaintance's son on the matter of assisting me or my colleagues in
informing the Congress members as to the criminal nature of manipulation and interference with the
legislative activities of the US Congress."738 In other words, Veselnitskaya claimed her focus was on
Congress and not the Campaign. No witness, however, recalled any reference to Congress during the
meeting. Veselnitskaya also maintained that she "attended the meeting as a lawyer of Denis Katsyv,"
the previously mentioned owner of Prevezon Holdings, but she did not "introduce [her]self in this
capacity."739
In a July 2017 television interview, Trump Jr. stated that while he had no way to gauge the
reliability, credibility, or accuracy of what Goldstone had stated was the purpose of the meeting,
if "someone has information on our opponent . . . maybe this is something. I should hear them
out."74° Trump Jr. further stated in September 2017 congressional testimony that he thought he
should "listen to what Rob and his colleagues had to say." 741 Depending on what, if any,
information was provided, Trump Jr. stated he could then "consult with counsel to make an
informed decision as to whether to give it any further consideration." 742
NOSC00003992 (6/9/16 Text Message, Kushner to Manafort); Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 9; Vargas
735
4/4/18 302, at 7; NOSC00000044 (6/9/16 Email, Kushner to Vargas); NOSC00000045 (6/9/16 Email,
Kushner to Cain).
736
Samochornov 7/12/17 302, at 4; Kushner 4/11/18
302, at 9-10; see also Interview of Donald J. Trump, Jr., Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 48-49
(Sept. 7, 2017).
Russian Lawyer Veselnitskaya Says She Didn't Give Trump Jr. Info on Clinton, NBC
737
News (July 11, 2017).

Testimony of Natalia Veselnitskaya before the United States Senate Committee on the
738
Judiciary, 115th Cong. 10. (Nov 20, 2017).

Testimony ofNatalia Veselnitskaya before the United States Senate Committee on the
739
Judiciary, 115th Cong. 21 (Nov. 20, 2017).

74°
Sean Hannity, Transcript-Donald Trump Jr, Fox News (July 11, 2017).
741
Interview of Donald J Trump, Jr, Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 16 (Sept. 7, 2017).
Interview of Donald J. Trump, Jr, Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 16-17 (Sept.
742
7, 2017).
125
After the June 9 meetin:

concluded, Goldstone a olo ized 744 and
hone call that the meeting was about ado tion
to Trum. J .743 According to Goldstone, he told Trump Jr.

told Emin A alarov in a
745
Aras Agalarov asked Kaveladze to report in after the meeting, but before Kaveladze could call, Aras
Agalarov called him.747 With Veselnitskaya next to him, Kaveladze reported that the meeting had
gone well, but he later told Aras Agalarov that the meeting about the Magnitsky Act had been a
waste of time because it was not with lawyers and they were "preaching to the wrong crowd."748
c. Post-June 9 Events
Veselnitskaya and Aras Agalarov made at least two unsuccessful attempts after the election
to meet with Trump representatives to convey similar information about Browder and the Magnitsky
Act.749 On November 23, 2016, Kaveladze emailed Goldstone about setting up another meeting "with
T people" and sent a document bearing allegations similar to those conveyed on June 9:750 Kaveladze
followed up with Goldstone, stating that "Mr. A," which Goldstone understood to mean Aras
Agalarov, called to ask about the meeting:751 Goldstone emailed the document to Rhona Graff, saying
that "Aras Agalarov has asked me to pass on this document in the hope it can be passed on to the
appropriate team. If needed, a lawyer representing the case is
743
Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 8; Goldstone 2/8/18 302,
at 9;
744
745 The week after the June 9 meeting, a cybersecurity firm

and the DNC announced the Russian hack of the DNC. See Volume I, Section III.B.2, supra.
(and one text message shows) that, shortly after the DNC announcement, Goldstone made comments connecting
the DNC hacking announcement to the June 9
meeting. OSC-KAV 00029 (6/14/16 Email, Goldstone to E.
Agalarov & Kaveladze (10:09 a.m.)). The investigation did not identify evidence connecting the events of
June 9 to the GRU's hack-and-dump operation. OSC-KAV_00029-30 (6/14/16 Email, Goldstone to E.
Agalarov).
746
747
Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 8; Call Records of Ike Kaveladze
126
Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 8; Call Records of Ike Kaveladze
748
On June 14, 2016 Kaveladze's teenage daughter emailed asking how the June 9 meeting had gone,
and Kaveladze responded, "meeting was boring. The Russians did not have an bad info on Hilar ."
OSC-KAV_00257 (6/14/16 Email, I. Kaveladze to A. Kaveladze;
749
Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 11;
750 OSC-KAV 00138 11/23/16 Email, Goldstone to Kaveladze);
751
RG000196 (11/26-29/16 Text Messages, Goldstone & Kaveladze);
127
in New York currently and happy to meet with any member of his transition team."752 According
to Goldstone, around January 2017, Kaveladze contacted him again to set up another meeting, but
Goldstone did not make the request.753 The investigation did not identify evidence of the transition
team following up.
Participants in the June 9, 2016 meeting began receiving inquiries from attorneys representing
the Trump Organization starting in approximately June 2017.754 On approximately June 2, 2017,
Goldstone spoke with Alan Garten, general counsel of the Trump Organization, about his
participation in the June 9 meeting.755 The same day, Goldstone emailed Veselnitskaya's name to
Garten, identifying her as the "woman who was the attorney who spoke at the meeting from
Moscow."756 Later in June 2017, Goldstone participated in a lengthier call with Garten and Alan
Futerfas, outside counsel for the Trump Organization (and, subsequently, personal counsel for
Trump Jr.).757 On June 27, 2017, Goldstone emailed Emin Agalarov with the subject "Trump
attorneys" and stated that he was "interviewed by attorneys" about the June 9 meeting who were
"concerned because it links Don Jr. to officials from Russia—which he has always denied
meeting."758 Goldstone stressed that he "did say at the time this was an awful idea and a terrible
meeting."759 Emin Agalarov sent a screenshot of the message to Kaveladze.7"
The June 9 meeting became public in July 2017. In a July 9, 2017 text message to Emin
Agalarov, Goldstone wrote "I made sure I kept you and your father out of [t]his story,"76I and lilf
contacted 1 can do a dance and keep you out of it."762 Goldstone added, "FBI now investigating," and
"I hope this favor was worth for your dad—it could blow up."763 On July 12, 2017 Emin Agalarov
complained to Kaveladze that his father, Aras, "never listens" to him and that their
Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 11;

752
DJTJR00118 (11/28/16
Email, Goldstone to Graff).
753
754
755
756
RG000256 (6/2/17 Email, Goldstone to Garten).
757
758
RG000092 (6/27/17 Email, Goldstone to E.
Agalarov).
759
RG000092 6/27/17 Email, Goldstone to E. Agalarov .
76°
OSC-KAV_01190 (6/27/17 Text Message, E. Agalarov to Kaveladze). 761
RG000286-87 (7/9/17 Text Messages, E. Agalarov & Goldstone);
762
763
128
relationship with "mr T has been thrown down the drain." 764 The next month, Goldstone
commented to Emin Agalarov about the volume of publicity the June 9 meeting had generated,
stating that his "reputation [was] basically destroyed by this dumb meeting which your father
insisted on even though Ike and Me told him would be bad news and not to do."765 Goldstone
added, "I am not able to respond out of courtesy to you and your father. So am painted as some
mysterious link to Putin."766
After public reporting on the June 9 meeting began, representatives from the Trump
Organization again reached out to participants. On July 10, 2017, Futerfas sent Goldstone an email
with a proposed statement for Goldstone to issue, which read:
As the person who arranged the meeting, I can definitively state that the statements I have
read by Donald Trump Jr. are 100% accurate. The meeting was a complete waste of time
and Don was never told Ms. Veselnitskaya's name prior to the meeting. Ms. Veselnitskaya
mostly talked about the Magnitsky Act and Russian adoption laws and the meeting lasted
20 to 30 minutes at most. There was never any follow up and nothing ever came of the
meeting.767
the statement drafted by Trump Organization representatives was 768 He proposed a

different statement, asserting that he had been asked "by [his] client in M oscow — Emin
Agalarov — to facilitate a meeting between a Russian attorney (Natalia Veselnitzkaya
[sic]) and Donald Trump Jr. The lawyer had apparently stated that she had some
information regarding funding to the DNC from Russia, which she believed Mr. Tr ump
Jr. might find interesting." 769 Goldstone never released either statement. 77°
On the Russian end, there were also communications about what participants should say
about the June 9 meeting. Specifically, the organization that hired Samochornov—an anti-
Magnitsky Act group controlled by Veselnitskaya and the owner of Prevezon—offered to pay
$90,000 of Samochornov's legal fees.771 At Veselnitskaya's request, the organization sent
Samochornov a transcript of a Veselnitskaya press interview, and Samochornov understood that
the organization would pay his legal fees only if he made statements consistent with
Veselnitskaya's.m Samochornov declined, telling the Office that he did not want to perjure
764
OSC-KAV 01197 (7/11-12/17 Text Messages, Kaveladze & E. Agalarov);
765 767
7/10/17 Email, Goldstone to Futerfas & Garten.
768
766
769
7/10/17 Email, Goldstone to Futerfas & Garten.
770
771
Samochornov 7/13/17 302, at 1;
772 Samochornov 7/13/17 302, at 1.
129
himself.' The individual who conveyed Veselnitskaya's request to Samochornov stated that he did
not expressly condition payment on following Veselnitskaya's answers but, in hindsight,
recognized that by sending the transcript, Samochornov could have interpreted the offer of
assistance to be conditioned on his not contradicting Veselnitskaya's account.774
Volume II, Section II.G, infra, discusses interactions between President Trump, Trump Jr.,
and others in June and July 2017 regarding the June 9 meeting.
6. Events at the Republican National Convention
Trump Campaign officials met with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak during the week
of the Republican National Convention. The evidence indicates that those interactions were brief
and non-substantive. During platform committee meetings immediately before the Convention,
J.D. Gordon, a senior Campaign advisor on policy and national security, diluted a proposed
amendment to the Republican Party platform expressing support for providing "lethal" assistance
to Ukraine in response to Russian aggression. Gordon requested that platform committee personnel
revise the proposed amendment to state that only "appropriate" assistance be provided to Ukraine.
The original sponsor of the "lethal" assistance amendment stated that Gordon told her (the sponsor)
that he was on the phone with candidate Trump in connection with his request to dilute the
language. Gordon denied making that statement to the sponsor, although he acknowledged it was
possible he mentioned having previously spoken to the candidate about the subject matter. The
investigation did not establish that Gordon spoke to or was directed by the candidate to make that
proposal. Gordon said that he sought the change because he believed the proposed language was
inconsistent with Trump's position on Ukraine.
a. Ambassador Kislyak's Encounters with Senator Sessions and J.D. Gordon

the Week of the RNC
In July 2016, Senator Sessions and Gordon spoke at the Global Partners in Diplomacy
event, a conference co-sponsored by the State Department and the Heritage Foundation held in
Cleveland, Ohio the same week as the Republican National Convention (RNC or "Convention").775
Approximately 80 foreign ambassadors to the United States, including Kislyak, were invited to the
conference.776
On July 20, 2016, Gordon and Sessions delivered their speeches at the conference.777 In his
speech, Gordon stated in pertinent part that the United States should have better relations with
773
Samochornov 7/13/17 302, at 1.
774
775
Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9; Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22; Allan Smith, We Now Know More About
why Jeff Sessions and a Russian Ambassador Crossed Paths at the Republican Convention, Business Insider
(Mar. 2, 2017).
776
Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9; Laura DeMarco, Global Cleveland and Sen. Bob Corker Welcome
International Republican National Convention Guests, Cleveland Plain Dealer (July 20, 2016).
777
Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9; Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22.
130
Russia.778 During Sessions's speech, he took questions from the audience, one of which may have
been asked by Kislyak.779 When the speeches concluded, several ambassadors lined up to greet the
speakers.78° Gordon shook hands with Kislyak and reiterated that he had meant what he said in the
speech about improving U.S.-Russia relations.781 Sessions separately spoke with between six and 12
ambassadors, including Kislyak.782 Although Sessions stated during interviews with the Office that
he had no specific recollection of what he discussed with Kislyak, he believed that the two spoke for
only a few minutes and that they would have exchanged pleasantries and said some things about
U.S.-Russia relations.783
Later that evening, Gordon attended a reception as part of the conference.784 Gordon ran
into Kislyak as the two prepared plates of food, and they decided to sit at the same table to eat. 785
They were joined at that table by the ambassadors from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and by Trump
Campaign advisor Carter Page.786 As they ate, Gordon and Kislyak talked for what Gordon
estimated to have been three to five minutes, during which Gordon again mentioned that he meant
what he said in his speech about improving U.S.-Russia relations.787
b. Change to Republican Party Platform
In preparation for the 2016 Convention, foreign policy advisors to the Trump Campaign,
working with the Republican National Committee, reviewed the 2012 Convention's foreign policy
platform to identify divergence between the earlier platform and candidate Trump's positions.788 The
Campaign team discussed toning down language from the 2012 platform that identified Russia as the
country's number one threat, given the candidate's belief that there needed to be better U.S. relations
with Russia?' The RNC Platform Committee sent the 2016 draft platform to the National Security and
Defense Platform Subcommittee on July 10, 2016, the evening before its
m
Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9.
779
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22; Luff 1/30/18 302, at 3.
780
Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9; Luff 1/30/18 302, at 3.
781
Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9.
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22; Luff 1/30/18 302, at 3; see also Volume I, Section IV.A.4.b, supra
782
(explaining that Sessions and Kislyak may have met three months before this encounter during a reception
held on April 26, 2016, at the Mayflower Hotel).
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22.
783
784
Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9-10.
785
Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9-10.
Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10; see also Volume I, Section IV.A.3.d, supra (explaining that
786
Page acknowledged meeting Kislyak at this event).

787
Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10.
788
Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10.
789
Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10.
131
first meeting to propose amendments.79°
Although only delegates could participate in formal discussions and vote on the platform,
the Trump Campaign could request changes, and members of the Trump Campaign attended
committee meetings.791 John Mashburn, the Campaign's policy director, helped oversee the
Campaign's involvement in the platform committee meetings.792 He told the Office that he directed
Campaign staff at the Convention, including J.D. Gordon, to take a hands-off approach and only
to challenge platform planks if they directly contradicted Trump's wishes. 793
On July 11, 2016, delegate Diana Denman submitted a proposed platform amendment that
included provision of armed support for Ukraine.794 The amendment described Russia's "ongoing
military aggression" in Ukraine and announced "support" for "maintaining (and, if warranted,
increasing) sanctions against Russia until Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity are fully
restored" and for "providing lethal defensive weapons to Ukraine's armed forces and greater
coordination with NATO on defense planning."795 Gordon reviewed the proposed platform changes,
including Denman's.796 Gordon stated that he flagged this amendment because of Trump's stated
position on Ukraine, which Gordon personally heard the candidate say at the March 31 foreign policy
meeting—namely, that the Europeans should take primary responsibility for any assistance to
Ukraine, that there should be improved U.S.-Russia relations, and that he did not want to start World
War III over that region.797 Gordon told the Office that Trump's statements on the campaign trail
following the March meeting underscored those positions to the point where Gordon felt obliged to
object to the proposed platform change and seek its dilution.798
On July 11, 2016, at a meeting of the National Security and Defense Platform Subcommittee,
Denman offered her amendment.799 Gordon and another Campaign staffer, Matt Miller, approached
a committee co-chair and asked him to table the amendment to permit further discussion.80°
Gordon's concern with the amendment was the language about providing "lethal
790
Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10; Hoff 5/26/17 302, at 1-2.
791
Hoff 5/26/17 302, at 1; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 10.
792
Mashburn 6/25/18 302, at 4; Manafort 9/20/18 302, at 7-8.
793
Mashburn 6/25/18 302, at 4; Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10.
DENMAN 000001-02, DENMAN 000012, DENMAN 000021-22; Denman 12/4/17 302, at 1;
794
Denman 6/7/17 302, at 2.

795
DENMAN 000001-02, DENMAN 000012, DENMAN 000021-22.
796
Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10-11.
797
Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 11; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 11; Gordon 2/14/19 302, at 1-2, 5-6.
798
Gordon 2/14/19 302, at 5-6.
799
Denman 6/7/17 302, at 2; see DENMAN 000014.
Denman 6/7/17 302, at 2; Denman 12/4/17 302, at 2; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 11-12; see Hoff
800
5/26/17 302, at 2.
132
defensive weapons to Ukraine."801 Miller did not have any independent basis to believe that this
language contradicted Trump's views and relied on Gordon's recollection of the candidate's
views."2
According to Denman, she spoke with Gordon and Matt Miller, and they told her that they
had to clear the language and that Gordon was "talking to New York."' Denman told others that
she was asked by the two Trump Campaign staffers to strike "lethal defense weapons" from the
proposal but that she refused.804 Denman recalled Gordon saying that he was on the phone with
candidate Trump, but she was skeptical whether that was true. 805 Gordon denied having told
Denman that he was on the phone with Trump, although he acknowledged it was possible that he
mentioned having previously spoken to the candidate about the subject matter.806 Gordon's phone
records reveal a call to Sessions's office in Washington that afternoon, but do not include calls
directly to a number associated with Trump.807 And according to the President's written answers
to the Office's questions, he does not recall being involved in the change in language of the
platform amendment.8°8
Gordon stated that he tried to reach Rick Dearborn, a senior foreign policy advisor, and
Mashburn, the Campaign policy director. Gordon stated that he connected with both of them (he
could not recall if by phone or in person) and apprised them of the language he took issue with in
the proposed amendment. Gordon recalled no objection by either Dearborn or Mashburn and that
all three Campaign advisors supported the alternative formulation ("appropriate assistance"). 809
Dearborn recalled Gordon warning them about the amendment, but not weighing in because
Gordon was more familiar with the Campaign's foreign policy stance.81° Mashburn stated that
Gordon reached him, and he told Gordon that Trump had not taken a stance on the issue and that
the Campaign should not intervene.811
When the amendment came up again in the committee's proceedings, the subcommittee
changed the amendment by striking the "lethal defense weapons" language and replacing it with
801
Denman 6/7/17 302, at 3.
802
M. Miller 10/25/17 302 at 3.
803
Denman 12/4/17 302, at 2; Denman 6/7/17 302, at 2.
804 Hoff 5/26/17 302, at 2.
805 Denman 6/7/17 302, at 2-3, 3-4; Denman 12/4/17 302, at 2.

806
Gordon 2/14/19 302, at 7.
807
Call Records of J.D. Gordon . Gordon stated to the Office that
his calls with Sessions were unrelated to the platform change. Gordon 2/14/19 302, at 7.
808
Part (f)).
809
Gordon 2/14/19 302, at 6-7; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 11-12; see Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 11.
810
Dearborn 11/28/17 302, at 7-8.
811
Mashburn 6/25/18 302, at 4.
133
Atterney-Werk-Preduet // May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
AtteffierWerit-Pfetieet // May Contain Material Protected Undcr Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
"appropriate assistance."812 Gordon stated that he and the subcommittee co-chair ultimately agreed
to replace the language about armed assistance with "appropriate assistance." 813 The subcommittee
accordingly approved Denman's amendment but with the term "appropriate assistance. "814 Gordon
stated that, to his recollection, this was the only change sought by the Campaign.' Sam Clovis, the
Campaign's national co-chair and chief policy advisor, stated he was surprised by the change and
did not believe it was in line with Trump's stance.816 Mashburn stated that when he saw the word
"appropriate assistance," he believed that Gordon had violated Mashburn's directive not to
intervene.817
7. Post-Convention Contacts with Kislyak
Ambassador Kislyak continued his efforts to interact with Campaign officials with
responsibility for the foreign-policy portfolio—among them Sessions and Gordon—in the weeks
after the Convention. The Office did not identify evidence in those interactions of coordination
between the Campaign and the Russian government.
a. Ambassador Kislyak Invites J.D. Gordon to Breakfast at the Ambassador's

Residence
On August 3, 2016, an official from the Embassy of the Russian Federation in the United States
wrote to Gordon "[o]n behalf of" Ambassador Kislyak inviting Gordon "to have breakfast/tea with the
Ambassador at his residence" in Washington, D.C. the following week.818 Gordon responded five days
later to decline the invitation. He wrote, "[t]hese days are not optimal for us, as we are busily knocking
down a constant stream of false media stories while also preparing for the first debate with HRC. Hope
to take a raincheck for another time when things quiet down a bit. Please pass along my regards to the
Ambassador."819 The investigation did not identify evidence that Gordon made any other arrangements
to meet (or met) with Kislyak after this email.
b. Senator Sessions's September 2016 Meeting with Ambassador Kislyak
Also in August 2016, a representative of the Russian Embassy contacted Sessions's Senate
office about setting up a meeting with Kislyak.82° At the time, Sessions was a member of the
812
Hoff 5/26/17 302, at 2-3; see Denman 12/4/17 302, at 2-3; Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 11.
813
Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 11; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 12.
814
Hoff 5/26/17 302, at 2-3.
815
Gordon 2/14/19 302, at 6.
816
Clovis 10/3/17 302, at 10-11.
817
Mashburn 6/25/18 302, at 4.
818
DJTFP00004828 (8/3/16 Email, Pchelyakov [[email protected]] to Gordon).
819
DJTFP00004953 (8/8/16 Email, Gordon to [email protected]).
820
Luff 1/30/18 302, at 5.
134
____________________ Attorney Work Product // May Contain Material Protected Under
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and would meet with foreign officials in that capacity. 82I But
Sessions's staff reported, and Sessions himself acknowledged, that meeting requests from
ambassadors increased substantially in 2016, as Sessions assumed a prominent role in the Trump
Campaign and his name was mentioned for potential cabinet-level positions in a future Trump
Administration.822
On September 8, 2016, Sessions met with Kislyak in his Senate office.823 Sessions said that
he believed he was doing the Campaign a service by meeting with foreign ambassadors, including
Kislyak.824 He was accompanied in the meeting by at least two of his Senate staff: Sandra Luff, his
legislative director; and Pete Landrum, who handled military affairs.825 The meeting lasted less than
30 minutes.826 Sessions voiced concerns about Russia's sale of a missile-defense system to Iran,
Russian planes buzzing U.S. military assets in the Middle East, and Russian aggression in emerging
democracies such as Ukraine and Moldova.827 Kislyak offered explanations on these issues and
complained about NATO land forces in former Soviet-bloc countries that border Russia.' Landrum
recalled that Kislyak referred to the presidential campaign as "an interesting campaign,"829 and
Sessions also recalled Kislyak saying that the Russian government was receptive to the overtures
Trump had laid out during his campaign.83° None of the attendees, though, remembered any
discussion of Russian election interference or any request that Sessions convey information from the
Russian government to the Trump Campaign.831
During the meeting, Kislyak invited Sessions to further discuss U.S.-Russia relations with
him over a meal at the ambassador's residence.832 Sessions was non-committal when Kislyak extended
the invitation. After the meeting ended, Luff advised Sessions against accepting the one-on-one
meeting with Kislyak, whom she assessed to be an "old school KGB guy."833 Neither Luff nor
Landrum recalled that Sessions followed up on the invitation or made any further effort to dine
821
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23-24; Luff 1/30/18 302, at 5.
822
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23-24; Luff 1/30/18 302, at 5; Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 3-5.
823
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23.
824
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23.
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23; Luff 1/30/18 302, at 5-6; Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 4-5 (stating he
825
could not remember if election was discussed).

826
Luff 1/30/18 302, at 6; Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 5.
827
Luff 1/30/18 302, at 6; Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 4-5.
828
Luff 1/30/18 302, at 6; Landrum 2/27/18 302 at 4-5.
829
Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 5.
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23. Sessions also noted that ambassadors came to him for information
830
about Trump and hoped he would pass along information to Trump. Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23-24.
831
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23; Luff 1/30/18 302, at 6; Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 5.
832
Luff 1/30/18 302, at 5; Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 4.
833
Luff 1/30/18 302, at 5.
135
____________________ Attorney Work Product // May Contain Material Protected Under
or meet with Kislyak before the November 2016 election.834 Sessions and Landrum recalled that,
after the election, some efforts were made to arrange a meeting between Sessions and Kislyalc.835
According to Sessions, the request came through CNI and would have involved a meeting between
Sessions and Kislyak, two other ambassadors, and the Governor of Alabama.836 Sessions, however,
was in New York on the day of the anticipated meeting and was unable to attend.837 The investigation
did not identify evidence that the two men met at any point after their September 8 meeting.
8. Paul Manafort
Paul Manafort served on the Trump Campaign, including a period as campaign chairman,
from March to August 2016.838 Manafort had connections to Russia through his prior work for
Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska and later through his work for a pro-Russian regime in Ukraine.
Manafort stayed in touch with these contacts during the campaign period through Konstantin
Kilimnik, a longtime Manafort employee who previously ran Manafort's office in Kiev and who
the FBI assesses to have ties to Russian intelligence.
Manafort instructed Rick Gates, his deputy on the Campaign and a longtime employee, 839
to provide Kilimnik with updates on the Trump Campaign—including internal polling data,
although Manafort claims not to recall that specific instruction. Manafort expected Kilimnik to
share that information with others in Ukraine and with Deripaska. Gates periodically sent such
polling data to Kilimnik during the campaign.
834
Luff 1/30/18 302, at 6; Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 4-5.
835
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23.
836
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23.
837
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23.
838
On August 21, 2018, Manafort was convicted in the Eastern District of Virginia on eight tax,
Foreign Bank Account Registration (F BAR), and bank fraud charges. On September 14, 2018, Manafort
pleaded guilty in the District of Columbia to (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and conspiracy to
commit offenses against the United States (money laundering, tax fraud, FBAR, Foreign Agents Registration
Act (FARA), and FARA false statements), and (2) conspiracy to obstruct justice (witness tampering).
Manafort also admitted criminal conduct with which he had been charged in the Eastern District of Virginia,
but as to which the jury hung. The conduct at issue in both cases involved Manafort's work in Ukraine and
the money he earned for that work, as well as crimes after the Ukraine work ended. On March 7, 2019,
Manafort was sentenced to 47 months of imprisonment in the Virginia prosecution. On March 13, the district
court in D.C. sentenced Manafort to a total term of 73 months: 60 months on the Count 1 conspiracy (with
30 of those months to run concurrent to the Virginia sentence), and 13 months on the Count 1 conspiracy, to
be served consecutive to the other two sentences. The two sentences resulted in a total term of 90 months.
839
As noted in Volume I, Section III.D.1.b, supra, Gates pleaded guilty to two criminal charges in
the District of Columbia, including making a false statement to the FBI, pursuant to a plea agreement. He
has provided information and in-court testimony that the Office has deemed to be reliable. See also
Transcript at 16, United States v. Paul J Manafort, Jr., 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2019), Doc. 514
("Manafort 2/13/19 Transcript") (court's explanation of reasons to credit Gates's statements in one
instance).
136
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Manafort also twice met Kilimnik in the United States during the campaign period and
conveyed campaign information. The second meeting took place on August 2, 2016, in New York
City. Kilimnik requested the meeting to deliver in person a message from former Ukrainian
President Viktor Yanukovych, who was then living in Russia. The message was about a peace
plan for Ukraine that Manafort has since acknowledged was a "backdoor" means for Russia to
control eastern Ukraine. Several months later, after the presidential election, Kilimnik wrote an
email to Manafort expressing the view—which Manafort later said he shared—that the plan's
success would require U.S. support to succeed: "all that is required to start the process is a very
minor 'wink' (or slight push) from [Donald Trump].,5840 The email also stated that if Manafort were
designated as the U.S. representative and started the process, Yanukovych would ensure his
reception in Russia "at the very top level."
Manafort communicated with Kilimnik about peace plans for Ukraine on at least four
occasions after their first discussion of the topic on August 2: December 2016 (the Kilimnik email
described above); January 2017; February 2017; and again in the spring of 2018. The Office
reviewed numerous Manafort email and text communications, and asked President Trump about
the plan in written questions.841 The investigation did not uncover evidence of Manafort's passing
along information about Ukrainian peace plans to the candidate or anyone else in the Campaign or
the Administration. The Office was not, however, able to gain access to all of Manafort's electronic
communications (in some instances, messages were sent using encryption applications). And while
Manafort denied that he spoke to members of the Trump Campaign or the new Administration
about the peace plan, he lied to the Office and the grand jury about the peace plan and his meetings
with Kilimnik, and his unreliability on this subject was among the reasons that the district judge
found that he breached his cooperation agreement.842
The Office could not reliably determine Manafort's ur ose in sharin internal olling data
with Kilimnik during the campaign period. Manafort did not see
a downside to sharing campaign information, and told Gates that his role in the Campaign would
The email was drafted in K Tmni c's DMP email account in En:lish
840
According to the President's written answers, he does not remember Manafort communicating to
841
him any particular positions that Ukraine or Russia would want the United States to support. Written
Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 16-17 (Response to Question IV, Part (d)).
842
Manafort made several false statements during debriefings. Based on that conduct, the Office
determined that Manafort had breached his plea agreement and could not be a cooperating witness. The judge
presiding in Manafort's D.C. criminal case found by a preponderance of the evidence that Manafort
intentionally made multiple false statements to the FBI, the Office, and the grand jury concerning his
interactions and communications with Kilimnik (and concerning two other issues). Although the report refers
at times to Manafort's statements, it does so only when those statements are sufficiently corroborated to be
trustworthy, to identify issues on which Manafort's untruthful responses may themselves be of evidentiary
value, or to provide Manafort's explanations for certain events, even when we were unable to determine
whether that explanation was credible.
137
Attorney ___ Work Product // May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
be "good for business" and potentially a way to be made whole for work he previously completed
in the Ukraine. As to Deripaska, Manafort claimed that by sharing campaign information with him,
Deripaska might see value in their relationship and resolve a "disagreement"—a reference to one or
more outstanding lawsuits. Because of questions about Manafort's credibility and our limited ability
to gather evidence on what happened to the polling data after it was sent to Kilimnik, the Office
could not assess what Kilimnik (or others he may have given it to) did with it. The Office did not
identify evidence of a connection between Manafort's sharing polling data and Russia's interference
in the election, which had already been reported by U.S. media outlets at the time of the August 2
meeting. The investigation did not establish that Manafort otherwise coordinated with the Russian
government on its election-interference efforts.
a. Paul Manafort's Ties to Russia and Ukraine
Manafort's Russian contacts during the campaign and transition periods stem from his
consulting work for Deripaska from approximately 2005 to 2009 and his separate political
consulting work in Ukraine from 2005 to 2015, including through his company DMP International
LLC (DMI). Kilimnik worked for Manafort in Kiev during this entire period and continued to
communicate with Manafort through at least June 2018. Kilimnik, who speaks and writes Ukrainian
and Russian, facilitated many of Manafort's communications with Deripaska and Ukrainian
oligarchs.
i. Oleg Deripaska Consulting Work

In approximately 2005, Manafort began working for Deripaska, a Russian oligarch who
has a global empire involving aluminum and power companies and who is closely aligned with
Vladimir Putin.843 A memorandum describing work that Manafort performed for Deripaska in 2005
regarding the post-Soviet republics referenced the need to brief the Kremlin and the benefits that
the work could confer on "the Putin Government."'" Gates described the work Manafort did for
Deripaska as "political risk insurance," and explained that Deripaska used Manafort to install
friendly political officials in countries where Deripaska had business interests. 845 Manafort's
company earned tens of millions of dollars from its work for Deripaska and was loaned millions of
dollars by Deripaska as wel1.846
In 2007, Deripaska invested through another entity in Pericles Emerging Market Partners
L.P. ("Pericles"), an investment fund created by Manafort and former Manafort business partner
Richard Davis. The Pericles fund was established to pursue investments in Eastern Europe. 847
Deripaska was the sole investor.'" Gates stated in interviews with the Office that the venture led
843
Pinchuk et al., Russian Tycoon Deripaska in Putin Delegation to China, Reuters (June 8, 2018).
844
6/23/05 Memo, Manafort & Davis to Deripaska & Rothchild.
845
Gates 2/2/18 302, at 7.
Manafort 9/20/18 302, at 2-5; Manafort Income by Year, 2005 — 2015; Manafort Loans
846
from Wire Transfers, 2005 — 2015.

847
Gates 3/12/18 302, at 5.
848
Manafort 12/16/15 Dep., at 157:8-11.
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Attorney Work Product II May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
to a deterioration of the relationship between Manafort and Deripaska.849 In particular, when the
fund failed, litigation between Manafort and Deripaska ensued. Gates stated that, by 2009,
Manafort's business relationship with Deripaska had "dried up."85° According to Gates, various
interactions with Deripaska and his intermediaries over the past few years have involved trying to
resolve the legal dispute.851 As described below, in 2016, Manafort, Gates, Kilimnik, and others
engaged in efforts to revive the Deripaska relationship and resolve the litigation.
ii. Political Consulting Work

Through Deripaska, Manafort was introduced to Rinat Akhmetov, a Ukrainian oligarch
who hired Manafort as a political consultant.852 In 2005, Akhmetov hired Manafort to engage in
political work supporting the Party of Regions,853 a political party in Ukraine that was generally
understood to align with Russia. Manafort assisted the Party of Regions in regaining power, and its
candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, won the presidency in 2010. Manafort became a close and trusted
political advisor to Yanukovych during his time as President of Ukraine. Yanukovych served in
that role until 2014, when he fled to Russia amidst popular protests.854
iii. Konstantin Kilimnik

Kilimnik is a Russian national who has lived in both Russia and Ukraine and was a longtime
Manafort employee.855 Kilimnik had direct and close access to Yanukovych and his senior
entourage, and he facilitated communications between Manafort and his clients, including
Yanukovych and multiple Ukrainian oligarchs.856 Kilimnik also maintained a relationship with
Deripaska's deputy, Viktor Boyarkin,857 a Russian national who previously served in the defense
attaché office of the Russian Embassy to the United States.858
849 Gates 2/2/18 302, at 9.

850 Gates 2/2/18 302, at 6.
851 Gates 2/2/18 302, at 9-10.
852 Manafort 7/30/14 302, at 1; Manafort 9/20/18 302, at 2.
853 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 5-6.
854 Gates 3/16/18 302, at 1; Davis 2/8/18 302, at 9; Devine 7/6/18 302, at 2-3.
855Patten 5/22/18 302, at 5; Gates 1/29/18 302, at 18-19; 10/28/97 Visa Record, U.S.
Kilimnik Department of State.
Gates 1/29/18 302, at 18-19; Patten 5/22/18 302, at 8; Gates 1/31/18 4-5; Gates 1/30/18
856
302, at 302, at 2; Gates 2/2/18 302, at 11.

857 Gates 1/29/18 302, at 18; Patten 5/22/18 302, at 8.
858 Boyarkin Visa Record, U.S. Department of State.
132
Manafort told the Office that he did not believe Kilimnik was working as a Russian "spy." 859
The FBI, however, assesses that Kilimnik has ties to Russian intelligence."' Several pieces of the
Office's evidence—including witness interviews and emails obtained through court-authorized search
warrants—support that assessment:
 Kilimnik was born on April 27, 1970, in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, then of the Soviet Union, and
attended the Military Institute of the Ministry of Defense from 1987 until 1992.861 Sam Patten,
a business partner to Kilimnik,862 stated that Kilimnik told him that he was a translator in the
Russian army for seven years and that he later worked in the Russian armament industry selling
arms and military equipment.863
 U.S. government visa records reveal that Kilimnik obtained a visa to travel to the United States
with a Russian diplomatic passport in 1997.864
 Kilimnik worked for the International Republican Institute's (IRI) Moscow office, where
he did translation work and general office management from 1998 to 2005. 865 While another
official recalled the incident differently, 866 one former associate of Kilimnik's at IRI told
the FBI that Kilimnik was fired from his post because his links to Russian intelligence were
too strong. The same individual stated that it was well known at IRI that Kilimnik had links
to the Russian government.867
 Jonathan Hawker, a British national who was a public relations consultant at FTI
Consulting, worked with DMI on a public relations campaign for Yanukovych. After
Hawker's work for DMI ended, Kilimnik contacted Hawker about working for a Russian
859
Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 5.
860
The Office has noted Kilimnik's assessed ties to Russian intelligence in public court filings.
E.g., Gov't Opp. to Mot. to Modify, United States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr., 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Dec. 4,
2017), Doc. 73, at 2 ("Manafbrt (D.D.C.) Gov't Opp. to Mot. to Modify").
861
12/17/16 Kilimnik Visa Record, U.S. Department of State.
862
In August 2018, Patten pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to violating the Foreign Agents
Registration Act, and admitted in his Statement of Offense that he also misled and withheld documents from
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in the course of its investigation of Russian election
interference. Plea Agreement, United States v. W. Samuel Patten, 1:18-cr-260 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 2018), Doc.
6; Statement of Offense, United States v. W. Samuel Patten, 1:18-cr-260 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 2018), Doc. 7.
863
Patten 5/22/18 302, at 5-6.
864
10/28/97 Kilimnik Visa Record, U.S. Department of State.
865
Nix 3/30/18 302, at 1-2.
866
Nix 3/30/18 302, at 2.
867
Lenzi 1/30/18 302, at 2.
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government entity on a public-relations project that would promote, in Western and

Ukrainian media, Russia's position on its 2014 invasion of Crimea.868
 Gates suspected that Kilimnik was a "spy," a view that he shared with Manafort, Hawker,
and Alexander van der Zwaan,869 an attorney who had worked with DMI on a report for
the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.87°
b. Contacts during Paul Manafort's Time with the Trump Campaign
i. Paul Manafort Joins the Campaign
Manafort served on the Trump Campaign from late March to August 19, 2016. On March
29, 2016, the Campaign announced that Manafort would serve as the Campaign's "Convention
Manager."871 On May 19, 2016, Manafort was promoted to campaign chairman and chief strategist,
and Gates, who had been assisting Manafort on the Campaign, was appointed deputy campaign
chairman.872
Thomas Barrack and Roger Stone both recommended Manafort to candidate Trump.873 In
early 2016, at Manafort's request, Barrack suggested to Trump that Manafort join the Campaign to
manage the Republican Convention.874 Stone had worked with Manafort from approximately 1980
until the mid-1990s through various consulting and lobbying firms. Manafort met Trump in 1982 when
Trump hired the Black, Manafort, Stone and Kelly lobbying firm.875 Over the years, Manafort saw
Trump at political and social events in New York City and at Stone's wedding, and Trump requested
VIP status at the 1988 and 1996 Republican conventions worked by Manafort.876
868
Hawker 1/9/18 302, at 13; 3/18/14 Email, Hawker & Tulukbaev.
869 van der Zwaan pleaded guilty in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to making
false statements to the Special Counsel's Office. Plea Agreement, United States v. Alex van der Zwaan, 1:18-
cr-31 (D.D.C. Feb. 20, 2018), Doc. 8.
870
Hawker 6/9/18 302, at 4; van der Zwaan 11/3/17 302, at 22. Manafort said in an interview that
Gates had joked with Kilimnik about Kilimnik's going to meet with his KGB handler. Manafort 10/16/18
302, at 7.
Press Release — Donald J. Trump Announces Campaign Convention Manager Paul J.
871
Manafort, The American Presidency Project — U.C. Santa Barbara (Mar. 29, 2016).
Gates 1/29/18 302, at 8; Meghan Keneally, Timeline of Manafort 's role in the Trump
872
Campaign, ABC News (Oct. 20, 2017).

873
Gates 1/29/18 302, at 7-8; Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 1-2; Barrack 12/12/17 302, at 3.
874
Barrack 12/12/17 302, at 3; Gates 1/29/18 302, at 7-8.
875
Manafort 10/16/18 302, at 6.
876
Manafort 10/16/18 302, at 6.
134
According to Gates, in March 2016, Manafort traveled to Trump's Mar-a-Lago estate in Florida
to meet with Trump. Trump hired him at that time.877 Manafort agreed to work on the Campaign without
pay. Manafort had no meaningful income at this point in time, but resuscitating his domestic political
campaign career could be financially beneficial in the future. Gates reported that Manafort intended, if
Trump won the Presidency, to remain outside the Administration and monetize his relationship with the
Administration.878
ii. Paul Manafort's Campaign-Period Contacts
Immediately upon joining the Campaign, Manafort directed Gates to prepare for his review
separate memoranda addressed to Deripaska, Akhmetov, Serhiy Lyovochkin, and Boris Kolesnikov, 879
the last three being Ukrainian oligarchs who were senior Opposition Bloc officials."° The memoranda
described Manafort's appointment to the Trump Campaign and indicated his willingness to consult on
Ukrainian politics in the future. On March 30, 2016, Gates emailed the memoranda and a press release
announcing Manafort's appointment to Kilimnik for translation and dissemination. 881 Manafort later
followed up with Kilimnik to ensure his messages had been delivered, emailing on April 11, 2016 to
ask whether Kilimnik had shown "our friends" the media coverage of his new role."' Kilimnik replied,
"Absolutely. Every article." Manafort further asked: "How do we use to get whole. Has Ovd [Oleg
Vladimirovich Deripaska] operation seen?" Kilimnik wrote back the same day, "Yes, I have been
sending everything to Victor [Boyarkin, Deripaska's deputy], who has been forwarding the coverage
directly to OVD."883
Gates reported that Manafort said that being hired on the Campaign would be "good for
business" and increase the likelihood that Manafort would be paid the approximately $2 million he was
owed for previous political consulting work in Ukraine.884 Gates also explained to the Office that
Manafort thought his role on the Campaign could help "confirm" that Deripaska had dropped the
Pericles lawsuit, and that Gates believed Manafort sent polling data to Deripaska (as
877
Gates 2/2/18 302, at 10.
878
Gates 1/30/18 302, at 4.
879
Gates 2/2/18 302, at 11.
880
See Sharon LaFraniere, Manafort's Trial Isn't About Russia, but It Will Be in the Air, New York
Times (July 30, 2018); Tierney Sneed, Prosecutors Believe Manafort Made $60 Million Consulting in
Ukraine, Talking Points Memo (July 30, 2018); Mykola Vorobiov, How Pro-Russian Forces Will Take
Revenge on Ukraine, Atlantic Council (Sept. 23, 2018); Sergii Leshchenko, Ukraine's Oligarchs Are Still
Calling the Shots, Foreign Policy (Aug. 14, 2014); Interfax-Ukraine, Kolesnikov: Inevitability of Punishment
Needed for Real Fight Against Smuggling in Ukraine, Kyiv Post (June 23, 2018); Igor Kossov, Kyiv Hotel
Industry Makes Room for New Entrants, Kyiv Post (Mar. 7, 2019); Markian Kuzmowycz, How the Kremlin
Can Win Ukraine's Elections, Atlantic Council (Nov. 19, 2018). The Opposition Bloc is a Ukraine political
party that largely reconstituted the Party of Regions.
881
3/30/16 Email, Gates to Kilimnik.
882
4/11/16 Email, Manafort & Kilimnik.
883
4/11/16 Email, Manafort & Kilimnik.
884
Gates 2/2/18 302, at 10.
135
discussed further below) so that Deripaska would not move forward with his lawsuit against
Manafort.885 Gates further stated that Deripaska wanted a visa to the United States, that Deripaska
could believe that having Manafort in a position inside the Campaign or Administration might be
helpful to Deripaska, and that Manafort's relationship with Trump could help Deripaska in other ways
as well.' Gates stated, however, that Manafort never told him anything specific about what, if
anything, Manafort might be offering Deripaska.887
Gates also reported that Manafort instructed him in April 2016 or early May 2016 to send
Kilimnik Campaign internal polling data and other updates so that Kilimnik, in turn, could share it
with Ukrainian oli archs.888 Gates understood that the information would also be shared with
Deripaska .889 Gates reported to the Office
that he did not know why Manafort wanted him to send polling information, but Gates thought it was
a way to showcase Manafort's work, and Manafort wanted to open doors to jobs after the Trump
Campaign ended.89° Gates said that Manafort's instruction included sending internal polling data
prepared for the Trump Campaign by pollster Tony Fabrizio.891 Fabrizio had worked with Manafort
for years and was brought into the Campaign by Manafort. Gates stated that, in accordance with
Manafort's instruction, he periodically sent Kilimnik polling data via WhatsApp; Gates then deleted
the communications on a daily basis.892 Gates further told the Office that, after Manafort left the
Campaign in mid-August, Gates sent Kilimnik polling data less frequently and that the data he sent
was more publicly available information and less internal data.893
Gates's account about • ollin data is consistent

with multiple emails that
Kilimnik sent to U.S. associates and press contacts between late July and mid-August of 2016.
Those emails referenced "internal polling," described the status of the Trump Campaign and
885
Gates 2/2/18 302, at 11; Gates 9/27/18 302 (serial 740), at 2.
886
Gates 2/2/18 302, at 12.
887
Gates 2/2/18 302, at 12.
888
Gates 1/31/18 302, at 17; Gates 9/27/18 302 (serial 740), at 2. In a later interview with the Office,
Gates stated that Manafort directed him to send polling data to Kilimnik after a May 7, 2016 meeting between
Manafort and Kilimnik in New York, discussed in Volume I, Section IV.A.8.b.iii, infra. Gates 11/7/18 302,
at 3.
889
Gates 9/27/18 302, Part II, at 2;
890
Gates 2/12/18 302, at 10; Gates 1/31/18 302, at 17.
891
Gates 9/27/18 302 (serial 740), at 2; Gates 2/7/18 302, at 15.
892
Gates 1/31/18 302, at 17.
Gates 2/12/18 302, at 11-12. According to Gates, his access to internal polling data was
893
more limited because Fabrizio was himself distanced from the Campaign at that point.
894
136
Manafort's role in it, and assessed Trump's prospects for victo .895 Manafort did not acknowled e
instructin Gates to send Kilimnik internal data,
The Office also obtained contemporaneous emails that shed light on the purpose of the
communications with Deripaska and that are consistent with Gates's account. For example, in response
to a July 7, 2016, email from a Ukrainian reporter about Manafort's failed Deripaska-backed investment,
Manafort asked Kilimnik whether there had been any movement on "this issue with our friend."897 Gates
stated that "our friend" likely referred to Deripaska,898 and Manafort told the Office that the "issue" (and
"our biggest interest," as stated below) was a solution to the Deripaska-Pericles issue.899 Kilimnik
replied:
I am carefully optimistic on the question of our biggest interest.
Our friend [Boyarkin] said there is lately significantly more attention to the campaign in his
boss' [Deripaska's] mind, and he will be most likely looking for ways to reach out to you pretty
soon, understanding all the time sensitivity. I am more than sure that it will be resolved and we
will get back to the original relationship with V.'s boss [Deripaska].90°
Eight minutes later, Manafort replied that Kilimnik should tell Boyarkin's "boss," a reference to
Deripaska, "that if he needs private briefings we can accommodate." 901 Manafort has alleged to the
Office that he was willing to brief Deripaska only on public campaign matters and gave an example:
why Trump selected Mike Pence as the Vice-Presidential running mate. 902 Manafort said he never
gave Deripaska a briefing. 903 Manafort noted that if Trump won, Deripaska would want to use
Manafort to advance whatever interests Deripaska had in the United States and elsewhere."'
8/18/16 Email, Kilimnik to Dirkse; 8/18/16 Email, Kilimnik to Schultz; 8/18/16 Email, Kilimnik to
895
Marson; 7/27/16 Email, Kilimnik to Ash; 8/18/16 Email, Kilimnik to Ash; 8/18/16 Email, Kilimnik to
Jackson; 8/18/16 Email, Kilimnik to Mendoza-Wilson; 8/19/16 Email, Kilimnik to Patten.
7/7/16 Email, Manafort to Kilimnik.
Gates 2/2/18 302, at 13.
896
897
Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 6.
898
7/8/16 Email, Kilimnik to Manafort.
899
7/8/16 Email, Kilimnik to Manafort; Gates 2/2/18 302, at 13.
900
Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 6.
901
Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 6.
902
Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 6.
903
904
137
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iii. Paul Manafort's Two Campaign-Period Meetings with Konstantin Kilimnik

in the United States
Manafort twice met with Kilimnik in person during the campaign period—once in May and
again in August 2016. The first meeting took place on May 7, 2016, in New York City. 905 In the
days leading to the meeting, Kilimnik had been working to gather information about the political
situation in Ukraine. That included information gleaned from a trip that former Party of Regions
official Yuriy Boyko had recently taken to Moscow—a trip that likely included meetings between
Boyko and high-ranking Russian officials.906 Kilimnik then traveled to Washington, D.C. on or
about May 5, 2016; while in Washington, Kilimnik had pre-arranged meetings with State
Department employees.907
Late on the evening of May 6, Gates arranged for Kilimnik to take a 3:00 a.m. train to meet
Manafort in New York for breakfast on May 7.908 According to Manafort, during the meeting, he
and Kilimnik talked about events in Ukraine, and Manafort briefed Kilimnik on the Trump
Campaign, expecting Kilimnik to pass the information back to individuals in Ukraine and
elsewhere.909 Manafort stated that Opposition Bloc members recognized Manafort's position on the
Campaign was an opportunity, but Kilimnik did not ask for anything. 91° Kilimnik spoke about a
plan of Boyko to boost election participation in the eastern zone of Ukraine, which was the base
for the Opposition Bloc.911 Kilimnik returned to Washington, D.C. right after the meeting with
Manafort.
Manafort met with Kilimnik a second time at the Grand Havana Club in New York City on
the evening of August 2, 2016. The events leading to the meeting are as follows. On July 28, 2016,
Kilimnik flew from Kiev to Moscow.912 The next day, Kilimnik wrote to Manafort requesting that
they meet, using coded language about a conversation he had that day.913 In an email with a subject
line "Black Caviar," Kilimnik wrote:
I met today with the guy who gave you your biggest black caviar jar several years ago. We
spent about 5 hours talking about his story, and I have several important messages from him
to you. He asked me to go and brief you on our conversation. I said I have to run it by you
first, but in principle I am prepared to do it. . . . It has to do about the future of his

906 4/26/16 Email, Kilimnik to Purcell, at 2; Gates 2/2/18 302, at 12; Patten 5/22/18 302, at 6-7; Gates
11/7/18 302, at 3.
907 5/7/16 Email, Kilimnik to Charap & Kimmage; 5/7/16 Email, Kasanof to Kilimnik.
908 5/6/16 Email, Manafort to Gates; 5/6/16 Email, Gates to Kilimnik.
909 Manafort 10/11/18 302, at 1.
910 Manafort 10/11/18 302, at 1.
911 Manafort 10/1 1/18 302, at 1.
912 7/25/16 Email, Kilimnik to [email protected] (2:17:34 a.m.).
913 7/29/16 Email, Kilimnik to Manafort (10:51 a.m.).
138
Atterney-Werk--Preduet II May Contain Matcrial Protcctcd Undcr Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
country, and is quite interesting.914
Manafort identified "the guy who gave you your biggest black caviar jar" as Yanukovych. He explained
that, in 2010, he and Yanukovych had lunch to celebrate the recent presidential election. Yanukovych
gave Manafort a large jar of black caviar that was worth approximately $30,000 to $40,000. 915
Manafort's identification of Yanukovych as "the guy who gave you your biggest black caviar jar" is
consistent with Kilimnik being in Moscow—where Yanukovych resided—when Kilimnik wrote "I met
today with the u " and with a December 2016 email in which Kilimnik
916
referred to Yanukovych as "BG," Manafort replied to Kilimnik's July 29
917
email, "Tuesday [August 2] is best . . . Tues or weds in NYC."
Three days later, on July 31, 2016, Kilimnik flew back to Kiev from Moscow, and on that same
day, wrote to Manafort that he needed "about 2 hours" for their meeting "because it is a long caviar
story to tell."918 Kilimnik wrote that he would arrive at JFK on August 2 at 7:30 p.m., and he and
Manafort agreed to a late dinner that night.919 Documentary evidence—including flight, phone, and
hotel records, and the timing of text messages exchanged920—confirms the dinner took place as planned
on August 2.921
As to the contents of the meeting itself, the accounts of Manafort and Gates—who arrived late
to the dinner—differ in certain respects. But their versions of events, when assessed alongside available
documentary evidence and what Kilimnik told business associate Sam Patten, indicate that at least three
principal topics were discussed.
First, Manafort and Kilimnik discussed a plan to resolve the ongoing political problems in
Ukraine by creating an autonomous republic in its more industrialized eastern region of Donbas,922
914
7/29/16 Email, Kilimnik to Manafort (10:51 a.m.).
915
Manafort 9/12/18 302, at 3.
916
7/29/16 Email, Manafort to Kilimnik; Investigative Technique
917
918
919
Kilimnik 8/2/16 CBP Record; Call Records of Konstantin Kilimnik
920
.11; Call Records of Rick Gates ; 8/2-3/16, Kilimnik Park Lane Hotel
Receipt.
Deripaska's private plane also flew to Teterboro Airport in New Jersey on the evening of August
921
2, 2016. According to Customs and Border Protection records, the only passengers on the plane were
Deripaska's wife, daughter, mother, and father-in-law, and separate records obtained by our Office confirm
that Kilimnik flew on a commercial flight to New York.
922
The Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics, which are located in the Donbas region of Ukraine,
declared themselves independent in response to the popular unrest in 2014 that removed President
Yanukovych from power. Pro-Russian Ukrainian militia forces, with backing from the Russian military, have
occupied the region since 2014. Under the Yanukovych-backed plan, Russia would assist in withdrawing the
military, and Donbas would become an autonomous region within Ukraine with its own
139
Ati-emer-Werlt-Rreelttet // May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
and having Yanukovych, the Ukrainian President ousted in 2014, elected to head that republic.923
That plan, Manafort later acknowledged, constituted a "backdoor" means for Russia to control
eastern Ukraine.924 Manafort initially said that, if he had not cut off the discussion, Kilimnik would
have asked Manafort in the August 2 meeting to convince Trump to come out in favor of the peace
plan, and Yanukovych would have expected Manafort to use his connections in Europe and Ukraine
to support the plan.' Manafort also initially told the Office that he had said to Kilimnik that the plan
was crazy, that the discussion ended, and that he did not recall Kilimnik askin Manafort to reconsider
the plan after their August 2 meetin .926 Manafort said
that he reacted negatively to Yanukovych sending—years later—an "urgent"

request when Yanukovych needed him.927 When confronted with an email written by Kilimnik on
or about December 8, 2016, however, Manafort acknowledged Kilimnik raised the peace plan again
in that email.928 Manafort ultimately acknowled ed Kilimnik also raised the eace lan in Januar and
February 2017 meetings with Manafort
929
Second, Manafort briefed Kilimnik on the state of the Trump Campaign and Manafort's
plan to win the election.93° That briefing encompassed the Campaign's messaging and its internal
polling data. According to Gates, it also included discussion of "battleground" states, which
Manafort identified as Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Minnesota.931 Manafort did not
refer ex licit/ to "battle:round" states in his tellin: of the August 2 discussion,
prime minister. The plan emphasized that Yanukovych would be an ideal candidate to bring peace to the
region as prime minister of the republic, and facilitate the reintegration of the re ion into Ukraine with the
support of the U.S. and Russian presidents. As noted above, according to the written
documentation describin the lan, for the lan to work, both U.S. and Russian support were necessary.
2/21/18 Email, Manafort, Ward, & Fabrizio, at 3-5.
923
Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 4;
924
925
Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 4.
926
Manafort 9/12/18 302, at 4.
927 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 5; Manafort 9/12/18
302, at 4.
928
Manafort 9/12/18 302, at 4; Investigative Technique
929 Documentary
evidence confirms the peace-plan discussions in 2018. 2/19/18 Email, Fabrizio to Ward (forwarding email
from Manafort); 2/21/18 Email, Manafort to Ward & Fabrizio.
93°
Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 5.
931
Gates 1/30/18 302, at 3, 5.
932
140
Atterney-Werk--Preduet II May Contain Matcrial Protcctcd Undcr Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
Third, according to Gates and what Kilimnik told Patten, Manafort and Kilimnik discussed
two sets of financial disputes related to Manafort's previous work in the region. Those consisted of
the unresolved Deripaska lawsuit and the funds that the Opposition Bloc owed to Manafort for his
political consulting work and how Manafort might be able to obtain payment.933
After the meeting, Gates and Manafort both stated that they left separately from Kilimnik
because they knew the media was tracking Manafort and wanted to avoid media reporting on his
connections to Kilimnik.934
c. Post-Resignation Activities
Manafort resigned from the Trump Campaign in mid-August 2016, approximately two weeks
after his second meeting with Kilimnik, amidst negative media reporting about his political consulting
work for the pro-Russian Party of Regions in Ukraine. Despite his resignation, Manafort continued
to offer advice to various Campaign officials through the November election. Manafort told Gates
that he still spoke with Kushner, Bannon, and candidate Trump,935 and some of those post-resignation
contacts are documented in emails. For example, on October 21, 2016, Manafort sent Kushner an
email and attached a strategy memorandum proposing that the Campaign make the case against
Clinton "as the failed and corrupt champion of the establishment" and that "Wikileaks provides the
Trump campaign the ability to make the case in a very credible way — by using the words of Clinton,
its campaign officials and DNC members."936 Later, in a November 5, 2016 email to Kushner entitled
"Securing the Victory," Manafort stated that he was "really feeling good about our prospects on
Tuesday and focusing on preserving the victory," and that he was concerned the Clinton Campaign
would respond to a loss by "mov[ing] immediately to discredit the [Trump] victory and claim voter
fraud and cyber-fraud, including the claim that the Russians have hacked into the voting machines
and tampered with the results."937
Trump was elected President on November 8, 2016. Manafort told the Office that, in the
wake of Trump's victory, he was not interested in an Administration job. Manafort instead preferred
to stay on the "outside," and monetize his campaign position to generate business given his
familiarity and relationship with Trump and the incoming Administration. 938 Manafort appeared to
follow that plan, as he traveled to the Middle East, Cuba, South Korea, Japan, and China and was
paid to explain what a Trump presidency would entail.939
Manafort's activities in early 2017 included meetings relating to Ukraine and Russia. The
933
Gates 1/30/18 302, at 2-4; Patten 5/22/18 302, at 7.
934
Gates 1/30/18 302, at 5; Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 5.
935
Gates 2/12/18 302, at 12.
936
NOSC00021517-20 (10/21/16 Email, Manafort to Kushner).
937
NOSC00021573-75 (11/5/16 Email, Manafort to Kushner).
938
Manafort 9/12/18 302, at 1, 4-5; Gates 1/30/18 302, at 4.
939
Manafort 9/12/18 302, at 1.
141
Attemey--Work ______ Product // May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
first meeting, which took place in Madrid, Spain in January 2017, was with Georgiy Oganov.
Oganov, who had previously worked at the Russian Embassy in the United States, was a senior
executive at a Deripaska company and was believed to report directly to Deripaska.94° Manafort
initially denied attending the meeting. When he later acknowledged it, he claimed that the meeting
had been arranged by his lawyers and concerned only the Pericles lawsuit.941 Other evidence,
however, provides reason to doubt Manafort's statement that the sole topic of the meeting was the
Pericles lawsuit. In particular, text messages to Manafort from a number associated with Kilimnik
suggest that Kilimnik and Boyarkin—not Manafort's counsel—had arranged the meeting between
Manafort and Oganov.942 Kilimnik's message states that the meeting was supposed to be "not about
money or Pericles" but instead "about recreating [the] old friendship"—ostensibly between
Manafort and Deripaska—"and talking about global politics."943 Manafort also replied by text that
he "need[s] this finished before Jan. 20,"944 which appears to be a reference to resolving Pericles
before the inauguration.
On January 15, 2017, three days after his return from Madrid, Manafort emailed K.T.
McFarland, who was at that time designated to be Deputy National Security Advisor and was
formally appointed to that position on January 20, 2017.945 Manafort's January 15 email to
McFarland stated: "I have some important information I want to share that I picked up on my travels
over the last month."946 Manafort told the Office that the email referred to an issue regarding Cuba,
not Russia or Ukraine, and Manafort had traveled to Cuba in the past month.947 Either way,
McFarland—who was advised by Flynn not to respond to the Manafort inquiry—appears not to
have responded to Manafort.948
Manafort told the Office that around the time of the Presidential Inauguration in January,
he met with Kilimnik and Ukrainian oligarch Serhiy Lyovochkin at the Westin Hotel in Alexandria,
Virginia.949 During this meeting, Kilimnik again discussed the Yanukovych peace plan that he had
broached at the August 2 meeting and in a detailed December 8, 2016 message found in Kilimnik's
DMP email account.950 In that December 8 email, which Manafort
Kalashnikova 5/17/18 302, at 4; Gary Lee, Soviet Embassy's Identity Crisis, Washington Post (Dec.
940
20, 1991); Georgy S. Oganov Executive Profile & Biography, Bloomberg (Mar. 12, 2019).
941
Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 7.
942
Text Message, Manafort & Kilimnik.
943
Text Message, Manafort & Kilimnik; Manafort 9/12/18 302, at 5.
944
Text Message, Manafort & Kilimnik.
945
1/15/17 Email, Manafort, McFarland, & Flynn.
946
1/15/17 Email, Manafort, McFarland, & Flynn.
947
Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 7.
948
1/15/17 Email, Manafort, McFarland, & Flynn; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 18-19.
949 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 7; Manafort 9/21/18
302, at 3; 1/19/17 & 1/22/17 Kilimnik CBP Records, Jan. 19 and 22, 2017; 2016-17 Text Messages,
Kilimnik & Patten, at 1-2.
142
acknowledged having read,951 Kilimnik wrote, that is required to start the process is a very
minor 'wink' (or slight push) from DT"—an apparent reference to President-elect Trump—"and a
decision to authorize you to be a 'special representative' and manage this process." Kilimnik assured
Manafort, with that authority, he "could start the process and within 10 days visit Russia [Yanukovych]
guarantees your reception at the very top level," and that "DT could have peace in Ukraine basically
within a few months after inauguration."952
ualif his en:a:ement on and su ort for the lan.
As noted above, and statements to the Office, Manafort sou ht to

On February 26, 2017, Manafort met Kilimnik in Madrid, where Kilimnik had flown from
Moscow.956 In his first two interviews with the Office, Manafort denied meeting with Kilimnik on
his Madrid trip and then—after being confronted with documentary evidence that Kilimnik was in
Madrid at the same time as him—recognized that he met him in Madrid. Manafort said that Kilimnik
had updated him on a criminal investigation into so-called "black ledger" payments to Manafort that
was bein: conducted b Ukraine's National Anti-Corru • tion Bureau.957
Manafort remained in contact with Kilimnik throughout 2017 and into the spring of 2018.
951
Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 6;
953
954
955
956
2/21/17 Email, Zatynaiko to Kilimnik.
957
Manafort 9/13/18 302, at 1.
958 In resolving whether Manafort breached
143
his cooperation plea agreement by lying to the Office, the district court found that Manafort lied about,
among other things, his contacts with Kilimnik regarding the peace plan, including the meeting in
Madrid. Manafort 2/13/19 Transcript, at 29-31, 40.
144
Those contacts included matters pertaining to the criminal charges brought by the Office, 959 and
the Ukraine peace plan. In early 2018, Manafort retained his longtime polling firm to craft a draft
poll in Ukraine, sent the pollsters a three-page primer on the plan sent by Kilimnik, and worked
with Kilimnik to formulate the polling questions.96° The primer sent to the pollsters specifically
called for the United States and President Trump to support the Autonomous Republic of Donbas
with Yanukovych as Prime Minister,961 and a series of questions in the draft poll asked for opinions
on Yanukovych's role in resolving the conflict in Donbas.962 (The poll was not solely about Donbas;
it also sought participants' views on leaders apart from Yanukovych as they pertained to the 2019
Ukraine presidential election.)
The Office has not uncovered evidence that Manafort brought the Ukraine peace plan to
the attention of the Trump Campaign or the Trump Administration. Kilimnik continued his efforts
to promote the peace plan to the Executive Branch (e.g., U.S. Department of State) into the summer
of 2018.9"
B. Post-Election and Transition-Period Contacts
Trump was elected President on November 8, 2016. Beginning immediately after the
election, individuals connected to the Russian government started contacting officials on the Trump
Campaign and Transition Team through multiple channels—sometimes through Russian
Ambassador Kislyak and at other times through individuals who sought reliable contacts through
U.S. persons not formally tied to the Campaign or Transition Team. The most senior levels of the
Russian government encouraged these efforts. The investigation did not establish that these efforts
reflected or constituted coordination between the Trump Campaign and Russia in its election-
interference activities.
1. Immediate Post-Election Activity
As soon as news broke that Trump had been elected President, Russian government
officials and prominent Russian businessmen began trying to make inroads into the new
Administration. They appeared not to have preexisting contacts and struggled to connect with
senior officials around the President-Elect. As explained below, those efforts entailed both official
contact through the Russian Embassy in the United States and outreaches—sanctioned at high
levels of the Russian government—through business rather than political contacts.
Manafort (D.D.C.) Gov't Opp. to Mot. to Modify, at 2; Superseding United Indictment in 48-51,
959
States v. Paul J Manafort, Jr., 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. June 8, 2018), Doc. 318.
2/12/18 Email, Fabrizio to Manafort & Ward; 2/16/18 Email, Fabrizio Email, to Manafort; 2/19/18
960
Fabrizio to Ward; 2/21/18 Email, Manafort to Ward & Fabrizio.

961
2/21/18 Email, Manafort to Ward & Fabrizio (7:16:49 a.m.) (attachment)
962
3/9/18 Email, Ward to Manafort & Fabrizio (attachment).
145
a. Outreach from the Russian Government
At approximately 3 a.m. on election night, Trump Campaign press secretary Hope Hicks
received a telephone call on her personal cell phone from a person who sounded foreign but was calling
from a number with a DC area code.964 Although Hicks had a hard time understanding the person, she
could make out the words "Putin call."965 Hicks told the caller to send her an email.966
The following morning, on November 9, 2016, Sergey Kuznetsov, an official at the Russian
Embassy to the United States, emailed Hicks from his Gmail address with the subject line,
"Message from Putin."967 Attached to the email was a message from Putin, in both English and
Russian, which Kuznetsov asked Hicks to convey to the President-Elect.968 In the message, Putin
offered his congratulations to Trump for his electoral victory, stating he "look[ed] forward to
working with [Trump] on leading Russian-American relations out of crisis."969
Hicks forwarded the email to Kushner, asking, "Can you look into this? Don't want to get
duped but don't want to blow off Putin!"9" Kushner stated in Congressional testimony that he
believed that it would be possible to verify the authenticity of the forwarded email through the
Russian Ambassador, whom Kushner had previously met in April 2016.971 Unable to recall the
Russian Ambassador's name, Kushner emailed Dimitri Simes of CNI, whom he had consulted
previously about Russia, see Volume I, Section IV.A.4, supra, and asked, "What is the name of
Russian ambassador?"972 Kushner forwarded Simes's response—which identified Kislyak by
name—to Hicks.' After checking with Kushner to see what he had learned, Hicks conveyed Putin's
letter to transition officials.974 Five days later, on November 14, 2016, Trump and Putin spoke by
phone in the presence of Transition Team members, including incoming National Security Advisor
Michael Flynn.975
964
Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 3.
965
Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 3.
966
Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 3.
967
NOSC00044381 (11/9/16 Email, Kuznetsov to Hicks (5:27 a.m.)).
968
NOSC00044381-82 (11/9/16 Email, Kuznetsov to Hicks (5:27 a.m.)).
969
NOSC00044382 (11/9/16 Letter from Putin to President-Elect Trump (Nov. 9, 2016)
(translation)).
970
NOSC00044381 (11/9/16 Email, Hicks to Kushner (10:26 a.m.)).
971
Statement of Jared C. Kushner to Congressional Committees, at 4 (Jul. 24, 2017).
NOSC00000058 (11/9/16 Email, Kushner to Simes (10:28 a.m.)); Statement of Jared
972
Kushner to Congressional Committees, at 4 (Jul. 24, 2017).

973
NOSC00000058 (11/9/16 Email, Kushner to Hicks (11:05:44 a.m.)).
974 Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 3-4.
Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 8-10; see Doug G. Ware, Trump, Russia's Putin Talk about Syria,
975
Icy Relations in Phone Call, UPI (Nov. 14, 2016).
146
b. High-Level Encouragement of Contacts through Alternative Channels
As Russian officials in the United States reached out to the President-Elect and his team, a
number of Russian individuals working in the private sector began their own efforts to make
contact. Petr Aven, a Russian national who heads Alfa-Bank, Russia's largest commercial bank,
described to the Office interactions with Putin during this time period that might account for the
flurry of Russian activity.976
Aven told the Office that he is one of approximately 50 wealthy Russian businessmen who
regularly meet with Putin in the Kremlin; these 50 men are often referred to as "oligarchs."' Aven told
the Office that he met on a quarterly basis with Putin, including in the fourth quarter (Q4) of 2016,
shortly after the U.S. presidential election.978 Aven said that he took these meetings seriously and
understood that any suggestions or critiques that Putin made during these meetings were implicit
directives, and that there would be consequences for Aven if he did not follow through.979 As was
typical, the 2016 Q4 meeting with Putin was preceded by a preparatory meeting with Putin's chief of
staff, Anton Vaino.98°
According to Aven, at his Q4 2016 one-on-one meeting with Putin,98' Putin raised the
prospect that the United States would impose additional sanctions on Russian interests, including
sanctions against Aven and/or Alfa-Bank.982 Putin suggested that Aven needed to take steps to
protect himself and Alfa-Bank.983 Aven also testified that Putin spoke of the difficulty faced by the
Russian government in getting in touch with the incoming Trump Administration. 984 According to
Aven, Putin indicated that he did not know with whom formally to speak and generally did not
know the people around the President-Elect.985
976
Aven rovided information to the Office in an interview and through an attorney proffer,
977
Aven 8/2/18 302, at 7.
978
979
Aven 8/2/18 302, at 2-3.

980 and interview with the Office,
Aven referred to the high-ranking Russian government officials using numbers (e.g., Official 1, Official 2).
Aven separately confirmed through an attorney proffer that Official 1 was Putin and Official 2 was Putin's
chief of staff, Vaino. See Affidavit of Ryan Junck (Aug. 2, 2018) (hard copy on file).
981
At the time of his Q4 2016 meeting with Putin, Aven was generally aware of the press coverage
about Russian interference in the U.S. election. According to Aven, he did not discuss that topic with Putin at
any point, and Putin did not mention the rationale behind the threat of new sanctions. Aven 8/2/18 302, at 5-
7.
982
983
984
985
147
ik4t-erttey-Werk--12r-edttet // May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
Aven told Putin he would take steps to protect himself and the Alfa-Bank
shareholders from potential sanctions, and one of those steps would be to try to reach out to the
incoming Administration to establish a line of communication. 986 Aven described Putin
responding with skepticism about Aven's prospect for success.987 According to Aven, although
Putin did not expressly direct him to reach out to the Trump Transition Team, Aven understood
that Putin expected him to try to respond to the concerns he had raised.988 Aven's efforts are
described in Volume I, Section IV.B.5, infra.
2. Kirill Dmitriev's Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Administration
Aven's description of his interactions with Putin is consistent with the behavior of Kirill
Dmitriev, a Russian national who heads Russia's sovereign wealth fund and is closely connected to
Putin. Dmitriev undertook efforts to meet members of the incoming Trump Administration in the
months after the election. Dmitriev asked a close business associate who worked for the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) royal court, George Nader, to introduce him to Trump transition officials,
and Nader eventually arranged a meeting in the Seychelles between Dmitriev and Erik Prince, a
Trump Campaign supporter and an associate of Steve Bannon.989 In addition, the UAE national
security advisor introduced Dmitriev to a hedge fund manager and friend of Jared Kushner, Rick
Gerson, in late November 2016. In December 2016 and January 2017, Dmitriev and Gerson worked
on a proposal for reconciliation between the United States and Russia, which Dmitriev implied he
cleared through Putin. Gerson provided that proposal to Kushner before the inauguration, and
Kushner later gave copies to Bannon and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson.
a. Background
Dmitriev is a Russian national who was appointed CEO of Russia's sovereign wealth fund,
the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), when it was founded in 2011. 990 Dmitriev reported
directly to Putin and frequently referred to Putin as his "boss."991
RDIF has co-invested in various projects with UAE sovereign wealth funds.992 Dmitriev
regularly interacted with Nader, a senior advisor to UAE Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed
986
987 Aven 8/2/18 302, at 6.

988
Aven 8/2/18 302, at 4-8;
Nader provided information to the Office in multi le interviews, all but one of which were
989
conducted under a proffer agreement The

investi ators also interviewed Prince under a proffer agreement. Bannon was interviewed by the Office,
under a proffer agreement.
990
Kirill Dmitriev Biography, Russian Direct Investment Fund, available at
https://rdifru/Engperson_dmitriev_kirill/. See also Overview, Russian Direct Investment Fund,
available at https://rdifru/Eng_About/.
Gerson 6/15/18 302, at 1. See also, e.g., 12/14/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson;
991
1/9/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson.

992
148
(Crown Prince Mohammed), in connection with RDIF's dealings with the UAE.993 Putin wanted
Dmitriev to be in charge of both the financial and the political relationship between Russia and the
Gulf states, in part because Dmitriev had been educated in the West and spoke English fluently. 994
Nader considered Dmitriev to be Putin's interlocutor in the Gulf region, and would relay Dmitriev's
views directly to Crown Prince Mohammed.995
Nader developed contacts with both U.S. presidential campaigns during the 2016 election,
and kept Dmitriev abreast of his efforts to do S0.996 According to Nader, Dmitriev said that his and
the government of Russia's preference was for candidate Trum • to win, and asked Nader to assist
him in meetin members of the Trum • Cam • ai n.997
Nader did not
introduce Dmitriev to anyone associated with the Trump Campaign before the election.999
I 14
Erik Prince is a businessman who had relationships with various individuals associated with
the Trump Campaign, including Steve Bannon, Donald Trump Jr., and Roger Stone.1005 Prince did
not have a formal role in the Campaign, although he offered to host a fundraiser for
993
Nader 1/22/18 302, at 1-2; Nader 1/23/18 302, at 2-3; 5/3/16 Email, Nader to Phares;
994
Nader 1/22/18 302, at 1-2.
995
Nader 1/22/18 302, at 3.
996
Nader 1/22/18 302, at 3;
997
Nader 1/22/18 302, at 3;
998
999
Nader 1/22/18 302, at 3.
1000
1001
1002
1003
1004
1005
Prince 4/4/18 302, at 1-5; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 21.
149
Trump and sent unsolicited policy papers on issues such as foreign policy, trade, and Russian election
interference to Bannon.1°°6
After the election, Prince frequently visited transition offices at Trump Tower, primarily to
meet with Bannon but on occasion to meet Michael Flynn and others.1007 Prince and Bannon would
discuss, inter alia, foreign policy issues and Prince's recommendations regarding who should be
appointed to fill key national securit ositions.1°°8 Although Prince was not formal/
affiliated with the transition, Nader received assurances
that the incoming Administration considered Prince a trusted associate.1°
b. Kirin Dmitriev's Post-Election Contacts With the Incoming Administration
Soon after midnight on election night, Dmitriev messaged Investigative Technique who
was travelin! to New York to attend the 2016 World Chess Championship.
Investigative Technique Dmitry Peskov, the
Russian Federation 's . ress secreta who was also attendin the World Chess Chamaionshi • 1°1°
Investigative Technique Ion Investigative Technique
At approximately 2:40 a.m. on November 9, 2016, news re orts stated that candidate Clinton
had called President-Elect Trum • to concede. At Investigative Technique
wrote to Dmitriev, "Putin has won.
Prince 4/4/18 302, at 1, 3-4; Prince 5/3/18 302, at 2; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 19-20; 10/18/16
1o°6
Email, Prince to Bannon.

1007 Flynn 11/20/17 302, at 6; Flynn 1/11/18 302, at 5; Flynn 1/24/18 302, at 5-6; Flynn 5/1/18 302,
at 11; Prince 4/4/18 302, at 5, 8; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 20-21; 11/12/16 Email, Prince to Corallo.
1011
1008
Prince 4/4/18 302, at 5; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 21.
10121009
1013 Investigative Technique Nader 1/22/18 302, at 5-6;

150
U.S. Department of
Justice
1014
1015
151
Later that morning, Dmitriev contacted Nader, who was in New York, to request a meeting
with the "key people" in the incoming Administration as soon as possible in light of the "[gjreat
results."1°16 He asked Nader to convey to the incoming Administration that "we want to start
rebuilding the relationship in whatever is a comfortable pace for them. We understand all of the
sensitivities and are not in a rush."1017 Dmitriev and Nader had previously discussed Nader
introducing him to the contacts Nader had made within the Trump Campaign. 1°18 Dmitriev also told
Nader that he would ask Putin for permission to travel to the United States, where he would be able
to speak to media outlets about the positive impact of Trump's election and the need for
reconciliation between the United States and Russia.'°19
Later that day, Dmitriev flew to New York, where Peskov was separately traveling to attend
the chess tournament.' Dmitriev invited Nader to the opening of the tournament and noted that, if
there was "a chance to see anyone key from Trump camp," he "would love to start building for the
future.551021 Dmitriev also asked Nader to invite Kushner to the event so that he (Dmitriev) could
meet him.1°22 Nader did not pass along Dmitriev's invitation to anyone connected with the incoming
Administration.1023 Although one World Chess Federation official recalled hearing from an
attendee that President-Elect Trump had stopped by the tournament, the investigation did not
establish that Trump or any Campaign or Transition Team official attended the event. 1°24 And the
President's written answers denied that he had.1°25
Nader stated that Dmitriev continued to press him to set up a meeting with transition
officials, and was particularly focused on Kushner and Trump Jr.'°26 Dmitriev told Nader that Putin
would be ver • rateful to Nader and that a meetin: would make histo .1027
1°16
11/9/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (9:34 a.m.); Nader 1/22/18 302, at 4.
1017
11/9/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (11:58 p.m.).
1018 Nader 1/22/18 302, at 3.
1019 11/9/16 Text Messa e, Dmitriev to Nader 10:06 a.m.); 11/9/16 Text Message,
Dmitriev to Nader (10:10 a.m.);
1020 11/9/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (10:08 a.m.); 11/9/16 Text Message,
Dmitriev to Nader (3:40 p.m.); Nader 1/22/18 302, at 5.
1021 11/9/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (7:10 p.m.).
1022 11/10/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (5:20 a.m.).
1°23
Nader 1/22/18 302, at 5-6.
1024 Marinello 5/31/18 302, at 2-3; Nader 1/22/18 302, at 5-6.
1025 Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 17-18 (Response to
Question V, Part (a).
1026 Nader 1/22/18 302, at 6;
1027 Nader 1/22/18 302, at 6;
152
At-t-erney--W-er-k--Pretittet II May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
According to Nader, Dmitriev was very

anxious to connect with the incoming
Administration and told Nader that he would try other routes to do so besides Nader himself.103° Nader
did not ultimately introduce Dmitriev to anyone associated with the incoming Administration during
Dmitriev's post-election trip to New York.1031
In early December 2016, Dmitriev again broached the topic of meeting incoming
Administration officials with Nader in January or February.1032 Dmitriev sent Nader a list of
publicly available quotes of Dmitriev speaking positively about Donald Trump "in case they [were]
helpful."1033
c. Erik Prince and Kirill Dmitriev Meet in the Seychelles
i. George Nader and Erik Prince Arrange Seychelles Meeting with Dmitriev
Nader traveled to New York in early January 2017 and had lunchtime and dinner meetings
with Erik Prince on January 3, 2017.1034 Nader and Prince discussed Dmitriev.1035 Nader informed
Prince that the Russians were looking to build a link with the incoming Trump
Administration .1°36 he told Prince that Dmitriev had been ushin Nader to
introduce him to someone from the incoming Administration
.1037 Nader suggested, in light of Prince's
relationship with Transition Team officials, that Prince and Dmitriev meet to discuss issues of
mutual concern.10381 Prince told Nader
that he needed to think further about it and to check with Transition Team officials. 1039
After his dinner with Prince, Nader sent Prince a link to a Wikipedia entry about Dmitriev,
and sent Dmitriev a message stating that he had just met "with some key people within the family
and inner circle"—a reference to Prince—and that he had spoken at length and positively about
1028
1029
1030
Nader 1/22/18 302, at 6.
1031
Nader 1/22/18 302, at 5-7.
1032
12/8/16 Text Messages, Dmitriev to Nader (12:10:31 a.m.); Nader 1/22/18 302, at 11.
12/8/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (12:10:31 a.m.); 12/8/16 Text Message,
1033
Dmitriev to Nader (12:10:57 a.m.).

Prince 4/4/18 302, at 8.
1034
1035
Prince 5/3/18 302, at 3;
1036
1037
1038
1039
153
Dmitriev.1°4° Nader told Dmitriev that the people he met had asked for Dmitriev's bio, and Dmitriev
replied that he would update and send it.1041 Nader later received from Dmitriev two files
concerning Dmitriev: one was a two-page biography, and the other was a list of Dmitriev's positive
quotes about Donald Trump.1042
The next morning, Nader forwarded the message and attachments Dmitriev had sent him
to Prince.1043 Nader wrote to Prince that these documents were the versions "to be used with some
additional details for them" (with "them" referring to members of the incoming
Administration).1044 Prince opened the attachments at Trump Tower within an hour of receiving
them.1°45 Prince stated that, while he was at Trump Tower that day, he spoke with Kellyanne
Conway, Wilbur Ross, Steve Mnuchin, and others while waiting to see Bannon.1°46 Cell-site
location data for Prince's mobile phone indicates that Prince remained at Trump Tower for
approximately three hours.1°47 Prince said that he could not recall whether, durin those three hours,
he met with Bannon and discussed Dmitriev with him.1°48
Prince booked a ticket to the Seychelles on January 7, 2017.1°50 The following day, Nader
wrote to Dmitriev that he had a "pleasant surprise" for him, namely that he had arranged for
Dmitriev to meet "a Special Guest" from "the New Team," referring to Prince.' Nader asked
Dmitriev if he could come to the Seychelles for the meeting on January 12, 2017, and Dmitriev
agreed.1052
The following day, Dmitriev sou ht assurance from Nader that the Seychelles meeting
would be worthwhile.1053 Dmitriev was not enthusiastic about the idea of
meeting with Prince, and that Nader assured him that Prince wielded influence with the incoming
1/4/17 Text Message, Nader to Prince; 1/4/17 Text Messa es,

1 0 4 0
Nader to Dmitriev (5:24 a.m. — 5:26 a.m.); Nader 1/22/18 302, at 8-9;
"' 1/4/17 Text Messages, Nader & Dmitriev (7:24:27 a.m.).
I
1042
1/4/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev to Nader (7:25-7:29 a.m.)
1043
1/4/17 Text Messages, Nader to Prince.
1044
1/4/17 Text Messages, Nader to Prince;
1045
Prince 5/3/18 302, at 1-3.
1046
Prince 5/3/18 302, at 2-3.
1047
Cell-site location data for Prince's mobile phone Investigative Technique
1048
Prince 5/3/18 302, at 3.
1049
1093
1
/5/17 Email, Kasbo to Prince.
1051
1/8/17 Text Messages, Nader to Dmitriev (6:05 — 6:10 p.m.). 1052
1/8/17 Text Messages, Nader & Dmitriev (6:10 — 7:27 p.m.). 1053
1/9/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader.

154
Attorney _____________ Work Product /1 May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
Administration.1°54 Nader wrote to Dmitriev, "This guy [Prince] is designated by Steve [Bannon]
to meet you! I know him and he is very very well connected and trusted by the New Team. His
sister is now a Minister of Education."1°55 According to Nader, Prince had led him to believe that
Bannon was aware of Prince's upcoming meeting with Dmitriev, and Prince acknowledged that it
was fair for Nader to think that Prince would pass information on to the Transition Team."' Bannon,
however, told the Office that Prince did not tell him in advance about his meeting with Dmitriev.'°57
ii. The Seychelles Meetings
Dmitriev arrived with his wife in the Seychelles on January 11, 2017, and checked into the
Four Seasons Resort where Crown Prince Mohammed and Nader were staying. 1058Prince arrived
that same day.1°59 Prince and Dmitriev met for the first time that afternoon in Nader's villa, with
Nader present.1°6° The initial meeting lasted approximately 30-45 minutes.1°61
Prince described the eight

years of the Obama
Administration in negative
terms, and stated that he was looking forward to a new era of cooperation and conflict resolution.1°63
According to Prince, he told Dmitriev that Bannon was effective if not conventional, and that Prince
provided policy papers to Bannon.'°64
-
rand Jury
1054
1°55
1/9/17 Text Message, Nader to Dmitriev (2:12:56 p.m.); Nader 1/19/18 302, at 13;
1056
Nader 1/19/18 302, at 13; Prince 5/3/18 302, at
3. 1057 Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 25-26.
1/10/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Nader (2:05:54 — 3:30:25 p.m.); 1/11/17 Text
1058
Messages, Dmitriev & Nader (2:16:16 — 5:17:59 p.m.).

1059 1/7/17 Email, Kasbo to Prince.
1060 1/11/17 Text Messages, Nader & Dmitriev (5:18:24 — 5:37:14 p.m.);
1°61
Prince 5/3/18 302, at 4;
1062
1063 tN
1064
Prince 5/3/18 302, at 4.
155
Attorney ______________Work Product /1 May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
1065
156
Attorney______________ Work Product /1 May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
topic of Russian interference in the 2016 election did not come up.
Prince added that he would inform Bannon about his meeting with Dmitriev, and that if there was
interest in continuin the discussion, Bannon or someone else on the Transition Team would do
so.1071
Afterwards, Prince returned to his room, where he learned that a Russian aircraft carrier had
sailed to Libya, which led him to call Nader and ask him to set up another meeting with Dmitriev. 1°73
According to Nader, Prince called and said he had checked with his associates back home and needed
to convey to Dmitriev that Libya was "off the table." 1074 Nader wrote to Dmitriev that Prince had
"received an urgent message that he needs to convey to you immediately," and arranged for himself,
Dmitriev, and Prince to meet at a restaurant on the Four Seasons property . 1°75
At the second meeting, Prince told Dmitriev that the United States could not acce t an Russian
involvement in Lib a because it would make the situation there much worse.1°76
1066
1067
1068
1069
Prince 5/3/18 302, at 4-5.
1070
1071
Prince 5/3/18 302, at 4;
1072
1073
Prince 4/4/18 302, at 10; Prince 5/3/18 302, at 4;
1074
Nader 1/22/18 302, at 14;
1075 1/11/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Nader (9:13:54 —
10:24:25 p.m.).
1076
Prince,
however, denied that and recalled that he was making these remarks to Dmitriev not in an official capacity
for the transition but based on his experience as a former naval officer. Prince 5/3/18 302, at 4.
157
Attorney _____________ Work Product /1 May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
1077
After the brief second meeting

1078
concluded, Nader and Dmitriev discussed what had transpired. Dmitriev told Nader that he was
disappointed in his meetings with Prince for two reasons: first, he believed the Russians needed to
be communicating with someone who had more authority within the incoming Administration than
Prince had.1°79 Second, he had hoped to have a discussion of greater substance, such as outlinin a
strate is roadmap for both countries to
follow.1080 Dmitriev told Nader that Prince's comments
were insulting 1081
Hours after the second meeting, Prince sent two text messages to Bannon from the
Seychelles.1°82 As described further below, investigators were unable to obtain the content of these or
other messages between Prince and Bannon, and the investigation also did not identify evidence of
any further communication between Prince and Dmitriev after their meetings in the Seychelles.
iii. Erik Prince 's Meeting with Steve Bannon after the Seychelles Trip
After the Seychelles meetings, Prince told Nader that he would inform Bannon about his
discussion with Dmitriev and would convey that someone within the Russian power structure was
interested in seeking better relations with the incoming Administration. 1083 On January 12, 2017,
Prince contacted Bannon's personal assistant to set up a meeting for the following week.'°84 Several
days later, Prince messaged her again asking about Bannon's schedule.'°85
Prince said that he met Bannon at Bannon's home after returning to the United States in mid-
January and briefed him about several topics, including his meeting with Dmitriev.1°86 Prince told the
Office that he explained to Bannon that Dmitriev was the head of a Russian sovereign wealth fund and
was interested in improving relations between the United States and Russia.1"7 Prince had on his
cellphone a screenshot of Dmitriev's Wikipedia page dated January 16, 2017,
1077
1 ° 7 8
Nader 1/22/18 302, at 15; 1 ° 7 9
Nader 1/22/18
302, at 9, 15;
108°
Nader 1/22/18 302, at 15.
1081 Nader 1/22/18 302, at 15.
1°82
Call Records of Erik Prince
1°83
Prince 4/4/18 302, at 10; Prince 5/3/18 302, at 4;
1°84
1/12/17 Text Messages, Prince to Preate.
1°85
1/15/17 Text Message, Prince to Preate.
1°86
Prince 4/4/18 302, at 11; Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5.
1°87
Prince 4/4/18 302, at 11; Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5.
158
Attorney______________ Work Product /1 May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
and Prince told the Office that he likely showed that image to Bannon.1°88 Prince also believed he
provided Bannon with Dmitriev's contact information.1°89 According to Prince, Bannon instructed
Prince not to follow up with Dmitriev, and Prince had the impression that the issue was not a
priority for Bannon.1°9° Prince related that Bannon did not appear angry, just relatively uninterested.
1°91
Bannon, by contrast, told the Office that he never discussed with Prince anything regarding
Dmitriev, RDIF, or any meetings with Russian individuals or people associated with Putin.1°92
Bannon also stated that had Prince mentioned such a meeting, Bannon would have remembered it,
and Bannon would have objected to such a meeting having taken place.1°93
The conflicting accounts provided by Bannon and Prince could not be independently
clarified by reviewing their communications, because neither one was able to produce any of the
messages they exchanged in the time period surrounding the Seychelles meeting. Prince's phone
contained no text messages prior to March 2017, though provider records indicate that he and
Bannon exchanged dozens of messages.1°94 Prince denied deleting any messages but claimed he
did not know why there were no messages on his device before March 2017.1095 Bannon's devices
similarly contained no messages in the relevant time period, and Bannon also stated he did not
know why messages did not appear on his device.1096 Bannon told the Office that, during both the
months before and after the Seychelles meeting, he regularly used his personal Blackberry and
personal email for work-related communications (including those with Prince), and he took no
steps to preserve these work communications.1097
d. Kirill Dmitriev's Post-Election Contact with Rick Gerson Regarding U.S.-

Russia Relations
Dmitriev's contacts during the transition period were not limited to those facilitated by
Nader. In approximately late November 2016, the UAE national security advisor introduced
Dmitriev to Rick Gerson, a friend of Jared Kushner who runs a hedge fund in New York.1°98 Gerson
stated he had no formal role in the transition and had no involvement in the Trump
Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5; 1/16/17 Image on Prince Phone (on file with the Office).
1°88
1089 Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5.
1090 Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5.

