Searchable Mueller Report
Searchable Mueller Report
S, Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.
March 2019
U.S. Deparlment of Justice
U.S. Department of Iustice
a. Background.
b. Origins of and Early Campaign Work
c. Carter Page's July 2016 Trip To Moscow ..
d. Later Campaign Work and Removal from the Campaign ...
4, Dimitri Simes and the Center for the National Interest „........., .„103
a. CNI and Dimitri Simes Connect with the Trump Campaign „......„.....„... 103
b. National Interest Hosts a Foreign Policy Speech at the Mayflower Hotel
105
c. Jeff Sessions's Post-Speech Interactions with CNI ......,...... ... 107
d. Jared Kushner's Continuing Contacts with Simes......................
5. June 9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower 110
a, Setting Up the June 9 Meeting. ... 110
i. Outreach to Donald Tnnnp Jr. 110
ii. Awareness of the Meeting Within the Campaign „.. ,..... ....... I 14
b. The Events of June 9, 2016, .............., 1 16
i. Arrangements for the Meeting . II6
ii. Conduct of the Meeting. 117
c. Past-June 9 Events ... 120
6. Events at the Republican National Convention, 123
Ambassador Kislyak's Encounters with Senator Sessions and J.D.
Gordon the Week of the RNC .......„„. „...................... 123
b. Change to Republican Party Platform. 124
7. Post-Convention Contacts with Kislyak ...................................,.................... 127
a, Am bassador Kislyak I nvites J.D. Gordon t o B reakfast at t h e
Ambassador's Residence .. 127
b. Senator Sess'ions's September 2016 Meeting with Ambassador Kislyak...... 127
8. Paul Manafort. 129
a. Paul Manafort's Ties to Russia and Ukraine..... ... 131
U.S. Depmtment of Justice
The Russian government interfered in the 2016 piesidential election in sweeping and
systematic fashion. Evidence of Russian government operations began to surface in mid-2016. In
June, the Democratic National Committee and its cyber response resin publicly announced that
Russian hackers had compromised its computer network. Releases of hacked materials — backs
that public reporting soon attributed to the Russian government — began 'that same month.
Additional releases followed in July through the organization WikiLeaks, with further releases in
October and November.
In late July 2016, soon after WikiLeaks's first release of stolen documents, a foreign
gavernment contacted the FBI about a May 2016 encounter with Trump Campaign foreign policy
advisor George Pnpadopoulos, Papadopoulos had suggested to a representative of that foreign
government that the Trump Campaign had received indications &om the Russian government that
it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information damaging to
Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. That infomiation prompted the FBI on July
31, 2016, to open an investigation into whether individuals associated with the Trump Campaign
were coordinating with the Russian goveriunent in its intcrferencc activities.
That fall, two federal agencies jointly announced that the Russian government "directed
recent compromises of e-mails ftom U S persons and institutions, including US political
organizations," and, *'[t]hese thefts and disclosures are intended to interfere with the US e'lection
process." After the eledtion, in late December 2016, the United States imyosed sanctions on Russia
for having interfered in the election, B y early 2017, several congressional committees were
examining Russia's interference in the election.
Within thc Executive Branch, these investigatory efforts ultimately led to the May 2017
appointment of Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III. The order appointing the Special Counsel
authorized him to investigate "the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016
presidential elec'tion," including any links or coordination between the Russian government and
individuals associated with the Trump Campaign.
As set forth in detail in this report, the Special Counsel's investigation established that
Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election principally through two operations. First, a
Russian entity carried out a social media campaign that favored presidential candidate Donald J,
Trump and disparaged presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. Second, n Russian intelligence
service conducted computer-intrusion operafions against,entities„employees, and volunteers
working an the Clinton Campaign and then released stolen documents, The investigation also
'identified numerous links between the Russian g overnm
ent and the Trump Campaign. Although
the investigation established that the Russian government perceived it would benefit from a Trump
presidency and worked to secure that outcome, nnd that the Camynign expected it wauld benefit
U.S, Department of Justice
electorally fmm mformation stolen and. released through Russian efforts, the investigation did not
establish that members of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian
government in its election interference activities.
The report describes actions and events that the Special Counsel's Office found to be
supported by the evidence collected in our investigation. In some instances, the report points out
the absence of evidence or conflicts in the evidence about a particular fact or event. In other
instances, when substantial, credible evidence enabled the Office to reach a conclusion with
conhdence, the report states that the investigation established that certain actions or events
occurred. A statement that the investigation did not establish particular' facts does not mean there
was no evidence of those facts.
Volume I describes the factual results of the Special Counsel's investigation of Russia's
interference in the 2Q16 presidential election and its interactions with the Trump Campaign.
Section I describes the scope of the investigation. Sections II and III describe the principal ways
Russia interfered in thc 2016 presidential election. Section IV describes links between the Russian
U.S. Department of Iustlce
//
governm
ent and individuals associated udth the Trump Campaign. Section V sets forth the Special
Counsel's charging decisions.
Volume II addresses the President's actions towards the FBF s investigation into Russia's
interference in the 2016 presidential election and related matters, and his actions towards the
Special Counsel's investigation. Volume II separately states its framework and the considerations
that guided that investigation.