1091 Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5.
1092 Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 10-11.
1093 Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 10-11.
1094 Call Records of Erik Prince
1095 Prince 4/4/18 302, at 6.
1096 Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 11; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 36.
1°97
Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 11.
Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 1, 3; 11/26/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson; 1/25/17 Text Message,
1°98
Dmitriev to Nader.
159
Atterftey-Werk-Pfeeittet // May Contain Material Protected Under Feel. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
Campaign other than occasional casual discussions about the Campaign with Kushner.1°99 After the
election, Gerson assisted the transition by arranging meetings for transition officials with former UK
prime minister Tony Blair and a UAE delegation led by Crown Prince Mohammed."'
When Dmitriev and Gerson met, they principally discussed potential joint ventures between
Gerson's hedge fund and RDIF.11°1 Dmitriev was interested in improved economic cooperation
between the United States and Russia and asked Gerson who he should meet with in the incoming
Administration who would be helpful towards this goal.11°2 Gerson replied that he would try to figure
out the best way to arrange appropriate introductions, but noted that confidentiality would be required
because of the sensitivity of holding such meetings before the new Administration took power, and
before Cabinet nominees had been confirmed by the Senate.11°3 Gerson said he would ask Kushner
and Michael Flynn who the "key person or people" were on the topics of reconciliation with Russia,
joint security concerns, and economic matters.11°4
Dmitriev told Gerson that he had been tasked by Putin to develop and execute a
reconciliation plan between the United States and Russia. He noted in a text message to Gerson
that if Russia was "approached with respect and willingness to understand our position, we can
have Major Breakthroughs quickly."1105 Gerson and Dmitriev exchanged ideas in December 2016
about what such a reconciliation plan would include.11°6 Gerson told the Office that the Transition
Team had not asked him to engage in these discussions with Dmitriev, and that he did so on his
own initiative and as a private citizen.1107
On January 9, 2017, the same day he asked Nader whether meeting Prince would be
worthwhile, Dmitriev sent his biography to Gerson and asked him if he could "share it with Jared (or
somebody else very senior in the team) - so that they know that we are focused from our side on
improving the relationship and my boss asked me to play a key role in that."11°8 Dmitriev also asked
Gerson if he knew Prince, and if Prince was somebody important or worth spending time
1099
Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 1.
1100 Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 1-2; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 21.
Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3-4; see, e.g., 12/2/16 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Gerson; 12/14/16 Text
11°1
Messages, Dmitriev & Gerson; 1/3/17 Text Message, Gerson to Dmitriev; 12/2/16 Email, Tolokonnikov to
Gerson.
1102 Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3; 12/14/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson.
1103 12/14/16 Text Message, Gerson to Dmitriev.
1104 12/14/16 Text Message, Gerson to Dmitriev.
1105 12/14/16 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Gerson; Gerson 6/15/18 302, at 1.
1106 12/14/16 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Gerson.
1107 Gerson 6/15/18 302, at 1.
1108 1/9/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev to Gerson; 1/9/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader.
160
Atterftey-Werk-Pfeeittet // May Contain Material Protected Under Feel. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
Atterney-41-erk--Pteeluet // May Contain Material Protected Undcr Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
with)
io9 After his trip to the Seychelles, Dmitriev told Gerson that Bannon had asked Prince to meet
with Dmitriev and that the two had had a positive meeting.nio
On January 16, 2017, Dmitriev consolidated the ideas for U.S.-Russia reconciliation that he
and Gerson had been discussing into a two-page document that listed five main points: (1) jointly
fighting terrorism; (2) jointly engaging in anti-weapons of mass destruction efforts; (3) developing
"win-win" economic and investment initiatives; (4) maintaining an honest, open, and continual
dialogue regarding issues of disagreement; and (5) ensuring proper communication and trust by "key
people" from each country.H H On January 18, 2017, Gerson gave a copy of the document to
Kushner.1112 Kushner had not heard of Dmitriev at that time."13 Gerson explained that Dmitriev was
the head of RDIF, and Gerson may have alluded to Dmitriev's being well connected.1114 Kushner
placed the document in a file and said he would get it to the right people.1115 Kushner ultimately
gave one copy of the document to Bannon and another to Rex Tillerson; according to Kushner,
neither of them followed up with Kushner about it.1116 On January 19, 2017, Dmitriev sent Nader a
copy of the two-page document, telling him that this was "a view from our side that I discussed in
my meeting on the islands and with you and with our friends. Please share with them — we believe
this is a good foundation to start from."1117
Gerson informed Dmitriev that he had given the document to Kushner soon after delivering
it On January 26, 2017, Dmitriev wrote to Gerson that his "boss"—an apparent reference to
Putin—was asking if there had been any feedback on the proposa1.1119 Dmitriev said, "[w]e do not
want to rush things and move at a comfortable speed. At the same time, my boss asked me to try to
have the key US meetings in the next two weeks if possible. '51120 He informed Gerson that Putin
and President Trump would speak by phone that Saturday, and noted that that information was
"very confidential."1121
The same day, Dmitriev wrote to Nader that he had seen his "boss" again yesterday who had
"emphasized that this is a great priority for us and that we need to build this communication
1109 Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 4.

1110 1/18/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Gerson.
1/16/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Gerson.
1112 Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3; Gerson 6/15/18 302, at 2.
1113 Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3.
1114 Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3; Gerson 6/15/18.302, at 1-2; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 22.
1115 Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3.
1116 Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 32.
1117 1/19/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (11:11:56 a.m.).
1118 1/18/17 Text Message, Gerson to Dmitriev; Gerson 6/15/18 302, at 2.
1119 1/26/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson.
161
channel to avoid bureaucracy.1,1122 On January 28, 2017, Dmitriev texted Nader that he wanted "to
see if I can confirm to my boss that your friends may use some of the ideas from the 2 pager I sent
you in the telephone call that will happen at 12 EST,"1123 an apparent reference to the call scheduled
between President Trump and Putin. Nader replied, "Definitely paper was so submitted to Team by
Rick and me. They took it seriously!"1124 After the call between President Trump and Putin
occurred, Dmitriev wrote to Nader that "the call went very well. My boss wants me to continue
making some public statements that us [sic] Russia cooperation is good and important."1125 Gerson
also wrote to Dmitriev to say that the call had gone well, and Dmitriev replied that the document
they had drafted together "played an important role."1126
Gerson and Dmitriev appeared to stop communicating with one another in approximately
March 2017, when the investment deal they had been working on together showed no signs of
progressing.1127
3. Ambassador Kislyak's Meeting with Jared Kushner and Michael Flynn in

Trump Tower Following the Election
On November 16, 2016, Catherine Vargas, an executive assistant to Kushner, received a

request for a meeting with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak. 1128 That same day, Vargas sent
Kushner an email with the subject, "MISSED CALL: Russian Ambassador to the US, Sergey
Ivanovich Kislyak . . . ."1129 The text of the email read, "RE: setting up a time to meet w/you on
12/1. LMK how to proceed." Kushner responded in relevant part, "I think I do this one -- confirm
with Dimitri [Simes of CNI] that this is the right guy."113° After reaching out to a colleague of Simes
at CNI, Vargas reported back to Kushner that Kislyak was "the best go-to guy for routine matters
in the US," while Yuri Ushakov, a Russian foreign policy advisor, was the contact for "more
direct/substantial matters."1131
Bob Foresman, the UBS investment bank executive who had previously tried to transmit to
candidate Trump an invitation to speak at an economic forum in Russia, see Volume I, Section
IV.A.1.d.ii, supra, may have provided similar information to the Transition Team. According to
1122
1/26/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (10:04:41 p.m.).
1123
1/28/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (11:05:39 a.m.).
1124
1/28/17 Text Message, Nader to Dmitriev (11:11:33 a.m.).
1125
1/29/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (11:06:35 a.m.).
1126
1/28/17 Text Message, Gerson to Dmitriev; 1/29/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson.
1127
Gerson 6/15/18 302, at 4; 3/21/17 Text Message, Gerson to Dmitriev.
Statement ofJared C. Kushner to Congressional Committees ("Kushner Stmt."), at 6
1128
(7/24/17) (written statement by Kushner to the Senate Judiciary Committee).

NOSC00004356 (11/16/16 Email, Vargas to Kushner (6:44 p.m.)).
1129
113°
NOSC00004356 (11/16/16 Email, Kushner to Vargas (9:54 p.m.)).
11/17/16 Email, Brown to Simes (10:41 a.m.); Brown 10/13/17 302, at 4; 11/17/16
1131
Email, Vargas to Kushner (12:31:18).
162
Affeffley-Werk-44-edttet // May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
Foresman, at the end of an early December 2016 meeting with incoming National Security Advisor
Michael Flynn and his designated deputy (K.T. McFarland) in New York, Flynn asked Foresman for
his thoughts on Kislyak. Foresman had not met Kislyak but told Flynn that, while Kislyak was an
important person, Kislyak did not have a direct line to Putin.1132 Foresman subsequently traveled to
Moscow, inquired of a source he believed to be close to Putin, and heard back from that source that
Ushakov would be the official channel for the incoming U.S. national security advisor."' Foresman
acknowledged that Flynn had not asked him to undertake that inquiry in Russia but told the Office that
he nonetheless felt obligated to report the information back to Flynn, and that he worked to get a face-
to-face meeting with Flynn in January 2017 so that he could do so.1134 Email correspondence suggests
that the meeting ultimately went forward,1135 but Flynn has no recollection of it or of the earlier
December meeting.1136 (The investigation did not identify evidence of Flynn or Kushner meeting with
Ushakov after being given his name.1137)
In the meantime, although he had already formed the impression that Kislyak was not
necessarily the right point of contact,1138 Kushner went forward with the meeting that Kislyak had
requested on November 16. It took place at Trump Tower on November 30, 2016.1139 At Kushner's
invitation, Flynn also attended; Bannon was invited but did not attend.114° During the meeting,
which lasted approximately 30 minutes, Kushner expressed a desire on the part of the incoming
Administration to start afresh with U.S.-Russian relations.1141 Kushner also asked Kislyak to
identify the best person (whether Kislyak or someone else) with whom to direct future
discussions—someone who had contact with Putin and the ability to speak for him.1142
The three men also discussed U.S. policy toward Syria, and Kislyak floated the idea of
having Russian generals brief the Transition Team on the topic using a secure communications
line.1143 After Flynn explained that there was no secure line in the Transition Team offices,
1132
Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 17.
1133
Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 17-18.
1134
Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 18.
RMF-SCO-00000015 (1/5/17 Email, Foresman to Atencio & Flaherty); RMF-SCO-00000015
1135
(1/5/17 Email, Flaherty to Foresman & Atencio).

1136
9/26/18 Attorney Proffer from Covington & Burling LLP (reflected in email on file with the
Office).
1137
Vargas 4/4/18 302, at 5.
1138
Kushner 11/1/17 302, at 4.
1139
AKIN_GUMP_BERKOWITZ_0000016-019 (11/29/16 Email, Vargas to Kuznetsov).
1140
Flynn 1/11/18 302, at 2; NOS00004240 (Calendar Invite, Vargas to Kushner & Flynn).
"41
Kushner Stmt. at 6.
1142
Kushner Stmt. at 6; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 18.
1143
Kushner Stmt. at 7; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 18; Flynn 1/11/18 302, at 2.
163
Attorney______________ Work Product II May Contain Material Protcctcd Undcr Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
Kushner asked Kislyak if they could communicate using secure facilities at the Russian
Embassy.11" Kislyak quickly rejected that idea.1145
4. Jared Kushner's Meeting with Sergey Gorkov
On December 6, 2016, the Russian Embassy reached out to Kushner's assistant to set up a
second meeting between Kislyak and Kushner.1146 Kushner declined several proposed meeting dates,
but Kushner's assistant indicated that Kislyak was very insistent about securing a second meeting.1147
Kushner told the Office that he did not want to take another meeting because he had already decided
Kislyak was not the right channel for him to communicate with Russia, so he arranged to have one of
his assistants, Avi Berkowitz, meet with Kislyak in his stead.1148 Although embassy official Sergey
Kuznetsov wrote to Berkowitz that Kislyak thought it "important" to "continue the conversation with
Mr. Kushner in person,"1149 Kislyak nonetheless agreed to meet instead with Berkowitz once it became
apparent that Kushner was unlikely to take a meeting.
Berkowitz met with Kislyak on December 12, 2016, at Trump Tower."' The meeting lasted
only a few minutes, during which Kislyak indicated that he wanted Kushner to meet someone who
had a direct line to Putin: Sergey Gorkov, the head of the Russian-government-owned bank
Vnesheconombank (VEB).
Kushner agreed to meet with Gorkov.1151 The one-on-one meeting took place the next day,
December 13, 2016, at the Colony Capital building in Manhattan, where Kushner had previously
scheduled meetings.1152 VEB was (and is) the subject of Department of Treasury economic sanctions
imposed in response to Russia's annexation of Crimea.1153 Kushner did not, however, recall any
discussion during his meeting with Gorkov about the sanctions against VEB or sanctions more
generally.1154 Kushner stated in an interview that he did not engage in any preparation for
1144
Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 18.
1145
Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 18.
1146
Kushner Stmt. at 7; NOSC00000123 (12/6/16 Email, Vargas to Kushner (12:11:40 p.m.)).
1147
Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 19; NOSC00000130 (12/12/16 Email, Kushner to Vargas (10:41
p.m.)).
Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 19; Kushner Stmt. at 7; DJTFP_SC0_01442290 (12/6/16 Email,
1148
Berkowitz to
DJTFP_SC0_01442290 (12/7/16 Email
1149
to Berkowitz (12:31:39 p.m.)).
115°
Berkowitz 1/12/18 302, at 7; AKIN_GUMP_BERKOWITZ_000001-04 (12/12/16 Text
Messages, Berkowitz & 202-701-8532).
Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 19; NOSC00000130-135 (12/12/16 Email, Kushner to Berkowitz).
1151
1152
Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 19; NOSC00000130-135 (12/12/16 Email, Kushner to Berkowitz).
Announcement of Treasury Sanctions on Entities Within the Financial Services and
1153
Energy Sectors of Russia, Against Arms or Related Materiel Entities, and those Undermining
Ukraine's Sovereignty, United States Department of the Treasury (Jul. 16, 2014).
1154
Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 20.
164
_________________ Attorney Work Product II May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R.
Crim. P. 6(c)
the meeting and that no one on the Transition Team even did a Google search for Gorkov's
name.1155
At the start of the meeting, Gorkov presented Kushner with two gifts: a painting and a bag
of soil from the town in Belarus where Kushner's family originated.1156
The accounts from Kushner and Gorkov differ as to whether the meeting was diplomatic or
business in nature. Kushner told the Office that the meeting was diplomatic, with Gorkov expressing
disappointment with U.S.-Russia relations under President Obama and hopes for improved relations
with the incoming Administration.11 57 According to Kushner, although Gorkov told Kushner a little
bit about his bank and made some statements about the Russian economy, the two did not discuss
Kushner's companies or private business dealings of any kind.1158 (At the time of the meeting,
Kushner Companies had a debt obligation coming due on the building it owned at 666 Fifth Avenue,
and there had been public reporting both about efforts to secure lending on the property and possible
conflicts of interest for Kushner arising out of his company's borrowing from foreign lenders.1159)
In contrast, in a 2017 public statement, VEB suggested Gorkov met with Kushner in
Kushner's capacity as CEO of Kushner Companies for the purpose of discussing business, rather
than as part of a diplomatic effort. In particular, VEB characterized Gorkov's meeting with Kushner
as part of a series of "roadshow meetings" with "representatives of major US banks and business
circles," which included "negotiations" and discussion of the "most promising business lines and
sectors."1160
Foresman, the investment bank executive mentioned in Volume 1, Sections IV.A.1 and
IV.B.3, supra, told the Office that he met with Gorkov and VEB deputy chairman Nikolay
Tselchomsky in Moscow just before Gorkov left for New York to meet Kushner.1161 According to
Foresman, Gorkov and Tsekhomsky told him that they were traveling to New York to discuss post-
election issues with U.S. financial institutions, that their trip was sanctioned by Putin, and that they
would be reporting back to Putin upon their return.1162
Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 19. Berkowitz, by contrast, stated to the Office that he had googled
1155
Gorkov's name and told Kushner that Gorkov appeared to be a banker. Berkowitz 1/12/18 302, at 8.
1156
Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 19-20.
1157
Kushner Stmt. at 8.
1158
Kushner Stmt. at 8.
See, e.g., Peter Grant, Donald Trump Son-in-Law Jared Kushner Could Face His Own
1159
Conflict-of-Interest Questions, Wall Street Journal (Nov. 29, 2016).

1160 Patrick Reevell & Matthew Mosk, Russian Banker Sergey Gorkov Brushes off Questions About
Meeting with Jared Kushner, ABC News (June 1, 2017).
Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 14-15.
1161
1162
Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 15-16.
165
Crim. P. 6(c)
Attertley-Werk-Pretitet II May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
The investigation did not resolve the apparent conflict in the accounts of Kushner and
Gorkov or determine whether the meeting was diplomatic in nature (as Kushner stated), focused
on business (as VEB's public statement indicated), or whether it involved some combination of
those matters or other matters. Regardless, the investigation did not identify evidence that Kushner
and Gorkov engaged in any substantive follow-up after the meeting.
Rather, a few days after the meeting, Gorkov's assistant texted Kushner's assistant, "Hi, please
inform your side that the information about the meeting had a very positive response!"1163 Over the
following weeks, the two assistants exchanged a handful of additional cordial texts.1164 On February
8, 2017, Gorkov's assistant texted Kushner's assistant (Berkowitz) to try to set up another meeting,
and followed up by text at least twice in the days that followed.' 165 According to Berkowitz, he did
not respond to the meeting request in light of the press coverage regarding the Russia investigation,
and did not tell Kushner about the meeting request.1166
5. Petr Aven's Outreach Efforts to the Transition Team
In December 2016, weeks after the one-on-one meeting with Putin described in Volume I,
Section IV.B.1.b, supra, Petr Aven attended what he described as a separate "all-hands" oligarch
meeting between Putin and Russia's most prominent businessmen.1167 As in Aven's one-on-one
meeting, a main topic of discussion at the oligarch meeting in December 2016 was the prospect of
forthcoming U.S. economic sanctions.1168
After the December 2016 all-hands meeting, Aven tried to establish a connection to the
Trump team. Aven instructed Richard Burt to make contact with the incoming Trump
Administration. Burt was on the board of directors for LetterOne (L1), another company headed
by Aven, and had done work for Alfa-Bank.1169 Burt had previously served as U.S. ambassador to
Germany and Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, and one of his
primary roles with Alfa-Bank and Li was to facilitate introductions to business contacts in the
United States and other Western countries.1170
While at a LI board meeting held in Luxembourg in late December 2016, Aven pulled Burt
aside and told him that he had spoken to someone high in the Russian government who expressed
AKIN_GUMP_BERKOWITZ_0000011 (12/19/16 Text Message, Ivanchenko to

1163
Berkowitz (9:56 a.m.)).

AKIN_GUMP_BERKOWITZ_0000011-15 (12/19/16 — 2/16/17 Text Messages,
1164
Ivanchenko & Berkowitz).

AKIN_GUMP_BERKOWITZ_0000015 (2/8/17 Text Message, Ivanchenko to
1165
Berkowitz (10:41 a.m.)).

Berkowitz 3/22/18 302, at 4-5.
1166
1167
Aven 8/2/18 302, at 7;
1168
1169 Aven 8/2/18 302, at 6.

166
1170 Aven 8/2/18 302, at 6; Burt 2/9/18 302, at 2.
167
Crim. P. 6(c)
interest in establishing a communications channel between the Kremlin and the Trump Transition
Team.1171 Aven asked for Burt's help in contacting members of the Transition Team.1172 Although
Burt had been responsible for helping Aven build connections in the past, Burt viewed Aven's
request as unusual and outside the normal realm of his dealings with Aven."'
Burt, who is a member of the board of CNI (discussed at Volume I, Section IV.A.4,
supra),1174 decided to approach CNI president Dimitri Simes for help facilitating Aven's request,
recalling that Simes had some relationship with Kushner.1175 At the time, Simes was lobbying the
Trump Transition Team, on Burt's behalf, to appoint Burt U.S. ambassador to Russia.1176
Burt contacted Simes by telephone and asked if he could arrange a meeting with Kushner
to discuss setting up a high-level communications channel between Putin and the incoming
Administration.1177 Simes told the Office that he declined and stated to Burt that setting up such a
channel was not a good idea in light of the media attention surrounding Russian influence in the
U.S. presidential election."' According to Simes, he understood that Burt was seeking a secret
channel, and Simes did not want CNI to be seen as an intermediary between the Russian
government and the incoming Administration.1179 Based on what Simes had read in the media, he
stated that he already had concerns that Trump's business connections could be exploited by Russia,
and Simes said that he did not want CNI to have any involvement or apparent involvement in
facilitating any connection.1180
In an email dated December 22, 2016, Burt recounted for Aven his conversation with
Simes:
Through a trusted third party, I have reached out to the very influential person I mentioned
in Luxembourg concerning Project A. There is an interest and an understanding for the need
to establish such a channel. But the individual emphasized that at this moment, with so much
intense interest in the Congress and the media over the question of cyber-hacking (and who
ordered what), Project A was too explosive to discuss. The individual agreed to discuss it
again after the New Year. I trust the individual's instincts on this.
1171
Burt 2/9/18 302, at 2;
1172
1173
Burt 2/9/18 302, at 4.
1174
Burt 2/9/18 302, at 5.
1175
Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3.
1176
Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3.
1177
Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 4.
1178
Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 4.
1179
Simes 3/27/18 302, at 5.
1180
Simes 3/27/18 302, at 5.
168
Attorney Work Product II May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
If this is unclear or you would like to discuss, don't hesitate to cal1.1181
According to Burt, the "very influential person" referenced in his email was Simes, and the reference
to a "trusted third party" was a fabrication, as no such third party existed. "Project A" was a term that
Burt created for Aven's effort to help establish a communications channel between Russia and the
Trump team, which he used in light of the sensitivities surrounding what Aven was requesting,
especially in light of the recent attention to Russia's influence in the U.S. presidential election.1182
According to Burt, his report that there was "interest" in a communications channel reflected Simes's
views, not necessarily those of the Transition Team, and in any event, Burt acknowledged that he
added some "hype" to that sentence to make it sound like there was more interest from the Transition
Team than may have actually existed.1183
Aven replied to Burt's email on the same day, saying "Thank you. All clear. 551184
According to Aven, this statement indicated that he did not want the outreach to
continue. 1185 Burt spoke to Aven some time thereafter about his attempt to make contact
with the Trum team, ex lainin to Aven that the current environment made it impossible, 1186
Burt did not recall discussing Aven's request with Simes again, nor did he recall speaking
to anyone else about the request. 1187
In the first quarter of 2017, Aven met again with Putin and other Russian officials.1188 At
that meeting, Putin asked about Aven's attem et to build relations with the Trum. Administration,
and Aven recounted his lack of success.1189
1190 Putin continued to inquire about Aven's efforts to connect to the Trump Administration
in several subsequent quarterly meetings.1191
Aven also told Putin's chief of staff that he had been subpoenaed by the FBI.1192 As part of
that conversation, he reported that he had been asked by the FBI about whether he had worked to
create a back channel between the Russian government and the Trump Administration.1193
1181
12/22/16 Email, Burt to Aven (7:23 p.m.).
1182
Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3.
1183
Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3-4.
1184
12/22/16 Email, Aven to Burt (4:58:22 p.m.).
1185
Aven 8/2/18 302, at 7.
1186
1187
Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3-4.
1188
1189
Aven 8/2/18 302, at 7.
1190
1191
1192
Aven 8/2/18 302, at 8. 1193
Aven 8/2/18 302, at 8;

169
Atterney-Werk-Preeleet // May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
According to Aven, the official showed no emotion in response to this report and did not appear to
care.1194
6. Carter Page Contact with Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich
In December 2016, more than two months after he was removed from the Trump Campaign,
former Campaign foreign policy advisor Carter Page again visited Moscow in an attempt to pursue
business opt ortunities.1195
According to Konstantin Kilimnik, Paul Manafort's associate, Page also gave some individuals in
Russia the impression that he had maintained his connections to President-Elect Trump. In a December
8, 2016 email intended for Manafort, Kilimnik wrote, "Carter Page is in Moscow today, sending
messages he is authorized to talk to Russia on behalf of DT on a range of issues of mutual interest,
including Ukraine."1197
On December 9, 2016, Page went to dinner with NES employees Shlomo Weber and Andrej
Krickovic.1198 Weber had contacted Dvorkovich to
let him know that Page was in town and to invite him to stop by the dinner if he wished to do so, and
Dvorkovich came to the restaurant for a few minutes to meet with Page.1199 Dvorkovich congratulated
Page on Trump's election and expressed interest in starting a dialogue between the United States and
Russia.120° Dvorkovich asked Page if he could facilitate connecting Dvorkovich with individuals
involved in the transition
to be • in a discussion of future co t• 1201
1194
Aven 8/2/18 302, at 8;
1195
Page 3/10/17 302, at 4; Page 3/16/17 302, at 3; Among
other meetings, Page contacted Andrey Baranov, head of investor relations at Rosneft, and the discussed
the sale of Rosneft and meetings Baranov had attended with Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin.
170
1196

1198
Page 3/16/17 302, at 3; Page 3/30/17 302, at 8.
1199
Weber 7/28/17 302, at 4; Page 3/16/17 302, at 3;
1200
Page 3/16/17 302, at 3;
1201 Page 3/16/17 302, at 3;
1202
1203
171
Attemey-Werlt-Prefittet // May Contain Matcrrial Protected Undcr Fcd. R. Crirri. P. 6(c)
Dvorkovich se aratel discussed workin: to ether in the future

b formin • an academic artnershi 1204
7. Contacts With and Through Michael T. Flynn
Incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn was the Transition Team's primary
conduit for communications with the Russian Ambassador and dealt with Russia on two sensitive
matters during the transition period: a United Nations Security Council vote and the Russian
government's reaction to the United States's imposition of sanctions for Russian interference in the
2016 election.1207 Despite Kushner's conclusion that Kislyak did not wield influence inside the
Russian government, the Transition Team turned to Flynn's relationship with Kislyak on both issues.
As to the sanctions, Flynn spoke by phone to K.T. McFarland, his incoming deputy, to prepare for
his call to Kislyak; McFarland was with the President-Elect and other senior members of the
Transition Team at Mar-a-Lago at the time. Although transition officials at Mar-a-Lago had some
concern about possible Russian reactions to the sanctions, the investigation did not identify evidence
that the President-Elect asked Flynn to make any request to Kislyak. Flynn asked Kislyak not to
escalate the situation in response to U.S. sanctions imposed on December 29, 2016, and Kislyak
later reported to Flynn that Russia acceded to that request.
a. United Nations Vote on Israeli Settlements
On December 21, 2016, Egypt submitted a resolution to the United Nations Security
Council calling on Israel to cease settlement activities in Palestinian territory. 1208 The Security
Council, which includes Russia, was scheduled to vote on the resolution the following day.1209
There was speculation in the media that the Obama Administration would not oppose the
resolution.121°
1204
1205
1206
1207 As discussed further in Volume I, Section V.C.4, infra, Flynn pleaded guilty to making false
statements to the FBI, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, about these communications with Ambassador
Kislyak. Plea Agreement, United States v. Michael T. Flynn, No. 1:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2017), Doc.
3. Flynn's plea agreement required that he cooperate with this Office, and the statements from Flynn in this
report reflect his cooperation over the course of multiple debriefings in 2017 and 2018.
12"
Karen DeYoung, How the U.S. Came to Abstain on a U.N. Resolution Condemning
Israeli Settlements, Washington Post (Dec. 28, 2016).
1209 Karen DeYoung, How the U.S. Came to Abstain on a U.N. Resolution Condemning
Israeli Settlements, Washington Post (Dec. 28, 2016).

1210
Michelle Nichols & Lesley Wroughton, U.S. Intended to Allow Passage of U.N. Draft
Critical of Israel, Reuters (Dec. 21, 2016).
172
According to Flynn, the Transition Team regarded the vote as a significant issue and wanted to
support Israel by opposing the resolution.1211 On December 22, 2016, multiple members of the
Transition Team, as well as President-Elect Trump, communicated with foreign government officials
to determine their views on the resolution and to rally support to delay the vote or defeat the
resolution.I212 Kushner led the effort for the Transition Team; Flynn was responsible for the Russian
government.1213 Minutes after an early morning phone call with Kushner on December 22, Flynn called
Kislyak.1214 According to Flynn, he informed Kislyak about the vote and the Transition Team's
opposition to the resolution, and requested that Russia vote against or delay the resolution.1215 Later that
day, President-Elect Trump spoke with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi about the vote.1216
Ultimately, Egypt postponed the vote.I217
On December 23, 2016, Malaysia, New Zealand, Senegal, and Venezuela resubmitted the
resolution.1218 Throughout the day, members of the Transition Team continued to talk with foreign
leaders about the resolution, with Flynn continuing to lead the outreach with the Russian
government through Kislyak.I219 When Flynn again spoke with Kislyak, Kislyak informed Flynn
that if the resolution came to a vote, Russia would not vote against it.122° The resolution later passed
14-0, with the United States abstaining.1221
b. U.S. Sanctions Against Russia
Flynn was also the Transition Team member who spoke with the Russian government when
the Obama Administration imposed sanctions and other measures against Russia in response to
Russia's interference in the 2016 presidential election. On December 28, 2016, then-President Obama
signed Executive Order 13757, which took effect at 12:01 a.m. the following day and
1211
Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 12; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 2. 1212
Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 12-14; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 2.
Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 12-14; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 2; Kushner 11/1/17 302, at 3; 12/22/16
1213
Email, Kushner to Flynn; 12/22/16 Email, McFarland to et al.

1214
Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 13; Call Records of Michael T. Flynn
Statement of Offense ¶ 3(d), United States v. Michael T. Flynn, No. 1:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. 1,
1215
2017), Doc. 4 ("Flynn Statement of Offense"); Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 12-13.

1216 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 2; Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 13.
1217
U.N. Vote on Israeli Settlement Postponed, "Potentially Indefinitely", Reuters (Dec. 22, 2016).
Somini Sengupta & Rick Gladstone, Rebuffing Israel, U.S. Allows Censure Over
1218
Settlements, New York Times (Dec. 23, 2016).

Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 12-14; Kushner 11/1/17 302, at 3; 12/23/16 Email, Flynn to
1219
Kushner et al.
1220
Flynn Statement of Offense 113(g).
Israel's Settlements Have No Legal Validity, Constitute Flagrant Violation of International Law,
1221
Security Council Reaffirms, 7853rd Meeting (PM), United Nations Security Council (Dec. 23, 2016).
173
imposed sanctions on nine Russian individuals and entities.1222 On December 29, 2016, the Obama
Administration also expelled 35 Russian government officials and closed two Russian government-
owned compounds in the United States.1223
During the rollout of the sanctions, President-Elect Trump and multiple Transition Team senior
officials, including McFarland, Steve Bannon, and Reince Priebus, were staying at the Mar-a-Lago club
in Palm Beach, Florida. Flynn was on vacation in the Dominican Republic,1224 but was in daily contact
with McFarland.1225
The Transition Team and President-Elect Trump were concerned that these sanctions would
harm the United States's relationship with Russia. 1226 Although the details and timing of sanctions
were unknown on December 28, 2016, the media began reporting that retaliatory measures from
the Obama Administration against Russia were forthcoming. 1227 When asked about imposing
sanctions on Russia for its alleged interference in the 2016 presidential election, President-Elect
Trump told the media, "I think we ought to get on with our lives." 1228
Russia initiated the outreach to the Transition Team. On the evening of December 28, 2016,
Kislyak texted Flynn, "can you kindly call me back at your convenience."1229 Flynn did not respond to
the text message that evening. Someone from the Russian Embassy also called Flynn the next morning,
at 10:38 a.m., but they did not talk.123°
The sanctions were announced publicly on December 29, 2016.1231 At 1:53 p.m. that day,
McFarland began exchanging emails with multiple Transition Team members and advisors about the
impact the sanctions would have on the incoming Administration.1232 At 2:07 p.m., a Transition Team
member texted Flynn a link to a New York Times article about the sanctions.1233 At 2:29
Taking Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency With Respect to Significant
1222
Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (Dec. 29, 2016).
Statement by the President on Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and
1223
Harassment, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (Dec. 29, 2016).
1224
Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 14; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 3-8; Bannon 2/12/18 302,
at 5. 1225
Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 5; Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 1; McFarland 11/22/17 302, at
3-9. 1226
Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 3.
Christine Wang, US to announce new sanctions against Russia in response to election
1227
hacking, CNBC (Dec. 28, 2016).

John Wagner, Trump on alleged election interference by Russia: "Get on with our lives ",
1228
Washington Post (Dec. 29, 2016).

1229
SF000006 (12/28/16 Text Message, Kislyak to Flynn).
1230
Call Records of Michael T. Flynn
1231
Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 2-3; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 4-5.
1232
12/29/16 Email, McFarland to O'Brien et al.; 12/29/16 Email, McFarland to Flynn et al.
1233
SF000001 (12/29/16 Text Message, Flaherty to Flynn).
174
p.m., McFarland called Flynn, but they did not talk.1234 Shortly thereafter, McFarland and Bannon
discussed the sanctions.1235 According to McFarland, Bannon remarked that the sanctions would hurt
their ability to have good relations with Russia, and that Russian escalation would make things more
difficult. 1236 McFarland believed she told Bannon that Flynn was scheduled to talk to Kislyak later that
night.1237 McFarland also believed she may have discussed the sanctions with Priebus, and likewise told
him that Flynn was scheduled to talk to Kislyak that night.1238 At 3:14 p.m., Flynn texted a Transition
Team member who was assisting McFarland, "Time for a call???"1239 The Transition Team member
responded that McFarland was on the phone with Tom Bossert, a Transition Team senior official, to
which Flynn responded, "Tit for tat w Russia not good. Russian AMBO reaching out to me today.'51240
Flynn recalled that he chose not to communicate with Kislyak about the sanctions until he had
heard from the team at Mar-a-Lago.1241 He first spoke with Michael Ledeen,1242 a Transition Team
member who advised on foreign policy and national security matters, for 20 minutes.I243 Flynn then
spoke with McFarland for almost 20 minutes to discuss what, if anything, to communicate to Kislyak
about the sanctions.1244 On that call, McFarland and Flynn discussed the sanctions, including their
potential impact on the incoming Trump Administration's foreign policy goals.1245 McFarland and
Flynn also discussed that Transition Team members in Mar-a-Lago did not want Russia to escalate the
situation.1246 They both understood that Flynn would relay a message to Kislyak in hopes of making
sure the situation would not get out of hand.1247
1234 Call Records of K.T. McFarland

1235 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 5-6.
1236 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 5-6.
1237 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 6.
1238 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 6.
1239 SF000001 (12/29/16 Text Message, Flynn to Flaherty).
1240 SF000001 (12/29/16 Text Message, Flynn to Flaherty).
1241 Flynn 11/20/17 302, at 3.
1242 Michael Ledeen is married to Barbara Ledeen, the Senate staffer whose 2016 efforts to locate
Hillary Clinton's missing emails are described in Volume I, Section III.D.2, supra.
1243 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 3; Call Records of Michael Ledeen
1244
Fl nn 11/17/17 302, at 3-4; Flynn Statement of Offense 3 c • Call Records of K.T. McFarland
; Call Records of Michael T. Flynn
1245 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 3-4
1246 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 3-4; Flynn Statement of Offense ¶ 3(c); McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 6-
7.
1247
Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 4; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 6-7.
175
Immediately after speaking with McFarland, Flynn called and spoke with Kislyak.' Flynn
discussed multiple topics with Kislyak, including the sanctions, scheduling a video teleconference
between President-Elect Trump and Putin, an upcoming terrorism conference, and Russia's views
about the Middle East.1249 With respect to the sanctions, Flynn requested that Russia not escalate
the situation, not get into a "tit for tat," and only respond to the sanctions in a reciprocal manner.12"
Multiple Transition Team members were aware that Flynn was speaking with Kislyak that
day. In addition to her conversations with Bannon and Reince Priebus, at 4:43 p.m., McFarland sent
an email to Transition Team members about the sanctions, informing the group that "Gen [F]lynn is
talking to russian ambassador this evening.151251 Less than an hour later, McFarland briefed President-
Elect Trump. Bannon, Priebus, Sean Spicer, and other Transition Team members were present.1252
During the briefing, President-Elect Trump asked McFarland if the Russians did "it," meaning the
intrusions intended to influence the presidential election.1253 McFarland said yes, and President-Elect
Trump expressed doubt that it was the Russians.1254 McFarland also discussed potential Russian
responses to the sanctions, and said Russia's response would be an indicator of what the Russians
wanted going forward.1255 President-Elect Trump opined that the sanctions provided him with
leverage to use with the Russians. 1256 McFarland recalled that at the end of the meeting, someone
may have mentioned to President-Elect Trump that Flynn was speaking to the Russian ambassador
that evening.1257
After the briefing, Flynn and McFarland spoke over the phone.1258 Flynn reported on the
substance of his call with Kislyak, including their discussion of the sanctions.1259 According to
McFarland, Flynn mentioned that the Russian response to the sanctions was not going to be escalatory
because they wanted a good relationship with the incoming Administration.1260 McFarland also gave
Flynn a summary of her recent briefing with President-Elect Trump.1261
1248
Flynn Statement of Offense ¶ 3(d).
1249 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 3-4; Flynn Statement of Offense ¶ 3(c); 12/30/16 Email, Flynn to
McFarland.
1250
Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 1; Flynn Statement of Offense ¶ 3(d).
1251
12/29/16 Email, McFarland to Flynn et al.
1252
12/29/16 Email, Westerhout to Flaherty; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7.
1253
McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7.
1254
McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7.
1255
McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7.
1256
McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7.
1257
McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7.
1258
McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7.
1259
Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 4; Flynn Statement of Offense ¶ 3(e).
1260
McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 8.
1261
McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 8.
176
Attefney-Werk-Preeltiet II May Contain Material Protcctcd Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
The next day, December 30, 2016, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov remarked that
Russia would respond in kind to the sanctions.1262 Putin superseded that comment two hours later,
releasing a statement that Russia would not take retaliatory measures in response to the sanctions
at that time.1263 Hours later President-Elect Trump tweeted, "Great move on delay (by V.
Putin).”1264 Shortly thereafter, Flynn sent a text message to McFarland summarizing his call with
Kislyak from the day before, which she emailed to Kushner, Bannon, Priebus, and other Transition
Team members.1265 The text message and email did not include sanctions as one of the topics
discussed with Kislyak.1266 Flynn told the Office that he did not document his discussion of
sanctions because it could be perceived as getting in the way of the Obama Administration's
foreign policy.1267
On December 31, 2016, Kislyak called Flynn and told him the request had been received at
the highest levels and that Russia had chosen not to retaliate to the sanctions in response to the
request.1268 Two hours later, Flynn spoke with McFarland and relayed his conversation with
Kislyak.1269 According to McFarland, Flynn remarked that the Russians wanted a better relationship
and that the relationship was back on track.127° Flynn also told McFarland that he believed his phone
call had made a difference.127I McFarland recalled congratulating Flynn in response.' Flynn spoke
with other Transition Team members that day, but does not recall whether they discussed the
sanctions.1273 Flynn recalled discussing the sanctions with Bannon the next day and that Bannon
appeared to know about Flynn's conversation with Kislyak.1274 Bannon,
Comment by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on recent US sanctions and the expulsion of Russian
1262
diplomats, Moscow, December 20, 2016, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Dec.
30, 2016 (5:32 a.m.)).
Statement of the President of the Russian Federation, Kremlin, Office of the President
1263
(Dec. 30, 2016 (7:15 a.m.)).

1264 @realDonaldTrump 12/30/16 (11:41 a.m.) Tweet.
1265
12/30/16 Email, Flynn to McFarland; 12/30/16 Email, McFarland to Kushner et al.
1266
12/30/16 Email, McFarland to Kushner et al.
1267 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 4.
1268
; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 1;
Flynn 1/19/17 302, at 3; Flynn Statement of Offense ¶ 3(g).
1269
; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 5;
Flynn 1/19/17 302, at 3; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10.
1270
McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10. 1271
McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10. 1272
McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10. 1273

Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 5-6.
1274 Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 1; Flynn 11/20/17 302, at 3; Flynn 1/19/17 302, at 5; Flynn
Statement of Offense ¶ 3(h).
177
Afferttey4V-tiflt-Preduet // May Contain Material Protected Undcr Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
for his part, recalled meeting with Flynn that day, but said that he did not remember discussing sanctions
with him.1275
Additional information about Flynn's sanctions-related discussions with Kislyak, and the
handling of those discussions by the Transition Team and the Trump Administration, is provided in
Volume II of this report.
***
In sum, the investigation established multiple links between Trump Campaign officials and
individuals tied to the Russian government. Those links included Russian offers of assistance to
the Campaign. In some instances, the Campaign was receptive to the offer, while in other instances
the Campaign officials shied away. Ultimately, the investigation did not establish that the
Campaign coordinated or conspired with the Russian government in its election -interference
activities.
1275
Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 9.
178
Attorney______________ Work Product // May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
V. PROSECUTION AND DECLINATION DECISIONS
The Appointment Order authorized the Special Counsel's Office "to prosecute federal
crimes arising from [its] investigation" of the matters assigned to it. In deciding whether to exercise
this prosecutorial authority, the Office has been guided by the Principles of Federal Prosecution set
forth in the Justice (formerly U.S. Attorney's) Manual. In particular, the Office has evaluated
whether the conduct of the individuals considered for prosecution constituted a federal offense and
whether admissible evidence would probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction for
such an offense. Justice Manual § 9-27.220 (2018). Where the answer to those questions was yes,
the Office further considered whether the prosecution would serve a substantial federal interest, the
individuals were subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction, and there existed an
adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution. Id.
As explained below, those considerations led the Office to seek charges against two
sets of n and
Russian nationals for their roles in ser etratinz the active-measures social media cam
corn uter-intrusion o erations. Harm to Ongoing Matter
The Office similarly determined that the contacts between Campaign officials and Russia-linked
individuals either did not involve the commission of a federal crime or, in the case of campaign-
finance offenses, that our evidence was not sufficient to obtain and sustain a criminal conviction.
At the same time, the Office concluded that the Principles of Federal Prosecution supported
charging certain individuals connected to the Campaign with making false statements or otherwise
obstructing this investigation or parallel congressional investigations.
A. Russian "Active Measures" Social Media Campaign
On February 16, 2018, a federal grand jury in the District of Columbia returned an
indictment charging 13 Russian nationals and three Russian entities—including the Internet
Research Agency (IRA) and Concord Management and Consulting LLC (Concord)—with
violating U.S. criminal laws in order to interfere with U.S. elections and political processes. 1276 The
indictment charges all of the defendants with conspiracy to defraud the United States (Count One),
three defendants with conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud (Count Two), and five
defendants with aggravated identity theft (Counts Three through Eight). Internet Research Agency
Indictment. Concord, which is one of the entities charged in the Count One conspiracy, entered an
appearance through U.S. counsel and moved to dismiss the charge on multiple grounds. In orders
and memorandum opinions issued on August 13 and November 15, 2018, the district court denied
Concord's motions to dismiss. United States v. Concord Management & Consulting LLC, 347 F.
Supp. 3d 38 (D.D.C. 2018). United States v. Concord Management & Consulting LLC, 317 F.
Supp. 3d 598 (D.D.C. 2018). As of this writing, the prosecution of Concord remains ongoing before
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The other defendants remain at large.
179
A more detailed explanation of the charging decision in this case is set forth in a separate
1276
memorandum provided to the Acting Attorney General before the indictment.
180
Attorney ______________ Work Product II May Contain Material Protected Undcr Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
Although members of the IRA had contact with individuals affiliated with the Trump
Campaign, the indictment does not charge any Trump Campaign official or any other U.S. person
with participating in the conspiracy. That is because the investigation did not identify evidence that
any U.S. person who coordinated or communicated with the IRA knew that he or she was speaking
with Russian nationals engaged in the criminal conspiracy. The Office therefore determined that
such persons did not have the knowledge or criminal purpose required to charge them in the
conspiracy to defraud the United States (Count One) or in the separate count alleging a wire- and
bank-fraud conspiracy involving the IRA and two individual Russian nationals (Count Two).
The Office did, however, charge one U.S. national for his role in supplying false or stolen
bank account numbers that allowed the IRA conspirators to access U.S. online payment systems
by circumventing those systems' security features. On February 12, 2018, Richard Pinedo pleaded
guilty, pursuant to a single-count information, to identity fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1028(a)(7) and (b)(1)(D). Plea Agreement, United States v. Richard Pinedo, No. 1:18-cr-24
(D.D.C. Feb. 12, 2018), Doc. 10. The investigation did not establish that Pinedo was aware of the
identity of the IRA members who purchased bank account numbers from him. Pinedo's sales of
account numbers enabled the IRA members to anonymously access a financial network through
which they transacted with U.S. persons and companies. See Gov't Sent. Mem. at 3, United States
v. Richard Pinedo, No. 1:18-cr-24 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2018), Doc. 24. On October 10, 2018, Pinedo
was sentenced to six months of imprisonment, to be followed by six months of home confinement,
and was ordered to complete 100 hours of community service.
B. Russian Hacking and Dumping Operations
1. Section 1030 Computer-Intrusion Conspiracy
a. Background
On July 13, 2018, a federal grand jury in the District of Columbia returned an indictment
charging Russian military intelligence officers from the GRU with conspiring to hack into various
U.S. computers used by the Clinton Campaign, DNC, DCCC, and other U.S. persons, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030 and 371 (Count One); committing identity theft and conspiring to commit
money laundering in furtherance of that hacking conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028A
and 1956(h) (Counts Two through Ten); and a separate conspiracy to hack into the computers of
U.S. persons and entities responsible for the administration of the 2016 U.S. election, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030 and 371 (Count Eleven). Netyksho Indictment.1277 As of this writing, all 12
defendants remain at large.
The Netyksho indictment alleges that the defendants conspired with one another and with
others to hack into the computers of U.S. persons and entities involved in the 2016 U.S. presidential
election, steal documents from those computers, and stage releases of the stolen documents to interfere
in the election. Netyksho Indictment ¶ 2. The indictment also describes how, in staging
The Office provided a more detailed explanation of the charging decision in this case in meetings with
1277
the Office of the Acting Attorney General before the indictment.
181
Atterftey-Werk-Preelttet II May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
the releases, the defendants used the Guccifer 2.0 persona to disseminate documents through
WikiLeaks. On July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks released over 20,000 emails and other documents that the
hacking conspirators had stolen from the DNC. Netyksho Indictment ¶ 48. In addition, on October
7, 2016, WikiLeaks began releasing emails that some conspirators had stolen from Clinton
Campaign chairman John Podesta after a successful spearphishing operation. Netyksho Indictment
¶ 49.
I
b. Charging Decision As to Harm to Ongoing Matter
1278
The Office also considered, but ruled out, charges on the theory that the post-hacking sharing and
dissemination of emails could constitute trafficking in or receipt of stolen property under the National Stolen
Property Act (NSPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314 and 2315. The statutes comprising the NSPA cover "goods, wares,
or merchandise," and lower courts have largely understood that phrase to be limited to tangible items since
the Supreme Court's decision in Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985). See United States v. Yijia
Zhang, 995 F. Supp. 2d 340, 344-48 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (collecting cases). One of those post-Dowling
decisions—United States v. Brown, 925 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1991)—specifically held that the NSPA does
not reach "a computer program in source code form," even though that code was stored in tangible items
(i.e., a hard disk and in a three-ring notebook). Id. at 1302-03. Congress, in turn, cited the Brown opinion
in explaining the need for amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) that "would ensure that the theft of
intangible information by the unauthorized use of a computer is prohibited in the same way theft of physical
items [is] protected." S. Rep. 104-357, at 7 (1996). That sequence of events would make it difficult to argue
that hacked emails in electronic form, which are the relevant stolen items here, constitute "goods, wares, or
merchandise" within the meaning of the NSPA.
182
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183
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184
2. Potential Section 1030 Violation By
See United States v.

Willis, 476 F.3d 1121, 1125 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007) (explaining that the 1986 amendments to Section
1030 reflect Congress's desire to reach "'intentional acts of unauthorized access—rather than
mistaken, inadvertent, or careless ones') (quoting S. Rep. 99-432, at 5 (1986)). In addition, the
computer likely qualifies as a "protected" one under the statute, which
reaches "effectively all computers with Internet access." United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 859
(9th Cir. 20121 fen band.
Applying the Principles of Federal Prosecution, however, the Office determined that
prosecution of this potential violation was not warranted. Those Principles instruct prosecutors to
consider, among other things, the nature and seriousness of the offense, the person's culpability in
connection with the offense, and the probable sentence to be im osed if the rosecution is successful.
Justice Manual 9-27.230.
185
C. Russian Government Outreach and Contacts
As explained in Section IV above, the Office's investigation uncovered evidence of

numerous links (i.e., contacts) between Trump Campaign officials and individuals having or
claiming to have ties to the Russian government. The Office evaluated the contacts under several
sets of federal laws, including conspiracy laws and statutes governing foreign agents who operate
in the United States. After considering the available evidence, the Office did not pursue charges
under these statutes against any of the individuals discussed in Section IV above—with the
exception of FARA charges against Paul Manafort and Richard Gates based on their activities on
behalf of Ukraine.
One of the interactions between the Trump Campaign and Russian-affiliated individuals—
the June 9, 2016 meeting between high-ranking campaign officials and Russians promising
derogatory information on Hillary Clinton—implicates an additional body of law: campaign-finance
statutes. Schemes involving the solicitation or receipt of assistance from foreign sources raise difficult
statutory and constitutional questions. As explained below, the Office evaluated those questions in
connection with the June 9 meeting Harm to Ongoing Matter
The Office ultimately concluded that, even if the principal legal questions were resolved favorably
to the government, a prosecution would encounter difficulties proving that Campaign officials or
individuals connected to the Campaign willfully violated the law.
Finally, although the evidence of contacts between Campaign officials and Russia-affiliated
individuals may not have been sufficient to establish or sustain criminal charges, several U.S.
persons connected to the Campaign made false statements about those contacts and took other steps
to obstruct the Office's investigation and those of Congress. This Office has therefore charged some
of those individuals with making false statements and obstructing justice.
1. Potential Coordination: Conspiracy and Collusion
As an initial matter, this Office evaluated potentially criminal conduct that involved the
collective action of multiple individuals not under the rubric of "collusion," but through the lens of
conspiracy law. In so doing, the Office recognized that the word "collud[e]" appears in the Acting
Attorney General's August 2, 2017 memorandum; it has frequently been invoked in public reporting;
and it is sometimes referenced in antitrust law, see, e.g., Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993). But collusion is not a specific offense or theory of liability
found in the U.S. Code; nor is it a term of art in federal criminal law. To the contrary, even as defined
in legal dictionaries, collusion is largely synonymous with conspiracy as that crime is set forth in the
general federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371. See Black's Law Dictionary 321 (10th ed. 2014)
(collusion is "[a]n agreement to defraud another or to do or obtain something forbidden by law"); 1
Alexander Burrill, A Law Dictionary and Glossary 311 (1871) ("An agreement between two or more
persons to defraud another by the forms of law, or to employ such forms as means of accomplishing
some unlawful object."); 1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary 352
186
(1897) ("An agreement between two or more persons to defraud a person of his rights by the forms
of law, or to obtain an object forbidden by law.").
For that reason, this Office's focus in resolving the question of joint criminal liability was on
conspiracy as defined in federal law, not the commonly discussed term "collusion." The Office
considered in particular whether contacts between Trump Campaign officials and Russia-linked
individuals could trigger liability for the crime of conspiracy—either under statutes that have their
own conspiracy language (e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1349, 1951(a)), or under the general conspiracy statute
(18 U.S.C. § 371). The investigation did not establish that the contacts described in Volume I, Section
IV, supra, amounted to an agreement to commit any substantive violation of federal criminal law—
including foreign-influence and campaign-finance laws, both of which are discussed further below.
The Office therefore did not charge any individual associated with the Trump Campaign with
conspiracy to commit a federal offense arising from Russia contacts, either under a specific statute or
under Section 371's offenses clause.
The Office also did not charge any campaign official or associate with a conspiracy under
Section 371's defraud clause. That clause criminalizes participating in an agreement to obstruct a
lawful function of the U.S. government or its agencies through deceitful or dishonest means. See
Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 861 (1966); Harnmerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182,
188 (1924); see also United States v. Concord Mgmt. & Consulting LLC, 347 F. Supp. 3d 38, 46
(D.D.C. 2018). The investigation did not establish any agreement among Campaign officials—or
between such officials and Russia-linked individuals—to interfere with or obstruct a lawful function
of a government agency during the campaign or transition period. And, as discussed in Volume I,
Section V.A, supra, the investigation did not identify evidence that any Campaign official or
associate knowingly and intentionally participated in the conspiracy to defraud that the Office
charged, namely, the active-measures conspiracy described in Volume I, Section II, supra.
Accordingly, the Office did not charge any Campaign associate or other U.S. person with conspiracy
to defraud the United States based on the Russia-related contacts described in Section IV above.
2. Potential Coordination: Foreign Agent Statutes (FARA and 18 U.S.C. § 951)
The Office next assessed the potential liability of Campaign-affiliated individuals under
federal statutes regulating actions on behalf of, or work done for, a foreign government.
a. Governing Law
Under 18 U.S.C. § 951, it is generally illegal to act in the United States as an agent of a
foreign government without providing notice to the Attorney General. Although the defendant must
act on behalf of a foreign government (as opposed to other kinds of foreign entities), the acts need
not involve espionage; rather, acts of any type suffice for liability. See United States v. Duran, 596
F.3d 1283, 1293-94 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Latchin, 554 F.3d 709, 715 (7th Cir. 2009);
United States v. Dumeisi, 424 F.3d 566, 581 (7th Cir. 2005). An "agent of a foreign government"
is an "individual" who "agrees to operate" in the United States "subject to the direction or control
of a foreign government or official." 18 U.S.C. § 951(d).
187
The crime defined by Section 951 is complete upon knowingly acting in the United States
as an unregistered foreign-government agent. 18 U.S.C. § 951(a). The statute does not require
willfulness, and knowledge of the notification requirement is not an element of the offense. United
States v. Campa, 529 F.3d 980, 998-99 (11th Cir. 2008); Duran, 596 F.3d at 1291-94; Dumeisi,
424 F.3d at 581.
The Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) generally makes it illegal to act as an agent
of a foreign principal by engaging in certain (largely political) activities in the United States without
registering with the Attorney General. 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621. The triggering agency relationship
must be with a foreign principal or "a person any of whose activities are directly or indirectly
supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in major part by a foreign
principal." 22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1). That includes a foreign government or political party and various
foreign individuals and entities. 22 U.S.C. § 611(b). A covered relationship exists if a person "acts
as an agent, representative, employee, or servant" or "in any other capacity at the order, request, or
under the [foreign principal's] direction or control." 22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1). It is sufficient if the
person "agrees, consents, assumes or purports to act as, or who is or holds himself out to be, whether
or not pursuant to contractual relationship, an agent of a foreign principal." 22 U. S .C. § 611(c)(2).
The triggering activity is that the agent "directly or through any other person" in the United
States (1) engages in "political activities for or in the interests of [the] foreign principal," which
includes attempts to influence federal officials or the public; (2) acts as "public relations counsel,
publicity agent, information-service employee or political consultant for or in the interests of such
foreign principal"; (3) "solicits, collects, disburses, or dispenses contributions, loans, money, or other
things of value for or in the interest of such foreign principal"; or (4) "represents the interests of such
foreign principal" before any federal agency or official. 22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1).
It is a crime to engage in a "[w]illful violation of any provision of the Act or any regulation
thereunder." 22 U.S.C. § 618(a)(1). It is also a crime willfully to make false statements or omissions
of material facts in FARA registration statements or supplements. 22 U.S.C. § 618(a)(2). Most
violations have a maximum penalty of five years of imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. 22 U.S.C. §
618.
b. Application
The investigation uncovered extensive evidence that Paul Manafort's and Richard Gates's
pre-campaign work for the government of Ukraine violated FARA. Manafort and Gates were charged
for that conduct and admitted to it when they pleaded guilty to superseding criminal informations in
the District of Columbia prosecution.128° The evidence underlying those charges is not addressed in
this report because it was discussed in public court documents and in a separate
1280 Gates Superseding Criminal Information; Waiver of Indictment, United States v. Richard W.
Gates III, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 203; Waiver of Trial by Jury, United States v. Richard
W. Gates III, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 204; Gates Plea Agreement; Statement of Offense,
United States v. Richard W. Gates III, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 206; Plea Agreement, United
States v. Paul J. Manafbrt, Jr., 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 2018), Doc. 422; Statement of Offense, United
States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr., 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 2018), Doc. 423.
188
prosecution memorandum submitted to the Acting Attorney General before the original indictment
in that case.
In addition, the investigation produced evidence of FARA violations involving Michael

Flynn. Those potential violations, however, concerned a country other than Russia (i.e., Turkey)
and were resolved when Flynn admitted to the underlying facts in the Statement of Offense that
accompanied his guilty plea to a false-statements charge. Statement of Offense, United States v.
Michael T Flynn, No. 1:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2017), Doc. 4 ("Flynn Statement of
Offense").1281
The investigation did not, however, yield evidence sufficient to sustain any charge that any
individual affiliated with the Trump Campaign acted as an agent of a foreign principal within the
meaning of FARA or, in terms of Section 951, subject to the direction or control of the government of
Russia, or any official thereof. In particular, the Office did not find evidence likely to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Campaign officials such as Paul Manafort, George Papadopoulos, and Carter
Page acted as agents of the Russian governmentor at its direction, control, or re uest—durin the
relevant time Deriod.1282
As a result, the Office did not charge any other Trump Campaign official with violating
FARA or Section 951, or attempting or conspiring to do so, based on contacts with the Russian
government or a Russian principal.
Finally, the Office investigated whether one of the above campaign advisors—George
Papadopoulos—acted as an agent of, or at the direction and control of, the government of Israel.
While the investigation revealed significant ties between Papadopoulos and Israel (and search
warrants were obtained in part on that basis), the Office ultimately determined that the evidence
was not sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction under FARA or Section 951.
3. Campaign Finance
Several areas of the Office's investigation involved efforts or offers by foreign nationals to
provide negative information about candidate Clinton to the Trump Campaign or to distribute that
information to the public, to the anticipated benefit of the Campaign. As explained below, the Office
considered whether two of those efforts in particular—the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump
On four occasions, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) issued warrants based on
1282
a finding of probable cause to believe that Page was an agent of a foreign power. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(b),
1805(a)(2)(A). The FISC's probable-cause finding was based on a different (and lower) standard than the
one governing the Office's decision whether to bring charges against Page, which is whether admissible
evidence would likely be sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Page acted as an agent of the
Russian Federation during the period at issue. Cf. United States v. Cardoza, 713 F.3d 656, 660 (D.C. Cir.
2013) (explaining that probable cause requires only "a fair probability," and not "certainty, or proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, or proof by a preponderance of the evidence").
189
Tower Harm to Ongoing Matter -constituted prosecutable violations of

the campaign-finance laws. The Office determined that the evidence was not sufficient to charge
either incident as a criminal violation.
a. Overview Of Governing Law
"[T]he United States has a compelling interest . . . in limiting the participation of foreign
citizens in activities of democratic self-government, and in thereby preventing foreign influence
over the U.S. political process." Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 288 (D.D.C. 2011)
(Kavanaugh, J., for three-judge court), aff'd, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012). To that end, federal campaign-
finance law broadly prohibits foreign nationals from making contributions, donations,
expenditures, or other disbursements in connection with federal, state, or local candidate elections,
and prohibits anyone from soliciting, accepting, or receiving such contributions or donations. As
relevant here, foreign nationals may not make—and no one may "solicit, accept, or receive" from
them—"a contribution or donation of money or other thing of value" or "an express or implied
promise to make a contribution or donation, in connection with a Federal, State, or local election."
52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)(1)(A), (a)(2).'283 The term "contribution," which is used throughout the
campaign-finance law, "includes" "any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or
anything of value made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal
office." 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(i). It excludes, among other things, "the value of [volunteer]
services." 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(B)(i).
Foreign nationals are also barred from making "an expenditure, independent expenditure,
or disbursement for an electioneering communication." 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)(1)(C). The term
"expenditure" "includes" "any purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of
money or anything of value, made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for
Federal office." 52 U.S.C. §.30101(9)(A)(0. It excludes, among other things, news stories and non-
partisan get-out-the-vote activities. 52 U.S.C. § 30101(9)(B)(i)-(ii). An "independent expenditure"
is an expenditure "expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate" and
made independently of the campaign. 52 U.S.C. § 30101(17). An "electioneering communication"
is a broadcast communication that "refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office" and
is made within specified time periods and targeted at the relevant electorate. 52 U.S.C. §
30104(0(3).
The statute defines "foreign national" by reference to FARA and the Immigration and
Nationality Act, with minor modification. 52 U.S.C. § 30121(b) (cross-referencing 22 U.S.C. §
611(b)(1)-(3) and 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20), (22)). That definition yields five, sometimes-overlapping
categories of foreign nationals, which include all of the individuals and entities relevant for present
purposes—namely, foreign governments and political parties, individuals
1283
Campaign-finance law also places financial limits on contributions, 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a), and
prohibits contributions from corporations, banks, and labor unions, 52 U.S.C. § 30118(a); see Citizens
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 320 (2010). Because the conduct that the Office investigated involved possible
electoral activity by foreign nationals, the foreign-contributions ban is the most readily applicable provision.
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outside of the U.S. who are not legal permanent residents, and certain non-U.S. entities located
outside of the U.S.
A "knowing[] and willful[]" violation involving an aggregate of $25,000 or more in a

calendar year is a felony. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(d)(1)(A)(i); see Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 292 (noting
that a willful violation will require some "proof of the defendant's knowledge of the law"); United
States v. Danielczyk, 917 F. Supp. 2d 573, 577 (E.D. Va. 2013) (applying willfulness standard
drawn from Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1998)); see also Wagner v. FEC, 793
F.3d 1, 19 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (en bane) (same). A "knowing[] and willful[]" violation involving
an aggregate of $2,000 or more in a calendar year, but less than $25,000, is a misdemeanor. 52
U.S.C. § 30109(d)(1)(A)(ii).
b. Application to June 9 Trump Tower Meeting
The Office considered whether to charge Trump Campaign officials with crimes in
connection with the June 9 meeting described in Volume I, Section IV.A.5, supra. The Office
concluded that, in light of the government's substantial burden of proof on issues of intent
("knowing" and "willful"), and the difficulty of establishing the value of the offered information,
criminal charges would not meet the Justice Manual standard that "the admissible evidence will
probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction." Justice Manual § 9-27.220.
In brief, the key facts are that, on June 3, 2016, Robert Goldstone emailed Donald Trump
Jr., to pass along from Emin and Aras Agalarov an "offer" from Russia's "Crown prosecutor" to
"the Trump campaign" of "official documents and information that would incriminate Hillary and
her dealings with Russia and would be very useful to [Trump Jr.'s] father." The email described
this as "very high level and sensitive information" that is "part of Russia and its government's
support to Mr. Trump-helped along by Aras and Emin." Trump Jr. responded: "if it's what you say
I love it especially later in the summer." Trump Jr. and Emin Agalarov had follow-up conversations
and, within days, scheduled a meeting with Russian representatives that was attended by Trump
Jr., Manafort, and Kushner. The communications setting up the meeting and the attendance by
high-level Campaign representatives support an inference that the Campaign anticipated receiving
derogatory documents and information from official Russian sources that could assist candidate
Trump's electoral prospects.
This series of events could implicate the federal election-law ban on contributions and
donations by foreign nationals, 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)(1)(A). Specifically, Goldstone passed along
an offer purportedly from a Russian government official to provide "official documents and
information" to the Trump Campaign for the purposes of influencing the presidential election.
Trump Jr. appears to have accepted that offer and to have arranged a meeting to receive those
materials. Documentary evidence in the form of email chains supports the inference that Kushner
and Manafort were aware of that purpose and attended the June 9 meeting anticipating the receipt
of helpful information to the Campaign from Russian sources.
The Office considered whether this evidence would establish a conspiracy to violate the
foreign contributions ban, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; the solicitation of an illegal foreign-
source contribution; or the acceptance or receipt of "an express or implied promise to make a
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[foreign-source] contribution," both in violation of 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)(1)(A), (a)(2). There are

reasonable arguments that the offered information would constitute a "thing of value" within the
meaning of these provisions, but the Office determined that the government would not be likely to
obtain and sustain a conviction for two other reasons: first, the Office did not obtain admissible
evidence likely to meet the government's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that these
individuals acted "willfully," i.e., with general knowledge of the illegality of their conduct; and,
second, the government would likely encounter difficulty in proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that the value of the promised information exceeded the threshold for a criminal violation, see 52
U.S.C. § 30109(d)(1)(A)(i).
i. Thing-of- Value Element
A threshold legal question is whether providing to a campaign "documents and

information" of the type involved here would constitute a prohibited campaign contribution. The
foreign contribution ban is not limited to contributions of money. It expressly prohibits "a
contribution or donation of money or other thing of value." 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)
(emphasis added). And the term "contribution" is defined throughout the campaign-finance laws
to "include[]" "any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value." 52
U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(i) (emphasis added).
The phrases "thing of value" and "anything of value" are broad and inclusive enough to
encompass at least some forms of valuable information. Throughout the United States Code, these
phrases serve as "term[s] of art" that are construed "broad[ly]." United States v. Nilsen, 967 F.2d
539, 542 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) ("thing of value" includes "both tangibles and intangibles");
see also, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 201(b)(1), 666(a)(2) (bribery statutes); id. § 641 (theft of government
property). For example, the term "thing of value" encompasses law enforcement reports that would
reveal the identity of informants, United States v. Girard, 601 F.2d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1979); classified
materials, United States v. Fowler, 932 F.2d 306, 310 (4th Cir. 1991); confidential information about
a competitive bid, United States v. Matzkin, 14 F.3d 1014, 1020 (4th Cir. 1994); secret grand jury
information, United States v. Jeter, 775 F.2d 670, 680 (6th Cir. 1985); and information about a
witness's whereabouts, United States v. Sheker, 618 F.2d 607, 609 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam). And
in the public corruption context, 'thing of value' is defined broadly to include the value which the
defendant subjectively attaches to the items received." United States v. Renzi, 769 F.3d 731, 744 (9th
Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Federal Election Commission (FEC) regulations recognize the value to a campaign of at

least some forms of information, stating that the term "anything of value" includes "the provision of
any goods or services without charge," such as "membership lists" and "mailing lists." 11 C.F.R. §
100.52(d)(1). The FEC has concluded that the phrase includes a state-by-state list of activists. See
Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. FEC, 475 F.3d 337, 338 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(describing the FEC's findings). Likewise, polling data provided to a campaign constitutes a
"contribution." FEC Advisory Opinion 1990-12 (Strub), 1990 WL 153454 (citing 11 C.F.R. §
106.4(b)). And in the specific context of the foreign-contributions ban, the FEC has concluded that
"election materials used in previous Canadian campaigns," including "flyers, advertisements, door
hangers, tri-folds, signs, and other printed material," constitute "anything of
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value," even though "the value of these materials may be nominal or difficult to ascertain." FEC
Advisory Opinion 2007-22 (Hurysz), 2007 WL 5172375, at *5.
These authorities would support the view that candidate-related opposition research given
to a campaign for the purpose of influencing an election could constitute a contribution to which the
foreign-source ban could apply. A campaign can be assisted not only by the provision of funds, but
also by the provision of derogatory information about an opponent. Political campaigns frequently
conduct and pay for opposition research. A foreign entity that engaged in such research and provided
resulting information to a campaign could exert a greater effect on an election, and a greater tendency
to ingratiate the donor to the candidate, than a gift of money or tangible things of value. At the same
time, no judicial decision has treated the voluntary provision of uncompensated opposition research
or similar information as a thing of value that could amount to a contribution under campaign-
finance law. Such an interpretation could have implications beyond the foreign-source ban, see 52
U.S.C. § 30116(a) (imposing monetary limits on campaign contributions), and raise First
Amendment questions. Those questions could be especially difficult where the information
consisted simply of the recounting of historically accurate facts. It is uncertain how courts would
resolve those issues.
ii. Willfulness
Even assuming that the promised "documents and information that would incriminate
Hillary" constitute a "thing of value" under campaign-finance law, the government would encounter
other challenges in seeking to obtain and sustain a conviction. Most significantly, the government has
not obtained admissible evidence that is likely to establish the scienter requirement beyond a
reasonable doubt. To prove that a defendant acted "knowingly and willfully," the government would
have to show that the defendant had general knowledge that his conduct was unlawful. U.S.
Department of Justice, Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses 123 (8th ed. Dec. 2017) ("Election
Offenses"); see Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 292 (noting that a willful violation requires "proof of the
defendant's knowledge of the law"); Danielczyk, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 577 ("knowledge of general
unlawfulness"). "This standard creates an elevated scienter element requiring, at the very least, that
application of the law to the facts in question be fairly clear. When there is substantial doubt
concerning whether the law applies to the facts of a particular matter, the offender is more likely to
have an intent defense." Election Offenses 123.
On the facts here, the government would unlikely be able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the June 9 meeting participants had general knowledge that their conduct was unlawful. The
investigation has not developed evidence that the participants in the meeting were familiar with the
foreign-contribution ban or the application of federal law to the relevant factual context. The
government does not have strong evidence of surreptitious behavior or efforts at concealment at the
time of the June 9 meeting. While the government has evidence of later efforts to prevent disclosure
of the nature of the June 9 meeting that could circumstantially provide support for a showing of
scienter, see Volume II, Section II.G, infra, that concealment occurred more than a year later,
involved individuals who did not attend the June 9 meeting, and may reflect an intention to avoid
political consequences rather than any prior knowledge of illegality. Additionally, in light of the
unresolved legal questions about whether giving "documents and information" of the sort offered
here constitutes a campaign contribution, Trump Jr. could mount a factual defense that he
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6(e)
did not believe his response to the offer and the June 9 meeting itself violated the law. Given his
less direct involvement in arranging the June 9 meeting, Kushner could likely mount a similar
defense. And, while Manafort is experienced with political campaigns, the Office has not developed
evidence showing that he had relevant knowledge of these legal issues.
iii. Difficulties in Valuing Promised Information
The Office would also encounter difficulty proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
value of the promised documents and information exceeds the $2,000 threshold for a criminal
violation, as well as the $25,000 threshold for felony punishment. See 52 U.S.C. § 30109(d)(1).
The type of evidence commonly used to establish the value of non-monetary contributions—such
as pricing the contribution on a commercial market or determining the upstream acquisition cost
or the cost of distribution—would likely be unavailable or ineffective in this factual setting.
Although damaging opposition research is surely valuable to a campaign, it appears that the
information ultimately delivered in the meeting was not valuable. And while value in a conspiracy
may well be measured by what the participants expected to receive at the time of the agreement,
see, e.g., United States v. Tombrello, 666 F.2d 485, 489 (11th Cir. 1982), Goldstone's description
of the offered material here was quite general. His suggestion of the information's value—i.e., that
it would "incriminate Hillary" and "would be very useful to [Trump Jr.'s] father"—was nonspecific
and may have been understood as being of uncertain worth or reliability, given Goldstone's lack
of direct access to the original source. The uncertainty over what would be delivered could be
reflected in Trump Jr.'s response ("if it's what you say I love it") (emphasis added).
Accordingly, taking into account the high burden to establish a culpable mental state in a
campaign-finance prosecution and the difficulty in establishing the required valuation, the Office
decided not to pursue criminal campaign-finance charges against Trump Jr. or other campaign
officials for the events culminating in the June 9 meeting.
c. Application to Harm to Ongoing Matter
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6(c)
i. uestions Over Whether Harm to Ongoing Matter
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6(e)
ii. Willfulness
As discussed, to establish a criminal campaign-finance violation, the government must

prove that the defendant acted "knowingly and willfully." 52 U.S.C. § 30109(d)(1)(A)(i). That
standard requires proof that the defendant knew generally that his conduct was unlawful. Election
Offenses 123. Given the uncertainties noted above, the "willfulness" requirement would pose a
substantial barrier to prosecution.
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6(c)
iii. Constitutional Considerations
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6(c)
4. False Statements and Obstruction of the Investigation
The Office determined that certain individuals associated with the Campaign lied to
investigators about Campaign contacts with Russia and have taken other actions to interfere with
the investigation. As explained below, the Office therefore charged some U.S. persons connected
to the Campaign with false statements and obstruction offenses.
a. Overview Of Governing Law
False Statements. The principal federal statute criminalizing false statements to

government investigators is 18 U.S.C. § 1001. As relevant here, under Section 1001(a)(2), it is a
crime to knowingly and willfully "make[] any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement
or representation" "in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive . . . branch of the
Government." An FBI investigation is a matter within the Executive Branch's jurisdiction. United
States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 479 (1984). The statute also applies to a subset of legislative
branch actions—viz., administrative matters and "investigation[s] or review[s]" conducted by a
congressional committee or subcommittee. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(c)(1) and (2); see United States v.
Pickett, 353 F.3d 62, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
Whether the statement was made to law enforcement or congressional investigators, the
government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the same basic non-jurisdictional elements: the
statement was false, fictitious, or fraudulent; the defendant knew both that it was false and that it was
unlawful to make a false statement; and the false statement was material. See, e.g., United States v.
Smith, 831 F.3d 1207, 1222 n.27 (9th Cir. 2017) (listing elements); see also Ninth Circuit Pattern
Instruction 8.73 & cmt. (explaining that the Section 1001 jury instruction was modified in light of the
Department of Justice's position that the phrase "knowingly and willfully" in the statute requires the
defendant's knowledge that his or her conduct was unlawful). In the D.C. Circuit, the government
must prove that the statement was actually false; a statement that is misleading but "literally true"
does not satisfy Section 1001(a)(2). See United States v. Milton, 8 F.3d 39, 45
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(D.C. Cir. 1993); United States v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 832-33 & n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1993). For that
false statement to qualify as "material," it must have a natural tendency to influence, or be
capable of influencing, a discrete decision or any other function of the agency to which it is
addressed. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Moore, 612
F.3d 698, 701 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
Perjury. Under the federal perjury statutes, it is a crime for a witness testifying under oath
before a grand jury to knowingly make any false material declaration. See 18 U.S.C. § 1623. The
government must prove four elements beyond a reasonable doubt to obtain a conviction under
Section 1623(a): the defendant testified under oath before a federal grand jury; the defendant's
testimony was false in one or more respects; the false testimony concerned matters that were
material to the grand jury investigation; and the false testimony was knowingly given. United States
v. Bridges, 717 F.2d 1444, 1449 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The general perjury statute, 18 U.S.C. §
1621, also applies to grand jury testimony and has similar elements, except that it requires that the
witness have acted willfully and that the government satisfy "strict common-law requirements for
establishing falsity." See Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 106 & n.6 (1979) (explaining "the
two-witness rule" and the corroboration that it demands).
Obstruction of Justice. Three basic elements are common to the obstruction statutes
pertinent to this Office's charging decisions: an obstructive act; some form of nexus between the
obstructive act and an official proceeding; and criminal (i.e., corrupt) intent. A detailed discussion
of those elements, and the law governing obstruction of justice more generally, is included in
Volume II of the report.
b. Application to Certain Individuals
i. George Papadopoulos
Investigators approached Papadopoulos for an interview based on his role as a foreign policy
advisor to the Trump Campaign and his suggestion to a foreign government representative that
Russia had indicated that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information
damaging to candidate Clinton. On January 27, 2017, Papadopoulos agreed to be interviewed by
FBI agents, who informed him that the interview was part of the investigation into potential Russian
government interference in the 2016 presidential election.
During the interview, Papadopoulos lied about the timing, extent, and nature of his
communications with Joseph Mifsud, Olga Polonskaya, and Ivan Timofeev. With respect to timing,
Papadopoulos acknowledged that he had met Mifsud and that Mifsud told him the Russians had
"dirt" on Clinton in the form of "thousands of emails." But Papadopoulos stated multiple times that
those communications occurred before he joined the Trump Campaign and that it was a "very
strange coincidence" to be told of the "dirt" before he started working for the Campaign. This
account was false. Papadopoulos met Mifsud for the first time on approximately March 14, 2016,
after Papadopoulos had already learned he would be a foreign policy advisor for the Campaign.
Mifsud showed interest in Papadopoulos only after learning of his role on the Campaign. And
Mifsud told Papadopoulos about the Russians possessing "dirt" on candidate Clinton in late April
2016, more than a month after Papadopoulos had joined the Campaign and
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been publicly announced by candidate Trump. Statement of Offense ri

25-26, United States v.
George Papadopoulos, No. 1:17-cr-182 (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 2017), Doc. 19 ("Papadopoulos Statement
of Offense").
Papadopoulos also made false statements in an effort to minimize the extent and importance
of his communications with Mifsud. For example, Papadopoulos stated that "[Mifsud]'s a nothing,"
that he thought Mifsud was "just a guy talk[ing] up connections or something," and that he believed
Mifsud was "BS' ing to be completely honest with you." In fact, however, Papadopoulos understood
Mifsud to have substantial connections to high-level Russian government officials and that Mifsud
spoke with some of those officials in Moscow before telling Papadopoulos about the "dirt."
Papadopoulos also engaged in extensive communications over a period of months with Mifsud about
foreign policy issues for the Campaign, including efforts to arrange a "history making" meeting
between the Campaign and Russian government officials. In addition, Papadopoulos failed to inform
investigators that Mifsud had introduced him to Timofeev, the Russian national who Papadopoulos
understood to be connected to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, despite being asked if he had
met with Russian nationals or "[a]nyone with a Russian accent" during the campaign. Papadopoulos
Statement of Offense IN 27-29.
Papadopoulos also falsely claimed that he met Polonskaya before he joined the Campaign,
and falsely told the FBI that he had "no" relationship at all with her. He stated that the extent of
their communications was her sending emails—"Just, 'Hi, how are you?' That's it." In truth,
however, Papadopoulos met Polonskaya on March 24, 2016, after he had joined the Campaign; he
believed that she had connections to high-level Russian government officials and could help him
arrange a potential foreign policy trip to Russia. During the campaign he emailed and spoke with
her over Skype on numerous occasions about the potential foreign policy trip to Russia.
Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ¶¶ 30-31.
Papadopoulos's false statements in January 2017 impeded the FBI's investigation into
Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. Most immediately, those statements hindered
investigators' ability to effectively question Mifsud when he was interviewed in the lobby of a
Washington, D.C. hotel on February 10, 2017. See Gov't Sent. Mem. at 6, United States v. George
Papadopoulos, No. 1:17-cr-182 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2017), Doc. 44. During that interview, Mifsud
admitted to knowing Papadopoulos and to having introduced him to Polonskaya and Timofeev. But
Mifsud denied that he had advance knowledge that Russia was in possession of emails damaging
to candidate Clinton, stating that he and Papadopoulos had discussed cybersecurity and hacking as
a larger issue and that Papadopoulos must have misunderstood their conversation. Mifsud also
falsely stated that he had not seen Papadopoulos since the meeting at which Mifsud introduced him
to Polonskaya, even though emails, text messages, and other information show that Mifsud met
with Papadopoulos on at least two other occasions—April 12 and April 26, 2016. In addition,
Mifsud omitted that he had drafted (or edited) the follow-up message that Polonskaya sent to
Papadopoulos following the initial meeting and that, as reflected in the language of that email chain
("Baby, thank you!"), Mifsud may have been involved in a personal relationship with Polonskaya
at the time. The false information and omissions in Papadopoulos's January 2017 interview
undermined investigators' ability to challenge Mifsud when he made these inaccurate statements.
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Given the seriousness of the lies and omissions and their effect on the FBI's investigation,
the Office charged Papadopoulos with making false statements to the FBI, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001. Information, United States v. George Papadopoulos, No. 1:17-cr-182 (D.D.C. Oct. 3,
2017), Doc. 8. On October 7, 2017, Papadopoulos pleaded guilty to that charge pursuant to a plea
agreement. On September 7, 2018, he was sentenced to 14 days of imprisonment, a $9,500 fine,
and 200 hours of community service.
ii .
iii. Michael Flynn
Michael Flynn agreed to be interviewed by the FBI on January 24, 2017, four days after he
had officially assumed his duties as National Security Advisor to the President. During the
interview, Flynn made several false statements pertaining to his communications with the Russian
ambassador.
First, Flynn made two false statements about his conversations with Russian Ambassador
Kislyak in late December 2016, at a time when the United States had imposed sanctions on Russia
for interfering with the 2016 presidential election and Russia was considering its response. See Flynn
Statement of Offense. Flynn told the agents that he did not ask Kislyak to refrain from escalating the
situation in response to the United States's imposition of sanctions. That statement was false. On
December 29, 2016, Flynn called Kislyak to request Russian restraint. Flynn made the call
immediately after speaking to a senior Transition Team official (K.T. McFarland) about what to
communicate to Kislyak. Flynn then spoke with McFarland again after the Kislyak call to report on
the substance of that conversation. Flynn also falsely told the FBI that he did not remember a follow-
up conversation in which Kislyak stated that Russia had chosen to moderate its response to the U.S.
sanctions as a result of Flynn's request. On December 31, 2016, Flynn in fact had such a conversation
with Kislyak, and he again spoke with McFarland within hours of the call to relay the substance of
his conversation with Kislyak. See Flynn Statement of Offense ¶ 3.
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Second, Flynn made false statements about calls he had previously made to representatives
of Russia and other countries regarding a resolution submitted by Egypt to the United Nations
Security Council on December 21, 2016. Specifically, Flynn stated that he only asked the countries'
positions on how they would vote on the resolution and that he did not request that any of the
countries take any particular action on the resolution. That statement was false. On December 22,
2016, Flynn called Kislyak, informed him of the incoming Trump Administration's opposition to
the resolution, and requested that Russia vote against or delay the resolution. Flynn also falsely
stated that Kislyak never described Russia's response to his December 22 request regarding the
resolution. Kislyak in fact told Flynn in a conversation on December 23, 2016, that Russia would
not vote against the resolution if it came to a vote. See Flynn Statement of Offense ¶ 4.
Flynn made these false statements to the FBI at a time when he was serving as National
Security Advisor and when the FBI had an open investigation into Russian interference in the 2016
presidential election, including the nature of any links between the Trump Campaign and Russia.
Flynn's false statements and omissions impeded and otherwise had a material impact on that
ongoing investigation. Flynn Statement of Offense ¶¶ 1-2. They also came shortly before Flynn
made separate submissions to the Department of Justice, pursuant to FARA, that also contained
materially false statements and omissions. Id. ¶ 5. Based on the totality of that conduct, the Office
decided to charge Flynn with making false statements to the FBI, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1001(a). On December 1, 2017, and pursuant to a plea agreement, Flynn pleaded guilty to that
charge and also admitted his false statements to the Department in his FARA filing. See id.; Plea
Agreement, United States v. Michael T Flynn, No. 1:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2017), Doc. 3.
Flynn is awaiting sentencing.
iv. Michael Cohen
Michael Cohen was the executive vice president and special counsel to the Trump
Organization when Trump was president of the Trump Organization. Information ¶ 1, United States
v. Cohen, No. 1:18-cr-850 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2018), Doc. 2 ("Cohen Information"). From the fall
of 2015 through approximately June 2016, Cohen was involved in a project to build a Trump-
branded tower and adjoining development in Moscow. The project was known as Trump Tower
Moscow.
In 2017, Cohen was called to testify before the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence (HPSCI) and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), both of which were
investigating Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election and possible links between Russia
and the presidential campaigns. In late August 2017, in advance of his testimony, Cohen caused a two-
page statement to be sent to SSCI and HPSCI addressing Trump Tower Moscow. Cohen Information
r 2-3. The letter contained three representations relevant here. First, Cohen stated that the Trump
Moscow project had ended in January 2016 and that he had briefed candidate Trump on the project
only three times before making the unilateral decision to terminate it. Second, Cohen represented that
he never agreed to travel to Russia in connection with the project and never considered asking Trump
to travel for the project. Third, Cohen stated that he did not recall any Russian government contact
about the project, including any response to an email that
202
he had sent to a Russian government email account. Cohen Information 114. Cohen later asked that
his two-page statement be incorporated into his testimony's transcript before SSCI, and he ultimately
gave testimony to SSCI that was consistent with that statement. Cohen Information ¶ 5.
Each of the foregoing representations in Cohen's two-page statement was false and
misleading. Consideration of the project had extended through approximately June 2016 and
included more than three progress reports from Cohen to Trump. Cohen had discussed with Felix
Sater his own travel to Russia as part of the project, and he had inquired about the possibility of
Trump traveling there—both with the candidate himself and with senior campaign official Corey
Lewandowski. Cohen did recall that he had received a response to the email that he sent to Russian
government spokesman Dmitry Peskov—in particular, that he received an email reply and had a
follow-up phone conversation with an English-speaking assistant to Peskov in mid-January 2016.
Cohen Information ¶ 7. Cohen knew the statements in the letter to be false at the time, and admitted
that he made them in an effort (1) to minimize the links between the project and Trump (who by
this time was President), and (2) to give the false impression that the project had ended before the
first vote in the Republican Party primary process, in the hopes of limiting the ongoing Russia
investigations. Id.
Given the nature of the false statements and the fact that he repeated them during his initial
interview with the Office, we charged Cohen with violating Section 1001. On November 29, 2018,
Cohen pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to a single-count information charging him with
making false statements in a matter within the jurisdiction of the legislative branch, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) and (c). Cohen Information. The case was transferred to the district judge
presiding over the separate prosecution of Cohen pursued by the Southern District of New York
(after a referral from our Office). On December 7, 2018, this Office submitted a letter to that judge
recommending that Cohen's cooperation with our investigation be taken into account in sentencing
Cohen on both the false-statements charge and the offenses in the Southern District prosecution.
On December 12, 2018, the judge sentenced Cohen to two months of imprisonment on the false-
statements count, to run concurrently with a 36-month sentence imposed on the other counts.
v. HO M
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vi. Jeff Sessions
As set forth in Volume I, Section IV.A.6, supra, the investigation established that, while a
U.S. Senator and a Trump Campaign advisor, former Attorney General Jeff Sessions interacted with
Russian Ambassador Kislyak during the week of the Republican National Convention in July 2016
and again at a meeting in Sessions's Senate office in September 2016. The investigation also
established that Sessions and Kislyak both attended a reception held before candidate Trump's
204
foreign policy speech at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C., in April 2016, and that it is
possible that they met briefly at that reception.
The Office considered whether, in light of these interactions, Sessions committed perjury
before, or made false statements to, Congress in connection with his confirmation as Attorney
General. In January 2017 testimony during his confirmation hearing, Sessions stated in response to a
question about Trump Campaign communications with the Russian government that he had "been
called a surrogate at a time or two in that campaign and I didn't have — did not have communications
with the Russians." In written responses submitted on January 17, 2017, Sessions answered "[n]o" to
a question asking whether he had "been in contact with anyone connected to any part of the Russian
government about the 2016 election, either before or after election day." And, in a March 2017
supplement to his testimony, Sessions identified two of the campaign-period contacts with
Ambassador Kislyak noted above, which had been reported in the media following the January 2017
confirmation hearing. Sessions stated in the supplemental response that he did "not recall any
discussions with the Russian Ambassador, or any other representatives of the Russian government,
regarding the political campaign on these occasions or any other occasion."
Although the investigation established that Sessions interacted with Kislyak on the
occasions described above and that Kislyak mentioned the presidential campaign on at least one
occasion, the evidence is not sufficient to prove that Sessions gave knowingly false answers to
Russia-related questions in light of the wording and context of those questions. With respect to
Sessions's statements that he did "not recall any discussions with the Russian Ambassador . . .
regarding the political campaign" and he had not been in contact with any Russian official "about
the 2016 election," the evidence concerning the nature of Sessions's interactions with Kislyak
makes it plausible that Sessions did not recall discussing the campaign with Kislyak at the time of
his statements. Similarly, while Sessions stated in his January 2017 oral testimony that he "did not
have communications with Russians," he did so in response to a question that had linked such
communications to an alleged "continuing exchange of information" between the Trump Campaign
and Russian government intermediaries. Sessions later explained to the Senate and to the Office
that he understood the question as narrowly calling for disclosure of interactions with Russians that
involved the exchange of campaign information, as distinguished from more routine contacts with
Russian nationals. Given the context in which the question was asked, that understanding is
plausible.
Accordingly, the Office concluded that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Sessions
was willfully untruthful in his answers and thus insufficient to obtain or sustain a conviction for
perjury or false statements. Consistent with the Principles of Federal Prosecution, the Office
therefore determined not to pursue charges against Sessions and informed his counsel of that
decision in March 2018.
vii. Others Interviewed During the Investigation
The Office considered whether, during the course of the investigation, other individuals
interviewed either omitted material information or provided information determined to be false.
Applying the Principles of Federal Prosecution, the Office did not seek criminal charges against
any individuals other than those listed above. In some instances, that decision was due to
205
evidentiary hurdles to proving falsity. In others, the Office determined that the witness ultimately
provided truthful information and that considerations of culpability, deterrence, and resource-
 reservation we'. hed a. ainst prosecution. See Justice Manual 9-27.220, 9-
27.230.
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Report On The Investigation Into

Russian Interference In The
2016 Presidential Election
Volume II of II
Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III
Submitted Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. 600.8(c)
Washington, D.C.
March 2019
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TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOLUME II
INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME II .......................................................................................................... 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME II ............................................................................................. 3
I. BACKGROUND LEGAL AND EVIDENTIARY PRINCIPLES .......................................................... 9
A. Legal Framework of Obstruction of Justice ........................................................................... 9
B. Investigative and Evidentiary Considerations ..................................................................... 12
II. FACTUAL RESULTS OF THE OBSTRUCTION INVESTIGATION .............................................. 15
A. The Campaign's Response to Reports About Russian Support for Trump ............................. 15
1. Press Reports Allege Links Between the Trump Campaign and Russia ........................ 16
2. The Trump Campaign Reacts to WikiLeaks's Release of Hacked Emails ..................... 17
3. The Trump Campaign Reacts to Allegations That Russia was Seeking to
Aid Candidate Trump ...................................................................................................... 18
4. After the Election, Trump Continues to Deny Any Contacts or
Connections with Russia or That Russia Aided his Election .......................................... 21
B. The President's Conduct Concerning the Investigation of Michael Flynn ............................... 24
1. Incoming National Security Advisor Flynn Discusses Sanctions on Russia
with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak ...................................................................... 24
2. President-Elect Trump is Briefed on the Intelligence Community's
Assessment of Russian Interference in the Election and Congress Opens
Election-Interference Investigations................................................................................ 27
3. Flynn Makes False Statements About his Communications with Kislyak to
Incoming Administration Officials, the Media, and the FBI........................................... 29
4. DOJ Officials Notify the White House of Their Concerns About Flynn ........................ 31
5. McGahn has a Follow-Up Meeting About Flynn with Yates; President
Trump has Dinner with FBI Director Comey ................................................................. 32
6. Flynn's Resignation ......................................................................................................... 36
7. The President Discusses Flynn with FBI Director Comey .............................................. 38
8. The Media Raises Questions About the President's Delay in Terminating
Flynn .............................................................................................................................. 41
9. The President Attempts to Have K.T. McFarland Create a Witness
Statement Denying that he Directed Flynn's Discussions with Kislyak .......................... 42
C. The President's Reaction to Public Confirmation of the FBI's Russia
Investigation ........................................................................................................................... 48
1. Attorney General Sessions Recuses From the Russia Investigation ................................. 48
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2. FBI Director Comey Publicly Confirms the Existence of the Russia

Investigation in Testimony Before HPSCI .............................................................. 52
3. The President Asks Intelligence Community Leaders to Make Public
Statements that he had No Connection to Russia .................................................... 55
4. The President Asks Comey to "Lift the Cloud" Created by the Russia
Investigation ............................................................................................................ 57
D. Events Leading Up To and Surrounding the Termination of FBI Director
Comey ............................................................................................................................... 62
1. Comey Testifies Before the Senate Judiciary Committee and Declines to
Answer Questions About Whether the President is Under Investigation ................ 62
2. The President Makes the Decision to Terminate Comey......................................... 64
E. The President's Efforts to Remove the Special Counsel .................................................. 77
1. The Appointment of the Special Counsel and the President's Reaction ................. 78
2. The President Asserts that the Special Counsel has Conflicts of Interest ................ 80
3. The Press Reports that the President is Being Investigated for Obstruction
of Justice and the President Directs the White House Counsel to Have the
Special Counsel Removed ....................................................................................... 84
F. The President's Efforts to Curtail the Special Counsel Investigation ............................... 90
1. The President Asks Corey Lewandowski to Deliver a Message to Sessions
to Curtail the Special Counsel Investigation............................................................ 90
2. The President Follows Up with Lewandowski ........................................................ 92
3. The President Publicly Criticizes Sessions in a New York Times Interview .......... 93
4. The President Orders Priebus to Demand Sessions's Resignation ........................... 94
G. The President's Efforts to Prevent Disclosure of Emails About the June 9,
2016 Meeting Between Russians and Senior Campaign Officials .................................. 98
1. The President Learns About the Existence of Emails Concerning the June
9, 2016 Trump Tower Meeting ................................................................................ 98
2. The President Directs Communications Staff Not to Publicly Disclose
Information About the June 9 Meeting ................................................................. 100
3. The President Directs Trump Jr.'s Response to Press Inquiries About the
June 9 Meeting...................................................................................................... 101
4. The Media Reports on the June 9, 2016 Meeting ................................................. 103
H. The President's Further Efforts to Have the Attorney General Take Over
the Investigation............................................................................................................. 107
1. The President Again Seeks to Have Sessions Reverse his Recusal ...................... 107
2. Additional Efforts to Have Sessions Unrecuse or Direct Investigations
Covered by his Recusal ........................................................................................ 109
11
209
I. The President Orders McGahn to Deny that the President Tried to Fire the
Special Counsel ................................................................................................................... 113
1. The Press Reports that the President Tried to Fire the Special Counsel ....................... 113
2. The President Seeks to Have McGahn Dispute the Press Reports ................................ 114
J. The President's Conduct Towards Flynn, Manafort, HOM ........................................... 120
1. Conduct Directed at Michael Flynn .............................................................................. 120
2. Conduct Directed at Paul Manafort .............................................................................. 122
3. H a r m t o O n g o i n g M a t t e r 1 2 8
K. The President's Conduct Involving Michael Cohen............................................................... 134
1 Candidate Trump's Awareness of and Involvement in the Trump Tower
Moscow Project ............................................................................................................ 134
2. Cohen Determines to Adhere to a "Party Line" Distancing Candidate
Trump From Russia ...................................................................................................... 138
3. Cohen Submits False Statements to Congress Minimizing the Trump
Tower Moscow Project in Accordance with the Party Line ......................................... 139
4. The President Sends Messages of Support to Cohen .................................................... 144
5. The President's Conduct After Cohen Began Cooperating with the
Government................................................................................................................... 148
L. Overarching Factual Issues .................................................................................................... 156
III. LEGAL DEFENSES To THE APPLICATION OF OBSTRUCTION-OF-JUSTICE STATUTES To THE
PRESIDENT .................................................................................................................................. 159
A. Statutory Defenses to the Application of Obstruction-Of-Justice Provisions
to the Conduct Under Investigation ..................................................................................... 160
1. The Text of Section 1512(c)(2) Prohibits a Broad Range of Obstructive
Acts 160
2. Judicial Decisions Support a Broad Reading of Section 1512(c)(2) ............................ 162
3. The Legislative History of Section 1512(c)(2) Does Not Justify Narrowing
Its Text.... ..................................................................................................................... 164
4. General Principles of Statutory Construction Do Not Suggest That Section
1512(c)(2) is Inapplicable to the Conduct in this Investigation .................................... 165
5. Other Obstruction Statutes Might Apply to the Conduct in this
Investigation .................................................................................................................. 167
B. Constitutional Defenses to Applying Obstruction-Of-Justice Statutes to
Presidential Conduct ............................................................................................................ 168
1. The Requirement of a Clear Statement to Apply Statutes to Presidential
Conduct Does Not Limit the Obstruction Statutes ........................................................ 169
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2. Separation-of-Powers Principles Support the Conclusion that Congress May

Validly Prohibit Corrupt Obstructive Acts Carried Out Through the
President's Official Powers .......................................................................................... 171
a. The Supreme Court's Separation-of-Powers Balancing Test Applies In
This Context ........................................................................................................... 172
b. The Effect of Obstruction-of-Justice Statutes on the President's
Capacity to Perform His Article II Responsibilities is Limited .............................. 173
c. Congress Has Power to Protect Congressional, Grand Jury, and Judicial
Proceedings Against Corrupt Acts from Any Source ............................................. 176
3. Ascertaining Whether the President Violated the Obstruction Statutes
Would Not Chill his Performance of his Article II Duties ........................................... 178
IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................. 182
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INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME II
This report is submitted to the Attorney General pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 600.8(c), which states
that, "[alt the conclusion of the Special Counsel's work, he . . . shall provide the Attorney General a
confidential report explaining the prosecution or declination decisions [the Special Counsel] reached."
Beginning in 2017, the President of the United States took a variety of actions towards the
ongoing FBI investigation into Russia's interference in the 2016 presidential election and related
matters that raised questions about whether he had obstructed justice. The Order appointing the
Special Counsel gave this Office jurisdiction to investigate matters that arose directly from the FBI's
Russia investigation, including whether the President had obstructed justice in connection with
Russia-related investigations. The Special Counsel's jurisdiction also covered potentially obstructive
acts related to the Special Counsel's investigation itself. This Volume of our report summarizes our
obstruction-of-justice investigation of the President.
We first describe the considerations that guided our obstruction-of-justice investigation, and
then provide an overview of this Volume:
First, a traditional prosecution or declination decision entails a binary determination to initiate

or decline a prosecution, but we determined not to make a traditional prosecutorial judgment. The
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) has issued an opinion finding that "the indictment or criminal
prosecution of a sitting President would impermissibly undermine the capacity of the executive branch
to perform its constitutionally assigned functions" in violation of "the constitutional separation of
powers."' Given the role of the Special Counsel as an attorney in the Department of Justice and the
framework of the Special Counsel regulations, see 28 U.S.C. § 515; 28 C.F.R. § 600.7(a), this Office
accepted OLC's legal conclusion for the purpose of exercising prosecutorial jurisdiction. And apart
from OLC's constitutional view, we recognized that a federal criminal accusation against a sitting
President would place burdens on the President's capacity to govern and potentially preempt
constitutional processes for addressing presidential misconduct.2
Second, while the OLC opinion concludes that a sitting President may not be prosecuted, it
recognizes that a criminal investigation during the President's term is permissible.3 The OLC opinion
also recognizes that a President does not have immunity after he leaves office.4 And if individuals
other than the President committed an obstruction offense, they may be prosecuted at this time. Given
those considerations, the facts known to us, and the strong public interest in
A Sitting President's Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C.

222, 222, 260 (2000) (OLC Op.).
See U.S. CONST. Art. I § 2, cl. 5; § 3, cl. 6; cf. OLC Op. at 257-258 (discussing relationship
2
between impeachment and criminal prosecution of a sitting President).

OLC Op. at 257 n.36 ("A grand jury could continue to gather evidence throughout the period
3
of immunity").
4
OLC Op. at 255 ("Recognizing an immunity from prosecution for a sitting President would
not preclude such prosecution once the President's term is over or he is otherwise removed from office
by resignation or impeachment").
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safeguarding the integrity of the criminal justice system, we conducted a thorough factual
investigation in order to preserve the evidence when memories were fresh and documentary materials
were available.
Third, we considered whether to evaluate the conduct we investigated under the Justice Manual
standards governing prosecution and declination decisions, but we determined not to apply an
approach that could potentially result in a judgment that the President committed crimes. The
threshold step under the Justice Manual standards is to assess whether a person's conduct "constitutes
a federal offense." U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Manual § 9-27.220 (2018) (Justice Manual). Fairness
concerns counseled against potentially reaching that judgment when no charges can be brought. The
ordinary means for an individual to respond to an accusation is through a speedy and public trial, with
all the procedural protections that surround a criminal case. An individual who believes he was
wrongly accused can use that process to seek to clear his name. In contrast, a prosecutor's judgment
that crimes were committed, but that no charges will be brought, affords no such adversarial
opportunity for public name-clearing before an impartial adjudicator.5
The concerns about the fairness of such a determination would be heightened in the case of a
sitting President, where a federal prosecutor's accusation of a crime, even in an internal report, could
carry consequences that extend beyond the realm of criminal justice. OLC noted similar concerns
about sealed indictments. Even if an indictment were sealed during the President's term, OLC
reasoned, "it would be very difficult to preserve [an indictment's] secrecy," and if an indictment
became public, "[t]he stigma and opprobrium" could imperil the President's ability to govern." 6
Although a prosecutor's internal report would not represent a formal public accusation akin to an
indictment, the possibility of the report's public disclosure and the absence of a neutral adjudicatory
forum to review its findings counseled against potentially determining "that the person's conduct
constitutes a federal offense." Justice Manual § 9-27.220.
Fourth, if we had confidence after a thorough investigation of the facts that the President
clearly did not commit obstruction of justice, we would so state. Based on the facts and the applicable
legal standards, however, we are unable to reach that judgment. The evidence we obtained about the
President's actions and intent presents difficult issues that prevent us from conclusively determining
that no criminal conduct occurred. Accordingly, while this report does not conclude that the President
committed a crime, it also does not exonerate him.
*
This report on our investigation consists of four parts. Section I provides an overview of
obstruction-of-justice principles and summarizes certain investigatory and evidentiary
considerations. Section II sets forth the factual results of our obstruction investigation and analyzes
the evidence. Section III addresses statutory and constitutional defenses. Section IV states our
conclusion.
5 For that reason, criticisms have been lodged against the practice of naming unindicted co-
conspirators in an indictment. See United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794, 802 (5th Cir. 1975) ("The courts
have struck down with strong language efforts by grand juries to accuse persons of crime while affording
them no forum in which to vindicate themselves."); see also Justice Manual § 9-11.130.
6
OLC Op. at 259 & n.38 (citation omitted).
2
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME II
Our obstruction-of-justice inquiry focused on a series of actions by the President that related
to the Russian-interference investigations, including the President's conduct towards the law
enforcement officials overseeing the investigations and the witnesses to relevant events.
FACTUAL RESULTS OF THE OBSTRUCTION INVESTIGATION
The key issues and events we examined include the following:
The Campaign's response to reports about Russian support for Trump. During the 2016
presidential campaign, questions arose about the Russian government's apparent support for candidate
Trump. After WikiLeaks released politically damaging Democratic Party emails that were reported to
have been hacked by Russia, Trump publicly expressed skepticism that Russia was responsible for
the hacks at the same time that he and other Campaign officials privately
sought information Harm to Ongoing Matter about any further planned WikiLeaks
releases. Trump also denied having any business in or connections to Russia, even though as late as
June 2016 the Trump Organization had been pursuing a licensing deal for a skyscraper to be built in
Russia called Trump Tower Moscow. After the election, the President expressed concerns to advisors
that reports of Russia's election interference might lead the public to question the legitimacy of his
election.
Conduct involving FBI Director Convey and Michael Flynn. In mid-January 2017, incoming
National Security Advisor Michael Flynn falsely denied to the Vice President, other administration
officials, and FBI agents that he had talked to Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak about Russia's
response to U.S. sanctions on Russia for its election interference. On January 27, the day after the
President was told that Flynn had lied to the Vice President and had made similar statements to the
FBI, the President invited FBI Director Comey to a private dinner at the White House and told Comey
that he needed loyalty. On February 14, the day after the President requested Flynn's resignation, the
President told an outside advisor, "Now that we fired Flynn, the Russia thing is over." The advisor
disagreed and said the investigations would continue.
Later that afternoon, the President cleared the Oval Office to have a one-on-one meeting with
Comey. Referring to the FBI's investigation of Flynn, the President said, "I hope you can see your
way clear to letting this go, to letting Flynn go. He is a good guy. I hope you can let this go." Shortly
after requesting Flynn's resignation and speaking privately to Comey, the President sought to have
Deputy National Security Advisor K.T. McFarland draft an internal letter stating that the President
had not directed Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak. McFarland declined because she did not
know whether that was true, and a White House Counsel's Office attorney thought that the request
would look like a quid pro quo for an ambassadorship she had been offered.
The President's reaction to the continuing Russia investigation. In February 2017, Attorney
General Jeff Sessions began to assess whether he had to recuse himself from campaign-related
investigations because of his role in the Trump Campaign. In early March, the President told White
House Counsel Donald McGahn to stop Sessions from recusing. And after Sessions announced his
recusal on March 2, the President expressed anger at the decision and told advisors that he should
have an Attorney General who would protect him. That weekend, the President took Sessions aside at
an event and urged him to "unrecuse." Later in March, Comey publicly
3
disclosed at a congressional hearing that the FBI was investigating "the Russian government's efforts
to interfere in the 2016 presidential election," including any links or coordination between the Russian
government and the Trump Campaign. In the following days, the President reached out to the Director
of National Intelligence and the leaders of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National
Security Agency (NSA) to ask them what they could do to publicly dispel the suggestion that the
President had any connection to the Russian election-interference effort. The President also twice
called Comey directly, notwithstanding guidance from McGahn to avoid direct contacts with the
Department of Justice. Comey had previously assured the President that the FBI was not investigating
him personally, and the President asked Comey to "lift the cloud" of the Russia investigation by saying
that publicly.
The President's termination of Comey. On May 3, 2017, Comey testified in a congressional

hearing, but declined to answer questions about whether the President was personally under
investigation. Within days, the President decided to terminate Comey. The President insisted that the
termination letter, which was written for public release, state that Comey had informed the President
that he was not under investigation. The day of the firing, the White House maintained that Comey's
termination resulted from independent recommendations from the Attorney General and Deputy
Attorney General that Comey should be discharged for mishandling the Hillary Clinton email
investigation. But the President had decided to fire Comey before hearing from the Department of
Justice. The day after firing Comey, the President told Russian officials that he had "faced great
pressure because of Russia," which had been "taken off" by Comey's firing. The next day, the
President acknowledged in a television interview that he was going to fire Comey regardless of the
Department of Justice's recommendation and that when he "decided to just do it," he was thinking
that "this thing with Trump and Russia is a made-up story." In response to a question about whether
he was angry with Comey about the Russia investigation, the President said, "As far as I'm concerned,
I want that thing to be absolutely done properly," adding that firing Comey "might even lengthen out
the investigation."
The appointment of a Special Counsel and efforts to remove him. On May 17, 2017, the
Acting Attorney General for the Russia investigation appointed a Special Counsel to conduct the
investigation and related matters. The President reacted to news that a Special Counsel had been
appointed by telling advisors that it was "the end of his presidency" and demanding that Sessions
resign. Sessions submitted his resignation, but the President ultimately did not accept it. The President
told aides that the Special Counsel had conflicts of interest and suggested that the Special Counsel
therefore could not serve. The President's advisors told him the asserted conflicts were meritless and
had already been considered by the Department of Justice.
On June 14, 2017, the media reported that the Special Counsel's Office was investigating
whether the President had obstructed justice. Press reports called this "a major turning point" in the
investigation: while Comey had told the President he was not under investigation, following
Comey's firing, the President now was under investigation. The President reacted to this news with
a series of tweets criticizing the Department of Justice and the Special Counsel's investigation. On
June 17, 2017, the President called McGahn at home and directed him to call the Acting Attorney
General and say that the Special Counsel had conflicts of interest and must be removed. McGahn
did not carry out the direction, however, deciding that he would resign rather than trigger what he
regarded as a potential Saturday Night Massacre.
4
Efforts to curtail the Special Counsel's investigation. Two days after directing McGahn to
have the Special Counsel removed, the President made another attempt to affect the course of the
Russia investigation. On June 19, 2017, the President met one-on-one in the Oval Office with his
former campaign manager Corey Lewandowski, a trusted advisor outside the government, and
dictated a message for Lewandowski to deliver to Sessions. The message said that Sessions should
publicly announce that, notwithstanding his recusal from the Russia investigation, the investigation
was "very unfair" to the President, the President had done nothing wrong, and Sessions planned to
meet with the Special Counsel and "let [him] move forward with investigating election meddling for
future elections." Lewandowski said he understood what the President wanted Sessions to do.
One month later, in another private meeting with Lewandowski on July 19, 2017, the President
asked about the status of his message for Sessions to limit the Special Counsel investigation to future
election interference. Lewandowski told the President that the message would be delivered soon.
Hours after that meeting, the President publicly criticized Sessions in an interview with the New York
Times, and then issued a series of tweets making it clear that Sessions's job was in jeopardy.
Lewandowski did not want to deliver the President's message personally, so he asked senior White
House official Rick Dearborn to deliver it to Sessions. Dearborn was uncomfortable with the task and
did not follow through.
Efforts to prevent public disclosure of evidence. In the summer of 2017, the President
learned that media outlets were asking questions about the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower
between senior campaign officials, including Donald Trump Jr., and a Russian lawyer who was
said to be offering damaging information about Hillary Clinton as "part of Russia and its
government's support for Mr. Trump." On several occasions, the President directed aides not to
publicly disclose the emails setting up the June 9 meeting, suggesting that the emails would not
leak and that the number of lawyers with access to them should be limited. Before the emails
became public, the President edited a press statement for Trump Jr. by deleting a line that
acknowledged that the meeting was with "an individual who [Trump Jr.] was told might have
information helpful to the campaign" and instead said only that the meeting was about adoptions
of Russian children. When the press asked questions about the President's involvement in Trump
Jr.'s statement, the President's personal lawyer repeatedly denied the President had played any role.
Further efforts to have the Attorney General take control of the investigation. In early
summer 2017, the President called Sessions at home and again asked him to reverse his recusal from
the Russia investigation. Sessions did not reverse his recusal. In October 2017, the President met
privately with Sessions in the Oval Office and asked him to "take [a] look" at investigating Clinton.
In December 2017, shortly after Flynn pleaded guilty pursuant to a cooperation agreement, the
President met with Sessions in the Oval Office and suggested, according to notes taken by a senior
advisor, that if Sessions unrecused and took back supervision of the Russia investigation, he would
be a "hero." The President told Sessions, "I'm not going to do anything or direct you to do anything.
I just want to be treated fairly." In response, Sessions volunteered that he had never seen anything
"improper" on the campaign and told the President there was a "whole new leadership team" in
place. He did not unrecuse.
Efforts to have McGahn deny that the President had ordered him to have the Special
Counsel removed. In early 2018, the press reported that the President had directed McGahn to
5
have the Special Counsel removed in June 2017 and that McGahn had threatened to resign rather
than carry out the order. The President reacted to the news stories by directing White House officials
to tell McGahn to dispute the story and create a record stating he had not been ordered to have the
Special Counsel removed. McGahn told those officials that the media reports were accurate in stating
that the President had directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed. The President then
met with McGahn in the Oval Office and again pressured him to deny the reports. In the same
meeting, the President also asked McGahn why he had told the Special Counsel about the President's
effort to remove the Special Counsel and why McGahn took notes of his conversations with the
President. McGahn refused to back away from what he remembered happening and perceived the
President to be testing his mettle.
Conduct towards Flynn, Manafort, HOM . After Flynn withdrew from a joint defense
agreement with the President and began cooperating with the government, the President's personal
counsel left a message for Flynn's attorneys reminding them of the President's warm feelings
towards Flynn, which he said "still remains," and asking for a "heads up" if Flynn knew
"information that implicates the President." When Flynn's counsel reiterated that Flynn could no
longer share information pursuant to a joint defense agreement, the President's personal counsel
said he would make sure that the President knew that Flynn's actions reflected "hostility" towards
the President. During Manafort's prosecution and when the jury in his criminal. trial was
deliberating, the President praised Manafort in public, said that Manafort was being treated
unfairly, and declined to rule out a pardon. After Manafort was convicted, the President called
Manafort "a brave man" for refusin! to "break" and said that "fli • ml" "almost ought to be
outlawed." Harm to Ongoing Matter
Conduct involving Michael Cohen. The President's conduct towards Michael Cohen, a
former Trump Organization executive, changed from praise for Cohen when he falsely minimized
the President's involvement in the Trump Tower Moscow project, to castigation of Cohen when he
became a cooperating witness. From September 2015 to June 2016, Cohen had pursued the Trump
Tower Moscow project on behalf of the Trump Organization and had briefed candidate Trump on
the project numerous times, including discussing whether Trump should travel to Russia to advance
the deal. In 2017, Cohen provided false testimony to Congress about the project, including stating
that he had only briefed Trump on the project three times and never discussed travel to Russia with
him, in an effort to adhere to a "party line" that Cohen said was developed to minimize the President's
connections to Russia. While preparing for his congressional testimony, Cohen had extensive
discussions with the President's personal counsel, who, according to Cohen, said that Cohen should
"stay on message" and not contradict the President. After the FBI searched Cohen's home and office
in April 2018, the President publicly asserted that Cohen would not "flip," contacted him directly to
tell him to "stay strong," and privately passed messages of support to him. Cohen also discussed
pardons with the President's personal counsel and believed that if he stayed on message he would be
taken care of. But after Cohen began cooperating with the government in the summer of 2018, the
President publicly criticized him, called him a "rat," and suggested that his family members had
committed crimes.
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Overarching factual issues. We did not make a traditional prosecution decision about these
facts, but the evidence we obtained supports several general statements about the President's
conduct.
Several features of the conduct we investigated distinguish it from typical obstruction-of-

justice cases. First, the investigation concerned the President, and some of his actions, such as firing
the FBI director, involved facially lawful acts within his Article II authority, which raises
constitutional issues discussed below. At the same time, the President's position as the head of the
Executive Branch provided him with unique and powerful means of influencing official proceedings,
subordinate officers, and potential witnesses—all of which is relevant to a potential obstruction-of-
justice analysis. Second, unlike cases in which a subject engages in obstruction of justice to cover up
a crime, the evidence we obtained did not establish that the President was involved in an underlying
crime related to Russian election interference. Although the obstruction statutes do not require proof
of such a crime, the absence of that evidence affects the analysis of the President's intent and requires
consideration of other possible motives for his conduct. Third, many of the President's acts directed
at witnesses, including discouragement of cooperation with the government and suggestions of
possible future pardons, took place in public view. That circumstance is unusual, but no principle of
law excludes public acts from the reach of the obstruction laws. If the likely effect of public acts is
to influence witnesses or alter their testimony, the harm to the justice system's integrity is the same.
Although the series of events we investigated involved discrete acts, the overall pattern of
the President's conduct towards the investigations can shed light on the nature of the President's acts
and the inferences that can be drawn about his intent. In particular, the actions we investigated can
be divided into two phases, reflecting a possible shift in the President's motives. The first phase
covered the period from the President's first interactions with Comey through the President's firing
of Comey. During that time, the President had been repeatedly told he was not personally under
investigation. Soon after the firing of Comey and the appointment of the Special Counsel, however,
the President became aware that his own conduct was being investigated in an obstruction-of-justice
inquiry. At that point, the President engaged in a second phase of conduct, involving public attacks
on the investigation, non-public efforts to control it, and efforts in both public and private to
encourage witnesses not to cooperate with the investigation. Judgments about the nature of the
President's motives during each phase would be informed by the totality of the evidence.
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEFENSES
The President's counsel raised statutory and constitutional defenses to a possible obstruction-
of-justice analysis of the conduct we investigated. We concluded that none of those legal defenses
provided a basis for declining to investigate the facts.
Statutory defenses. Consistent with precedent and the Department of Justice's general
approach to interpreting obstruction statutes, we concluded that several statutes could apply here.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1505, 1512(b)(3), 1512(c)(2). Section 1512(c)(2) is an omnibus obstruction-
of-justice provision that covers a range of obstructive acts directed at pending or contemplated
official proceedings. No principle of statutory construction justifies narrowing the provision to
cover only conduct that impairs the integrity or availability of evidence. Sections 1503 and 1505
also offer broad protection against obstructive acts directed at pending grand jury,
7
judicial, administrative, and congressional proceedings, and they are supplemented by a provision in
Section 1512(b) aimed specifically at conduct intended to prevent or hinder the communication to law
enforcement of information related to a federal crime.
Constitutional defenses. As for constitutional defenses arising from the President's status as
the head of the Executive Branch, we recognized that the Department of Justice and the courts have
not definitively resolved these issues. We therefore examined those issues through the framework
established by Supreme Court precedent governing separation-of-powers issues. The Department
of Justice and the President's personal counsel have recognized that the President is subject to
statutes that prohibit obstruction of justice by bribing a witness or suborning perjury because that
conduct does not implicate his constitutional authority. With respect to whether the President can
be found to have obstructed justice by exercising his powers under Article II of the Constitution,
we concluded that Congress has authority to prohibit a President's corrupt use of his authority in
order to protect the integrity of the administration of justice.
Under applicable Supreme Court precedent, the Constitution does not categorically and
permanently immunize a President for obstructing justice through the use of his Article II powers. The
separation-of-powers doctrine authorizes Congress to protect official proceedings, including those of
courts and grand juries, from corrupt, obstructive acts regardless of their source. We also concluded
that any inroad on presidential authority that would occur from prohibiting corrupt acts does not
undermine the President's ability to fulfill his constitutional mission. The term "corruptly" sets a
demanding standard. It requires a concrete showing that a person acted with an intent to obtain an
improper advantage for himself or someone else, inconsistent with official duty and the rights of
others. A preclusion of "corrupt" official action does not diminish the President's ability to exercise
Article II powers. For example, the proper supervision of criminal law does not demand freedom for
the President to act with a corrupt intention of shielding himself from criminal punishment, avoiding
financial liability, or preventing personal embarrassment. To the contrary, a statute that prohibits
official action undertaken for such corrupt purposes furthers, rather than hinders, the impartial and
evenhanded administration of the law. It also aligns with the President's constitutional duty to
faithfully execute the laws. Finally, we concluded that in the rare case in which a criminal investigation
of the President's conduct is justified, inquiries to determine whether the President acted for a corrupt
motive should not impermissibly chill his performance of his constitutionally assigned duties. The
conclusion that Congress may apply the obstruction laws to the President's corrupt exercise of the
powers of office accords with our constitutional system of checks and balances and the principle that
no person is above the law.
CONCLUSION
Because we determined not to make a traditional prosecutorial judgment, we did not draw
ultimate conclusions about the President's conduct. The evidence we obtained about the President's
actions and intent presents difficult issues that would need to be resolved if we were making a
traditional prosecutorial judgment. At the same time, if we had confidence after a thorough
investigation of the facts that the President clearly did not commit obstruction of justice, we would so
state. Based on the facts and the applicable legal standards, we are unable to reach that judgment.
Accordingly, while this report does not conclude that the President committed a crime, it also does
not exonerate him.
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I. BACKGROUND LEGAL AND EVIDENTIARY PRINCIPLES
A. Legal Framework of Obstruction of Justice
The May 17, 2017 Appointment Order and the Special Counsel regulations provide this
Office with jurisdiction to investigate "federal crimes committed in the course of, and with intent
to interfere with, the Special Counsel's investigation, such as perjury, obstruction of justice,
destruction of evidence, and intimidation of witnesses." 28 C.F.R. § 600.4(a). Because of that
description of our jurisdiction, we sought evidence for our obstruction-of-justice investigation with
the elements of obstruction offenses in mind. Our evidentiary analysis is similarly focused on the
elements of such offenses, although we do not draw conclusions on the ultimate questions that
govern a prosecutorial decision under the Principles of Federal Prosecution. See Justice Manual §
9-27.000 et seq. (2018).
Here, we summarize the law interpreting the elements of potentially relevant obstruction
statutes in an ordinary case. This discussion does not address the unique constitutional issues that arise
in an inquiry into official acts by the President. Those issues are discussed in a later section of this
report addressing constitutional defenses that the President's counsel have raised. See Volume II,
Section III.B, infra.
Three basic elements are common to most of the relevant obstruction statutes: (1) an
obstructive act; (2) a nexus between the obstructive act and an official proceeding; and (3) a corrupt
intent. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1505, 1512(c)(2). We describe those elements as they have been
interpreted by the courts. We then discuss a more specific statute aimed at witness tampering, see 18
U.S.C. § 1512(b), and describe the requirements for attempted offenses and endeavors to obstruct
justice, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1512(c)(2).
Obstructive act. Obstruction-of-justice law "reaches all corrupt conduct capable of

producing an effect that prevents justice from being duly administered, regardless of the means
employed." United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386, 1393 (11 th Cir. 1984) (interpreting 18
U.S.C. § 1503). An "effort to influence" a proceeding can qualify as an endeavor to obstruct justice
even if the effort was "subtle or circuitous" and "however cleverly or with whatever cloaking of
purpose" it was made. United States v. Roe, 529 F.2d 629, 632 (4th Cir. 1975); see also United
States v. Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153, 173 (2d Cir. 2006). The verbs "'obstruct or impede' are broad"
and "can refer to anything that blocks, makes difficult, or hinders." Marinello v. United States, 138
S. Ct. 1101, 1106 (2018) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted).
An improper motive can render an actor's conduct criminal even when the conduct would
otherwise be lawful and within the actor's authority. See United States v. Cuero, 151 F.3d 620, 631
(7th Cir. 1998) (affirming obstruction conviction of a criminal defense attorney for "litigation-related
conduct"); United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 992 (1st Cir. 1987) ("any act by any party—whether
lawful or unlawful on its face—may abridge § 1503 if performed with a corrupt motive").
Nexus to a pending or contemplated official proceeding. Obstruction-of-justice law generally

requires a nexus, or connection, to an official proceeding. In Section 1503, the nexus must be to
pending "judicial or grand jury proceedings." United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593,
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599 (1995). In Section 1505, the nexus can include a connection to a "pending" federal agency
proceeding or a congressional inquiry or investigation. Under both statutes, the government must
demonstrate "a relationship in time, causation, or logic" between the obstructive act and the
proceeding or inquiry to be obstructed. Id. at 599; see also Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States,
544 U.S. 696, 707-708 (2005). Section 1512(c) prohibits obstructive efforts aimed at official
proceedings including judicial or grand jury proceedings. 18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(1)(A). "For purposes
of" Section 1512, "an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of
the offense." 18 U.S.C. § 1512(f)(1). Although a proceeding need not already be in progress to trigger
liability under Section 1512(c), a nexus to a contemplated proceeding still must be shown. United
States v. Young, 916 F.3d 368, 386 (4th Cir. 2019); United States v. Petruk, 781 F.3d 438, 445 (8th
Cir. 2015); United States v. Phillips, 583 F.3d 1261, 1264 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Reich,
479 F.3d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 2007). The nexus requirement narrows the scope of obstruction statutes
to ensure that individuals have "fair warning" of what the law proscribes. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 600
(internal quotation marks omitted).
The nexus showing has subjective and objective components. As an objective matter, a
defendant must act "in a manner that is likely to obstruct justice," such that the statute "excludes
defendants who have an evil purpose but use means that would only unnaturally and improbably be
successful." Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 601-602 (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he
endeavor must have the natural and probable effect of interfering with the due administration of
justice." Id. at 599 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As a subjective matter, the actor
must have "contemplated a particular, foreseeable proceeding." Petruk, 781 F.3d at 445-446. A
defendant need not directly impede the proceeding. Rather, a nexus exists if "discretionary actions of
a third person would be required to obstruct the judicial proceeding if it was foreseeable to the
defendant that the third party would act on the [defendant's] communication in such a way as to
obstruct the judicial proceeding." United States v. Martinez, 862 F.3d 223, 238 (2d Cir. 2017)
(brackets, ellipses, and internal quotation marks omitted).
Corruptly. The word "corruptly" provides the intent element for obstruction of justice and
means acting "knowingly and dishonestly" or "with an improper motive." United States v. Richardson,
676 F.3d 491, 508 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Gordon, 710 F.3d 1124, 1 1 5 1 (10th Cir. 2013)
(to act corruptly means to "act[] with an improper purpose and to engage in conduct knowingly and
dishonestly with the specific intent to subvert, impede or obstruct" the relevant proceeding) (some
quotation marks omitted); see 18 U.S.C. § 1515(b) ("As used in section 1505, the term 'corruptly'
means acting with an improper purpose, personally or by influencing another."); see also Arthur
Andersen, 544 U.S. at 705-706 (interpreting "corruptly" to mean "wrongful, immoral, depraved, or
evil" and holding that acting "knowingly . . . corruptly" in 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) requires "consciousness
of wrongdoing"). The requisite showing is made when a person acted with an intent to obtain an
"improper advantage for [him]self or someone else, inconsistent with official duty and the rights of
others." BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 276 (3d ed. 1969); see United States v. Pasha, 797
F.3d 1122, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 616 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (characterizing this definition as the "longstanding and well-accepted meaning" of
"corruptly").
Witness tampering. A more specific provision in Section 1512 prohibits tampering with a
witness. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1), (3) (making it a crime to "knowingly use[] intimidation . . . or
corruptly persuade[] another person," or "engage[] in misleading conduct towards another
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person," with the intent to "influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official
proceeding" or to "hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer . . .
of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense"). To
establish corrupt persuasion, it is sufficient that the defendant asked a potential witness to lie to
investigators in contemplation of a likely federal investigation into his conduct. United States v.
Edlind, 887 F.3d 166, 174 (4th Cir. 2018); United States v. Sparks, 791 F.3d 1188, 1191-1192
(10th Cir. 2015); United States v. Byrne, 435 F.3d 16, 23-26 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v.
LaShay, 417 F.3d 715, 718-719 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Burns, 298 F.3d 523, 539-540
(6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Pennington, 168 F.3d 1060, 1066 (8th Cir. 1999). The
"persuasion" need not be coercive, intimidating, or explicit; it is sufficient to "urge," "induce,"
"ask[]," "argu[e]," "giv[e] reasons," Sparks, 791 F.3d at 1192, or "coach[] or remind[] witnesses
by planting misleading facts," Edlind, 887 F.3d at 174. Corrupt persuasion is shown "where a
defendant tells a potential witness a false story as if the story were true, intending that the witness
believe the story and testify to it." United States v. Rodolitz, 786 F.2d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1986); see
United States v. Gabriel, 125 F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir. 1997). It also covers urging a witness to recall
a fact that the witness did not know, even if the fact was actually true. See LaShay, 417 F.3d at
719. Corrupt persuasion also can be shown in certain circumstances when a person, with an
improper motive, urges a witness not to cooperate with law enforcement. See United States v.
Shotts, 145 F.3d 1289, 1301 (11th Cr. 1998) (telling Secretary "not to [say] anything [to the FBI]
and [she] would not be bothered").
When the charge is acting with the intent to hinder, delay, or prevent the communication of
information to law enforcement under Section 1512(b)(3), the "nexus" to a proceeding inquiry
articulated in Aguilar—that an individual have "knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the
judicial proceeding," 515 U.S. at 599—does not apply because the obstructive act is aimed at the
communication of information to investigators, not at impeding an official proceeding.
Acting "knowingly . . . corruptly" requires proof that the individual was "conscious of
wrongdoing." Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 705-706 (declining to explore "[t]he outer limits of this
element" but indicating that an instruction was infirm where it permitted conviction even if the
defendant "honestly and sincerely believed that [the] conduct was lawful"). It is an affirmative defense
that "the conduct consisted solely of lawful conduct and that the defendant's sole intention was to
encourage, induce, or cause the other person to testify truthfully." 18 U.S.C. § 1512(e).
Attempts and endeavors. Section 1512(c)(2) covers both substantive obstruction offenses and
attempts to obstruct justice. Under general principles of attempt law, a person is guilty of an attempt
when he has the intent to commit a substantive offense and takes an overt act that constitutes a
substantial step towards that goal. See United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 106-107 (2007).
"[T]he act [must be] substantial, in that it was strongly corroborative of the defendant's criminal
purpose." United States v. Pratt, 351 F.3d 131, 135 (4th Cir. 2003). While "mere abstract talk" does
not suffice, any "concrete and specific" acts that corroborate the defendant's intent can constitute a
"substantial step." United States v. Irving, 665 F.3d 1184, 11981205 (10th Cir. 2011). Thus, "soliciting
an innocent agent to engage in conduct constituting an element ofthe crime" may qualify as a
substantial step. Model Penal Code § 5.01(2)(g); see United States v. Lucas, 499 F.3d 769, 781 (8th
Cir. 2007).
11
The omnibus clause of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 prohibits an "endeavor" to obstruct justice, which
sweeps more broadly than Section 1512's attempt provision. See United States v. Sampson, 898
F.3d 287, 302 (2d Cir. 2018); United States v. Leisure, 844 F.2d 1347, 1366-1367 (8th Cir. 1988)
(collecting cases). "It is well established that a[n] [obstruction-of-justice] offense is complete when
one corruptly endeavors to obstruct or impede the due administration of justice; the prosecution
need not prove that the due administration of justice was actually obstructed or impeded." United
States v. Davis, 854 F.3d 1276, 1292 (I 1 th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
B. Investigative and Evidentiary Considerations
After the appointment of the Special Counsel, this Office obtained evidence about the
following events relating to potential issues of obstruction of justice involving the President:
(a) The President's January 27, 2017 dinner with former FBI Director James Comey in which
the President reportedly asked for Comey's loyalty, one day after the White House had been
briefed by the Department of Justice on contacts between former National Security Advisor
Michael Flynn and the Russian Ambassador;
(b) The President's February 14, 2017 meeting with Comey in which the President reportedly
asked Comey not to pursue an investigation of Flynn;
(c) The President's private requests to Comey to make public the fact that the President was not
the subject of an FBI investigation and to lift what the President regarded as a cloud;
(d) The President's outreach to the Director of National Intelligence and the Directors of the
National Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency about the FBI's Russia
investigation;
(e) The President's stated rationales for terminating Comey on May 9, 2017, including
statements that could reasonably be understood as acknowledging that the FBI's Russia
investigation was a factor in Comey's termination; and
(f) The President's reported involvement in issuing a statement about the June 9, 2016 Trump
Tower meeting between Russians and senior Trump Campaign officials that said the meeting
was about adoption and omitted that the Russians had offered to provide the Trump
Campaign with derogatory information about Hillary Clinton.
Taking into account that information and our analysis of applicable statutory and constitutional
principles (discussed below in Volume II, Section III, infra), we determined that there was a sufficient
factual and legal basis to further investigate potential obstruction-of-justice issues involving the
President.
Many of the core issues in an obstruction-of-justice investigation turn on an individual's

actions and intent. We therefore requested that the White House provide us with documentary
evidence in its possession on the relevant events. We also sought and obtained the White House's
concurrence in our conducting interviews of White House personnel who had relevant information.
And we interviewed other witnesses who had pertinent knowledge, obtained documents on a
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voluntary basis when possible, and used legal process where appropriate. These investigative steps
allowed us to gather a substantial amount of evidence.
We also sought a voluntary interview with the President. After more than a ear of discussion,
the President declined to be interviewed.
During the course of our discussions,

the President did agree to answer written questions on certain Russia-related topics, and he provided
us with answers. He did not similarly agree to provide written answers to questions on obstruction
topics or questions on events during the transition. Ultimately, while we believed that we had the
authority and legal justification to issue a grand jury subpoena to obtain the President's testimony,
we chose not to do so. We made that decision in view of the substantial delay that such an
investigative step would likely produce at a late stage in our investigation. We also assessed that
based on the significant body of evidence we had already obtained of the President's actions and his
public and private statements describing or explaining those actions, we had sufficient evidence to
understand relevant events and to make certain assessments without the President's testimony. The
Office's decision-making process on this issue is described in more detail in Appendix C, infra, in a
note that precedes the President's written responses.
In assessing the evidence we obtained, we relied on common principles that apply in any
investigation. The issue of criminal intent is often inferred from circumstantial evidence. See, e.g.,
United States v. Croteau, 819 F.3d 1293, 1305 (11th Cir. 2016) ("[G]uilty knowledge can rarely be
established by direct evidence. . . . Therefore, mens rea elements such as knowledge or intent may
be proved by circumstantial evidence.") (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v.
Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 36 (2d Cir. 2012) ("The government's case rested on circumstantial evidence,
but the mens rea elements of knowledge and intent can often be proved through circumstantial
evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.") (internal quotation marks omitted). The
principle that intent can be inferred from circumstantial evidence is a necessity in criminal cases,
given the right of a subject to assert his privilege against compelled self-incrimination under the Fifth
Amendment and therefore decline to testify. Accordingly, determinations on intent are frequently
reached without the opportunity to interview an investigatory subject.
Obstruction-of-justice cases are consistent with this rule. See, e.g., Edlind, 887 F.3d at 174,
176 (relying on "significant circumstantial evidence that [the defendant] was conscious of her
wrongdoing" in an obstruction case; "[b]ecause evidence of intent will almost always be
circumstantial, a defendant may be found culpable where the reasonable and foreseeable consequences
of her acts are the obstruction of justice") (internal quotation marks, ellipses, and punctuation omitted);
Quattrone, 441 F.3d at 173-174. Circumstantial evidence that illuminates intent may include a pattern
of potentially obstructive acts. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) ("Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act . . .
may be admissible . . . [to] prov[e] motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
absence of mistake, or lack of accident."); see, e.g., United States v. Frankhauser, 80 F.3d 641, 648-
650 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Arnold, 773 F.2d 823, 832-834 (7th Cir. 1985); Cintolo, 818 F.2d
at 1000.
Credibility judgments may also be made based on objective facts and circumstantial evidence.
Standard jury instructions highlight a variety of factors that are often relevant in
13
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assessing credibility. These include whether a witness had a reason not to tell the truth; whether the
witness had a good memory; whether the witness had the opportunity to observe the events about
which he testified; whether the witness's testimony was corroborated by other witnesses; and whether
anything the witness said or wrote previously contradicts his testimony. See, e.g., First Circuit Pattern
Jury Instructions § 1.06 (2018); Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal Cases) § 1.08
(2012); Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction § 3.01 (2012).
In addition to those general factors, we took into account more specific factors in assessing
the credibility of conflicting accounts of the facts. For example, contemporaneous written notes
can provide strong corroborating evidence. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 232 (1975)
(the fact that a "statement appeared in the contemporaneously recorded report . . . would tend
strongly to corroborate the investigator's version of the interview"). Similarly, a witness's recitation
of his account before he had any motive to fabricate also supports the witness's credibility. See
Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 158 (1995) ("A consistent statement that predates the motive
is a square rebuttal of the charge that the testimony was contrived as a consequence of that
motive."). Finally, a witness's false description of an encounter can imply consciousness of
wrongdoing. See Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting the "well-
settled principle that false exculpatory statements are evidence—often strong evidence—of guilt").
We applied those settled legal principles in evaluating the factual results of our investigation.
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II. FACTUAL RESULTS OF THE OBSTRUCTION INVESTIGATION
This section of the report details the evidence we obtained. We first provide an overview of
how Russia became an issue in the 2016 presidential campaign, and how candidate Trump responded.
We then turn to the key events that we investigated: the President's conduct concerning the FBI
investigation of Michael Flynn; the President's reaction to public confirmation of the FBI's Russia
investigation; events leading up to and surrounding the termination of FBI Director Comey; efforts to
terminate the Special Counsel; efforts to curtail the scope of the Special Counsel's investigation;
efforts to prevent disclosure of information about the June 9, 2016 Trump Tower meeting between
Russians and senior campaign officials; efforts to have the Attorney General unrecuse; and conduct
towards McGahn, Cohen, and other witnesses.
We summarize the evidence we found and then analyze it by reference to the three statutory
obstruction-of-justice elements: obstructive act, nexus to a proceeding, and intent. We focus on
elements because, by regulation, the Special Counsel has "jurisdiction . . . to investigate . . . federal
crimes committed in the course of, and with intent to interfere with, the Special Counsel's
investigation, such as perjury, obstruction of justice, destruction of evidence, and intimidation of
witnesses." 28 C.F.R. § 600.4(a). Consistent with our jurisdiction to investigate federal obstruction
crimes, we gathered evidence that is relevant to the elements of those crimes and analyzed them
within an elements framework—while refraining from reaching ultimate conclusions about whether
crimes were committed, for the reasons explained above. This section also does not address legal
and constitutional defenses raised by counsel for the President; those defenses are analyzed in
Volume II, Section III, infra.
A. The Campaign's Response to Reports About Russian Support for Trump
During the 2016 campaign, the media raised questions about a possible connection between
the Trump Campaign and Russia.' The questions intensified after WikiLeaks released politically
damaging Democratic Party emails that were reported to have been hacked by Russia. Trump
responded to questions about possible connections to Russia by denying any business involvement in
Russia—even though the Trump Organization had pursued a business project in Russia as late as June
2016. Trump also expressed skepticism that Russia had hacked the emails at the same
time as he and other Campaign advisors privately sought information H OM about any
further planned WikiLeaks releases. After the election, when questions persisted about possible links
between Russia and the Trump Campaign, the President-Elect continued to deny any connections to
Russia and privately expressed concerns that reports of Russian election interference might lead the
public to question the legitimacy of his election.8
' This section summarizes and cites various news stories not for the truth of the information
contained in the stories, but rather to place candidate Trump's response to those stories in context.
Volume I of this report analyzes the underlying facts of several relevant events that were reported on
by the media during the campaign.
8
As discussed in Volume I, while the investigation identified numerous links between individuals
with ties to the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign, the evidence was
not sufficient to charge that any member of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with
representatives of the Russian government to interfere in the 2016 election.
15
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1. Press Reports Allege Links Between the Trump Campaign and Russia
On June 16, 2015, Donald J. Trump declared his intent to seek nomination as the Republican
candidate for President.9 By early 2016, he distinguished himself among Republican candidates by
speaking of closer ties with Russia,' saying he would get along well with Russian President Vladimir
Putin,11 questioning whether the NATO alliance was obsolete, 12 and praising Putin as a "strong
leader."13 The press reported that Russian political analysts and commentators perceived Trump as
favorable.to Russia.14
Beginning in February 2016 and continuing through the summer, the media reported that
several Trump campaign advisors appeared to have ties to Russia. For example, the press reported that
campaign advisor Michael Flynn was seated next to Vladimir Putin at an RT gala in Moscow in
December 2015 and that Flynn had appeared regularly on RT as an analyst.15 The press also reported
that foreign policy advisor Carter Page had ties to a Russian state-run gas company,16 and that
campaign chairman Paul Manafort had done work for the "Russian-backed former Ukrainian president
Viktor Yanukovych."17 In addition, the press raised questions during the Republican
9
@realDonaldTrump 6/16/15 (11:57 a.m. ET) Tweet.
1°See, e.g., Meet the Press Interview with Donald J. Trump, NBC (Dec. 20, 2015) (Trump: "I think
it would be a positive thing if Russia and the United States actually got along"); Presidential Candidate
Donald Trump News Conference, Hanahan, South Carolina, C-SPAN (Feb. 15, 2016) ("You want to make
a good deal for the country, you want to deal with Russia.").
" See, e.g., Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees, CNN (July 8, 2015) ("I think I get along with [Putin]
fine."); Andrew Rafferty, Trump Says He Would "Get Along Very Well" With Putin, NBC (July 30, 2015)
. (quoting Trump as saying, "I think I would get along very well with Vladimir Putin.").
12
See, e.g., @realDonaldTrump Tweet 3/24/16 (7:47 a.m. ET); @realDonaldTrump Tweet 3/24/16
(7:59 a.m. ET).
13
See, e.g., Meet the Press Interview with Donald J. Trump, NBC (Dec. 20, 2015) ("[Putin] is a
strong leader. What am I gonna say, he's a weak leader? He's making mincemeat out of our President.");
Donald Trump Campaign Rally in Vandalia, Ohio, C-SPAN (Mar. 12, 2016) ("I said [Putin] was a strong
leader, which he is. I mean, he might be bad, he might be good. But he's a strong leader.").
14
See, e.g., Andrew Osborn, From Russia with love: why the Kremlin backs Trump, Reuters (Mar.
24, 2016); Robert Zubrin, Trump: The Kremlin's Candidate, National Review (Apr. 4, 2016).
15
See, e.g., Mark Hosenball & Steve Holland, Trump being advised by ex-U.S. Lieutenant General
who favors closer Russia ties, Reuters (Feb. 26, 2016); Tom Hamburger et al., Inside Trump's financial ties
to Russia and his unusual flattery of Vladimir Putin, Washington Post (June 17, 2016). Certain matters
pertaining to Flynn are described in Volume I, Section IV.B.7, supra.
16
See, e.g., Zachary Mider, Trump's New Russia Advisor Has Deep Ties to Kremlin's Gazprom,
Bloomberg (Mar. 30, 2016); Julia Iofee, Who is Carter Page?, Politico (Sep. 23, 2016). Certain matters
pertaining to Page are described in Volume I, Section IV.A.3, supra.
17
Tracy Wilkinson, In a shift, Republican platform doesn't call for arming Ukraine against Russia,
spurring outrage, Los Angeles Times (July 21, 2016); Josh Rogin, Trump campaign guts GOP's anti-Russia
stance on Ukraine, Washington Post (July 18, 2016).
16
Aftertity—Werit-Preeittet II May Contain Material Protected Under Feel. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
National Convention about the Trump Campaign's involvement in changing the Republican platform's
stance on giving "weapons to Ukraine to fight Russian and rebel forces."18
2. The Trump Campaign Reacts to WikiLeaks's Release of Hacked Emails
On June 14, 2016, a cybersecurity firm that had conducted in-house analysis for the
Democratic National Committee (DNC) posted an announcement that Russian government hackers
had infiltrated the DNC's computer and obtained access to documents.19
On July 22, 2016, the day before the Democratic National Convention, WikiLeaks posted
thousands of hacked DNC documents revealing sensitive internal deliberations.20 Soon thereafter,
Hillary Clinton's campaign manager publicly contended that Russia had hacked the DNC emails and
arranged their release in order to help candidate Trump.' On July 26, 2016, the New York Times
reported that U.S. "intelligence agencies ha[d] told the White House they now have 'high confidence'
that the Russian government was behind the theft of emails and documents from the Democratic
National Committee."22
Within the Trum. Cam al • n, aides reacted with enthusiasm to reports of the hacks. 23
Harm to Ongoing Matter discussed with Campaign officials that WikiLeaks
would release the hacked material. Some witnesses said that Trump himself discussed the
possibility of upcoming releases HOM . Michael
Trum. Or anization and s ecial counsel to Trum., Cohen,
recalled then-executive vice .resident of the
hearin_
. arm to Ongoing
Matter
Cohen recalled that Trump responded, "oh good, alright,"
Josh Rogin, Trump campaign guts GOP 's anti-Russia stance on Ukraine, Washington Post,
18
Opinions (July 18, 2016). The Republican Platform events are described in Volume I, Section IV.A.6,
supra.
Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee, CrowdStrike (June
19
15, 2016) (post originally appearing on June 14, 2016, according to records of the timing provided by
CrowdStrike); Ellen Nakashima, Russian government hackers penetrated DNC, stole opposition
research on Trump, Washington Post (June 14, 2016).
20
Tom Hamburger and Karen Tumulty, WikiLeaks releases thousands of documents about
Clinton and internal deliberations, Washington Post (July 22, 2016).
Amber Phillips, Clinton campaign manager: Russians leaked Democrats ' emails to help
21
Donald Trump, Washington Post (July 24, 2016).

22
David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, Spy Agency Consensus Grows That Russia Hacked
D.N.C., New York Times (July 26, 2016).
23
Gates 4/10/18 302, at 5; Newman 8/23/18 302, at 1.
24
Gates 4/11/18 302, at 2-3 (SM-2180998); Gates 10/25/18 302, at 2; see also Volume I,
Section III.D.1, supra.
25
Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 8; see also Volume I, Section III.D.1, supra. According to Cohen, after
WikiLeaks's subsea uent release of stolen DNC emails on July 22, 2016, Trump said to Cohen words to the
effect of, HOM Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 10. Cohen's role in the candidate's and later
17
the same time, Gates was with Trump on a trip to an airport
, and shortly after the call ended, Trum. told Gates that more releases of damaging
and Harm to Ongoing Matter .26 Manafort said that shortl after WikiLeaks's Jul 22,
2016 release of hacked documents, he s oke to Trump Harm to Ongoing Matter
, Manafort recalled that Trump responded that
Manafort should keep Trump u.dated.27 De uty campaign manager
Rick Gates said that Manafort was ressure about HOM information and that
Manafort instructed Gates status updates on u comin. releases.' Around
information would be coming.' Harm to Ongoing Matter were discussed within the
Campaign,3° and in the summer of 2016, the Campaign was planning a communications strategy based
on the possible release of Clinton emails by WikiLeaks.31
3. The Trump Campaign Reacts to Allegations That Russia was Seeking to Aid
Candidate Trump
In the days that followed WikiLeaks's July 22, 2016 release of hacked DNC emails, the Trump
Campaign publicly rejected suggestions that Russia was seeking to aid candidate Trump. On July 26,
2016, Trump tweeted that it was "[c]razy" to suggest that Russia was "dealing with Trump"' and that
"[for the record," he had "ZERO investments in Russia."33
In a press conference the next day, July 27, 2016, Trump characterized "this whole thing with
Russia" as "a total deflection" and stated that it was "farfetched" and "ridiculous." 34 Trump said that
the assertion that Russia had hacked the emails was unproven, but stated that it would give him "no
pause" if Russia had Clinton's emails.35 Trump added, "Russia, if you're listening,
I hope you're able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing. I think you will probably be rewarded
President's activities, and his own criminal conduct, is described in Volume II, Section II.K, infra, and
in Volume I, Section IV.A.1, supra.
26
Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 8.
27 . As explained in footnote 197 of Volume
I, Section III.D.1.b, supra, this Office has included Manafort's account of these events because it
aligns with those of other witnesses and is corroborated to that extent.
28
Gates 10/25/18 302, at 4.
29
Gates 10/25/18 302, at 4.
3°
Bannon 1/18/19 302, at 3.
Gates 4/11/18 302, at 1-2 (SM-2180998); Gates 10/25/18 302, at 2 (messa in strate was bein
31
formed in June/Jul timeframe based on claims b Assan:e on June 12, 2016,

Harm to Ongoing Matter ).
32
@realDonaldTrump 7/26/16 (6:47 p.m. ET) Tweet.
33 @realDonaldTrump 7/26/16 (6:50 p.m. ET) Tweet.
34
Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016).
35
18
Mterftey—Werk—Prefluet // May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
mightily by our press."36 Trump also said that "there's nothing that I can think of that I'd rather do
than have Russia friendly as opposed to the way they are right now," and in response to a question
about whether he would recognize Crimea as Russian territory and consider lifting sanctions,
Trump replied, "We'll be looking at that. Yeah, we'll be looking."37
During the press conference, Trump repeated "I have nothing to do with Russia" five times.'
He stated that "the closest [he] came to Russia" was that Russians may have purchased a home or
condos from him.39 He said that after he held the Miss Universe pageant in Moscow in 2013 he had
been interested in working with Russian companies that "wanted to put a lot of money into
developments in Russia" but "it never worked out."4° He explained, "[f]rankly, I didn't want to do it
for a couple of different reasons. But we had a major developer . . . that wanted to develop property
in Moscow and other places. But we decided not to do it."41 The Trump Organization, however, had
been pursuing a building project in Moscow—the Trump Tower Moscow project—from
approximately September 2015 through June 2016, and the candidate was regularly updated on
developments, including possible trips by Michael Cohen to Moscow to promote the deal and by
Trump himself to finalize it.42
Cohen recalled speaking with Trump after the press conference about Trump's denial of any
business dealings in Russia, which Cohen regarded as untrue.' Trump told Cohen that Trump Tower
Moscow was not a deal yet and said, "Why mention it if it is not a deal?"44 According to Cohen, at
around this time, in response to Trump's disavowal of connections to Russia, campaign
36
Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016). Within five hours of
Trump's remark, a Russian intelligence service began targeting email accounts associated with Hillary
Clinton for possible hacks. See Volume I, Section III, supra. In written answers submitted in this
investigation, the President stated that he made the "Russia, if you're listening" statement "in jest and
sarcastically, as was apparent to any objective observer." Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20,
2018), at 13 (Response to Question II, Part (d)).
37
Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016). In his written answers
submitted in this investigation, the President said that his statement that "we'll be looking" at Crimea and
sanctions "did not communicate any position." Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at
17 (Response to Question IV, Part (g)).
38
39
Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016). 4°
41
The Trump Tower Moscow project and Trump's involvement in it is discussed in detail
42
in Volume I, Section TV.A.I, supra, and Volume II, Section II.K, infra.
43
Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 4.
44
Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 4-5.
19
advisors had developed a "party line" that Trump had no business with Russia and no connections to
Russia."
In addition to denying any connections with Russia, the Trump Campaign reacted to reports
of Russian election interference in aid of the Campaign by seeking to distance itself from Russian
contacts. For example, in August 2016, foreign policy advisor J.D. Gordon declined an invitation to
Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak's residence because the timing was "not optimal" in view of
media reports about Russian interference.46 On August 19, 2016, Manafort was asked to resign amid
media coverage scrutinizing his ties to a pro-Russian political party in Ukraine and links to Russian
business.47 And when the media published stories about Page's connections to Russia in September
2016, Trump Campaign officials terminated Page's association with the Campaign and told the press
that he had played "no role" in the Campaign."
On October 7, 2016, WikiLeaks released the first set of emails stolen by a Russian intelligence
agency from Clinton Campaign chairman John Podesta.49 The same day, the federal government
announced that "the Russian Government directed the recent compromises of e-mails from US persons
and institutions, including from US political organizations." 50 The government statement directly
linked Russian hacking to the releases on WikiLeaks, with the goal of interfering with the presidential
election, and concluded "that only Russia's senior-most officials could have authorized these
activities" based on their "scope and sensitivity."5I
On October 11, 2016, Podesta stated publicly that the FBI was investigating Russia's hacking
and said that candidate Trump might have known in advance that the hacked emails were going to be
released.52 Vice Presidential Candidate Mike Pence was asked whether the Trump
Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 1; Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 3-5. The formation of the "party line" is
45
described in greater detail in Volume II, Section ILK, infra.

DJTFP00004953 (8/8/16 Email, Gordon to Pchelyakov) (stating that "[t]hese days are not
46
optimal for us, as we are busily knocking down a stream of false media stories"). The invitation and
Gordon's response are discussed in Volume I, Section IV.A.7.a, supra.
47
See, e.g., Amber Phillips, Paul Manafort's complicated ties to Ukraine, explained, Washington Post
(Aug. 19, 2016) ("There were also a wave of fresh headlines dealing with investigations into [Manafort's] ties
to a pro-Russian political party in Ukraine."); Tom Winter & Ken Dilanian, Donald Trump Aide Paul
Manafort Scrutinized for Russian Business Ties, NBC (Aug. 18, 2016). Relevant events involving Manafort
are discussed in Volume I, Section IV.A.8, supra.
Michael Isikoff, U.S. intel officials probe ties between Trump adviser and Kremlin, Yahoo
48
News (Sep. 23, 2016); see, e.g., 9/25/16 Email, Hicks to Conway & Bannon; 9/23/16 Email, J. Miller
to Bannon & S. Miller; Page 3/16/17 302, at 2.
49
@WikiLeaks 10/7/16 (4:32 p.m. ET) Tweet.
Joint Statement from the Department Of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of
5°
National Intelligence on Election Security, DHS (Oct. 7, 2016).

51
Joint Statement from the Department Of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of
National Intelligence on Election Security, DHS (Oct. 7, 2016).
John Wagner & Anne Gearan, Clinton campaign chairman ties email hack to Russians,
52
suggests Trump had early warning, Washington Post (Oct. 11, 2016).
20
Atter-ftey-VIzerk-Predttet // May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
Campaign was "in cahoots" with WikiLeaks in releasing damaging Clinton-related information and
responded, "Nothing could be further from the truth."53
4. After the Election, Trump Continues to Deny Any Contacts or Connections with
Russia or That Russia Aided his Election
On November 8, 2016, Trump was elected President. Two days later, Russian officials told
the press that the Russian government had maintained contacts with Trump's "immediate entourage"
during the campaign. 54 In response, Hope Hicks, who had been the Trump Campaign spokesperson,
said, "We are not aware of any campaign representatives that were in touch with any foreign entities
before yesterday, when Mr. Trump spoke with many world leaders."' Hicks gave an additional
statement denying any contacts between the Campaign and Russia: "It never happened. There was
no communication between the campaign and any foreign entity during the campaign." 56
On December 10, 2016, the press reported that U.S. intelligence agencies had "concluded that
Russia interfered in last month's presidential election to boost Donald Trump's bid for the White
House."' Reacting to the story the next day, President-Elect Trump stated, "I think it's ridiculous. I
think it's just another excuse." 58 He continued that no one really knew who was responsible for the
hacking, suggesting that the intelligence community had "no idea if it's Russia or China or somebody.
It could be somebody sitting in a bed some place." 59 The President-Elect
53
Louis Nelson, Pence denies Trump camp in cahoots with WikiLeaks, Politico (Oct. 14, 2016).
Ivan Nechepurenko, Russian Officials Were in Contact With Trump Allies, Diplomat Says, New
54
York Times (Nov. 10, 2016) (quoting Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov saying, "[t]here
were contacts" and "I cannot say that all, but a number of them maintained contacts with Russian
representatives"); Jim Heintz & Matthew Lee, Russia eyes better ties with Trump; says contacts underway,
Associated Press (Nov. 11, 2016) (quoting Ryabkov saying, "I don't say that all of them, but a whole array
of them supported contacts with Russian representatives").
Ivan Nechepurenko, Russian Officials Were in Contact With Trump Allies, Diplomat Says, New
55
York Times (Nov. 11, 2016) (quoting Hicks).

Jim Heintz & Matthew Lee, Russia eyes better ties with Trump; says contacts underway,
56
Associated Press (Nov. 10, 2016) (quoting Hicks). Hicks recalled that after she made that statement, she
spoke with Campaign advisors Kellyanne Conway, Stephen Miller, Jason Miller, and probably Kushner
and Bannon to ensure it was accurate, and there was no hesitation or pushback from any of them. Hicks
12/8/17 302, at 4.
Damien Gayle, CIA concludes Russia interfered to help Trump win election, say reports,
57
Guardian (Dec. 10, 2016).

Chris Wallace Hosts "Fox News Sunday," Interview with President-Elect Donald Trump, CQ
58
Newsmaker Transcripts (Dec. 11, 2016).

59
21
also said that Democrats were "putting [] out" the story of Russian interference "because they suffered
one of the greatest defeats in the history of politics."60
On December 18, 2016, Podesta told the press that the election was "distorted by the Russian
intervention" and questioned whether Trump Campaign officials had been "in touch with the
Russians."61 The same day, incoming Chief of Staff Reince Priebus appeared on Fox News Sunday
and declined to say whether the President-Elect accepted the intelligence community's determination
that Russia intervened in the election.62 When asked about any contact or coordination between the
Campaign and Russia, Priebus said, "Even this question is insane. Of course we didn't interface with
the Russians."63 Priebus added that "this whole thing is a spin job" and said, "the real question is,
why the Democrats . . . are doing everything they can to delegitimize the outcome of the election?" 64
On December 29, 2016, the Obama Administration announced that in response to Russian
cyber operations aimed at the U.S. election, it was imposing sanctions and other measures on several
Russian individuals and entities.65 When first asked about the sanctions, President-Elect Trump said,
"I think we ought to get on with our lives."66 He then put out a statement that said "It's time for our
country to move on to bigger and better things," but indicated that he would meet with intelligence
community leaders the following week for a briefing on Russian interference.° The briefing occurred
on January 6, 2017.68 Following the briefing, the intelligence community released the public version
of its assessment, which concluded with high confidence that Russia had intervened in the election
through a variety of means with the goal of harming Clinton's
60

David Morgan, Clinton campaign: It's an 'open question' if Trump team colluded with Russia,
61
Reuters Business Insider (Dec. 18, 2016).

62
Chris Wallace Hosts "Fox News Sunday," Interview with Incoming White House Chief of
Staff Reince Priebus, Fox News (Dec. 18, 2016).
63
64
65
Harassment, White House (Dec. 29, 2016); see also Missy Ryan et al., Obama administration announces
measures to punish Russia for 2016 election interference, Washington Post (Dec. 29, 2016).
John Wagner, Trump on alleged election interference by Russia: 'Get on with our lives, '
66
Washington Post (Dec. 29, 2016).

67
Missy Ryan et al., Obama administration announces measures to punish Russia for 2016
election interference, Washington Post (Dec. 29, 2016).
68
Comey 11/15/17 302, at 3.
22
Aft-ertier Welfk-Predue+ // May Contain Material Protcctcd Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
electability.69 The assessment further concluded with high confidence that Putin and the Russian
government had developed a clear preference for Trump.'
Several days later, BuzzFeed published unverified allegations compiled by former British
intelligence officer Christopher Steele during the campaign about candidate Trump's Russia
connections under the headline "These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia."71 In a press
conference the next day, the President-Elect called the release "an absolute disgrace" and said, "I have
no dealings with Russia. I have no deals that could happen in Russia, because we've stayed away. . . .
So I have no deals, I have no loans and I have no dealings. We could make deals in Russia very easily
if we wanted to, I just don't want to because I think that would be a conflict."'
Several advisors recalled that the President-Elect viewed stories about his Russian
connections, the Russia investigations, and the intelligence community assessment of Russian
interference as a threat to the legitimacy of his electoral victory.' Hicks, for example, said that the
President-Elect viewed the intelligence community assessment as his "Achilles heel" because, even if
Russia had no impact on the election, people would think Russia helped him win, taking away from
what he had accomplished.74 Sean Spicer, the first White House communications director, recalled
that the President thought the Russia story was developed to undermine the legitimacy of his
election.75 Gates said the President viewed the Russia investigation as an attack on the legitimacy of
his win.76 And Priebus recalled that when the intelligence assessment came out, the President-Elect
was concerned people would question the legitimacy of his win.77
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Russia's Influence Campaign Targeting the
69
2016 US Presidential Election, at 1 (Jan. 6, 2017).

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Russia's Influence Campaign Targeting the
70
2016 US Presidential Election, at 1 (Jan. 6, 2017).

Ken Bensinger et al., These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia, BuzzFeed (Jan.
71
10, 2017).
Donald Trump's News Conference: Full Transcript and Video, New York Times (Jan.
72
11, 2017), available at https://wwvv.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/us/politics/trump-press-

conference-transcript.html.
73
Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 7; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 18; Spicer 10/16/17 302, at 6; Bannon
2/14/18 302, at 2; Gates 4/18/18 302, at 3; see Pompeo 6/28/17 302, at 2 (the President believed that
the purpose of the Russia investigation was to delegitimize his presidency).
74
Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 18.
75
Spicer 10/17/17 302, at 6.
76
Gates 4/18/18 302, at 3.
77
Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 7.
23
Att-eftley-Werk—Predeet II May Contain Material Protected Undcr Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
B. The President's Conduct Concerning the Investigation of Michael Flynn
Overview
During the presidential transition, incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn had
two phone calls with the Russian Ambassador to the United States about the Russian response to
U.S. sanctions imposed because of Russia's election interference. After the press reported on Flynn's
contacts with the Russian Ambassador, Flynn lied to incoming Administration officials by saying he
had not discussed sanctions on the calls. The officials publicly repeated those lies in press interviews.
The FBI, which previously was investigating Flynn for other matters, interviewed him about the calls
in the first week after the inauguration, and Flynn told similar lies to the FBI. On January 26, 2017,
Department of Justice (DOJ) officials notified the White House that Flynn and the Russian
Ambassador had discussed sanctions and that Flynn had been interviewed by the FBI. The next night,
the President had a private dinner with FBI Director James Comey in which he asked for Comey's
loyalty. On February 13, 2017, the President asked Flynn to resign. The following day, the President
had a one-on-one conversation with Comey in which he said, "I hope you can see your way clear to
letting this go, to letting Flynn go."
Evidence
1. Incoming National Security Advisor Flynn Discusses Sanctions on Russia with

Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak
Shortly after the election, President-Elect Trump announced he would appoint Michael
Flynn as his National Security Advisor. 78 For the next two months, Flynn played an active role on
the Presidential Transition Team (PTT) coordinating policy positions and communicating with
foreign government officials, including Russian Ambassador to the United States Sergey Kislyak. 79
On December 29, 2016, as noted in Volume II, Section II.A.4, supra, the Obama
Administration announced that it was imposing sanctions and other measures on several Russian
individuals and entities.8° That day, multiple members of the PTT exchanged emails about the
sanctions and the impact they would have on the incoming Administration, and Flynn informed
members of the PTT that he would be speaking to the Russian Ambassador later in the day.81
78
Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 7; President-Elect Dondld .I. Trump Selects U.S. Senator Jeff Sessions for
Attorney General, Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and U.S.
Rep. Mike Pompeo as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, President-Elect Donald J. Trump Press
Release (Nov. 18, 2016); see also, e.g., Bryan Bender, Trump names Mike Flynn national security adviser,
Politico, (Nov. 17, 2016).
79
Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 8-14; Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 3-5.
80
Harassment, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (Dec. 29, 2016).
81
12/29/16 Email, O'Brien to McFarland et al.; 12/29/16 Email, Bossert to Flynn et al.; 12/29/16
Email, McFarland to Flynn et al.; SF000001 (12/29/16 Text Message, Flynn to Flaherty) ("Tit for tat w
Russia not good. Russian AMBO reaching out to me today."); Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 2.
24
Atterfrey-Werk-Predttet // - ;-
Flynn, who was in the Dominican Republic at the time, and K.T. McFarland, who was slated to become
the Deputy National Security Advisor and was at the Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida with the President-
Elect and other senior staff, talked by phone about what, if anything, Flynn should communicate to
Kislyak about the sanctions.' McFarland had spoken with incoming Administration officials about the
sanctions and Russia's possible responses and thought she had mentioned in those conversations that
Flynn was scheduled to speak with Kislyak.83 Based on those conversations, McFarland informed
Flynn that incoming Administration officials at Mar-a-Lago did not want Russia to escalate the
situation." At 4:43 p.m. that afternoon, McFarland sent an email to several officials about the sanctions
and informed the group that "Gen [F]lynn is talking to russian ambassador this evening." 85
Approximately one hour later, McFarland met with the President-Elect and senior officials
and briefed them on the sanctions and Russia's possible responses. 86 Incoming Chief of Staff Reince
Priebus recalled that McFarland may have mentioned at the meeting that the sanctions situation could
be "cooled down" and not escalated. 87 McFarland recalled that at the end of the meeting, someone
may have mentioned to the President-Elect that Flynn was speaking to the Russian Ambassador that
evening." McFarland did not recall any response by the President-Elect.89 Priebus recalled that the
President-Elect viewed the sanctions as an attempt by the Obama Administration to embarrass him
by delegitimizing his election."
Immediately after discussing the sanctions with McFarland on December 29, 2016, Flynn
called Kislyak and requested that Russia respond to the sanctions only in a reciprocal manner, without
escalating the situation.' After the call, Flynn briefed McFarland on its substance.' Flynn told
McFarland that the Russian response to the sanctions was not going to be escalatory because Russia
wanted a good relationship with the Trump Administration.93 On December 30, 2016, Russian
President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would not take retaliatory measures
Statement of Offense at 2-3, United States v. Michael T. Flynn, 1:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. 1,
82
2017), Doc. 4 (Flynn Statement of Offense); Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 3-4; Flynn 11/20/17 302, at 3;
McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 6-7.
83
McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 4-7 (recalling discussions about this issue with Bannon and Priebus).
84
Flynn Statement of Offense, at 3; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 3-4; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 6-7.
85
12/29/16 Email, McFarland to Flynn et al.
86
McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7.
87
Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 3.
88
McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7. Priebus thought it was possible that McFarland had mentioned
Flynn's scheduled call with Kislyak at this meeting, although he was not certain. Priebus 1/18/18 302,
at 3.
89
McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7.
Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 3.
91
Flynn Statement of Offense, at 3; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 3-4.
92
Flynn Statement of Offense, at 3; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7-8; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 4.
93
McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 8.
25
Atit-efftey—VIzerk--PretIttet // May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
in response to the sanctions at that time and would instead "plan . . . further steps to restore Russian-
US relations based on the policies of the Trump Administration."94 Following that announcement, the
President-Elect tweeted, "Great move on delay (by V. Putin) - I always knew he was very smart!"95
On December 31, 2016, Kislyak called Flynn and told him that Flynn's request had been
received at the highest levels and Russia had chosen not to retaliate in response to the request.96 Later
that day, Flynn told McFarland about this follow-up conversation with Kislyak and Russia's decision
not to escalate the sanctions situation based on Flynn's request.97 McFarland recalled that Flynn
thought his phone call had made a difference.98 Flynn spoke with other incoming Administration
officials that day, but does not recall whether they discussed the sanctions.99
Flynn recalled discussing the sanctions issue with incoming Administration official Stephen
Bannon the next day.' oo Flynn said that Bannon appeared to know about Flynn's conversations with
Kislyak, and he and Bannon agreed that they had "stopped the train on Russia's response" to the
sanctions.' cn On January 3, 2017, Flynn saw the President-Elect in person and thought they discussed
the Russian reaction to the sanctions, but Flynn did not have a specific recollection of telling the
President-Elect about the substance of his calls with Kislyak.1°2
Members of the intelligence community were surprised by Russia's decision not to retaliate in
response to the sanctions.103 When analyzing Russia's response, they became aware of Flynn's
discussion of sanctions with Kislyak.1°4 Previously, the FBI had opened an investigation of Flynn
based on his relationship with the Russian government.105 Flynn's contacts with Kislyak became a key
component of that investigation.'
94
Statement by the President of Russia, President of Russia (Dec. 30, 2016)
12/30/16. @realDonaldTrump 12/30/16 (2:41 p.m. ET) Tweet.
96
Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 3; Flynn Statement of Offense, at 3.
Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 3; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 6; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10; Flynn
97
Statement of Offense, at 3.
98
McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10; see Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 4.
99
Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 5-6.
100 Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 4-5. Bannon recalled meeting with Flynn that day, but said he did not
remember discussing sanctions with him. Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 9.
101 Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 1; Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 5.
102
Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 6; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 6.
103
McCord 7/17/17 302, at 2.
104
McCord 7/17/17 302, at 2.
105
McCord 7/17/17 302, at 2-3; Comey 11/15/17 302, at 5.
106
McCord 7/17/17 302, at 2-3.
26
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2. President-Elect Trump is Briefed on the Intelligence Community's Assessment of

Russian Interference in the Election and Congress Opens Election-Interference
Investigations
On January 6, 2017, as noted in Volume II, Section II.A.4, supra, intelligence officials briefed
President-Elect Trump and the incoming Administration on the intelligence community's assessment
that Russia had interfered in the 2016 presidential election. 107 When the briefing concluded, Comey
spoke with the President-Elect privately to brief him on unverified, personally sensitive allegations
compiled by Steele. 1°8 According to a memorandum Comey drafted immediately after their private
discussion, the President-Elect began the meeting by telling Comey he had conducted himself
honorably over the prior year and had a great reputation.' °9 The President-Elect stated that he thought
highly of Comey, looked forward to working with him, and hoped that he planned to stay on as FBI
director."' Comey responded that he intended to continue serving in that role."' Comey then briefed
the President-Elect on the sensitive material in the Steele reporting.' 12 Comey recalled that the
President-Elect seemed defensive, so Comey decided
Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 115th
107
Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 1-2).
Comey 11/15/17 302, at 3; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select
108
Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former
Director of the FBI, at 1-2).
Comey 1/7/17 Memorandum, at 1. Comey began drafting the memorandum summarizing the
109
meeting immediately after it occurred. Comey 11/15/17 302, at 4. He finished the memorandum that
evening and finalized it the following morning. Comey 11/15/17 302, at 4.
110
Comey 1/7/17 Memorandum, at 1; Comey 11/15/17 302, at 3. Comey identified several other
occasions in January 2017 when the President reiterated that he hoped Comey would stay on as FBI director.
On January 11, President-Elect Trump called Comey to discuss the Steele reports and stated that he thought
Comey was doing great and the President-Elect hoped he would remain in his position as FBI director. Comey
11/15/17 302, at 4; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee,
115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (testimony of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI), CQ Cong. Transcripts,
at 90. ("[D]uring that call, he asked me again, 'Hope you're going to stay, you're doing a great job.' And I told
him that I intended to."). On January 22, at a White House reception honoring law enforcement, the President
greeted Comey and said he looked forward to working with him. Hearing on Russian Election Interference
Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (testimony of James B. Comey,
former Director of the FBI), CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 22. And as discussed in greater detail in Volume II,
Section II.D, infra, on January 27, the President invited Comey to dinner at the White House and said he was
glad Comey wanted to stay on as FBI Director.
111
Comey 1/7/17 Memorandum, at 1; Comey 11/15/17 302, at 3.
Comey 1/7/17 Memorandum, at 1-2; Comey 11/15/17 302, at 3. Comey's briefing included the Steele
112
reporting's unverified allegation that the Russians had compromising tapes of the President involving conduct
when he was a private citizen during a 2013 trip to Moscow for the Miss Universe Pageant. During the 2016
presidential campaign, a similar claim may have reached candidate Trump. On October 30, 2016, Michael
Cohen received a text from Russian businessman Giorgi Rtskhiladze that said, "Stopped flow of tapes from
Russia but not sure if there's anything else. Just so you know . . . ." 10/30/16 Text Message, Rtskhiladze to
Cohen. Rtskhiladze said "tapes" referred to compromising tapes of Trump rumored to be held by persons
associated with the Russian real estate conglomerate Crocus Group, which had helped host
27
1
Atterfte54 therit-Pretittet // May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
to assure him that the FBI was not investigating him personally.' 13 Comey recalled he did not want
the President-Elect to think of the conversation as a "J. Edgar Hoover move."114
On January 10, 2017, the media reported that Comey had briefed the President-Elect on the
Steele reporting,' and BuzzFeed News published information compiled by Steele online, stating that
the information included "specific, unverified, and potentially unverifiable allegations of contact
between Trump aides and Russian operatives."116 The next day, the President-Elect expressed
concern to intelligence community leaders about the fact that the information had leaked and asked
whether they could make public statements refuting the allegations in the Steele reports. 117
In the following weeks, three Congressional committees opened investigations to examine

Russia's interference in the election and whether the Trump Campaign had colluded with Russia."' On
January 13, 2017, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) announced that it would
conduct a bipartisan inquiry into Russian interference in the election, including any "links between
Russia and individuals associated with political campaigns."' On January 25, 2017, the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) announced that it had been conducting an
investigation into Russian election interference and possible coordination with the political
campaigns.12° And on February 2, 2017, the Senate Judiciary Committee announced that it too would
investigate Russian efforts to intervene in the election.12'
the 2013 Miss Universe Pageant in Russia. Rtskhiladze 4/4/18 302, at 12. Cohen said he spoke to Trump
about the issue after receiving the texts from Rtskhiladze. Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 13. Rtskhiladze said he
was told the tapes were fake, but he did not communicate that to Cohen. Rtskhiladze 5/10/18 302, at 7.
113
Comey 11/15/17 302, at 3-4; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate
Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B.
Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 2).
114
Comey 11/15/17 302, at 3.
See, e.g., Evan Perez et al., Intel chiefs presented Trump with claims of Russian efforts to
115
compromise him, CNN (Jan. 10, 2017; updated Jan. 12, 2017).
116
Ken Bensinger et al., These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia, BuzzFeed
News (Jan. 10, 2017).
117
1/11/17 Email, Clapper to Comey ("He asked if I could put out a statement. He would
See
prefer of course that I say the documents are bogus, which, of course, I can't do."); 1/12/17 Email,
Comey to Clapper ("He called me at 5 yesterday and we had a very similar conversation."); Comey
11/15/17 302, at 4-5.
11'
See 2016 Presidential Election Investigation Fast Facts, CNN (first published Oct. 12, 2017;
updated Mar. 1, 2019) (summarizing starting dates of Russia-related investigations).
119
Joint Statement on Committee Inquiry into Russian Intelligence Activities, SSCI (Jan. 13, 2017).
Joint Statement on Progress of Bipartisan HPSCI Inquiry into Russian Active Measures, HP
120
SCI (Jan. 25, 2017).

121 Joint Statement from Senators Graham and Whitehouse on Investigation into Russian
Influence on Democratic Nations ' Elections (Feb. 2, 2017).
28
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3. Flynn Makes False Statements About his Communications with Kislyak to

Incoming Administration Officials, the Media, and the FBI
On January 12, 2017, a Washington Post columnist reported that Flynn and Kislyak
communicated on the day the Obama Administration announced the Russia sanctions.122 The column
questioned whether Flynn had said something to "undercut the U.S. sanctions" and whether Flynn's
communications had violated the letter or spirit of the Logan Act.123
President-Elect Trump called Priebus after the story was published and expressed anger about
Priebus recalled that the President-Elect asked, "What the hell is this all about?"125 Priebus called
it.124
Flynn and told him that the President-Elect was angry about the reporting on Flynn's conversations
with Kislyak.126 Flynn recalled that he felt a lot of pressure because Priebus had spoken to the "boss"
and said Flynn needed to "kill the story."I27 Flynn directed McFarland to call the Washington Post
columnist and inform him that no discussion of sanctions had occurred.I28 McFarland recalled that
Flynn said words to the effect of, "I want to kill the story." 129 McFarland made the call as Flynn had
requested although she knew she was providing false information, and the Washington Post updated
the column to reflect that a "Trump official" had denied that Flynn and Kislyak discussed sanctions.I3°
When Priebus and other incoming Administration officials questioned Flynn internally about
the Washington Post column, Flynn maintained that he had not discussed sanctions with Kislyak.I31
Flynn repeated that claim to Vice President-Elect Michael Pence and to incoming press secretary Sean
Spicer.I32 In subsequent media interviews in mid-January, Pence, Priebus, and
122
David Ignatius, Why did Obama dawdle on Russia's hacking?, Washington Post (Jan. 12, 2017).
David Ignatius, Why did Obama dawdle on Russia's hacking?, Washington Post (Jan. 12, 2017). The
123
Logan Act makes it a crime for "[a]ny citizen of the United States, wherever he may be" to "without authority
of the United States, directly or indirectly commence[] or carr[y] on any correspondence or intercourse with
any foreign government or any officer or agent thereof, in relation to any disputes or controversies with the
United States, or to defeat the measures of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 953.
124 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 6.
125 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 6.
126 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 6.
127 Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 1; Flynn 11/20/17 302, at 6.
128 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 12-13.
129 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 12.
130 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 12-13; McFarland 8/29/17 302, at 8; see David Ignatius, Why
did Obama dawdle on Russia's hacking?, Washington Post (Jan. 12, 2017).
Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 1, 8; Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 7; Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 7-8; S. Miller
131
8/31/17 302, at 8-11.

132
Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 1, 8; Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 7; S. Miller 8/31/17 302, at 10-11.
29
Afteffley--Werk—Preekte+ II May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
Spicer denied that Flynn and Kislyak had discussed sanctions, basing those denials on their
conversations with Flynn.133
The public statements of incoming Administration officials denying that Flynn and Kislyak
had discussed sanctions alarmed senior DOJ officials, who were aware that the statements were not
true.134 Those officials were concerned that Flynn had lied to his colleagues—who in turn had
unwittingly misled the American public—creating a compromise situation for Flynn because the
Department of Justice assessed that the Russian government could prove Flynn lied. 135 The FBI
investigative team also believed that Flynn's calls with Kislyak and subsequent denials about
discussing sanctions raised potential Logan Act issues and were relevant to the FBI's broader Russia
investigation.136
On January 20, 2017, President Trump was inaugurated and Flynn was sworn in as National
Security Advisor. On January 23, 2017, Spicer delivered his first press briefing and stated that he had
spoken with Flynn the night before, who confirmed that the calls with Kislyak were about topics
unrelated to sanctions.137 Spicer's statements added to the Department of Justice's concerns that Russia
had leverage over Flynn based on his lies and could use that derogatory information to compromise
him.'
On January 24, 2017, Flynn agreed to be interviewed by agents from the FBI. 139 During
the interview, which took place at the White House, Flynn falsely stated that he did not ask Kislyak
to refrain from escalating the situation in response to the sanctions on Russia imposed by the
Obama Administration."' Flynn also falsely stated that he did not remember a follow-up
conversation in which Kislyak stated that Russia had chosen to moderate its response to those
sanctions as a result of Flynn's request.'"
133
Face the Nation Interview with Vice President-Elect Pence, CBS (Jan. 15, 2017); Julie Hirschfield
Davis et al., Trump National Security Advisor Called Russian Envoy Day Before Sanctions Were Imposed,
Washington Post (Jan. 13, 2017); Meet the Press Interview with Reince Priebus, NBC (Jan. 15, 2017).
134
Yates 8/15/17 302, at 2-3; McCord 7/17/17 302, at 3-4; McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 5 (DOJ
officials were "really freaked out about it").
135 Yates 8/15/17 302, at 3; McCord 7/17/17 302, at 4.
136 McCord 7/17/17 302, at 4; McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 5-6.
137 Sean Spicer, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (Jan. 23, 2017).
138 Yates 8/15/17 302, at 4; Axelrod 7/20/17 302, at 5.
139 Flynn Statement of Offense, at 2.
140 Flynn Statement of Offense, at 2.
141 Flynn Statement of Offense, at 2. On December 1, 2017, Flynn admitted to making these false
statements and pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which makes it a crime to knowingly and
willfully "make[] any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation" to federal law
enforcement officials. See Volume I, Section IV.A.7, supra.
30
4. DOJ Officials Notify the White House of Their Concerns About Flynn
On January 26, 2017, Acting Attorney General Sally Yates contacted White House Counsel
Donald McGahn and informed him that she needed to discuss a sensitive matter with him in person. 142
Later that day, Yates and Mary McCord, a senior national security official at the Department of
Justice, met at the White House with McGahn and White House Counsel's Office attorney James
Burnham.' Yates said that the public statements made by the Vice President denying that Flynn and
Kislyak discussed sanctions were not true and put Flynn in a potentially compromised position
because the Russians would know he had lied.144 Yates disclosed that Flynn had been interviewed
by the FBI.145 She declined to answer a specific question about how Flynn had performed during that
interview,146 but she indicated that Flynn's statements to the FBI were similar to the statements he
had made to Pence and Spicer denying that he had discussed sanctions. 147 McGahn came away from
the meeting with the impression that the FBI had not pinned Flynn down in lies, I48 but he asked John
Eisenberg, who served as legal advisor to the National Security Council, to examine potential legal
issues raised by Flynn's FBI interview and his contacts with Kislyak. 149
That afternoon, McGahn notified the President that Yates had come to the White House to
discuss concerns about Flynn.I5° McGahn described what Yates had told him, and the President asked
him to repeat it, so he did.151 McGahn recalled that when he described the FBI interview of Flynn, he
said that Flynn did not disclose having discussed sanctions with Kislyak, but that there may not have
been a clear violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.152 The President asked about Section 1001, and McGahn
explained the law to him, and also explained the Logan Act.I53 The President
142
Yates 8/15/17 302, at 6.
Yates 8/15/17 302, at 6; McCord 7/17/17 302, at 6; SCR015_000198 (2/15/17 Draft
143
Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President).

Yates 8/15/17 302, at 6-8; McCord 7/17/17 302, at 6-7; Burnham 11/3/17 302, at 4;
144
SCR015_000198 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President).
McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 5; Yates 8/15/17 302, at 7; McCord 7/17/17 302, at 7; Burnham
145
11/3/17 302, at 4.
146
Yates 8/15/17 302, at 7; McCord 7/17/17 302, at 7.
SCR015_000198 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the
147
President); Burnham 11/3/17 302, at 4.

148
McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 5.
149
President); McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 6, 8.

is°McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 6; SCR015_000278 (White House Counsel's Office Memorandum re:
"Flynn Tick Tock") (on January 26, "McGahn IMMEDIATELY advises POTUS"); SCR015_000198
(2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President).
151
McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 6.
152
McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 7.
153
McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 7.
31
instructed McGahn to work with Priebus and Bannon to look into the matter further and directed that
they not discuss it with any other officials.I54 Priebus recalled that the President was angry with Flynn
in light of what Yates had told the White House and said, "not again, this guy, this stuff." 155
That evening, the President dined with several senior advisors and asked the group what they
thought about FBI Director Comey.I56 According to Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats, who
was at the dinner, no one openly advocated terminating Comey but the consensus on him was not
positive.' 57 Coats told the group that he thought Comey was a good director.I58 Coats encouraged the
President to meet Comey face-to-face and spend time with him before making a decision about
whether to retain him.I59
5. McGahn has a Follow-Up Meeting About Flynn with Yates; President Trump has
Dinner with FBI Director Comey
The next day, January 27, 2017, McGahn and Eisenberg discussed the results of Eisenberg's
initial legal research into Flynn's conduct, and specifically whether Flynn may have violated the
Espionage Act, the Logan Act, or 18 U.S.C. § 1001.160 Based on his preliminary research, Eisenberg
informed McGahn that there was a possibility that Flynn had violated 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and the Logan
Act.16I Eisenberg noted that the United States had never successfully prosecuted an individual under
the Logan Act and that Flynn could have possible defenses, and
McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 7; SCR015_000198-99 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from

154
the Office of the Counsel to the President).

155
Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 8. Several witnesses said that the President was unhappy with Flynn for
other reasons at this time. Bannon said that Flynn's standing with the President was not good by December
2016. Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 12. The President-Elect had concerns because President Obama had warned
him about Flynn shortly after the election. Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 4-5; Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 7 (President
Obama's comment sat with President-Elect Trump more than Hicks expected). Priebus said that the President
had become unhappy with Flynn even before the story of his calls with Kislyak broke and had become so
upset with Flynn that he would not look at him during intelligence briefings. Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 8. Hicks
said that the President thought Flynn had bad judgment and was angered by tweets sent by Flynn and his son,
and she described Flynn as "being on thin ice" by early February 2017. Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 7, 10.
156
Coats 6/14/17 302, at 2.
157
Coats 6/14/17 302, at 2.
158
Coats 6/14/17 302, at 2.
159
Coats 6/14/17 302, at 2.
160 SCR015_000199 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to
the President); McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 8.
161
President); Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 9.
32
told McGahn that he believed it was unlikely that a prosecutor would pursue a Logan Act charge under
the circumstances) 62
That same morning, McGahn asked Yates to return to the White House to discuss Flynn
163
again. In that second meeting, McGahn expressed doubts that the Department of Justice would bring
a Logan Act prosecution against Flynn, but stated that the White House did not want to take action
that would interfere with an ongoing FBI investigation of Flynn.164 Yates responded that Department
of Justice had notified the White House so that it could take action in response to the information
provided.165 McGahn ended the meeting by asking Yates for access to the underlying information the
Department of Justice possessed pertaining to Flynn's discussions with Kislyak.166
Also on January 27, the President called FBI Director Comey and invited him to dinner that
evening.167 Priebus recalled that before the dinner, he told the President something like, "don't talk
about Russia, whatever you do," and the President promised he would not talk about Russia at the
dinner.168 McGahn had previously advised the President that he should not communicate directly with
the Department of Justice to avoid the perception or reality of political interference in law
enforcement.169 When Bannon learned about the President's planned dinner with Comey, he suggested
that he or Priebus also attend, but the President stated that he wanted to dine with Comey alone. 170
Comey said that when he arrived for the dinner that evening, he was surprised and concerned to see
that no one else had been invited.171
162
President); Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 9.
163
President); McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 8; Yates 8/15/17 302, at 8.
164
Yates 8/15/17 302, at 9; McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 8.
165
Yates 8/15/17 302, at 9; Burnham 11/3/17 302, at 5; see SCR015_00199 (2/15/17 Draft
Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President) ("Yates was unwilling to confirm or
deny that there was an ongoing investigation but did indicate that the Department of Justice would not
object to the White House taking action against Flynn.").
166
Yates 9/15/17 302, at 9; Burnham 11/3/17 302, at 5. In accordance with McGahn's request, the
Department of Justice made the underlying information available and Eisenberg viewed the information in
early February. Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 5; FBI 2/7/17 Electronic Communication, at 1 (documenting
2/2/17 meeting with Eisenberg).
Comey 11/15/17 302, at 6; SCR012b_000001 (President's Daily Diary, 1/27/17); Hearing on
167
Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017)
(Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 2-3).
168
Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 17.
169
See McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 9; Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 2; Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 17.
17°
Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 17.
171
Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 3); see
Comey 11/15/17 302, at 6.
33
Comey provided an account of the dinner in a contemporaneous memo, an interview with this
Office, and congressional testimony. According to Comey's account of the dinner, the President
repeatedly brought up Comey's future, asking whether he wanted to stay on as FBI director.172 Because
the President had previously said he wanted Comey to stay on as FBI director, Comey interpreted the
President's comments as an effort to create a patronage relationship by having Comey ask for his job.173
The President also brought up the Steele reporting that Comey had raised in the January 6, 2017 briefing
and stated that he was thinking about ordering the FBI to investigate the allegations to prove they were
false.174 Comey responded that the President should think carefully about issuing such an order because
it could create a narrative that the FBI was investigating him personally, which was incorrect.175 Later
in the dinner, the President brought up Flynn and said, "the guy has serious judgment issues."I76 Comey
did not comment on Flynn and the President did not acknowledge any FBI interest in or contact with
Flynn.'"
According to Comey's account, at one point during the dinner the President stated, "I need
loyalty, I expect loyalty."178 Comey did not respond and the conversation moved on to other topics,
but the President returned to the subject of Comey's job at the end of the dinner and repeated, "I need
loyalty."179 Comey responded, "You will always get honesty from me."18° The
172
Comey 11/15/17 302, at 7; Comey 1/28/17 Memorandum, at 1, 3; Hearing on Russian Election
Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 1 I 5th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for
the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 3).
173
Director of the FBI, at 3).
174
Comey 1/28/17 Memorandum, at 3; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate
Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey,
former Director of the FBI, at 4).
175
176
177
178
Comey 1/28/18 Memorandum, at 2; Comey 11/15/17 302, at 7; Hearing on Russian Election
Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for
179
the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 3-4).
180
34
President said, "That's what I want, honest loyalty. 11181 Comey said, "You will get that from
me in
After Comey's account of the dinner became public, the President and his advisors disputed
that he had asked for Comey's loyalty.' The President also indicated that he had not invited Comey
to dinner, telling a reporter that he thought Comey had "asked for the dinner" because "he wanted to
stay on." I 84 But substantial evidence corroborates Comey's account of the dinner invitation and the
request for loyalty. The President's Daily Diary confirms that the President "extend[ed] a dinner
invitation" to Comey on January 27. 185 With respect to the substance of the dinner conversation,
Comey documented the President's request for loyalty in a memorandum he began drafting the night
of the dinner;186 senior FBI officials recall that Comey told them about the loyalty request shortly
after the dinner occurred;" and Comey described the request while
181Comey 1/28/17 Memorandum, at 3; Comey 11/15/17 302, at 7; Hearing on Russian Election

182Comey 1/28/17 Memorandum, at 3; Comey 11/15/17 302, at 7; Hearing on Russian Election
183See, e.g., Michael S. Schmidt, In a Private Dinner, Trump Demanded Loyalty. Comey Demurred.,
New York Times (May 11, 2017) (quoting Sarah Sanders as saying, "[The President] would never even
suggest the expectation of personal loyalty"); Ali Vitali, Trump Never Asked for Comey's Loyalty,
President's Personal Lawyer Says, NBC (June 8, 2017) (quoting the President's personal counsel as saying,
"The president also never told Mr. Comey, 'I need loyalty, I expect loyalty,' in form or substance.");
Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (June 9, 2017) ("I hardly know the man.
I'm not going to say 'I want you to pledge allegiance.' Who would do that? Who would ask a man to pledge
allegiance under oath?"). In a private conversation with Spicer, the President stated that he had never asked
for Comey's loyalty, but added that if he had asked for loyalty, "Who cares?" Spicer 10/16/17 302, at 4.
The President also told McGahn that he never said what Comey said he had. McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 17.
184 Interview of Donald J. Trump, NBC (May 11, 2017).
185SCR012b_000001 (President's Daily Diary, 1/27/17) (reflecting that the President called Comey
in the morning on January 27 and "[t]he purpose of the call was to extend a dinner invitation"). In addition,
two witnesses corroborate Comey's account that the President reached out to schedule the dinner, without
Comey having asked for it. Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 17 (the President asked to schedule the January 27
dinner because he did not know much about Comey and intended to ask him whether he wanted to stay on
as FBI Director); Rybicki 11/21/18 302, at 3 (recalling that Comey told him about the President's dinner
invitation on the day of the dinner).
186Comey 11/15/17 302, at 8; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select
187McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 9-10; Rybicki 11/21/18 302, at 3. After leaving the White House, Comey
called Deputy Director of the FBI Andrew McCabe, summarized what he and the President had discussed,
including the President's request for loyalty, and expressed shock over the President's request. McCabe
8/17/17 302, at 9. Comey also convened a meeting with his senior leadership team to discuss what the
President had asked of him during the dinner and whether he had handled the request for loyalty properly.
McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 10; Rybicki 11/21/18 302, at 3. In addition, Comey distributed his
35
under oath in congressional proceedings and in a subsequent interview with investigators subject
to penalties for lying under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Comey's memory of the details of the dinner,
including that the President requested loyalty, has remained consistent throughout)"
6. Flynn's Resignation
On February 2, 2017, Eisenberg reviewed the underlying information relating to Flynn's calls
with Kislyak.'89 Eisenberg recalled that he prepared a memorandum about criminal statutes that could
apply to Flynn's conduct, but he did not believe the White House had enough information to make a
definitive recommendation to the President. 19° Eisenberg and McGahn discussed that Eisenberg's
review of the underlying information confirmed his preliminary conclusion that Flynn was unlikely
to be prosecuted for violating the Logan Act. 191 Because White House officials were uncertain what
Flynn had told the FBI, however, they could not assess his exposure to prosecution for violating 18
U.S.C. § 1001.192
The week of February 6, Flynn had a one-on-one conversation with the President in the Oval
Office about the negative media coverage of his contacts with Kislyak. 193 Flynn recalled that the
President was upset and asked him for information on the conversations. 194 Flynn listed the specific
dates on which he remembered speaking with Kislyak, but the President corrected one of the dates he
listed. 195 The President asked Flynn what he and Kislyak discussed and Flynn responded that he might
have talked about sanctions. 196
memorandum documenting the dinner to his senior leadership team, and McCabe confirmed that the
memorandum captured what Comey said on the telephone call immediately following the dinner. McCabe
8/17/17 302, at 9-10.
188
There also is evidence that corroborates other aspects of the memoranda Comey wrote documenting
his interactions with the President. For example, Comey recalled, and his memoranda reflect, that he told the
President in his January 6, 2017 meeting, and on phone calls on March 30 and April 11, 2017, that the FBI
was not investigating the President personally. On May 8, 2017, during White House discussions about firing
Comey, the President told Rosenstein and others that Comey had told him three times that he was not under
investigation, including once in person and twice on the phone. Gauhar-000058 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes).
Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 5; FBI 2/7/17 Electronic Communication, at 1 (documenting
189
2/2/17 meeting with Eisenberg).

190
Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 6.
191
Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 9; SCR015_000200 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the
Office of the Counsel to the President).
192
Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 9.
193
Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 2.
194
Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 2.
195
Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 2.
196
Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 2-3.
36
On February 9, 2017, the Washington Post reported that Flynn discussed sanctions with
Kislyak the month before the President took office.197 After the publication of that story, Vice
President Pence learned of the Department of Justice's notification to the White House about the
content of Flynn's calls.198 He and other advisors then sought access to and reviewed the underlying
information about Flynn's contacts with Kislyak.199 FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe, who
provided the White House officials access to the information and was present when they reviewed it,
recalled the officials asking him whether Flynn's conduct violated the Logan Act.20° McCabe
responded that he did not know, but the FBI was investigating the matter because it was a
possibility.201 Based on the evidence of Flynn's contacts with Kislyak, McGahn and Priebus concluded
that Flynn could not have forgotten the details of the discussions of sanctions and had instead been
lying about what he discussed with Kislyak.202 Flynn had also told White House officials that the FBI
had told him that the FBI was closing out its investigation of him, 203 but Eisenberg did not believe
him.204 After reviewing the materials and speaking with Flynn, McGahn and Priebus concluded that
Flynn should be terminated and recommended that course of action to the President.2°5
That weekend, Flynn accompanied the President to Mar-a-Lago.206 Flynn recalled that on
February 12, 2017, on the return flight to D.C. on Air Force One, the President asked him whether he
had lied to the Vice President.207 Flynn responded that he may have forgotten details of his calls, but
he did not think he lied.208 The President responded, "Okay. That's fine. I got it."2°9
Greg Miller et al., National security adviser Flynn discussed sanctions with Russian
197
ambassador, despite denials, officials say, Washington Post (Feb. 9, 2017).

198
President); McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 12.

199 SCR015_000202 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the
President); McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 11-13; Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 10; McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 12.
2" McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 13.
201
McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 13.
McGahn 11/30/17 302, at l2; Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 8; Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 10;
202
SCR015_000202 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President).
203 McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 11; Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 9; Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 11.
204 Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 9.
zos SCR015_000202 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the
President); Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 10; McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 12.
206 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 8.
207 Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 9; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 8.
208 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 8; Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 9.
209 Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 9.
37
,k-tter-ney-Werk—Pfedttet II May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
Atterfrey-W0fit-Prettue+ // May Contain Matcrial Protected Undcr Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
On February 13, 2017, Priebus told Flynn he had to resign.21° Flynn said he wanted to say
goodbye to the President, so Priebus brought him to the Oval Office.211 Priebus recalled that the
President hugged Flynn, shook his hand, and said, "We'll give you a good recommendation. You're a
good guy. We'll take care of you."212
Talking points on the resignation prepared by the White House Counsel's Office and
distributed to the White House communications team stated that McGahn had advised the President
that Flynn was unlikely to be prosecuted, and the President had determined that the issue with Flynn
was one of trust.'" Spicer told the press the next day that Flynn was forced to resign "not based on a
legal issue, but based on a trust issue, [where] a level of trust between the President and General Flynn
had eroded to the point where [the President] felt he had to make a change."214
7. The President Discusses Flynn with FBI Director Comey
On February 14, 2017, the day after Flynn's resignation, the President had lunch at the White
House with New Jersey Governor Chris Christie.215 According to Christie, at one point during the
lunch the President said, "Now that we fired Flynn, the Russia thing is over."216 Christie laughed and
responded, "No way."217 He said, "this Russia thing is far from over" and "[w]e'll be here on
Valentine's Day 2018 talking about this."218 The President said, "[w]hat do you mean? Flynn met with
the Russians. That was the problem. I fired Flynn. It's over."' Christie recalled responding that based
on his experience both as a prosecutor and as someone who had been investigated, firing Flynn would
not end the investigation.' Christie said there was no way to make an investigation shorter, but a lot of
ways to make it longer.221 The President asked Christie what he meant, and Christie told the President
not to talk about the investigation even if he was
210
Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 9.
211
Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 9; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 10.
212
213
SCR004_00600 (2/16/17 Email, Burnham to Donaldson).
214
Sean Spicer, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (Feb. 14, 2017). After Flynn pleaded guilty to
violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001 in December 2017, the President tweeted, "I had to fire General Flynn because he
lied to the Vice President and the FBI." @realDonaldTrump 12/2/17 (12:14 p.m. ET) Tweet. The next day,
the President's personal counsel told the press that he had drafted the tweet. Maegan Vazquez et al., Trump's
lawyer says he was behind President's tweet about firing Flynn, CNN (Dec. 3, 2017).
215
Christie 2/13/19 302, at 2-3; SCRO12b_000022 (President's Daily Diary, 2/14/17).
216
Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3.
217
Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3.
Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3. Christie said he thought when the President said "the Russia thing"
218
he was referring to not just the investigations but also press coverage about Russia. Christie thought
the more important thing was that there was an investigation. Christie 2/13/19 302, at 4.
219
Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3.
220
Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3.
221
Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3.
38
Atferttey-Wer-k--Pre€1.tt.et // May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
frustrated at times.222 Christie also told the President that he would never be able to get rid of Flynn,
"like gum on the bottom of your shoe."223
Towards the end of the lunch, the President brought up Comey and asked if Christie was still
friendly with him.224 Christie said he was.225 The President told Christie to call Comey and tell him
that the President "really like[s] him. Tell him he's part of the team." 226 At the end of the lunch, the
President repeated his request that Christie reach out to Comey. 227 Christie had no intention of
complying with the President's request that he contact Comey. 228 He thought the President's request
was "nonsensical" and Christie did not want to put Comey in the position of having to receive such
a phone cal1.229 Christie thought it would have been uncomfortable to pass on that message. 23°
At 4 p.m. that afternoon, the President met with Comey, Sessions, and other officials for a
homeland security briefing.231 At the end of the briefing, the President dismissed the other attendees
and stated that he wanted to speak to Comey alone.232 Sessions and senior advisor to the President
Jared Kushner remained in the Oval Office as other participants left, but the President
222
Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3-4.
223
Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3. Christie also recalled that during the lunch, Flynn called Kushner, who
was at the lunch, and complained about what Spicer had said about Flynn in his press briefing that day.
Kushner told Flynn words to the effect of, "You know the President respects you. The President cares about
you. I'll get the President to send out a positive tweet about you later." Kushner looked at the President when
he mentioned the tweet, and the President nodded his assent. Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3. Flynn recalled getting
upset at Spicer's comments in the press conference and calling Kushner to say he did not appreciate the
comments. Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 9.
224
Christie 2/13/19 302, at 4.
225
Christie 2/13/19 302, at 4.
226
Christie 2/13/19 302, at 4-5.
227
Christie 2/13/19 302, at 5.
228
Christie 2/13/19 302, at 5.
229
Christie 2/13/19 302, at 5.
230
Christie 2/13/19 302, at 5.
231
SCRO12b_000022 (President's Daily Diary, 2/14/17); Comey 11/15/17 302, at 9.
Comey 11/15/17 302, at 10; 2/14/17 Comey Memorandum, at 1; Hearing on Russian Election
232
the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 4); Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 18 (confirming
that everyone was shooed out "like Comey said" in his June testimony).
39
excused them, repeating that he wanted to speak only with Comey.233 At some point after others had left
the Oval Office, Priebus opened the door, but the President sent him away.234
According to Comey's account of the meeting, once they were alone, the President began the
conversation by saying, "I want to talk about Mike Flynn." 235 The President stated that Flynn had
not done anything wrong in speaking with the Russians, but had to be terminated because he had
misled the Vice President. 236 The conversation turned to the topic of leaks of classified information,
but the President returned to Flynn, saying "he is a good guy and has been through a lot." 237 The
President stated, "I hope you can see your way clear to letting this go, to letting Flynn go. He is a
good guy. I hope you can let this go." 238 Comey agreed that Flynn "is a good guy," but did not
commit to ending the investigation of Flynn. 239 Comey testified under oath that he took the
President's statement "as a direction" because of the President's position and the circumstances of
the one-on-one meeting. 240
233
Comey 11/15/17 302, at 10; Comey 2/14/17 Memorandum, at 1; Hearing on Russian Election
the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 4). Sessions recalled that the President asked
to speak to Comey alone and that Sessions was one of the last to leave the room; he described Comey's
testimony about the events leading up to the private meeting with the President as "pretty accurate."
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 6. Kushner had no recollection of whether the President asked Comey to stay
behind. Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 24.
234
Comey 2/14/17 Memorandum, at 2; Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 18.
235
236
237
238
Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 5);
Comey 2/14/17 Memorandum, at 2. Comey said he was highly confident that the words in quotations in
his Memorandum documenting this meeting were the exact words used by the President. He said he knew
from the outset of the meeting that he was about to have a conversation of consequence, and he remembered
the words used by the President and wrote them down soon after the meeting. Comey 11/15/17 302, at 10-
11.
239
Comey 11/15/17 302, at 10; Comey 2/14/17 Memorandum, at 2.
240
Cong. (June 8, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 31) (testimony of James B. Comey, former Director of the
FBI). Comey further stated, "I mean, this is the president of the United States, with me alone, saying, Ì
hope' this. I took it as, this is what he wants me to do." Id.; see also Comey 11/15/17 302, at 10 (Comey
took the statement as an order to shut down the Flynn investigation).
40
Shortly after meeting with the President, Comey began drafting a memorandum documenting
their conversation. 241 Comey also met with his senior leadership team to discuss the President's
request, and they agreed not to inform FBI officials working on the Flynn case of the President's
statements so the officials would not be influenced by the request. 242 Comey also asked for a meeting
with Sessions and requested that Sessions not leave Comey alone with the President again."
8. The Media Raises Questions About the President's Delay in Terminating Flynn
After Flynn was forced to resign, the press raised questions about why the President waited
more than two weeks after the DOJ notification to remove Flynn and whether the President had
known about Flynn's contacts with Kislyak before the DOJ notification. 244 The press also continued
to raise questions about connections between Russia and the President's campaign.' On February 15,
2017, the President told reporters, "General Flynn is a wonderful man. I think he's been treated very,
very unfairly by the media." 246 On February 16, 2017, the President held
241
Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the record of James B. Comey, former
242 Comey 11/15/17 302, at 11; Rybicki 6/9/17 302, at 4; Rybicki 6/22/17 302, at 1; Hearing on
Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017)
(Statement for the record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 5-6).
Comey 11/15/17 302, at 11; Rybicki 6/9/17 302, at 4-5; Rybicki 6/22/17 302, at 1-2; Sessions 1/17/18
243
302, at 6 (confirming that later in the week following Comey's one-on-one meeting with the President in the
Oval Office, Comey told the Attorney General that he did not want to be alone with the President); Hunt 2/1/18
302, at 6 (within days of the February 14 Oval Office meeting, Comey told Sessions he did not think it was
appropriate for the FBI Director to meet alone with the President); Rybicki 11/21/18 302, at 4 (Rybicki helped
to schedule the meeting with Sessions because Comey wanted to talk about his concerns about meeting with
the President alone); Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence
Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the record of James B. Comey, former Director of the
FBI, at 6).
244
See, e.g., Sean Spicer, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (Feb. 14, 2017) (questions from the
press included, "if [the President] was notified 17 days ago that Flynn had misled the Vice President, other
officials here, and that he was a potential threat to blackmail by the Russians, why would he be kept on for
almost three weeks?" and "Did the President instruct [Flynn] to talk about sanctions with the [Russian
ambassador]?"). Priebus recalled that the President initially equivocated on whether to fire Flynn because
it would generate negative press to lose his National Security Advisor so early in his term. Priebus 1/18/18
302, at 8.
245
E.g., Sean Sullivan et al., Senators from both parties pledge to deepen probe of Russia and the 2016
election, Washington Post (Feb. 14, 2017); Aaron Blake, 5 times Donald Trump's team denied contact with
Russia, Washington Post (Feb. 15, 2017); Oren Dorell, Donald Trump's ties to Russia go back 30 years, USA
Today (Feb. 15, 2017); Pamela Brown et al., Trump aides were in constant touch with senior Russian officials
during campaign, CNN (Feb. 15, 2017); Austin Wright, Comey briefs senators amid furor over Trump-Russia
ties, Politico (Feb. 17, 2017); Megan Twohey & Scott Shane, A Back-Channel Plan for Ukraine and Russia,
Courtesy of Trump Associates, New York Times (Feb. 19, 2017).
Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel in Joint Press Conference,
246
White House (Feb. 15, 2017).
41
a press conference and said that he removed Flynn because Flynn "didn't tell the Vice President of
the United States the facts, and then he didn't remember. And that just wasn't acceptable to me." 247
The President said he did not direct Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak, but "it certainly would
have been okay with me if he did. I would have directed him to do it if I thought he wasn't doing it. I
didn't direct him, but I would have directed him because that's his job." 248 In listing the reasons for
terminating Flynn, the President did not say that Flynn had lied to him. 249 The President also denied
having any connection to Russia, stating, "I have nothing to do with Russia. I told you, I have no
deals there. I have no anything."' The President also said he "had nothing to do with" WikiLeaks's
publication of information hacked from the Clinton campaign.25I
9. The President Attempts to Have K.T. McFarland Create a Witness Statement

Denying that he Directed Flynn's Discussions with Kislyak
On February 22, 2017, Priebus and Bannon told McFarland that the President wanted her to
resign as Deputy National Security Advisor, but they suggested to her that the Administration could
make her the ambassador to Singapore.' The next day, the President asked Priebus to have McFarland
draft an internal email that would confirm that the President did not direct Flynn to call the Russian
Ambassador about sanctions.' Priebus said he told the President he would only direct McFarland to
write such a letter if she were comfortable with it.254 Priebus called McFarland into his office to convey
the President's request that she memorialize in writing that the President did not direct Flynn to talk to
Kislyak.255 McFarland told Priebus she did not know whether the President had directed Flynn to talk
to Kislyak about sanctions, and she declined to say yes or no
247
Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2017).
248
Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2017). The President
also said that Flynn's conduct "wasn't wrong — what he did in terms of the information he saw." The
President said that Flynn was just "doing the job," and "if anything, he did something right."
Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2017); Priebus
249
1/18/18 302, at 9.
250
251
252
KTMF_00000047 (McFarland 2/26/17 Memorandum for the Record); McFarland 12/22/17
302, at 16-17.
See Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 11; see also KTMF_00000048 (McFarland 2/26/17
253
Memorandum for the Record); McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 17.

254
Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 1 1 .
255
KTMF 00000048 (McFarland 2/26/17 Memorandum for the Record); McFarland 12/22/17
302, at 17.
42
to the request.256 Priebus understood that McFarland was not comfortable with the President's request,
and he recommended that she talk to attorneys in the White House Counsel's Office.257
McFarland then reached out to Eisenberg.258 McFarland told him that she had been fired from
her job as Deputy National Security Advisor and offered the ambassadorship in Singapore but that
the President and Priebus wanted a letter from her denying that the President directed Flynn to discuss
sanctions with Kislyak.259 Eisenberg advised McFarland not to write the requested letter. 26° As
documented by McFarland in a contemporaneous "Memorandum for the Record" that she wrote
because she was concerned by the President's request: "Eisenberg . . . thought the requested email
and letter would be a bad idea - from my side because the email would be awkward. Why would I be
emailing Priebus to make a statement for the record? But it would also be a bad idea for the President
because it looked as if my ambassadorial appointment was in some way a quid pro quo." 261 Later that
evening, Priebus stopped by McFarland's office and told her not to write the email and to forget he
even mentioned it. 262
Around the same time, the President asked Priebus to reach out to Flynn and let him know that
the President still cared about him.263 Priebus called Flynn and said that he was checking in and that
Flynn was an American hero.264 Priebus thought the President did not want Flynn saying bad things
about him.265
On March 31, 2017, following news that Flynn had offered to testify before the FBI and
congressional investigators in exchange for immunity, the President tweeted, "Mike Flynn should ask
for immunity in that this is a witch hunt (excuse for big election loss), by media & Dems, of
KTMF_00000047 (McFarland 2/26/17 Memorandum for the Record) ("I said I did not know
256
whether he did or didn't, but was in Maralago the week between Christmas and New Year's (while Flynn was
on vacation in Carribean) and I was not aware of any Flynn-Trump, or Trump-Russian phone calls");
McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 17.
257
Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 11.
258
McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 17.
259
McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 17.
260
KTMF_00000048 (McFarland 2/26/17 Memorandum for the Record); McFarland 12/22/17
302, at 17.
KTMF_00000048 (McFarland 2/26/17 Memorandum for the Record); see McFarland
261
12/22/17 302, at 17.

McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 17; KTMF_00000048 (McFarland 2/26/17 Memorandum for
262
the Record).
263
Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 9.
264
265
Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 9-10.
43
historic proportion!"266 In late March or early April, the President asked McFarland to pass a message
to Flynn telling him the President felt bad for him and that he should stay strong.267
Analysis
In analyzing the President's conduct related to the Flynn investigation, the following evidence
is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice:
a. Obstructive act. According to Comey's account of his February 14, 2017 meeting in
the Oval Office, the President told him, "I hope you can see your way clear to letting this go, to
letting Flynn go. . . . I hope you can let this go." In analyzing whether these statements constitute
an obstructive act, a threshold question is whether Comey's account of the interaction is accurate,
and, if so, whether the President's statements had the tendency to impede the administration of
justice by shutting down an inquiry that could result in a grand jury investigation and a criminal
charge.
After Comey's account of the President's request to "Iet[] Flynn go" became public, the
President publicly disputed several aspects of the story. The President told the New York Times that
he did not "shoo other people out of the room" when he talked to Comey and that he did not remember
having a one-on-one conversation with Comey.268 The President also publicly denied that he had asked
Comey to "let[] Flynn go" or otherwise communicated that Comey should drop the investigation of
Flynn.269 In private, the President denied aspects of Comey's account to White House advisors, but
acknowledged to Priebus that he brought Flynn up in the meeting with Comey and stated that Flynn
was a good guy.27° Despite those denials, substantial evidence corroborates Comey's account.
266 @realDonaldTrump 3/31/17 (7:04 a.m. ET) Tweet; see Shane Harris at al., Mike Flynn
Offers to Testes in Exchange for Immunity, Wall Street Journal (Mar. 30, 2017).
267
McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 18.
Excerpts From The Times 's Interview With Trump, New York Times (July 19, 2017). Hicks
268
recalled that the President told her he had never asked Comey to stay behind in his office. Hicks
12/8/17 302, at 12.
269
In a statement on May 16, 2017, the White House said: "While the President has repeatedly
expressed his view that General Flynn is a decent man who served and protected our country, the President
has never asked Mr. Comey or anyone else to end any investigation, including any investigation involving
General Flynn. . . . This is not a truthful or accurate portrayal of the conversation between the President and
Mr. Comey." See Michael S. Schmidt, Comey Memorandum Says Trump Asked Him to End Flynn
Investigation, New York Times (May 16, 2017) (quoting White House statement); @realDonaldTrump
12/3/17 (6:15 a.m. ET) Tweet ("I never asked Comey to stop investigating Flynn. Just more Fake News
covering another Comey lie!").
Priebus recalled that the President acknowledged telling Comey that Flynn was a good guy and
270
he hoped "everything worked out for him." Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 19. McGahn recalled that the President
denied saying to Comey that he hoped Comey would let Flynn go, but added that he was "allowed to hope."
The President told McGahn he did not think he had crossed any lines. McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 8.
44
First, Comey wrote a detailed memorandum of his encounter with the President on the same
day it occurred. Comey also told senior FBI officials about the meeting with the President that day,
and their recollections of what Comey told them at the time are consistent with Comey's account. 271
Second, Comey provided testimony about the President's request that he "let[] Flynn go" under
oath in congressional proceedings and in interviews with federal investigators subject to penalties for
lying under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Comey's recollections of the encounter have remained consistent over
time.
Third, the objective, corroborated circumstances of how the one-on-one meeting came to occur
support Comey's description of the event. Comey recalled that the President cleared the room to speak
with Comey alone after a homeland security briefing in the Oval Office, that Kushner and Sessions
lingered and had to be shooed out by the President, and that Priebus briefly opened the door during
the meeting, prompting the President to wave him away. While the President has publicly denied those
details, other Administration officials who were present have confirmed Comey's account of how he
ended up in a one-on-one meeting with the President.272 And the President acknowledged to Priebus
and McGahn that he in fact spoke to Comey about Flynn in their one-on-one meeting.
Fourth, the President's decision to clear the room and, in particular, to exclude the Attorney
General from the meeting signals that the President wanted to be alone with Comey, which is
consistent with the delivery of a message of the type that Comey recalls, rather than a more innocuous
conversation that could have occurred in the presence of the Attorney General.
Finally, Comey's reaction to the President's statements is consistent with the President having
asked him to "let[] Flynn go." Comey met with the FBI leadership team, which agreed to keep the
President's statements closely held and not to inform the team working on the Flynn investigation so
that they would not be influenced by the President's request. Comey also promptly met with the
Attorney General to ask him not to be left alone with the President again, an account verified by
Sessions, FBI Chief of Staff James Rybicki, and Jody Hunt, who was then the Attorney General's
chief of staff.
A second question is whether the President's statements, which were not phrased as a direct
order to Comey, could impede or interfere with the FBI's investigation of Flynn. While the President
said he "hope[d]" Comey could "let[] Flynn go," rather than affirmatively directing him to do so,
the circumstances of the conversation show that the President was asking Comey to close the FBI's
investigation into Flynn. First, the President arranged the meeting with Comey so that they would
be alone and purposely excluded the Attorney General, which suggests that the President meant to
make a request to Comey that he did not want anyone else to hear. Second, because the President is
the head of the Executive Branch, when he says that he "hopes" a subordinate will do something, it
is reasonable to expect that the subordinate will do what the President wants. Indeed, the President
repeated a version of "let this go" three times, and Comey
271
Rybicki 11/21/18 302, at 4; McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 13-14.
272
See Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 18; Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 6.
45
testified that he understood the President's statements as a directive, which is corroborated by the way
Comey reacted at the time.
b. Nexus to a proceeding. To establish a nexus to a proceeding, it would be necessary to

show that the President could reasonably foresee and actually contemplated that the investigation of
Flynn was likely to lead to a grand jury investigation or prosecution.
At the time of the President's one-on-one meeting with Comey, no grand jury subpoenas had
been issued as part of the FBI's investi ation into Fl nn. But Fl nn's lies to the FBI violated
federal criminal law, and resulted in Flynn's
prosecution for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001. By the time the President spoke to Comey about Flynn,
DOJ officials had informed McGahn, who informed the President, that Flynn's statements to senior
White House officials about his contacts with Kislyak were not true and that Flynn had told the same
version of events to the FBI. McGahn also informed the President that Flynn's conduct could violate
18 U.S.C. § 1001. After the Vice President and senior White House officials reviewed the underlying
information about Flynn's calls on February 10, 2017, they believed that Flynn could not have
forgotten his conversations with Kislyak and concluded that he had been lying. In addition, the
President's instruction to the FBI Director to "leg] Flynn go" suggests his awareness that Flynn could
face criminal exposure for his conduct and was at risk of prosecution.
c. Intent. As part of our investigation, we examined whether the President had a personal
stake in the outcome of an investigation into Flynn—for example, whether the President was aware
of Flynn's communications with Kislyak close in time to when they occurred, such that the President
knew that Flynn had lied to senior White House officials and that those lies had been passed on to
the public. Some evidence suggests that the President knew about the existence and content of Flynn's
calls when they occurred, but the evidence is inconclusive and could not be relied upon to establish
the President's knowledge. In advance of Flynn's initial call with Kislyak, the President attended a
meeting where the sanctions were discussed and an advisor may have mentioned that Flynn was
scheduled to talk to Kislyak. Flynn told McFarland about the substance of his calls with Kislyak and
said they may have made a difference in Russia's response, and Flynn recalled talking to Bannon in
early January 2017 about how they had successfully "stopped the train on Russia's response" to the
sanctions. It would have been reasonable for Flynn to have wanted the President to know of his
communications with Kislyak because Kislyak told Flynn his request had been received at the highest
levels in Russia and that Russia had chosen not to retaliate in response to the request, and the
President was pleased by the Russian response, calling it a "[g]reat move." And the President never
said publicly or internally that Flynn had lied to him about the calls with Kislyak.
But McFarland did not recall providing the President-Elect with Flynn's read-out of his calls
with Kislyak, and Flynn does not have a specific recollection of telling the President -Elect directly
about the calls. Bannon also said he did not recall hearing about the calls from Flynn. And in
February 2017, the President asked Flynn what was discussed on the calls and whether he had lied
to the Vice President, suggesting that he did not already know. Our investigation accordingly did
not produce evidence that established that the President knew about Flynn's discussions of
sanctions before the Department of Justice notified the White House of those discussions in late
January 2017. The evidence also does not establish that Flynn otherwise
46
possessed information damaging to the President that would give the President a personal incentive
to end the FBI's inquiry into Flynn's conduct.
Evidence does establish that the President connected the Flynn investigation to the FBI's
broader Russia investigation and that he believed, as he told Christie, that terminating Flynn would
end "the whole Russia thing." Flynn's firing occurred at a time when the media and Congress were
raising questions about Russia's interference in the election and whether members of the President's
campaign had colluded with Russia. Multiple witnesses recalled that the President viewed the Russia
investigations as a challenge to the legitimacy of his election. The President paid careful attention to
negative coverage of Flynn and reacted with annoyance and anger when the story broke disclosing
that Flynn had discussed sanctions with Kislyak. Just hours before meeting one-on-one with Comey,
the President told Christie that firing Flynn would put an end to the Russia inquiries. And after
Christie pushed back, telling the President that firing Flynn would not end the Russia investigation,
the President asked Christie to reach out to Comey and convey that the President liked him and he
was part of "the team." That afternoon, the President cleared the room and asked Comey to "let[]
Flynn go."
We also sought evidence relevant to assessing whether the President's direction to Comey
was motivated by sympathy towards Flynn. In public statements the President repeatedly described
Flynn as a good person who had been harmed by the Russia investigation, and the President directed
advisors to reach out to Flynn to tell him the President "care[d]" about him and felt bad for him. At
the same time, multiple senior advisors, including Bannon, Priebus, and Hicks, said that the
President had become unhappy with Flynn well before Flynn was forced to resign and that the
President was frequently irritated with Flynn. Priebus said he believed the President's initial
reluctance to fire Flynn stemmed not from personal regard, but from concern about the negative
press that would be generated by firing the National Security Advisor so early in the Administration.
And Priebus indicated that the President's post-firing expressions of support for Flynn were
motivated by the President's desire to keep Flynn from saying negative things about him.
The way in which the President communicated the request to Comey also is relevant to
understanding the President's intent. When the President first learned about the FBI investigation
into Flynn, he told McGahn, Bannon, and Priebus not to discuss the matter with anyone else in the
White House. The next day, the President invited Comey for a one-on-one dinner against the advice
of an aide who recommended that other White House officials also attend. At the dinner, the President
asked Comey for "loyalty" and, at a different point in the conversation, mentioned that Flynn had
judgment issues. When the President met with Comey the day after Flynn's termination—shortly
after being told by Christie that firing Flynn would not end the Russia investigation—the President
cleared the room, even excluding the Attorney General, so that he could again speak to Comey alone.
The President's decision to meet one-on-one with Comey contravened the advice of the White House
Counsel that the President should not communicate directly with the Department of Justice to avoid
any appearance of interfering in law enforcement activities. And the President later denied that he
cleared the room and asked Comey to "let[] Flynn go"—a denial that would have been unnecessary
if he believed his request was a proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
47
Finally, the President's effort to have McFarland write an internal email denying that the
President had directed Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak highlights the President's concern about
being associated with Flynn's conduct. The evidence does not establish that the President was trying
to have McFarland lie. The President's request, however, was sufficiently irregular that McFarland—
who did not know the full extent of Flynn's communications with the President and thus could not
make the representation the President wanted—felt the need to draft an internal memorandum
documenting the President's request, and Eisenberg was concerned that the request would look like a
quid pro quo in exchange for an ambassadorship.
C. The President's Reaction to Public Confirmation of the FBI's Russia

Investigation
Overview
In early March 2017, the President learned that Sessions was considering recusing from the
Russia investigation and tried to prevent the recusal. After Sessions announced his recusal on March
2, the President expressed anger at Sessions for the decision and then privately asked Sessions to
"unrecuse." On March 20, 2017, Comey publicly disclosed the existence of the FBI's Russia
investigation. In the days that followed, the President contacted Comey and other intelligence
agency leaders and asked them to push back publicly on the suggestion that the President had any
connection to the Russian election-interference effort in order to "lift the cloud" of the ongoing
investigation.
Evidence
1. Attorney General Sessions Recuses From the Russia Investigation
In late February 2017, the Department of Justice began an internal analysis of whether Sessions
should recuse from the Russia investigation based on his role in the 2016 Trump Campaign. 273 On
March 1, 2017, the press reported that, in his January confirmation hearing to become Attorney
General, Senator Sessions had not disclosed two meetings he had with Russian Ambassador Kislyak
before the presidential election, leading to congressional calls for Sessions to recuse or for a special
counsel to investigate Russia's interference in the presidential election.274
Also on March 1, the President called Comey and said he wanted to check in and see how
Comey was doing.275 According to an email Comey sent to his chief of staff after the call, the President
"talked about Sessions a bit," said that he had heard Comey was "doing great," and said that he hoped
Comey would come by to say hello when he was at the White House?' Comey
273
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 1; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 3.
274
E.g., Adam Entous et al., Sessions met with Russian envoy twice last year, encounters he
later did not disclose, Washington Post (Mar. 1, 2017).
3/1/17 Email, Comey to Rybicki; SCR012b_000030 (President's Daily Diary, 3/1/17,
275
reflecting call with Comey at 11:55 am.)

276
3/1/17 Email, Comey to Rybicki; see Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate
Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 86) (testimony
48
interpreted the call as an effort by the President to "pull [him] in," but he did not perceive the call as
an attempt by the President to find out what Comey was doing with the Flynn investigation.'
The next morning, the President called McGahn and urged him to contact Sessions to tell
him not to recuse himself from the Russia investigation?' McGahn understood the President to be
concerned that a recusal would make Sessions look guilty for omitting details in his confirmation
hearing; leave the President unprotected from an investigation that could hobble the presidency
and derail his policy objectives; and detract from favorable press coverage of a Presidential
Address to Congress the President had delivered earlier in the week.' McGahn reached out to
Sessions and reported that the President was not happy about the possibility of recusal. 280
Sessions replied that he intended to follow the rules on recusal. 281 McGahn reported back to the
President about the call with Sessions, and the President reiterated that he did not want Sessions
to recuse.282 Throughout the day, McGahn continued trying on behalf of the President to avert
Sessions's recusal by speaking to Sessions's personal counsel, Sessions's chief of staff, and Senate
Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, and by contacting Sessions himself two more times.' Sessions
recalled that other White House advisors also called him that day to argue against his recusal .284
That afternoon, Sessions announced his decision to recuse "from any existing or future
investigations of any matters related in any way to the campaigns for President of the United States."285
Sessions believed the decision to recuse was not a close call, given the applicable
of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI) ("[H]e called me one day. . . . [H]e just called to check
in and tell me I was doing an awesome job, and wanted to see how I was doing.").
277
Comey 11/15/17 302, at 17-18.
278
McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 16.
McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 16-17; see SC_ AD_ 00123 (Donaldson 3/2/17 Notes) ("Just in the
279
middle of another Russia Fiasco.").

280
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 3.
281
McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 17.
282
McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 17.
McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 18-19; Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 3; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 4; Donaldson
283
11/6/17 302, at 8-10; see Hunt-000017; SC_AD_00121 (Donaldson 3/2/17 Notes).

284
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 3.
285
Attorney General Sessions Statement on Recusal, Department of Justice Press Release (Mar. 2,
2017) ("During the course of the last several weeks, I have met with the relevant senior career Department
officials to discuss whether I should recuse myself from any matters arising from the campaigns for President
of the United States. Having concluded those meetings today, I have decided to recuse myself from any
existing or future investigations of any matters related in any way to the campaigns for President of the United
States."). At the time of Sessions's recusal, Dana Boente, then the Acting Deputy Attorney General and U.S.
Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, became the Acting Attorney General for campaign-related
matters pursuant to an executive order specifying the order of succession at the Department of Justice. Id.
("Consistent with the succession order for the Department of Justice, . . . Dana Boente shall act as and perform
the functions of the Attorney General with respect to any matters from
49
language in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), which Sessions considered to be clear and
decisive. 286 Sessions thought that any argument that the CFR did not apply to him was "very
thin."' Sessions got the impression, based on calls he received from White House officials, that
the President was very upset with him and did not think he had done his duty as Attorney
General. 288
Shortly after Sessions announced his recusal, the White House Counsel's Office directed that
Sessions should not be contacted about the matter. 289 Internal White House Counsel's Office notes from
March 2, 2017, state "No contact w/Sessions" and "No comms / Serious concerns about obstruction." 29°
On March 3, the day after Sessions's recusal, McGahn was called into the Oval Office. 29I
Other advisors were there, including Priebus and Bannon. 292 The President opened the
conversation by saying, "I don't have a lawyer."' The President expressed anger at McGahn about
the recusal and brought up Roy Cohn, stating that he wished Cohn was his attorney. 294 McGahn
interpreted this comment as directed at him, suggesting that Cohn would fight for th e
which I have recused myself to the extent they exist."); see Exec. Order No. 13775, 82 Fed. Reg. 10697
(Feb. 14, 2017).
286
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 1-2. 28 C.F.R. § 45.2 provides that "no employee shall participate in a
criminal investigation or prosecution if he has a personal or political relationship with . . . [a]ny person or
organization substantially involved in the conduct that is the subject of the investigation or prosecution," and
defines "political relationship" as "a close identification with an elected official, a candidate (whether or not
successful) for elective, public office, a political party, or a campaign organization, arising from service as a
principal adviser thereto or a principal official thereof."
287
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 2.
288
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 3.
Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 11; SC_AD_00123 (Donaldson 3/2/17 Notes). It is not clear whether
289
the President was aware of the White House Counsel's Office direction not to contact Sessions about his
recusal.
SC_AD_00123 (Donaldson 3/2/17 Notes). McGahn said he believed the note "No comms /
29°
Serious concerns about obstruction" may have referred to concerns McGahn had about the press team
saying "crazy things" and trying to spin Sessions's recusal in a way that would raise concerns about
obstruction. McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 19. Donaldson recalled that "No comms" referred to the order that
no one should contact Sessions. Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 11.
291
McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 2.
292
McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 2.
293
McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 2.
McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 2. Cohn had previously served as a lawyer for the President during his
294
career as a private businessman. Priebus recalled that when the President talked about Cohn, he said Cohn
would win cases for him that had no chance, and that Cohn had done incredible things for him. Priebus
4/3/18 302, at 5. Bannon recalled the President describing Cohn as a winner and a fixer, someone who got
things done. Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 6.
50
President whereas McGahn would not.295 The President wanted McGahn to talk to Sessions about
the recusal, but McGahn told the President that DOJ ethics officials had weighed in on Sessions's
decision to recuse." The President then brought up former Attorneys General Robert Kennedy and
Eric Holder and said that they had protected their presidents. 297 The President also pushed back on
the DOJ contacts policy, and said words to the effect of, "You're telling me that Bobby and Jack
didn't talk about investigations? Or Obama didn't tell Eric Holder who to investigate?"298 Bannon
recalled that the President was as mad as Bannon had ever seen him and that he screamed at McGahn
about how weak Sessions was.2" Bannon recalled telling the President that Sessions's recusal was
not a surprise and that before the inauguration they had discussed that Sessions would have to recuse
from campaign-related investigations because of his work on the Trump Campaign. 30°
That weekend, Sessions and McGahn flew to Mar-a-Lago to meet with the President.30I
Sessions recalled that the President pulled him aside to speak to him alone and suggested that Sessions
should "unrecuse" from the Russia investigation.302 The President contrasted Sessions with Attorneys
General Holder and Kennedy, who had developed a strategy to help their presidents where Sessions
had not.303 Sessions said he had the impression that the President feared that the investigation could
spin out of control and disrupt his ability to govern, which Sessions could have helped avert if he were
still overseeing it.304
On March 5, 2017, the White House Counsel's Office was informed that the FBI was asking for
transition-period records relating to Flynn—indicating that the FBI was still actively investigating
him.305 On March 6, the President told advisors he wanted to call the Acting Attorney
295
McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 2.
296
McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 2.
297
McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 3. Bannon said the President saw Robert Kennedy and Eric Holder as
Attorneys General who protected the presidents they served. The President thought Holder always stood
up for President Obama and even took a contempt charge for him, and Robert Kennedy always had his
brother's back. Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 5. Priebus recalled that the President said he had been told his entire
life he needed to have a great lawyer, a "bulldog," and added that Holder had been willing to take a
contempt-of-Congress charge for President Obama. Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 5.
298
McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 3.
299
Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 5.
300
Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 5.
31:"
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 3; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 5; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 3.
302
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 3-4.
303
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 3-4
304
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 3-4. Hicks recalled that after Sessions recused, the President was angry
and scolded Sessions in her presence, but she could not remember exactly when that conversation occurred.
Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 13.
305
SC_AD___000137 (Donaldson 3/5/17 Notes); see Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 13.
51
General to find out whether the White House or the President was being investigated, although it is
not clear whether the President knew at that time of the FBI's recent request concerning Flynn.3°6
2. FBI Director Comey Publicly Confirms the Existence of the Russia

Investigation in Testimony Before HPSCI
On March 9, 2017, Comey briefed the "Gang of Eight" congressional leaders about the FBI's
investigation of Russian interference, including an identification of the principal U.S. subjects of
the investigation.m Although it is unclear whether the President knew of that briefing at the time,
notes taken by Annie Donaldson, then McGahn's chief of staff, on March 12, 2017, state, "POTUS
in panic/chaos . . Need binders to put in front of POTUS. (1) All things related to Russia." 308 The
week after Comey's briefing, the White House Counsel's Office was in contact with SSCI Chairman
Senator Richard Burr about the Russia investigations and appears to have received information
about the status of the FBI investigation.'
On March 20, 2017, Comey was scheduled to testify before HPSCI.31° In advance of Comey's
testimony, congressional officials made clear that they wanted Comey to provide information about
the ongoing FBI investigation.' Dana Boente, who at that time was the Acting Attorney General for
the Russia investigation, authorized Comey to confirm the existence of the Russia investigation and
agreed that Comey should decline to comment on whether any particular individuals, including the
President, were being investigated.312
Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 14; see SC_AD_000168 (Donaldson 3/6/17 Notes) ("POTUS wants to
306
call Dana [then the Acting Attorney General for campaign-related investigations] / Is investigation / No / We
know something on Flynn / GSA got contacted by FBI / There's something hot").
307
Comey 11/15/17 302, at 13-14; SNS-Classified-0000140-44 (3/8/17 Email, Gauhar to Page et
al.).
SC_AD_00188 (Donaldson 3/12/18 Notes). Donaldson said she was not part of the conversation that
308
led to these notes, and must have been told about it from others. Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 13.
Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 14-15. On March 16, 2017, the White House Counsel's Office was briefed
309
by Senator Burr on the existence of "4-5 targets." Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 15. The "targets" were identified
in notes taken by Donaldson as "Flynn (FBI was in—wra • sin: u • —*DOJ looking for phone
records"; "Comey—>Manafort (Ukr + Russia, not campaign)"; HOM "Carter Page ($
game)"; and "Greek Guy" (potentially referring to George Papadopoulos, later charged with violating 18
U.S.C. § 1001 for lying to the FBI). SC_AD_00198 (Donaldson 3/16/17 Notes). Donaldson and McGahn
both said they believed these were targets of SSCI. Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 15; McGahn 12/12/17 302,
at 4. But SSCI does not formally investigate individuals as "targets"; the notes on their face reference the
FBI, the Department of Justice, and Comey; and the notes track the background materials prepared by the
FBI for Comey's briefing to the Gang of 8 on March 9. See SNS-Classified-0000140-44 (3/8/17 Email,
Gauhar to Page et al.); see also Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 15 (Donaldson could not rule out that Burr had
told McGahn those individuals were the FBI's targets).
Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence
310
Committee, 115th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017).

311
Comey 11/15/17 302, at 16; McCabe 8/17/17, at 15; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 1.
312
Boente 1/31/18 302, at 5; Comey 11/15/17 302, at 16-17.
52
In his opening remarks at the HPSCI hearing, which were drafted in consultation with the
Department of Justice, Comey stated that he had "been authorized by the Department of Justice to
confirm that the FBI, as part of [its] counterintelligence mission, is investigating the Russian
government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election and that includes investigating the
nature of any links between individuals associated with the Trump campaign and the Russian
government and whether there was any coordination between the campaign and Russia's efforts. As
with any counterintelligence investigation, this will also include an assessment of whether any crimes
were committed."' Comey added that he would not comment further on what the FBI was "doing and
whose conduct [it] [was] examining" because the investigation was ongoing and classified—but he
observed that he had "taken the extraordinary step in consultation with the Department of Justice of
briefing this Congress's leaders . . . in a classified setting in detail about the investigation."314 Comey
was specifically asked whether President Trump was "under investigation during the campaign" or
"under investigation now."315 Comey declined to answer, stating, "Please don't over interpret what I've
said as—as the chair and ranking know, we have briefed him in great detail on the subjects of the
investigation and what we're doing, but I'm not gonna answer about anybody in this forum."316 Comey
was also asked whether the FBI was investigating the information contained in the Steele reporting,
and he declined to answer.31"
According to McGahn and Donaldson, the President had expressed frustration with Comey
before his March 20 testimony, and the testimony made matters worse." The President had previously
criticized Comey for too frequently making headlines and for not attending intelligence briefings at
the White House, and the President suspected Comey of leaking certain information to the media. 319
McGahn said the President thought Comey was acting like "his own branch of government."'
313
Committee, 115th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 11) (testimony by FBI Director James B.
Comey); Comey 11/15/17 302, at 17; Boente 1/31/18 302, at 5 (confirming that the Department of Justice
authorized Comey's remarks).
314
Committee, 115th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 11) (testimony by FBI Director
James B. Comey ).
315
Committee, 115th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 130) (question by Rep. Swalwell).
316
James B. Comey).
317
James B. Comey).
318
Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 21; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 7.
319
Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 21; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 6-9.
320
McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 7.
53
Press reports following Comey's March 20 testimony suggested that the FBI was investigating
the President, contrary to what Comey had told the President at the end of the January 6, 2017
intelligence assessment briefing.321 McGahn, Donaldson, and senior advisor Stephen Miller recalled
that the President was upset with Comey's testimony and the press coverage that followed because of
the suggestion that the President was under investigation.322 Notes from the White House Counsel's
Office dated March 21, 2017, indicate that the President was "beside himself' over Comey's
testimony.323 The President called McGahn repeatedly that day to ask him to intervene with the
Department of Justice, and, according to the notes, the President was "getting hotter and hotter, get
rid?"324 Officials in the White House Counsel's Office became so concerned that the President would
fire Comey that they began drafting a memorandum that examined whether the President needed cause
to terminate the FBI director.325
At the President's urging, McGahn contacted Boente several times on March 21, 2017, to seek
Boente's assistance in having Comey or the Department of Justice correct the misperception that the
President was under investigation.326 Boente did not specifically recall the conversations, although he
did remember one conversation with McGahn around this time where McGahn asked if there was a
way to speed up or end the Russia investigation as quickly as possible. 327 Boente said McGahn told
him the President was under a cloud and it made it hard for him to govern.328 Boente recalled telling
McGahn that there was no good way to shorten the investigation and attempting to do so could erode
confidence in the investigation's conclusions.3' Boente said McGahn agreed and dropped the issue.33°
The President also sought to speak with Boente directly, but McGahn told the President that Boente
did not want to talk to the President about the request
E.g., Matt Apuzzo et al., F.B.I. Is Investigating Trump's Russia Ties, Comey Confirms, New York
321
Times (Mar. 20, 2017); Andy Greenberg. The FBI Has Been Investigating Trump's Russia Ties Since July,
Wired (Mar. 20, 2017); Julie Borger & Spencer Ackerman, Trump-Russia collusion is being investigated by
FBI, Comey confirms, Guardian (Mar. 20, 2017); see Comey 1/6/17 Memorandum, at 2.
322
Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 16-17; S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 4; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 5-7.
SC_AD_00213 (Donaldson 3/21/17 Notes). The notes from that day also indicate that the
323
President referred to the "Comey bombshell" which "made [him] look like a fool." SC_AD_00206
(Donaldson 3/21/17 Notes).
324
SC_AD 00210 (Donaldson 3/21/17 Notes).
325
SCR016_000002-05 (White House Counsel's Office Memorandum). White House Counsel's
Office attorney Uttam Dhillon did not recall a triggering event causing the White House Counsel's Office
to begin this research. Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 5. Metadata from the document, which was provided by the
White House, establishes that it was created on March 21, 2017.
326
Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 16-21; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 5-7.
327
Boente 1/31/18 302, at 5.
328
Boente 1/31/18 302, at 5.
329
Boente 1/31/18 302, at 5.
330
Boente 1/31/18 302, at 5.
54
to intervene with Comey.331 McGahn recalled Boente telling him in calls that day that he did not think
it was sustainable for Comey to stay on as FBI director for the next four years, which McGahn said
he conveyed to the President.' Boente did not recall discussing with McGahn or anyone else the idea
that Comey should not continue as FBI director.333
3. The President Asks Intelligence Community Leaders to Make Public Statements

that he had No Connection to Russia
In the weeks following Comey's March 20, 2017 testimony, the President repeatedly asked
intelligence community officials to push back publicly on any suggestion that the President had a
connection to the Russian election-interference effort.
On March 22, 2017, the President asked Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats and
CIA Director Michael Pompeo to stay behind in the Oval Office after a Presidential Daily Briefing. 334
According to Coats, the President asked them whether they could say publicly that no link existed
between him and Russia.335 Coats responded that the Office of the Director ofNational Intelligence
(ODNI) has nothing to do with investigations and it was not his role to make a public statement on
the Russia investigation.' Pompeo had no recollection of being asked to stay behind after the March
22 briefing, but he recalled that the President regularly urged officials to get the word out that he had
not done anything wrong related to Russia.'
Coats told this Office that the President never asked him to speak to Comey about the FBI
investigation.338 Some ODNI staffers, however, had a different recollection of how Coats described
the meeting immediately after it occurred. According to senior ODNI official Michael Dempsey,
Coats said after the meeting that the President had brought up the Russia investigation and asked
him to contact Comey to see if there was a way to get past the investigation, get it over with, end it,
or words to that effect.'" Dempsey said that Coats described the President's comments as falling
"somewhere between musing about hating the investigation" and wanting Coats to "do something
to stop it."34° Dempsey said Coats made it clear that he would not get involved with an ongoing FBI
investigation.341 Edward Gistaro, another ODNI official, recalled
331
SC AD_00210 (Donaldson 3/21/17 Notes); McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 7; Donaldson 11/6/17
302, at 19.
332
McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 7; Burnham 11/03/17 302, at 11.
333 Boente 1/31/18 302, at 3.
334
Coats 6/14/17 302, at 3; Culver 6/14/17 302, at 2.
335
Coats 6/14/17 302, at 3.
336
Coats 6/14/17 302, at 3.
337
Pompeo 6/28/17 302, at 1-3.
338
Coats 6/14/17 302, at 3.
339
Dempsey 6/14/17 302, at 2.
34°
Dempsey 6/14/17 302, at 2-3.
341
Dempsey 6/14/17 302, at 3.
55
that right after Coats's meeting with the President, on the walk from the Oval Office back to the
Eisenhower Executive Office Building, Coats said that the President had kept him behind to ask him
what he could do to "help with the investigation."342 Another ODNI staffer who had been waiting for
Coats outside the Oval Office talked to Gistaro a few minutes later and recalled Gistaro reporting that
Coats was upset because the President had asked him to contact Comey to convince him there was
nothing to the Russia investigation.343
On Saturday, March 25, 2017, three days after the meeting in the Oval Office, the President
called Coats and again complained about the Russia investigations, saying words to the effect of,
"I can't do anything with Russia, there's things I'd like to do with Russia, with trade, with ISIS, they're
all over me with this."344 Coats told the President that the investigations were going to go on and the
best thing to do was to let them run their course. 345 Coats later testified in a congressional hearing
that he had "never felt pressure to intervene or interfere in any way and shape—with shaping
intelligence in a political way, or in relationship . . . to an ongoing investigation." 346
On March 26, 2017, the day after the President called Coats, the President called NSA
Director Admiral Michael Rogers.347 The President expressed frustration with the Russia
investigation, saying that it made relations with the Russians difficult.'" The President told Rogers
"the thing with the Russians [wa]s messing up" his ability to get things done with Russia. 349 The
President also said that the news stories linking him with Russia were not true and asked Rogers if
he could do anything to refute the stories.' Deputy Director of the NSA Richard Ledgett, who was
present for the call, said it was the most unusual thing he had experienced in 40 years of government
service.351 After the call concluded, Ledgett prepared a memorandum that he and Rogers both signed
documenting the content of the conversation and the President's request, and they placed the
memorandum in a safe." But Rogers did not perceive the President's request to be an order, and the
President did not ask Rogers to push back on the Russia
342
Gistaro 6/14/17 302, at 2.
343
Culver 6/14/17 302, at 2-3.
344
Coats 6/14/17 302, at 4.
345
Coats 6/14/17 302, at 4; Dempsey 6/14/17 302, at 3 (Coats relayed that the President had asked
several times what Coats could do to help "get [the investigation] done," and Coats had repeatedly told the
President that fastest way to "get it done" was to let it run its course).
346
Hearing on Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Before the Senate Select Intelligence
Committee, 115th Cong. (June 7, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 25) (testimony by Daniel Coats,
Director of National Intelligence).
347
Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 3-4.
348
Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 4.
349
Ledgett 6/13/17 302, at 1-2; see Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 4.
350 Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 4-5; Ledgett 6/13/17 302, at 2.
351
Ledgett 6/13/17 302, at 2.
352
Ledgett 6/13/17 302, at 2-3; Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 4.
56
6
7 i-tterlity—Wer-k—Prettuet // May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
investigation itself.353 Rogers later testified in a congressional hearing that as NSA Director he had
"never been directed to do anything [he] believe[d] to be illegal, immoral, unethical or inappropriate"
and did "not recall ever feeling pressured to do so."354
In addition to the specific comments made to Coats, Pompeo, and Rogers, the President spoke
on other occasions in the presence of intelligence community officials about the Russia investigation
and stated that it interfered with his ability to conduct foreign relations.'" On at least two occasions,
the President began Presidential Daily Briefings by stating that there was no collusion with Russia
and he hoped a press statement to that effect could be issued. 356 Pompeo recalled that the President
vented about the investigation on multiple occasions, complaining that there was no evidence against
him and that nobody would publicly defend him. 357 Rogers recalled a private conversation with the
President in which he "vent[ed]" about the investigation, said he had done nothing wrong, and said
something like the "Russia thing has got to go away." 358 Coats recalled the President bringing up the
Russia investigation several times, and Coats said he finally told the President that Coats's job was
to provide intelligence and not get involved in investigations.359
4. The President Asks Comey to "Lift the Cloud" Created by the Russia
Investigation
On the morning of March 30, 2017, the President reached out to Comey directly about the
Russia investigation.360 According to Comey's contemporaneous record of the conversation, the
President said "he was trying to run the country and the cloud of this Russia business was making
353
Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 5; Ledgett 6/13/17 302, at 2.
Hearing on Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Before the Senate Select Intelligence
354
Committee, 115th Cong. (June 7, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 20) (testimony by Admiral Michael
Rogers, Director of the National Security Agency).
355
Gistaro 6/14/17 302, at 1, 3; Pompeo 6/28/17 302, at 2-3.
356
Gistaro 6/14/17 302, at 1.
357
Pompeo 6/28/17 302, at 2.
358
Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 6.
359
Coats 6/14/17 302, at 3-4.
360
SCR012b_000044 (President's Daily Diary, 3/30/17, reflecting call to Comey from 8:14 - 8:24 a.m.);
Comey 3/30/17 Memorandum, at 1 ("The President called me on my CMS phone at 8:13 am today . . . . The
call lasted 11 minutes (about 10 minutes when he was connected)."; Hearing on Russian Election Interference
Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of
James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 6).
57
that difficult."361 The President asked Comey what could be done to "lift the cloud." 362 Comey
explained "that we were running it down as quickly as possible and that there would be great benefit,
if we didn't find anything, to our Good Housekeeping seal of approval, but we had to do our work."363
Comey also told the President that congressional leaders were aware that the FBI was not
investigating the President personally. 364 The President said several times, "We need to get that fact
out."365 The President commented that if there was "some satellite" (which Comey took to mean an
associate of the President's or the campaign) that did something, "it would be good to find that out"
but that he himself had not done anything wrong and he hoped Comey "would find a way to get out
that we weren't investigating him."366 After the call ended, Comey called Boente and told him about
the conversation, asked for guidance on how to respond, and said he was uncomfortable with direct
contact from the President about the investigation. 367
On the morning of April 11, 2017, the President called Comey again.368 According to Comey's
contemporaneous record of the conversation, the President said he was "following up to see if
[Comey] did what [the President] had asked last time—getting out that he personally is not under
investigation."369 Comey responded that he had passed the request to Boente but not heard back, and
he informed the President that the traditional channel for such a request would be to
361
Comey 3/30/17 Memorandum, at 1. Comey subsequently testified before Congress about this
conversation and described it to our Office; his recollections were consistent with his memorandum.
Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong.
(June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 6); Comey
11/15/17 302, at 18.
362
363
364
365
former Director of the FBI, at 6). •
366
former Director of the FBI, at 6-7).
367
Comey 3/30/17 Memorandum, at 2; Boente 1/31/18 302, at 6-7; Hearing on Russian Election
SCR012b_000053 (President's Daily Diary, 4/11/17, reflecting call to Comey from 8:27 — 8:31
368
a.m.); Comey 4/11/17 Memorandum, at 1 ("I returned the president's call this morning at 8:26 am EDT.
We spoke for about four minutes.").
369
Comey 4/11/17 Memorandum, at 1. Comey subsequently testified before Congress about this
conversation and his recollections were consistent with his memo. Hearing on Russian Election
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have the White House Counsel contact DOJ leadership.37° The President said he would take that
step.371 The President then added, "Because I have been very loyal to you, very loyal, we had that
thing, you know."' In a televised interview that was taped early that afternoon, the President was asked
if it was too late for him to ask Comey to step down; the President responded, "No, it's not too late,
but you know, I have confidence in him. We'll see what happens. You know, it's going to be
interesting."373 After the interview, Hicks told the President she thought the President's comment about
Comey should be removed from the broadcast of the interview, but the President wanted to keep it in,
which Hicks thought was unusual.'
Later that day, the President told senior advisors, including McGahn and Priebus, that he had
reached out to Comey twice in recent weeks.375 The President acknowledged that McGahn would not
approve of the outreach to Comey because McGahn had previously cautioned the President that he
should not talk to Comey directly to prevent any perception that the White House was interfering with
investigations.376 The President told McGahn that Comey had indicated the FBI could make a public
statement that the President was not under investigation if the Department of Justice approved that
action.377 After speaking with the President, McGahn followed up with Boente to relay the President's
understanding that the FBI could make a public announcement if the Department of Justice cleared
4.378 McGahn recalled that Boente said Comey had told him there was nothing obstructive about the
calls from the President, but they made Comey uncomfortable.379 According to McGahn, Boente
responded that he did not want to issue a statement about the President not being under investigation
because of the potential political ramifications and did not want to order Comey to do it because that
action could prompt the
37°
Comey 4/11/17 Memorandum, at 1.
371
Comey 4/11/17 Memorandum, at 1.
Comey 4/11/17 Memorandum, at 1. In a footnote to this statement in his memorandum, Comey
372
wrote, "His use of these words did not fit with the flow of the call, which at that point had moved away
from any request of me, but I have recorded it here as it happened."
Maria Bartiromo, Interview with President Trump, Fox Business Network (Apr. 12, 2017);
373
SCR012b 000054 (President's Daily Diary, 4/11/17, reflecting Bartiromo interview from 12:30 - 12:55
p.m.).
374
Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 13.
375
Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 23; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 9.
Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 23; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 9; see McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 9; Dhillon
376
11/21/17 302, at 2 (stating that White House Counsel attorneys had advised the President not to contact the FBI
Director directly because it could create a perception he was interfering with investigations). Later in April,
the President told other attorneys in the White House Counsel's Office that he had called Comey even though
he knew they had advised against direct contact. Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 2 (recalling that the President said,
"I know you told me not to, but I called Comey anyway.").
377
McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 9.
378
McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 9.
McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 9; see Boente 1/31/18 302, at 6 (recalling that Comey told him after the
379
March 30, 2017 call that it was not obstructive).
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appointment of a Special Counse1.38° Boente did not recall that aspect of his conversation with
McGahn, but did recall telling McGahn that the direct outreaches from the President to Comey were
a problem.381 Boente recalled that McGahn agreed and said he would do what he could to address that
issue.382
Analysis
In analyzing the President's reaction to Sessions's recusal and the requests he made to Coats,
Pompeo, Rogers, and Comey, the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of
justice:
a. Obstructive act. The evidence shows that, after Comey's March 20, 2017 testimony,
the President repeatedly reached out to intelligence agency leaders to discuss the FBI's investigation.
But witnesses had different recollections of the precise content of those outreaches. Some ODNI
officials recalled that Coats told them immediately after the March 22 Oval Office meeting that the
President asked Coats to intervene with Comey and "stop" the investigation. But the first-hand
witnesses to the encounter remember the conversation differently. Pompeo had no memory of the
specific meeting, but generally recalled the President urging officials to get the word out that the
President had not done anything wrong related to Russia. Coats recalled that the President asked
that Coats state publicly that no link existed between the President and Russia, but did not ask him
to speak with Comey or to help end the investigation. The other outreaches by the President during
this period were similar in nature. The President asked Rogers if he could do anything to refute the
stories linking the President to Russia, and the President asked Comey to make a public statement
that would "lift the cloud" of the ongoing investigation by making clear that the President was not
personally under investigation. These requests, while significant enough that Rogers thought it
important to document the encounter in a written memorandum, were not interpreted by the officials
who received them as directives to improperly interfere with the investigation.
b. Nexus to a proceeding. At the time of the President's outreaches to leaders of the

intelligence agencies in late March and early April 2017, the FBI's Russia investigation did not yet
involve grand jury proceedings. The outreaches, however, came after and were in response to Comey's
March 20, 2017 announcement that the FBI, as a part of its counterintelligence mission, was
conducting an investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. Comey
testified that the investigation included any links or coordination with Trump campaign officials and
would "include an assessment of whether any crimes were committed."
c. Intent. As described above, the evidence does not establish that the President asked or
directed intelligence agency leaders to stop or interfere with the FBI's Russia investigation—and the
President affirmatively told Comey that if "some satellite" was involved in Russian election
interference "it would be good to find that out." But the President's intent in trying to prevent
Sessions's recusal, and in reaching out to Coats, Pompeo, Rogers, and Comey following
380
McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 9-10.
381
Boente 1/31/18 302, at 7; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 9.
382
Boente 1/31/18 302, at 7.
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A4terttey-Wefk-Pr-edeet II May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
Comey's public announcement of the FBI's Russia investigation, is nevertheless relevant to

understanding what motivated the President's other actions towards the investigation.
The evidence shows that the President was focused on the Russia investigation's implications
for his presidency—and, specifically, on dispelling any suggestion that he was under investigation or
had links to Russia. In early March, the President attempted to prevent Sessions's recusal, even after
being told that Sessions was following DOJ conflict-of-interest rules. After Sessions recused, the
White House Counsel's Office tried to cut off further contact with Sessions about the matter, although
it is not clear whether that direction was conveyed to the President. The President continued to raise
the issue of Sessions's recusal and, when he had the opportunity, he pulled Sessions aside and urged
him to unrecuse. The President also told advisors that he wanted an Attorney General who would
protect him, the way he perceived Robert Kennedy and Eric Holder to have protected their presidents.
The President made statements about being able to direct the course of criminal investigations, saying
words to the effect of, "You're telling me that Bobby and Jack didn't talk about investigations? Or
Obama didn't tell Eric Holder who to investigate?"
After Comey publicly confirmed the existence of the FBI's Russia investigation on March
20, 2017, the President was "beside himself" and expressed anger that Comey did not issue a
statement correcting any misperception that the President himself was under investigation. The
President sought to speak with Acting Attorney General Boente directly and told McGahn to contact
Boente to request that Comey make a clarifying statement. The President then asked other
intelligence community leaders to make public statements to refute the suggestion that the President
had links to Russia, but the leaders told him they could not publicly comment on the investigation.
On March 30 and April 11, against the advice of White House advisors who had informed him that
any direct contact with the FBI could be perceived as improper interference in an ongoing
investigation, the President made personal outreaches to Comey asking him to "lift the cloud" of
the Russia investigation by making public the fact that the President was not personally under
investigation.
Evidence indicates that the President was angered by both the existence of the Russia
investigation and the public reporting that he was under investigation, which he knew was not true
based on Comey's representations. The President complained to advisors that if people thought Russia
helped him with the election, it would detract from what he had accomplished.
Other evidence indicates that the President was concerned about the impact of the Russia
investigation on his ability to govern. The President complained that the perception that he was under
investigation was hurting his ability to conduct foreign relations, particularly with Russia. The
President told Coats he "can't do anything with Russia," he told Rogers that "the thing with the
Russians" was interfering with his ability to conduct foreign affairs, and he told Comey that "he was
trying to run the country and the cloud of this Russia business was making that difficult."
61
D. Events Leading Up To and Surrounding the Termination of FBI

Director
Comey
Overview
Comey was scheduled to testify before Congress on May 3, 2017. Leading up to that
testimony, the President continued to tell advisors that he wanted Comey to make public that the
President was not under investigation. At the hearing, Comey declined to answer questions about the
scope or subjects of the Russia investigation and did not state publicly that the President was not
under investigation. Two days later, on May 5, 2017, the President told close aides he was going to
fire Comey, and on May 9, he did so, using his official termination letter to make public that Comey
had on three occasions informed the President that he was not under investigation. The President
decided to fire Comey before receiving advice or a recommendation from the Department of Justice,
but he approved an initial public account of the termination that attributed it to a recommendation
from the Department of Justice based on Comey's handling of the Clinton email investigation. After
Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein resisted attributing the firing to his recommendation, the
President acknowledged that he intended to fire Comey regardless of the DOJ recommendation and
was thinking of the Russia investigation when he made the decision. The President also told the
Russian Foreign Minister, "I just fired the head of the F.B.I. He was
crazy, a real nut job. I faced great pressure because of Russia. That's taken off ........................ I'm not
under investigation."
Evidence
1. Comey Testifies Before the Senate Judiciary Committee and Declines to Answer
Questions About Whether the President is Under Investigation
On May 3, 2017, Comey was scheduled to testify at an FBI oversight hearing before the Senate
Judiciary Committee.383 McGahn recalled that in the week leading up to the hearing, the President said
that it would be the last straw if Comey did not take the opportunity to set the record straight by publicly
announcing that the President was not under investigation.384 The President had previously told
McGahn that the perception that the President was under investigation was hurting his ability to carry
out his presidential duties and deal with foreign leaders.385 At the hearing, Comey declined to answer
questions about the status of the Russia investigation, stating "[t]he Department of Justice ha[d]
authorized [him] to confirm that [the Russia investigation] exists," but that he was "not going to say
another word about it" until the investigation was completed.386 Comey also declined to answer
questions about whether investigators had "ruled
383
Hearing on Oversight of the FBI before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. (May
3, 2017).
384
McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 10-11.
McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 7, 10-11 (McGahn believed that two foreign leaders had expressed
385
sympathy to the President for being under investigation); SC_AD_00265 (Donaldson 4/11/17 Notes) ("P
Called Comey — Day we told him not to? 'You are not under investigation' NK/China/Sapping
Credibility").
62
Hearing on FBI Oversight Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. (CQ Cong.
386
Transcripts, at 70) (May 3, 2017) (testimony by FBI Director James Comey). Comey repeated this point
63
out anyone in the Trump campaign as potentially a target of th[e] criminal investigation," including
whether the FBI had "ruled out the president of the United States."387
Comey was also asked at the hearing about his decision to announce 11 days before the
presidential election that the FBI was reopening the Clinton email investigation.388 Comey stated that
it made him "mildly nauseous to think that we might have had some impact on the election," but added
that "even in hindsight" he "would make the same decision."'" He later repeated that he had no regrets
about how he had handled the email investigation and believed he had "done the right thing at each
turn."'
In the afternoon following Comey's testimony, the President met with McGahn, Sessions,
and Sessions's Chief of Staff Jody Hunt.391 At that meeting, the President asked McGahn how
Comey had done in his testimony and McGahn relayed that Comey had declined to answer questions
about whether the President was under investigation.' The President became very upset and directed
his anger at Sessions.' According to notes written by Hunt, the President said, "This is terrible Jeff.
It's all because you recused. AG is supposed to be most important appointment. Kennedy appointed
his brother. Obama appointed Holder. I appointed you and you recused yourself. You left me on an
island. I can't do anything." 394 The President said that the recusal was unfair and that it was
interfering with his ability to govern and undermining his authority with foreign leaders. 395 Sessions
responded that he had had no choice but to recuse, and it was a mandatory rather than discretionary
decision.' Hunt recalled that Sessions also stated at
several times during his testimony. See id. at 26 (explaining that he was "not going to say another
peep about [the investigation] until we're done"); id. at 90 (stating that he would not provide any
updates about the status of investigation "before the matter is concluded").
Hearing on FBI Oversight Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. (May 3,
387
2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 87-88) (questions by Sen. Blumenthal and testimony by FBI Director
James B. Comey).
388
2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 15) (question by Sen. Feinstein).

389
2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 17) (testimony by FBI Director James B. Comey).
390
2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 92) (testimony by FBI Director James B. Comey).
391
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 8; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 8.
392
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 8; Hunt-000021 (Hunt 5/3/17 Notes); McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 6.
393
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 8-9.
Hunt-000021 (Hunt 5/3/17 Notes). Hunt said that he wrote down notes describing this
394
meeting and others with the President after the events occurred. Hunt 2/1/17 302, at 2.
Hunt-000021-22 (Hunt 5/3/17 Notes) ("I have foreign leaders saying they are sorry I am being
395
investigated."); Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 8 (Sessions recalled that a Chinese leader had said to the President
that he was sorry the President was under investigation, which the President interpreted as undermining his
authority); Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 8.
396
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 8; Hunt-000022 (Hunt 5/3/17 Notes).
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some point during the conversation that a new start at the FBI would be appropriate and the President
should consider replacing Comey as FBI director.397 According to Sessions, when the meeting
concluded, it was clear that the President was unhappy with Comey, but Sessions did not think the
President had made the decision to terminate Comey.398
Bannon recalled that the President brought Comey up with him at least eight times on May 3
and May 4, 2017.399 According to Bannon, the President said the same thing each time: "He told me
three times I'm not under investigation. He's a showboater. He's a grandstander. I don't know any
Russians. There was no collusion."400 Bannon told the President that he could not fire Comey because
"that ship had sailed."40I Bannon also told the President that firing Comey was not going to stop the
investigation, cautioning him that he could fire the FBI director but could not fire the F131 -.'
2. The President Makes the Decision to Terminate Comey
The weekend following Comey's May 3, 2017 testimony, the President traveled to his resort
in Bedminster, New Jersey.403 At a dinner on Friday, May 5, attended by the President and various
advisors and family members, including Jared Kushner and senior advisor Stephen Miller, the
President stated that he wanted to remove Comey and had ideas for a letter that would be used to
make the announcement.' The President dictated arguments and specific language for the letter, and
Miller took notes.405 As reflected in the notes, the President told Miller that the letter should start,
"While I greatly appreciate you informing me that I am not under investigation concerning what I
have often stated is a fabricated story on a Trump-Russia relationship —pertaining to the 2016
presidential election, please be informed that I, and I believe the American public — including Ds
and Rs — have lost faith in you as Director of the FBI.55406 Following the dinner, Miller prepared a
termination letter based on those notes and research he conducted to support the President's
arguments.407 Over the weekend, the President provided several rounds of
397 Hunt-000022 (Hunt 5/3/17 Notes).

398 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 9.
399 Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 20.
400 Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 20.
401 Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 20.
402 Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 20-21; see Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 28.
403 S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 4-5; SCR025_000019 (President's Daily Diary, 5/4/17).
404 S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 5.
405 S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 5-6.
406 S. Miller 5/5/17 Notes, at 1; see S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 8.
407 S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 6.
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edits on the draft letter.408 Miller said the President was adamant that he not tell anyone at the White
House what they were preparing because the President was worried about leaks.409
In his discussions with Miller, the President made clear that he wanted the letter to open with
a reference to him not being under investigation.' Miller said he believed that fact was important to
the President to show that Comey was not being terminated based on any such investigation.'
According to Miller, the President wanted to establish as a factual matter that Comey had been under
a "review period" and did not have assurance from the President that he would be permitted to keep
his job.412
The final version of the termination letter prepared by Miller and the President began in a way
that closely tracked what the President had dictated to Miller at the May 5 dinner: "Dear Director
Comey, While I greatly appreciate your informing me, on three separate occasions, that I am not under
investigation concerning the fabricated and politically-motivated allegations of a Trump-Russia
relationship with respect to the 2016 Presidential Election, please be informed that
I, along with members of both political parties and, most importantly, the American Public, have lost
faith in you as the Director of the FBI and you are hereby terminated." 413 The four-page letter went
on to critique Comey's judgment and conduct, including his May 3 testimony before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, his handling of the Clinton email investigation, and his failure to hold leakers
accountable.414 The letter stated that Comey had "asked [the President] at dinner shortly after
inauguration to let [Comey] stay on in the Director's role, and [the President] said that [he] would
consider it," but the President had "concluded that [he] ha[d] no alternative but to find new leadership
for the Bureau — a leader that restores confidence and trust."415
In the morning of Monday, May 8, 2017, the President met in the Oval Office with senior
advisors, including McGahn, Priebus, and Miller, and informed them he had decided to terminate
Comey.416 The President read aloud the first paragraphs of the termination letter he wrote with
408 S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 6-8.

S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 7. Miller said he did not want Priebus to be blindsided, so on
409
Sunday night he called Priebus to tell him that the President had been thinking about the "Comey
situation" and there would be an important discussion on Monday. S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 7.
410
S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 8.
411
S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 8.
412
S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 10.
SCR013c_000003-06 (Draft Termination Letter to FBI Director Comey).
413
SCR013c_
414
000003-06 (Draft Termination Letter to FBI Director Comey). Kushner said that the
termination letter reflected the reasons the President wanted to fire Comey and was the truest representation of
what the President had said during the May 5 dinner. Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 25.
415
SCRO13c_000003 (Draft Termination Letter to FBI Director Comey).
McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 11; Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 24; S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 11; Dhillon
416
11/21/17 302, at 6; Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 13.
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Miller and conveyed that the decision had been made and was not up for discussion.417 The President
told the group that Miller had researched the issue and determined the President had the authority to
terminate Comey without cause.418 In an effort to slow down the decision-making process, McGahn
told the President that DOJ leadership was currently discussing Comey's status and suggested that
White House Counsel's Office attorneys should talk with Sessions and Rod Rosenstein, who had
recently been confirmed as the Deputy Attorney General.419 McGahn said that previously scheduled
meetings with Sessions and Rosenstein that day would be an opportunity to find out what they thought
about firing Comey.420
At noon, Sessions, Rosenstein, and Hunt met with McGahn and White House Counsel's Office
attorney Uttam Dhillon at the White House.421 McGahn said that the President had decided to fire
Comey and asked for Sessions's and Rosenstein's views.422 Sessions and Rosenstein criticized Comey
and did not raise concerns about replacing him.423 McGahn and Dhillon said the fact that neither
Sessions nor Rosenstein objected to replacing Comey gave them peace of mind that the President's
decision to fire Comey was not an attempt to obstruct justice.424 An Oval Office meeting was
scheduled later that day so that Sessions and Rosenstein could discuss the issue with the President.425
At around 5 p.m., the President and several White House officials met with Sessions and
Rosenstein to discuss Comey.426 The President told the group that he had watched Comey's May
S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 11 (observing that the President started the meeting by saying, "I'm
417
going to read you a letter. Don't talk me out of this. I've made my decision."); Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 6
(the President announced in an irreversible way that he was firing Comey); Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 13
(the President did not leave whether or not to fire Comey up for discussion); Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 25;
McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 11-12.
418
Dhillon 302 11/21/17, at 6; Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 13; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 11.
McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 12, 13; S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 11; Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 7.
419
Because of the Attorney General's recusal, Rosenstein became the Acting Attorney General for the Russia
investigation upon his confirmation as Deputy Attorney General. See 28 U.S.C. § 508(a) ("In case of a
vacancy in the office of Attorney General, or of his absence or disability, the Deputy Attorney General
may exercise all the duties of that office").
420
McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 12.
Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 7; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 13; Gauhar-000056 (Gauhar 5/16/17
421
Notes); see Gauhar-000056-72 (2/11/19 Memorandum to File attaching Gauhar handwritten notes) ("Ms.
Gauhar determined that she likely recorded all these notes during one or more meetings on Tuesday, May
16, 2017.").
422
McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 13; see Gauhar-000056 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes).
423
Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 7-9; Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 9; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 13.
424
McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 13; Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 9.
425
Hunt-000026 (Hunt 5/8/17 Notes); see Gauhar-000057 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes).
426
Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at 2; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 14; see Gauhar-000057 (Gauhar 5/16/17
Notes).
67
3 testimony over the weekend and thought that something was "not right" with Comey.427 The
President said that Comey should be removed and asked Sessions and Rosenstein for their views. 428
Hunt, who was in the room, recalled that Sessions responded that he had previously recommended
that Comey be replaced.429 McGahn and Dhillon said Rosenstein described his concerns about
Comey's handling of the Clinton email investigation.430
The President then distributed copies of the termination letter he had drafted with Miller, and
the discussion turned to the mechanics of how to fire Comey and whether the President's letter should
be used.' McGahn and Dhillon urged the President to permit Comey to resign, but the President was
adamant that he be fired.432 The group discussed the possibility that Rosenstein and Sessions could
provide a recommendation in writing that Comey should be removed.433 The President agreed and
told Rosenstein to draft a memorandum, but said he wanted to receive it first thing the next morning.434
Hunt's notes reflect that the President told Rosenstein to include in his recommendation the fact that
Comey had refused to confirm that the President was not personally under investigation.435 According
to notes taken by a senior DOJ official of Rosenstein's description of his meeting with the President,
the President said, "Put the Russia stuff in the memo."436 Rosenstein responded that the Russia
investigation was not the basis of his recommendation, so he did not think Russia should be
mentioned.437 The President told Rosenstein he would appreciate it if Rosenstein put it in his letter
anyway.438 When Rosenstein
427
Hunt-000026-27 (Hunt 5/8/17 Notes).
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 10; see Gauhar-000058 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes) ("POTUS to AG:
428
What is your rec?").

429
Hunt-000027 (Hunt 5/8/17 Notes).
430
McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 14; Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 7.
431
Hunt-000028 (Hunt 5/8/17 Notes).
432
McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 13.
433
Hunt-000028-29 (Hunt 5/8/17 Notes).
McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 13; Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at 2; see Gauhar-000059 (Gauhar
434
5/16/17 Notes) ("POTUS tells DAG to write a memo").

Hunt-000028-29 (Hunt 5/8/17 Notes) ("POTUS asked if Rod's recommendation would include the
435
fact that although Comey talks about the investigation he refuses to say that the President is not under
investigation. . . . So it would be good if your recommendation would make mention of the fact that Comey
refuses to say public[ly] what he said privately 3 times.").
436
Gauhar-000059 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes).
437
Sessions 1/17/18 302 at 10; McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 13; see Gauhar-000059 (Gauhar 5/16/17
Notes).
Gauhar-000059 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes); McCabe 5/16/17 Memorandum 1; McCabe 9/26/17
438
302, at 13.
68
left the meeting, he knew that Comey would be terminated, and he told DOJ colleagues that his own
reasons for replacing Comey were "not [the President's] reasons."439
On May 9, Hunt delivered to the White House a letter from Sessions recommending Comey's
removal and a memorandum from Rosenstein, addressed to the Attorney General, titled "Restoring
Public Confidence in the FBI."44° McGahn recalled that the President liked the DOJ letters and agreed
that they should provide the foundation for a new cover letter from the President accepting the
recommendation to terminate Comey.441 Notes taken by Donaldson on May 9 reflected the view of
the White House Counsel's Office that the President's original termination letter should "[n]ot [see
the] light of day" and that it would be better to offer "[n]o other rationales" for the firing than what
was in Rosenstein's and Sessions's memoranda.442 The President asked Miller to draft a new
termination letter and directed Miller to say in the letter that Comey had informed the President three
times that he was not under investigation.443 McGahn, Priebus, and Dhillon objected to including that
language, but the President insisted that it be included.444 McGahn, Priebus, and others perceived that
language to be the most important part of the letter to
Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at 2; Gauhar-000059 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes) ("DAG reasons not their
439
reasons [POTUS]"); Gauhar-000060 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes) ("1st draft had a recommendation. Took it out
b/c knew decision had already been made.").
440
Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at 4; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 15; 5/9/17 Letter, Sessions to President Trump
("Based on my evaluation, and for the reasons expressed by the Deputy Attorney General in the attached
memorandum, I have concluded that a fresh start is needed at the leadership of the FBI."); 5/9/17 Memorandum,
Rosenstein to Sessions (concluding with, "The way the Director handled the conclusion of the email
investigation was wrong. As a result, the FBI is unlikely to regain public and congressional trust until it has a
Director who understands the gravity of the mistakes and pledges never to repeat them. Having refused to admit
his errors, the Director cannot be expected to implement the necessary corrective actions.").
441
S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 12; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 15; Hunt-000031 (Hunt 5/9/17 Notes).
SC_AD_00342 (Donaldson 5/9/17 Notes). Donaldson also wrote "Pis this the beginning of
442
the end?" because she was worried that the decision to terminate Comey and the manner in which it
was carried out would be the end of the presidency. Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 25.
443
S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 12; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 15; Hunt-000032 (Hunt 5/9/17 Notes).
McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 15; S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 12; Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 8, 10;
4"
Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 27; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 14-15; Hunt-000032 (Hunt 5/9/17 Notes).
69
Atterney-Werk—Prettuet // May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
Atterney-Weeduet // May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
the President.445 Dhillon made a final pitch to the President that Comey should be permitted to resign,
but the President refused."'
Around the time the President's letter was finalized, Priebus summoned Spicer and the press
team to the Oval Office, where they were told that Comey had been terminated for the reasons stated
in the letters by Rosenstein and Sessions.447 To announce Comey's termination, the White House
released a statement, which Priebus thought had been dictated by the President.448 In full, the statement
read: "Today, President Donald J. Trump informed FBI Director James Comey that he has been
terminated and removed from office. President Trump acted based on the clear recommendations of
both Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein and Attorney General Jeff Sessions."449
That evening, FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe was summoned to meet with the
President at the White House.45° The President told McCabe that he had fired Comey because of the
decisions Comey had made in the Clinton email investigation and for many other reasons.451 The
President asked McCabe if he was aware that Comey had told the President three times that he was
not under investigation.452 The President also asked McCabe whether many people in the FBI disliked
Comey and whether McCabe was part of the "resistance" that had disagreed with Comey's decisions
in the Clinton investigation.453 McCabe told the President that he knew Comey had told the President
he was not under investigation, that most people in the FBI felt positively about Comey, and that
McCabe worked "very closely" with Comey and was part of all the decisions that had been made in
the Clinton investigation.454
445
Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 10; Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 15 (providing the view that the President's
desire to include the language about not being under investigation was the "driving animus of the whole
thing"); Burnham 11/3/17 302, at 16 (Burnham knew the only line the President cared about was the line
that said Comey advised the President on three separate occasions that the President was not under
investigation). According to Hunt's notes, the reference to Comey's statement would indicate that
"notwithstanding" Comey's having informed the President that he was not under investigation, the President
was terminating Comey. Hunt-000032 (Hunt 5/9/17 Notes). McGahn said he believed the President wanted
the language included so that people would not think that the President had terminated Comey because the
President was under investigation. McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 15.
McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 15; Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 25; see SC_AD_00342 (Donaldson
446
5/9/17 Notes) ("Resign vs. Removal. — POTUS/removal.").

447 Spicer 10/16/17 302, at 9; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 16.
448
Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 28.
449
Statement of the Press Secretary, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (May 9, 2017).
McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 4; SCR025_000044 (President's Daily Diary, 5/9/17); McCabe
45°
5/10/17 Memorandum, at 1.
451
McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 5; McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at 1.
452
McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 5; McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at 1-2.
453
454
70
Later that evening, the President told his communications team he was unhappy with the press
coverage of Comey's termination and ordered them to go out and defend him.455 The President also
called Chris Christie and, according to Christie, said he was getting "killed" in the press over Comey's
termination.456 The President asked what he should do.457 Christie asked, "Did you fire [Comey]
because of what Rod wrote in the memo?", and the President responded, "Yes." 458 Christie said that
the President should "get Rod out there" and have him defend the decision.459 The President told
Christie that this was a "good idea" and said he was going to call Rosenstein right away.46°
That night, the White House Press Office called the Department of Justice and said the White
House wanted to put out a statement saying that it was Rosenstein's idea to fire Comey.461 Rosenstein
told other DOJ officials that he would not participate in putting out a "false story. 51462 The President
then called Rosenstein directly and said he was watching Fox News, that the coverage had been great,
and that he wanted Rosenstein to do a press conference.463 Rosenstein responded that this was not a
good idea because if the press asked him, he would tell the truth that Comey's firing was not his idea.464
Sessions also informed the White House Counsel's Office that evening that Rosenstein was upset that
his memorandum was being portrayed as the reason for Comey's termination.465
In an unplanned press conference late in the evening of May 9, 2017, Spicer told reporters, "It
was all [Rosenstein]. No one from the White House. It was a DOJ decision. "466 That evening and the
next morning, White House officials and spokespeople continued to maintain that the
455
Spicer 10/16/17 302, at 11; Hicks 12/8/17, at 18; Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 2.
456
Christie 2/13/19 302, at 6.
457
Christie 2/13/19 302, at 6.
458
Christie 2/13/19 302, at 6.
459
Christie 2/13/19 302, at 6.
460
Christie 2/13/19 302, at 6.
461
Gauhar-000071 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes); Page Memorandum, at 3 (recording events of
5/16/17); McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 14.
462
Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at 4-5; Gauhar-000059 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes).
463
Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at 4-5; Gauhar-000071 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes).
Gauhar-000071 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes). DOJ notes from the week of Comey's firing indicate that
464
Priebus was "screaming" at the DOJ public affairs office trying to get Rosenstein to do a press conference,
and the DOJ public affairs office told Priebus that Rosenstein had told the President he was not doing it.
Gauhar-000071-72 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes).
465
McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 16-17; Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 26-27; Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 11.
Jenna Johnson, After Trump fired Comey, White House staff scrambled to explain why, Washington Post
466
(May 10, 2017) (quoting Spicer).
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Afteftiey-Wefk-Predttet // May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
President's decision to terminate Comey was driven by the recommendations the President received
from Rosenstein and Sessions.467
In the morning on May 10, 2017, President Trump met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey
Lavrov and Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak in the Oval Office.' The media subsequently
reported that during the May 10 meeting the President brought up his decision the prior day to
terminate Comey, telling Lavrov and Kislyak: "I just fired the head of the F.B.I. He was crazy, a real
nut job. I faced great pressure because of Russia. That's taken off. . . . I'm not under investigation." 469
The President never denied making those statements, and the White House did not dispute the
account, instead issuing a statement that said: "By grandstanding and politicizing the investigation
into Russia's actions, James Comey created unnecessary pressure on our ability to engage and
negotiate with Russia. The investigation would have always continued, and obviously, the
termination of Comey would not have ended it. Once again, the real story is that our national security
has been undermined by the leaking of private and highly classified information." 470 Hicks said that
when she told the President about the reports on his meeting with Lavrov, he did not look concerned
and said of Comey, "he is crazy."471 When McGahn asked the President about his comments to
Lavrov, the President said it was good that Comey was fired because that took the pressure off by
making it clear that he was not under investigation so he could get more work done. 472
That same morning, on May 10, 2017, the President called McCabe.473 According to a
memorandum McCabe wrote following the call, the President asked McCabe to come over to the
White House to discuss whether the President should visit FBI headquarters and make a speech to
See, e.g., Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (May 10, 2017);
467
SCR013_001088 (5/10/17 Email, Hemming to Cheung et al.) (internal White House email describing
comments on the Comey termination by Vice President Pence).
SCR08_000353 (5/9/17 White House Document, "Working Visit with Foreign Minister Sergey
468
Lavrov of Russia"); SCR08_001274 (5/10/17 Email, Ciaramella to Kelly et al.). The meeting had been
planned on May 2, 2017, during a telephone call between the President and Russian President Vladimir
Putin, and the meeting date was confirmed on May 5, 2017, the same day the President dictated ideas for
the Comey termination letter to Stephen Miller. SCR08_001274 (5/10/17 Email, Ciaramella to Kelly et
al.).
Matt Apuzzo et al., Trump Told Russians That Firing "Nut Job" Comey Eased Pressure
469
From Investigation, New York Times (May 19, 2017).

SCRO8 002117 (5/19/17 Email, Walters to Farhi (CBS News)); see Spicer 10/16/17 302, at 13 (noting
470
he would have been told to "clean it up" if the reporting on the meeting with the Russian Foreign Minister was
inaccurate, but he was never told to correct the reporting); Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 19 (recalling that the President
never denied making the statements attributed to him in the Lavrov meeting and that the President had said
similar things about Comey in an off-the-record meeting with reporters on May 18, 2017, calling Comey a "nut
job" and "crazy").
471
Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 19.
472
McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 18.
473
SCR025_000046 (President's Daily Diary, 5/10/17); McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at 1.
72
employees.474 The President said he had received "hundreds" of messages from FBI employees
indicating their support for terminating Comey. 475 The President also told McCabe that Comey
should not have been permitted to travel back to Washington, D.C. on the FBI's airplane after he had
been terminated and that he did not want Comey "in the building again," even to collect his
belongings.476 When McCabe met with the President that afternoon, the President, without
prompting, told McCabe that people in the FBI loved the President, estimated that at least 80% of
the FBI had voted for him, and asked McCabe who he had voted for in the 2016 presidential
election.477
In the afternoon of May 10, 2017, deputy press secretary Sarah Sanders spoke to the President
about his decision to fire Comey and then spoke to reporters in a televised press conference.478 Sanders
told reporters that the President, the Department of Justice, and bipartisan members of Congress had
lost confidence in Comey, "[a]nd most importantly, the rank and file of the FBI had lost confidence
in their director. Accordingly, the President accepted the recommendation of his Deputy Attorney
General to remove James Comey from his position."' In response to questions from reporters, Sanders
said that Rosenstein decided "on his own" to review Comey's performance and that Rosenstein
decided "on his own" to come to the President on Monday, May 8 to express his concerns about
Comey. When a reporter indicated that the "vast majority" of FBI agents supported Comey, Sanders
said, "Look, we've heard from countless members of the FBI that say very different things." 48°
Following the press conference, Sanders spoke to the President, who told her she did a good job and
did not point out any inaccuracies in her comments."' Sanders told this Office that her reference to
hearing from "countless members of the FBI" was a "slip of the tongue."482 She also recalled that her
statement in a separate press interview that rank-and-file FBI agents had lost confidence in Comey
was a comment she made "in the heat of the moment" that was not founded on anything."'
Also on May 10, 2017, Sessions and Rosenstein each spoke to McGahn and expressed concern
that the White House was creating a narrative that Rosenstein had initiated the decision to
474
McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at 1.
475
McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at 1.
McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at 1; Rybicki 6/13/17 302, at 2. Comey had been visiting the
476
FBI's Los Angeles office when he found out he had been terminated. Comey 11/15/17 302, at 22.
McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at 1-2. McCabe's memorandum documenting his meeting
477
with the President is consistent with notes taken by the White House Counsel's Office. See
SC_AD_00347 (Donaldson 5/10/17 Notes).
478
Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 4; Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (May 10, 2017).
479
Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (May 10, 2017); Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 4.
480
Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (May 10, 2017).
481
Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 4.
482
Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 4.
483
Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 3.
73
fire Comey.484 The White House Counsel's Office agreed that it was factually wrong to say that the
Department of Justice had initiated Comey's termination,485 and McGahn asked attorneys in the White
House Counsel's Office to work with the press office to correct the narrative.486
The next day, on May 11, 2017, the President participated in an interview with Lester Holt.
The President told White House Counsel's Office attorneys in advance of the interview that the
communications team could not get the story right, so he was going on Lester Holt to say what really
happened.487 During the interview, the President stated that he had made the decision to fire Comey
before the President met with Rosenstein and Sessions. The President told Holt, "I was going to fire
regardless of recommendation . . . . [Rosenstein] made a recommendation. But regardless of
recommendation, I was going to fire Comey knowing there was no good time to do it."4" The President
continued, "And in fact, when I decided to just do it, I said to myself—I said, you know, this Russia
thing with Trump and Russia is a made-up story. It's an excuse by the Democrats for having lost an
election that they should've won."489
In response to a question about whether he was angry with Comey about the Russia
investigation, the President said, "As far as I'm concerned, I want that thing to be absolutely done
properly."49° The President added that he realized his termination of Comey "probably maybe will
confuse people" with the result that it "might even lengthen out the investigation," but he "ha[d] to do
the right thing for the American people" and Comey was "the wrong man for that position."491 The
President described Comey as "a showboat" and "a grandstander," said that "[t]he FBI has been in
turmoil," and said he wanted "to have a really competent, capable director."492 The President affirmed
that he expected the new FBI director to continue the Russia investigation.493
On the evening of May 11, 2017, following the Lester Holt interview, the President tweeted,
"Russia must be laughing up their sleeves watching as the U.S. tears itself apart over a Democrat
EXCUSE for losing the election."494 The same day, the media reported that the President had
demanded that Comey pledge his loyalty to the President in a private dinner shortly
484
McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 16-17; Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 26; see Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at
485 Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 27.

486 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 17.
487 Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 11.
488 Interview with President Donald Trump, NBC (May 11, 2017) Transcript, at 2.
489 Interview with President Donald TruMp, NBC (May 11, 2017) Transcript, at 2.
492 Interview with President Donald Trump, NBC (May 11, 2017) Transcript, at 1, 5.
494 @realDonaldTrump 5/11/17 (4:34 p.m. ET) Tweet.
74
after being sworn in.495 Late in the morning of May 12, 2017, the President tweeted, "Again, the story
that there was collusion between the Russians & Trump campaign was fabricated by Dems as an excuse
for losing the election."496 The President also tweeted, "James Comey better hope that there are no
'tapes' of our conversations before he starts leaking to the press!" and "When James Clapper himself,
and virtually everyone else with knowledge of the witch hunt, says there is no collusion, when does it
end?"497
Analysis
In analyzing the President's decision to fire Comey, the following evidence is relevant to the
elements of obstruction of justice:
a. Obstructive act. The act of firing Comey removed the individual overseeing the
FBI's Russia investigation. The President knew that Comey was personally involved in the
investigation based on Comey's briefing of the Gang of Eight, Comey's March 20, 2017 public
testimony about the investigation, and the President's one-on-one conversations with Comey.
Firing Comey would qualify as an obstructive act if it had the natural and probable effect of
interfering with or impeding the investigation—for example, if the termination would have the effect
of delaying or disrupting the investigation or providing the President with the opportunity to appoint a
director who would take a different approach to the investigation that the President perceived as more
protective of his personal interests. Relevant circumstances bearing on that issue include whether the
President's actions had the potential to discourage a successor director or other law enforcement
officials in their conduct of the Russia investigation. The President fired Comey abruptly without
offering him an opportunity to resign, banned him from the FBI building, and criticized him publicly,
calling him a "showboat" and claiming that the FBI was "in turmoil" under his leadership. And the
President followed the termination with public statements that were highly critical of the investigation;
for example, three days after firing Comey, the President referred to the investigation as a "witch hunt"
and asked, "when does it end?" Those actions had the potential to affect a successor director's conduct
of the investigation.
The anticipated effect of removing the FBI director, however, would not necessarily be to
prevent or impede the FBI from continuing its investigation. As a general matter, FBI investigations
run under the operational direction of FBI personnel levels below the FBI director. Bannon made a
similar point when he told the President that he could fire the FBI director, but could not fire the FBI.
The White House issued a press statement the day after Comey was fired that said, "The investigation
would have always continued, and obviously, the termination of Comey would not have ended it." In
addition, in his May 11 interview with Lester Holt, the President stated that he understood when he
made the decision to fire Comey that the action might prolong the investigation. And the President
chose McCabe to serve as interim director, even
Michael S. Schmidt, In a Private Dinner, Trump Demanded Loyalty. Comey Demurred.,

495
New York Times (May 11, 2017).

496
@realDonaldTrump 5/12/17 (8:26 a.m. ET) Tweet; @realDonaldTrump 5/12/17 (8:54 a.m.
497
ET) Tweet.
75
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though McCabe told the President he had worked "very closely" with Comey and was part of all the
decisions made in the Clinton investigation.
b. Nexus to a proceeding. The nexus element would be satisfied by evidence showing

that a grand jury proceeding or criminal prosecution arising from an FBI investigation was objectively
foreseeable and actually contemplated by the President when he terminated Comey.
Several facts would be relevant to such a showing. At the time the President fired Comey, a
grand jury had not begun to hear evidence related to the Russia investigation and no grand jury
subpoenas had been issued. On March 20, 2017, however, Comey had announced that the FBI was
investigating Russia's interference in the election, including "an assessment of whether any crimes
were committed." It was widely known that the FBI, as part of the Russia investigation, was
investigating the hacking of the DNC's computers—a clear criminal offense.
In addition, at the time the President fired Comey, evidence indicates the President knew that
Flynn was still under criminal investigation and could potentially be prosecuted, despite the
President's February 14, 2017 request that Comey "let[] Flynn go." On March 5, 2017, the White
House Counsel's Office was informed that the FBI was asking for transition-period records relating to
Flynn—indicating that the FBI was still actively investigating him. The same day, the President told
advisors he wanted to call Dana Boente, then the Acting Attorney General for the Russia investigation,
to find out whether the White House or the President was being investigated. On March 31, 2017, the
President signaled his awareness that Flynn remained in legal jeopardy by tweeting that "Mike Flynn
should ask for immunity" before he agreed to provide testimony to the FBI or Congress. And in late
March or early April, the President asked McFarland to pass a message to Flynn telling him that the
President felt bad for him and that he should stay strong, further demonstrating the President's
awareness of Flynn's criminal exposure.
c. Intent. Substantial evidence indicates that the catalyst for the President's decision
to fire Comey was Comey's unwillingness to publicly state that the President was not personally
under investigation, despite the President's repeated requests that Comey make such an
announcement. In the week leading up to Comey's May 3, 2017 Senate Judiciary Committee
testimony, the President told McGahn that it would be the last straw if Comey did not set the record
straight and publicly announce that the President was not under investigation. But during his May
3 testimony, Comey refused to answer questions about whether the President was being
investigated. Comey's refusal angered the President, who criticized Sessions for leaving him
isolated and exposed, saying "You left me on an island." Two days later, the President told advisors
he had decided to fire Comey and dictated a letter to Stephen Miller that began with a reference to
the fact that the President was not being investigated: "While I greatly appreciate you informing
me that I am not under investigation concerning what I have often stated is a fabricated story on a
Trump-Russia relationship . . . ." The President later asked Rosenstein to include "Russia" in his
memorandum and to say that Comey had told the President that he was not under investigation.
And the President's final termination letter included a sentence, at the President's insi stence and
against McGahn's advice, stating that Comey had told the President on three separate occasions
that he was not under investigation.
The President's other stated rationales for why he fired Comey are not similarly supported by
the evidence. The termination letter the President and Stephen Miller prepared in Bedminster
76
Aft-efftey-Werk-Prectuet // May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
cited Comey's handling of the Clinton email investigation, and the President told McCabe he fired
Comey for that reason. But the facts surrounding Comey's handling of the Clinton email investigation
were well known to the President at the time he assumed office, and the President had made it clear
to both Comey and the President's senior staff in early 2017 that he wanted Comey to stay on as
director. And Rosenstein articulated his criticism of Comey's handling of the Clinton investigation
after the President had already decided to fire Comey. The President's draft termination letter also
stated that morale in the FBI was at an all-time low and Sanders told the press after Comey's
termination that the White House had heard from "countless" FBI agents who had lost confidence in
Comey. But the evidence does not support those claims. The President told Comey at their January
27 dinner that "the people of the FBI really like [him]," no evidence suggests that the President heard
otherwise before deciding to terminate Comey, and Sanders acknowledged to investigators that her
comments were not founded on anything.
We also considered why it was important to the President that Comey announce publicly that
he was not under investigation. Some evidence indicates that the President believed that the erroneous
perception he was under investigation harmed his ability to manage domestic and foreign affairs,
particularly in dealings with Russia. The President told Comey that the "cloud" of "this Russia
business" was making it difficult to run the country. The President told Sessions and McGahn that
foreign leaders had expressed sympathy to him for being under investigation and that the perception
he was under investigation was hurting his ability to address foreign relations issues. The President
complained to Rogers that "the thing with the Russians [was] messing up" his ability to get things done
with Russia, and told Coats, "I can't do anything with Russia, there's things I'd like to do with Russia,
with trade, with ISIS, they're all over me with this." The President also may have viewed Comey as
insubordinate for his failure to make clear in the May 3 testimony that the President was not under
investigation.
Other evidence, however, indicates that the President wanted to protect himself from an
investigation into his campaign. The day after learning about the FBI's interview of Flynn, the President
had a one-on-one dinner with Comey, against the advice of senior aides, and told Comey he needed
Comey's "loyalty." When the President later asked Comey for a second time to make public that he
was not under investigation, he brought up loyalty again, saying "Because I have been very loyal to
you, very loyal, we had that thing, you know." After the President learned of Sessions's recusal from
the Russia investigation, the President was furious and said he wanted an Attorney General who would
protect him the way he perceived Robert Kennedy and Eric Holder to have protected their presidents.
The President also said he wanted to be able to tell his Attorney General "who to investigate."
In addition, the President had a motive to put the FBI's Russia investigation behind him. The
evidence does not establish that the termination of Comey was designed to cover up a conspiracy
between the Trump Campaign and Russia: As described in Volume I, the evidence uncovered in the
investigation did not establish that the President or those close to him were involved in the charged
Russian computer-hacking or active-measure conspiracies, or that the President otherwise had an
unlawful relationship with any Russian official. But the evidence does indicate that a thorough FBI
investigation would uncover facts about the campaign and the President personally that the President
could have understood to be crimes or that would give rise to personal and political concerns.
Although the President publicly stated during and after the election that he had no connection to
Russia, the Trump Organization, through Michael Cohen,
77
was pursuing the proposed Trump Tower Moscow project through June 2016 and candidate Trump
was repeatedly briefed on the .ro_ress of those efforts.498 In addition, some witnesses said that Truro
was aware that Harm to Ongoing Matter
at a time when public reports stated that Russian intelligence officials were behind the
hacks, and that Trump privately sought information about future WikiLeaks releases.499 More broadly,
multiple witnesses described the President's preoccupation with press coverage of the Russia
investigation and his persistent concern that it raised questions about the legitimacy of his election . 5°'
Finally, the President and White House aides initially advanced a pretextual reason to the
press and the public for Comey's termination. In the immediate aftermath of the firing, the President
dictated a press statement suggesting that he had acted based on the DOJ recommendations, and
White House press officials repeated that story. But the President had decided to fire Comey before
the White House solicited those recommendations. Although the President ultimately acknowledged
that he was going to fire Comey regardless of the Department of Justice's recommendations, he did
so only after DOJ officials made clear to him that they would resist the White House's suggestion
that they had prompted the process that led to Comey's termination. The initial reliance on a
pretextual justification could support an inference that the President had concerns about providing
the real reason for the firing, although the evidence does not resolve whether those concerns were
personal, political, or both.
E. The President's Efforts to Remove the Special Counsel
Overview
The Acting Attorney General appointed a Special Counsel on May 17, 2017, prompting the
President to state that it was the end of his presidency and that Attorney General Sessions had failed
to protect him and should resign. Sessions submitted his resignation, which the President ultimately
did not accept. The President told senior advisors that the Special Counsel had conflicts of interest,
but they responded that those claims were "ridiculous" and posed no obstacle to the Special Counsel's
service. Department of Justice ethics officials similarly cleared the Special Counsel's service. On
June 14, 2017, the press reported that the President was being personally investigated for obstruction
of justice and the President responded with a series of tweets
498
See Volume II, Section II.K.1, infra.
499
See Volume 1, Section III.D.1, supra.
5( )
' In addition to whether the President had a motive related to Russia-related matters that an FBI
investigation could uncover, we considered whether the President's intent in firing Comey was connected to
other conduct that could come to light as a result of the FBI's Russian-interference investigation. In particular,
Michael Cohen was a potential subject of investigation because of his pursuit of the Trump Tower Moscow
project and involvement in other activities. And facts uncovered in the Russia investigation, which our Office
referred to the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, ultimately led to the conviction
of Cohen in the Southern District of New York for campaign-finance offenses related to payments he said he
made at the direction of the President. See Volume II, Section II.K.5, infra. The investigation, however, did
not establish that when the President fired Comey, he was considering the possibility that the FBI's
investigation would uncover these payments or that the President's intent in firing Comey was otherwise
connected to a concern about these matters coming to light.
78
criticizing the Special Counsel's investigation. That weekend, the President called McGahn and
directed him to have the Special Counsel removed because of asserted conflicts of interest. McGahn
did not carry out the instruction for fear of being seen as triggering another Saturday Night Massacre
and instead prepared to resign. McGahn ultimately did not quit and the President did not follow up
with McGahn on his request to have the Special Counsel removed.
Evidence
1. The Appointment of the Special Counsel and the President's Reaction
On May 17, 2017, Acting Attorney General Rosenstein appointed Robert S. Mueller, III as
Special Counsel and authorized him to conduct the Russia investigation and matters that arose
from the investigation.' The President learned of the Special Counsel's appointment from Sessions,
who was with the President, Hunt, and McGahn conducting interviews for a new FBI Director.'
Sessions stepped out of the Oval Office to take a call from Rosenstein, who told him about the
Special Counsel appointment, and Sessions then returned to inform the President of the news.'
According to notes written by Hunt, when Sessions told the President that a Special Counsel had
been appointed, the President slumped back in his chair and said, "Oh my God. This is terrible.
This is the end of my Presidency. I'm fucked."" The President became angry and lambasted the
Attorney General for his decision to recuse from the investigation, stating, "How could you let this
happen, Jeff?"' The President said the position of Attorney General was his most important
appointment and that Sessions had "let [him] down," contrasting him to Eric Holder and Robert
Kennedy.' Sessions recalled that the President said to him, "you were supposed to protect me," or
words to that effect. 507 The President returned to the consequences of the appointment and said,
"Everyone tells me if you get one of these independent counsels it ruins your presidency. It takes
years and years and I won't be able to do anything. This is the worst thing that ever happened to
me."508
501 Office of the Deputy Attorney General, Order No. 3915-2017, Appointment of Special
Counsel to Investigate Russian Interference with the 2016 Presidential Election and Related Matters
(May 17, 2017).
502 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 13; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 18; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 4; Hunt-
000039 (Hunt 5117117 Notes).
503 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 13; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 18; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 4; Hunt-
000039 (Hunt 5/17/17 Notes).
504 Hunt-000039 (Hunt 5/17/17 Notes).
505 Hunt-000039 (Hunt 5/17/17 Notes); Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 13-14.
506 Hunt-000040; see Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14.
507 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14.
Hunt-000040 (Hunt 5/17/17 Notes); see Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14. Early the next morning,
508
the President tweeted, "This is the single greatest witch hunt of a politician in American history!"
79
The President then told Sessions he should resign as Attorney Genera1.509 Sessions agreed to
submit his resignation and left the Oval Office.' Hicks saw the President shortly after Sessions
departed and described the President as being extremely upset by the Special Counsel's
appointment.511 Hicks said that she had only seen the President like that one other time, when the
Access Hollywood tape came out during the campaign.512
The next day, May 18, 2017, FBI agents delivered to McGahn a preservation notice that
discussed an investigation related to Comey's termination and directed the White House to preserve
all relevant documents.513 When he received the letter, McGahn issued a document hold to White
House staff and instructed them not to send out any burn bags over the weekend while he sorted things
out.514
Also on May 18, Sessions finalized a resignation letter that stated, "Pursuant to our
conversation of yesterday, and at your request, I hereby offer my resignation."' Sessions,
accompanied by Hunt, brought the letter to the White House and handed it to the President. 516 The
President put the resignation letter in his pocket and asked Sessions several times whether he wanted
to continue serving as Attorney Genera1. 517 Sessions ultimately told the President he wanted to stay,
but it was up to the President. 518 The President said he wanted Sessions to stay.' At the conclusion
of the meeting, the President shook Sessions's hand but did not return the resignation letter. 52°
When Priebus and Bannon learned that the President was holding onto Sessions's resignation
letter, they became concerned that it could be used to influence the Department of Justice. 521 Priebus
told Sessions it was not good for the President to have the letter because it
509
Hunt-000041 (Hunt 5/17/17 Notes); Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14.
510
Hunt-000041 (Hunt 5/17/17 Notes); Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14.
511
Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 21.
Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 2L The Access Hollywood tape was released on October 7, 2016, as
512
discussed in Volume I, Section III.D.1, supra.

McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 9; SCR015_000175-82 (Undated Draft Memoranda to White
513
House Staff).
514
McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 9; SCR015_000175-82 (Undated Draft Memoranda to White House
Staff). The White House Counsel's Office had previously issued a document hold on February 27, 2017.
SCR015 000171 (2/17/17 Memorandum from McGahn to Executive Office of the President Staff).
Hunt-000047 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes); 5/18/17 Letter, Sessions to President Trump (resigning
515
as Attorney General).
516
Hunt-000047-49 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes); Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14.
517
518
519
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14.
520
Hunt-000049 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes).
521
Hunt-000050-51 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes).
80
would function as a kind of"shock collar" that the President could use any time he wanted; Priebus
said the President had "DOJ by the throat."522 Priebus and Bannon told Sessions they would attempt
to get the letter back from the President with a notation that he was not accepting Sessions's
resignation.523
On May 19, 2017, the President left for a trip to the Middle East.524 Hicks recalled that on the
President's flight from Saudi Arabia to Tel Aviv, the President pulled Sessions's resignation letter
from his pocket, showed it to a group of senior advisors, and asked them what he should do about it. 525
During the trip, Priebus asked about the resignation letter so he could return it to Sessions, but the
President told him that the letter was back at the White House, somewhere in the residence. 526 It was
not until May 30, three days after the President returned from the trip, that the President returned the
letter to Sessions with a notation saying, "Not accepted."'
2. The President Asserts that the Special Counsel has Conflicts of Interest
In the days following the Special Counsel's appointment, the President repeatedly told advisors,
including Priebus, Bannon, and McGahn, that Special Counsel Mueller had conflicts of interests' The
President cited as conflicts that Mueller had interviewed for the FBI Director position shortly before
being appointed as Special Counsel, that he had worked for a law firm that represented people affiliated
with the President, and that Mueller had disputed certain fees relating to his membership in a Trump
golf course in Northern Virginia.529 The President's advisors pushed
522
Hunt-000050 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes); Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 21; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 21.
523
Hunt-000051 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes).
524
SCR026_000110 (President's Daily Diary, 5/19/17).
525
Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 22.
526
Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 21. Hunt's notes state that when Priebus returned from the trip,
Priebus told Hunt that the President was supposed to have given him the letter, but when he asked for
it, the President "slapped the desk" and said he had forgotten it back at the hotel. Hunt-000052 (Hunt
Notes, undated).
527
Hunt-000052-53 (Hunt 5/30/17 Notes); 5/18/17 Letter, Sessions to President Trump (resignation
letter). Robert Porter, who was the White House Staff Secretary at the time, said that in the days after the
President returned from the Middle East trip, the President took Sessions's letter out of a drawer in the Oval
Office and showed it to Porter. Porter 4/13/18 302, at 8.
Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 12; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 10; McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1; McGahn
528
12/14/17 302, at 10; Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 12.

Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 12; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 10. In October 2011, Mueller resigned his family's
529
membership from Trump National Golf Club in Sterling, Virginia, in a letter that noted that "we live in the
District and find that we are unable to make full use of the Club" and that inquired "whether we would be
entitled to a refund of a portion of our initial membership fee," which was paid in 1994. 10/12/11 Letter,
Muellers to Trump National Golf Club. About two weeks later, the controller of the club responded that the
Muellers' resignation would be effective October 31, 2011, and that they would be "placed on a waitlist to be
refunded on a first resigned / first refunded basis" in accordance with the club's legal
81
back on his assertion of conflicts, telling the President they did not count as true conflicts. 530 Bannon
recalled telling the President that the purported conflicts were "ridiculous" and that none of them was
real or could come close to justifying precluding Mueller from serving as Special Counse1. 531 As for
Mueller's interview for FBI Director, Bannon recalled that the White House had invited Mueller to
speak to the President to offer a perspective on the institution of the FBI.532 Bannon said that, although
the White House thought about beseeching Mueller to become Director again, he did not come in
looking for the job.533 Bannon also told the President that the law firm position did not amount to a
conflict in the legal community.534 And Bannon told the President that the golf course dispute did not
rise to the level of a conflict and claiming one was "ridiculous and petty."535 The President did not
respond when Bannon pushed back on the stated conflicts of interest.536
On May 23, 2017, the Department of Justice announced that ethics officials had determined
that the Special Counsel's prior law firm position did not bar his service, generating media reports that
Mueller had been cleared to serve.537 McGahn recalled that around the same time, the President
complained about the asserted conflicts and prodded McGahn to reach out to Rosenstein about the
issue.538 McGahn said he responded that he could not make such a call and that the President should
instead consult his personal lawyer because it was not a White House issue.539 Contemporaneous notes
of a May 23, 2017 conversation between McGahn and the President reflect that McGahn told the
President that he would not call Rosenstein and that he would suggest that the President not make
such a call either.54° McGahn advised that the President could discuss the issue with his personal
attorney but it would "look like still trying to meddle in [the] investigation" and "knocking out
Mueller" would be "[a]nother fact used to claim obst[ruction] of
documents. 10/27/11 Letter, Muellers to Trump National Golf Club. The Muellers have not had further
contact with the club.
Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 3; Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 13 (confirming that he, Priebus, and
530
McGahn pushed back on the asserted conflicts).

531
Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 12-13.
532
Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 12.
533
Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 12.
534
Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 12.
535
Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 13.
536
Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 12.
Matt Zapotosky & Matea Gold, Justice Department ethics experts clear Mueller to lead
537
Russia probe, Washington Post (May 23, 2017).

538
McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 10; Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 12.
539
McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1. McGahn and Donaldson said that after the appointment of the Special
Counsel, they considered themselves potential fact witnesses and accordingly told the President that inquiries
related to the investigation should be brought to his personal counsel. McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 7; Donaldson
4/2/18 302, at 5.
540 SC_AD_00361 (Donaldson 5/31/17 Notes).
82
just[ice]." 541 McGahn told the President that his "biggest exposure" was not his act of firing
Comey but his "other contacts" and "calls," and his "ask re: Flynn." 542 By the time McGahn
provided this advice to the President, there had been widespread reporting on the President's
request for Comey's loyalty, which the President publicly denied; his request that Comey "le t[]
Flynn go," which the President also denied; and the President's statement to the Russian Foreign
Minister that the termination of Comey had relieved "great pressure" related to Russia, which the
President did not deny.'
On June 8, 2017, Comey testified before Congress about his interactions with the President
before his termination, including the request for loyalty, the request that Comey "let[] Flynn go,"
and the request that Comey "lift the cloud" over the presidency caused by the ongoing
investigation. 544 Comey's testimony led to a series of news reports about whether the President had
obstructed justice." On June 9, 2017, the Special Counsel's Office informed the White House
Counsel's Office that investigators intended to interview intelligence comm unity officials who had
allegedly been asked by the President to push back against the Russia investigation."
On Monday, June 12, 2017, Christopher Ruddy, the chief executive of Newsmax Media and a
longtime friend of the President's, met at the White House with Priebus and Bannon." Ruddy recalled
that they told him the President was strongly considering firing the Special Counsel
541
SC_AD_00361 (Donaldson 5/31/17 Notes).
542
SC AD 00361 (Donaldson 5/31/17 Notes).
See, e.g., Michael S. Schmidt, In a Private Dinner, Trump Demanded Loyalty. Comey Demurred.,
543
New York Times (May 11, 2017); Michael S. Schmidt, Comey Memorandum Says Trump Asked Him to
End Flynn Investigation, New York Times (May 16, 2017); Matt Apuzzo et al., Trump Told Russians That
Firing 'Nut Job' Comey Eased Pressure From Investigation, New York Times (May 19, 2017).
544
Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 5-6).
Comey testified that he deliberately caused his memorandum documenting the February 14, 2017 meeting
to be leaked to the New York Times in response to a tweet from the President, sent on May 12, 2017, that
stated "James Comey better hope that there are no 'tapes' of our conversations before he starts leaking to
the press!," and because he thought sharing the memorandum with a reporter "might prompt the
appointment of a special counsel." Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select
Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 55) (testimony by James B.
Comey, former Director of the FBI).
545
See, e.g., Matt Zapotosky, Comey lays out the case that Trump obstructed justice, Washington
Post (June 8, 2017) ("Legal analysts said Comey's testimony clarified and bolstered the case that the
president obstructed justice.").
546
6/9/17 Email, Special Counsel's Office to the White House Counsel's Office. This Office made
the notification to give the White House an opportunity to invoke executive privilege in advance of the
interviews. On June 12, 2017, the Special Counsel's Office interviewed Admiral Rogers in the presence of
agency counsel. Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 1. On June 13, the Special Counsel's Office interviewed Ledgett.
Ledgett 6/13/17 302, at 1. On June 14, the Office interviewed Coats and other personnel from his office.
Coats 6/14/17 302, at 1; Gistaro 6/14/17 302, at 1; Culver 6/14/17 302, at 1.
547
Ruddy 6/6/18 302, at 5.
83
and that he would do so precipitously, without vetting the decision through Administration officials.548
Ruddy asked Priebus if Ruddy could talk publicly about the discussion they had about the Special
Counsel, and Priebus said he could.549 Priebus told Ruddy he hoped another blow up like the one that
followed the termination of Comey did not happen.55° Later that day, Ruddy stated in a televised
interview that the President was "considering perhaps terminating the Special Counsel" based on
purported conflicts of interest.' Ruddy later told another news outlet that "Trump is definitely
considering" terminating the Special Counsel and "it's not something that's being dismissed."' Ruddy's
comments led to extensive coverage in the media that the President was considering firing the Special
Counsel.553
White House officials were unhappy with that press coverage and Ruddy heard from friends
that the President was upset with him.554 On June 13, 2017, Sanders asked the President for guidance
on how to respond to press inquiries about the possible firing of the Special Counsel.555 The President
dictated an answer, which Sanders delivered, saying that "[w]hile the president has every right to" fire
the Special Counsel, "he has no intention to do so."556
Also on June 13, 2017, the President's personal counsel contacted the Special Counsel's Office
and raised concerns about possible conflicts.557 The President's counsel cited Mueller's previous
partnership in his law firm, his interview for the FBI Director position, and an asserted personal
relationship he had with Comey.558 That same day, Rosenstein had testified publicly before Congress
and said he saw no evidence of good cause to terminate the Special. Counsel, including for conflicts
of interest.' Two days later, on June 15, 2017, the Special Counsel's
548
Ruddy 6/6/18 302, at 5-6.
549
Ruddy 6/6/18 302, at 6.
550
Ruddy 6/6/18 302, at 6.
Trump Confidant Christopher Ruddy says Mueller has "real conflicts" as special counsel,
551
PBS (June 12, 2017); Michael D. Shear & Maggie Haberman, Friend Says Trump Is Considering
Firing Mueller as Special Counsel, New York Times (June 12, 2017).
552
Katherine Faulders & Veronica Stracqualursi, Trump friend Chris Ruddy says Spicer 's
`bizarre' statement doesn't deny claim Trump seeking Mueller firing, ABC (June 13, 2017).
See, e.g., Michael D. Shear & Maggie Haberman, Friend Says Trump Is Considering Firing
553
Mueller as Special Counsel, New York Times (June 12, 2017).

554
Ruddy 6/6/18 302, at 6-7.
555
Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 6-7.
Glenn Thrush et al., Trump Stews, Staff Steps In, and Mueller Is Safe for Now, New York Times
556
(June 13, 2017); see Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 6 (Sanders spoke with the President directly before speaking to the
press on Air Force One and the answer she gave is the answer the President told her to give).
557
Special Counsel's Office Attorney 6/13/17 Notes.
558
Special Counsel's Office Attorney 6/13/17 Notes.
Hearing on Fiscal 2018 Justice Department Budget before the Senate Appropriations
559
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and Science, 115th Cong. (June 13, 2017) (CQ Cong.
Transcripts, at 14) (testimony by Rod Rosenstein, Deputy Attorney General).
84
Attorney ______________ Work Product // May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
Office informed the Acting Attorney General's office about the areas of concern raised by the
President's counsel and told the President's counsel that their concerns had been communicated to
Rosenstein so that the Department of Justice could take any appropriate action.56°
3. The Press Reports that the President is Being Investigated for Obstruction of Justice
and the President Directs the White House Counsel to Have the Special Counsel
Removed
On the evening of June 14, 2017, the Washington Post published an article stating that the
Special Counsel was investigating whether the President had attempted to obstruct justice.561 This
was the first public report that the President himself was under investigation by the Special Counsel's
Office, and cable news networks quickly picked up on the report. 562 The Post story stated that the
Special Counsel was interviewing intelligence community leaders, including Coats and Rogers,
about what the President had asked them to do in response to Comey's March 20, 2017 testimony;
that the inquiry into obstruction marked "a major turning point" in the investigation; and that while
"Trump had received private assurances from then-FBI Director James B. Comey starting in January
that he was not personally under investigation," "[ojfficials say that changed shortly after Comey's
firing."563 That evening, at approximately 10:31 p.m., the President called McGahn on McGahn's
personal cell phone and they spoke for about 15 minutes.564 McGahn did not have a clear memory of
the call but thought they might have discussed the stories reporting that the President was under
investigation.565
Beginning early the next day, June 15, 2017, the President issued a series of tweets
acknowledging the existence of the obstruction investigation and criticizing it. He wrote: "They made
up a phony collusion with the Russians story, found zero proof, so now they go for obstruction of
justice on the phony story. Nice";566 "You are witnessing the single greatest WITCH HUNT in
American political history—led by some very bad and conflicted people!";567 and "Crooked H
destroyed phones w/ hammer, 'bleached' emails, & had husband meet w/AG days
560 Special Counsel's Office Attorney 6/15/17 Notes.

561
Devlin Barrett et al., Special counsel is investigating Trump for possible obstruction of
justice, officials say, Washington Post (June 14, 2017).
CNN, for example, began running a chyron at 6:55 p.m. that stated: "WASH POST:
562
MUELLER INVESTIGATING TRUMP FOR OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE." CNN, (June 14,

2017, published online at 7:15 p.m. ET).
563
Devlin Barrett et al., Special counsel is investigating Trump for possible obstruction of
justice, officials say, Washington Post (June 14, 2017).
SCR026_000183 (President's Daily Diary, 6/14/17) (reflecting call from the President to McGahn
564
on 6/14/17 with start time 10:31 p.m. and end time 10:46 p.m.); Call Records of Don McGahn.
565
McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 1-2. McGahn thought he and the President also probably talked
about the investiture ceremony for Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch, which was scheduled for the
following day. McGahn 2/28/18 302, at 2.
566
567
85
before she was cleared—& they talk about obstruction?"' The next day, June 16, 2017, the President
wrote additional tweets criticizing the investigation: "After 7 months of investigations & committee
hearings about my 'collusion with the Russians,' nobody has been able to show any proof. Sad!"; 569
and "I am being investigated for firing the FBI Director by the man who told me to fire the FBI
Director! Witch Hunt."57°
On Saturday, June 17, 2017, the President called McGahn and directed him to have the Special
Counsel removed.57I McGahn was at home and the President was at Camp David.572 In interviews
with this Office, McGahn recalled that the President called him at home twice and on both occasions
directed him to call Rosenstein and say that Mueller had conflicts that precluded him from serving as
Special Counsel.573
On the first call, McGahn recalled that the President said something like, "You gotta do this. You
gotta call Rod."574 McGahn said he told the President that he would see what he could do.575 McGahn
was perturbed by the call and did not intend to act on the request.576 He and other advisors believed the
asserted conflicts were "silly" and "not real," and they had previously communicated that view to the
President.577 McGahn also had made clear to the President that the White House Counsel's Office should
not be involved in any effort to press the issue of conflicts.578 McGahn was concerned about having any
role in asking the Acting Attorney General to fire the Special Counsel because he had grown up in the
Reagan era and wanted to be more like Judge
568
569
570
571
McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1-2; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 10.
McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1, 3; SCR026_000196 (President's Daily Diary, 6/17/17) (records
572
showing President departed the White House at 11:07 a.m. on June 17, 2017, and arrived at Camp
David at 11:37 a.m.).
573
McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1-2; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 10. Phone records show that the President
called McGahn in the afternoon on June 17, 2017, and they spoke for approximately 23 minutes. SCR026
000196 (President's Daily Diary, 6/17/17) (reflecting call from the President to McGahn on 6/17/17 with start
time 2:23 p.m. and end time 2:46 p.m.); (Call Records of Don McGahn). Phone records do not show another
call between McGahn and the President that day. Although McGahn recalled receiving multiple calls from
the President on the same day, in light of the phone records he thought it was possible that the first call instead
occurred on June 14, 2017, shortly after the press reported that the President was under investigation for
obstruction of justice. McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 1-3. While McGahn was not certain of the specific dates of
the calls, McGahn was confident that he had at least two phone conversations with the President in which
the. President directed him to call the Acting Attorney General to have the Special Counsel removed.
McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 1-3.
574
McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1.
575
McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1.
576
McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1.
577
McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1-2.
578
McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1-2.
86
Robert Bork and not "Saturday Night Massacre Bork."' McGahn considered the President's request to
be an inflection point and he wanted to hit the brakes.58°
When the President called McGahn a second time to follow up on the order to call the
Department of Justice, McGahn recalled that the President was more direct, saying something like,
"Call Rod, tell Rod that Mueller has conflicts and can't be the Special Counsel." 581 McGahn recalled
the President telling him "Mueller has to go" and "Call me back when you do it."582 McGahn
understood the President to be saying that the Special Counsel had to be removed by Rosenstein. 583
To end the conversation with the President, McGahn left the President with the impression that
McGahn would call Rosenstein.584 McGahn recalled that he had already said no to the President's
request and he was worn down, so he just wanted to get off the phone.585
McGahn recalled feeling trapped because he did not plan to follow the President's directive
but did not know what he would say the next time the President called.586 McGahn decided he had to
resign.587 He called his personal lawyer and then called his chief of staff, Annie Donaldson, to inform
her of his decision.588 He then drove to the office to pack his belongings and submit his resignation
letter.589 Donaldson recalled that McGahn told her the President had called and demanded he contact
the Department of Justice and that the President wanted him to do something that McGahn did not
want to do.59° McGahn told Donaldson that the President had called at least twice and in one of the
calls asked "have you done it?"591 McGahn did not tell Donaldson the specifics of the President's
request because he was consciously trying not to involve her in the
579 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2.

580 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2.
581 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5.
582 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2, 5; McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 3.
583 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1-2, 5.
584 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2.
585 McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 3; McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2.
586 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2.
587 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2.
McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2-3; McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 3; Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at 4; Call Records
588
of Don McGahn.
589
McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2; Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at 4.
590
Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at 4.
591
87
investigation, but Donaldson inferred that the President's directive was related to the Russia
investigation.592 Donaldson prepared to resign along with McGahn.593
That evening, McGahn called both Priebus and Bannon and told them that he intended to
resign.594 McGahn recalled that, after speaking with his attorney and given the nature of the President's
request, he decided not to share details of the President's request with other White House staff.595
Priebus recalled that McGahn said that the President had asked him to "do crazy shit," but he thought
McGahn did not tell him the specifics of the President's request because McGahn was trying to protect
Priebus from what he did not need to know.' Priebus and Bannon both urged McGahn not to quit, and
McGahn ultimately returned to work that Monday and remained in his position.597 He had not told the
President directly that he planned to resign, and when they next saw each other the President did not
ask McGahn whether he had followed through with calling Rosenstein.'
Around the same time, Chris Christie recalled a telephone call with the President in which
the President asked what Christie thought about the President firing the Special Counsel.' Christie
advised against doing so because there was no substantive basis for the President to fire the Special
Counsel, and because the President would lose support from Republicans in Congress if he did so. 60°
Analysis
In analyzing the President's direction to McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed, the
following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice:
a. Obstructive act. As with the President's firing of Comey, the attempt to remove
the Special Counsel would qualify as an obstructive act if it would naturally obstruct the
McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 3-4; Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at 4-5. Donaldson said she believed
592
McGahn consciously did not share details with her because he did not want to drag her into the
investigation. Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at 5; see McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 3.
593
McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 10; Call Records of Don McGahn; McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 3-4;
594
Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 6-7.

McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 4. Priebus and Bannon confirmed that McGahn did not tell them
595
the specific details of the President's request. Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 7; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 10.
596
Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 7.
597
McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 3; McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 3-4.
598
McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 3.
Christie 2/13/19 302, at 7. Christie did not recall the precise date of this call, but believed it was
599
after Christopher Wray was announced as the nominee to be the new FBI director, which was on June 7,
2017. Christie 2/13/19 302, at 7. Telephone records show that the President called Christie twice after that
time period, on July 4, 2017, and July 14, 2017. Call Records of Chris Christie.
600
Christie 2/13/19 302, at 7.
88
investigation and any grand jury proceedings that might flow from the inquiry. Even if the removal of
the lead prosecutor would not prevent the investigation from continuing under a new appointee, a
factfinder would need to consider whether the act had the potential to delay further action in the
investigation, chill the actions of any replacement Special Counsel, or otherwise impede the
investigation.
A threshold question is whether"the President in fact directed McGahn to have the Special
Counsel removed. After news organizations reported that in June 2017 the President had ordered
McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed, the President publicly disputed these accounts, and
privately told McGahn that he had simply wanted McGahn to bring conflicts of interest to the
Department of Justice's attention. See Volume II, Section ILI, infra. Some of the President's specific
language that McGahn recalled from the calls is consistent with that explanation. Substantial evidence,
however, supports the conclusion that the President went further and in fact directed McGahn to call
Rosenstein to have the Special Counsel removed.
First, McGahn's clear recollection was that the President directed him to tell Rosenstein not
only that conflicts existed but also that "Mueller has to go." McGahn is a credible witness with no
motive to lie or exaggerate given the position he held in the White House. 6°I McGahn spoke with
the President twice and understood the directive the same way both times, making it unlikely that
he misheard or misinterpreted the President's request. In response to that request, McGahn decided
to quit because he did not want to participate in events that he described as akin to the Saturday
Night Massacre. He called his lawyer, drove to the White House, packed up his office, prepared to
submit a resignation letter with his chief of staff, told Priebus that the President had asked him to
"do crazy shit," and informed Priebus and Bannon that he was leaving. Those acts would be a
highly unusual reaction to a request to convey information to the Department of Justice.
Second, in the days before the calls to McGahn, the President, through his counsel, had already
brought the asserted conflicts to the attention of the Department of Justice. Accordingly, the President
had no reason to have McGahn call Rosenstein that weekend to raise conflicts issues that already had
been raised.
Third, the President's sense of urgency and repeated requests to McGahn to take immediate
action on a weekend—"You gotta do this. You gotta call Rod."—support McGahn's recollection that
the President wanted the Department of Justice to take action to remove the Special Counsel. Had the
President instead sought only to have the Department of Justice re-examine asserted conflicts to
evaluate whether they posed an ethical bar, it would have been unnecessary to set the process in motion
on a Saturday and to make repeated calls to McGahn.
Finally, the President had discussed "knocking out Mueller" and raised conflicts of interest in
a May 23, 2017 call with McGahn, reflecting that the President connected the conflicts to a plan to
remove the Special Counsel. And in the days leading up to June 17, 2017, the President made clear to
Priebus and Bannon, who then told Ruddy, that the President was considering terminating
601
When this Office first interviewed McGahn about this topic, he was reluctant to share
detailed information about what had occurred and only did so after continued questioning. See
McGahn 12/14/17 302 (agent notes).
89
the Special Counsel. Also during this time period, the President reached out to Christie to get his
thoughts on firing the Special Counsel. This evidence shows that the President was not just seeking
an examination of whether conflicts existed but instead was looking to use asserted conflicts as a way
to terminate the Special Counsel.
b. Nexus to an official proceeding. To satisfy the proceeding requirement, it would be

necessary to establish a nexus between the President's act of seeking to terminate the Special Counsel
and a pending or foreseeable grand jury proceeding.
Substantial evidence indicates that by June 17, 2017, the President knew his conduct was under
investigation by a federal prosecutor who could present any evidence of federal crimes to a grand jury.
On May 23, 2017, McGahn explicitly warned the President that his "biggest exposure" was not his act
of firing Comey but his "other contacts" and "calls," and his "ask re: Flynn." By early June, it was
widely reported in the media that federal prosecutors had issued grand jury subpoenas in the Flynn
inquiry and that the Special Counsel had taken over the Flynn investigation.6' On June 9, 2017, the
Special Counsel's Office informed the White House that investigators would be interviewing
intelligence agency officials who allegedly had been asked by the President to push back against the
Russia investigation. On June 14, 2017, news outlets began reporting that the President was himself
being investigated for obstruction of justice. Based on widespread reporting, the President knew that
such an investigation could include his request for Comey's loyalty; his request that Comey "let[]
Flynn go"; his outreach to Coats and Rogers; and his termination of Comey and statement to the
Russian Foreign Minister that the termination had relieved "great pressure" related to Russia. And on
June 16, 2017, the day before he directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed, the President
publicly acknowledged that his conduct was under investigation by a federal prosecutor, tweeting, "I
am being investigated for firing the FBI Director by the man who told me to fire the FBI Director!"
c. Intent. Substantial evidence indicates that the President's attempts to remove the
Special Counsel were linked to the Special Counsel's oversight of investigations that involved the
President's conduct—and, most immediately, to reports that the President was being investigated for
potential obstruction of justice.
Before the President terminated Comey, the President considered it critically important that he
was not under investigation and that the public not erroneously think he was being investigated. As
described in Volume II, Section II.D, supra, advisors perceived the President, while he was drafting
the Comey termination letter, to be concerned more than anything else about getting out that he was
not personally under investigation. When the President learned of the appointment of the Special
Counsel on May 17, 2017, he expressed further concern about the investigation, saying "[t]his is the
end of my Presidency." The President also faulted Sessions for recusing, saying "you were supposed
to protect me."
On June 14, 2017, when the Washington Post reported that the Special Counsel was
investigating the President for obstruction of justice, the President was facing what he had wanted
602 See, e.g., Evan Perez et al., CNN exclusive.: Grand jury subpoenas issued in FBI's Russia
investigation, CNN (May 9, 2017); Matt Ford, Why Mueller Is Taking Over the Michael Flynn Grand
Jury, The Atlantic (June 2, 2017).
90
to avoid: a criminal investigation into his own conduct that was the subject of widespread media
attention. The evidence indicates that news of the obstruction investigation prompted the President to
call McGahn and seek to have the Special Counsel removed. By mid-June, the Department of Justice
had already cleared the Special Counsel's service and the President's advisors had told him that the
claimed conflicts of interest were "silly" and did not provide a basis to remove the Special Counsel.
On June 13, 2017, the Acting Attorney General testified before Congress that no good cause for
removing the Special Counsel existed, and the President dictated a press statement to Sanders saying
he had no intention of firing the Special Counsel. But the next day, the media reported that the
President was under investigation for obstruction of justice and the Special Counsel was interviewing
witnesses about events related to possible obstruction—spurring the President to write critical tweets
about the Special Counsel's investigation. The President called McGahn at home that night and then
called him on Saturday from Camp David. The evidence accordingly indicates that news that an
obstruction investigation had been opened is what led the President to call McGahn to have the Special
Counsel terminated.
There also is evidence that the President knew that he should not have made those calls to
McGahn. The President made the calls to McGahn after McGahn had specifically told the President
that the White House Counsel's Office—and McGahn himself—could not be involved in pressing
conflicts claims and that the President should consult with his personal counsel if he wished to raise
conflicts. Instead of relying on his personal counsel to submit the conflicts claims, the President
sought to use his official powers to remove the Special Counsel. And after the media reported on
the President's actions, he denied that he ever ordered McGahn to have the Special Counsel
terminated and made repeated efforts to have McGahn deny the story, as discussed in Volume II,
Section ILI, infra. Those denials are contrary to the evidence and suggest the President's awareness
that the direction to McGahn could be seen as improper.
F. The President's Efforts to Curtail the Special Counsel Investigation
Overview
Two days after the President directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed, the
President made another attempt to affect the course of the Russia investigation. On June 19, 2017, the
President met one-on-one with Corey Lewandowski in the Oval Office and dictated a message to be
delivered to Attorney General Sessions that would have had the effect of limiting the Russia
investigation to future election interference only. One month later, the President met again with
Lewandowski and followed up on the request to have Sessions limit the scope of the Russia
investigation. Lewandowski told the President the message would be delivered soon. Hours later, the
President publicly criticized Sessions in an unplanned press interview, raising questions about
Sessions's job security.
1. The President Asks Corey Lewandowski to Deliver a Message to Sessions to

Curtail the Special Counsel Investigation
On June 19, 2017, two days after the President directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel
removed, the President met one-on-one in the Oval Office with his former campaign
91
manager Corey Lewandowski.603 Senior White House advisors described Lewandowski as a "devotee"
of the President and said the relationship between the President and Lewandowski was "close."6"4
During the June 19 meeting, Lewandowski recalled that, after some small talk, the President
brought up Sessions and criticized his recusal from the Russia investigation.6°5 The President told
Lewandowski that Sessions was weak and that if the President had known about the likelihood of
recusal in advance, he would not have appointed Sessions.606 The President then asked Lewandowski
to deliver a message to Sessions and said "write this down." 607 This was the first time the President
had asked Lewandowski to take dictation, and Lewandowski wrote as fast as possible to make sure
he captured the content correctly.608
The President directed that Sessions should give a speech publicly announcing:
I know that I recused myself from certain things having to do with specific areas. But our
POTUS . . . is being treated very unfairly. He shouldn't have a Special Prosecutor/Counsel b/c
he hasn't done anything wrong. I was on the campaign w/ him for nine months, there were no
Russians involved with him. I know it for a fact b/c I was there. He didn't do anything wrong
except he ran the greatest campaign in American history.609
The dictated message went on to state that Sessions would meet with the Special Counsel to limit his
jurisdiction to future election interference:
Now a group of people want to subvert the Constitution of the United States. I am going to
meet with the Special Prosecutor to explain this is very unfair and let the Special Prosecutor
move forward with investigating election meddling for future elections so that nothing can
happen in future elections.61°
603 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 2; SCR026 000201 President's Dail Dia , 6/19/17 .
604
Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 7; Dearborn 6/20/18 302, at 1 (describing Lewandowski as a "comfort to the
President" whose loyalty was appreciated). Kelly said that when he was Chief of Staff and the President had
meetings with friends like Lewandowski, Kelly tried not to be there and to push the meetings to the residence
to create distance from the West Wing. Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 7.
605
Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 2.
606
607
6
" Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 3.
609 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 2-3; Lewandowski 6/19/17 Notes, at 1-2.
610 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 3; Lewandowski 6/19/17 Notes, at 3.
92
The President said that if Sessions delivered that statement he would be the "most popular guy in the
country."611 Lewandowski told the President he understood what the President wanted Sessions to
do.612
Lewandowski wanted to pass the message to Sessions in person rather than over the
phone.613 He did not want to meet at the Department of Justice because he did not want a public
log of his visit and did not want Sessions to have an advantage over him by meeting on what
Lewandowski described as Sessions's turf. 614 Lewandowski called Sessions and arranged a meeting
for the following evening at Lewandowski's office, but Sessions had to cancel due to a last minute
conflict.615 Shortly thereafter, Lewandowski left Washington, D.C., without having had an
opportunity to meet with Sessions to convey the President's message. 616 Lewandowski stored the
notes in a safe at his home, which he stated was his standard procedure with sensitive items.617
2. The President Follows Up with Lewandowski
Following his June meeting with the President, Lewandowski contacted Rick Dearborn, then
a senior White House official, and asked if Dearborn could pass a message to Sessions.' Dearborn
agreed without knowing what the message was, and Lewandowski later confirmed that Dearborn
would meet with Sessions for dinner in late July and could deliver the message then.' Lewandowski
recalled thinking that the President had asked him to pass the message because the President knew
Lewandowski could be trusted, but Lewandowski believed Dearborn would be a better messenger
because he had a longstanding relationship with Sessions and because Dearborn was in the
government while Lewandowski was not.620
On July 19, 2017, the President again met with Lewandowski alone in the Oval Office. 621 In
the preceding days, as described in Volume II, Section II.G, infra, emails and other information about
the June 9, 2016 meeting between several Russians and Donald Trump Jr., Jared Kushner, and Paul
Manafort had been publicly disclosed. In the July 19 meeting with Lewandowski, the
611
Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 3; Lewandowski 6/19/17 Notes, at 4.
612
613
Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 3-4.
614
615
616
617
618
Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 4; see Dearborn 6/20/18 302, at 3.
619
Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 4-5.
620
Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 4, 6.
Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 5; SCR029b 000002-03 (6/5/18 Additional Response to Special
621
Counsel Request for Certain Visitor Log Information).
93
President raised his previous request and asked if Lewandowski had talked to Sessions. 622
Lewandowski told the President that the message would be delivered soon.623 Lewandowski recalled
that the President told him that if Sessions did not meet with him, Lewandowski should tell Sessions
he was fired.624
Immediately following the meeting with the President, Lewandowski saw Dearborn in the
anteroom outside the Oval Office and gave him a typewritten version of the message the President
had dictated to be delivered to Sessions.625 Lewandowski told Dearborn that the notes were the
message they had discussed, but Dearborn did not recall whether Lewandowski said the message was
from the President.626 The message "definitely raised an eyebrow" for Dearborn, and he recalled not
wanting to ask where it came from or think further about doing anything with it.627 Dearborn also said
that being asked to serve as a messenger to Sessions made him uncomfortable. 628 He recalled later
telling Lewandowski that he had handled the situation, but he did not actually follow through with
delivering the message to Sessions, and he did not keep a copy of the typewritten notes Lewandowski
had given him.629
3. The President Publicly Criticizes Sessions in a New York Times Interview
Within hours of the President's meeting with Lewandowski on July 19, 2017, the President
gave an unplanned interview to the New York Times in which he criticized Sessions's decision to
recuse from the Russia investigation.630 The President said that "Sessions should have never recused
himself, and if he was going to recuse himself, he should have told me before he took the job, and I
would have picked somebody else."' Sessions's recusal, the President said, was "very unfair to the
president. How do you take a job and then recuse yourself? If he would have recused himself before
the job, I would have said, 'Thanks, Jeff, but I can't, you know, I'm not going to
622
623
624
Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 6. Priebus vaguely recalled Lewandowski telling him that in
approximately May or June 2017 the President had asked Lewandowski to get Sessions's resignation.
Priebus recalled that Lewandowski described his reaction as something like, "What can I do? I'm not an
employee of the administration. I'm a nobody." Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 6.
625
Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 5. Lewandowski said he asked Hope Hicks to type the notes when
he went in to the Oval Office, and he then retrieved the notes from her partway through his meeting with
the President. Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 5.
626 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 5; Dearborn 6/20/18 302, at 3.
627 Dearborn 6/20/18 302, at 3.
628 Dearborn 6/20/18 302, at 3.
629 Dearborn 6/20/18 302, at 3-4.
630 Peter Baker et al., Excerpts From The Times 's Interview With Trump, New York Times (July
19, 2017).
631 Peter Baker et al., Excerpts From The Times 's Interview With Trump, New York Times (July
19, 2017).
94
take you.' It's extremely unfair, and that's a mild word, to the president." 632 Hicks, who was present
for the interview, recalled trying to "throw [herself] between the reporters and [the President]" to stop
parts of the interview, but the President "loved the interview."633
Later that day, Lewandowski met with Hicks and they discussed the President's New York
Times interview.634 Lewandowski recalled telling Hicks about the President's request that he meet
with Sessions and joking with her about the idea of firing Sessions as a private citizen if Sessions
would not meet with him.635 As Hicks remembered the conversation, Lewandowski told her the
President had recently asked him to meet with Sessions and deliver a message that he needed to do
the "right thing" and resign.636 While Hicks and Lewandowski were together, the President called
Hicks and told her he was happy with how coverage of his New York Times interview criticizing
Sessions was playing out.637
4. The President Orders Priebus to Demand Sessions's Resignation
Three days later, on July 21, 2017, the Washington Post reported that U.S. intelligence
intercepts showed that Sessions had discussed campaign-related matters with the Russian ambassador,
contrary to what Sessions had said publicly.' That evening, Priebus called Hunt to talk about whether
Sessions might be fired or might resign.639 Priebus had previously talked to Hunt when the media had
reported on tensions between Sessions and the President, and, after speaking to Sessions, Hunt had
told Priebus that the President would have to fire Sessions if he wanted to remove Sessions because
Sessions was not going to quit.64° According to Hunt, who took contemporaneous notes of the July 21
call, Hunt told Priebus that, as they had previously discussed, Sessions had no intention of resigning.641
Hunt asked Priebus what the President would
Peter Baker et al., Excerpts From The Times's Interview With Trump, New York Times (July
632
19, 2017).
633
Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 23.
634
Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 10; Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 6.
635
636
Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 10. Hicks thought that the President might be able to make a recess
appointment of a new Attorney General because the Senate was about to go on recess. Hicks 3/13/18 302, at
10. Lewandowski recalled that in the afternoon of July 19, 2017, following his meeting with the President,
he conducted research on recess appointments but did not share his research with the President. Lewandowski
4/6/18 302, at 7.
637
638
Adam Entous et al., Sessions discussed Trump campaign-related matters with Russian
ambassador, U.S. intelligence intercepts show, Washington Post (July 21, 2017). The underlying events
concerning the Sessions-Kislyak contacts are discussed in Volume I, Section IV.A.4.c, supra.
639
Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 23.
649
Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 23.
641
Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 23-24; Hunt 7/21/17 Notes, at 1.
95
accomplish by firing Sessions, pointing out there was an investigation before and there would be an
investigation after.642
Early the following morning, July 22, 2017, the President tweeted, "A new INTELLIGENCE
LEAK from the Amazon Washington Post, this time against A.G. Jeff Sessions. These illegal leaks,
like Comey's, must stop ! "643 Approximately one hour later, the President tweeted, "So many people
are asking why isn't the A.G. or Special Council looking at the many Hillary Clinton or Comey
crimes. 33,000 e-mails deleted?"644 Later that morning, while aboard Marine One on the way to
Norfolk, Virginia, the President told Priebus that he had to get Sessions to resign immediately.645
The President said that the country had lost confidence in Sessions and the negative publicity was
not tolerable.646 According to contemporaneous notes taken by Priebus, the President told Priebus to
say that he "need[ed] a letter of resignation on [his] desk immediately" and that Sessions had "no
choice" but "must immediately resign."647 Priebus replied that if they fired Sessions, they would
never get a new Attorney General confirmed and that the Department of Justice and Congress would
turn their backs on the President, but the President suggested he could make a recess appointment to
replace Sessions.648
Priebus believed that the President's request was a problem, so he called McGahn and asked
for advice, explaining that he did not want to pull the trigger on something that was "all wrong ."649
Although the President tied his desire for Sessions to resign to Sessions's negative press and poor
performance in congressional testimony, Priebus believed that the President's desire to replace
Sessions was driven by the President's hatred of Sessions's recusal from the Russia investigation. 650
McGahn told Priebus not to follow the President's order and said they should consult their personal
counsel, with whom they had attorney-client privilege.651 McGahn
642
Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 23-24; Hunt 7/21/17 Notes, at 1-2.
643
644 @realDonaldTrump 7/22/17 (7:44 a.m. ET) Tweet. Three minutes later, the President
tweeted, "What about all of the Clinton ties to Russia, including Podesta Company, Uranium deal,
Russian Reset, big dollar speeches etc." @realDonaldTrump 7/22/17 (7:47 a.m. ET) Tweet.
645 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 13-14.
646 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 14; Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 4-5; see RP__000073 (Priebus 7/22/17 Notes).
647 RP_000073 (Priebus 7/22/17 Notes).
648 Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 5.
649 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 14; Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 4-5.
650 Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 5.
651 RP_000074 (Priebus 7/22/17 Notes); McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 11; Priebus 1/18/18 302, at
14. Priebus followed McGahn's advice and called his personal attorney to discuss the President's
request because he thought it was the type of thing about which one would need to consult an attorney.
Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 14.
96
and Priebus discussed the possibility that they would both have to resign rather than carry out the
President's order to fire Sessions.652
That afternoon, the President followed up with Priebus about demanding Sessions's
resignation, using words to the effect of, "Did you get it? Are you working on it?"653 Priebus said that
he believed that his job depended on whether he followed the order to remove Sessions, although the
President did not directly say so.' Even though Priebus did not intend to carry out the President's
directive, he told the President he would get Sessions to resign.655 Later in the day, Priebus called the
President and explained that it would be a calamity if Sessions resigned because Priebus expected that
Rosenstein and Associate Attorney General Rachel Brand would also resign and the President would
be unable to get anyone else confirmed.656 The President agreed to hold off on demanding Sessions's
resignation until after the Sunday shows the next day, to prevent the shows from focusing on the
firing.657
By the end of that weekend, Priebus recalled that the President relented and agreed not to ask
Sessions to resign.' Over the next several days, the President tweeted about Sessions. On the morning
of Monday, July 24, 2017, the President criticized Sessions for neglecting to investigate Clinton and
called him "beleaguered."659 On July 25, the President tweeted, "Attorney General Jeff Sessions has
taken a VERY weak position on Hillary Clinton crimes (where are E-mails & DNC server) & Intel
leakers!"66° The following day, July 26, the President tweeted, "Why didn't A.G. Sessions replace
Acting FBI Director Andrew McCabe, a Comey friend who was in charge of Clinton investigation."661
According to Hunt, in light of the President's frequent public attacks, Sessions prepared another
resignation letter and for the rest of the year carried it with him in his pocket every time he went to
the White House.662
652
McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 11; RP_000074 (Priebus 7/22/17 Notes) ("discuss resigning
together").
653
Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 14; Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 4.
654
Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 4.
655
Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 15.
656
Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 15.
657
Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 15.
658
Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 15.
659
@realDonaldTrump 7/24/17 (8:49 a.m. ET) Tweet ("So why aren't the Committees and
investigators, and of course our beleaguered A.G., looking into Crooked Hillarys crimes & Russia
relations?").
660 @realDonaldTrump 7/25/17 (6:12 a.m. ET) Tweet. The President sent another tweet shortly before
this one asking "where is the investigation A.G." @realDonaldTrump 7/25/17 (6:03 a.m. ET) Tweet.
661
662
Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 24-25.
97
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Analysis
In analyzing the President's efforts to have Lewandowski deliver a message directing Sessions
to publicly announce that the Special Counsel investigation would be confined to future election
interference, the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice:
a. Obstructive act. The President's effort to send Sessions a message through

Lewandowski would qualify as an obstructive act if it would naturally obstruct the investigation and
any grand jury proceedings that might flow from the inquiry.
The President sought to have Sessions announce that the President "shouldn't have a Special
Prosecutor/Counsel" and that Sessions was going to "meet with the Special Prosecutor to explain this
is very unfair and let the Special Prosecutor move forward with investigating election meddling for
future elections so that nothing can happen in future elections." The President wanted Sessions to
disregard his recusal from the investigation, which had followed from a formal DOJ ethics review,
and have Sessions declare that he knew "for a fact" that "there were no Russians involved with the
campaign" because he "was there." The President further directed that Sessions should explain that
the President should not be subject to an investigation "because he hasn't done anything wrong."
Taken together, the President's directives indicate that Sessions was being instructed to tell the
Special Counsel to end the existing investigation into the President and his campaign, with the
Special Counsel being permitted to "move forward with investigating election meddling for future
elections."
b. Nexus to an official proceeding. As described above, by the time of the President's

initial one-on-one meeting with Lewandowski on June 19, 2017, the existence of a grand jury
investigation supervised by the Special Counsel was ublic knowled e. B the time of the President's
follow-up meeting with Lewandowski,
See Volume II, Section II.G, infra. To satisfy the nexus requirement, it
would be necessary to show that limiting the Special Counsel's investigation would have the natural
and probable effect of impeding that grand jury proceeding.
c. Intent. Substantial evidence indicates that the President's effort to have Sessions limit
the scope of the Special Counsel's investigation to future election interference was intended to prevent
further investigative scrutiny of the President's and his campaign's conduct.
As previously described, see Volume II, Section II.B, supra, the President knew that the
Russia investigation was focused in part on his campaign, and he perceived allegations of Russian
interference to cast doubt on the legitimacy of his election. The President further knew that the
investigation had broadened to include his own conduct and whether he had obstructed justice. Those
investigations would not proceed if the Special Counsel's jurisdiction were limited to future election
interference only.
The timing and circumstances of the President's actions support the conclusion that he sought
that result. The President's initial direction that Sessions should limit the Special Counsel's
investigation came just two days after the President had ordered McGahn to have the Special Counsel
removed, which itself followed public reports that the President was personally under
98
Atterney—ViLetk—ileettuet II May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
investigation for obstruction of justice. The sequence of those events raises an inference that after
seeking to terminate the Special Counsel, the President sought to exclude his and his campaign's
conduct from the investigation's scope. The President raised the matter with Lewandowski again on
July 19, 2017, just days after emails and information about the June 9, 2016 meeting between Russians
and senior campaign officials had been publicly disclosed, generating substantial media coverage and
investigative interest.
The manner in which the President acted provides additional evidence of his intent. Rather
than rely on official channels, the President met with Lewandowski alone in the Oval Office. The
President selected a loyal "devotee" outside the White House to deliver the message, supporting an
inference that he was working outside White House channels, including McGahn, who had
previously resisted contacting the Department of Justice about the Special Counsel. The President
also did not contact the Acting Attorney General, who had just testified publicly that there was no
cause to remove the Special Counsel. Instead, the President tried to use Sessions to restrict and
redirect the Special Counsel's investigation when Sessions was recused and could not properly take
any action on it.
The July 19, 2017 events provide further evidence of the President's intent. The President
followed up with Lewandowski in a separate one-on-one meeting one month after he first dictated
the message for Sessions, demonstrating he still sought to pursue the request. And just hours after
Lewandowski assured the President that the message would soon be delivered to Sessions, the
President gave an unplanned interview to the New York Times in which he publicly attacked
Sessions and raised questions about his job security. Four days later, on July 22, 2017, the President
directed Priebus to obtain Sessions's resignation. That evidence could raise an inference that the
President wanted Sessions to realize that his job might be on the line as he evaluated whether to
comply with the President's direction that Sessions publicly announce that, notwithstanding his
recusal, he was going to confine the Special Counsel's investigation to future election interference.
G. The President's Efforts to Prevent Disclosure of Emails About the June 9, 2016
Meeting Between Russians and Senior Campaign Officials
Overview
By June 2017, the President became aware of emails setting up the June 9, 2016 meeting
between senior campaign officials and Russians who offered derogatory information on Hillary Clinton
as "part of Russia and its government's support for Mr. Trump." On multiple occasions in late June and
early July 2017, the President directed aides not to publicly disclose the emails, and he then dictated a
statement about the meeting to be issued by Donald Trump Jr. describing the meeting as about
adoption.
Evidence
1. The President Learns About the Existence of Emails Concerning the June 9, 2016
Trump Tower Meeting
In mid-June 2017—the same week that the President first asked Lewandowski to pass a
message to Sessions—senior Administration officials became aware of emails exchanged during
99
MI-enter -Werk-Pfecittet // May Contain Material Protected Undcr Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
the campaign arranging a meeting between Donald Trump Jr., Paul Manafort, Jared Kushner, and a
Russian attorney.663 As described in Volume I, Section IV.A.5, supra, the emails stated that the
"Crown [P]rosecutor of Russia" had offered "to provide the Trump campaign with some official
documents and information that would incriminate Hillary and her dealings with Russia" as part of
"Russia and its government's support for Mr. Trump.,,664Trump Jr. responded, "[I]f it's what you say I
love it,"665 and he, Kushner, and Manafort met with the Russian attorney and several other Russian
individuals at Trump Tower on June 9, 2016.666 At the meeting, the Russian attorney claimed that
funds derived from illegal activities in Russia were provided to Hillary Clinton and other Democrats,
and the Russian attorney then spoke about the Magnitsky Act, a 2012 U.S. statute that imposed
financial and travel sanctions on Russian officials and that had resulted in a retaliatory ban in Russia
on U.S. adoptions of Russian children.667
According to written answers submitted by the President in response to questions from this
Office, the President had no recollection of learning of the meeting or the emails setting it up at the
time the meeting occurred or at any other time before the election.668
The Trump Campaign had previously received a document request from SSCI that called for
the production of various information, including, "[a] list and a description of all meetings" between
any "individual affiliated with the Trump campaign" and "any individual formally or informally
affiliated with the Russian government or Russian business interests which took place between June
16, 2015, and 12 pm on January 20, 2017," and associated records.669 Trump Organization attorneys
became aware of the June 9 meeting no later than the first week of June 2017, when they began
interviewing the meeting participants, and the Trump Organization attorneys provided the emails
setting up the meeting to the President's personal counse1.67° Mark Corallo, who had been hired as a
spokesman for the President's personal legal team, recalled that he learned about the June 9 meeting
around June 21 or 22, 2017.671 Priebus recalled learning about the June 9 meeting from Fox News host
Sean Hannity in late June 2017.672 Priebus notified one
663
Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 1; Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 2.
RG000061 (6/3/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.); @DonaldJTrumpJR 7/11/17 (11:01 a.m.
664
ET) Tweet.
RG000061 (6/3/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone); @DonaldJTrumpJR 7/11/17 (11:01 a.m.
665
ET) Tweet.
666
Samochornov 7/12/17 302, at 4.
667
See Volume I, Section IV.A.5, supra (describing meeting in detail).
668
Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 8 (Response to Question I, Parts
(a) through (c)). The President declined to answer questions about his knowledge of the June 9 meeting
or other events after the election.
669
DJTFP_SCO_PDF_00000001-02 (5/17/17 Letter, SSCI to Donald J. Trump for President, Inc.).
670
Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 12; 6/2/17 and 6/5/17 Emails, Goldstone & Garten; Raffel 2/8/18
302, at 3; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2.
671
Corallo 2/15/18 302, at 3.
672
Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 7.
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At*erneyerrk-Pretteet // May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
of the President's personal attorneys, who told Priebus he was already working on it. 673 By late June,
several advisors recalled receiving media inquiries that could relate to the June 9 meeting.674
2. The President Directs Communications Staff Not to Publicly Disclose Information

About the June 9 Meeting
Communications advisors Hope Hicks and Josh Raffel recalled discussing with Jared
Kushner and Ivanka Trump that the emails were damaging and would inevitably be leaked. 675 Hicks
and Raffel advised that the best strategy was to proactively release the emails to the press. 676 On or
about June 22, 2017, Hicks attended a meeting in the White House residence with the President,
Kushner, and Ivanka Trump.677 According to Hicks, Kushner said that he wanted to fill the President
in on something that had been discovered in the documents he was to provide to the congressional
committees involving a meeting with him, Manafort, and Trump Jr. Kushner brought a folder of
678
documents to the meeting and tried to show them to the President, but the President stopped Kushner
and said he did not want to know about it, shutting the conversation down. 679
On June 28, 2017, Hicks viewed the emails at Kushner's attorney's office.68° She recalled being
shocked by the emails because they looked "really bad."68I The next day, Hicks spoke privately with
the President to mention her concern about the emai Is, which she understood were soon going to be
shared with Congress.682 The President seemed upset because too many people knew about the emails
and he told Hicks that just one lawyer should deal with the matter.683 The President indicated that he
did not think the emails would leak, but said they would leak if everyone had access to them!'"
673
Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 7.
674
Corallo 2/15/18 302, at 3; Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 8; Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 3.
675
Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 2-3; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2.
676
Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 2-3, 5; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2; Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 8.
677
Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 6-7; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 1.
678
Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 7; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 1.
679
Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 7; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 1. Counsel for Ivanka Trump provided an attorney
proffer that is consistent with Hicks's account and with the other events involving Ivanka Trump set forth in
this section of the report. Kushner said that he did not recall talking to the President at this time about the June
9 meeting or the underlying emails. Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 30.
680
Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 1-2.
681
Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2.
682
Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 8.
683
Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2-3; Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 8.
684
Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 8.
1 01
Later that day, Hicks, Kushner, and Ivanka Trump went together to talk to the President. 685
Hicks recalled that Kushner told the President the June 9 meeting was not a big deal and was about
Russian adoption, but that emails existed setting up the meeting.686 Hicks said she wanted to get in
front of the story and have Trump Jr. release the emails as part of an interview with "softball
questions."687 The President said he did not want to know about it and they should not go to the press.6"
Hicks warned the President that the emails were "really bad" and the story would be "massive" when
it broke, but the President was insistent that he did not want to talk about it and said he did not want
details.689 Hicks recalled that the President asked Kushner when his document production was due.69°
Kushner responded that it would be a couple of weeks and the President said, "then leave it alone." 691
Hicks also recalled that the President said Kushner's attorney should give the emails to whomever he
needed to give them to, but the President did not think they would be leaked to the press.692 Raffel later
heard from Hicks that the President had directed the group not to be proactive in disclosing the emails
because the President believed they would not leak.'
3. The President Directs Trump Jr.'s Response to Press Inquiries About the June 9
Meeting
The following week, the President departed on an overseas trip for the G20 summit in
Hamburg, Germany, accompanied by Hicks, Raffel, Kushner, and Ivanka Trump, among others.694 On
July 7, 2017, while the President was overseas, Hicks and Raffel learned that the New York Times was
working on a story about the June 9 meeting.' The next day, Hicks told the President about the story
and he directed her not to comment.696 Hicks thought the President's reaction was odd because he
usually considered not responding to the press to be the ultimate sin.697 Later that day, Hicks and the
President again spoke about the story.698 Hicks recalled that the President asked
685
Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 8; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2.
686
Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2; Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 9.
687
Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2-3.
688
Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2-3; Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 9.
689
Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 3; Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 9.
690
Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 3.
691
Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 3.
692
Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 9.
693
Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 5.
694
Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 6.
695
Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 6-7; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 3.
696
Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 10; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 3.
697
Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 10.
698
Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 3.
1 02
her what the meeting had been about, and she said that she had been told the meeting was about
Russian adoption.699 The President responded, "then just say that."70°
On the flight home from the G20 on July 8, 2017, Hicks obtained a draft statement about the
meeting to be released by Trump Jr. and brought it to the President.' The draft statement began with
a reference to the information that was offered by the Russians in setting up the meeting: "I was
asked to have a meeting by an acquaintance I knew from the 2013 Miss Universe pageant with an
individual who I was told might have information helpful to the campaign." 7°2 Hicks again wanted
to disclose the entire story, but the President directed that the statement not be issued because it said
too much.703 The President told Hicks to say only that Trump Jr. took a brief meeting and it was
about Russian adoption!" After speaking with the President, Hicks texted Trump Jr. a revised
statement on the June 9 meeting that read:
It was a short meeting. I asked Jared and Paul to stop by. We discussed a program about the
adoption of Russian children that was active and popular with American families years ago
and was since ended by the Russian government, but it was not a campaign issue at that time
and there was no follow up.7°5
Hicks's text concluded, "Are you ok with this? Attributed to you." 7°6 Trump Jr. responded by text
message that he wanted to add the word "primarily" before "discussed" so that the statement would
read, "We primarily discussed a program about the adoption of Russian children."707 Trump Jr. texted
that he wanted the change because "[t]hey started with some Hillary thing which was bs and some
other nonsense which we shot down fast."' Hicks texted back, "I think that's right too but boss man
worried it invites a lot of questions[.] [U]ltimately [d]efer to you and [your attorney] on that word Bc
I know it's important and I think the mention of a campaign issue adds something to it in case we have
to go further."709 Trump Jr. responded, "If I don't have it in there it appears as though I'm lying later
when they inevitably leak something."7I° Trump Jr.'s statement—adding
699
Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 3; Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 10.
700
Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 3; see Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 10.
7°1
Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 4.
702
Hicks 7/8/17 Notes.
703
Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 4-5; Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 11.
704
Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 11.
705
SCR011a_000004 (7/8/17 Text Message, Hicks to Trump Jr.).
706 SCRO1 1 a_000004 (7/8/17 Text Message, Hicks to Trump Jr.).
707
SCR011a_000005 (7/8/17 Text Message, Trump Jr. to Hicks).
708
SCRO1 1 a_000005 (7/8/17 Text Message, Trump Jr. to Hicks).
709 SCR011a_000005 (7/8/17 Text Message, Hicks to Trump Jr.).
710
SCRO 1 1 a_000006 (7/8/17 Text Message, Trump Jr. to Hicks).
1 03
the word "primarily" and making other minor additions—was then provided to the New York
Times.711 The full statement provided to the Times stated:
It was a short introductory meeting. I asked Jared and Paul to stop by. We primarily discussed
a program about the adoption of Russian children that was active and popular with American
families years ago and was since ended by the Russian government, but it was not a campaign
issue at the time and there was no follow up. I was asked to attend the meeting by an
acquaintance, but was not told the name of the person I would be meeting with beforehand.712
The statement did not mention the offer of derogatory information about Clinton or any discussion of
the Magnitsky Act or U.S. sanctions, which were the principal subjects of the meeting, as described
in Volume I, Section IV.A.5, supra.
A short while later, while still on Air Force One, Hicks learned that Priebus knew about the
emails, which further convinced her that additional information about the June 9 meeting would leak
and the White House should be proactive and get in front of the story.713 Hicks recalled again going
to the President to urge him that they should be fully transparent about the June 9 meeting, but he
again said no, telling Hicks, "You've given a statement. We're done."714
Later on the flight home, Hicks went to the President's cabin, where the President was on the
phone with one of his personal attorneys.' At one point the President handed the phone to Hicks, and
the attorney told Hicks that he had been working with Circa News on a separate story, and that she
should not talk to the New York Times.716
4. The Media Reports on the June 9, 2016 Meeting
Before the President's flight home from the G20 landed, the New York Times published its
story about the June 9, 2016 meeting?" In addition to the statement from Trump Jr., the Times story
also quoted a statement from Corallo on behalf of the President's legal team suggesting that the
meeting might have been a setup by individuals working with the firm that produced the Steele
reporting.718 Corallo also worked with Circa News on a story published an hour later that
Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 6; see Jo Becker et al., Trump Team Met With Lawyer Linked to
711
Kremlin During Campaign, New York Times (July 8, 2017).

See Jo Becker et al., Trump Team Met With Lawyer Linked to Kremlin During Campaign,
712

713
Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 6; Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 9-10.
714
Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 12; Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 10.
715
Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 7.
716
Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 7.
717
New York Times (July 8, 2017); Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 10.

718
1 04
questioned whether Democratic operatives had arranged the June 9 meeting to create the appearance
of improper connections between Russia and Trump family members.' Hicks was upset about Corallo's
public statement and called him that evening to say the President had not approved the statement.'
The next day, July 9, 2017, Hicks and the President called Corallo together and the President
criticized Corallo for the statement he had released.' Corallo told the President the statement had
been authorized and further observed that Trump Jr.'s statement was inaccurate and that a document
existed that would contradict it. Corallo said that he purposely used the term "document" to refer to
722
the emails setting up the June 9 meeting because he did not know what the President knew about the
emails.723 Corallo recalled that when he referred to the "document" on the call with the President,
Hicks responded that only a few people had access to it and said "it will never get out." 724 Corallo
took contemporaneous notes of the call that say: "Also mention existence of doe. Hope says 'only a
few people have it. It will never get out.'" 725 Hicks later told investigators that she had no memory of
making that comment and had always believed the emails would eventually be leaked, but she might
have been channeling the President on the phone call because it was clear to her throughout her
conversations with the President that he did not think the emails would leak.726
On July 11, 2017, Trump Jr. posted redacted images of the emails setting up the June 9 meeting
on Twitter; the New York Times reported that he did so "[a]fter being told that The Times was about
to publish the content of the emails."727 Later that day, the media reported that the President had been
personally involved in preparing Trump Jr.'s initial statement to the New York Times that had claimed
the meeting "primarily" concerned "a program about the adoption of Russian children."728 Over the
next several days, the President's personal counsel repeatedly and
719
See Donald Trump Jr. gathered members of campaign for meeting with Russian lawyer
before election, Circa News (July 8, 2017).
720
Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 8; Corallo 2/15/18 302, at 6-7.
721
Corallo 2/15/18 302, at 7.
722
Corallo 2/15/18 302, at 7.
723
Corallo 2/15/18 302, at 7-9.
724
Corallo 2/15/18 302, at 8.
725
Corallo 2/15/18 302, at 8; Corallo 7/9/17 Notes ("Sunday 9th — Hope calls w/ POTUS on
line"). Corallo said he is "100% confident" that Hicks said "It will never get out" on the call. Corallo
2/15/18 302, at 9.
726
Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 9.
727
@DonaldJTrumpJR 7/11/17 (11:01 a.m. ET) Tweet; Jo Becker et al., Russian Dirt on
Clinton? Ì Love It,' Donald Trump Jr. Said, New York Times (July 11, 2017).
728
See, e.g., Peter Baker & Maggie Haberman, Rancor at White House as Russia Story Refuses
to Let the Page Turn, New York Times (July 11, 2017) (reporting that the President "signed off' on
Trump Jr.'s statement).
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inaccurately denied that the President played any role in drafting Trump Jr.'s statement. 729 After
consulting with the President on the issue, White House Press Secretary Sarah Sanders told the
media that the President "certainly didn't dictate" the statement, but that "he weighed in, offered
suggestions like any father would do." 73° Several months later, the President's personal counsel
stated in a private communication to the Special Counsel's Office that "the President dictated a short
but accurate response to the New York Times article on behalf of his son, Donald Trump, Jr." 731
The President later told the press that it was "irrelevant" whether he dictated the statement and said,
"It's a statement to the New York Times. . . . That's not a statement to a high tribunal of judges." 732
On July 12, 2017, the Special Counsel's Office Trump Jr.

related to the June 9 meeting and those who attended the
June 9 meeting.
On July 19, 2017, the President had his follow-up

meeting with Lewandowski and then met with reporters for the New
York Times. In addition to criticizing Sessions in his Times interview, the President addressed the
June 9, 2016 meeting and said he "didn't know anything about the meeting" at the time. 734 The
President added, "As I've said—most other people, you know, when they call up and say, 'By the
way, we have information on your opponent,' I think most politicians — I was just with a lot of
people, they said . . . , 'Who wouldn't have taken a meeting like that?"735
Analysis
In analyzing the President's actions regarding the disclosure of information about the June 9
meeting, the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice:
a. Obstructive act. On at least three occasions between June 29, 2017, and July 9,
2017, the President directed Hicks and others not to publicly disclose information about the June
See, e.g., David Wright, Trump lawyer: President was aware of "nothing", CNN (July 12, 2017)
729
(quoting the President's personal attorney as saying, "I wasn't involved in the statement drafting at all nor was
the President."); see also Good Morning America, ABC (July 12, 2017) ("The President didn't sign off on
anything. . . . The President wasn't involved in that"); Meet the Press, NBC (July 16, 2017) ("I do want to be
clear—the President was not involved in the drafting of the statement.").
Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (Aug. 1, 2017); Sanders 7/3/18 302,
730
at 9 (the President told Sanders he "weighed in, as any father would" and knew she intended to tell
the press what he 'said).
731
1/29/18 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 18.
732
Remarks by President Trump in Press Gaggle (June 15, 2018).
733
Peter Baker et al., Excerpts From The Times 's Interview With Trump, New York Times
734
(July 19, 2017).

Peter Baker et al., Excerpts From The Times 's Interview With Trump, New York Times
735
(July 19, 2017).
106
9, 2016 meeting between senior campaign officials and a Russian attorney. On June 29, Hicks warned
the President that the emails setting up the June 9 meeting were "really bad" and the story would be
"massive" when it broke, but the President told her and Kushner to "leave it alone." Early on July 8,
after Hicks told the President the New York Times was working on a story about the June 9 meeting,
the President directed her not to comment, even though Hicks said that the President usually
considered not responding to the press to be the ultimate sin. Later that day, the President rejected
Trump Jr.'s draft statement that would have acknowledged that the meeting was with "an individual
who I was told might have information helpful to the campaign." The President then dictated a
statement to Hicks that said the meeting was about Russian adoption (which the President had twice
been told was discussed at the meeting). The statement dictated by the President did not mention the
offer of derogatory information about Clinton.
Each of these efforts by the President involved his communications team and was directed at
the press. They would amount to obstructive acts only if the President, by taking these actions, sought
to withhold information from or mislead congressional investigators or the Special Counsel. On May
17, 2017, the President's campaign received a document request from SSCI that clearly covered the
June 9 meeting and underlying emails, and those documents also plainly would have been relevant to
the Special Counsel's investigation.
But the evidence does not establish that the President took steps to prevent the emails or
other information about the June 9 meeting from being provided to Congress or the Special
Counsel. The series of discussions in which the President sought to limit access to the emails and
prevent their public release occurred in the context of developing a press strategy. The only
evidence we have of the President discussing the production of documents to Congress or the
Special Counsel is the conversation on June 29, 2017, when Hicks recalled the President
acknowledging that Kushner's attorney should provide emails related to the June 9 meeting to
whomever he needed to give them to. We do not have evidence of what the President discussed
with his own lawyers at that time.
b. Nexus to an official proceeding. As described above, by the time of the President's

attempts to prevent the public release of the emails regarding the June 9 meeting, the existence of a
grand jury investigation supervised by the Special Counsel was public knowledge, and the President
had been told that the emails were responsive to congressional inquiries. To satisfy the nexus
requirement, however, it would be necessary to show that preventing the release of the emails to the
public would have the natural and probable effect of impeding the grand jury proceeding or
congressional inquiries. As noted above, the evidence does not establish that the President sought
to prevent disclosure of the emails in those official proceedings.
c. Intent. The evidence establishes the President's substantial involvement in the

communications strategy related to information about his campaign's connections to Russia and his
desire to minimize public disclosures about those connections. The President became aware of the
emails no later than June 29, 2017, when he discussed them with Hicks and Kushner, and he could
have been aware of them as early as June 2, 2017, when lawyers for the Trump Organization began
interviewing witnesses who participated in the June 9 meeting. The President thereafter repeatedly
rejected the advice of Hicks and other staffers to publicly release information about the June 9
meeting. The President expressed concern that multiple people had access to the emails and instructed
Hicks that only one lawyer should deal with the matter. And the President
107
dictated a statement to be released by Trump Jr. in response to the first press accounts of the June 9
meeting that said the meeting was about adoption.
But as described above, the evidence does not establish that the President intended to prevent
the Special Counsel's Office or Congress from obtaining the emails setting up the June 9 meeting or
other information about that meeting. The statement recorded by Corallo—that the emails "will never
get out"—can be explained as reflecting a belief that the emails would not be made public if the
President's press strategy were followed, even if the emails were provided to Congress and the Special
Counsel.
H. The President's Further Efforts to Have the Attorney General Take Over the
Investigation
Overview
From summer 2017 through 2018, the President attempted to have Attorney General Sessions
reverse his recusal, take control of the Special Counsel's investigation, and order an investigation of
Hillary Clinton.
Evidence
1. The President Again Seeks to Have Sessions Reverse his Recusal
After returning Sessions's resignation letter at the end of May 2017, but before the President's
July 19, 2017 New York Times interview in which he publicly criticized Sessions for recusing from
the Russia investigation, the President took additional steps to have Sessions reverse his recusal. In
particular, at some point after the May 17, 2017 appointment of the Special Counsel, Sessions recalled,
the President called him at home and asked if Sessions would "unrecuse" himself. 736 According to
Sessions, the President asked him to reverse his recusal so that Sessions could direct the Department
of Justice to investigate and prosecute Hillary Clinton, and the "gist" of the conversation was that the
President wanted Sessions to unrecuse from "all of it," including the Special Counsel's Russia
investigation.' Sessions listened but did not respond, and he did not reverse his recusal or order an
investigation of Clinton.738
In early July 2017, the President asked Staff Secretary Rob Porter what he thought of Associate
Attorney General Rachel Brand.' Porter recalled that the President asked him if Brand was good,
tough, and "on the team."74° The President also asked if Porter thought Brand was interested in being
responsible for the Special Counsel's investigation and whether she would want
736
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 15. That was the second time that the President asked Sessions to
reverse his recusal from campaign-related investigations. See Volume II, Section II.C. 1 , supra
(describing President's March 2017 request at Mar-a-Lago for Sessions to unrecuse).
737
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 15.
738
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 15.
739
Porter 4/13/18 302, at 11; Porter 5/8/18 302, at 6.
740
108
to be Attorney General one day.741 Because Porter knew Brand, the President asked him to sound her
out about taking responsibility for the investigation and being Attorney Genera1.742 Contemporaneous
notes taken by Porter show that the President told Porter to "Keep in touch with your friend," in
reference to Brand.'" Later, the President asked Porter a few times in passing whether he had spoken
to Brand, but Porter did not reach out to her because he was uncomfortable with the task."'" In asking
him to reach out to Brand, Porter understood the President to want to find someone to end the Russia
investigation or fire the Special Counsel, although the President never said so explicitly?" Porter did
not contact Brand because he was sensitive to the implications of that action and did not want to be
involved in a chain of events associated with an effort to end the investigation or fire the Special
Counsel.746
McGahn recalled that during the summer of 2017, he and the President discussed the fact that
if Sessions were no longer in his position the Special Counsel would report directly to a non-recused
Attorney Genera1.747 McGahn told the President that things might not change much under a new
Attorney General.'" McGahn also recalled that in or around July 2017, the President frequently
brought up his displeasure with Sessions.749 Hicks recalled that the President viewed Sessions's recusal
from the Russia investigation as an act of disloyalty.' In addition to criticizing Sessions's recusal, the
President raised other concerns about Sessions and his job performance with McGahn and Hicks.751
Porter 4/13/18 302, at 11; Porter 5/8/18 302, at 6. Because of Sessions's recusal, if Rosenstein were
741
no longer in his position, Brand would, by default, become the DOJ official in charge of supervising the
Special Counsel's investigation, and if both Sessions and Rosenstein were removed, Brand would be next in
line to become Acting Attorney General for all DOJ matters. See 28 U.S.C. § 508.
742
743
SC_RRP000020 (Porter 7/10/17 Notes).
744
Porter 4/13/18 302, at 11-12.
745
Porter 4/13/18 302, at 11-12.
Porter 4/13/18 302, at 11-12. Brand confirmed that no one ever raised with her the prospect of
746
taking over the Russia investigation or becoming Attorney General. Brand 1/29/19 302, at 2.
747
McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 11.
748
McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 11.
749
McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 9.
750
Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 10.
751
McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 9; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 10.
109
2. Additional Efforts to Have Sessions Unrecuse or Direct Investigations Covered by

his Recusal
Later in 2017, the President continued to urge Sessions to reverse his recusal from campaign-
related investigations and considered replacing Sessions with an Attorney General who would not be
recused.
On October 16, 2017, the President met privately with Sessions and said that the Department
of Justice was not investigating individuals and events that the President thought the Department
should be investigating.752 According to contemporaneous notes taken by Porter, who was at the
meeting, the President mentioned Clinton's emails and said, "Don't have to tell us, just take [a]
look."753 Sessions did not offer any assurances or promises to the President that the Department of
Justice would comply with that request. 754 Two days later, on October 18, 2017, the President
tweeted, "Wow, FBI confirms report that James Comey drafted letter exonerating Crooked Hillary
Clinton long before investigation was complete. Many people not interviewed, including Clinton
herself. Comey stated under oath that he didn't do this-obviously a fix? Where is Justice Dept?" 755
On October 29, 2017, the President tweeted that there was "ANGER & UNITY" over a "lack of
investigation" of Clinton and "the Comey fix," and concluded: "DO SOMETHING! "756
On December 6, 2017, five days after Flynn pleaded guilty to lying about his contacts with
the Russian government, the President asked to speak with Sessions in the Oval Office at the end of
a cabinet meeting.757 During that Oval Office meeting, which Porter attended, the President again
suggested that Sessions could "unrecuse," which Porter linked to taking back supervision of the
Russia investigation and directing an investigation of Hillary Clinton.' According to
contemporaneous notes taken by Porter, the President said, "I don't know if you could un-recuse
yourself. You'd be a hero. Not telling you to do anything. Dershowitz says POTUS can get involved.
Can order AG to investigate. I don't want to get involved. I'm not going to get involved. I'm not going
to do anything or direct you to do anything. I just want to be treated fairly."' According to Porter's
notes, Sessions responded, "We are taking steps; whole new leadership
752
Porter 5/8/18 302, at 10.
753
SC_RRP000024 (Porter 10/16/17 Notes); see Porter 5/8/18 302, at 10.
754
Porter 5/8/18 302, at 10.
@realDonaldTrump 10/18/17 (6:21 a.m. ET) Tweet; @realDonaldTrump 10/18/17(6:27
755
a.m. ET) Tweet.

@realDonaldTrump 10/29/17 (9:53 a.m. ET) Tweet; @realDonaldTrump 10/29/17 (10:02
756
a.m. ET) Tweet; @realDonaldTrump 10/29/17 (10:17 a.m. ET) Tweet.

757
Porter 4/13/18 302, at 5-6; see SC_RRP000031 (Porter 12/6/17 Notes) ("12:45pm With the
President, Gen. Kelly, and Sessions (who I pulled in after the Cabinet meeting)"); SC_RRP000033 (Porter
12/6/17 Notes) ("Post-cabinet meeting — POTUS asked me to get AG Sessions. Asked me to stay. Also
COS Kelly.").
758
Porter 5/8/18 302, at 12; Porter 4/13/18 302, at 5-6.
759
SC_RRP000033 (Porter 12/6/17 Notes); see Porter 4/13/18 302, at 6; Porter 5/8/18 302, at 12.
110
team. Professionals; will operate according to the law." 76° Sessions also said, "I never saw anything
that was improper," which Porter thought was noteworthy because it did not fit with the previous
discussion about Clinton.761 Porter understood Sessions to be reassuring the President that he was on
the President's team.762
At the end of December, the President told the New York Times it was "too bad" that Sessions
had recused himself from the Russia investigation.763 When asked whether Holder had been a more
loyal Attorney General to President Obama than Sessions was to him, the President said, "I don't want
to get into loyalty, but I will tell you that, I will say this: Holder protected President Obama. Totally
protected him. When you look at the things that they did, and Holder protected the president. And I
have great respect for that, I'll be honest."764 Later in January, the President brought up the idea of
replacing Sessions and told Porter that he wanted to "clean house" at the Department of Justice. 765 In
a meeting in the White House residence that Porter attended on January 27, 2018, Porter recalled that
the President talked about the great attorneys he had in the past with successful win records, such as
Roy Cohn and Jay Goldberg, and said that one of his biggest failings as President was that he had not
surrounded himself with good attorneys, citing Sessions as an example.766 The President raised
Sessions's recusal and brought up and criticized the Special Counsel's investigation.767
Over the next several months, the President continued to criticize Sessions in tweets and media
interviews and on several occasions appeared to publicly encourage him to take action in the Russia
investigation despite his recusal.768 On June 5, 2018, for example, the President
760
SC_RRP000033 (Porter 12/6/17 Notes); see Porter 4/13/18 302, at 6.
761
SC_RRP000033 (Porter 12/6/17 Notes); Porter 4/13/18 302, at 6.
762
Porter 4/13/18 302, at 6-7.
Michael S. Schmidt & Michael D. Shear, Trump Says Russia Inquiry Makes U.S. "Look Very
763
Bad", New York Times (Dec. 28, 2017).

Michael S. Schmidt & Michael D. Shear, Trump Says Russia Inquiry Makes U.S. "Look Very
764
Bad", New York Times (Dec. 28, 2017).

765
Porter 4/13/18 302, at 14.
Porter 5/8/18 302, at 15. Contemporaneous notes Porter took of the conversation state, "Roy
766
Cohn (14-0) / Jay Goldberg (12-0)." SC_RRP000047 (Porter 1/27/18 Notes).

767
Porter 5/8/18 302, at 15-16.
See, e.g., @realDonaldTrump 2/28/18 (9:34 a.m. ET) Tweet ("Why is A.G. Jeff Sessions asking the
768
Inspector General to investigate potentially massive FISA abuse. Will take forever, has no prosecutorial power
and already late with reports on Comey etc. Isn't the I.G. an Obama guy? Why not use Justice Department
lawyers? DISGRACEFUL!"); @realDonaldTrump 4/7/18 (4:52 p.m. ET) Tweet ("Lawmakers of the House
Judiciary Committee are angrily accusing the Department of Justice of missing the Thursday Deadline for
turning over UNREDACTED Documents relating to FISA abuse, FBI, Comey, Lynch, McCabe, Clinton
Emails and much more. Slow walking — what is going on? BAD!"); @realDonaldTrump 4/22/18 (8:22 a.m.
ET) Tweet ("`GOP Lawmakers asking Sessions to Investigate Comey and Hillary Clinton.' @FoxNews Good
luck with that request!"); @realDonaldTrump 12/16/18 (3:37 p.m. ET) Tweet
111
tweeted, "The Russian Witch Hunt Hoax continues, all because Jeff Sessions didn't tell me he was
going to recuse himself. . . . I would have quickly picked someone else. So much time and money
wasted, so many lives ruined . . . and Sessions knew better than most that there was No Collusion!"769
On August 1, 2018, the President tweeted that 'Attorney General Jeff Sessions should stop this
Rigged Witch Hunt right now." 77° On August 23, 2018, the President publicly criticized Sessions in
a press interview and suggested that prosecutions at the Department of Justice were politically
motivated because Paul Manafort had been prosecuted but Democrats had not. 771 The President said,
"I put in an Attorney General that never took control of the Justice Department, Jeff Sessions." 772
That day, Sessions issued a press statement that said, "I took control of the Department of Justice the
day I was sworn in . . . . While I am Attorney General, the actions of the Department of Justice will
not be improperly influenced by political considerations." 773 The next day, the President tweeted a
response: "'Department of Justice will not be improperly influenced by political considerations.' Jeff,
this is GREAT, what everyone wants, so look into all of the corruption on the 'other side' including
deleted Emails, Comey lies & leaks, Mueller conflicts, McCabe, Strzok, Page, Ohr, FISA abuse,
Christopher Steele & his phony and corrupt Dossier, the Clinton Foundation, illegal surveillance of
Trump campaign, Russian collusion by Dems — and so much more. Open up the papers &
documents without redaction? Come on Jeff, you can do it, the country is waiting!" 774
On November 7, 2018, the day after the midterm elections, the President replaced Sessions
with Sessions's chief of staff as Acting Attorney Genera1.775
Analysis
In analyzing the President's efforts to have Sessions unrecuse himself and regain control of the
Russia investigation, the following considerations and evidence are relevant to the elements of
obstruction of justice:
a. Obstructive act. To determine if the President's efforts to have the Attorney General unrecuse
could qualify as an obstructive act, it would be necessary to assess evidence on whether those actions
would naturally impede the Russia investigation. That inquiry would take into account the supervisory
role that the Attorney General, if unrecused, would play in the Russia investigation. It also would have
to take into account that the Attorney General's recusal covered
("Jeff Sessions should be ashamed of himself for allowing this total HOAX to get started in the first
place!").
769
770
771
Fox & Friends Interview of President Trump, Fox News (Aug. 23, 2018).
772
Fox & Friends Interview of President Trump, Fox News (Aug. 23, 2018).
773
Sessions 8/23/18 Press Statement.
@realDonaldTrump 8/24/18 (6:17 a.m. ET) Tweet; @ realDonaldTrump 8/24/18 (6:28 a.m.
774
ET) Tweet.
775
112
other campaign-related matters. The inquiry would not turn on what Attorney General Sessions would
actually do if unrecused, but on whether the efforts to reverse his recusal would naturally have had
the effect of impeding the Russia investigation.
On multiple occasions in 2017, the President spoke with Sessions about reversing his
recusal so that he could take over the Russia investigation and begin an investigation and
prosecution of Hillary Clinton. For example, in early summer 2017, Sessions recalled the President
asking him to unrecuse, but Sessions did not take it as a directive. When the President raised the
issue again in December 2017, the President said, as recorded by Porter, "Not telling you to do
anything. . . . I'm not going to get involved. I'm not going to do anything or direct you to do
anything. I just want to be treated fairly." The duration of the President's efforts—which spanned
from March 2017 to August 2018—and the fact that the President repeatedly criticized Sessions in
public and in private for failing to tell the President that he would have to recuse is relevant to
assessing whether the President's efforts to have Sessions unrecuse could qualify as obstructive
acts.
b. Nexus to an official proceeding. As described above, by mid-June 2017, the existence

of a grand jury investigation supervised by the Special Counsel was public knowledge. In addition,
in July 2017, a different grand jury supervised by the Special Counsel was empaneled in the
District of Columbia, and the press reported on the existence of this grand jury in early August
2017.' Whether the conduct towards the Attorney General would have a foreseeable impact on
those proceedings turns on much of the same evidence discussed above with respect to the
obstructive-act element.
c. Intent. There is evidence that at least one purpose of the President's conduct toward
Sessions was to have Sessions assume control over the Russia investigation and supervise it in a
way that would restrict its scope. By the summer of 2017, the President was aware that the Special
Counsel was investigating him personally for obstruction of justice. And in the wake of the
disclosures of emails about the June 9 meeting between Russians and senior members of the
campaign, see Volume II, Section II.G, supra, it was evident that the investigation into the
campaign now included the President's son, son-in-law, and former campaign manager. The
President had previously and unsuccessfully sought to have Sessions publicly announce that the
Special Counsel investigation would be confined to future election interference. Yet Sessions
remained recused. In December 2017, shortly after Flynn pleaded guilty, the President spoke to
Sessions in the Oval Office with only Porter present and told Sessions that he would be a hero if
he unrecused. Porter linked that request to the President's desire that Sessions take back supervision
of the Russia investigation and direct an investigation of Hillary Clinton. The President said in that
meeting that he "just want[ed] to be treated fairly," which could reflect his perception that it was
unfair that he was being investigated while Hillary Clinton was not. But a principal effect of that
act would be to restore supervision of the Russia investigation to the Attorney General—a position
that the President frequently suggested should be occupied by someone like Eric Holder and Bobby
Kennedy, who the President described as protecting their
776
E.g., Del Quentin Wilbur & Byron Tau, Special Counsel Robert Mueller Impanels Washington
Grand Jury in Russia Probe, Wall Street Journal (Aug. 3, 2017); Carol D. Leonnig et al., Special Counsel
Mueller using grand jury in federal court in Washington as part of Russia investigation, Washington Post
(Aug. 3, 2017).
113
Atteffley-Wer-It-Preduet II May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
presidents. A reasonable inference from those statements and the President's actions is that the
President believed that an unrecused Attorney General would play a protective role and could shield
the President from the ongoing Russia investigation.
I. The President Orders McGahn to Deny that the President Tried to Fire
the
Special Counsel
Overview
In late January 2018, the media reported that in June 2017 the President had ordered McGahn
to have the Special Counsel fired based on purported conflicts of interest but McGahn had refused,
saying he would quit instead. After the story broke, the President, through his personal counsel and
two aides, sought to have McGahn deny that he had been directed to remove the Special Counsel.
Each time he was approached, McGahn responded that he would not refute the press accounts because
they were accurate in reporting on the President's effort to have the Special Counsel removed. The
President later personally met with McGahn in the Oval Office with only the Chief of Staff present
and tried to get McGahn to say that the President never ordered him to fire the Special Counsel.
McGahn refused and insisted his memory of the President's direction to remove the Special Counsel
was accurate. In that same meeting, the President challenged McGahn for taking notes of his
discussions with the President and asked why he had told Special Counsel investigators that he had
been directed to have the Special Counsel removed.
Evidence
1. The Press Reports that the President Tried to Fire the Special Counsel
On January 25, 2018, the New York Times reported that in June 2017, the President had
ordered McGahn to have the Department of Justice fire the Special Counsel.' According to the article,
"[a]mid the first wave of news media reports that Mr. Mueller was examining a possible obstruction
case, the president began to argue that Mr. Mueller had three conflicts of interest that disqualified him
from overseeing the investigation."778 The article further reported that "[a]fter receiving the president's
order to fire Mr. Mueller, the White House counsel . . . refused to ask the Justice Department to dismiss
the special counsel, saying he would quit instead."779 The article stated that the president "ultimately
backed down after the White House counsel threatened to resign rather than carry out the directive."'
After the article was published, the President
Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, Trump Ordered Mueller Fired, but Backed Off
777
When White House Counsel Threatened to Quit, New York Times (Jan. 25. 2018).
Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, Trump Ordered Mueller Fired, hut Backed Off
778
779
780
1 14
Afteffley4V-eflt-Prettuet II May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
dismissed the story when asked about it by reporters, saying, "Fake news, folks. Fake news. A typical
New York Times fake story."781
The next day, the Washington Post reported on the same event but added that McGahn had not
told the President directly that he intended to resign rather than carry out the directive to have the
Special Counsel terminated.' In that respect, the Post story clarified the Times story, which could be
read to suggest that McGahn had told the President of his intention to quit, causing the President to
back down from the order to have the Special Counsel fired."
2. The President Seeks to Have McGahn Dispute the Press Reports
On January 26, 2018, the President's personal counsel called McGahn's attorney and said
that the President wanted McGahn to put out a statement denying that he had been asked to fire
the Special Counsel and that he had threatened to quit in protest?" McGahn's attorney spoke with
McGahn about that request and then called the President's personal counsel to relay that McGahn
would not make a statement.' McGahn's attorney informed the President's personal counsel that the
Times story was accurate in reporting that the President wanted the Special Counsel removed. 786
Accordingly, McGahn's attorney said, although the article was inaccurate in some other respects,
McGahn could not comply with the President's request to dispute the story." Hicks recalled
relaying to the President that one of his attorneys had spoken to McGahn's attorney about the
issue.788
Sophie Tatum & Kara Scannell, Trump denies he called for Mueller's firing, CNN (Jan. 26,
781
2018); Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, Trump Ordered Mueller Fired, but Backed Off When
White House Counsel Threatened to Quit, New York Times (Jan. 25, 2018).
782
The Post article stated, "Despite internal objections, Trump decided to assert that Mueller had
unacceptable conflicts of interest and moved to remove him from his position. . . . In response, McGahn
said he would not remain at the White House if Trump went through with the move. . . . McGahn did not
deliver his resignation threat directly to Trump but was serious about his threat to leave." Rosalind S.
Helderman & Josh Dawsey, Trump moved to fire Mueller in June, bringing White House counsel to the
brink of leaving, Washington Post (Jan. 26, 2018).
Rosalind S. Helderman & Josh Dawsey, Trump moved to fire Mueller in June, bringing White
783
House counsel to the brink of leaving, Washington Post (Jan. 26, 2018); see McGahn 3/8/17 302, at 3-4.
784
McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 3 (agent note).
785
786
McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 3-4 (agent note).
787
Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 11. Hicks also recalled that the President spoke on the phone that day with
788
Chief of Staff John Kelly and that the President said Kelly told him that McGahn had totally refuted the
story and was going to put out a statement. Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 11. But Kelly said that he did not speak
to McGahn when the article came out and did not tell anyone he had done so. Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 1-2.
115
Also on January 26, 2017, Hicks recalled that the President asked Sanders to contact
McGahn about the story.789 McGahn told Sanders there was no need to respond and indicated that
some of the article was accurate.' Consistent with that position, McGahn did not correct the Times
story.
On February 4, 2018, Priebus appeared on Meet the Press and said he had not heard the
President say that he wanted the Special Counsel fired.791 After Priebus's appearance, the President
called Priebus and said he did a great job on Meet the Press.' The President also told Priebus that the
President had "never said any of those things about" the Special Counsel.793
The next day, on February 5, 2018, the President complained about the Times article to
Porter.794 The President told Porter that the article was "bullshit" and he had not sought to terminate
the Special Counse1.795 The President said that McGahn leaked to the media to make himself look
good.796 The President then directed Porter to tell McGahn to create a record to make clear that the
President never directed McGahn to fire the Special Counsel.797 Porter thought the matter should be
handled by the White House communications office, but the President said he wanted McGahn to
write a letter to the file "for our records" and wanted something beyond a press statement to
demonstrate that the reporting was inaccurate.798 The President referred to McGahn as a "lying
bastard" and said that he wanted a record from him.799 Porter recalled the President
Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 11. Sanders did not recall whether the President asked her to speak to
789
McGahn or if she did it on her own. Sanders 7/23/18 302, at 2.

790
Sanders 7/23/18 302, at 1-2.
791
Meet the Press Interview with Reince Priebus, NBC (Feb. 4, 2018).
792
Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 10.
793
Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 10.
Porter 4/13/18 302, at 16-17. Porter did not recall the timing of this discussion with the President.
794
Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17. Evidence indicates it was February 5, 2018. On the back of a pocket card dated
February 5, 2018, Porter took notes that are consistent with his description of the discussion: "COS: (1) Letter
from DM — Never threatened to quit — DJT never told him to fire M." SC_RRP000053 (Porter Undated
Notes). Porter said it was possible he took the notes on a day other than February 5. Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17.
But Porter also said that "COS" referred to matters he wanted to discuss with Chief of Staff Kelly, Porter
4/13/18 302, at 17, and Kelly took notes dated February 5, 2018, that state "POTUS —Don McGahn letter
— Mueller + resigning." WH000017684 (Kelly 2/5/18 Notes). Kelly said he did not recall what the notes
meant, but thought the President may have "mused" about having McGahn write a letter. Kelly 8/2/18 302,
at 3. McGahn recalled that Porter spoke with him about the President's request about two weeks after the
New York Times story was published, which is consistent with the discussion taking place on or about
February 5. McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4.
795
Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17.
796
Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17.
797
Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17.
798
799
116
saying something to the effect of, "If he doesn't write a letter, then maybe I'll have to get rid of hinvomo
Later that day, Porter spoke to McGahn to deliver the President's message. 80I Porter told
McGahn that he had to write a letter to dispute that he was ever ordered to terminate the Special
Counse1.802 McGahn shrugged off the request, explaining that the media reports were true.8°3 McGahn
told Porter that the President had been insistent on firing the Special Counsel and that McGahn had
planned to resign rather than carry out the order, although he had not personally told the President he
intended to quit.8°4 Porter told McGahn that the President suggested that McGahn would be fired if he
did not write the letter.8°5 McGahn dismissed the threat, saying that the optics would be terrible if the
President followed through with firing him on that basis.8°6 McGahn said he would not write the letter
the President had requested.' Porter said that to his knowledge the issue of McGahn's letter never came
up with the President again, but Porter did recall telling Kelly about his conversation with McGahn.8o8
The next day, on February 6, 2018, Kelly scheduled time for McGahn to meet with him and
the President in the Oval Office to discuss the Times article. 809 The morning of the meeting, the
President's personal counsel called McGahn's attorney and said that the President was going to be
speaking with McGahn and McGahn could not resign no matter what happened in the meeting. 810
The President began the Oval Office meeting by telling McGahn that the New York Times
story did not "look good" and McGahn needed to correct it.811 McGahn recalled the President said, "I
never said to fire Mueller. I never said 'fire.' This story doesn't look good. You need to correct this.
You're the White House counsel."'
800
Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17.
8°1
Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17; McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4.
802
803 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17; McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4.
804
Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17; McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4. 8°5
806 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17-18; McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4.
807
McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4.
8°8
Porter 4/13/18 302, at 18.
McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4; WH000017685 (Kelly 2/6/18 Notes). McGahn recalled that, before
8°9
the Oval Office meeting, he told Kelly that he was not inclined to fix the article. McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4.
McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5 (agent note); 2/26/19 Email, Counsel for Don McGahn to Special
810
Counsel's Office (confirming February 6, 2018 date of call from the President's personal counsel).
811
McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4; Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 2.
812
117
In response, McGahn acknowledged that he had not told the President directly that he planned
to resign, but said that the story was otherwise accurate.813 The President asked McGahn, "Did I say
the word 'fire'T,814 McGahn responded, "What you said is, 'Call Rod [Rosenstein], tell Rod that Mueller
has conflicts and can't be the Special Counsel.'" The President responded,
"I never said that.//816 The President said he merely wanted McGahn to raise the conflicts issue with
Rosenstein and leave it to him to decide what to do.817 McGahn told the President he did not
understand the conversation that way and instead had heard, "Call Rod. There are conflicts. Mueller
has to go./5818 The President asked McGahn whether he would "do a correction," and McGahn said
no.819 McGahn thought the President was testing his mettle to see how committed McGahn was to
what happened.82° Kelly described the meeting as "a little tense."82I
The President also asked McGahn in the meeting why he had told Special Counsel's Office
investigators that the President had told him to have the Special Counsel removed. 822 McGahn
responded that he had to and that his conversations with the President were not protected by attorney-
client privilege.823 The President then asked, "What-about these notes? Why do you take notes?
Lawyers don't take notes. I never had a lawyer who took notes." 824 McGahn responded that he keeps
notes because he is a "real lawyer" and explained that notes create a record and are not a bad thing.'
The President said, "I've had a lot of great lawyers, like Roy Cohn. He did not take notes." 826
After the Oval Office meeting concluded, Kelly recalled McGahn telling him that McGahn
and the President "did have that conversation" about removing the Special Counsel.827 McGahn
recalled that Kelly said that he had pointed out to the President after the Oval Office that McGahn
813
McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4.
814
815
McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5.
816
McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5.
817
McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5.
818
McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5.
819
820
McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5.
821
Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 2.
822
McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5.
823
McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5.
824
McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5. McGahn said the President was referring to Donaldson's notes, which
the President thought of as McGahn's notes. McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5.
825
McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5.
826
McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5.
827
Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 2.
118
had not backed down and would not budge.828 Following the Oval Office meeting, the President's
personal counsel called McGahn's counsel and relayed that the President was "fine" with McGahn.829
Analysis
In analyzing the President's efforts to have McGahn deny that he had been ordered to have
the Special Counsel removed, the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of
justice:
a. Obstructive act. The President's repeated efforts to get McGahn to create a record
denying that the President had directed him to remove the Special Counsel would qualify as an
obstructive act if it had the natural tendency to constrain McGahn from testifying truthfully or to
undermine his credibility as a potential witness if he testified consistently with his memory, rather
than with what the record said.
There is some evidence that at the time the New York Times and Washington Post stories were
published in late January 2018, the President believed the stories were wrong and that he had never
told McGahn to have Rosenstein remove the Special Counsel. The President correctly understood that
McGahn had not told the President directly that he planned to resign. In addition, the President told
Priebus and Porter that he had not sought to terminate the Special Counsel, and in the Oval Office
meeting with McGahn, the President said, "I never said to fire Mueller. I never said 'fire.'" That
evidence could indicate that the President was not attempting to persuade McGahn to change his story
but was instead offering his own—but different—recollection of the substance of his June 2017
conversations with McGahn and McGahn's reaction to them.
Other evidence cuts against that understanding of the President's conduct. As previously
described, see Volume II, Section II.E, supra, substantial evidence supports McGahn's account that
the President had directed him to have the Special Counsel removed, including the timing and
context of the President's directive; the manner in which McGahn reacted; and the fact that the
President had been told the conflicts were insubstantial, were being considered by the Department
of Justice, and should be raised with the President's personal counsel rather than brought to McGahn.
In addition, the President's subsequent denials that he had told McGahn to have the Special Counsel
removed were carefully worded. When first asked about the New York Times story, the President
said, "Fake news, folks. Fake news. A typical New York Times fake story." And when the President
spoke with McGahn in the Oval Office, he focused on whether he had used the word "fire," saying,
"I never said to fire Mueller. I never said 'fire" and "Did I say the word 'fire'?" The President's
assertion in the Oval Office meeting that he had never directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel
removed thus runs counter to the evidence.
In addition, even if the President sincerely disagreed with McGahn's memory of the June 17,
2017 events, the evidence indicates that the President knew by the time of the Oval Office
828
McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5. Kelly did not recall discussing the Oval Office meeting with the
President after the fact. Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 2. Handwritten notes taken by Kelly state, "Don[:] Mueller
discussion in June. - Bannon Priebus - came out okay." WH000017685 (Kelly 2/6/18 Notes).
829
119
meeting that McGahn's account differed and that McGahn was firm in his views. Shortly after the
story broke, the President's counsel told McGahn's counsel that the President wanted McGahn to
make a statement denying he had been asked to fire the Special Counsel, but McGahn responded
through his counsel that that aspect of the story was accurate and he therefore could not comply with
the President's request. The President then directed Sanders to tell McGahn to correct the story, but
McGahn told her he would not do so because the story was accurate in reporting on the President's
order. Consistent with that position, McGahn never issued a correction. More than a week later, the
President brought up the issue again with Porter, made comments indicating the President thought
McGahn had leaked the story, and directed Porter to have McGahn create a record denying that the
President had tried to fire the Special Counsel. At that point, the President said he might "have to get
rid of" McGahn if McGahn did not comply. McGahn again refused and told Porter, as he had told
Sanders and as his counsel had told the President's counsel, that the President had in fact ordered him
to have Rosenstein remove the Special Counsel. That evidence indicates that by the time of the Oval
Office meeting the President was aware that McGahn did not think the story was false and did not
want to issue a statement or create a written record denying facts that McGahn believed to be true.
The President nevertheless persisted and asked McGahn to repudiate facts that McGahn had
repeatedly said were accurate.
b. Nexus to an official proceeding. By January 2018, the Special Counsel's use of a

grand jury had been further confirmed by the return of several indictments. The President also was
aware that the Special Counsel was investigating obstruction-related events because, among other
reasons, on January 8, 2018, the Special Counsel's Office provided his counsel with a detailed list
of topics for a possible interview with the President. 83° The President knew that McGahn had
personal knowledge of many of the events the Special Counsel was investigating and that McGahn
had already been interviewed by Special Counsel investigators. And in the Oval Office meeting,
the President indicated he knew that McGahn had told the Special Counsel's Office about the
President's effort to remove the Special Counsel. The President challenged McGahn for disclosing
that information and for taking notes that he viewed as creating unnecessary legal exposure. That
evidence indicates the President's awareness that the June 17, 2017 events were relevant to the
Special Counsel's investigation and any grand jury investigation that might grow out of it.
To establish a nexus, it would be necessary to show that the President's actions would have the
natural tendency to affect such a proceeding or that they would hinder, delay, or prevent the
communication of information to investigators. Because McGahn had spoken to Special Counsel
investigators before January 2018, the President could not have been seeking to influence his prior
statements in those interviews. But because McGahn had repeatedly spoken to investigators and the
obstruction inquiry was not complete, it was foreseeable that he would be interviewed again on
obstruction-related topics. If the President were focused solely on a press strategy in seeking to have
McGahn refute the New York Times article, a nexus to a proceeding or to further investigative
interviews would not be shown. But the President's efforts to have McGahn write a letter "for our
records" approximately ten days after the stories had come out—well past the typical
830 1/29/18 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 1-2 ("In our
conversation of January 8, your office identified the following topics as areas you desired to address
with the President in order to complete your investigation on the subjects of alleged collusion and
obstruction of justice"; listing 16 topics).
120
24ffettity-Werk--Preduet // May Contain Material Protected Undcr Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
time to issue a correction for a news story—indicates the President was not focused solely on a press
strategy, but instead likely contemplated the ongoing investigation and any proceedings arising from
it.
c. Intent. Substantial evidence indicates that in repeatedly urging McGahn to dispute

that he was ordered to have the Special Counsel terminated, the President acted for the purpose of
influencing McGahn's account in order to deflect or prevent further scrutiny of the President's conduct
towards the investigation.
Several facts support that conclusion. The President made repeated attempts to get McGahn
to change his story. As described above, by the time of the last attempt, the evidence suggests that
the President had been told on multiple occasions that McGahn believed the President had ordered
him to have the Special Counsel terminated. McGahn interpreted his encounter with the President
in the Oval Office as an attempt to test his mettle and see how committed he was to his memory of
what had occurred. The President had already laid the groundwork for pressing McGahn to alter his
account by telling Porter that it might be necessary to fire McGahn if he did not deny the story, and
Porter relayed that statement to McGahn. Additional evidence of the President's intent may be
gleaned from the fact that his counsel was sufficiently alarmed by the prospect of the President's
meeting with McGahn that he called McGahn's counsel and said that McGahn could not resign no
matter what happened in the Oval Office that day. The President's counsel was well aware of
McGahn's resolve not to issue what he believed to be a false account of events despite the President's
request. Finally, as noted above, the President brought up the Special Counsel investigation in his
Oval Office meeting with McGahn and criticized him for telling this Office about the June 17, 2017
events. The President's statements reflect his understanding—and his displeasure—that those
events would be part of an obstruction-of-justice inquiry.
J. The President's Conduct Towards Flynn, Manafort, HOM
Overview
In addition to the interactions with McGahn described above, the President has taken other
actions directed at possible witnesses in the Special Counsel's investigation, including Flynn, Manafort,
HOM and as described in the next section, Cohen. When Flynn withdrew from a joint defense
agreement with the President, the President's personal counsel stated that Flynn's actions would be
viewed as reflecting "hostility" towards the President. During Manafort's prosecution and while the jury
was deliberating, the President repeatedly stated that Manafort was bein: treated unfairl and made it
known that Manafort could receive a .ardon. Harm to Ongoing Matter
Evidence
1. Conduct Directed at Michael Flynn
As previously noted, see Volume II, Section II.B, supra, the President asked for Flynn's
resignation on February 13, 2017. Following Flynn's resignation, the President made positive public
comments about Flynn, describing him as a "wonderful man," "a fine person," and a "very
121
After-ney-Werk-Preeluet // May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
good person."831 The President also privately asked advisors to pass messages to Flynn conveying that the
President still cared about him and encouraging him to stay strong.832
In late November 2017, Flynn began to cooperate with this Office. On November 22, 2017, Flynn
withdrew from a joint defense agreement he had with the President.' Flynn's counsel told the President's
personal counsel and counsel for the White House that Flynn could no longer have confidential
communications with the White House or the President.' Later that night, the President's personal counsel
left a voicemail for Flynn's counsel that said:
I understand your situation, but let me see if I can't state it in starker terms. . . . [I]t wouldn't
surprise me if you've gone on to make a deal with . . . the government. . . . [I]f . . . there's
information that implicates the President, then we've got a national security issue, . . . so,
you know, . . . we need some kind of heads up. Um, just for the sake of protecting all our
interests if we can. . . . [R]emember what we've always said about the President and his
feelings toward Flynn and, that still remains . . .
835
On November 23, 2017, Flynn's attorneys returned the call from the President's personal
counsel to acknowledge receipt of the voicemail. 836 Flynn's attorneys reiterated that they were no
longer in a position to share information under any sort of privilege. 837 According to Flynn's attorneys,
the President's personal counsel was indignant and vocal in his disagreement. 838 The President's
personal counsel said that he interpreted what they said to him as a reflection of Flynn's
831
See, e.g., Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2018) (stating
that "Flynn is a fine person" and "I don't think [Flynn] did anything wrong. If anything, he did something
right . . . You know, he was just doing his job"); Interview of Donald J. Trump, NBC (May 11, 2017)
(stating that Flynn is a "very good person").
See Priebus 1/18/17 302, at 9-10 (the President asked Priebus to contact Flynn the week he was
832
terminated to convey that the President still cared about him and felt bad about what happened to him;
Priebus thought the President did not want Flynn to have a problem with him); McFarland 12/22/17 302, at
18 (about a month or two after Flynn was terminated, the President asked McFarland to get in touch with
Flynn and tell him that he was a good guy, he should stay strong, and the President felt bad for him); Flynn
1/ 9/18 302, at 9 (recalling the call from Priebus and an additional call from Hicks who said she wanted to
1
relay on behalf of the President that the President hoped Flynn was okay); Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3
(describing a phone conversation between Kushner and Flynn the day after Flynn was fired where Kushner
said, "You know the President respects you. The President cares about you. I'll get the President to send out
a positive tweet about you later," and the President nodded his assent to Kushner's comment promising a
tweet).
833 Counsel for Flynn 3/1/18 302, at 1.
835 11/22/17 Voicemail Transcript, President's Personal Counsel to Counsel for Michael Flynn.
122
Atterney-Werk-Prefittet // May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
hostility towards the President and that he planned to inform his client of that interpretation.839 Flynn's
attorneys understood that statement to be an attempt to make them reconsider their position because
the President's personal counsel believed that Flynn would be disturbed to know that such a message
would be conveyed to the President.84°
On December 1, 2017, Flynn pleaded guilty to making false statements pursuant to a

cooperation agreement."' The next day, the President told the press that he was not concerned about
what Flynn might tell the Special Counse1. 842 In response to a question about whether the President
still stood behind Flynn, the President responded, "We'll see what happens." 843 Over the next several
days, the President made public statements expressing sympathy for Flynn and indicating he had not
been treated fairly.844 On December 15, 2017, the President responded to a press inquiry about
whether he was considering a pardon for Flynn by saying, "I don't want to talk about pardons for
Michael Flynn yet. We'll see what happens. Let's see. I can say this: When you look at what's gone
on with the FBI and with the Justice Department, people are very, very angry. )5845
2. Conduct Directed at Paul Manafort
On October 27, 2017, a grand jury in the District of Columbia indicted Manafort and former
deputy campaign manager Richard Gates on multiple felony counts, and on February 22, 2018, a
grand jury in the Eastern District of Virginia indicted Manafort and Gates on additional felony
839
Counsel for Flynn 3/1/18 302, at 2. Because of attorney-client privilege issues, we did not
seek to interview the President's personal counsel about the extent to which he discussed his statements
to Flynn's attorneys with the President.
8413
Counsel for Flynn 3/1/18 302, at 2.
Information, United States v. Michael T. Flynn, 1:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2017), Doc. 1;
841
Plea Agreement, United States v. Michael T Flynn, 1:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2017), Doc. 3.
842
President Trump Remarks on Tax Reform and Michael Flynn's Guilty Plea, C-SPAN (Dec.
2, 2017).
843
President Trump Remarks on Tax Reform and Michael Flynn's Guilty Plea, C-SPAN (Dec.
2, 2017).
844 See
@realDonaldTrump 12/2/17 (9:06 p.m. ET) Tweet ("So General Flynn lies to the FBI and
his life is destroyed, while Crooked Hillary Clinton, on that now famous FBI holiday 'interrogation' with
no swearing in and no recording, lies many times . . . and nothing happens to her? Rigged system, or just
a double standard?"); President Trump Departure Remarks, C-SPAN (Dec. 4, 2017) ("Well, I feel badly
for General Flynn. I feel very badly. He's led a very strong life. And I feel very badly.").
845
President Trump White House Departure, C-SPAN (Dec. 15, 2017).
123
counts.846 The charges in both cases alleged criminal conduct by Manafort that began as early as 2005 and
continued through 2018.847
In January 2018, Manafort told Gates that he had talked to the President's personal counsel
and they were "going to take care of us." 848 Manafort told Gates it was stupid to plead, saying that
he had been in touch with the President's personal counsel and repeating that they should "sit tight"
and "we'll be taken care of." 849 Gates asked Manafort outright if anyone mentioned pardons and
Manafort said no one used that word.'
As the proceedings against Manafort progressed in court, the President told Porter that he
never liked Manafort and that Manafort did not know what he was doing on the campaign. 851 The
President discussed with aides whether and in what way Manafort might be cooperating with the
Special Counsel's investigation, and whether Manafort knew any information that would be
harmful to the President."
In public, the President made statements criticizing the prosecution and suggesting that
Manafort was being treated unfairly. On June 15, 2018, before a scheduled court hearing that day
on whether Manafort's bail should be revoked based on new charges that Manafort had tampered
with witnesses while out on bail, the President told the press, "I feel badly about a lot of them
Indictment, United States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr. and Richard W. Gates III, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C.
846
Oct, 27, 2017), Doc. 13 ("Manafort and Gates D.D.C. Indictment"); Indictment, United States v. Paul J.
Manafort, Jr. and Richard W. Gates III, 1:18-cr-83 (E.D. Va. Feb. 22, 2018), Doc. 9 ("Manafort and Gates
E.D. Va. Indictment")
847 Manafort and Gates D.D.C. Indictment; Manafort and Gates E.D. Va. Indictment.
Gates 4/18/18 302, at 4. In February 2018, Gates pleaded guilty, pursuant to a cooperation plea
848
agreement, to a superseding criminal information charging him with conspiring to defraud and commit
multiple offenses (i.e., tax fraud, failure to report foreign bank accounts, and acting as an unregistered
agent of a foreign principal) against the United States, as well as making false statements to our Office.
Superseding Criminal Information, United States v. Richard W. Gates III, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23,
2018), Doc. 195; Plea Agreement, United States v. Richard W. Gates III, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23,
2018), Doc. 205. Gates has provided information and in-court testimony that the Office has deemed to be
reliable.
849 Gates 4/18/18 302, at 4.
850
Gates 4/18/18 302, at 4. Manafort told this Office that he never told Gates that he had talked to the
President's personal counsel or suggested that they would be taken care of Manafort also said he hoped for a
pardon but never discussed one with the President, although he noticed the President's public comments about
pardons. Manafort 10/1/18 302, at 11. As explained in Volume I, Section IV.A.8, supra, Manafort entered
into a plea agreement with our Office. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia determined that
he breached the agreement by being untruthful in proffer sessions and before the grand jury. Order, United
States v. Manafort, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2019), Doc. 503.
Porter 5/8/18 302, at 11. Priebus recalled that the President never really liked Manafort. See
851
Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 11. Hicks said that candidate Trump trusted Manafort's judgment while he worked
on the Campaign, but she also once heard Trump tell Gates to keep an eye on Manafort. Hicks 3/13/18
302, at 16.
852 Porter 5/8/18 302, at 11; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 14.
124
because I think a lot of it is very unfair. I mean, I look at some of them where they go back 12 years.
Like Manafort has nothing to do with our campaign. But I feel so—I tell you, I feel a little badly about
it. They went back 12 years to get things that he did 12 years ago? . . . I feel badly for some people,
because they've gone back 12 years to find things about somebody, and I don't think it's right." 853 In
response to a question about whether he was considering a pardon for Manafort or other individuals
involved in the Special Counsel's investigation, the President said,
"I don't want to talk about that. No, I don't want to talk about that. . . . But look, I do want to see
people treated fairly. That's what it's all about."' Hours later, Manafort's bail was revoked and the
President tweeted, "Wow, what a tough sentence for Paul Manafort, who has represented Ronald
Reagan, Bob Dole and many other top political people and campaigns. Didn't know Manafort was
the head of the Mob. What about Comey and Crooked Hillary and all the others? Very unfair!" 855
Immediately following the revocation of Manafort's bail, the President's personal lawyer,
Rudolph Giuliani, gave a series of interviews in which he raised the possibility of a pardon for
Manafort. Giuliani told the New York Daily News that "[w]hen the whole thing is over, things might
get cleaned up with some presidential pardons."' Giuliani also said in an interview that, although the
President should not pardon anyone while the Special Counsel's investigation was ongoing, "when the
investigation is concluded, he's kind of on his own, right?"857 In a CNN interview two days later,
Giuliani said, "I guess I should clarify this once and for all. . . . The president has issued no pardons in
this investigation. The president is not going to issue pardons in this investigation. . . . When it's over,
hey, he's the president of the United States. He retains his pardon power. Nobody is taking that away
from him."858 Giuliani rejected the suggestion that his and the President's comments could signal to
defendants that they should not cooperate in a criminal prosecution because a pardon might follow,
saying the comments were "certainly not intended that way."859 Giuliani said the comments only
acknowledged that an individual involved in the investigation would not be "excluded from [a pardon],
if in fact the president and his advisors . . . come to the conclusion that you have been treated unfairly."'
Giuliani observed that pardons were not unusual in political investigations but said, "That doesn't mean
they're going to happen
853
Remarks by President Trump in Press Gaggle, White House (June 15, 2018).
854
Remarks by President Trump in Press Gaggle, White House (June 15, 2018).
855
856
Chris Sommerfeldt, Rudy Giuliani says Mueller probe 'might get cleaned up' with 'presidential
pardons ' in light of Paul Manafort going to jail, New York Daily News (June 15, 2018).
857
Sharon LaFraniere, Judge Orders Paul Manafort Jailed Before Trial, Citing New
Obstruction Charges, New York Times (June 15, 2018) (quoting Giuliani).
858
State of the Union with Jake Tapper Transcript, CNN (June 17, 2018); see Karoun Demirjian,
Giuliani suggests Trump may pardon Manafort after Mueller's probe, Washington Post (June 17, 2018).
859
State of the Union with Jake Tapper Transcript, CNN (June 17, 2018).
860
State of the Union with Jake Tapper Transcript, CNN (June 17, 2018).
125
here. Doesn't mean that anybody should rely on it. . . . Big signal is, nobody has been pardoned yet.,,86i
On July 31, 2018, Manafort's criminal trial began in the Eastern District of Virginia,
generating substantial news coverage.862 The next day, the President tweeted, "This is a terrible
situation and Attorney General Jeff Sessions should stop this Rigged Witch Hunt right now, before
it continues to stain our country any further. Bob Mueller is totally conflicted, and his 17 Angry
Democrats that are doing his dirty work are a disgrace to USA!" 863 Minutes later, the President
tweeted, "Paul Manafort worked for Ronald Reagan, Bob Dole and many other highly prominent and
respected political leaders. He worked for me for a very short time. Why didn't government tell me
that he was under investigation. These old charges have nothing to do with Collusion—a Hoax!"864
Later in the day, the President tweeted, "Looking back on history, who was treated worse, Alfonse
Capone, legendary mob boss, killer and 'Public Enemy Number One,' or Paul Manafort, political
operative & Reagan/Dole darling, now serving solitary confinement—although convicted of
nothing? Where is the Russian Collusion?"865 The President's tweets about the Manafort trial were
widely covered by the press.866 When asked about the President's tweets, Sanders told the press,
"Certainly, the President's been clear. He thinks Paul Manafort's been treated unfairly." 867
On August 16, 2018, the Manafort case was submitted to the jury and deliberations began. At
that time, Giuliani had recently suggested to reporters that the Special Counsel investigation needed
to be "done in the next two or three weeks,"868 and media stories reported that a Manafort acquittal
would add to criticism that the Special Counsel investigation was not worth the time and expense,
whereas a conviction could show that ending the investigation would be premature.869
861
State of the Union with fake Tapper Transcript, CNN (June 17, 2018).
862 S e e ,
e.g., Katelyn Polantz, Takeaways from day one of the Paul Manafort trial, CNN (July 31,
2018); Frank Bruni, Paul Manafort's Trial Is Donald Trump's, Too, New York Times Opinion (July 31, 2018);
Rachel Weiner et al., Paul Manafort trial Day 2: Witnesses describe extravagant clothing purchases, home
remodels, lavish cars paid with wire transfers, Washington Post (Aug. 1, 2018).
863 @realDonaldTrump 8/1/18 (9:24 a.m. ET) Tweet. Later that day, when Sanders was asked
about the President's tweet, she told reporters, "It's not an order. It's the President's opinion." Sarah
Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (Aug. 1, 2018).
864 @realDonaldTrump 8/1/18 (9:34 a.m. ET) Tweet.
865
866 See,
e.g., Carol D. Leonnig et al., Trump calls Manafort prosecution "a hoax," says
Sessions should stop Mueller investigation "right now", Washington Post (Aug. 1, 2018); Louis
Nelson, Trump claims Manafort case has "nothing to do with collusion", Politico (Aug. 1. 2018).
867
Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (Aug. 1, 2018).
868 Chris Strohm & Shannon Pettypiece, Mueller Probe Doesn't Need to Shut Down Before
Midterms, Officials Say, Bloomberg (Aug. 15, 2018).
See, e.g., Katelyn Polantz et al., Manafort jury ends first day of deliberations without a verdict,
869
CNN (Aug. 16, 2018); David Voreacos, What Mueller's Manafort Case Means for the Trump Battle to
126
On August 17, 2018, as jury deliberations continued, the President commented on the trial from the
South Lawn of the White House. In an impromptu exchange with reporters that lasted approximately
five minutes, the President twice called the Special Counsel's investigation a "rigged witch hunt."'
When asked whether he would pardon Manafort if he was convicted, the President said, "I don't talk
about that now. I don't talk about that."87I The President then added, without being asked a further
question, "I think the whole Manafort trial is very sad when you look at what's going on there. I think
it's a very sad day for our country. He worked for me for a very short period of time. But you know
what, he happens to be a very good person. And I think it's very sad what they've done to Paul
Manafort."872 The President did not take further questions. 873 In response to the President's
statements, Manafort's attorney said, "Mr. Manafort really appreciates the support of President
Trump."874
On August 21, 2018, the jury found Manafort guilty on eight felony counts. Also on August
21, Michael Cohen pleaded guilty to eight offenses, including a campaign-finance violation that
he said had occurred "in coordination with, and at the direction of, a candidate for federal office." 875
The President reacted to Manafort's convictions that day by telling reporters, "Paul Manafort's a
good man" and "it's a very sad thing that happened." 876 The President described the Special
Counsel's investigation as "a witch hunt that ends in disgrace." 877 The next day, the President
tweeted, "I feel very badly for Paul Manafort and his wonderful family. 'Justice' took a 12 year old
tax case, among other things, applied tremendous pressure on him and, unlike Michael Cohen, he
refused to 'break'—make up stories in order to get a 'deal.' Such respect for a brave man!" 878
In a Fox News interview on August 22, 2018, the President said: "[Cohen] makes a better deal
when he uses me, like everybody else. And one of the reasons I respect Paul Manafort so much is he
went through that trial—you know they make up stories. People make up stories. This
Come, Bloomberg (Aug. 2, 2018); Gabby Morrongiello, What a guilty verdict for Manafort would
mean for Trump and Mueller, Washington Examiner (Aug. 18, 2018).
870
President Trump Remarks on John Brennan and Mueller Probe, C-SPAN (Aug. 17, 2018).
871
872
873
874 Trump calls Manafort "very good person," All In with Chris Hayes (Aug. 17, 2018) (transcript);
Manafort lawyer: We appreciate Trump 's support, CNN (Aug. 17, 2018)
(https://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2018/08/17/paul-manafort-attorney-trump-jury-deliberations-
schneider-lead-vpx.cnn).
875
Transcript at 23, United States v. Michael Cohen, 1:18-cr-602 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2018),
Doc. 7 (Cohen 8/21/18 Transcript).
876
President Trump Remarks on Manafort Trial, C-SPAN (Aug. 21, 2018).
877
President Trump Remarks on Manafort Trial, C-SPAN (Aug.21, 2018).
878
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whole thing about flipping, they call it, I know all about flipping." 879 The President said that flipping
was "not fair" and "almost ought to be outlawed. 15880 In response to a question about whether he was
considering a pardon for Manafort, the President said, "I have great respect for what he's done, in
terms of what he's gone through. . . . He worked for many, many people many, many years, and I
would say what he did, some of the charges they threw against him, every consultant, every lobbyist
in Washington probably does.15881 Giuliani told journalists that the President "really thinks Manafort
has been horribly treated" and that he and the President had discussed the political fallout if the
President pardoned Manafort.882 The next day, Giuliani told the Washington Post that the President
had asked his lawyers for advice on the possibility of a pardon for Manafort and other aides, and had
been counseled against considering a pardon until the investigation concluded. 883
On September 14, 2018, Manafort pleaded guilty to charges in the District of Columbia and
signed a plea agreement that required him to cooperate with investigators. 884 Giuliani was reported
to have publicly said that Manafort remained in a joint defense agreement with the President
following Manafort's guilty plea and agreement to cooperate, and that Manafort's attorneys regularly
briefed the President's lawyers on the topics discussed and the information Manafort had provided in
interviews with the Special Counsel's Office.' On November 26, 2018, the Special Counsel's Office
disclosed in a public court filing that Manafort had breached his plea agreement by lying about
multiple subjects.886 The next day, Giuliani said that the President had been "upset for weeks" about
what he considered to be "the un-American, horrible treatment of
879
Fox & Friends Exclusive Interview with President Trump, Fox News (Aug. 23, 2018) (recorded
the previous day).
880
the previous day).
881
the previous day).
882 Maggie Haberman & Katie Rogers, "How Did We End Up Here?" Trump Wonders as the White
House Soldiers On, New York Times (Aug. 22, 2018).
883
Carol D. Leonnig & Josh Dawsey, Trump recently sought his lawyers' advice on possibility of
pardoning Manafort, Giuliani says, Washington Post (Aug. 23, 2018).
884
Plea Agreement, United States v. Paul J Manafort, Jr., 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 2018),
Doc. 422.
885
Karen Freifeld & Nathan Layne, Trump lawyer: Manafort said nothing damaging in Mueller
interviews, Reuters (Oct. 22, 2018); Michael S. Schmidt et al., Manafort's Lawyer Said to Brief Trump
Attorneys on What He Told Mueller, New York Times (Nov. 27, 2018); Dana Bash, Manafort team briefed
Giuliani on Mueller meetings, CNN, Posted 11/28/18, available at
https://www.cnn.com/videos/pol iti cs/2018/11/28/manafort-lawyers-keepi ng-trump-lawyers-gi ul i an i-
updated-mueller-probe-bash-sot-nr-vpx.cnn, see Sean Hannity, Interview with Rudy Giuliani, Fox News
(Sept. 14, 2018) (Giuliani: "[T]here was a quote put out by a source close to Manafort that the plea
agreement has, and cooperation agreement has, nothing to do with the Trump campaign. . . . Now, I know
that because I've been privy to a lot of facts I can't repeat.").
886
Joint Status Report, United States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr., (D.D.0 Nov. 26, 2018), Doc. 455.
127
1 28
Attentey4Verk-Pre4uet /I May Contain Material Protected Undcr Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
Manafort."887 In an interview on November 28, 2018, the President suggested that it was "very brave"
that Manafort did not "flip":
If you told the truth, you go to jail. You know this flipping stuff is terrible. You flip and you
lie and you get—the prosecutors will tell you 99 percent of the time they can get people to flip.
It's rare that they can't. But I had three people: Manafort, Corsi—I don't know
Corsi, but he refuses to say what they demanded.888 Manafort, Corsi HOM . It's
actually very brave.889
In response to a question about a potential pardon for Manafort, the President said, "It was never
discussed, but I wouldn't take it off the table. Why would I take it off the table?"89°
3. Harm to Ongoing Matter

BigHarm to Ongoing Matter

Stephen Collinson, Trump appears consumed by Mueller investigation as details emerge,
887
CNN (Nov. 29, 2018).

"Corsi" is a reference to Jerome Corsi, HOM
888
who was involved in efforts
to coordinate with WikiLeaks and Assange, and who stated publicly at that time that he had refused a plea
offer from the S secial Counsel's Office because he was "not going to sign a lie." Sara Murray & Eli
Watkins, HOM says he won't agree to plea deal, CNN (Nov. 26, 2018).
Marisa Schultz & Nikki Schwab, Oval Office Interview with President Trump: Trump says pardon
889
for Paul Manafort still a possibility, New York Post (Nov. 28, 2018). That same day, the President tweeted:
"While the disgusting Fake News is doing everything within their power not to report it that way, at least 3
major players are intimating that the Angry Mueller Gang of Dems is viciously telling witnesses to lie about
facts & they will get relief. This is our Joseph McCarthy Era!" @realDonaldTrump 11/28/18 (8:39 a.m. ET)
Tweet.
Marisa Schultz & Nikki Schwab, New York Post Oval Office Interview with President
890
Trump: Trump says pardon for Paul Manafort still a possibility, New York Post (Nov. 28, 2018).
892
893
89 Harm to Ongoing Matter 1 2 8

Atterney-W-ofit-Pretittet // • • ; " ; __ •
Ka Harm to Ongoing Matter

Harm to
895
Ongoing Matter

■
Harm to Ongoing 899 Matter
129
Attorney Work Product //

'Harm to Ongoing Matter
.1


I :

903

904

905

907
908 Harm to Ongoing Matter 1 3 0

Atterney-r-k--Preflttet // May Contain Material Protected Undcr Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
Analysis
In analyzing the President's conduct towards Flynn, Manafort, HOM , the following
evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice:
a. Obstructive act. The President's actions towards witnesses in the Special Counsel's
investigation would qualify as obstructive if they had the natural tendency to prevent particular
witnesses from testifying truthfully, or otherwise would have the probable effect of influencing,
delaying, or preventing their testimony to law enforcement.
With regard to Flynn, the President sent private and public messages to Flynn encouraging
him to stay strong and conveying that the President still cared about him before he began to
cooperate with the government. When Flynn's attorneys withdrew him from a joint defense
agreement with the President, signaling that Flynn was potentially cooperating with the government,
the President's personal counsel initially reminded Flynn's counsel of the President's warm feelings
towards Flynn and said "that still remains." But when Flynn's counsel reiterated that Flynn could
no longer share information under a joint defense agreement, the President's personal counsel stated
that the decision would be interpreted as reflecting Flynn's hostility towards the President. That
sequence of events could have had the potential to affect Flynn's decision to cooperate, as well as
the extent of that cooperation. Because of privilege issues, however, we could not determine
whether the President was personally involved in or knew about the specific message his counsel
delivered to Flynn's counsel.
With respect to Manafort, there is evidence that the President's actions had the potential to
influence Manafort's decision whether to cooperate with the government. The President and his
personal counsel made repeated statements suggesting that a pardon was a possibility for Manafort,
while also making it clear that the President did not want Manafort to "flip" and cooperate with the
government. On June 15, 2018, the day the judge presiding over Manafort's D.C. case was considering
whether to revoke his bail, the President said that he "felt badly" for Manafort and stated, "I think a
lot of it is very unfair." And when asked about a pardon for Manafort, the President said, "I do want
to see people treated fairly. That's what it's all about." Later that day, after Manafort's bail was revoked,
the President called it a "tough sentence" that was "Very unfair!" Two days later, the President's
personal counsel stated that individuals involved in the Special Counsel's investigation could receive
a pardon "if in fact the [P]resident and his advisors . . . come to the conclusion that you have been
treated unfairly"—using language that paralleled how the President had already described the
treatment of Manafort. Those statements, combined with the President's commendation of Manafort
for being a "brave man" who "refused to 'break'," suggested that a pardon was a more likely possibility
if Manafort continued not to cooperate with the government. And while Manafort eventually pleaded
guilty pursuant to a cooperation agreement, he was found to have violated the agreement by lying to
investigators.
The President's public statements during the Manafort trial, including during jury
deliberations, also had the potential to influence the trial jury. On the second day of trial, for example,
the President called the prosecution a "terrible situation" and a "hoax" that "continues to stain our
country" and referred to Manafort as a "Reagan/Dole darling" who was "serving solitary confinement"
even though he was "convicted of nothing." Those statements were widely picked up by the press.
While jurors were instructed not to watch or read news stories about the case and
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are presumed to follow those instructions, the President's statements during the trial generated
substantial media coverage that could have reached jurors if they happened to see the statements or
learned about them from others. And the President's statements during jury deliberations that Manafort
"happens to be a very good person" and that "it's very sad what they've done to Paul Manafort" had
the potential to influence jurors who learned of the statements, which the President made just as jurors
were considering whether to convict or acquit Manafort.
b. Nexus to an official proceeding. The President's actions towards Flynn, Manafort,

HOM appear to have been connected to pending or antici sated official proceedings involving
each individual. The President's conduct towards Flynn HOM principally occurred when both
were under criminal investigation by the Special Counsel's Office and press reports speculated about
whether they would cooperate with the Special Counsel's investigation. And the President's conduct
towards Manafort was directly connected to the official proceedings involving him. The President
made statements about Manafort and the charges against him during Manafort's criminal trial. And
the President's comments about the prospect of Manafort "flipping" occurred when it was clear the
Special Counsel continued to oversee grand jury proceedings.
c. Intent. Evidence concerning the President's intent related to Flynn as a potential

witness is inconclusive. As previously noted, because of privilege issues we do not have evidence
establishing whether the President knew about or was involved in his counsel's communications
with Flynn's counsel stating that Flynn's decision to withdraw from the joint defense agreement and
cooperate with the government would be viewed as reflecting "hostility" towards the President. And
regardless of what the President's personal counsel communicated, the President continued to
express sympathy for Flynn after he pleaded guilty pursuant to a cooperation agreement, stating that
Flynn had "led a very strong life" and the President "fe[lt] very badly" about what had happened to
him.
Evidence concerning the President's conduct towards Manafort indicates that the President
intended to encourage Manafort to not cooperate with the government. Before Manafort was
convicted, the President repeatedly stated that Manafort had been treated unfairly. One day after
Manafort was convicted on eight felony charges and potentially faced a lengthy prison term, the
President said that Manafort was "a brave man" for refusing to "break" and that "flipping" "almost
ought to be outlawed." At the same time, although the President had privately told aides he did not
like Manafort, he publicly called Manafort "a good man" and said he had a "wonderful family." And
when the President was asked whether he was considering a pardon for Manafort, the President did
not respond directly and instead said he had "great respect for what [Manafort]'s done, in terms of
what he's gone through." The President added that "some of the charges they threw against him,
every consultant, every lobbyist in Washington probably does." In light of the President's counsel's
previous statements that the investigations "might get cleaned up with some presidential pardons"
and that a pardon would be possible if the President "come[s] to the conclusion that you have been
treated unfairly," the evidence supports the inference that the
132
President intended Manafort to believe that he could receive a pardon, which would make cooperation
with the government as a means of obtaining a lesser sentence unnecessary.
We also examined the evidence of the President's intent in making public statements about
Manafort at the beginning of his trial and when the jury was deliberating. Some evidence supports a
conclusion that the President intended, at least in part, to influence the jury. The trial generated
widespread publicity, and as the jury began to deliberate, commentators suggested that an acquittal
would add to pressure to end the Special Counsel's investigation. By publicly stating on the second
day of deliberations that Manafort "happens to be a very good person" and that "it's very sad what
they've done to Paul Manafort" right after calling the Special Counsel's investigation a "rigged witch
hunt," the President's statements could, if they reached jurors, have the natural tendency to engender
sympathy for Manafort among jurors, and a factfinder could infer that the President intended that
result. But there are alternative explanations for the President's comments, including that he genuinely
felt sorry for Manafort or that his goal was not to influence the jury but to influence public opinion.
The President's comments also could have been intended to continue sending a message to Manafort
that a pardon was possible. As described above, the President made his comments about Manafort
being "a very good person" immediately after declining to answer a question about whether he would
pardon Manafort.
133
K. The President's Conduct Involving Michael Cohen
Overview
The President's conduct involving Michael Cohen spans the full period of our
investigation. During the campaign, Cohen pursued the Trump Tower Moscow project on behalf
of the Trump Organization. Cohen briefed candidate Trump on the project numerous times,
including discussing whether Trump should travel to Russia to advance the deal. After the media
began questioning Trump's connections to Russia, Cohen promoted a "party line" that publicly
distanced Trump from Russia and asserted he had no business there. Cohen continued to adhere to
that party line in 2017, when Congress asked him to provide documents and testimony in its Russia
investigation. In an attempt to minimize the President's connections to Russia, Cohen submitted a
letter to Congress falsely stating that he only briefed Trump on the Trump Tower Moscow project
three times, that he did not consider asking Trump to travel to Russia, that Cohen had not received
a response to an outreach he made to the Russian government, and that the project ended in January
2016, before the first Republican caucus or primary. While working on the congressional
statement, Cohen had extensive discussions with the President's personal counsel, who, according
to Cohen, said that Cohen should not contradict the President and should keep the statement short
and "tight." After the FBI searched Cohen's home and office in April 2018, the President publicly
asserted that Cohen would not "flip" and privately passed messages of support to him. Cohen also
discussed pardons with the President's personal counsel and believed that if he stayed on message,
he would get a pardon or the President would do "something else" to make the investigat ion end.
But after Cohen began cooperating with the government in July 2018, the President publicly
criticized him, called him a "rat," and suggested his family members had committed crimes.
Evidence
1. Candidate Trump's Awareness of and Involvement in the Trump Tower Moscow

Project
The President's interactions with Cohen as a witness took place against the background of the
President's involvement in the Trump Tower Moscow project.
As described in detail in Volume I, Section IV.A.1, supra, from September 2015 until at least
June 2016, the Trump Organization pursued a Trump Tower Moscow project in Russia, with
negotiations conducted by Cohen, then-executive vice president of the Trump Organization and special
counsel to Donald J. Trump.' The Trump Organization had previously and
909 In August 2018 and November 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty to multiple crimes of deception,
including making false statements to Congress about the Trump Tower Moscow project, as described later in
this section. When Cohen first met with investigators from this Office, he repeated the same lies he told
Congress about the Trump Tower Moscow project. Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 12-17. But after Cohen pleaded guilty
to offenses in the Southern District of New York on August 21, 2018, he met with investigators again and
corrected the record. The Office found Cohen's testimony in these subsequent proffer sessions to be consistent
with and corroborated by other information obtained in the course of the Office's investigation. The Office's
sentencing submission in Cohen's criminal case stated: "Starting with his second meeting with the [Special
Counsel's Office] in September 2018, the defendant has accepted responsibility not only for
134
unsuccessfully pursued a building project in Moscow.' According to Cohen, in approximately

September 2015 he obtained internal approval from Trump to negotiate on behalf of the Trump
Organization to have a Russian corporation build a tower in Moscow that licensed the Trump name
and brand. 911 Cohen thereafter had numerous brief conversations with Trump about the project. 9t2
Cohen recalled that Trump wanted to be updated on any developments with Trump Tower Moscow
and on several occasions brought the project up with Cohen to ask what was happen ing on it. 913
Cohen also discussed the project on multiple occasions with Donald Trump Jr. and Ivanka Trump.'
4
In the fall of 2015, Trump signed a Letter of Intent for the project that specified highly
lucrative terms for the Trump Organization." In December 2015, Felix Sater, who was handling
negotiations between Cohen and the Russian corporation, asked Cohen for a copy of his and Trump's
passports to facilitate travel to Russia to meet with government officials and possible financing
partners.' Cohen recalled discussing the trip with Trump and requesting a copy of Trump's passport
from Trump's personal secretary, Rhona Graff. 917
By January 2016, Cohen had become frustrated that Sater had not set up a meeting with Russian
government officials, so Cohen reached out directly by email to the office of Dmitry
his false statements concerning the [Trump Tower] Moscow Project, but also his broader efforts through
public statements and testimony before Congress to minimize his role in, and what he knew about, contacts
between the [Trump Organization] and Russian interests during the course of the campaign. . . . The
information provided by Cohen about the [Trump Tower] Moscow Project in these proffer sessions is
consistent with and corroborated by other information obtained in the course of the [Special Counsel's
Office's] investigation. . . . The defendant, without prompting by the [Special Counsel's Office], also corrected
other false and misleading statements that he had made concerning his outreach to and contacts with Russian
officials during the course of the campaign." Gov't Sentencing Submission at 4, United States v. Michael
Cohen, 1:18-cr-850 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2018), Doc. 14. At Cohen's sentencing, our Office further explained
that Cohen had "provided valuable information . . . while taking care and being careful to note what he knows
and what he doesn't know." Transcript at 19, United States v. Michael Cohen, 1:18-cr-850 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
12, 2018), Doc. 17 (Cohen 12/12/18 Transcript).
See Volume I, Section IV.A.l, supra (noting that starting in at least 2013, several employees of
910
the Trump Organization, including then-president of the organization Donald J. Trump, pursued a Trump
Tower Moscow deal with several Russian counterparties).
911
Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 1-4; Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 15.
912
Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 2, 4.
913
Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 4.
914
Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 4, 10.
MDC-H-000618-25 (10/28/15 Letter of Intent, signed by Donald J. Trump, Trump Acquisition,
915
LLC and Andrey Rozov, I.C. Expert Investment Company); Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 3; Written Responses of
Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 15 (Response to Question III, Parts (a) through (g)).
916
MDC-H-000600 (12/19/15 Email, Sater to Cohen).
917
Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 5.
135
Peskov, who was Putin's deputy chief of staff and press secretary.918 On January 20, 2016, Cohen
received an email response from Elena Poliakova, Peskov's personal assistant, and phone records
confirm that they then spoke for approximately twenty minutes, during which Cohen described the
Trump Tower Moscow project and requested assistance in moving the project forward. 919 Cohen
recalled briefing candidate Trump about the call soon afterwards.92° Cohen told Trump he spoke with
a woman he identified as "someone from the Kremlin," and Cohen reported that she was very
professional and asked detailed questions about the project.921 Cohen recalled telling Trump he wished
the Trump Organization had assistants who were as competent as the woman from the Kremlin.922
Cohen thought his phone call renewed interest in the project.923 The day after Cohen's call with
Poliakova, Sater texted Cohen, asking him to "[c]all me when you have a few minutes to chat . . . It's
about Putin they called today."924 Sater told Cohen that the Russian government liked the project and
on January 25, 2016, sent an invitation for Cohen to visit Moscow "for a working visit." 925 After the
outreach from Sater, Cohen recalled telling Trump that he was waiting to hear back on moving the
project forward.926
After January 2016, Cohen continued to have conversations with Sater about Trump Tower
Moscow and continued to keep candidate Trump updated about those discussions and the status of the
project.927 Cohen recalled that he and Trump wanted Trump Tower Moscow to succeed and that
Trump never discouraged him from working on the project because of the campaign.928 In March or
April 2016, Trump asked Cohen if anything was happening in Russia.929 Cohen also
See FS00004 (12/30/15 Text Message, Cohen to Sater); TRUMPORG_MC_000233 (1/11/16

918
Email, Cohen to [email protected]); MDC-H-000690 (1/14/16 Email, Cohen to

[email protected]); TRUMPORG_MC_000235 (1/16/16 Email, Cohen to [email protected]).
919
1/20/16 Email, Poliakova to Cohen; Call Records of Michael Cohen. (Showing a 22-minute call on
January 20, 2016, between Cohen and the number Poliakova provided in her email); Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 2-
3. After the call, Cohen saved Poliakova's contact information in his Trump Organization Outlook contact list.
1/20/16 Cohen Microsoft Outlook Entry (6:22 a.m.).
920
Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5.
921
Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5-6; Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 4.
922
Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5.
923
Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 5.
924
FS00011 (1/21/16 Text Messages, Sater & Cohen).
925
Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 5; 1/25/16 Email, Sater to Cohen (attachment).
926
Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5.
927 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 6. In later congressional testimony, Cohen stated that he briefed Trump on
the project approximately six times after January 2016. Hearing on Issues Related to Trump Organization
Before the House Oversight and Reform Committee, 116th Cong. (Feb. 27, 2019) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at
24) (testimony of Michael Cohen).
928
Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 6.
929
Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 4.
136

Attenterkli-er-k--fir-e4ttet
recalled briefing Donald Trump Jr. in the spring—a conversation that Cohen said was not "idle chit
chat" because Trump Tower Moscow was potentially a $1 billion deal.93°
Cohen recalled that around May 2016, he again raised with candidate Trump the possibility of
a trip to Russia to advance the Trump Tower Moscow project.93I At that time, Cohen had received
several texts from Sater seeking to arrange dates for such a trip. 932 On May 4, 2016, Sater wrote to
Cohen, "I had a chat with Moscow. ASSUMING the trip does happen the question is
before or after the convention ............. Obviously the premeeting trip (you only) can happen anytime
you want but the 2 big guys [is] the question. I said I would confirm and revert."933 Cohen responded,
"My trip before Cleveland. Trump once he becomes the nominee after the convention."934 On May 5,
2016, Sater followed up with a text that Cohen thought he probably read to Trump:
Peskov would like to invite you as his guest to the St. Petersburg Forum which is
Russia's Davos it's June 16-19. He wants to meet there with you and possibly introduce
you to either Putin or Medvedev. . . . This is perfect. The entire business class of Russia
will be there as well. He said anything you want to discuss including dates and subjects
are on the table to discuss.935
Cohen recalled discussing the invitation to the St. Petersburg Economic Forum with candidate
Trump and saying that Putin or Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev might be there. 936 Cohen
remembered that Trump said that he would be willing to travel to Russia if Cohen could "lock and
load" on the dea1.937 In June 2016, Cohen decided not to attend the St. Petersburg Economic Forum
because Sater had not obtained a formal invitation for Cohen from Peskov. 938 Cohen said he had a
quick conversation with Trump at that time but did not tell him that the project was over because he
did not want Trump to complain that the deal was on-again-off-again if it were revived.939
During the summer of 2016, Cohen recalled that candidate Trump publicly claimed that he had
nothing to do with Russia and then shortly afterwards privately checked with Cohen about the status
of the Trump Tower Moscow project, which Cohen found "interesting."940 At some point
930 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 10.

931
Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 7.
932 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 7.
933 FS00015 (5/4/16 Text Message, Sater to Cohen).
934 FS00015 (5/4/16 Text Message, Cohen to Sater).
935 FS00016-17 (5/5/16 Text Messages, Sater & Cohen).
936 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 7.
937 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 7.
938 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 7-8.
939 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 8.
940 Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2.
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that summer, Cohen recalled having a brief conversation with Trump in which Cohen said the
Trump Tower Moscow project was going nowhere because the Russian development company had
not secured a piece of property for the project. 941 Trump said that was "too bad," and Cohen did
not recall talking with Trump about the project after that. 942 Cohen said that at no time during the
campaign did Trump tell him not to pursue the project or that the project should be abandoned. 943
2. Cohen Determines to Adhere to a "Party Line" Distancing Candidate Trump

From Russia
As previously discussed, see Volume II, Section II.A, supra, when questions about possible
Russian support for candidate Trump emerged during the 2016 presidential campaign, Trump denied
having any personal, financial, or business connection to Russia, which Cohen described as the "party
line" or "message" to follow for Trump and his senior advisors.944
After the election, the Trump Organization sought to formally close out certain deals in
advance of the inauguration.945 Cohen recalled that Trump Tower Moscow was on the list of deals
to be closed out.946 In approximately January 2017, Cohen began receiving inquiries from the media
about Trump Tower Moscow, and he recalled speaking to the President-Elect when those inquiries
came in. Cohen was concerned that truthful answers about the Trump Tower Moscow project might
947
not be consistent with the "message" that the President-Elect had no relationship with Russia.948
In an effort to "stay on message," Cohen told a New York Times reporter that the Trump Tower
Moscow deal was not feasible and had ended in January 2016.949 Cohen recalled that this was part of
a "script" or talking points he had developed with President-Elect Trump and others to
Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2. Cohen could not recall the precise timing of this conversation, but said
941
he thought it occurred in June or July 2016. Cohen recalled that the conversation happened at some point
after candidate Trump was publicly stating that he had nothing to do with Russia. Cohen 3/19/19 302, at
2.
942
Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2.
943
Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2.
944
Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 1; Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 3, 5; Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 9.
945
Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 1-2; see also Rtskhiladze 4/4/18 302, at 8-9.
946
Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 1-2.
947
Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 3.
948
Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4.
949
Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 5. The article was published on February 19, 2017, and reported that Sater
and Cohen had been working on plan for a Trump Tower Moscow "as recently as the fall of 2015" but had
come to a halt because of the presidential campaign. Consistent with Cohen's intended party line message,
the article stated, "Cohen said the Trump Organization had received a letter of intent for a project in Moscow
from a Russian real estate developer at that time but determined that the project was not feasible." Megan
Twohey & Scott Shane, A Back-Channel Plan for Ukraine and Russia, Courtesy of Trump Associates, New
York Times (Feb. 19, 2017).
138
Attertiey-Werk—Pretittet // May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
dismiss the idea of a substantial connection between Trump and Russia.95° Cohen said that he
discussed the talking points with Trump but that he did not explicitly tell Trump he thought they were
untrue because Trump already knew they were untrue.' Cohen thought it was important to say the deal
was done in January 2016, rather than acknowledge that talks continued in May and June 2016,
because it limited the period when candidate Trump could be alleged to have a relationship with Russia
to an early point in the campaign, before Trump had become the party's presumptive nominee.952
3. Cohen Submits False Statements to Congress Minimizing the Trump Tower

Moscow Project in Accordance with the Party Line
In early May 2017, Cohen received requests from Congress to provide testimony and
documents in connection with congressional investigations of Russian interference in the 2016
election.' At that time, Cohen understood Congress's interest in him to be focused on the allegations
in the Steele reporting concerning a meeting Cohen allegedly had with Russian officials in Prague
during the campaign.954 Cohen had never traveled to Prague and was not concerned about those
allegations, which he believed were provably false.955 On May 18, 2017, Cohen met with the President
to discuss the request from Congress, and the President instructed Cohen that he should cooperate
because there was nothing there.956
Cohen eventually entered into a joint defense agreement (JDA) with the President and other
individuals who were part of the Russia investigation.957 In the months leading up to his congressional
testimony, Cohen frequently spoke with the President's personal counse1.958 Cohen
950
Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 5-6.
951
Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 6.
952
Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 10.
P-SCO-000000328 (5/9/17 Letter, HPSCI to Cohen); P-SCO-000000331 (5/12/17 Letter,
953
SSCI to Cohen).
954
Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 2-3.
955
Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 2-3.
956
Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 2; Cohen 11/20/19 302, at 3.
957
Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 2.
Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 2-3; Cohen 11/20/18, at 2-6. Cohen told investigators about his conversations
958
with the President's personal counsel after waiving any privilege of his own and after this Office advised his
counsel not to provide any communications that would be covered by any other privilege, including
communications protected by a joint defense or common interest privilege. As a result, most of what Cohen told
us about his conversations with the President's personal counsel concerned what Cohen had communicated to
the President's personal counsel, and not what was said in response. Cohen described certain statements made
by the President's personal counsel, however, that are set forth in this section. Cohen and his counsel were better
positioned than this Office to evaluate whether any privilege protected those statements because they had
knowledge of the scope of their joint defense agreement and access to privileged communications that may have
provided context for evaluating the statements they shared. After interviewing Cohen about these matters, we
asked the President's personal counsel if he wished to provide information to us about his conversations with
Cohen related to Cohen's congressional testimony about
139
Att-etherWer-k—Preduet // May Got-Ralf:1 Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
said that in those conversations the President's personal counsel would sometimes say that he had just
been with the President.959 Cohen recalled that the President's personal counsel told him the JDA was
working well together and assured him that there was nothing there and if they stayed on message the
investigations would come to an end soon.96° At that time, Cohen's legal bills were being paid by the
Trump Organization,961 and Cohen was told not to worry because the investigations would be over by
summer or fall of 2017.962 Cohen said that the President's personal counsel also conveyed that, as part
of the JDA, Cohen was protected, which he would not be if he "went rogue." 963 Cohen recalled that
the President's personal counsel reminded him that "the President loves you" and told him that if he
stayed on message, the President had his back.964
In August 2017, Cohen began drafting a statement about Trump Tower Moscow to submit to
Congress along with his document production.' The final version of the statement contained several
false statements about the project.966 First, although the Trump Organization continued to pursue the
project until at least June 2016, the statement said, "The proposal was under consideration at the Trump
Organization from September 2015 until the end of January 2016. By the end of January 2016, I
determined that the proposal was not feasible for a variety of business reasons and should not be
pursued further. Based on my business determinations, the Trump Organization abandoned the
proposal."967 Second, although Cohen and candidate Trump had discussed possible travel to Russia by
Trump to pursue the venture, the statement said, "Despite overtures by Mr. Sater, I never considered
asking Mr. Trump to travel to Russia in connection with this proposal. I told Mr. Sater that Mr. Trump
would not travel to Russia unless there was a definitive agreement in place."968 Third, although Cohen
had regularly briefed Trump on the status
Trump Tower Moscow. The President's personal counsel declined and, through his own counsel, indicated
that he could not disaggregate information he had obtained from Cohen from information he had obtained
from other parties in the JDA. In view of the admonition this Office gave to Cohen's counsel to withhold
communications that could be covered by privilege, the President's personal counsel's uncertainty about the
provenance of his own knowledge, the burden on a privilege holder to establish the elements to support a
claim of privilege, and the substance of the statements themselves, we have included relevant statements
Cohen provided in this report. If the statements were to be used in a context beyond this report, further analysis
could be warranted.
959 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 6.
960 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 2, 4.
961 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4.
962 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 8; Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 3-4.
963 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4.
964 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 11; Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 2.
P-SCO-000003680 and P-SCO-0000003687 (8/16/17 Email and Attachment, Michael
965
Cohen's Counsel to Cohen). Cohen said it was not his idea to write a letter to Congress about Trump
Tower Moscow. Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 7.
966
P-SCO-00009478 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017)).
967
968
140
Atterftey-V,/er-k-41retittet I/ May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
of the project and had numerous conversations about it, the statement said, "Mr. Trump was never in
contact with anyone about this proposal other than me on three occasions, including signing a non-
binding letter of intent in 2015."969 Fourth, although Cohen's outreach to Peskov in January 2016 had
resulted in a lengthy phone call with a representative from the Kremlin, the statement said that Cohen
did "not recall any response to my email [to Peskov], nor any other contacts by me with Mr. Peskov
or other Russian government officials about the proposal."97°
Cohen's statement was circulated in advance to, and edited by, members of the JDA.97' Before
the statement was finalized, early drafts contained a sentence stating, "The building project led me to
make limited contacts with Russian government officials."972 In the final version of the statement, that
line was deleted.973 Cohen thought he was told that it was a decision of the JDA to take out that
sentence, and he did not push back on the deletion.974 Cohen recalled that he told the President's
personal counsel that he would not contest a decision of the JDA.975
Cohen also recalled that in drafting his statement for Congress, he spoke with the President's
personal counsel about a different issue that connected candidate Trump to Russia: Cohen's efforts to
set up a meeting between Trump and Putin in New York during the 2015 United Nations General
Assembly.976 In September 2015, Cohen had suggested the meeting to Trump, who told Cohen to
reach out to Putin's office about it.977 Cohen spoke and emailed with a Russian official about a possible
meeting, and recalled that Trump asked him multiple times for updates on the proposed meeting with
Putin.978 When Cohen called the Russian official a second time, she told him it would not follow
proper protocol for Putin to meet with Trump, and Cohen relayed that
969
970
Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 8-9. Cohen also testified in Congress that the President's counsel reviewed
971
and edited the statement. Hearing on Issues Related to Trump Organization Before the House Oversight and
Reform Committee, 1166' Cong. (Feb. 27, 2019) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 24-25) (testimony by Michael
Cohen). Because of concerns about the common interest privilege, we did not obtain or review all drafts of
Cohen's statement. Based on the drafts that were released through this Office's filter process, it appears that
the substance of the four principal false statements described above were contained in an early draft prepared
by Cohen and his counsel. P-SCO-0000003680 and P-SCO-0000003687 (8/16/17 Email and Attachment,
Cohen's counsel to Cohen).
972
P-SCO-0000003687 (8/16/17 Draft Statement of Michael Cohen); Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4.
Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4. A different line stating that Cohen did "not recall any response to
973
my email [to Peskov in January 2016], nor any other contacts by me with Mr. Peskov or other Russian
government officials about the proposal" remained in the draft. See P-SCO-0000009478 (Statement
of Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017)).
974
Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4.
975
Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5.
976
Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 10-11.
977
Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 11; Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 4.
978
Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 11; Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 5.
141
message to Trump.979 Cohen anticipated he might be asked questions about the proposed Trump-Putin
meeting when he testified before Congress because he had talked about the potential meeting on Sean
Hannity's radio show.98° Cohen recalled explaining to the President's personal counsel the "whole
story" of the attempt to set up a meeting between Trump and Putin and Trump's role in it.981 Cohen
recalled that he and the President's personal counsel talked about keeping Trump out of the narrative,
and the President's personal counsel told Cohen the story was not relevant and should not be included
in his statement to Congress.982
Cohen said that his "agenda" in submitting the statement to Congress with false
representations about the Trump Tower Moscow project was to minimize links between the project
and the President, give the false impression that the project had ended before the first presidential
primaries, and shut down further inquiry into Trump Tower Moscow, with the aim of limiting the
ongoing Russia investigations. 983 Cohen said he wanted to protect the President and be loyal to him
by not contradicting anything the President had said.984 Cohen recalled he was concerned that if he
told the truth about getting a response from the Kremlin or speaking to candidate Trump about travel
to Russia to pursue the project, he would contradict the message that no connection existed between
Trump and Russia, and he rationalized his decision to provide false testimony because the deal
never happened.985 He was not concerned that the story would be contradicted by individuals who
knew it was false because he was sticking to the party line adhered to by the whole group.986 Cohen
wanted the support of the President and the White House, and he believed that following the party
line would help put an end to the Special Counsel and congressional investigations. 987
Between August 18, 2017, when the statement was in an initial draft stage, and August 28,
2017, when the statement was submitted to Congress, phone records reflect that Cohen spoke with the
President's personal counsel almost daily.' On August 27, 2017, the day before Cohen
979
Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 5.
9813
Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 11.
981
Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2.
Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2; see Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 11 (recalling that he was told that if he stayed
982
on message and kept the President out of the narrative, the President would have his back).
Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 8; Information at 4-5, United States v. Michael Cohen, 1:18-cr-850
983
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2018), Doc. 2 (Cohen Information).

984
Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4.
985
Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4; Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 2-3, 4, 6.
986
Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 9.
987
Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 8-9.
988
Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 2-3; Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5; Call Records of Michael Cohen (Reflecting
three contacts on August 18, 2017 (24 seconds; 5 minutes 25 seconds; and 10 minutes 58 seconds); two
contacts on August 19 (23 seconds and 24 minutes 26 seconds); three contacts on August 23 (8 seconds; 20
minutes 33 seconds; and 5 minutes 8 seconds); one contact on August 24 (11 minutes 59 seconds); 14 contacts
on August 27 (28 seconds; 4 minutes 37 seconds; 1 minute 16 seconds; 1 minutes 35
142
Atieretey-WOfk-Predttet // May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
submitted the statement to Congress, Cohen and the President's personal counsel had numerous
contacts by phone, including calls lasting three, four, six, eleven, and eighteen minutes. 989 Cohen
recalled telling the President's personal counsel, who did not have first-hand knowledge of the
project, that there was more detail on Trump Tower Moscow that was not in the statement, including
that there were more communications with Russia and more communications with candidate Trump
than the statement refiected.99° Cohen stated that the President's personal counsel responded that it
was not necessary to elaborate or include those details because the project did not progress and that
Cohen should keep his statement short and "tight" and the matter would soon come to an end.991
Cohen recalled that the President's personal counsel said "his client" appreciated Cohen, that Cohen
should stay on message and not contradict the President, that there was no need to muddy the water,
and that it was time to move on.992 Cohen said he agreed because it was what he was expected to
do.993 After Cohen later pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress about the Trump
Tower Moscow project, this Office sought to speak with the President's personal counsel about these
conversations with Cohen, but counsel declined, citing potential privilege concerns. 994
At the same time that Cohen finalized his written submission to Congress, he served as a source
for a Washington Post story published on August 27, 2017, that reported in depth for the first time
that the Trump Organization was "pursuing a plan to develop a massive Trump Tower in Moscow" at
the same time as candidate Trump was "running for president in late 2015 and early 2016." 995 The
article reported that "the project was abandoned at the end of January 2016, just before the presidential
primaries began, several people familiar with the proposal said."996 Cohen recalled that in speaking to
the Post, he held to the false story that negotiations for the deal ceased in January 2016.997
seconds; 6 minutes 16 seconds; 1 minutes 10 seconds; 3 minutes 5 seconds; 18 minutes 55 seconds; 4

minutes 56 seconds; 11 minutes 6 seconds; 8 seconds; 3 seconds; 2 seconds; 2 seconds).
Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5; Call Records of Michael Cohen. (Reflecting 14 contacts on August
989
27, 2017 (28 seconds; 4 minutes 37 seconds; 1 minute 16 seconds; 1 minutes 35 seconds; 6 minutes
16 seconds; 1 minutes 10 seconds; 3 minutes 5 seconds; 18 minutes 55 seconds; 4 minutes 56 seconds;
11 minutes 6 seconds; 8 seconds; 3 seconds; 2 seconds; 2 seconds)).
990
Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5.
991
Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5. Cohen also vaguely recalled telling the President's personal counsel
that he spoke with a woman from the Kremlin and that the President's personal counsel responded to the
effect of "so what?" because the deal never happened. Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5.
992
Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5.
993
Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5.
994
2/8/19 email, Counsel for personal counsel to the President to Special Counsel's Office.
Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 7; Carol D. Leonnig et al., Trump's business sought deal on a Trump
995
Tower in Moscow while he ran for president, Washington Post (Aug. 27, 2017).
996
Carol D. Leonnig et al., Trump's business sought deal on a Trump Tower in Moscow while
he ran for president, Washington Post (Aug. 27, 2017).
997
Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 7.
143
On August 28, 2017, Cohen submitted his statement about the Trump Tower Moscow project
to Congress.998 Cohen did not recall talking to the President about the specifics of what the statement
said or what Cohen would later testify to about Trump Tower Moscow.999 He recalled speaking to
the President more generally about how he planned to stay on message in his testimony.' °°° On
September 19, 2017, in anticipation of his impending testimony, Cohen orchestrated the public
release of his opening remarks to Congress, which criticized the allegations in the Steele material
and claimed that the Trump Tower Moscow project "was terminated in January of 2016; which
occurred before the Iowa caucus and months before the very first primary. ',loot Cohen said the release
of his opening remarks was intended to shape the narrative and let other people who might be
witnesses know what Cohen was saying so they could follow the same message. 1002 Cohen said his
decision was meant to mirror Jared Kushner's decision to release a statement in advance of
Kushner's congressional testimony, which the President's personal counsel had told Cohen the
President liked.10' Cohen recalled that on September 20, 2017, after Cohen's opening remarks had
been printed by the media, the President's personal counsel told him that the President was pleased
with the Trump Tower Moscow statement that had gone out.' °°4
On October 24 and 25, 2017, Cohen testified before Congress and repeated the false statements
he had included in his written statement about Trump Tower Moscow.1°°5 Phone records show that
Cohen spoke with the President's personal counsel immediately after his testimony on both days.'°°6
4. The President Sends Messages of Support to Cohen
In January 2018, the media reported that Cohen had arranged a $130,000 payment during the
campaign to prevent a woman from publicly discussing an alleged sexual encounter she had
998
P-SCO-000009477 - 9478 (8/28/17 Letter and Attachment, Cohen to SSCI).
999
Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 2; Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 9.
1000 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 9.
100
' Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 7; see, e.g., READ: Michael Cohen's statement to the Senate intelligence
committee, CNN (Sept. 19, 2017).
1002
Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 7.
1003
Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 7; Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 6.
Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 6. Phone records show that the President's personal counsel called Cohen
1004
on the morning of September 20, 2017, and they spoke for approximately 11 minutes, and that they had two
more contacts that day, one of which lasted approximately 18 minutes. Call Records of Michael Cohen.
(Reflecting three contacts on September 20, 2017, with calls lasting for 11 minutes 3 seconds; 2 seconds; and
18 minutes 38 seconds).
Cohen Information, at 4; Executive Session, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
1005
U.S. House of Representatives, Interview of Michael Cohen (Oct. 24, 2017), at 10-11, 117-119.
1006 Call Records of Michael Cohen. (Reflecting two contacts on October 24, 2017 (12 minutes 8
seconds and 8 minutes 27 seconds) and three contacts on October 25, 2017 (1 second; 4 minutes 6 seconds;
and 6 minutes 6 seconds)).
144
Atterttey-1111Lefk-Pfedttet // May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
with the President before he ran for office.lm This Office did not investigate Cohen's campaign-period
payments to women.' 0°8 However, those events, as described here, are potentially relevant to the
President's and his personal counsel's interactions with Cohen as a witness who later began to
cooperate with the government.
On February 13, 2018, Cohen released a statement to news organizations that stated, "In a
private transaction in 2016, I used my own personal funds to facilitate a payment of $130,000 to
[the woman]. Neither the Trump Organization nor the Trump campaign was a party to the
transaction with [the woman], and neither reimbursed me for the payment, either directly or
indirectly."1009 In congressional testimony on February 27, 2019, Cohen testified that he had
discussed what to say about the payment with the President and that the President had directed
Cohen to say that the President "was not knowledgeable . . . of [Cohen's] actions" in making the
payment.m° On February 19, 2018, the day after the New York Times wrote a detailed story
attributing the payment to Cohen and describing Cohen as the President's "fixer," Cohen received a
text message from the President's personal counsel that stated, "Client says thanks for what you
do."I°"
On April 9, 2018, FBI agents working with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District
of New York executed search warrants on Cohen's home, hotel room, and office.'°12 That day, the
President spoke to reporters and said that he had "just heard that they broke into the office of one of
my personal attorneys—a good man."I013 The President called the searches "a real disgrace" and said,
"It's an attack on our country, in a true sense. It's an attack on what we all
See, e.g., Michael Rothfeld & Joe Palazzolo, Trump Lawyer Arranged $130, 000 Payment
1007
for Adult-Film Star's Silence, Wall Street Journal (Jan. 12, 2018).
1008 The Office was authorized to investigate Cohen's establishment and use of Essential Consultants
LLC, which Cohen created to facilitate the $130,000 payment during the campaign, based on evidence that
the entity received funds from Russian-backed entities. Cohen's use of Essential Consultants to facilitate the
$130,000 payment to the woman during the campaign was part of the Office's referral of certain Cohen-
related matters to the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York.
See, e.g., Mark Berman, Longtime Trump attorney says he made $130,000 payment to
1009
Stormy Daniels with his money, Washington Post (Feb. 14, 2018).
Hearing on Issues Related to Trump Organization Before the House Oversight and Reform
1010
Committee, 116th Cong. (Feb. 27, 2019) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 147-148) (testimony of Michael Cohen).
Toll records show that Cohen was connected to a White House phone number for approximately five minutes
on January 19, 2018, and for approximately seven minutes on January 30, 2018, and that Cohen called Melania
Trump's cell phone several times between January 26, 2018, and January 30, 2018. Call Records of Michael
Cohen.
2/19/18 Text Message, President's personal counsel to Cohen; see Jim Rutenberg et al.,
1011
Tools of Trump's Fixer: Payouts, Intimidation and the Tabloids, New York Times (Feb. 18, 2018).
1012 Gov't Opp. to Def. Mot. for Temp. Restraining Order, In the Matter of Search Warrants
Executed on April 9, 2018, 18-mj-3161 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2018), Doc. 1 ("On April 9, 2018, agents from
the New York field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation . . . executed search warrants for Michael
Cohen's residence, hotel room, office, safety deposit box, and electronic devices.").
Remarks by President Trump Before Meeting with Senior Military Leadership, White House
1013
(Apr. 9, 2018).
145
Atterrity-Wefk-Preelttet II May Contain Material Protcctcd Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
stand for."1014 Cohen said that after the searches he was concerned that he was "an open book," that
he did not want issues arising from the payments to women to "come out," and that his false statements
to Congress were "a big concern."1015
A few days after the searches, the President called Cohen.'°16 According to Cohen, the President
said he wanted to "check in" and asked if Cohen was okay, and the President encouraged Cohen to
"hang in there" and "stay strong."1017 Cohen also recalled that following the searches he heard from
individuals who were in touch with the President and relayed to Cohen the President's
support for him.1018 Cohen recalled that , a friend of the President's, reached out
to say that he was with "the Boss" in Mar-a-La o and the President had said "he loves you" and
not to worry.1°19 Cohen recalled that for the Trump
Organization, told him, "the boss loves you." And Cohen said that , a friend
of the President's, told him, "everyone knows the boss has your back."
On or about April 17, 2018, Cohen began speaking with an attorney, Robert Costello, who had
a close relationship with Rudolph Giuliani, one of the President's personal lawyers.' Costello told
Cohen that he had a "back channel of communication" to Giuliani, and that Giuliani had said the
"channel" was "crucial" and "must be maintained."1023 On April 20, 2018, the New York Times
published an article about the President's relationship with and treatment of Cohen.1024 The President
responded with a series of tweets predicting that Cohen would not "flip":
The New York Times and a third rate reporter . . . are going out of their way to destroy Michael
Cohen and his relationship with me in the hope that he will 'flip.' They use nonexistent 'sources'
and a drunk/drugged up loser who hates Michael, a fine person with a wonderful family.
Michael is a businessman for his own account/lawyer who I have always liked & respected.
Most people will flip if the Government lets them out of trouble, even
Remarks by President Trump Before Meeting with Senior Military Leadership, White House
1014
(Apr. 9, 2018).
1°15
Cohen, 10/17/18 302, at 11.
1°16
Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 4. 1017
Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 4. 1°18
Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 11. 1019
Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 11. 1020
Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 11. 1021

Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 11.
4/17/18 Email, Citron to Cohen; 4/19/18 Email, Costello to Cohen; MC-SCO-001 (7/7/18
1022
redacted billing statement from Davidoff, Hutcher & Citron to Cohen).

1023
4/21/18 Email, Costello to Cohen.
See Maggie Haberman et al., Michael Cohen Has Said He Would Take a Bullet for Trump.
1024
Maybe Not Anymore., New York Times (Apr. 20, 2018).
146
Atierftey-Wet.k-Pr-ettuet // May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
if it means lying or making up stories. Sorry, I don't see Michael doing that despite the horrible
Witch Hunt and the dishonest media!'s
In an email that day to Cohen, Costello wrote that he had spoken with Giuliani.'°26 Costello told Cohen
the conversation was "Very Very Positive[.] You are 'loved'. . . they are in our corner. . . . Sleep well
tonight[], you have friends in high places."1°27
Cohen said that following these messages he believed he had the support of the White House
if he continued to toe the party line, and he determined to stay on message and be part of the team.1°28
At the time, Cohen's understood that his legal fees were still being paid by the Trump Organization,
which he said was important to him.1°29 Cohen believed he needed the power of the President to take
care of him, so he needed to defend the President and stay on message.'°3°
Cohen also recalled speaking with the President's personal counsel about pardons after the
searches of his home and office had occurred, at a time when the media had reported that pardon
discussions were occurring at the White House. 1031 Cohen told the President's personal counsel he
had been a loyal lawyer and servant, and he said that after the searches he was in an uncomfortable
position and wanted to know what was in it for him.'°32 According to Cohen, the President's personal
counsel responded that Cohen should stay on message, that the investigation was a witch hunt, and
that everything would be fine. 1°33 Cohen understood based on this conversation and previous
conversations about pardons with the President's personal counsel that as long as he stayed on
message, he would be taken care of by the President, either through a pardon or through the
investigation being shut down.'°34
1025 @realDonaldTrump 4/21/18 (9:10

a.m. ET) Tweets. 1026 4/21/18 Email,
Costello to Cohen. 1°27 4/21/18 Email, Harm to Ongoing Matter
Costello to Cohen.
Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 11. 1°29

1028
Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 10. 103°

Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 10.
1°31
Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 7. At a White House press briefing on April 23, 2018, in response to a
question about whether the White House had "close[d] the door one way or the other on the President
pardoning Michael Cohen," Sanders said, "It's hard to close the door on something that hasn't taken place.
I don't like to discuss or comment on hypothetical situations that may or may not ever happen. I would
refer you to personal attorneys to comment on anything specific regarding that case, but we don't have
anything at this point." Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (Apr. 23, 2018).
1032
Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 7; Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 3.
1033
Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 3.
147
1034 Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 3-4.
148
On April 24, 2018, the President responded to a reporter's inquiry whether he would
consider a pardon for Cohen with, "Stupid question." 1°35 On June 8, 2018, the President said he
"hadn't even thought about" pardons for Manafort or Cohen, and continued, "It's far too early to
be thinking about that. They haven't been convicted of anything. There's nothing to pardon." 1°36
And on June 15, 2018, the President expressed sympathy for Cohen, Manafort, and Flynn in a press
interview and said, "I feel badly about a lot of them, because I think a lot of it is very unfair."'
5. The President's Conduct After Cohen Began Cooperating with the Government
On July 2, 2018, ABC News reported based on an "exclusive" interview with Cohen that
Cohen "strongly signaled his willingness to cooperate with special counsel Robert Mueller and federal
prosecutors in the Southern District of New York—even if that puts President Trump in jeopardy.5,1038
That week, the media reported that Cohen had added an attorney to his legal team who previously had
worked as a legal advisor to President Bill Clinton.1039
Beginning on July 20, 2018, the media reported on the existence of a recording Cohen had
made of a conversation he had with candidate Trump about a payment made to a second woman who
said she had had an affair with Trump.1040 On July 21, 2018, the President responded: "Inconceivable
that the government would break into a lawyer's office (early in the morning)—almost unheard of.
Even more inconceivable that a lawyer would tape a client—totally unheard of & perhaps illegal. The
good news is that your favorite President did nothing wrong!,,loc On July 27, 2018, after the media
reported that Cohen was willing to inform investigators that Donald Trump Jr. told his father about
the June 9, 2016 meeting to get "dirt" on Hillary Clinton,1042 the President tweeted: "[S]° the Fake
News doesn't waste my time with dumb questions, NO, I did NOT know of the meeting with my son,
Don jr. Sounds to me like someone is trying to make up
Remarks by President Trump and President Macron of France Before Restricted Bilateral
1035
Meeting, The White House (Apr. 24, 2018).

President Donald Trump Holds Media Availability Before Departing for the G-7 Summit,
1036
CQ Newsmaker Transcripts (June 8, 2018).

1037
Remarks by President Trump in Press Gaggle, The White House (June 15, 2018).
EXCLUSIVE: Michael Cohen says family and country, not President Trump, is his first
1038
loyalty', ABC (July 2, 2018). Cohen said in the interview, "To be crystal clear, my wife, my daughter
and my son, and this country have my first loyalty."
See e.g., Darren Samuelsohn, Michael Cohen hires Clinton scandal veteran Lanny Davis,
1039
Politico (July 5, 2018).

1040
See,e.g., Matt Apuzzo et al., Michael Cohen Secretly Taped Trump Discussing Payment to
Playboy Model, New York Times (July 20, 2018).
1042 See, e.g., Jim Sciutto, Cuomo Prime Time Transcript, CNN (July 26, 2018).
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stories in order to get himself out of an unrelated jam (Taxi cabs maybe?). He even retained Bill and
Crooked Hillary's lawyer. Gee, I wonder if they helped him make the choice!"1°43
On August 21, 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty in the Southern District of New York to eight felony
charges, including two counts of campaign-finance violations based on the payments he had made
during the final weeks of the campaign to women who said they had affairs with the President.'"
During the plea hearing, Cohen stated that he had worked "at the direction of the candidate in making
those payments.1045 The next day, the President contrasted Cohen's cooperation with Manafort's
refusal to cooperate, tweeting, "I feel very badly for Paul Manafort and his wonderful family. 'Justice'
took a 12 year old tax case, among other things, applied tremendous pressure on him and, unlike
Michael Cohen, he refused to 'break'—make up stories in order to get a 'deal.' Such respect for a brave
man!"1046
On September 17, 2018, this Office submitted written questions to the President that
included questions about the Trump Tower Moscow project and attached Cohen's written statement
to Congress and the Letter of Intent signed by the President."' Among other issues, the questi ons
asked the President to describe the timing and substance of discussions he had with Cohen about
the project, whether they discussed a potential trip to Russia, and whether the President "at any
time direct[ed] or suggest[ed] that discussions about the Trump Moscow project should cease," or
whether the President was "informed at any time that the project had been abandoned. 551048
On November 20, 2018, the President submitted written responses that did not answer those
questions about Trump Tower Moscow directly and did not provide any information about the timing
of the candidate's discussions with Cohen about the project or whether he participated in any
discussions about the project being abandoned or no longer pursued."49 Instead, the President's
answers stated in relevant part:
I had few conversations with Mr. Cohen on this subject. As I recall, they were brief, and they
were not memorable. I was not enthused about the proposal, and I do not recall any discussion
of travel to Russia in connection with it. I do not remember discussing it with
1043 @realDonaldTrump 7/27/18 (7:26 a.m. ET) Tweet; @realDonaldTrump 7/27/18 (7:38 a.m. ET)
Tweet; @realDonaldTrump 7/27/18 (7:56 a.m. ET) Tweet. At the time of these tweets, the press had reported
that Cohen's financial interests in taxi cab medallions were being scrutinized by investigators. See, e.g., Matt
Apuzzo et al., Michael Cohen Secretly Taped Trump Discussing Payment to Playboy Model, New York
Times (July 20, 2018).
1044 Cohen Information.
1045
Cohen 8/21/18 Transcript, at 23.
1°47
9/17/18 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to President's Personal Counsel (attaching written
questions for the President, with attachments).
9/17/18 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to President's Personal Counsel (attaching written
1048
questions for the President), Question III, Parts (a) through (g).
1049
Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018).
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anyone else at the Trump Organization, although it is possible. I do not recall being aware at
the time of any communications between Mr. Cohen and Felix Sater and any Russian
government official regarding the Letter of Intent.1050
On November 29, 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress based
on his statements about the Trump Tower Moscow project.1051 In a plea agreement with this Office,
Cohen agreed to "provide truthful information regarding any and all matters as to which this Office
deems relevant."I052 Later on November 29, after Cohen's guilty plea had become public, the President
spoke to reporters about the Trump Tower Moscow project, saying:
I decided not to do the project. . . . I decided ultimately not to do it. There would have been
nothing wrong if I did do it. If I did do it, there would have been nothing wrong. That was
my business. . . . It was an option that I decided not to do. . . . I decided not to do it. The
primary reason . . . T was focused on running for President. . . . I was running my business
while I was campaigning. There was a good chance that I wouldn't have won, in which case
I would've gone back into the business. And why should I lose lots of opportunities? 10"
The President also said that Cohen was "a weak person. And by being weak, unlike other people that
you watch—he is a weak person. And what he's trying to do is get a reduced sentence. So he's lying
about a project that everybody knew about."1°54 The President also brought up Cohen's written
submission to Congress regarding the Trump Tower Moscow project: "So here's the story: Go back
and look at the paper that Michael Cohen wrote before he testified in the House and/or Senate. It
talked about his position."I°55 The President added, "Even if [Cohen] was right, it doesn't matter
because I was allowed to do whatever I wanted during the campaign.551056
In light of the President's public statements following Cohen's guilty plea that he "decided not
to do the project," this Office again sought information from the President about whether he
participated in any discussions about the project being abandoned or no longer pursued, including
when he "decided not to do the project," who he spoke to about that decision, and what motivated
105°Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 15 (Response to Question III,
Parts (a) through (g)).
1°51 Cohen Information; Cohen 8/21/18 Transcript.
1052 Plea Agreement at 4, United States v. Michael Cohen, 1:18-cr-850 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2018).
1053
President Trump Departure Remarks, C-SPAN (Nov. 29, 2018). In contrast to the President's
remarks following Cohen's guilty plea, Cohen's August 28, 2017 statement to Congress stated that Cohen, not
the President, "decided to abandon the proposal" in late January 2016; that Cohen "did not ask or brief Mr.
Trump . . . before I made the decision to terminate further work on the proposal"; and that the decision to
abandon the proposal was "unrelated" to the Campaign. P-SCO-000009477 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen,
Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017)).
1054 President Trump Departure Remarks, C-SPAN (Nov. 29, 2018).
1°55 President Trump Departure Remarks, C-SPAN (Nov. 29, 2018). 1056
President Trump Departure Remarks, C-SPAN (Nov. 29, 2018).
151
the decision.1°57 The Office also again asked for the timing of the President's discussions with Cohen
about Trump Tower Moscow and asked him to specify "what period of the campaign" he was involved
in discussions concerning the project's' In response, the President's personal counsel declined to
provide additional information from the President and stated that "the President has fully answered
the questions at issue."1059
In the weeks following Cohen's plea and agreement to provide assistance to this Office, the
President repeatedly implied that Cohen's family members were guilty of crimes. On December 3,
2018, after Cohen had filed his sentencing memorandum, the President tweeted, "'Michael Cohen
asks judge for no Prison Time.' You mean he can do all of the TERRIBLE, unrelated to Trump,
things having to do with fraud, big loans, Taxis, etc., and not serve a long prison term? He makes
up stories to get a GREAT & ALREADY reduced deal for himself, and get his wife and father-in-
law (who has the money?) off Scott Free. He lied for this outcome and should, in m o•inion serve
a full and corn • ete sentence."
'•
°62
On December 12, 2018, Cohen was sentenced to three years of imprisonment) The next
day, the President sent a series of tweets that said:
I never directed Michael Cohen to break the law. . . . Those charges were just agreed to by him
in order to embarrass the president and get a much reduced prison sentence, which he did—
including the fact that his family was temporarily let off the hook. As a lawyer, Michael has
great liability to me!1°63
On December 16, 2018, the President tweeted, "Remember, Michael Cohen only became a 'Rat' after
the FBI did something which was absolutely unthinkable & unheard of until the Witch Hunt was
illegally started. They BROKE INTO AN ATTORNEY'S OFFICE! Why didn't they break into the
DNC to get the Server, or Crooked's office?"1°64
In January 2019, after the media reported that Cohen would provide public testimony in a
congressional hearing, the President made additional public comments suggesting that Cohen's
10571
/23/19 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to President's Personal Counsel.
1058
1/23/19 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to President's Personal Counsel.
1059
2/6/19 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office.
1060 @realDonaldTrump 12/3/18 (10:24 a.m. ET and 10:29 a.m. ET) Tweets (emphasis added).
1062
Cohen 12/12/18 Transcript.
1063@realDonaldTrump 12/13/18 (8:17 a.m. ET, 8:25 a.m. ET, and 8:39 a.m. ET) Tweets
(emphasis added).
1064
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family members had committed crimes. In an interview on Fox on January 12, 2019, the President
was asked whether he was worried about Cohen's testimony and responded:
[I]n order to get his sentence reduced, [Cohen] says "I have an idea, I'll ah, tell—I'll give you
some information on the president." Well, there is no information. But he should give
information maybe on his father-in-law because that's the one that people want to look at
because where does that money—that's the money in the family. And I guess he didn't want to
talk about his father-in-law, he's trying to get his sentence reduced. So it's ah, pretty sad. You
know, it's weak and it's very sad to watch a thing like that.1°65
On January 18, 2019, the President tweeted, "Kevin Corke, @FoxNews 'Don't forget, Michael
Cohen has already been convicted of perjury and fraud, and as recently as this week, the Wall Street
Journal has suggested that he may have stolen tens of thousands of dollars. . . .' Lying to reduce his
jail time! Watch father-in-law. n, io66
On January 23, 2019, Cohen postponed his congressional testimony, citing threats against his
fami ly.1°67 The next day, the President tweeted, "So interesting that bad lawyer Michael Cohen, who
sadly will not be testifying before Congress, is using the lawyer of Crooked Hillary Clinton to
represent him—Gee, how did that happen?"1°68
Also in January 2019, Giuliani gave press interviews that appeared to confirm Cohen's
account that the Trump Organization pursued the Trump Tower Moscow project well past January
2016. Giuliani stated that "it's our understanding that [discussions about the Trump Moscow project]
went on throughout 2016. Weren't a lot of them, but there were conversations. Can't be sure of the
exact date. But the president can remember having conversations with him about it. . . . The president
also remembers—yeah, probably up—could be up to as far as October, November.591069 In an
interview with the New York Times, Giuliani quoted the President as saying that the discussions
regarding the Trump Moscow project were "going on from the day I announced to the day I won." 1°7°
On January 21, 2019, Giuliani issued a statement that said: "My recent statements about discussions
during the 2016 campaign between Michael Cohen and candidate Donald Trump about a potential
Trump Moscow 'project' were hypothetical and not based on conversations I had with the
president."1°71
1065
Jeanine Pirro Interview with President Trump, Fox News (Jan. 12, 2019) (emphasis added).
1066 @realDonaldTrump 1/18/19 (10:02 a.m. ET) Tweet (emphasis added).
1067
Statement by Lanny Davis, Cohen's personal counsel (Jan. 23, 2019).
1069
Meet the Press Interview with Rudy Giuliani, NBC (Jan. 20, 2019).
Mark Mazzetti et al., Moscow Skyscraper Talks Continued Through "the Day I Won," Trump
1070
Is Said to Acknowledge, New York Times (Jan. 20, 2019).

Maggie Haberman, Giuliani Says His Moscow Trump Tower Comments Were "Hypothetical",
1071
New York Times (Jan. 21, 2019). In a letter to this Office, the President's counsel stated that Giuliani's public
comments "were not intended to suggest nor did they reflect knowledge of the existence or timing
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Analysis
In analyzing the President's conduct related to Cohen, the following evidence is relevant to the
elements of obstruction of justice.
a. Obstructive act. We gathered evidence of the President's conduct related to Cohen on

two issues: (i) whether the President or others aided or participated in Cohen's false statements to
Congress, and (ii) whether the President took actions that would have the natural tendency to prevent
Cohen from providing truthful information to the government.
i. First, with regard to Cohen's false statements to Congress, while there is

evidence, described below, that the President knew Cohen provided false testimony to Congress about
the Trump Tower Moscow project, the evidence available to us does not establish that the President
directed or aided Cohen's false testimony.
Cohen said that his statements to Congress followed a "party line" that developed within the
campaign to align with the President's public statements distancing the President from Russia. Cohen
also recalled that, in speaking with the President in advance of testifying, he made it clear that he
would stay on message—which Cohen believed they both understood would require false testimony.
But Cohen said that he and the President did not explicitly discuss whether Cohen's testimony about
the Trump Tower Moscow project would be or was false, and the President did not direct him to
provide false testimony. Cohen also said he did not tell the President about the specifics of his planned
testimony. During the time when his statement to Congress was being drafted and circulated to
members of the JDA, Cohen did not speak directly to the President about the statement, but rather
communicated with the President's personal counsel—as corroborated by phone records showing
extensive communications between Cohen and the President's personal counsel before Cohen
submitted his statement and when he testified before Congress.
Cohen recalled that in his discussions with the President's personal counsel on August 27,
2017—the day before Cohen's statement was submitted to Congress—Cohen said that there were
more communications with Russia and more communications with candidate Trump than the
statement reflected. Cohen recalled expressing some concern at that time. According to Cohen, the
President's personal counsel—who did not have first-hand knowledge of the project—responded by
saying that there was no need to muddy the water, that it was unnecessary to include those details
because the project did not take place, and that Cohen should keep his statement short and tight, not
elaborate, stay on message, and not contradict the President. Cohen's recollection of the content of
those conversations is consistent with direction about the substance of Cohen's draft statement that
appeared to come from members of the JDA. For example, Cohen omitted any reference to his
outreach to Russian government officials to set up a meeting between Trump and Putin during the
United Nations General Assembly, and Cohen believed it was a decision of
154
of conversations beyond that contained in the President's [written responses to the Special Counsel's
Office]." 2/6/19 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office.
155
the JDA to delete the sentence, "The building project led me to make limited contacts with Russian
government officials."
The President's personal counsel declined to provide us with his account of his conversations
with Cohen, and there is no evidence available to us that indicates that the President was aware of
the information Cohen provided to the President's personal counsel. The President's conversations
with his personal counsel were presumptively protected by attorney-client privilege, and we did not
seek to obtain the contents of any such communications. The absence of evidence about the
President and his counsel's conversations about the drafting of Cohen's statement precludes us from
assessing what, if any, role the President played.
ii. Second, we considered whether the President took actions that would have the
natural tendency to prevent Cohen from providing truthful information to criminal investigators or to
Congress.
Before Cohen began to cooperate with the government, the President publicly and privately
urged Cohen to stay on message and not "flip." Cohen recalled the President's personal counsel
telling him that he would be protected so long as he did not go "rogue." In the days and weeks that
followed the April 2018 searches of Cohen's home and office, the President told reporters that Cohen
was a "good man" and said he was "a fine person with a wonderful family . . . who I have always
liked & respected." Privately, the President told Cohen to "hang in there" and "stay strong." People
who were close to both Cohen and the President passed messages to Cohen that "the President loves
you," "the boss loves you," and "everyone knows the boss has your back." Through the President's
personal counsel, the President also had previously told Cohen "thanks for what you do" after Cohen
provided information to the media about payments to women that, according to Cohen, both Cohen
and the President knew was false. At that time, the Trump Organization continued to pay Cohen's
legal fees, which was important to Cohen. Cohen also recalled discussing the possibility of a pardon
with the President's personal counsel, who told him to stay on message and everything would be fine.
The President indicated in his public statements that a pardon had not been ruled out, and also stated
publicly that "[m]ost people will flip if the Government lets them out of trouble" but that he "d[idn't]
see Michael doing that."
After it was reported that Cohen intended to cooperate with the government, however, the
President accused Cohen of "mak[ing] up stories in order to get himself out of an unrelated jam (Taxi
cabs maybe?)," called Cohen a "rat," and on multiple occasions publicly suggested that Cohen's family
members had committed crimes. The evidence concerning this sequence of events could support an
inference that the President used inducements in the form of positive messages in an effort to get
Cohen not to cooperate, and then turned to attacks and intimidation to deter the provision of
information or undermine Cohen's credibility once Cohen began cooperating.
b. Nexus to an official proceeding. The President's relevant conduct towards Cohen

occurred when the President knew the Special Counsel's Office, Congress, and the U.S. Attorney's
Office for the Southern District of New York were investigating Cohen's conduct. The President
acknowledged through his public statements and tweets that Cohen potentially could cooperate with
the government investigations.
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c. Intent. In analyzing the President's intent in his actions towards Cohen as a potential
witness, there is evidence that could support the inference that the President intended to discourage
Cohen from cooperating with the government because Cohen's information would shed adverse light
on the President's campaign-period conduct and statements.
i. Cohen's false congressional testimony about the Trump Tower Moscow

project was designed to minimize connections between the President and Russia and to help limit
the congressional and DOJ Russia investigations—a goal that was in the President's interest, as
reflected by the President's own statements. During and after the campaign, the President made
repeated statements that he had "no business" in Russia and said that there were "no deals that could
happen in Russia, because we've stayed away." As Cohen knew, and as he recalled communicating
to the President during the campaign, Cohen's pursuit of the Trump Tower Moscow project cast
doubt on the accuracy or completeness of these statements.
In connection with his guilty plea, Cohen admitted that he had multiple conversations with
candidate Trump to give him status updates about the Trump Tower Moscow project, that the
conversations continued through at least June 2016, and that he discussed with Trump possible travel
to Russia to pursue the project. The conversations were not off-hand, according to Cohen, because the
project had the potential to be so lucrative. In addition, text messages to and from Cohen and other
records further establish that Cohen's efforts to advance the project did not end in January 2016 and
that in May and June 2016, Cohen was considering the timing for possible trips to Russia by him and
Trump in connection with the project.
The evidence could support an inference that the President was aware of these facts at the time
of Cohen's false statements to Congress. Cohen discussed the project with the President in early 2017
following media inquiries. Cohen recalled that on September 20, 2017, the day after he released to the
public his opening remarks to Congress—which said the project "was terminated in January of
2016"—the President's personal counsel told him the President was pleased with what Cohen had said
about Trump Tower Moscow. And after Cohen's guilty plea, the President told reporters that he had
ultimately decided not to do the project, which supports the inference that he remained aware of his
own involvement in the project and the period during the Campaign in which the project was being
pursued.
ii. The President's public remarks following Cohen's guilty plea also suggest that
the President may have been concerned about what Cohen told investigators about the Trump Tower
Moscow project. At the time the President submitted written answers to questions from this Office
about the project and other subjects, the media had reported that Cohen was cooperating with the
government but Cohen had not yet pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress.
Accordingly, it was not publicly known what information about the project Cohen had provided to the
government. In his written answers, the President did not provide details about the timing and
substance of his discussions with Cohen about the project and gave no indication that he had decided
to no longer pursue the project. Yet after Cohen pleaded guilty, the President publicly stated that he
had personally made the decision to abandon the project. The President then declined to clarify the
seeming discrepancy to our Office or answer additional questions. The content and timing of the
President's provision of information about his knowledge and actions regarding the Trump Tower
Moscow project is evidence that the President may have been concerned about the information that
Cohen could provide as a witness.
157
iii. The President's concern about Cohen cooperating may have been directed at
the Southern District of New York investigation into other aspects of the President's dealings with
Cohen rather than an investigation of Trump Tower Moscow. There also is some evidence that the
President's concern about Cohen cooperating was based on the President's stated belief that Cohen
would provide false testimony against the President in an attempt to obtain a lesser sentence for his
unrelated criminal conduct. The President tweeted that Manafort, unlike Cohen, refused to "break"
and "make up stories in order to get a 'deal.'" And after Cohen pleaded guilty to making false
statements to Congress, the President said, "what [Cohen]'s trying to do is get a reduced sentence.
So he's lying about a project that everybody knew about." But the President also appeared to defend
the underlying conduct, saying, "Even if [Cohen] was right, it doesn't matter because I was allowed
to do whatever I wanted during the campaign." As described above, there is evidence that the
President knew that Cohen had made false statements about the Trump Tower Moscow project and
that Cohen did so to protect the President and minimize the President's connections to Russia during
the campaign.
iv. Finally, the President's statements insinuating that members of Cohen's family
committed crimes after Cohen began cooperating with the government could be viewed as an effort
to retaliate against Cohen and chill further testimony adverse to the President by Cohen or others. It
is possible that the President believes, as reflected in his tweets, that Cohen "ma[d]e[] up stories" in
order to get a deal for himself and "get his wife and father-in-law ... off Scott Free." It also is possible
that the President's mention of Cohen's wife and father-in-law were not intended to affect Cohen as a
witness but rather were part of a public-relations strategy aimed at discrediting Cohen and deflecting
attention away from the President on Cohen-related matters. But the President's suggestion that
Cohen's family members committed crimes happened more than once, including just before Cohen
was sentenced (at the same time as the President stated that Cohen "should, in my opinion, serve a
full and complete sentence") and again just before Cohen was scheduled to testify before Congress.
The timing of the statements supports an inference that they were intended at least in part to discourage
Cohen from further cooperation.
L. Overarching Factual Issues
Although this report does not contain a traditional prosecution decision or declination decision,
the evidence supports several general conclusions relevant to analysis of the facts concerning the
President's course of conduct.
1. Three features of this case render it atypical compared to the heartland obstruction-of-justice
prosecutions brought by the Department of Justice.
First, the conduct involved actions by the President. Some of the conduct did not implicate the
President's constitutional authority and raises garden-variety obstruction-of-justice issues. Other
events we investigated, however, drew upon the President's Article II authority, which raised
constitutional issues that we address in Volume II, Section III.B, infra. A factual analysis of that
conduct would have to take into account both that the President's acts were facially lawful and that his
position as head of the Executive Branch provides him with unique and powerful means of influencing
official proceedings, subordinate officers, and potential witnesses.
158
Second, many obstruction cases involve the attempted or actual cover-up of an underlying
crime. Personal criminal conduct can furnish strong evidence that the individual had an improper
obstructive purpose, see, e.g., United States v. Willoughby, 860 F.2d 15, 24 (2d Cir. 1988), or that he
contemplated an effect on an official proceeding, see, e.g., United States v. Binday, 804 F.3d 558, 591
(2d Cir. 2015). But proof of such a crime is not an element of an obstruction offense. See United States
v. Greer, 872 F.3d 790, 798 (6th Cir. 2017) (stating, in applying the obstruction sentencing guideline,
that "obstruction of a criminal investigation is punishable even if the prosecution is ultimately
unsuccessful or even if the investigation ultimately reveals no underlying crime"). Obstruction of
justice can be motivated by a desire to protect non-criminal personal interests, to protect against
investigations where underlying criminal liability falls into a gray area, or to avoid personal
embarrassment. The injury to the integrity of the justice system is the same regardless of whether a
person committed an underlying wrong.
In this investigation, the evidence does not establish that the President was involved in an
underlying crime related to Russian election interference. But the evidence does point to a range of
other possible personal motives animating the President's conduct. These include concerns that
continued investigation would call into question the legitimacy of his election and potential
uncertainty about whether certain events—such as advance notice of WikiLeaks's release of hacked
information or the June 9, 2016 meeting between senior campaign officials and Russians—could be
seen as criminal activity by the President, his campaign, or his family.
Third, many of the President's acts directed at witnesses, including discouragement of

cooperation with the government and suggestions of possible future pardons, occurred in public view.
While it may be more difficult to establish that public-facing acts were motivated by a corrupt intent,
the President's power to influence actions, persons, and events is enhanced by his unique ability to
attract attention through use of mass communications. And no principle of law excludes public acts
from the scope of obstruction statutes. If the likely effect of the acts is to intimidate witnesses or alter
their testimony, the justice system's integrity is equally threatened.
2. Although the events we investigated involved discrete acts—e.g., the President's

statement to Comey about the Flynn investigation, his termination of Comey, and his efforts to
remove the Special Counsel—it is important to view the President's pattern of conduct as a whole.
That pattern sheds light on the nature of the President's acts and the inferences that can be drawn
about his intent.
a. Our investigation found multiple acts by the President that were capable of exerting undue
influence over law enforcement investigations, including the Russian-interference and obstruction
investigations. The incidents were often carried out through one-on-one meetings in which the
President sought to use his official power outside of usual channels. These actions ranged from
efforts to remove the Special Counsel and to reverse the effect of the Attorney General's recusal; to
the attempted use of official power to limit the scope of the investigation; to direct and indirect
contacts with witnesses with the potential to influence their testimony. Viewing the acts collectively
can help to illuminate their significance. For example, the President's direction to McGahn to have
the Special Counsel removed was followed almost immediately by his direction to Lewandowski to
tell the Attorney General to limit the scope of the Russia investigation to prospective election-
interference only—a temporal connection that suggests that both acts were taken with a related
purpose with respect to the investigation.
159
The President's efforts to influence the investigation were mostly unsuccessful, but that is
largely because the persons who surrounded the President declined to carry out orders or accede to
his requests. Comey did not end the investigation of Flynn, which ultimately resulted in Flynn's
prosecution and conviction for lying to the FBI. McGahn did not tell the Acting Attorney General that
the Special Counsel must be removed, but was instead prepared to resign over the President's order.
Lewandowski and Dearborn did not deliver the President's message to Sessions that he should confine
the Russia investigation to future election meddling only. And McGahn refused to recede from his
recollections about events surrounding the President's direction to have the Special Counsel removed,
despite the President's multiple demands that he do so. Consistent with that pattern, the evidence we
obtained would not support potential obstruction charges against the President's aides and associates
beyond those already filed.
b. In considering the full scope of the conduct we investigated, the President's actions can be
divided into two distinct phases reflecting a possible shift in the President's motives. In the first phase,
before the President fired Comey, the President had been assured that the FBI had not opened an
investigation of him personally. The President deemed it critically important to make public that he
was not under investigation, and he included that information in his termination letter to Comey after
other efforts to have that information disclosed were unsuccessful.
Soon after he fired Comey, however, the President became aware that investigators were
conducting an obstruction-of-justice inquiry into his own conduct. That awareness marked a
significant change in the President's conduct and the start of a second phase of action. The President
launched public attacks on the investigation and individuals involved in it who could possess evidence
adverse to the President, while in private, the President engaged in a series of targeted efforts to control
the investigation. For instance, the President attempted to remove the Special Counsel; he sought to
have Attorney General Sessions unrecuse himself and limit the investigation; he sought to prevent
public disclosure of information about the June 9, 2016 meeting between Russians and campaign
officials; and he used public forums to attack potential witnesses who might offer adverse information
and to praise witnesses who declined to cooperate with the government. Judgments about the nature
of the President's motives during each phase would be informed by the totality of the evidence.
160
III. LEGAL DEFENSES To THE APPLICATION OF OBSTRUCTION-OF-JUSTICE STATUTES To THE

PRESIDENT
The President's personal counsel has written to this Office to advance statutory and
constitutional defenses to the potential application of the obstruction-of-justice statutes to the
President's conduct.i' As a statutory matter, the President's counsel has argued that a core obstruction-
of-justice statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1 5 1 2(c)(2), does not cover the President's actions. im As a
constitutional matter, the President's counsel argued that the President cannot obstruct justice by
exercising his constitutional authority to close Department of Justice investigations or terminate the
FBI Director.1°74 Under that view, any statute that restricts the President's exercise of those powers
would impermissibly intrude on the President's constitutional role. The President's counsel has
conceded that the President may be subject to criminal laws that do not directly involve exercises of
his Article II authority, such as laws prohibiting bribing witnesses or suborning perjury. 1°75 But
counsel has made a categorical argument that "the President's exercise of his constitutional authority
here to terminate an FBI Director and to close investigations cannot constitutionally constitute
obstruction of justice."' °76
In analyzing counsel's statutory arguments, we concluded that the President's proposed

interpretation of Section 1 5 12(c)(2) is contrary to the litigating position of the Department of Justice
and is not supported by principles of statutory construction.
As for the constitutional arguments, we recognized that the Department of Justice and the
courts have not definitively resolved these constitutional issues. We therefore analyzed the President's
position through the framework of Supreme Court precedent addressing the separation of powers.
Under that framework, we concluded, Article II of the Constitution does not categorically and
permanently immunize the President from potential liability for the conduct that we investigated.
Rather, our analysis led us to conclude that the obstruction-of-justice statutes can
6/23/17 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office; see also 1/29/18
1072
Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office; 2/6/18 Letter, President's Personal
Counsel to Special Counsel's Office; 8/8/18 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's
Office, at 4.
2/6/18 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 2-9. Counsel has also
1073
noted that other potentially applicable obstruction statutes, such as 18 U.S.C. § 1505, protect only pending
proceedings. 6/23/17 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 7-8. Section
1512(c)(2) is not limited to pending proceedings, but also applies to future proceedings that the person
contemplated. See Volume II, Section III.A, supra.
6/23/17 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 1 ("[T]he
1074
President cannot obstruct . . . by simply exercising these inherent Constitutional powers.").

1075
6/23/17 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 2 n. 1.
6/23/17 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 2 n.1 (dashes omitted);
1076
see also 8/8/18 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 4 ("[T]he obstruction-of-
justice statutes cannot be read so expansively as to create potential liability based on facially lawful acts
undertaken by the President in furtherance of his core Article II discretionary authority to remove principal
officers or carry out the prosecution function.").
161
6 3 1
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validly prohibit a President's corrupt efforts to use his official powers to curtail, end, or interfere with
an investigation.
A. Statutory Defenses to the Application of Obstruction-Of-Justice Provisions to the

Conduct Under Investigation
The obstruction-of-justice statute most readily applicable to our investigation is 18 U.S.C. §

1512(c)(2). Section 1512(c) provides:
(c) Whoever corruptly—
(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or

attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for use
in an official proceeding; or
(2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to

do so,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
The Department of Justice has taken the position that Section 1512(c)(2) states a broad,
independent, and unqualified prohibition on obstruction of justice. 1°77 While defendants have
argued that subsection (c)(2) should be read to cover only acts that would impair the availability or
integrity of evidence because that is subsection (c)(1)'s focus, strong arguments weigh against that
proposed limitation. The text of Section 1512(c)(2) confirms that its sweep is not tethered to Section
1512(c)(1); courts have so interpreted it; its history does not counsel otherwise; and no principle of
statutory construction dictates a contrary view. On its face, therefore, Section 1512(c)(2) applies to
all corrupt means of obstructing a proceeding, pending or contemplated—including by improper
exercises of official power. In addition, other statutory provisions that are potential ly applicable to
certain conduct we investigated broadly prohibit obstruction of proceedings that are pending before
courts, grand juries, and Congress. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1505. Congress has also specifically
prohibited witness tampering. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b).
1. The Text of Section 1512(c)(2) Prohibits a Broad Range of Obstructive Acts
Several textual features of Section 1512(c)(2) support the conclusion that the provision broadly
prohibits corrupt means of obstructing justice and is not limited by the more specific prohibitions in
Section 1512(c)(1), which focus on evidence impairment.
First, the text of Section 1512(c)(2) is unqualified: it reaches acts that "obstruct[], influence[],
or impede[] any official proceeding" when committed "corruptly." Nothing in Section 1512(c)(2)'s
text limits the provision to acts that would impair the integrity or availability of evidence for use in
an official proceeding. In contrast, Section 1512(c)(1) explicitly includes the requirement that the
defendant act "with the intent to impair the object's integrity or availability
1077
See U.S. Br., United States v. Kumar, Nos. 06-5482—cr(L), 06-5654—cr(CON) (2d Cir.
filed Oct. 26, 2007), at pp. 15-28; United States v. Singleton, Nos. H-04-CR-514SS, H-06-cr-80 (S.D.
Tex. filed June 5, 2006).
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for use in an official proceeding," a requirement that Congress also included in two other sections of
Section 1512. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(a)(2)(B)(ii) (use of physical force with intent to cause a person
to destroy an object "with intent to impair the integrity or availability of the object for use in an
official proceeding"); 1512(b)(2)(B) (use of intimidation, threats, corrupt persuasion, or misleading
conduct with intent to cause a person to destroy an object "with intent to impair the integrity or
availability of the object for use in an official proceeding"). But no comparable intent or conduct
element focused on evidence impairment appears in Section 1512(c)(2). The intent element in
Section 1512(c)(2) comes from the word "corruptly." See, e.g., United States v. McKibbins, 656 F.3d
707, 711 (7th Cir. 2011) ("The intent element is important because the word `corruptly' is what serves
to separate criminal and innocent acts of obstruction.") (internal quotation marks omitted). And the
conduct element in Section 1512(c)(2) is "obstruct[ing], influenc[ing], or imped[ing]" a proceeding.
Congress is presumed to have acted intentionally in the disparate inclusion and exclusion of
evidence-impairment language. See Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351, 358 (2014) ("[W]hen
'Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another'—let alone
in the very next provision—this Court `presume[s]' that Congress intended a difference in meaning")
(quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)); accord Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v.
Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 777 (2018).
Second, the structure of Section 1512 supports the conclusion that Section 1512(c)(2) defines
an independent offense. Section 1512(c)(2) delineates a complete crime with different elements
from Section 1512(c)(1)—and each subsection of Section 1512(c) contains its own "attempt"
prohibition, underscoring that they are independent prohibitions. The two subsections of Section
1512(c) are connected by the conjunction "or," indicating that each provides an alternative basis for
criminal liability. See Loughrin, 573 U.S. at 357 ("ordinary use [of 'oil is almost always disjunctive,
that is, the words it connects are to be given separate meanings") (internal quotation marks omitted).
In Loughrin, for example, the Supreme Court relied on the use of the word "or" to hold that adjacent
and overlapping subsections of the bank fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1344, state distinct offenses and
that subsection 1344(2) therefore should not be interpreted to contain an additional element
specified only in subsection 1344(1). Id; see also Shaw v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 462, 465-469
(2016) (recognizing that the subsections of the bank fraud statute "overlap substantially" but
identifying distinct circumstances covered by each). 1078 And here, as in Loughrin, Section 1512(c)'s
"two clauses have separate numbers, line breaks before, between, and after them, and equivalent
indentation—thus placing the clauses visually on an equal footing and indicating that they have
separate meanings." 573 U.S. at 359.
Third, the introductory word "otherwise" in Section 1512(e)(2) signals that the provision
covers obstructive acts that are different from those listed in Section 1512(c)(1). See Black's Law
Dictionary 1101 (6th ed. 1990) ("otherwise" means "in a different manner; in another way, or in other
ways"); see also, e.g., American Heritage College Dictionary Online ("1. In another way;
The Office of Legal Counsel recently relied on several of the same interpretive principles in
1078
concluding that language that appeared in the first clause of the Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084, restricting its
prohibition against certain betting or wagering activities to "any sporting event or contest," did not apply
to the second clause of the same statute, which reaches other betting or wagering activities. See
Reconsidering Whether the Wire Act Applies to Non-Sports Gambling (Nov. 2, 2018), slip op. 7 (relying
on plain language); id. at 11 (finding it not "tenable to read into the second clause the qualifier 'on any
sporting event or contest' that appears in the first clause"); id. at 12 (relying on Digital Realty).
163
differently; 2. Under other circumstances"); see also Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128
(1936) (characterizing "otherwise" as a "broad term" and holding that a statutory prohibition on
kidnapping "for ransom or reward or otherwise" is not limited by the words "ransom" and "reward"
to kidnappings for pecuniary benefits); Collazos v. United States, 368 F.3d 190, 200 (2d Cir. 2004)
(construing "otherwise" in 28 U.S.C. § 2466(1)(C) to reach beyond the "specific examples" listed
in prior subsections, thereby covering the "myriad means that human ingenuity might devise to
permit a person to avoid the jurisdiction of a court"); cf. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144
(2006) (recognizing that "otherwise" is defined to mean "in a different way or manner," and holding
that the word "otherwise" introducing the residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18
U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), can, but need not necessarily, "refer to a crime that is similar to the listed
examples in some respects but different in others"). 1°79 The purpose of the word "otherwise" in
Section 1512(c)(2) is therefore to clarify that the provision covers obstructive acts other than the
destruction of physical evidence with the intent to impair its integrity or availability, which is the
conduct addressed in Section 1512(c)(1). The word "otherwise" does not signal that Section
1512(c)(2) has less breadth in covering obstructive conduct than the language of the provision
implies.
2. Judicial Decisions Support a Broad Reading of Section 1512(c)(2)
Courts have not limited Section 1512(c)(2) to conduct that impairs evidence, but instead have
read it to cover obstructive acts in any form.
As one court explained, "[t]his expansive subsection operates as a catch-all to cover òtherwise'
obstructive behavior that might not constitute a more specific offense like document destruction,
which is listed in (c)(1)." United States v. Volpendesto, 746 F.3d 273, 286 (7th Cir. 2014) (some
quotation marks omitted). For example, in United States v. Ring, 628 F. Supp. 2d 195 (D.D.C. 2009),
the court rejected the argument that "§ 1512(c)(2)'s reference to conduct that òtherwise obstructs,
influences, or impedes any official proceeding' is limited to conduct that is similar to the type of
conduct proscribed by subsection (c)(1)—namely, conduct that impairs the integrity or availability of
`record[s], documents[s], or other object[s] for use in an official proceeding." Id. at 224. The court
explained that "the meaning of § 1512(c)(2) is plain on its face." Id. (alternations in original). And
courts have upheld convictions under Section 1512(c)(2) that did not involve evidence impairment,
but instead resulted from conduct that more broadly thwarted arrests or investigations. See, e.g.,
United States v. Martinez, 862 F.3d 223, 238 (2d Cir. 2017) (police officer tipped off suspects about
issuance of arrest warrants before "outstanding warrants could be executed, thereby potentially
interfering with an ongoing grand jury proceeding"); United States v. Ahrensfield, 698 F.3d 1310,
1324-1326 (10th Cir. 2012) (officer disclosed existence of an undercover investigation to its target);
United States v. Phillips, 583 F.3d 1261, 1265 (10th Cir. 2009) (defendant disclosed identity of an
undercover officer thus preventing him from making controlled purchases from methamphetamine
dealers). Those cases illustrate, that Section 1512(c)(2) applies to corrupt acts—including by public
officials—that frustrate the
1°'9 In Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 15 (2011), the Supreme Court substantially abandoned
Begay's reading of the residual clause, and in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), the Court
invalidated the residual clause as unconstitutionally vague. Begay's analysis of the word "otherwise" is thus
of limited value.
164
commencement or conduct of a proceeding, and not just to acts that make evidence unavailable or
impair its integrity.
Section 1512(c)(2)'s breadth is reinforced by the similarity of its language to the omnibus
clause of 18 U.S.C. § 1503, which covers anyone who "corruptly . . . obstructs, or impedes, or
endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice." That clause of Section
1503 follows two more specific clauses that protect jurors, judges, and court officers. The omnibus
clause has nevertheless been construed to be "far more general in scope than the earlier clauses of
the statute." United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995). "The omnibus clause is essentially
a catch-all provision which generally prohibits conduct that interferes with the due administration
ofjustice." United States v. Brenson, 104 F.3d 1267, 1275 (11th Cir. 1997). Courts have accordingly
given it a "non-restrictive reading." United States v. Kumar, 617 F.3d 612, 620 (2d Cir. 2010); id. at
620 n.7 (collecting cases from the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits). As one court
has explained, the omnibus clause "prohibits acts that are similar in result, rather than manner, to the
conduct described in the first part of the statute." United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 1331, 1333 (5th
Cir. 1978). While the specific clauses "forbid certain means of obstructing justice . . . the omnibus
clause aims at obstruction of justice itself, regardless of the means used to reach that result." Id.
(collecting cases). Given the similarity of Section 1512(c)(2) to Section 1503's omnibus clause,
Congress would have expected Section 1512(c)(2) to cover acts that produced a similar result to the
evidence-impairment provisions—i.e., the result of obstructing justice—rather than covering only
acts that were similar in manner. Read this way, Section 1512(c)(2) serves a distinct function in the
federal obstruction-of-justice statutes: it captures corrupt conduct, other than document destruction,
that has the natural tendency to obstruct contemplated as well as pending proceedings.
Section 1512(c)(2) overlaps with other obstruction statutes, but it does not render them
superfluous. Section 1503, for example, which covers pending grand jury and judicial proceedings,
and Section 1505, which covers pending administrative and congressional proceedings, reach
"endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede" the proceedings—a broader test for inchoate violations
than Section 1512(c)(2)'s "attempt" standard, which requires a substantial step towards a completed
offense. See United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287, 302 (2d Cir. 2018) ("[E]fforts to witness tamper
that rise to the level of an 'endeavor' yet fall short of an 'attempt' cannot be prosecuted under § 1512.");
United States v. Leisure, 844 F.2d 1347, 1366-1367 (8th Cir. 1988) (collecting cases recognizing the
difference between the "endeavor" and "attempt" standards). And 18 U.S.C. § 1519, which prohibits
destruction of documents or records in contemplation of an investigation or proceeding, does not
require the "nexus" showing under Aguilar, which Section 1512(c)(2) demands. See, e.g., United
States v. Yielding, 657 F.3d 688, 712 (8th Cir. 2011) ("The requisite knowledge and intent [under
Section 1519] can be present even if the accused lacks knowledge that he is likely to succeed in
obstructing the matter."); United States v. Gray, 642 F.3d 371, 376-377 (2d Cir. 2011) ("[I]n enacting
§ 1519, Congress rejected any requirement that the government prove a link between a defendant's
conduct and an imminent or pending official proceeding."). The existence of even "substantial"
overlap is not "uncommon" in criminal statutes. Loughrin, 573 U.S. at 359 n.4; see Shaw, 137 S. Ct.
at 458-469; Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 616 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The fact that there is now some overlap
between § 1503 and § 1512 is no more intolerable than the fact that there is some overlap between the
omnibus clause of § 1503 and the other provisions of § 1503 itself."). But given that Sections 1503,
1505, and
165
1519 each reach conduct that Section 1512(c)(2) does not, the overlap provides no reason to give
Section 1512(c)(2) an artificially limited construction. See Shaw, 137 S. Ct. at 469.1°80
3. The Legislative History of Section 1512(c)(2) Does Not Justify Narrowing Its
Text
"Given the straightforward statutory command" in Section 1512(c)(2), "there is no reason to

resort to legislative history." United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997). In any event, the
legislative history of Section 1512(c)(2) is not a reason to impose extratextual limitations on its reach.
Congress enacted Section 1512(c)(2) as part the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-204, Tit. XI, § 1102, 116 Stat. 807. The relevant section of the statute was entitled
"Tampering with a Record or Otherwise Impeding an Official Proceeding." 116 Stat. 807 (emphasis
added). That title indicates that Congress intended the two clauses to have independent effect.
Section 1512(c) was added as a floor amendment in the Senate and explained as closing a certain
"loophole" with respect to "document shredding." See 148 Cong. Rec. 56545 (July 10, 2002) (Sen.
Lott); id. at S6549-S6550 (Sen. Hatch). But those explanations do not limit the enacted text. See
Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 115 (1988) ("[I]t is not the law that a statute can have
no effects which are not explicitly mentioned in its legislative history."); see also Encino Motorcars,
LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1143 (2018) ("Even if Congress did not foresee all of the
applications of the statute, that is no reason not to give the statutory text a fair reading."). The floor
statements thus cannot detract from the meaning of the enacted text. See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal
Co., 534 U.S. 438, 457 (2002) ("Floor statements from two Senators cannot amend the clear and
unambiguous language of a statute. We see no reason to give greater weight to the views of two
Senators than to the collective votes of both Houses, which are memorialized in the unambiguous
statutory text."). That principle has particular force where one of the proponents of the amendment
to Section 1512 introduced his remarks as only "briefly elaborat[ing] on some of the specific
provisions contained in this bill." 148 Cong. Rec. S6550 (Sen. Hatch).
Indeed, the language Congress used in Section 1512(c)(2)—prohibiting "corruptly . . .

obstruct[ing], influenc[ing], or imped[ing] any official proceeding" or attempting to do so—
parallels a provision that Congress considered years earlier in a bill designed to strengthen
protections against witness tampering and obstruction of justice. While the earlier provision is not
a direct antecedent of Section 1512(c)(2), Congress's understanding of the broad scope of the
1080 The Supreme Court's decision in Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101 (2018), does not
support imposing a non-textual limitation on Section 1512(c)(2). Marinello interpreted the tax obstruction
statute, 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a), to require "a 'nexus' between the defendant's conduct and a particular
administrative proceeding." Id. at 1109. The Court adopted that construction in light of the similar
interpretation given to "other obstruction provisions," id. (citing Aguilar and Arthur Andersen), as well as
considerations of context, legislative history, structure of the criminal tax laws, fair warning, and lenity. Id at
1106-1108. The type of "nexus" element the Court adopted in Marinello already applies under Section
1512(c)(2), and the remaining considerations the Court cited do not justify reading into Section 1512(c)(2)
language that is not there. See Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29 (1997) (the Court "ordinarily resist[s]
reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face.").
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earlier provision is instructive. Recognizing that "the proper administration of justice may be impeded
or thwarted" by a "variety of corrupt methods . . . limited only by the imagination of the criminally
inclined," S. Rep. No. 532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1982), Congress considered a bill that would
have amended Section 1512 by making it a crime, inter alia, when a person "corruptly . . . influences,
obstructs, or impedes . . . [t]he enforcement and prosecution of federal law," "administration of a law
under which an official proceeding is being or may be conducted," or the "exercise of a Federal
legislative power of inquiry." Id. at 17-19 (quoting S. 2420).
The Senate Committee explained that:
[T]he purpose of preventing an obstruction of or miscarriage of justice cannot be fully carried

out by a simple enumeration of the commonly prosecuted obstruction offenses. There must
also be protection against the rare type of conduct that is the product of the inventive criminal
mind and which also thwarts justice.
Id. at 18. The report gave examples of conduct "actually prosecuted under the current residual clause
[in 18 U.S.C. § 1503], which would probably not be covered in this series [of provisions] without a
residual clause." Id. One prominent example was "[a] conspiracy to cover up the Watergate burglary
and its aftermath by having the Central Intelligence Agency seek to interfere with an ongoing FBI
investigation of the burglary." Id. (citing United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
The report therefore indicates a congressional awareness not only that residual-clause language
resembling Section 1512(0(2) broadly covers a wide variety of obstructive conduct, but also that
such language reaches the improper use of governmental processes to obstruct justice—specifically,
the Watergate cover-up orchestrated by White House officials including the President himself See
Haldeman, 559 F.3d at 51, 86-87, 120-129, 162.1081
4. General Principles of Statutory Construction Do Not Suggest That Section

1512(c)(2) is Inapplicable to the Conduct in this Investigation
The requirement of fair warning in criminal law, the interest in avoiding due process concerns
in potentially vague statutes, and the rule of lenity do not justify narrowing the reach of Section
1512(c)(2)' s text.1°82
a. As with other criminal laws, the Supreme Court has "exercised restraint" in interpreting
obstruction-of-justice provisions, both out of respect for Congress's role in defining crimes and in the
interest of providing individuals with "fair warning" of what a criminal statute prohibits. Marinello v.
United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101, 1106 (2018); Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 703;
1081 The Senate ultimately accepted the House version of the bill, which excluded an omnibus
clause. See United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 382-383 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (tracing history of the
proposed omnibus provision in the witness-protection legislation). During the floor debate on the bill,
Senator Heinz, one of the initiators and primary backers of the legislation, explained that the omnibus clause
was beyond the scope of the witness-protection measure at issue and likely "duplicative" of other obstruction
laws, 128 Cong. Rec. 26,810 (1982) (Sen. Heinz), presumably referring to Sections 1503 and 1505.
In a separate section addressing considerations unique to the presidency, we consider
1082
principles of statutory construction relevant in that context. See Volume II, Section III.B. 1, infra.
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Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599-602. In several obstruction cases, the Court has imposed a nexus test that
requires that the wrongful conduct targeted by the provision be sufficiently connected to an official
proceeding to ensure the requisite culpability. Marinello, 138 S. Ct. at 1109; Arthur Andersen, 544
U.S. at 707-708; Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 600-602. Section 1512(c)(2) has been interpreted to require a
similar nexus. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 916 F.3d 368, 386 (4th Cir. 2019); United States v.
Petruk, 781 F.3d 438, 445 (8th Cir. 2015); United States v. Phillips, 583 F.3d 1261, 1264 (10th Cir.
2009); United States v. Reich, 479 F.3d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 2007). To satisfy the nexus requirement,
the government must show as an objective matter that a defendant acted "in a manner that is likely
to obstruct justice," such that the statute "excludes defendants who have an evil purpose but use
means that would only unnaturally and improbably be successful." Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 601-602
(internal quotation marks omitted); see id. at 599 ("the endeavor must have the natural and probable
effect of interfering with the due administration of justice") (internal quotation marks omitted). The
government must also show as a subjective matter that the actor "contemplated a particular,
foreseeable proceeding." Petruk, 781 F.3d at 445. Those requirements alleviate fair-warning
concerns by ensuring that obstructive conduct has a close enough connection to existing or future
proceedings to implicate the dangers targeted by the obstruction laws and that the individual actually
has the obstructive result in mind.
b. Courts also seek to construe statutes to avoid due process vagueness concerns. See, e.g.,
McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2373 (2016); Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358,
368, 402-404 (2010). Vagueness doctrine requires that a statute define a crime "with sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited" and "in a manner that
does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Id. at 402-403 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The obstruction statutes' requirement of acting "corruptly" satisfies that test.
"Acting 'corruptly' within the meaning of § 1512(c)(2) means acting with an improper purpose
and to engage in conduct knowingly and dishonestly with the specific intent to subvert, impede or
obstruct" the relevant proceeding. United States v. Gordon, 710 F.3d 1124, 1151 (10th Cir. 2013)
(some quotation marks omitted). The majority opinion in Aguilar did not address the defendant's
vagueness challenge to the word "corruptly," 515 U.S. at 600 n. 1, but Justice Scalia's separate
opinion did reach that issue and would have rejected the challenge, id. at 616-617 (Scalia, J., joined
by Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "Statutory language need
not be colloquial," Justice Scalia explained, and "the term 'corruptly' in criminal laws has a
longstanding and well-accepted meaning. It denotes an act done with an intent to give some
advantage inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others." Id. at 616 (internal quotation marks
omitted; citing lower court authority and legal dictionaries). Justice Scalia added that "in the context
of obstructing jury proceedings, any claim of ignorance of wrongdoing is incredible." Id. at 617.
Lower courts have also rejected vagueness challenges to the word "corruptly." See, e.g., United States
v. Edwards, 869 F.3d 490, 501-502 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Brenson, 104 F.3d 1267, 1280-
1281 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 1331, 1336 n.9 (5th Cir. 1978). This well-
established intent standard precludes the need to limit the obstruction statutes to only certain kinds
of inherently wrongful conduct.'°83
In United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991), the court of appeals found the
1083
term "corruptly" in 18 U.S.C. § 1505 vague as applied to a person who provided false information to
Congress. After suggesting that the word "corruptly" was vague on its face, 951 F.2d at 378, the court
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c. Finally, the rule of lenity does not justify treating Section 1512(c)(2) as a prohibition on
evidence impairment, as opposed to an omnibus clause. The rule of lenity is an interpretive principle
that resolves ambiguity in criminal laws in favor of the less-severe construction. Cleveland v. United
States, 531 U.S. 12, 25 (2000). "[A]s [the Court has] repeatedly emphasized," however, the rule of
lenity applies only if, "after considering text, structure, history and purpose, there remains a grievous
ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute such that the Court must simply guess as to what Congress
intended." Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 188 n.10 (2014) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The rule has been cited, for example, in adopting a narrow meaning of "tangible object" in
an obstruction statute when the prohibition's title, history, and list of prohibited acts indicated a focus
on destruction of records. See Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1088 (2015) (plurality opinion)
(interpreting "tangible object" in the phrase "record, document, or tangible object" in 18 U.S.C. §
1519 to mean an item capable of recording or preserving information). Here, as discussed above, the
text, structure, and history of Section 1512(c)(2) leaves no "grievous ambiguity" about the statute's
meaning. Section 1512(c)(2) defines a structurally independent general prohibition on obstruction
of official proceedings.
5. Other Obstruction Statutes Might Apply to the Conduct in this Investigation
Regardless whether Section 1512(c)(2) covers all corrupt acts that obstruct, influence, or
impede pending or contemplated proceedings, other statutes would apply to such conduct in pending
proceedings, provided that the remaining statutory elements are satisfied. As discussed above, the
omnibus clause in 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) applies generally to obstruction of pending judicial and grand
proceedings.1°84 See Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 598 (noting that the clause is "far more general in scope"
than preceding provisions). Section 1503(a)'s protections extend to witness tampering and to other
obstructive conduct that has a nexus to pending proceedings. See Sampson, 898 F.3d at 298-303 &
n.6 (collecting cases from eight circuits holding that Section 1503 covers witness-related obstructive
conduct, and cabining prior circuit authority). And Section 1505 broadly criminalizes obstructive
conduct aimed at pending agency and congressional proceedings.1°85 See, e.g., United States v. Rainey,
757 F.3d 234, 241-247 (5th Cir. 2014).
concluded that the statute did not clearly apply to corrupt conduct by the person himself and the "core"
conduct to which Section 1505 could constitutionally be applied was one person influencing another person
to violate a legal duty. Id. at 379-386. Congress later enacted a provision overturning that result by providing
that "[a]s used in [S]ection 1505, the term 'corruptly' means acting with an improper purpose, personally or
by influencing another, including by making a false or misleading statement, or withholding, concealing,
altering, or destroying a document or other information." 18 U.S.C. § 1515(b). Other courts have declined to
follow Poindexter either by limiting it to Section 1505 and the specific conduct at issue in that case, see
Brenson, 104 F.3d at 1280-1281; reading it as narrowly limited to certain types of conduct, see United States
v. Morrison, 98 F.3d 619, 629-630 (D.C. Cir. 1996); or by noting that it predated Arthur Andersen's
interpretation of the term "corruptly," see Edwards, 869 F.3d at 501-502.
1084 Section 1503(a) provides for criminal punishment of:
Whoever . . . corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or
communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct,
or impede, the due administration of justice.
1085
Section 1505 provides for criminal punishment of:
169
Finally, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3) criminalizes tampering with witnesses to prevent the

communication of information about a crime to law enforcement. The nexus inquiry articulated in
Aguilar—that an individual has "knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the judicial
proceeding," 515 U.S. at 599—does not apply to Section 1512(b)(3). See United States v. Byrne, 435
F.3d 16, 24-25 (1st Cir. 2006). The nexus inquiry turns instead on the actor's intent to prevent
communications to a federal law enforcement official. See Fowler v. United States, 563 U.S. 668,
673-678 (2011).
* * *
In sum, in light of the breadth of Section 1512(c)(2) and the other obstruction statutes, an
argument that the conduct at issue in this investigation falls outside the scope of the obstruction laws
lacks merit.
B. Constitutional Defenses to Applying Obstruction-Of-Justice Statutes to

Presidential Conduct
The President has broad discretion to direct criminal investigations. The Constitution vests the
"executive Power" in the President and enjoins him to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."
U.S. CONST. ART II, §§ 1, 3. Those powers and duties form the foundation of prosecutorial discretion.
See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (Attorney General and United States
Attorneys "have this latitude because they are designated by statute as the President's delegates to help
him discharge his constitutional responsibility to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.').
The President also has authority to appoint officers of the United States and to remove those whom
he has appointed. U.S. CONST. ART II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting authority to the President to appoint all
officers with the advice and consent of the Senate, but providing that Congress may vest the
appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, the heads of departments, or the courts of law);
see also Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 477, 492-
493, 509 (2010) (describing removal authority as flowing from the President's "responsibility to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed").
Although the President has broad authority under Article II, that authority coexists with
Congress's Article I power to enact laws that protect congressional proceedings, federal
investigations, the courts, and grand juries against corrupt efforts to undermine their functions.
Usually, those constitutional powers function in harmony, with the President enforcing the criminal
laws under Article II to protect against corrupt obstructive acts. But when the President's official
actions come into conflict with the prohibitions in the obstruction statutes, any constitutional tension
is reconciled through separation-of-powers analysis.
Whoever corruptly .. . influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence,

obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which any pending
proceeding is being had before any department or agency of the United States, or the due
and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which any inquiry or investigation is being
had by either House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the
Congress.
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The President's counsel has argued that "the President's exercise of his constitutional authority
. . . to terminate an FBI Director and to close investigations . . . cannot constitutionally constitute
obstruction of justice."1086 As noted above, no Department of Justice position or Supreme Court
precedent directly resolved this issue. We did not find counsel's contention, however, to accord with
our reading of the Supreme Court authority addressing separation-of-powers issues. Applying the
Court's framework for analysis, we concluded that Congress can validly regulate the President's
exercise of official duties to prohibit actions motivated by a corrupt intent to obstruct justice. The
limited effect on presidential power that results from that restriction would not impermissibly
undermine the President's ability to perform his Article II functions.
1. The Requirement of a Clear Statement to Apply Statutes to Presidential Conduct

Does Not Limit the Obstruction Statutes
Before addressing Article II issues directly, we consider one threshold statutory-construction

principle that is unique to the presidency: "The principle that general statutes must be read as not
applying to the President if they do not expressly apply where application would arguably limit the
President's constitutional role." OLC, Application of 28 U.S.C. ,sC 458 to Presidential Appointments
of Federal Judges, 19 Op. O.L.C. 350, 352 (1995). This "clear statement rule," id, has its source in
two principles: statutes should be construed to avoid serious constitutional questions, and Congress
should not be assumed to have altered the constitutional separation of powers without clear assurance
that it intended that result. OLC, The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President
and Congress, 20 Op. O.L.C. 124, 178 (1996).
The Supreme Court has applied that clear-statement rule in several cases. In one leading case,
the Court construed the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., not to apply to judicial
review of presidential action. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-801 (1992). The Court
explained that it "would require an express statement by Congress before assuming it intended the
President's performance of his statutory duties to be reviewed for abuse of discretion." Id. at 801. In
another case, the Court interpreted the word "utilized" in the Federal Advisory Committee Act
(FACA), 5 U.S.C. App., to apply only to the use of advisory committees established directly or
indirectly by the government, thereby excluding the American Bar Association's advice to the
Department of Justice about federal judicial candidates. Public Citizen v. United States Department
of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 455, 462-467 (1989). The Court explained that a broader interpretation of
the term "utilized" in FACA would raise serious questions whether the statute "infringed unduly on
the President's Article II power to nominate federal judges and violated the doctrine of separation of
powers." Id. at 466-467. Another case found that an established canon of statutory construction
applied with "special force" to provisions that would impinge on the President's foreign-affairs powers
if construed broadly. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993) (applying the
presumption against extraterritorial application to construe the Refugee Act of 1980 as not governing
in an overseas context where it could affect "foreign and military affairs for which the President has
unique responsibility"). See Application
1086 6/23/17 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 2 n. 1.
171
of 28 U.S.C. § 458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 353-354

(discussing Franklin, Public Citizen, and Sale).
The Department of Justice has relied on this clear-statement principle to interpret certain
statutes as not applying to the President at all, similar to the approach taken in Franklin. See, e.g.,
Memorandum for Richard T. Burress, Office of the President, from Laurence H. Silberman, Deputy
Attorney General, Re: Conflict of Interest Problems Arising out of the President's Nomination of
Nelson A. Rockefeller to be Vice President under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution,
at 2, 5 (Aug. 28, 1974) (criminal conflict-of-interest statute, 18 U.S.C. § 208, does not apply to the
President). Other OLC opinions interpret statutory text not to apply to certain presidential or
executive actions because of constitutional concerns. See Application of 28 U.S.C. § 458 to
Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 350-357 (consanguinity limitations
on court appointments, 28 U.S.C. § 458, found inapplicable to "presidential appointments of judges
to the federal judiciary"); Constraints Imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 1913 on Lobbying Efforts, 13 Op.
O.L.C. 300, 304-306 (1989) (limitation on the use of appropriated funds for certain lobbying
programs found inapplicable to certain communications by the President and executive officials).
But OLC has also recognized that this clear-statement rule "does not apply with respect to a
statute that raises no separation of powers questions were it to be applied to the President," such as
the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201. Application of 28 U.S.C. § 458 to Presidential
Appointments of Federal Judges, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 357 n.11. OLC explained that "[a]pplication of §
201 raises no separation of powers question, let alone a serious one," because [t]he Constitution
confers no power in the President to receive bribes." Id. In support of that conclusion, OLC noted
constitutional provisions that forbid increases in the President's compensation while in office, "which
is what a bribe would function to do," id. (citing U.S. CONST. ART. II, § 1, cl. 7), and the express
constitutional power of "Congress to impeach [and convict] a President for, inter alia, bribery," id.
(citing U.S. CONST. ART II, § 4).
Under OLC's analysis, Congress can permissibly criminalize certain obstructive conduct by
the President, such as suborning perjury, intimidating witnesses, or fabricating evidence, because
those prohibitions raise no separation-of-powers questions. See Application of 28 U.S.C. § 458 to
Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 357 n.11. The Constitution does
not authorize the President to engage in such conduct, and those actions would transgress the
President's duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." U.S. CONST. ART II, §§ 3.
In view of those clearly permissible applications of the obstruction statutes to the President,
Franklin's holding that the President is entirely excluded from a statute absent a clear statement
would not apply in this context.
A more limited appliCation of a clear-statement rule to exclude from the obstruction statutes
only certain acts by the President—for example, removing prosecutors or ending investigations for
corrupt reasons—would be difficult to implement as a matter of statutory interpretation. It is not
obvious how a clear-statement rule would apply to an omnibus provision like Section 1512(c)(2) to
exclude corruptly motivated obstructive acts only when carried out in the President's conduct of office.
No statutory term could easily bear that specialized meaning. For example, the word "corruptly" has a
well-established meaning that does not exclude exercises of official power for corrupt ends. Indeed, an
established definition states that "corruptly" means action with an
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At4et9tey—Wer-k--Pr-edttet II May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
intent to secure an improper advantage "inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others."
BALI,IiNTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 276 (3d ed. 1969) (emphasis added). And it would be
contrary to ordinary rules of statutory construction to adopt an unconventional meaning of a statutory
term only when applied to the President. See United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 522 (2008)
(plurality opinion of Scalia, J.) (rejecting proposal to "giv[e] the same word, in the same statutory
provision, different meanings in different factual contexts"); cf. Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 462467
(giving the term "utilized" in the FACA a uniform meaning to avoid constitutional questions). Nor
could such an exclusion draw on a separate and established background interpretive presumption,
such as the presumption against extraterritoriality applied in Sale. The principle that courts will
construe a statute to avoid serious constitutional questions "is not a license for the judiciary to rewrite
language enacted by the legislature." Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 59-60 (1997). "It is one
thing to acknowledge and accept . . . well defined (or even newly enunciated), generally applicable,
background principles of assumed legislative intent. It is quite another to espouse the broad
proposition that criminal statutes do not have to be read as broadly as they are written, but are subject
to case-by-case exceptions." Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 406 (1998).
When a proposed construction "would thus function as an extra-textual limit on [a statute's]

compass," thereby preventing the statute "from applying to a host of cases falling within its clear
terms," Loughrin, 573 U.S. at 357, it is doubtful that the construction would reflect Congress's intent.
That is particularly so with respect to obstruction statutes, which "have been given a broad and all-
inclusive meaning." Rainey, 757 F.3d at 245 (discussing Sections 1503 and 1505) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Accordingly, since no established principle of interpretation would exclude the
presidential conduct we have investigated from statutes such as Sections 1503, 1505, 1512(b), and
1512(c)(2), we proceed to examine the separation-of-powers issues that could be raised as an Article
II defense to the application of those statutes.
2. Separation-of-Powers Principles Support the Conclusion that Congress May Validly

Prohibit Corrupt Obstructive Acts Carried Out Through the President's Official
Powers
When Congress imposes a limitation on the exercise of Article II powers, the limitation's
validity depends on whether the measure "disrupts the balance between the coordinate branches."
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977). "Even when a branch does not
arrogate power to itself, . . . the separation-of-powers doctrine requires that a branch not impair another
in the performance of its constitutional duties." Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996).
The "separation of powers does not mean," however, "that the branches 'ought to have no partial
agency in, or no controul over the acts of each other.' Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 703 (1997)
(quoting James Madison, The Federalist No. 47, pp. 325-326 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis omitted)).
In this context, a balancing test applies to assess separation-of-powers issues. Applying that test here,
we concluded that Congress can validly make obstruction-of-justice statutes applicable to corruptly
motivated official acts of the President without impermissibly undermining his Article II functions.
173
a. The Supreme Court's Separation-of-Powers Balancing Test Applies In

This Context
A congressionally imposed limitation on presidential action is assessed to determine "the

extent to which it prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned
functions," and, if the "potential for disruption is present[,] . . . whether that impact is justified by an
overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress." Administrator
of General Services, 433 U.S. at 443; see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731,753754 (1982); United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706-707 (1974). That balancing test applies to a congressional
regulation of presidential power through the obstruction-of-justice laws.1087
When an Article II power has not been "explicitly assigned by the text of the Constitution to
be within the sole province of the President, but rather was thought to be encompassed within the
general grant to the President of the 'executive Power,'" the Court has balanced competing
constitutional considerations. Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 484 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, J.). As Justice Kennedy noted in Public Citizen,
the Court has applied a balancing test to restrictions on "the President's power to remove Executive
officers, a power [that] . . . is not conferred by any explicit provision in the text of the Constitution
(as is the appointment power), but rather is inferred to be a necessary part of the grant of the
'executive Power.'" Id. (citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988), and Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52, 115-116 (1926)). Consistent with that statement, Morrison sustained a good-
cause limitation on the removal of an inferior officer with defined prosecutorial responsibilities after
determining that the limitation did not impermissibly undermine the President's ability to perform
his Article II functions. 487 U.S. at 691-693, 695-696. The Court has also evaluated other general
executive-power claims through a balancing test. For example, the Court evaluated the President's
claim of an absolute privilege for presidential communications about his official acts by balancing
that interest against the Judicial Branch's need for evidence in a criminal case. United States v. Nixon,
supra (recognizing a qualified constitutional privilege for presidential communications on official
matters). The Court has also upheld a law that provided for archival access to presidential records
despite a claim of absolute presidential privilege over the records. Administrator of General Services,
433 U.S. at 443-445, 451-455. The analysis in those cases supports applying a balancing test to assess
the constitutionality of applying the obstruction-of-justice statutes to presidential exercises of
executive power.
Only in a few instances has the Court applied a different framework. When the President's
power is "both 'exclusive' and 'conclusive' on the issue," Congress is precluded from regulating its
exercise. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084 (2015). In Zivotofsky, for example, the Court
followed "Justice Jackson's familiar tripartite framework" in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 635-638 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring), and held that the President's
1087
OLC applied such a balancing test in concluding that the President is not subject to criminal
prosecution while in office, relying on many of the same precedents discussed in this section. See A Sitting
President 's Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. 222, 237-238, 244-245
(2000) (relying on, inter alia, United States v. Nixon, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, and Clinton v. Jones, and quoting
the legal standard from Administrator of General Services v. Nixon that is applied in the text). OLC
recognized that "[t]he balancing analysis" it had initially relied on in finding that a sitting President is immune
from prosecution had "been adopted as the appropriate mode of analysis by the Court." Id. at 244.
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authority to recognize foreign nations is exclusive. Id. at 2083, 2094. See also Public Citizen 491 U.S.
at 485-486 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing the power to grant pardons under U.S.
CONST., ART. II, § 2, cl. 1, and the Presentment Clauses for legislation, U.S. CONST., ART. I, § 7,
Cls. 2, 3, as examples of exclusive presidential powers by virtue of constitutional text).
But even when a power is exclusive, "Congress' powers, and its central role in making laws,
give it substantial authority regarding many of the policy determinations that precede and follow"
the President's act. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2087. For example, although the President's power to
grant pardons is exclusive and not subject to congressional regulation, see United States v. Klein,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147-148 (1872), Congress has the authority to prohibit the corrupt use
of"anything of value" to influence the testimony of another person in a judicial, congressional, or
agency proceeding, 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(3)—which would include the offer or promise of a pardon
to induce a person to testify falsely or not to testify at all. The offer of a pardon would precede the
act of pardoning and thus be within Congress's power to regulate even if the pardon itself is not.
Just as the Speech or Debate Clause, U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 6, c1.1, absolutely protects legislative
acts, but not a legislator's "taking or agreeing to take money for a promise to act in a certain way .
. . for it is taking the bribe, not performance of the illicit compact, that is a criminal act," United
States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 526 (1972) (emphasis omitted), the promise of a pardon to
corruptly influence testimony would not be a constitutionally immunized act. The application of
obstruction statutes to such promises therefore would raise no serious separation-of-powers issue.
b. The Effect of Obstruction-of-Justice Statutes on the President's Capacity

to Perform His Article II Responsibilities is Limited
Under the Supreme Court's balancing test for analyzing separation-of-powers issues, the first
task is to assess the degree to which applying obstruction-of-justice statutes to presidential actions
affects the President's ability to carry out his Article II responsibilities. Administrator of General
Services, 433 U.S. at 443. As discussed above, applying obstruction-of-justice statutes to presidential
conduct that does not involve the President's conduct of office—such as influencing the testimony of
witnesses—is constitutionally unproblematic. The President has no more right than other citizens to
impede official proceedings by corruptly influencing witness testimony. The conduct would be
equally improper whether effectuated through direct efforts to produce false testimony or suppress the
truth, or through the actual, threatened, or promised use of official powers to achieve the same result.
The President's action in curtailing criminal investigations or prosecutions, or discharging

law enforcement officials, raises different questions. Each type of action involves the exercise of
executive discretion in furtherance of the President's duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed." U.S. CONST., ART. II, § 3. Congress may not supplant the President's exercise of
executive power to supervise prosecutions or to remove officers who occupy law enforcement
positions. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726-727 (1986) ("Congress cannot reserve for itself
the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by impeachment. .
. . [Because t]he structure of the Constitution does not permit Congress to execute the laws, . . . [t]his
kind of congressional control over the execution of the laws . . • . is constitutionally impermissible.").
Yet the obstruction-of-justice statutes do not aggrandize power in Congress or usurp executive
authority. Instead, they impose a discrete limitation on conduct
175
only when it is taken with the "corrupt" intent to obstruct justice. The obstruction statutes thus would
restrict presidential action only by prohibiting the President from acting to obstruct official
proceedings for the improper purpose of protecting his own interests. See Volume H, Section III.A.3,
supra.
The direct effect on the President's freedom of action would correspondingly be a limited
one. A preclusion of "corrupt" official action is not a major intrusion on Article II powers. For
example, the proper supervision of criminal law does not demand freedom for the President to act
with the intention of shielding himself from criminal punishment, avoiding financial liability, or
preventing personal embarrassment. To the contrary, a statute that prohibits official action
undertaken for such personal purposes furthers, rather than hinders, the impartial and evenhanded
administration of the law. And the Constitution does not mandate that the President have unfettered
authority to direct investigations or prosecutions, with no limits whatsoever, in order to carry out
his Article II functions. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 (1985) ("Congress may limit an
agency's exercise of enforcement power if it wishes, either by setting substantive priorities, or by
otherwise circumscribing an agency's power to discriminate among issues or cases it will pursue.");
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707 ("[t]o read the Art. II powers of the President as providing
an absolute privilege [to withhold confidential communications from a criminal trial]. . . would
upset the constitutional balance of 'a workable government' and gravely impair the role of the courts
under Art. III").
Nor must the President have unfettered authority to remove all Executive Branch officials
involved in the execution of the laws. The Constitution establishes that Congress has legislative
authority to structure the Executive Branch by authorizing Congress to create executive departments
and officer positions and to specify how inferior officers are appointed. E.g., U.S. CONST., ART. I,
§ 8, cl. 18 (Necessary and Proper Clause); ART. II, § 2, cl. 1 (Opinions Clause); ART. II, § 2, cl. 2
(Appointments Clause); see Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 499. While the President's removal
power is an important means of ensuring that officers faithfully execute the law, Congress has a
recognized authority to place certain limits on removal. Id. at 493-495.
The President's removal powers are at their zenith with respect to principal officers—that is,
officers who must be appointed by the President and who report to him directly. See Free Enterprise
Fund, 561 U.S. at 493, 500. The President's "exclusive and illimitable power of removal" of those
principal officers furthers "the President's ability to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed." Id.
at 493, 498 (internal quotation marks omitted); Myers, 272 U.S. at 627. Thus, "there are some 'purely
executive' officials who must be removable by the President at will if he is able to accomplish his
constitutional role." Morrison, 487 U.S. at 690; Myers, 272 U.S. at 134 (the President's "cabinet
officers must do his will," and "[t]he moment that he loses confidence in the intelligence, ability,
judgment, or loyalty of any one of them, he must have the power to remove him without delay"); cl
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (Congress has the power to create
independent agencies headed by principal officers removable only for good cause). In light of those
constitutional precedents, it may be that the obstruction statutes could not be constitutionally applied
to limit the removal of a cabinet officer such as the Attorney General. See 5 U.S.C. § 101; 28 U.S.C.
§ 503. In that context, at least absent circumstances showing that the President was clearly attempting
to thwart accountability for personal conduct while evading ordinary political checks and balances,
even the highly limited
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regulation imposed by the obstruction statutes could possibly intrude too deeply on the President's
freedom to select and supervise the members of his cabinet.
The removal of inferior officers, in contrast, need not necessarily be at will for the President
to fulfill his constitutionally assigned role in managing the Executive Branch. "[I]nferior officers are
officers whose work is directed and supervised at some level by other officers appointed by the
President with the Senate's consent." Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 510 (quoting Edmond v.
United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has
long recognized Congress's authority to place for-cause limitations on the President's removal of
"inferior Officers" whose appointment may be vested in the head of a department. U.S. CONST. ART.
II, § 2, cl. 2. See United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886) ("The constitutional authority in
Congress to thus vest the appointment [of inferior officers in the heads of departments] implies
authority to limit, restrict, and regulate the removal by such laws as Congress may enact in relation to
the officers so appointed") (quoting lower court decision); Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689 n. 27 (citing
Perkins); accord id. at 723-724 & n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (recognizing that Perkins is "established"
law); see also Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 493495 (citing Perkins and Morrison). The category
of inferior officers includes both the FBI Director and the Special Counsel, each of whom reports to
the Attorney General. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 515(a), 531; 28 C.F.R. Part 600. Their work is thus
"directed and supervised" by a presidentially-
appointed, Senate-confirmed officer. See In re: Grand Jury Investigation, F.3d , 2019 WL
921692, at *3-*4 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 26, 2019) (holding that the Special Counsel is an "inferior officer"
for constitutional purposes).
Where the Constitution permits Congress to impose a good-cause limitation on the removal
of an Executive Branch officer, the Constitution should equally permit Congress to bar removal for
the corrupt purpose of obstructing justice. Limiting the, range of permissible reasons for removal to
exclude a "corrupt" purpose imposes a lesser restraint on the President than requiring an affirmative
showing of good cause. It follows that for such inferior officers, Congress may constitutionally
restrict the President's removal authority if that authority was exercised for the corrupt purpose of
obstructing justice. And even if a particular inferior officer's position might be of such importance
to the execution of the laws that the President must have at-will removal authority, the obstruction-
of-justice statutes could still be constitutionally applied to forbid removal for a corrupt reason. '°88 A
narrow and discrete limitation on removal that precluded corrupt action would leave ample room for
all other considerations, including disagreement over policy or loss of confidence in the officer's
judgment or commitment. A corrupt-purpose prohibition therefore would not undermine the
President's ability to perform his Article II functions. Accordingly, because the separation-of-powers
question is "whether the removal restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the President's
ability to perform his constitutional duty," Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691, a restriction on removing an
inferior officer for a
1088 Although the FBI director is an inferior officer, he is appointed by the President and removable by
him at will, see 28 U.S.C. § 532 note, and it is not clear that Congress could constitutionally provide the FBI
director with good-cause tenure protection. See OLC, Constitutionality of Legislation Extending the Term of the
FBI Director, 2011 WL 2566125, at *3 (O.L.C. June 20, 2011) ("tenure protection for an officer with the FBI
Director's broad investigative, administrative, and policymaking responsibilities would raise a serious
constitutional question whether Congress had 'impede[d] the President's ability to perform his constitutional
duty' to take care that the laws be faithfully executed") (quoting Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691).
177
corrupt reason—a reason grounded in achieving personal rather than official ends—does not seriously
hinder the President's performance of his duties. The President retains broad latitude to supervise
investigations and remove officials, circumscribed in this context only by the requirement that he not
act for corrupt personal purposes.1089
c. Congress Has Power to Protect Congressional, Grand Jury, and Judicial

Proceedings Against Corrupt Acts from Any Source
Where a law imposes a burden on the President's performance of Article II functions,

separation-of-powers analysis considers whether the statutory measure "is justified by an overriding
need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress." Administrator of General
Services, 433 U.S. at 443. Here, Congress enacted the obstruction-of-justice statutes to protect, among
other things, the integrity of its own proceedings, grand jury investigations, and federal criminal trials.
Those objectives are within Congress's authority and serve strong governmental interests.
i. Congress has Article I authority to define generally applicable criminal law and apply it
to all persons—including the President. Congress clearly has authority to protect its own legislative
functions against corrupt efforts designed to impede legitimate fact-gathering and lawmaking
efforts. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187, 206-207 (1957); Chapman v. United States,
5 App. D.C. 122, 130 (1895). Congress also has authority to establish a system of federal courts,
which includes the power to protect the judiciary against obstructive acts. See U.S. CONST. ART.
I, § 8, cls. 9, 18 ("The Congress shall have Power . . . To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme
Court" and "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing powers"). The long lineage of the obstruction-of-justice statutes, which can be traced to
at least 1831, attests to the necessity for that protection. See An Act Declaratory of the Law
Concerning Contempts of Court, 4 Stat. 487-488 § 2 (1831) (making it a crime if "any person or
persons shall corruptly . . . endeavor to influence, intimidate, or impede any juror, witness, or
officer, in any court of the United States, in the discharge of his duty, or shall, corruptly . . . obstruct,
or impede, or endeavor to obstruct or impede, the due administration of justice therein").
ii. The Article III courts have an equally strong interest in being protected against obstructive
acts, whatever their source. As the Supreme Court explained in United States v. Nixon, a "primary
constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch" is "to do justice in criminal prosecutions." 418 U.S. at 707;
accord Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 384 (2004).
In Nixon, the Court rejected the President's claim of absolute executive privilege because "the
allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably
1089 The obstruction statutes do not disqualify the President from acting in a case simply because he
has a personal interest in it or because his own conduct may be at issue. As the Department of Justice has made
clear, a claim of a conflict of interest, standing alone, cannot deprive the President of the ability to fulfill his
constitutional function. See, e.g., OLC, Application of 28 U.S.C. § 458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal
Judges, 19 O.L.C. Op. at 356 (citing Memorandum for Richard T. Burress, Office of the President, from
Laurence H. Silberman, Deputy Attorney General, Re: Conflict of Interest Problems Arising out of the
President's Nomination of Nelson A. Rockefeller to be Vice President under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution, at 2, 5 (Aug. 28, 1974)).
178
relevant in a criminal trial would cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely
impair the basic function of the courts." 407 U.S. at 712. As Nixon illustrates, the need to safeguard
judicial integrity is a compelling constitutional interest. See id. at 709 (noting that the denial of full
disclosure of the facts surrounding relevant presidential communications threatens "[t]he very
integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system").
iii. Finally, the grand jury cannot achieve its constitutional purpose absent protection from
corrupt acts. Serious federal criminal charges generally reach the Article III courts based on an
indictment issued by a grand jury. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 327 (1940) ("The
Constitution itself makes the grand jury a part of the judicial process."). And the grand jury's function
is enshrined in the Fifth Amendment. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V. ("[n]o person shall be held to
answer" for a serious crime "unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury"). "[T]he whole
theory of [the grand jury's] function is that it belongs to no branch of the institutional government,
serving as a kind of buffer or referee between the Government and the people," United States v.
Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992), "pledged to indict no one because of prejudice and to free no one
because of special favor." Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956). If the grand jury were
not protected against corrupt interference from all persons, its function as an independent charging
body would be thwarted. And an impartial grand jury investigation to determine whether probable
cause exists to indict is vital to the criminal justice process.
The final step in the constitutional balancing process is to assess whether the separation-of-
powers doctrine permits Congress to take action within its constitutional authority notwithstanding
the potential impact on Article II functions. See Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. at 443;
see also Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691-693, 695-696; United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 711-712. In
the case of the obstruction-of-justice statutes, our assessment of the weighing of interests leads us to
conclude that Congress has the authority to impose the limited restrictions contained in those statutes
on the President's official conduct to protect the integrity of important functions of other branches of
government.
A general ban on corrupt action does not unduly intrude on the President's responsibility to
"take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." U.S. CONST. ART II, §§ 3.1090 To the contrary,
the concept of "faithful execution" connotes the use of power in the interest of the publ ic, not in
the office holder's personal interests. See 1 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language
763 (1755) ("faithfully" def. 3: "[w]ith strict adherence to duty and allegiance"). And immunizing
the President from the generally applicable criminal prohibition against corrupt obstruction of
official proceedings would seriously impair Congress's power to enact laws "to promote objectives
within [its] constitutional authority," Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. at 425—i.e.,
protecting the integrity of its own proceedings and the proceedings of Article III courts and grand
juries.
1090 As noted above, the President's selection and removal of principal executive officers may
have a unique constitutional status.
179
Accordingly, based on the analysis above, we were not persuaded by the argument that the
President has blanket constitutional immunity to engage in acts that would corruptly obstruct justice
through the exercise of otherwise-valid Article II powers. 1091
3. Ascertaining Whether the President Violated the Obstruction Statutes Would Not
Chill his Performance of his Article II Duties
Applying the obstruction statutes to the President's official conduct would involve determining
as a factual matter whether he engaged in an obstructive act, whether the act had a nexus to official
proceedings, and whether he was motivated by corrupt intent. But applying those standards to the
President's official conduct should not hinder his ability to perform his Article II duties. Cf. Nixon v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 752-753 & n.32 (taking into account chilling effect on the President in adopting
a constitutional rule of presidential immunity from private civil damages action based on official
duties). Several safeguards would prevent a chilling effect: the existence of settled legal standards, the
presumption of regularity in prosecutorial actions, and the existence of evidentiary limitations on
probing the President's motives. And historical experience confirms that no impermissible chill should
exist.
a. As an initial matter, the term "corruptly" sets a demanding standard. It requires a concrete
showing that a person acted with an intent to obtain an "improper advantage for [him]self or someone
else, inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others." BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY
276 (3d ed. 1969); see United States v. Pasha, 797 F.3d 1122, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Aguilar, 515
U.S. at 616 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). That standard parallels the President's
constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful execution of the laws. And virtually everything that the
President does in the routine conduct of office will have a clear governmental purpose and will not be
contrary to his official duty. Accordingly, the President has no reason to be chilled in those actions
because, in virtually all instances, there will be no credible basis for suspecting a corrupt personal
motive.
That point is illustrated by examples of conduct that would and would not satisfy the stringent
corrupt-motive standard. Direct or indirect action by the President to end a criminal investigation into
his own or his family members' conduct to protect against personal embarrassment or legal liability
would constitute a core example of corruptly motivated conduct. So too would action to halt an
enforcement proceeding that directly and adversely affected the President's financial interests for the
purpose of protecting those interests. In those examples,
1091
A possible remedy through impeachment for abuses of power would not substitute for potential
criminal liability after a President leaves office. Impeachment would remove a President from office, but
would not address the underlying culpability of the conduct or serve the usual purposes of the criminal law.
Indeed, the Impeachment Judgment Clause recognizes that criminal law plays an independent role in
addressing an official's conduct, distinct from the political remedy of impeachment. See U.S. CONST. ART.
I, § 3, cl. 7. Impeachment is also a drastic and rarely invoked remedy, and Congress is not restricted to
relying only on impeachment, rather than making criminal law applicable to a former President, as OLC has
recognized. A Sitting President's Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. at 255
("Recognizing an immunity from prosecution for a sitting President would not preclude such prosecution
once the President's term is over or he is otherwise removed from office by resignation or impeachment.").
180
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official power is being used for the purpose of protecting the President's personal interests. In
contrast, the President's actions to serve political or policy interests would not qualify as corrupt.
The President's role as head of the government necessarily requires him to take into account
political factors in making policy decisions that affect law-enforcement actions and proceedings.
For instance, the President's decision to curtail a law-enforcement investigation to avoid
international friction would not implicate the obstruction-of-justice statutes. The criminal law does
not seek to regulate the consideration of such political or policy factors in the conduct of
government. And when legitimate interests animate the President's conduct, those interests will
almost invariably be readily identifiable based on objective factors. Because the President's conduct
in those instances will obviously fall outside the zone of obstruction law, no chilling concern should
arise.
b. There is also no reason to believe that investigations, let alone prosecutions, would occur
except in highly unusual circumstances when a credible factual basis exists to believe that
obstruction occurred. Prosecutorial action enjoys a presumption of regularity: absent "clear
evidence to the contrary, courts presume that [prosecutors] have properly discharged their official
duties." Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 (quoting United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S.
1, 14-15 (1926)). The presumption of prosecutorial regularity would provide even greater protection
to the President than exists in routine cases given the prominence and sensitivity of any matter
involving the President and the likelihood that such matters will be subject to thorough and careful
review at the most senior levels of the Department of Justice. Under OLC's opinion that a sitting
President is entitled to immunity from indictment, only a successor Administration would be able
to prosecute a former President. But that consideration does not suggest that a President would have
any basis for fearing abusive investigations or prosecutions after leaving office. There are "obvious
political checks" against initiating a baseless investigation or prosecution of a former President. See
Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. at 448 (considering political checks in separation-of-
powers analysis). And the Attorney General holds "the power to conduct the criminal litigation of
the United States Government," United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 694 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 516),
which provides a strong institutional safeguard against politicized investigations or prosecutions.
1092
1092 Similar institutional safeguards protect Department of Justice officers and line prosecutors
against unfounded investigations into prosecutorial acts. Prosecutors are generally barred from participating
in matters implicating their personal interests, see 28 C.F.R. § 45.2, and are instructed not to be influenced
by their "own professional or personal circumstances," Justice Manual § 9-27.260, so prosecutors would
not frequently be in a position to take action that could be perceived as corrupt and personally motivated.
And if such cases arise, criminal investigation would be conducted by responsible officials at the
Department of Justice, who can be presumed to refrain from pursuing an investigation absent a credible
factual basis. Those facts distinguish the criminal context from the common-law rule of prosecutorial
immunity, which protects against the threat of suit by "a defendant [who] often will transform his resentment
at being prosecuted into the ascription of improper and malicious actions." Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 425 (1976). As the Supreme Court has noted, the existence of civil immunity does not justify criminal
immunity. See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974) ("Whatever may be the case with respect to
civil liability generally, . . . we have never held that the performance of the duties of judicial, legislative, or
executive officers, requires or contemplates the immunization of otherwise criminal deprivation of
constitutional rights.") (citations omitted).
181
Atterttey—Werk--Prettetet // May Contain Material Protcctcd Undcr Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
These considerations distinguish the Supreme Court's holding in Nixon v. Fitzgerald that, in
part because inquiries into the President's motives would be "highly intrusive," the President is
absolutely immune from private civil damages actions based on his official conduct. 457 U.S. at
756-757. As Fitzgerald recognized, "there is a lesser public interest in actions for civil damages
than, for example, in criminal prosecutions." Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 754 n.37; see Cheney, 542 U.S.
at 384. And private actions are not subject to the institutional protections of an action under the
supervision of the Attorney General and subject to a presumption of regularity. Armstrong, 517 U.S.
at 464.
c. In the rare cases in which a substantial and credible basis justifies conducting an
investigation of the President, the process of examining his motivations to determine whether he
acted for a corrupt purpose need not have a chilling effect. Ascertaining the President's motivations
would turn on any explanation he provided to justify his actions, the advice he received, the
circumstances surrounding the actions, and the regularity or irregularity of the process he employed
to make decisions. But grand juries and courts would not have automatic access to confidential
presidential communications on those matters; rather, they could be presented in official proceedings
only on a showing of sufficient need. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 712; In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 754,
756-757 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. at 448-449 (former
President can invoke presidential communications privilege, although successor's failure to support
the claim "detracts from [its] weight").
In any event, probing the President's intent in a criminal matter is unquestionably constitutional
in at least one context: the offense of bribery turns on the corrupt intent to receive a thing of value in
return for being influenced in official action. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2). There can be no serious argument
against the President's potential criminal liability for bribery offenses, notwithstanding the need to
ascertain his purpose and intent. See U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 3; ART. II, § 4; see also Application of 28
U.S.C. § 458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 357 n.1 l ("Application
of § 201[to the President] raises no separation of powers issue, let alone a serious one.").
d. Finally, history provides no reason to believe that any asserted chilling effect justifies
exempting the President from the obstruction laws. As a historical matter, Presidents have very seldom
been the subjects of grand jury investigations. And it is rarer still for circumstances to raise even the
possibility of a corrupt personal motive for arguably obstructive action through the President's use of
official power. Accordingly, the President's conduct of office should not be chilled based on
hypothetical concerns about the possible application of a corrupt-motive standard in this context.
* * *
In sum, contrary to the position taken by the President's counsel, we concluded that, in light
of the Supreme Court precedent governing separation-of-powers issues, we had a valid basis for
investigating the conduct at issue in this report. In our view, the application of the obstruction
statutes would not impermissibly burden the President's performance of his Article II function to
supervise prosecutorial conduct or to remove inferior law-enforcement officers. And the protection
of the criminal justice system from corrupt acts by any person—including the President—accords
with the fundamental principle of our government that "[n]o [person] in this
182
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country is so high that he is above the law." United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882); see also Clinton
v. Jones, 520 U.S. at 697; United States v. Nixon, supra.
Mt-erfiey-Wer-k-Pfeektet II May Contain Material Protected Undcr Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
IV. CONCLUSION
Because we determined not to make a traditional prosecutorial judgment, we did not draw
ultimate conclusions about the President's conduct. The evidence we obtained about the President's
actions and intent presents difficult issues that would need to be resolved if we were making a
traditional prosecutorial judgment. At the same time, if we had confidence after a thorough
investigation of the facts that the President clearly did not commit obstruction of justice, we would so
state. Based on the facts and the applicable legal standards, we are unable to reach that judgment.
Accordingly, while this report does not conclude that the President committed a crime, it also does
not exonerate him.
At+eritey4VerlePre4het // May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
Appendix A
Attorney __ Work Product // May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
A4terner WerlePrednet // May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
(Office of fir Prpixtg cAtionteg 6erteral

Nuel!ingtott, 20530
ORDER NO, 3 91 5 - 20 1 7
APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL COUNSEL

TO INVESTIGATE RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE WITH THE
2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND RELATED MATTERS
By virtue of the authority vested in me as Acting Attorney General, including 28 U.S.C.

§§ 509, 510, and 515, in order to discharge my responsibility to provide supervision and
management of the Department of Justice, and to ensure a full and thorough investigation of the
Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election, I hereby order as
follows:
(a) Robert S. Mueller III is appointed to serve as Special Counsel for the United States
Department of Justice,
(b) The Special Counsel is authorized to conduct the investigation confirmed by then-FBI
Director James B. Comey in testimony before the Ilouse Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence on March 20, 2017, including:
(i) any links and/or coordination between the Russian government and individuals
associated with the campaign of President Donald Trump; and
(ii) any matters that arose or may arise directly from the investigation; and
(iii) any other matters within the scope of 28 C.F.R. § 600.4(a).
(c) If the Special Counsel believes it is necessary and appropriate, the Special Counsel is
authorized to prosecute federal crimes arising from the investigation of these matters.
(d) Sections 600,4 through 600.10 of Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations are
applicable to the Special Counsel.
17/2
Date Ro"J. Rose
Acting Att r ney General
A-1
AfEerney-3?/Lerlt-Prefleet II May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
Appendix B
// May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. RrGrini4L.76.(e)
At.teritey4siet4t-Pfedue+ II May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY
The following glossary contains names and brief descriptions of individuals and entities
referenced in the two volumes of this report. It is not intended to be comprehensive and is intended only
to assist a reader in the reading the rest of the report.
Referenced Persons
Agalarov, Aras Russian real-estate developer (owner of the Crocus Group); met Donald Trump
in connection with the Miss Universe pageant and helped arrange the June 9,
2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Natalia Veselnitskaya and Trump
Campaign officials.
Agalarov, Emin Performer, executive vice president of Crocus Group, and son of Aras
Agalarov; helped arrange the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between
Natalia Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign officials.
Former member in the Ukrainian parliament who hired Paul Manafort to
Akhmetov, Rinat conduct work for Ukrainian political party, the Party of Regions.
Akhmetshin, Rinat U.S. lobbyist and associate of Natalia Veselnitskaya who attended the June 9,
2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign
officials.
Aslanov, Head of U.S. department of the Internet Research Agency, which engaged
Dzheykhun (Jay) in an "active measures" social media campaign to interfere in the 2016
U.S. presidential election.
Assange, Julian Founder of WikiLeaks, which in 2016 posted on the internet documents stolen
from entities and individuals affiliated with the Democratic Party.
Aven, Petr Chairman of the board of Alfa-Bank who attempted outreach to the Presidential
Transition Team in connection with anticipated post-election sanctions.
White House chief strategist and senior counselor to President Trump (Jan.
Bannon, Stephen 2017 — Aug. 2017); chief executive of the Trump Campaign.
(Steve)
Director of investor relations at Russian state-owned oil company, Rosneft, and
Baranov, Andrey associate of Carter Page.
Assistant to Jared Kushner.
Berkowitz, Avi
Acting Attorney General (Jan. 2017 — Feb. 2017); Acting Deputy Attorney
Boente, Dana General (Feb. 2017 — Apr. 2017).
Internet Research Agency employee who worked on "active measures"
Bogacheva, Anna social media campaign to interfere in in the 2016 U.S. presidential
election; traveled to the United States under false pretenses in 2014.
Former homeland security advisor to the President who also served as a senior
Bossert, Thomas official on the Presidential Transition Team.
(Tom)
B-1
Atter-Fier-Welk—Pfelliuet II May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
Boyarkin, Viktor Employee of Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska.

Boyd, Charles Chairman of the board of directors at the Center for the National Interest, a
U.S.-based think tank with operations in and connections to Russia.
Boyko, Yuriy Member of the Ukrainian political party Opposition Bloc and member of
the Ukrainian parliament.
Brand, Rachel Associate Attorney General (May 2017 - Feb. 2018).
Browder, William Founder of Hermitage Capital Management who lobbied in favor of the
(Bill) Magnitsky Act, which imposed financial and travel sanctions on Russian
officials.
Bulatov, Alexander Russian intelligence official who associated with Carter Page in 2008.
Burchik, Mikhail Executive director of the Internet Research Agency, which engaged in an
"active measures" social media campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S.
presidential election.
Burck, William Personal attorney to Don McGahn, White House Counsel.

Burnham, James Attorney in the White House Counsel's Office who attended January 2017
meetings between Sally Yates and Donald McGahn.
Burt, Richard Former U.S. ambassador who had done work Alfa-Bank and was a board
member of the Center for the National Interest.
Bystrov, Mikhail General director of the Internet Research Agency, which engaged in an
"active measures" social media campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S.
Calamari, Matt Chief operating officer for the Trump Organization.
Caputo, Michael Trump Campaign advisor.

Chaika, Yuri Prosecutor general of the Russian Federation who also maintained a
relationship with Aras Agalarov.
Christie, Chris Former Governor of New Jersey.
Clapper, James Director of National Intelligence (Aug. 2010 - Jan. 2017).
Clovis, Samuel Jr. Chief policy advisor and national co-chair of the Trump Campaign.
Coats, Dan Director of National Intelligence.
Cobb, Ty Special Counsel to the President (July 2017 - May 2018).
Cohen, Michael Former vice president to the Trump Organization and special counsel to
Donald Trump who spearheaded an effort to build a Trump-branded
property in Moscow. He admitted to lying to Congress about the project.
Comey, James Jr. Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Sept. 4, 2013 - May 9,
2017).
B-2
Conway, Kellyanne Counselor to President Trump and manager of the Trump Campaign.
Corallo, Mark Spokesman for President Trump's personal legal team (June 2017 — July
2017).
Corsi, Jerome Author and political commentator who formerly worked for
WorldNetDail and InfoWars. Harm to
Ongoing Matter
Costello, Robert
Attorney who represented he had a close relationship with Rudolph Giuliani,
Credico, Randolph Radio talk show host who interviewed Julian Assange in 2016
(Randy) Harm to Ongoing Matter
Davis, Richard the President's personal counsel.

(Rick) Jr.
Partner with Pegasus Sustainable Century Merchant Bank, business partner
of Paul Manafort, and co-founder of the Davis Manafort lobbying firm.
Dearborn, Rick
Former White House deputy chief of staff for policy who previously served as
chief of staff to Senator Jeff Sessions.
Dempsey, Michael
Office of Director of National Intelligence official who recalled discussions
with Dan Coats after Coats's meeting with President Trump on March 22, 2017.
Denman, Diana Delegate to 2016 Republican National Convention who proposed a platform
plank amendment that included armed support for Ukraine.
Deripaska, Oleg Russian businessman with ties to Vladimir Putin who hired Paul Manafort
for consulting work between 2005 and 2009.
Attorney in the White House Counsel's Office (Jan. 2017 — June 2018).
Dhillon, Uttam
Head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF); met with Erik Prince in
Dmitriev, Kirill
the Seychelles in January 2017 and, separately, drafted a U.S.-Russia
reconciliation plan with Rick Gerson.
Donaldson, Annie Chief of staff to White House Counsel Donald McGahn (Jan. 2017 — Dec.
2018).
Dvorkovich, Arkady Deputy prime minister of the Russian Federation and chairman of the board of
directors of the New Economic School in Moscow. He met with Carter Page
twice in 2016.
Executive of Genbank in Crimea and associate of Felix Sater.
Dvoskin, Evgeney
Attorney in the White House Counsel's Office and legal counsel for the
Eisenberg, John
National Security Council.
Ex-wife of Dmitry Klokov who emailed Ivanka Trump to introduce Klokov to
Erchova, Lana the Trump Campaign in the fall of 2015.
(a/k/a Lana
Alexander)
B-3
Fabrizio, Anthony Partner at the research and consulting firm Fabrizio, Lee & Associates. He
(Tony) was a pollster for the Trump Campaign and worked with Paul Manafort on
Ukraine-related polling after the election.
Fishbein, Jason Attorney who performed worked for Julian Assange and also sent
WikiLeaks a password for an unlaunched website PutinTrump.org on
September 20, 2016.
Flynn, Michael G. Son of Michael T. Flynn, National Security Advisor (Jan. 20, 2017 — Feb.
(a/k/a Michael 13, 2017).
Flynn Jr.)
Flynn, Michael T. National Security Advisor (Jan. 20, 2017 — Feb. 13, 2017), Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency (July 2012 — Aug. 7, 2014), and Trump
Campaign advisor. He pleaded guilty to lying to the FBI about
communications with Ambassador Sergey Kislyak in December 2016.
Foresman, Robert Investment banker who sought meetings with the Trump Campaign in
(Bob) spring 2016 to discuss Russian foreign policy, and after the election met
with Michael Flynn.
Futerfas, Alan Outside counsel for the Trump Organization and subsequently personal
counsel for Donald Trump Jr.
Garten, Alan General counsel of the Trump Organization.
Gates, Richard Deputy campaign manager for Trump Campaign, Trump Inaugural
(Rick) III Committee deputy chairman, and longtime employee of Paul Manafort. He
pleaded guilty to conspiring to defraud the United States and violate U.S.
laws, as well as making false statements to the FBI.
Gerson, Richard New York hedge fund manager and associate of Jared Kushner. During the
(Rick) transition period, he worked with Kirill Dmitriev on a proposal for
reconciliation between the United States and Russia.
Gistaro, Edward Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Intelligence Integration.
Glassner, Michael Political director of the Trump Campaign who helped introduce George
Papadopoulos to others in the Trump Campaign.
Goldstone, Robert Publicist for Emin Agalarov who contacted Donald Trump Jr. to arrange the
June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Natalia Veselnitskaya and
Trump Campaign officials.
Gordon, Jeffrey National security advisor to the Trump Campaign involved in changes to
(J.D.) the Republican party platform and who communicated with Russian
Ambassador Sergey Kislyak at the Republican National Convention.
Gorkov, Sergey Chairman of Vnesheconombank (VEB), a Russian state-owned bank, who
met with Jared Kushner during the transition period.
Graff, Rhona Senior vice-president and executive assistant to Donald J. Trump at the
Trump Organization.
B-4
HOM Harm to Ongoing Matter
Public relations consultant at FTI Consulting; worked with Davis Manafort

Hawker, Jonathan International LLC on public relations campaign in Ukraine.
Heilbrunn, Jacob Editor of the National Interest, the periodical that officially hosted
candidate Trump's April 2016 foreign policy speech.
Hicks, Hope White House communications director (Aug. 2017 — Mar. 2018) and press
secretary for the Trump Campaign.
Holt, Lester NBC News anchor who interviewed President Trump on May 11, 2017.
Hunt, Jody Chief of staff to Attorney General Jeff Sessions (Feb. 2017 — Oct. 2017).
Ivanov, Igor President of the Russian International Affairs Council and former Russian
foreign minister. Ivan Timofeev told George Papadopoulos that Ivanov
advised on arranging a "Moscow visit" for the Trump Campaign.
Ivanov, Sergei Special representative of Vladimir Putin, former Russian deputy prime
minister, and former FSB deputy director. In January 2016, Michael Cohen
emailed the Kremlin requesting to speak to Ivanov.
Kasowitz, Marc President Trump's personal counsel (May 2017 — July 2017).
Katsyv, Denis Son of Peter Katsyv; owner of Russian company Prevezon Holdings Ltd.
and associate of Natalia Veselnitskaya.
Katsyv, Peter Russian businessman and father of Denis Katsyv.
Kaveladze, Irakli Vice president at Crocus Group and Aras Agalarov's deputy in the United
(Ike) States. He participated in the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower
between Natalia Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign officials.
Kaverzina, Irina Employee of the Internet Research Agency, which engaged in an "active
measures" social media campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S.
Kelly, John White House chief of staff (July 2017 — Jan. 2019).
Khalilzad, Zalmay U.S. special representative to Afghanistan and former U.S. ambassador.
He met with Senator Jeff Sessions during foreign policy dinners put
together through the Center for the National Interest.
Kilimnik, Russian-Ukrainian political consultant and long-time employee of Paul
Konstantin Manafort assessed by the FBI to have ties to Russian intelligence.
Kislyak, Sergey Former Russian ambassador to the United States and current Russian
senator from Mordovia.
Klimentov, Denis Employee of the New Economic School who informed high-ranking
Russian government officials of Carter Page's July 2016 visit to Moscow.
B-5
Brother of Denis Klimentov who contacted Kremlin press secretary Dmitri

Klimentov, Dmitri Peskov about Carter Page's July 2016 visit to Moscow.
Klokov, Dmitry Executive for PJSC Federal Grid Company of Unified Energy System and
former aide to Russia's minister of energy. He communicated with
Michael Cohen about a possible meeting between Vladimir Putin and
candidate Trump.
Kobyakov, Anton Advisor to Vladimir Putin and member of the Roscongress Foundation
who invited candidate Trump to the St. Petersburg International Economic
Forum.
Krickovic, Andrej Professor at the Higher School of Economics who recommended that Carter
Page give a July 2016 commencement address in Moscow.
Krylova, Internet Research Agency employee who worked on "active measures" social
Aleksandra media campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election; traveled to
the United States under false pretenses in 2014.
Kushner, Jared President Trump's son-in-law and senior advisor to the President.
Kuznetsov, Sergey Russian government official at the Russian Embassy to the United States
who transmitted Vladimir Putin's congratulations to President-Elect Trump
for his electoral victory on November 9, 2016.
Advisor to Senator Jeff Sessions who attended the September 2016 meeting
Landrum, Pete between Sessions and Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak.
Lavrov, Sergey Russian minister of foreign affairs and former permanent representative of
Russia to the United Nations.
Ledeen, Barbara Senate staffer and associate of Michael Flynn who sought to obtain
Hillary Clinton emails during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign
period.
Member of the Presidential Transition Team who advised on foreign policy and
Ledeen, Michael national security matters.
Ledgett, Richard Deputy director of the National Security Agency (Jan. 2014 — Apr. 2017);
present when President Trump called Michael Rogers on March 26, 2017.
Lewandowski, Campaign manager for the Trump Campaign (Jan. 2015 — June 2016).
Corey
Legislative director for Senator Jeff Sessions; attended a September 2016
Luff, Sandra
meeting between Sessions and Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak.
Lyovochkin, Serhiy Member of Ukrainian parliament and member of Ukrainian political party,
Opposition Bloc Party.
Magnitsky, Sergei Russian tax specialist who alleged Russian government corruption and died in
Russian police custody in 2009. His death prompted passage of
B-6
Attertit-Wefk-Pfe4u-et II May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
the Magnitsky Act, which imposed financial and travel sanctions on

Russian officials.
Malloch, Theodore Chief executive officer of Global Fiduciary Governance and the Roosevelt
(Ted) Group. He was a London-based associate of Jerome Corsi.
Trump campaign member (March 2016 - Aug. 2016) and chairman and
Manafort, Paul Jr.
chief strategist (May 2016 - Aug. 2016).
Mashburn, John Trump administration official and former policy director to the Trump
Campaign.
McCabe, Andrew Acting director of the FBI (May 2017 - Aug. 2017); deputy director of the
FBI (Feb. 2016 - Jan. 2018).
McCord, Mary Acting Assistant Attorney General (Oct. 2016 - May 2017).
McFarland, Deputy White House National Security Advisor (Jan. 2017 - May 2017).
Kathleen (K.T.)
McGahn, Donald White House Counsel (Jan. 2017 - Oct. 2018).
(Don)
Medvedev, Dmitry Prime Minister of Russia.
Melnik, Yuriy Spokesperson for the Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C., who
connected with George Papadopoulos on social media.
Mifsud, Joseph Maltese national and former London-based professor who, immediately
after returning from Moscow in April 2016, told George Papadopoulos that
the Russians had "dirt" in the form of thousands of Clinton emails.
Miller, Matt Trump Campaign staff member who was present at the meeting of the
National Security and Defense Platform Subcommittee in July 2016.
Miller, Stephen Senior advisor to the President.
Millian, Sergei Founder of the Russian American Chamber of Commerce who met with
George Papadopoulos during the campaign.
Mnuchin, Steven Secretary of the Treasury.
Miiller-Maguhn, Member of hacker association Chaos Computer Club and associate of Julian
Andrew Assange, founder of WikiLeaks.
Nader, George Advisor to the United Arab Emirates's Crown Prince who arranged a
meeting between Kirill Dmitriev and Erik Prince during the transition
period.
Netyksho, Viktor Russian military officer in command of a unit involved in Russian hack-
and-release operations to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
B-7
Atteffiey-Wefk—PFe4tiet // May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
Oganov, Georgiy Advisor to Oleg Deripaska and a board member of investment company Basic
Element. He met with Paul Manafort in Spain in early 2017.
Oknyansky, Henry Florida-based Russian individual who claimed to have derogatory
(a/k/a Henry information pertaining to Hillary Clinton. He met with Roger Stone in
Greenberg) May 2016.
Page, Carter Foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign who advocated pro-Russian
views and made July 2016 and December 2016 visits to Moscow.
Papadopoulos, Foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign who received information
George from Joseph Mifsud that Russians had "dirt" in the form of thousands of
Clinton emails. He pleaded guilty to lying to the FBI about his contact with
Mifsud.
Parscale, Bradley Digital media director for the 2016 Trump Campaign.
Patten, William Lobbyist and business partner of Konstantin Kilimnik.
(Sam) Jr.
Deputy chief of staff of and press secretary for the Russian presidential
Peskov, Dmitry
administration.
Phares, Walid Foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign and co-secretary general of the
Transatlantic Parliamentary Group on Counterterrorism (TAG).
Pinedo, Richard U.S. person who pleaded guilty to a single-count information of identity
fraud.
Podesta, John Jr. Clinton campaign chairman whose email account was hacked by the GRU.
WikiLeaks released his stolen emails during the 2016 campaign.
Podobnyy, Victor Russian intelligence officer who interacted with Carter Page while operating
inside the United States; later charged in 2015 with conspiring to act as an
unregistered agent of Russia.
Personal assistant to Dmitry Peskov who responded to Michael Cohen's
Poliakova, Elena outreach about the Trump Tower Moscow project in January 2016.
Polonskaya, Olga Russian national introduced to George Papadopoulos by Joseph Mifsud as an

individual with connections to Vladimir Putin.
Pompeo, Michael U.S. Secretary of State; director of the Central Intelligence Agency (Jan. 2017
— Apr. 2018).
Porter, Robert White House staff secretary (Jan. 2017 — Feb. 2018).
Priebus, Reince White House chief of staff (Jan. 2017 — July 2017); chair of the Republican
National Committee (Jan. 2011 — Jan. 2017).
Prigozhin, Yevgeniy Head of Russian companies Concord Catering and Concord Management
and Consulting; supported and financed the Internet Research Agency,
which engaged in an "active measures" social media campaign to interfere
in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
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Attorney_________________Work Product // May___________ Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P.
6(c)
Prikhodko, Sergei
First deputy head of the Russian Government Office and former Russian
deputy prime minister. In January 2016, he invited candidate Trump to the
St. Petersburg International Economic Forum.
Prince, Erik
Businessman and Trump Campaign supporter who met with Presidential
Transition Team officials after the election and traveled to the Seychelles to
meet with Kirill Dmitriev in January 2017.
Raffel, Josh
White House communications advisor (Apr. 2017 — Feb. 2018).
Rasin, Alexei
Ukrainian associate of Henry Oknyansky who claimed to possess
derogatory information regarding Hillary Clinton.
Rogers, Michael
Director of the National Security Agency (Apr. 2014 — May 2018).
Rosenstein, Rod
Deputy Attorney General (Apr. 2017 — present); Acting Attorney General
for the Russian election interference investigation (May 2017 — Nov.
2018).
Rozov, Andrei
Chairman of I.C. Expert Investment Company, a Russian real-estate
development corporation that signed a letter of intent for the Trump Tower
Moscow project in 2015.
Rtskhiladze, Giorgi
Executive of the Silk Road Transatlantic Alliance, LLC who communicated
with Cohen about a Trump Tower Moscow proposal.
Ruddy, Christopher
Chief executive of Newsmax Media and associate of President Trump.
Rybicki, James
FBI chief of staff (May 2015 — Feb. 2018).
Samochornov,
Anatoli Translator who worked with Natalia Veselnitskaya and attended a June 9,
2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Veselnitskaya and Trump
Campaign officials.
Sanders, Sarah
Huckabee White House press secretary (July 2017 — present).
Sater, Felix
Real-estate advisor who worked with Michael Cohen to pursue a Trump
Saunders, Paul J. Tower Moscow project.
Executive with the Center for the National Interest who worked on outlines
and logistics of candidate Trump's April 2016 foreign policy speech.
Sechin, Igor Executive chairman of Rosneft, a Russian-stated owned oil company.
Sessions, Jefferson Attorney General (Feb. 2017 — Nov. 2018); U.S. Senator (Jan. 1997 —
III (Jeff) Feb. 2017); head of the Trump Campaign's foreign policy advisory team.
Shoygu, Sergey Russian Minister of Defense.
Simes, Dimitri President and chief executive officer of the Center for the National Interest.
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Smith, Peter Investment banker active in Republican politics who sought to obtain
Hillary Clinton emails during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign period.
White House press secretary and communications director (Jan. 2017 —
Spicer, Sean July 2017).
Stone, Roger
Tillerson, Rex Advisor to the Trump Campaign Harm to Ongoing Matter

Timofeev, Ivan
U.S. Secretary of State (Feb. 2017 — Mar. 2018).

Trump, Donald Jr. Director of programs at the Russian International Affairs Council and
program director of the Valdai Discussion Club who communicated in 2016
with George Papadopoulos, attempting to arrange a meeting between the
Russian government and the Trump Campaign.
President Trump's son; trustee and executive vice president of the Trump
Trump, Eric Organization; helped arrange and attended the June 9, 2016 meeting at
Trump Tower between Natalia Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign
Trump, Ivanka
officials.
President Trump's son; trustee and executive vice president of the Trump
Ushakov, Yuri Organization.
Viktorovich
President Trump's daughter; advisor to the President and former executive
vice president of the Trump Organization.
Vaino, Anton
Aide to Vladimir Putin and former Russian ambassador to the United States;
Van der Zwaan, identified to the Presidential Transition Team as the proposed channel to the
Alexander Russian government.
Vargas, Catherine
Chief of staff to Russian president Vladimir Putin.
Vasilchenko, Gleb
Former attorney at Slcadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP; worked
with Paul Manafort and Rick Gates.
Executive assistant to Jared Kushner.
Veselnitskaya,
Natalia Internet Research Agency employee who engaged in an "active measures"
social media campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
Weber, Shlomo Russian attorney who advocated for the repeal of the Magnitsky Act and
was the principal speaker at the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower with
Yanukovych, Viktor Trump Campaign officials.
Rector of the New Economic School (NES) in Moscow who invited Carter
Page to speak at NES commencement in July 2016.
Former president of Ukraine who had worked with Paul Manafort.
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Acting Attorney General (Jan. 20, 2017 — Jan. 30, 2017); Deputy
Yates, Sally Attorney General (Jan. 10, 2015 — Jan. 30, 2017).
Yatsenko, Sergey Deputy chief financial officer of Gazprom, a Russian state-owned energy
company, and associate of Carter Page.
Zakharova, Maria Director of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affair's Information and
Press Department who received notification of Carter Page's speech in
July 2016 from Denis Klimentov.
Zayed al Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and deputy supreme commander of the
Mohammed bin United Arab Emirates (UAE) armed forces.
Entities and Organizations
Alfa-Bank Russia's largest commercial bank, which is headed by Petr Aven.

Center for the National U.S.-based think tank with expertise in and connections to Russia.
Interest (CNI) CNI's publication, the National Interest, hosted candidate Trump's
foreign policy speech in April 2016.
Concord Umbrella term for Concord Management and Consulting, LLC and
Concord Catering, which are Russian companies controlled by
Yevgeniy Prigozhin.
Crocus Group or A Russian real-estate and property development company that, in
Crocus International 2013, hosted the Miss Universe Pageant, and from 2013 through 2014,
worked with the Trump Organization on a Trump Moscow project.
DCLeaks Fictitious online persona operated by the GRU that released stolen
documents during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign period.
Democratic Political committee working to elect Democrats to the House of
Congressional Representatives; hacked by the GRU in April 2016.
Campaign Committee
Democratic National Formal governing body for the Democratic Party; hacked by the GRU
Committee in April 2016.
Duma Lower House of the national legislature of the Russian Federation.
Gazprom Russian oil and gas company majority-owned by the Russian
government.
Global Energy Capital, Investment and management firm founded by Carter Page.
LLC
Global Partners in Event hosted in partnership with the U.S. Department of State and the
Diplomacy Republican National Convention. In 2016, Jeff Sessions and J.D.
Gordon delivered speeches at the event and interacted with Russian
Ambassador Sergey Kislyak.
B-11
Guccifer 2.0 Fictitious online persona operated by the GRU that released stolen
documents during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign period.
I.C. Expert Investment Russian real-estate and development corporation that signed a letter of intent
Company with a Trump Organization subsidiary to develop a Trump Moscow
property.
Internet Research Russian entity based in Saint Petersburg and funded by Concord that
Agency (IRA) engaged in an "active measures" social media campaign to interfere in the
2016 U.S. presidential election.
KLS Research LLC Business established by an associate of and at the direction of Peter Smith
to further Smith's search for Hillary Clinton emails.
Kremlin Official residence of the president of the Russian Federation; it is used
colloquially to refer to the office of the president or the Russian government.
Company that includes Petr Aven and Richard Burt as board members.
LetterOne During a board meeting in December 2016, Aven asked for Burt's help to
make contact with the Presidential Transition Team.
University in Rome, Italy, where George Papadopoulos was introduced
Link Campus to Joseph Mifsud.
University International law advisory organization in London that employed Joseph
London Centre of Mifsud and George Papadopoulos.
International Law
Practice (LCILP) Russian Federation's military intelligence agency.
Main Intelligence
Directorate of the
General Staff (GRU) Moscow-based school that invited Carter Page to speak at its July 2016
New Economic School in commencement ceremony.
Moscow (NES) Ukrainian political party that incorporated members of the defunct Party of
Opposition Bloc Regions.
Ukrainian political party of former President Yanukovych. It was generally
Party of Regions understood to align with Russian policies.
Company registered in the Cayman Islands by Paul Manafort and his
Pericles Emerging business partner Rick Davis. Oleg Deripaska invested in the fund.
Market Partners LLP Russian company that was a defendant in a U.S. civil action alleging the
Prevezon Holdings Ltd. laundering of proceeds from fraud exposed by Sergei Magnitsky.
Russian entity that organized the St. Petersburg International Economic
Roscongress Forum.
Foundation Russian state-owned oil and energy company.
Rosneft Sovereign wealth fund established by the Russian Government in 2011 and
Russian Direct headed by Kirill Dmitriev.
Investment Fund
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Russian International Russia-based nonprofit established by Russian government decree. It is

Affairs Council associated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and its members include
Ivan Timofeev, Dmitry Peskov, and Petr Aven.
Silk Road Group Privately held investment company that entered into a licensing agreement
to build a Trump-branded hotel in Georgia.
St. Petersburg Annual event held in Russia and attended by prominent Russian politicians
International Economic and businessmen.
Forum
Tatneft Russian energy company.
Transatlantic European group that sponsored a summit between European Parliament
Parliamentary Group on lawmakers and U.S. persons. George Papadopoulos, Sam Clovis, and
Counterterrorism Walid Phares attended the TAG summit in July 2016.
Unit 26165 (GRU) GRU military cyber unit dedicated to targeting military, political,
governmental, and non-governmental organizations outside of Russia. It
engaged in computer intrusions of U.S. persons and organizations, as well
as the subsequent release of the stolen data, in order to interfere in the 2016
U.S. presidential election.
Unit 74455 (GRU) GRU military unit with multiple departments that engaged in cyber
operations. It engaged in computer intrusions of U.S. persons and
organizations, as well as the subsequent release of the stolen data, in order
to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
Valdai Discussion Club Group that holds a conference attended by Russian government officials,
including President Putin.
WikiLeaks Organization founded by Julian Assange that posts information online,
including data stolen from private, corporate, and U.S. Government entities.
Released data stolen by the GRU during the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
B-13
Index of Acronyms
CNI Center for the National Interest

DCCC Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee
DNC Democratic National Committee
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FSB Russian Federal Security Service
GEC Global Energy Capital, LLC
GRU Russian Federation's Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff
HPSCI U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
HRC Hillary Rodham Clinton
IRA Internet Research Agency
LCILP London Centre of International Law Practice
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NES New Economic School
NSA National Security Agency
ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence
PTT Presidential Transition Team
RDIF Russian Direct Investment Fund
RIAC Russian International Affairs Council
SBOE State boards of elections
SCO Special Counsel's Office
SJC U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee
SSCI U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
TAG Transatlantic Parliamentary Group on Counterterrorism
VEB Vnesheconombank
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Appendix C
Atterner Werit-Predttet // May Contain Matcrial Protcctcd Undcr Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
1 1 1
Atteftiey- 1 1 -014C-Preduet // May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
APPENDIX C
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
The President provided written responses through his personal counsel to questions submitted
to him by the Special Counsel's Office. We first explain the process that led to the submission of
written questions and then attach the President's responses.
Beginning in December 2017, this Office sought for more than a year to interview the
President on topics relevant to both Russian-election interference and obstruction-of-justice. We
advised counsel that the President was a "subject" of the investigation under the definition of the
Justice Manual—"a person whose conduct is within the scope of the grand jury's investigation." Justice
Manual § 9-11.151 (2018). We also advised counsel that "[a]n interview with the President is vital to
our investigation" and that this Office had "carefully considered the constitutional and other arguments
raised by . . . counsel, and they d[id] not provide us with reason to forgo seeking an interview."1 We
additionally stated that "it is in the interest of the Presidency and the public for an interview to take
place" and offered "numerous accommodations to aid the President's preparation and avoid surprise."2
After extensive discussions with the Department of Justice about the Special Counsel's objective of
securing the President's testimony, these accommodations included the submissions of written
questions to the President on certain Russia-related topics.3
We received the President's written responses in late November 2018.4 In December 2018, we
informed counsel of the insufficiency of those responses in several respects. 5 We noted, among other
things, that the President stated on more than 30 occasions that he "does not 'recall' or `remember' or
have an 'independent recollection' of information called for by the questions. 6 Other answers were
"incomplete or imprecise."7 The written responses, we informed counsel, "demonstrate the inadequacy
of the written format, as we have had no opportunity to ask follow-up questions that would ensure
complete answers and potentially refresh your client's recollection or clarify the extent or nature of his
lack of recollection."8 We again requested an in-person interview, limited to certain topics, advising
the President's counsel that "[t]his is the President's
1 5/16/18 Letter, Special Counsel to the President's Personal Counsel, at 1.

2 5/16/18 Letter, Special Counsels's Office to the President's Personal Counsel, at 1; see 7/30/18
Letter, Special Counsel's Office to the President's Personal Counsel, at 1 (describing accommodations).
3
9/17/18 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to the President's Personal Counsel, at 1 (submitting
written questions).
4
11/20/18 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to the Special Counsel's Office (transmitting
written responses of Donald J. Trump).
5 12/3/18 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to the President's Personal Counsel, at 3.
12/3/18 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to the President's Personal Counsel, at 3; see (noting,
"for example," that the President "did not answer whether he had at any time directed or suggested that
discussions about the Trump Moscow Project should cease . . . but he has since made public comments
about that topic").
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opportunity to voluntarily provide us with information for us to evaluate in the context of all of the
evidence we have gathered."9 The President declined.10
1, I 1H
Recognizing that the President would not be interviewed voluntarily, we considered whether
to issue a subpoena for his testimony. We viewed the written answers to be inadequate. But at that
point, our investigation had made significant progress and had produced substantial evidence for our
report. We thus weighed the costs of potentially lengthy constitutional litigation, with resulting delay
in finishing our investigation, against the anticipated benefits for our investigation and report. As
explained in Volume II, Section II.B., we determined that the substantial quantity of information we
had obtained from other sources allowed us to draw relevant factual conclusions on intent and
credibility, which are often inferred from circumstantial evidence and assessed without direct
testimony from the subject of the investigation.
9 12/3/18 Letter, Special Counsel to the President's Personal Counsel.

10 12/12/18 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to the Special Counsel's Office, at 2.
12
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WRITTEN QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED UNDER OATH BY PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP
I June 9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower
a. When did you first learn that Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner
was considering participating in a meeting in June 2016 concerning potentially
negative information about Hillary Clinton? Describe who you learned t he
information from and the substance of the discussion.
b. Attached to this document as Exhibit A is a series of emails from June 2016 between,
among others, Donald Trump, Jr. and Rob Goldstone. In addition to the emails
reflected in Exhibit A, Donald Tru mp, Jr. had other communications with Rob
Goldstone and Emin Agalarov between June 3, 2016, and June 9, 2016.
i. Did Mr. Trump, Jr. or anyone else tell you about or show you any of these
communications? If yes, describe who discussed the communications with
you, when, and the substance of the discussion(s).
ii. When did you first see or learn about all or any part of the emails reflected in Exhibit
A?
iii. When did you first learn that the proposed meeting involved or was
described as being part of Russia and its government's support for your
candidacy?
iv. Did you suggest to or direct anyone not to discuss or release publicly all or
any portion of the emails reflected in Exhibit A? If yes, describe who you
communicated with, when, the substance of the communication(s) , and why
you took that action.
c. On June 9, 2016, Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, and Jared Kushner attended a
meeting at Trump Tower with several individuals, including a Russian lawyer,
Natalia Veselnitskaya (the "June 9 meeting").
i. Other than as set forth in your answers to I.a and I.b, what, if anything,
were you told about the possibility of this meeting taking place, or the
scheduling of such a meeting? Describe who you discussed this with, when,
and what you were informed about the meeting.
ii. When did you learn that some of the individuals attending the June 9 meeting
were Russian or had any affiliation with any part of the Russian government?
Describe who you learned this information from and the substance of the
discussion(s).
iii. What were you told about what was discussed at the June 9 meeting?
Describe each conversation in which you were told about what was
discussed at the meeting, who the conversation was with, when it occurred,
and the substance of the statements they made about the meeting.
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iv. Were you told that the June 9 meeting was about, in whole or in part,
adoption and/or the Magnitsky Act? If yes, describe who you had that
discussion with, when, and the substance of the discussion.
d. For the period June 6, 2016 through June 9, 2016, for what portion of each day were you in
Trump Tower?
i. Did you speak or meet with Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared
Kushner on June 9, 2016? If yes, did any portion of any of those
conversations or meetings include any reference to any aspect of the June
9 meeting? If yes, describe who you spoke with and the substance of the
conversation.
e. Did you communicate directly or indirectly with any member or representative of the
Agalarov family after June 3, 2016? If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, and
the substance of the communication.
f. Did you learn of any communications between Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or
Jared Kushner and any member or representative of the Agalarov family, Natalia
Veselnitskaya, Rob Goldstone, o r any Russian official or contact that took place
after June 9, 2016 and concerned the June 9 meeting or efforts by Russia to assist
the campaign? If yes, describe who you learned this information from, when, and
the substance of what you learned.
g. On June 7, 2016, you gave a speech in which you said, in part, "I am going to give a
major speech on probably Monday of next week and we're going to be discussing all
of the things that have taken place with the Clintons."
i. Why did you make that statement?
ii. What information did you plan to share with respect to the Clintons?
iii. What did you believe the source(s) of that information would be?
iv. Did you expect any of the information to have come from the June 9
meeting?
v. Did anyone help draft the speech that you were referring to? If so, who?
vi. Why did you ultimately not give the speech you referenced on June 7,
2016?
h. Did any person or entity inform you during the campaign that Vladimir Putin or the
Russian government supported your candidacy or opposed the candidacy of Hillary
Clinton? If yes, describe the source(s) of the information, when you were informed,
and the content of such discussion(s).
i. Did any person or entity inform you during the campaign that any foreign government
or foreign leader, other than Russia or Vladimir Putin, had provided, wished to
provide, or offered to provide tangible support to your campaign, including by way
of offering to provide negative information on Hillary Clinton? If
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Attorney _ Work Product // May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
yes, describe the source(s) of the information, when you were informed, and the content of
such discussion(s).
II. Russian Hacking / Russian Efforts Using Social Media / WikiLeaks
a. On June 14, 2016, it was publicly reported that computer hackers had penetrated the
computer network of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and that Russian
intelligence was behind the unauthorized access, or hack. Prior to June 14, 2016,
were you provided any information about any potential or actual hacking of the
computer systems or email accounts of the DNC, the Democratic Congressional
Campaign Committee (DCCC), the Clinton Campaign, Hillary Clinton, or individuals
associated with the Clinton campaign? If yes, describe who provided this
information, when, and the substance of the information.
b. On July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks released nearly 20,000 emails sent or received by Democratic party
officials.
i. Prior to the July 22, 2016 release, were you aware from any source that
WikiLeaks, Guccifer 2.0, DCLeaks, or Russians had or potentially had
possession of or planned to release emails or information that could h elp
your campaign or hurt the Clinton campaign? If yes, describe who you
discussed this issue with, when, and the substance of the discussion(s).
ii. After the release of emails by WikiLeaks on July 22, 2016, were you told that
WikiLeaks possessed or might possess additional information that could be
released during the campaign? If yes, describe who provided this
information, when, and what you were told.
c. Are you aware of any communications during the campaign, directly or indirectly,
between Roger Stone, Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Rick Gates and (a)
WikiLeaks, (b) Julian Assange, (c) other representatives of WikiLeaks, (d) Guccifer
2.0, (e) representatives of Guccifer 2.0, or (f) representatives of DCLeaks? If yes,
describe who provided you with this information, when you learned of the
communications, and what you know about those communications.
d. On July 27, 2016, you stated at a press conference: "Russia, if you're listening, I
hope you're able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing. I thi nk you will
probably be rewarded mightily by our press."
i. Why did you make that request of Russia, as opposed to any other country, entity, or
individual?
ii. In advance of making that statement, what discussions, if any, did you have with
anyone else about the substance of the statement?
iii. Were you told at any time before or after you made that statement that
Russia was attempting to infiltrate or hack computer systems or email
accounts of Hillary Clinton or her campaign? If yes, describe who provided
this information, when, and what you were told.
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// May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
e. On October 7, 2016, emails hacked from the account of John Podesta were released by WikiLeaks.
i. Where were you on October 7, 2016?
ii. Were you told at any time in advance of, or on the day of, the October 7
release that WikiLeaks possessed or might possess emails related to John
Podesta? If yes, describe who told you this, when, and what you were told.
iii. Are you aware of anyone associated with you or your campaign, including
Roger Stone, reaching out to WikiLeaks, either directly or through an
intermediary, on or about October 7, 2016? If yes, identify the person and
describe the substance of the conversations or contacts.
f. Were you told of anyone associated with you or your campaign, including Roger
Stone, having any discussions, directly or indirectly, with WikiLeaks, Guccifer 2.0,
or DCLeaks regarding the content or timing of release of hacked emails? If yes,
describe who had such contacts, how you bec ame aware of the contacts, when you
became aware of the contacts, and the substance of the contacts.
g. From June 1, 2016 through the end of the campaign, how frequently did you
communicate with Roger Stone? Describe the nature of your communication(s) wit h
Mr. Stone.
i. During that time period, what efforts did Mr. Stone tell you he was making
to assist your campaign, and what requests, if any, did you make of Mr.
Stone?
ii. Did Mr. Stone ever discuss WikiLeaks with you or, as far as you were aware,
with anyone else associated with the campaign? If yes, describe what you were
told, from whom, and when.
iii. Did Mr. Stone at any time inform you about contacts he had with WikiLeaks
or any intermediary of WikiLeaks, or about forthcoming releases of
information? If yes, describe what Stone told you and when.
h. Did you have any discussions prior to January 20, 2017, regarding a potential pardon
or other action to benefit Julian Assange? If yes, describe who you had the
discussion(s) with, when, and the content of the discussion(s).
i. Were you aware of any efforts by foreign individuals or companies, including those
in Russia, to assist your campaign through the use of social media postings or the
organization of rallies? If yes, identify who you discussed such assista nce with,
when, and the content of the discussion(s).
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The Trump Organization Moscow Project
a. In October 2015, a "Letter of Intent," a copy of which is attached as Exhibit B,

was signed for a proposed Trump Organization project in Moscow (the "Trump
Moscow project").
i. When were you first informed of discussions about the Trump Moscow
project? By whom? What were you told about the project?
ii. Did you sign the letter of intent?
b. In a statement provided to Congress, attached as Exhibit C, Michael Cohen stated:

"To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Trump was never in contact with anyone about
this proposal other than me on three occasio ns, including signing a non-binding
letter of intent in 2015." Describe all discussions you had with Mr. Cohen, or anyone
else associated with the Trump Organization, about the Trump Moscow project,
including who you spoke with, when, and the substance of the discussion(s).
c. Did you learn of any communications between Michael Cohen or Felix Sater and any
Russian government officials, including officials in the office of Dmitry Peskov,
regarding the Trump Moscow project? If so, identify who provided this i nformation
to you, when, and the substance of what you learned.
d. Did you have any discussions between June 2015 and June 2016 regarding a potential
trip to Russia by you and/or Michael Cohen for reasons related to the Trump Moscow
project? If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, and the substance of the
discussion(s).
e. Did you at any time direct or suggest that discussions about the Trump Moscow
project should cease, or were you informed at any time that the project had been
abandoned? If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, the substance of the
discussion(s), and why that decision was made.
f. Did you have any discussions regarding what information would be provided publicly
or in response to investigative inquiries about potential or actual inves tments or
business deals the Trump Organization had in Russia, including the Trump Moscow
project? If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, and the substance of the
discussion(s).
g. Aside from the Trump Moscow project, did you or the Trump Organization have any
other prospective or actual business interests, investments, or arrangements with
Russia or any Russian interest or Russian individual during the campaign? If yes,
describe the business interests, investments, or arrangements.
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Attorney Work Product /1 May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
IV. Contacts with Russia and Russia-Related Issues During the Campaign
a. Prior to mid-August 2016, did you become aware that Paul Manafort had ties to the
Ukrainian government? If yes, describe who you learned this information from,
when, and the substance of what you were told. Did Mr. Manafort's connections to
the Ukrainian or Russian governments play any role in your decision to have him
join your campaign? If yes, describe that role.
b. Were you aware that Paul Manafort offered briefings on the progress of your
campaign to Oleg Deripaska? If yes, describe who you learned this informatio n
from, when, the substance of what you were told, what you understood the
purpose was of sharing such information with Mr. Deripaska, and how you
responded to learning this information.
c. Were you aware of whether Paul Manafort or anyone else associated with your
campaign sent or directed others to send internal Trump campaign information to
any person located in Ukraine or Russia or associated with the Ukrainian or Russian
governments? If yes, identify who provided you with this information, when, the
substance of the discussion(s), what you understood the purpose was of sharing
the internal campaign information, and how you responded to learning this
information.
d. Did Paul Manafort communicate to you, directly or indirectly, any positions

Ukraine or Russi a would want the U.S. to support? If yes, describe when he
communicated those positions to you and the substance of those
communications.
e. During the campaign, were you told about efforts by Russian officials to meet with
you or senior members of your campaign? If yes, describe who you had
conversations with on this topic, when, and what you were told.
f. What role, if any, did you have in changing the Republican Party platform
regarding arming Ukraine during the Republican National Convention? Prior to th e
convention, what information did you have about this platform provision? After
the platform provision was changed, who told you about the change, when did
they tell you, what were you told about why it was changed, and who was
involved?
g. On July 27, 2016, in response to a question about whether you would recognize
Crimea as Russian territory and lift sanctions on Russia, you said: "We'll be looking
at that. Yeah, we'll be looking." Did you intend to communicate by that statement or
at any other time during the campaign a willingness to lift sanctions and/or recognize
Russia's annexation of Crimea if you were elected?
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What consideration did you give to lifting sanctions and/or recognizing

Russia's annexation of Crimea if you were elected? Desc ribe who you spoke
with about this topic, when, the substance of the discussion(s).
V. Contacts with Russia and Russia-Related Issues During the Transition
a. Were you asked to attend the World Chess Championship gala on November 10,
2016? If yes, who asked you to attend, when were you asked, and what were you
told about about why your presence was requested?
i. Did you attend any part of the event? If yes, describe any interactions you
had with any Russians or representatives of the Russian government at the
event.
b. Following the Obama Administration's imposition of sanctions on Russia in December

2016 ("Russia sanctions"), did you discuss with Lieutenant General (LTG) Michael
Flynn, K.T. McFarland, Steve Bannon, Reince Priebus, Jared Kushner, Erik Pr ince,
or anyone else associated with the transition what should be communicated to the
Russian government regarding the sanctions? If yes, describe who you spoke with
about this issue, when, and the substance of the discussion(s).
c. On December 29 and December 31, 2016, LTG Flynn had conversations with Russian
Ambassador Sergey Kislyak about the Russia sanctions and Russia's response to
the Russia sanctions.
i Did you direct or suggest that LTG Flynn have discussions with anyone from the Russian
government about the Russia sanctions?
ii. Were you told in advance of LTG Flynn's December 29, 2016 conversation
that he was going to be speaking with Ambassador Kislyak? If yes, describe
who told you this information, when, and what you were told. If no, when
and from whom did you learn of LTG Flynn's December 29, 2016 conversation
with Ambassador Kislyak?
iii. When did you learn of LTG Flynn and Ambassador Kislyak's call on
December 31, 2016? Who told you and what were you told?
iv. When did you learn that sanctions were discussed in the December 29 and
December 31, 2016 calls between LTG Flynn and Ambassador Kislyak? Who
told you and what were you told?
d. At any time between December 31, 2016, and January 20, 2017, did anyone tell you
or suggest to you that Russia's deci sion not to impose reciprocal sanctions was
attributable in any way to LTG Flynn's communications with Ambassador Kislyak?
If yes, identify who provided you with this information, when, and the substance
of what you were told.
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e. On January 12, 2017, the Washington Post published a column that stated that LTG
Flynn phoned Ambassador Kislyak several times on December 29, 2016. After
learning of the column, did you direct or suggest to anyone that LTG Flynn should
deny that he discussed sanctions with Ambassador Kislyak? If yes, who did you
make this suggestion or direction to, when, what did you say, and why did you take
this step?
i. After learning of the column, did you have any conversations with LTG Flynn
about his conversations with Ambassador Kislyak in December 2016? If yes,
describe when those discussions occurred and the content of the discussions.
f. Were you told about a meeting between Jared Kushner and Sergei Gorkov that took place in
December 2016?
i. If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, the substance of the
discussion(s), and what you understood was the purpose of the meeting.
g. Were you told about a meeting or meetings between Erik Prince and Kirill Dmitriev
or any other representative from the Russian government that took place in January
2017?
i. If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, the substance of the discussion(s),
and what you understood was the purpose of the meeting(s).
h. Prior to January 20, 2017, did you talk to Steve Bannon, Jared Kushner, or any other
individual associated with the transition regarding establishing an unofficial line of
communication with Russia? If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, the
substance of the discussion(s), and what you understood was the purpose of such
an unofficial line of communication.
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RESPONSES OF PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP
I. June 9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower
a. When did you first learn that Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner was
considering participating in a meeting in June 2016 concerning potentially negative information
about Hillary Clinton? Describe who you learned the information from and the substance of the
discussion.
b. Attached to this document as Exhibit A is a series of emails from June 2016 between, among
others, Donald Trump, Jr. and Rob Goldstone. In addition to the emails reflected in. Exhibit A,
Donald Trump, Jr. had other communications with Rob Goldstone and Emin Agalarov between
June 3, 2016, and June 9, 2016.
i. Did Mr. Trump, Jr. or anyone else tell you about or show you any of these
communications? If yes, describe who discussed the communications with you, when,
and the substance of the discussion(s).
ii. When did you first see or learn about all or any part of the emails reflected in Exhibit
A?
iii. When did you first learn that the proposed meeting involved or was described as being
part of Russia and its government's support for your candidacy?
iv. Did you suggest to or direct anyone not to discuss or release publicly all or any
portion of the emails reflected in Exhibit A? If yes, describe who you communicated
with, when, the substance of the communication(s), and why you took that action.
c. On June 9, 2016, Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, and Jared Kushner attended a meeting at
Trump Tower with several individuals, including a Russian lawyer, Natalia Veselnitskaya (the
"June 9 meeting").
i. Other than as set forth in your answers to 1.a and I.b, what, if anything, were you told
about the possibility of this meeting taking place, or the scheduling of such a meeting?
Describe who you discussed this with, when, and what you were informed about the
meeting.
ii. When did you learn that some of the individuals attending the June 9 meeting were
Russian or had any affiliation with any part of the Russian government? Describe who
you learned this information from and the substance of the discussion(s).
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iii. What were you told about what was discussed at the June 9 meeting? Describe each
conversation in which you were told about what was discussed at the meeting, who the
conversation was with, when it occurred, and the substance of the statements they made
about the meeting.
iv. Were you told that the June 9 meeting was about, in whole or in part, adoption and/or
the Magnitsky Act? Ilyes, describe who you had that discussion with, when, and the
substance of the discussion.
d. For the period June 6, 2016 through June 9, 2016, for what portion or each day were you in
Trump Tower?
i. Did you speak or meet with Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner on
June 9, 2016? If yes, did any portion of any of those conversations or meetings include
any reference to any aspect of the June 9 meeting? If yes, describe who you spoke with
and the substance of the conversation.
e. Did you communicate directly or indirectly with any member or representative of the Agalarov
family after June 3, 2016? If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, and the substance of the
communication.
Did you learn of any communications between Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared
Kushner and any member or representative of the Agalarov family, Natalia Veselnitskaya, Rob
Goldstone, or any Russian official or contact that took place after June 9, 2016 and concerned
the June 9 meeting or efforts by Russia to assist the campaign? If yes, describe who you learned
this information from, when, and the substance of what you learned.
g. On June 7, 2016, you gave a speech in which you said, in part, "I am going to give a major
speech on probably Monday of next week and we're going to be discussing all of the things
that have taken place with the Clintons."
i. Why did you make that statement?
ii. What information did you plan to share with respect to the Clintons?
iii. What did you believe the source(s) of that information would be?
iv. Did you expect any of the information to have come from the June 9 meeting?
v. Did anyone help draft the speech that you were referring to? If so, who?
vi. Why did you ultimately not give the speech you referenced on June 7, 2016?
h. Did any person or entity inform you during the campaign that Vladimir Putin or the Russian
7
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government supported your candidacy or opposed the candidacy of Hillary Clinton? If yes,
describe the source(s) of the information, when you were informed, and the content of such
discussion(s).
i. Did any person or entity inform you during the campaign that any foreign government or
foreign leader, other than Russia or Vladimir Putin, had provided, wished to provide, or offered
to provide tangible support to your campaign, including by way of offering to provide negative
information on Hillary Clinton? If yes, describe the source(s) of the information, when you
were informed, and the content of such discussion(s).
Response to Question 1, Parts (a) through (c)
I have no recollection of learning at the time that Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner
was considering participating in a meeting in June 2016 concerning potentially negative information
about Hillary Clinton. Nor do I recall learning during the campaign that the June 9, 2016 meeting
had taken place, that the referenced emails existed, or that Donald J. Trump, Jr., had other
communications with Emin Agalarov or Robert Goldstone between June 3, 2016 and June 9, 2016.
Response to Question 1, Part (d)
I have no independent recollection of what portion of these four days in June of 2016 1 spent in Trump
Tower. This was one of many busy months during a fast-paced campaign, as the primary season was
ending and we were preparing for the general election campaign.
I am now aware that my Campaign's calendar indicates that I was in New York City from June 6 —
9, 2016. Calendars kept in my Trump Tower office reflect that I had various calls and meetings
scheduled for each of these days. While those calls and meetings may or may not actually have taken
place, they do indicate that I was in Trump Tower during a portion of each of these working days,
and I have no reason to doubt that I was. When I was in New York City, I stayed at my Trump Tower
apartment.
My Trump Organization desk calendar also reflects that I was outside Trump Tower during portions
of these days. The June 7, 2016 calendar indicates I was scheduled to leave Trump Tower in the
early evening for Westchester where I gave remarks after winning the California, New Jersey, New
Mexico, Montana, and South Dakota Republican primaries held that day. The June 8, 2016 calendar
indicates a scheduled departure in late afternoon to attend a ceremony at my son's school. The June
9, 2016 calendar indicates I was scheduled to attend midday meetings and a fundraising luncheon
at the Four Seasons Hotel. At this point, I do not remember on what dates these events occurred,
but I do not currently have a reason to doubt that they took place as scheduled on my calendar.
Widely available media reports, including television footage, also shed light on my activities during
these days. For example, I am aware that my June 7, 2016 victory remarks at the Trump
8
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Attorney ______________ Work Product // May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
National Golf Club in Briarcliff Manor, New York, were recorded and published by the media. I
remember winning those primaries and generally recall delivering remarks that evening.
At this point in time, I do not remember whether I spoke or met with Donald Trump, Jr., Paul
Manafort, or Jared Kushner on June 9, 2016. My desk calendar indicates I was scheduled to meet
with Paul Manafort on the morning of June 9, but I do not recall if that meeting took place. It was
more than two years ago, at a time when I had many calls and interactions daily.
Response to Question I, Part (e)
I have no independent recollection of any communications I had with the Agalarov family or
anyone I understood to be a representative of the Agalarov family after June 3, 2016 and before
the end of the campaign. While preparing to respond to these questions, I have become aware of
written communications with the Agalarovs during the campaign that were sent, received, and
largely authored by my staff and which I understand have already been produced to you.
In general, the documents include congratulatory letters on my campaign victories, emails about
a painting Emin and Aras Agalarov arranged to have delivered to Trump Tower as a birthday
present, and emails regarding delivery of a book written by Aras Agalarov. The documents reflect
that the deliveries were screened by the Secret Se►vice.
Response to Question I, Part (t)
I do not recall being aware during the campaign of communications between Donald Trump, Jr.,
Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner and any member or representative of the Agalarov family, Robert
Goldstone, Natalia Veselnitskaya (whose name I was not familiar with), or anyone I understood
to be a Russian official.
Response to Question I, Part (g)
In remarks I delivered the night I won the California, New Jersey, New Mexico, Montana, and
South Dakota Republican primaries, I said, "1 am going to give a major speech on probably
Monday of next week and we're going to be discussing all of the things that have taken place with
the Clintons." In general, I expected to give a speech referencing the publicly available, negative
information about the Clintons, including, for example, Mrs. Clinton's failed policies, the Clintons'
use of the State Department to further their interests and the interests of the Clinton Foundation,
Mrs. Clinton's improper use of a private server for State Department business, the destruction of
33,000 emails on that server, and Mrs. Clinton's temperamental unsuitability for the off►ce of
President.
In the course of preparing to respond to your questions, I have become aware that the Campaign
documents already produced to you reflect the drafting, evolution, and sources of information for the
speech I expected to give "probably" on the Monday following my June 7, 2016 comments. These
documents generally show that the text of the speech was initially drafted by Campaign staff
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with input from various outside advisors and was based on publicly available material, including, in
particular, information from the book Clinton Cush by Peter Schweizer.
The Pulse Nightclub terrorist attack took place in the early morning hours of Sunday, June 12, 2016.
In light of that tragedy, I gave a speech directed more specifically to national security and terrorism
than to the Clintons. That speech was delivered at the Saint Anselm College Institute of Politics in
Manchester, New Hampshire, and, as reported, opened with the following:
This was going to be a speech on Hillary Clinton and how bad a President, especially
in these times of Radical Islamic Terrorism, she would be. Even her former Secret
Service Agent, who has seen her under pressure and in times of stress, has stated that
she lacks the temperament and integrity to be president. There will be plenty of
opportunity to discuss these important issues at a later time, and I will deliver that
speech soon. But today there is only one thing to discuss: the growing threat of terrorism
inside of our borders.
I continued to speak about Mrs. Clinton's failings throughout the campaign, using the information
prepared for inclusion in the speech to which I referred on June 7, 2016.
Response to Question I, Part (h)
I have no recollection of being told during the campaign that Vladimir Putin or the Russian
government "supported" my candidacy or "opposed" the candidacy of Hillary Clinton. However, I
was aware of some reports indicating that President Putin had made complimentary statements
about me.
Response to Question I, Part (i)
I have no recollection of being told during the campaign that any foreign government or foreign leader
had provided, wished to provide, or offered to provide tangible support to my campaign.
Russian Hacking / Russian Efforts Using Social Media / WikiLeaks
a. On June 14, 2016, it was publicly reported that computer hackers had penetrated the
computer network of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and that Russian
intelligence was behind the unauthorized access, or hack. Prior to June 14, 2016, were you
provided any information about any potential or actual hacking of the computer systems or
email accounts of the DNC, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC),
the Clinton Campaign, Hillary Clinton, or individuals associated with the Clinton
campaign? If yes, describe who provided this information, when, and the substance of the
information.
10
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Ifimettre,--Al-efk-Pretittet '.4 . - ;- d. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
b. On July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks released nearly 20,000 emails sent or received by Democratic
party officials.
i. Prior to the July 22, 2016 release, were you aware from any source that WikiLeaks,
Guccifer 2.0, DCLeaks, or Russians had or potentially had possession of or planned to
release emails or information that could help your campaign or hurt the Clinton
campaign? If yes, describe who you discussed this issue with, when, and the substance
of the discussion(s).
ii. After the release of emails by WikiLeaks on July 22, 2016, were you told that
WikiLeaks possessed or might possess additional information that could be released
during the campaign? If yes, describe who provided this information, when, and what
you were told.
c. Are you aware of any communications during the campaign, directly or indirectly, between
Roger Stone, Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Rick Gates and (a) WikiLeaks, (b) Julian
Assange, (c) other representatives of WikiLeaks, (d) Guccifer 2.0, (e) representatives of
Guccifer 2.0, or (f) representatives of DCLeaks? If yes, describe who provided you with this
information, when you learned of the communications, and what you know about those
communications.
d. On July 27, 2016, you stated at a press conference: "Russia, if you're listening, I hope
you're able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing. I think you will probably be rewarded
mightily by our press."
i. Why did you make that request of Russia, as opposed to any other country, entity, or
individual?
ii. In advance of making that statement, what discussions, if any, did you have with
anyone else about the substance of the statement?
iii.Were you told at any time before or after you made that statement that Russia was attempting
to infiltrate or hack computer systems or email accounts of Hillary Clinton or her
campaign? If yes, describe who provided this information, when, and what you were
told.
e. On October 7, 2016, emails hacked from the account of John Podesta were released by
WikiLeaks.
Where were you on October 7, 2016?
ii. Were you told at any time in advance of, or on the day of, the October 7 release that
WikiLeaks possessed or might possess emails related to John Podesta? If yes, describe
who told you this, when, and what you were told.
11
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iii. Are you aware of anyone associated with you or your campaign, including Roger Stone,
reaching out to WikiLeaks, either directly or through an intermediary, on or about
October 7, 2016? I ryes, identify the person and describe the substance of the
conversations or contacts.
F. Were you told of anyone associated with you or your campaign, including Roger Stone, having
any discussions, directly or indirectly, with WikiLeaks, Guccifer 2.0, or DCLeaks regarding
the content or timing of release of hacked emails? If yes, describe who had such contacts, how
you became aware of the contacts, when you became aware of the contacts, and the substance
of the contacts.
g. From June 1, 2016 through the end of the campaign, how frequently did you communicate
with Roger Stone? Describe the nature of your communication(s) with Mr. Stone.
i. During that time period, what efforts did Mr. Stone tell you he was making to assist
your campaign, and what requests, if any, did you make of Mr. Stone?
ii. Did Mr. Stone ever discuss WikiLeaks with you or, as far as you were aware, with
anyone else associated with the campaign? [ryes, describe what you were told, from
whom, and when.
iii. Did Mr. Stone at anytime inform you about contacts he had with WikiLeaks or any
intermediary of WikiLeaks, or about forthcoming releases of information? If yes,
describe what Stone told you and when.
11. Did you have any discussions prior to January 20, 2017, regarding a potential pardon or other
action to benefit Julian Assange? If yes, describe who you had the discussion(s) with, when,
and the content of the discussion(s).
Were you aware of any efforts by foreign individuals or companies, including those in Russia,
to assist your campaign through the use of social media postings or the organization of rallies?
If yes, identify who you discussed such assistance with, when, and the content of the
discussion(s).
Response to Question II, Part (a)
I do not remember the date on which it was publicly reported that the DNC had been hacked, but my
best recollection is that I learned of the hacking at or shortly after the time it became the subject of
media reporting. I do not recall being provided any information during the campaign about the hacking
of any of the named entities or individuals before it became the subject of media reporting.
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Attorney ___ Work—Predutt II May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
Response to Question II, Part (b)
I recall that in the months leading up to the election there was considerable media reporting about the
possible hacking and release of campaign-related information and there was a lot of talk about this
matter. At the time, I was generally aware of these media reports and may have discussed these issues
with my campaign staff or others, but at this point in time - more than two years later — 1 have no
recollection of any particular conversation, when it occurred, or who the participants were.
Response to Question II, Part (c)
1 do not recall being aware during the campaign of any communications between the individuals
named in Question II (c) and anyone I understood to be a representative of WikiLeaks or any of
the other individuals or entities referred to in the question.
Response to Question II, Part (d)
I made the statement quoted in Question II (d) in jest and sarcastically, as was apparent to any
objective observer. The context of the statement is evident in the full reading or viewing of the
July 27, 2016 press conference, and I refer you to the publicly available transcript and video of
that press conference. I do not recall having any discussion about the substance of the statement
in advance of the press conference. I do not recall being told during the campaign of any efforts
by Russia to infiltrate or hack the computer systems or email accounts of Hillary Clinton or her
campaign prior to them becoming the subject of media reporting and I have no recollection of any
particular conversation in that regard.
Response to Question II, Part (e)
I was in Trump Tower in New York City on October 7, 2016. I have no recollection of being told
that WikiLeaks possessed or might possess emails related to John Podesta before the release of Mr.
Podesta's emails was reported by the media. Likewise, I have no recollection of being told that
Roger Stone, anyone acting as an intermediary for Roger Stone, or anyone associated with my
campaign had communicated with WikiLeaks on October 7, 2016.
Response to Question II, Part (f)
I do not recall being told during the campaign that Roger Stone or anyone associated with my
campaign had discussions with any of the entities named in the question regarding the content or
timing of release of hacked emails,
Response to Question II, Part (g)
I spoke by telephone with Roger Stone from time to time during the campaign. I have no
recollection of the specifics of any conversations I had with Mr. Stone between June 1, 2016 and
I3
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November 8, 2016. I do not recall discussing WikiLeaks with him, nor do I recall being aware of
Mr. Stone having discussed WikiLeaks with individuals associated with my campaign, although I
was aware that WikiLeaks was the subject of media reporting and campaign-related discussion at
the time.
Response to Question II, Part (h)
I do not recall having had any discussion during the campaign regarding a pardon or action to benefit
Julian Assange.
Response to Question II, Part (i)
I do not recall being aware during the campaign of specific efforts by foreign individuals or companies
to assist my campaign through the use of social media postings or the organization of rallies.
III. The Trump Organization Moscow Project
a. In October 2015, a "Letter of Intent," a copy of which is attached as Exhibit B, was signed
for a proposed Trump Organization project in Moscow (the "Trump Moscow project").
i. When were you first informed of discussions about the Trump Moscow project? By
whom? What were you told about the project?
ii. Did you sign the letter of intent?
b. In a statement provided to Congress, attached as Exhibit C, Michael Cohen stated: "To the
best of my knowledge, Mr. Trump was never in contact with anyone about this proposal other
than me on three occasions, including signing a non-binding letter of intent in 2015." Describe
all discussions you had with Mr. Cohen, or anyone else associated with the Trump
Organization, about the Trump Moscow project, including who you spoke with, when, and the
substance of the discussion(s).
c. Did you learn of any communications between Michael Cohen or Felix Sater and any
Russian government officials, including officials in the office of Dmitry Peskov, regarding the
Trump Moscow project? If so, identify who provided this information to you, when, and the
substance of what you learned.
d. Did you have any discussions between June 2015 and June 2016 regarding a potential trip
to Russia by you and/or Michael Cohen for reasons related to the Trump Moscow project?
If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, and the substance of the discussion(s).
e. Did you at any time direct or suggest that discussions about the Trump Moscow project
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Attorncy Work Product // May Contain Matcrial Protcctcd Undcr Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
should cease, or were you informed at any time that the project had been abandoned? If
yes, describe who you spoke with, when, the substance of the discussion(s), and why that
decision was made.
f. Did you have any discussions regarding what information would be provided publicly or in
response to investigative inquiries about potential or actual investments or business deals
the Trump Organization had in Russia, including the Trump Moscow project? If yes,
describe who you spoke with, when, and the substance of the discussion(s).
g• Aside from the Trump Moscow project, did you or the Trump Organization have any other
prospective or actual business interests, investments, or arrangements with Russia or any
Russian interest or Russian individual during the campaign? If yes, describe the business
interests, investments, or arrangements.
Response to Question III, Parts (a) through (g)
Sometime in 2015, Michael Cohen suggested to me the possibility of a Trump Organization project
in Moscow. As I recall, Mr. Cohen described this as a proposed project of a general type we have
done in the past in a variety of locations. I signed the non-binding Letter of Intent attached to your
questions as Exhibit B which required no equity or expenditure on our end and was consistent with
our ongoing efforts to expand into significant markets around the world.
I had few conversations with Mr. Cohen on this subject. As I recall, they were brief, and they were
not memorable. I was not enthused about the proposal, and I do not recall any discussion of travel to
Russia in connection with it. I do not remember discussing it with anyone else at the Trump
Organization, although it is possible. I do not recall being aware at the time of any communications
between Mr. Cohen or Felix Sater and any Russian government official regarding the Letter of Intent.
In the course of preparing to respond to your questions, I have become aware that Mr. Cohen sent an
email regarding the Letter of Intent to "Mr. Peskov" at a general, public email account, which should
show there was no meaningful relationship with people in power in Russia. I understand those
documents already have been provided to you.
I vaguely remember press inquiries and media reporting during the campaign about whether the
Trump Organization had business dealings in Russia. I may have spoken with campaign staff or
Trump Organization employees regarding responses to requests for information, but I have no
current recollection of any particular conversation, with whom I may have spoken, when, or the
substance of any conversation. As I recall, neither I nor the Trump Organization had any projects
or proposed projects in Russia during the campaign other than the Letter of Intent.
IV. Contacts with Russia and Russia-Related Issues During the Campaign
a. Prior to mid-August 2016, did you become aware that Paul Manafort had ties to the Ukrainian
government? If yes, describe who you learned this information from, when, and the
substance of what you were told. Did Mr. Manafort's connections to the Ukrainian or
17
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Russian governments play any role in your decision to have him join your campaign? If yes,
describe that role.
b. Were you aware that Paul Manafort offered briefings on the progress of your campaign to Oleg
Deripaska? If yes, describe who you learned this information from, when, the substance of what
you were told, what you understood the purpose was of sharing such information with Mr.
Deripaska, and how you responded to learning this information.
c. Were you aware of whether Paul Manafort or anyone else associated with your campaign sent
or directed others to send internal Trump campaign information to any person located in
Ukraine or Russia or associated with the Ukrainian or Russian governments? If yes, identify
who provided you with this information, when, the substance of the discussion(s), what you
understood the purpose was of sharing the internal campaign information, and how you
responded to learning this information.
d. Did Paul Manafort communicate to you, directly or indirectly, any positions Ukraine or Russia
would want the U.S. to support? If yes, describe when he communicated those positions to you
and the substance of those communications.
e. During the campaign, were you told about efforts by Russian officials to meet with you or
senior members of your campaign? If yes, describe who you had conversations with on this
topic, when, and what you were told.
f. What role, if any, did you have in changing the Republican Party platform regarding arming
Ukraine during the Republican National Convention? Prior to the convention, what information
did you have about this platform provision? After the platform provision was changed, who
told you about the change, when did they tell you, what were you told about why it was
changed, and who was involved?
g. On July 27, 2016, in response to a question about whether you would recognize Crimea as
Russian territory and lift sanctions on Russia, you said: "We'll be looking at that. Yeah, we'll
be looking." Did you intend to communicate by that statement or at any other time during the
campaign a willingness to lift sanctions and/or recognize Russia's annexation of Crimea if you
were elected?
i. What consideration did you give to lifting sanctions and/or recognizing Russia's
annexation of Crimea if you were elected? Describe who you spoke with about this
topic, when, the substance of the discussion(s).
Response to Question IV, Parts (a) through (d)
Mr. Manafort was hired primarily because of his delegate work for prior presidential candidates,
including Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Bob Dole. I knew that Mr. Manafort
had done international consulting work and, at some time before Mr. Manafort left the
17
C-22
campaign, I learned that he was somehow involved with individuals concerning Ukraine, but I do
not remember the specifics of what I knew at the time.
I had no knowledge of Mr. Manafort offering briefings on the progress of my campaign to an

individual named Oleg Deripaska, nor do I remember being aware of Mr. Manafort or anyone else
associated with my campaign sending or directing others to send internal Trump Campaign
information to anyone I knew to be in Ukraine or Russia at the time or to anyone I understood to
be a Ukrainian or Russian government employee or official. I do not remember Mr. Manafort
communicating to me any particular positions Ukraine or Russia would want the United States to
support.
Response to Question IV, Part (e)
I do not recall being told during the campaign of efforts by Russian officials to meet with me or
with senior members of my campaign. In the process of preparing to respond to these questions, I
became aware that on March 17, 2016, my assistant at the Trump Organization, Rhona Graff,
received an email from a Sergei Prikhodko, who identified himself as Deputy Prime Minister of
the Russian Federation, Foundation Roscongress, inviting me to participate in the St. Petersburg
International Economic Forum to be held in June 2016. The documents show that Ms. Graff
prepared for my signature a brief response declining the invitation. I understand these documents
already have been produced to you.
Response to Question IV, Part (f)
I have no recollection of the details of what, when, or from what source I first learned about the
change to the platform amendment regarding arming Ukraine, but I generally recall learning of
the issue as part of media reporting. I do not recall being involved in changing the language to the
amendment.
Response to Question IV, Part (g)
My statement did not communicate any position.
V. Contacts with Russia and Russia-Related Issues During the Transition
a. Were you asked to attend the World Chess Championship gala on November 10, 2016? If
yes, who asked you to attend, when were you asked, and what were you told about about
[sic] why your presence was requested?
i. Did you attend any part of the event? If yes, describe any interactions you had with
any Russians or representatives of the Russian government at the event.
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___________________ Attorney Work Product // May Contain Material Protected Undcr Fcd. R.
Crim. P. 6(c)
Response to Question V, Part (a)
I do not remember having been asked to attend the World Chess Championship gala, and I did not
attend the event. During the course of preparing to respond to these questions, I have become aware
of documents indicating that in March of 2016, the president of the World Chess Federation invited
the Trump Organization to host, at Trump Tower, the 2016 World Chess Championship Match to
be held in New York in November 2016. I have also become aware that in November 2016, there
were press inquiries to my staff regarding whether I had plans to attend the tournament, which was
not being held at Trump Tower. I understand these documents have already been provided to you.
.Lt ___
Execut d onNOVIMMULIO, 2018

DONA D J. TRUMP
President of the United States
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___________________ Attorney Work Product // May Contain Material Protected Undcr Fcd. R.
Crim. P. 6(c)
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19
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Attether WerlePreduet // May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. It. Crim. P. 6(c)
Affer-ttey-3,11-erlt-Prereltiet // May Contain Material Protected Undcr Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
Appendix D
Attether WerlePreduet // May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. It. Crim. P. 6(c)
Atteriter Werlt-Preddet // May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
APPENDIX D
SPECIAL COUNSEL'S OFFICE TRANSFERRED, REFERRED, AND COMPLETED CASES
This appendix identifies matters transferred or referred by the Special Counsel's Office, as well
as cases prosecuted by the Office that are now completed.
A. Transfers
The Special Counsel's Office has concluded its investigation into links and coordination
between the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign. Certain
matters assigned to the Office by the Acting Attorney General have not fully concluded as of the date
of this report. After consultation with the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the Office has
transferred responsibility for those matters to other components of the Department of Justice and the
FBI. Those transfers include:
1. United States v. Bijan Rafiekian and Kamil Ekim Alptekin
U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia
(Awaiting trial)
The Acting Attorney General authorized the Special Counsel to investigate, among other
things, possible criminal conduct by Michael Flynn in acting as an unregistered agent for the
Government of Turkey. See August 2, 2017 Memorandum from Rod J. Rosenstein to Robert S.
Mueller, III. The Acting Attorney General later confirmed the Special Counsel's authority to
investigate Rafiekian and Alptekin because they "may have been jointly involved" with Flynn in
FARA-related crimes. See October 20, 2017 Memorandum from Associate Deputy Attorney General
Scott Schools to Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein.
On December 1, 2017, Flynn pleaded guilty to an Information charging him with making false
statements to the FBI about his contacts with the Russian ambassador to the United States. As part of
that plea, Flynn agreed to a Statement of the Offense in which he acknowledged that the Foreign
Agents Registration Act (FARA) documents he filed on March 7, 2017 "contained materially false
statements and omissions." Flynn's plea occurred before the Special Counsel had made a final decision
on whether to charge Rafiekian or Alptekin. On March 27, 2018, after consultation with the Office of
the Deputy Attorney General, the Special Counsel's Office referred the investigation of Rafiekian and
Alptekin to the National Security Division (NSD) for any action it deemed appropriate. The Special
Counsel's Office determined the referral was appropriate because the investigation of Flynn had been
completed, and that investigation had provided the rationale for the Office's investigation of Rafiekian
and Alptekin. At NSD's request, the Eastern District of Virginia continued the investigation of
Rafiekian and Alptekin.
2. United States v. Michael Flynn
US. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia
(Awaiting sentencing)
D-1
3. United States v. Richard Gates

U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia
4. United States v. Internet Research Agency, et al. (Russian Social Media Campaign)
National Security Division
(Post-indictment, pre-arrest & pre-trials)
5. United States v. Konstantin Kilimnik.
(Post-indictment, pre-arrest)
6. United States v. Paul Manafort

U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia
(Post-conviction)
7. United States v. Viktor Netyksho, et al. (Russian Hacking Operations)
U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western District of Pennsylvania
National Security Division
(Post-indictment, pre-arrest)
8. United States v. William Samuel Patten
US. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia
The Acting Attorney General authorized the Special Counsel to investigate aspects of Patten's
conduct that related to another matter that was under investigation by the Office. The investigation
uncovered evidence of a crime; the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia handled the
prosecution of Patten.
9. Harm to Ongoing Matter
(Investigation ongoing)
The Acting Attorney General authorized the Special Counsel to investigate, among other
things, crime or crimes arising out of payments Paul Manafort received from the Ukrainian
government before and during the tenure of President Viktor Yanukovych. See August 2, 2017
Memorandum from Rod J. Rosenstein to Robert S. Mueller, III. The Acting Attorney General
One defendant, Concord Management & Consulting LLC, appeared through counsel and is
in pretrial litigation.
D-2
Atteriter4,Ier-le-Preduet // May Contain Material Protcctcd Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
later confirmed the Special Co unse s authont to investi:ate Harm to Ongoing

Matter
On October 27, 2017, Paul Manafort and Richard Gates were charged in the District of
Columbia with various crimes (including FARA) in connection with work they performed for
Russia-backed political entities in Ukraine. On February 22, 2018, Manafort and Gates were
charged in the Eastern District of Virginia with various other crimes in connection with the
payments they received for work performed for Russia-backed political entities in Ukraine.
During the course of its f OM , the Special Counsel's Office developed substantial
evidence with respect to individuals d entities that wer Harm to Ongoing Matter
. On February 23, 2018, Gates pleaded guilty in the District of Columbia to a multi-
object conspiracy and to making false statements; the remaining charges against Gates were
dismissed.3 Thereafter, in consultation with the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the Special
Counsel's Office closed the I arm to Ongoing Matter and referred them HOM for further
investigation as it deemed appropriate. The Office based its decision to close those matters on its
mandate, the indictments of
Manafort, Gates's plea, and its Harm to Ongoing Matter
determination as to how best to
allocate its resources, among other reasons;
At
the investigation of those closed matters.
10. United States v. Roger Stone
ll•I arm to Ongoing Matter

(Awaiting trial)
(Investigation ongoing)
B. Referrals
During the course of the investigation, the Office periodically identified evidence of
potential criminal activity that was outside the scope of the Special Counsel's jurisdiction
established by the Acting Attorney General. After consultation with the Office of the Deputy
Attorney General, the Office referred that evidence to appropriate law enforcement autho rities,
principally other components of the Department of Justice and the FBI. Those referrals, listed

Manafort was ultimately convicted at trial in the Eastern District of Virginia and pleaded
guilty in the District of Columbia. See Vol. I, Section IV.A.8. The trial and plea happened after the
transfer decision described here.
D-3
alphabetically by subject, are summarized below.

1. HOM
2. Michael Cohen
During the course of the investigation, the Special Counsel's Office uncovered evidence of
potential wire fraud and FECA violations pertaining to Michael Cohen. That evidence was referred to
the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York and the FBI's New York Field Office.
3. OM
4. I OM
5. Gres or Crai LHOM Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP
During the course of the FARA investigation of Paul Manafort and Rick Gates, the Special
Counsel's Office uncovered evidence of potential FARA violations pertaining to HOM
Gregory Craig, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP (Skadden), and their work on behalf of
the government of Ukraine.
After consultation with the NSD, the evidence regarding Craig HOM was
referred to NSD, and NSD elected to partner with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District
of New York and the FBI's New York Field Office. NSD later elected to partner on the Craig matter
with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia. NSD retained and handled issues relating
to Skadden itself
6. OM
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Attorney____________ Work Product II May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
7. H OM
8. H OM
9 . H OM
10. OM
111 OM
12. HOM
13.
HOM
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Attefney411Lerit-Pfe4det // May Contain Material Protected Under Fcd. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
14. HOM
C. Completed Prosecutions
In three cases prosecuted by the Special Counsel's Office, the defendants have completed or
are about to complete their terms of imprisonment. Because no further proceedings are likely in any
case, responsibility for them has not been transferred to any other office or component.
1. United States v. George Papadopoulos
Post-conviction, Completed term of imprisonment (December 7, 2018)
2. United States v. Alex van der Zwaan
Post-conviction, Completed term of imprisonment (June 4, 2018)
3. United States v. Richard Pinedo
Post-conviction, Currently in Residential Reentry Center (release date May 13, 2019)
D-6

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U.S.

Report On The Investigation Into

Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III

TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOLUME I

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME I ...................................................................................................... 1

c. The GRU's Transfer of Stolen Materials to WikiLeaks ..........................................45

c. Harm to Ongoing Matter

b. Contacts with the Campaign about WikiLeaks...................................................................................................................52

d. George Papadopoulos Learns That Russia Has "Dirt" in the Form of

1. Oleg Deripaska Consulting Work ............................................................... 131

B. Russian Hacking and Dumping Operations .................................................................... 175

ii. Willfulness ............................................................................................................................ 190

iv. Analysis HOM

iii. Constitutional Considerations ............................................................................................... 190

Below we describe the evidentiary considerations underpinning statements about the

In evaluating whether evidence about collective action of multiple individuals constituted a

The report on our investigation consists of two volumes:

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME I

RUSSIAN SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN

RUSSIAN HACKING OPERATIONS

The presidential campaign of Donald J. Trump ("Trump Campaign" or "Campaign")

Secreta of State he later said

RUSSIAN CONTACTS WITH THE CAMPAIGN

The Russian contacts consisted of business connections, offers of assistance to the

Post-2016 Election. Immediately after the November 8 election, Russian government

On January 6, 2017, members of the intelligence community briefed President-Elect Trump

THE SPECIAL COUNSEL'S CHARGING DECISIONS

I. THE SPECIAL COUNSEL'S INVESTIGATION

(iii) any other matters within the scope of 28 C.F.R. § 600.4(a).

II. RUSSIAN "ACTIVE MEASURES" SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN

A. Structure of the Internet Research Agency

Harm to Ongoing Matter

Harm to Ongoing Matter

2018). See SM-2230634, serial 92.

arm to Ongoing Matter

9Harm to Ongoing Matter

" See SM-2230634, serial 86 Harm to Ongoing Matter

Harm to Ongoing Matter

Harm to Ongoing Matter

iiHarm to Ongoing Matter

B. Funding and Oversight from Concord and Prigozhin

13 Harm to Ongoing Matter

15 Harm to Ongoing Matter

See SM-2230634, serials

18 Harm to Ongoing Matter

Harm to Ongoing Matter

Harm to Ongoing Matter

igHarm to Ongoing Matter

Harm to Ongoing Matter

'Warm to Ongoing Matter

UHarm to Ongoing Matter

Harm to Ongoing Matter

21 Harm to Ongoing Matter

Known as "Putin's Cook", New York Times (Feb. 16, 2018).

24 Harm to Ongoing Matter

U.S. Department of Justice

Harm to Ongoing Matter

Harm to Ongoing Matter

isHarm to Ongoing Matter

arm to Ongoing Matter

Harm to Ongoing Matter

Harm to Ongoing Matter

Harm to Ongoing Matter