U.S. Department of Justice
The Internet Research Agency (IRA) carried out the earliest Russian interference
operations identified by the investigation — a social media campaign designed to provoke and
amplify political and socle discord in the United States, The IRA was based in St. PetersBurg,
Russia, and received funding fmm Russian oligarch Yevgeniy Prigozhln and companies be
conti'ulled. Pri ozhin is widel re arted to have ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin
• S • •
In mid-2014, the IRA sent em lo ees to the United States on an intelli ence- atherin
mission with instructions • S • •
The IRA later used social media accounts and interest groups to sow discord in the U.S.
political system through what it termed "information warfare." The campaign evolved from a
generalized program designed in 2014 and 2015 to undermine the U.S. electoral system, to a
targeted operation that by early 2016 favored candidate Trump and disparaged candidate Clinton,
The IRA's operation also included the purchase of political advertisements on social media in the
names of U.S. persons and entities, as well as the staging af political rallies inside the United
States, To organize those rallies, IRA employees posed as U,S, grassraots entities and persons and
made contact with Trump supporters and Trump Campaign officials in the United States. The
investigation did not identify evidence that any U,S, persons conspired or coordinated with the
IRA. Section II of this report details the Office's investigation of the Russian social media
campaign.
At the same time tbut the IRA operation began to focus on supporthrg candidate Trump in
early 2016, the Russian government, employed a second form of interference: cyber intrusions
(hacking) and releases af hacked materials damaging to the Clintan Campaign. The Russian
intelligence service known as the Main Intelligence Directorate af the General Staff of the Russian
Army (GRU) carried aut these operations.
In March 2016, the GRU began hacking the email acrounts of Clinton Campaign
volunteers and employees, including campaign chairman John Podesta. In April 2016, the GRU
hacked into the computer networks of the Democratic' Congressional Campaign Committee
(DCCC) and the Democratic National Committee (DNC). Thc GRU stole hundreds of thousands
of documents from the compromised email accounts and networks. Amund the time that the DNC
announced in mid-June 2016 the Russian government's role in hacking its network, the GRU
began disseminating stolen materials through the fictitious online personas "DCLeaks" and
"Guceifer 2.0." The GRU later released additional materials through the organization WikiLeaks.
U,S. Department of Justice
The social media campaign and the ORU hacking operations coincided with a series of
contacts betw'een Trump Campaign officials and individuals with ties to the Russian government.
The Office investigated whether those contacts reflected or resulted in the Campaign conspiring
or coordinating with Russia in its 'election-interference activities. A lthough the investigation
established that the Russian government perceived it would benefit from a Trump presidency and
worked to secure that outcome, and that the Campaign expected it would benefit electorally from
information stolen and released thmugh Russian efforts, the investigation did not establish that
embers of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its
election interference activities.
2015. Some of the earliest contacts were made in connection with a Trump Organization
real-estate project in Russia. known as Trump Tower Moscow. Candidate Trump signed a Letter
of Intent for Trump Tower Moscmv by November 2015., and in January 2016 Trump Organization
executive Michael Cohen emailed and spoke about the project with the office of Russian
governm
ent p ress secretary Dmitry Peskov. The Trump Organization pursued the project through
at least June,2016, including by considering travel to Russia by Cohen and candidate Trump.
Spring 2016; Campaign foreign policy advisor George Papadopoulos made early contact
with Joseph Mifsud, a London-based professor who had connections to Russia and traveled to
Moscow in April 2016. I mmediately upon his return to London from that trip, Mifsud told
Papadopoulos that the Russian government had "dirt" on Hillary Clinton in the fc rm of thousands
U.S. Department of Justice
of emails. One week later, in the first week of May 2016, Papadopoulos suggested to a
representative of a foreign government that the Trump Campaign had received indications fi'om
the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of
information damaging to candidate Clinton. Throughout that period of time and for several months
thereafter, Papadopoulos worked with Mifsud and two Russian nationals ta arrange a meeting
between the Campaign and the Russian government. No meeting took place.
Srrrrtirter 2016. Russian outreach ta the Trump Campaign continued into the summer of
2016, as candidate Trump was becoming the presumptive Republican nominee for President. On
June 9, 2016, for example, a Russian lawyer met with senior Trump Campaign officials Donald
Trump Jr,, Jared Kushner, and campaign chairman Paul Manafart to deliver what the email
proposing the meeting had described as "official documents and information that would
incriminate Hillary." T h e materials were offered to Trump Jr. as "part of Russia and its
government's support for Mr. Trump." T he written communications setting up the meeting
showed that the Campaign anticipated receiving information f'rom Russia that could assist
candidate Trump's electoral prospects, but the Russian lawyer's presentation did not provide such
1llformattan.
Days after the June 9 meeting, on June 14, 2016, a cybersecurity firm and the DNC
announced that Russian government hackers had infiltrated the DNC and obtairied access to
opposition research on candidate Trump, among other documents.
In July 2016, Campaign foreign policy advisar Carter Page traveled in his persanal capacity
to Moscow andgave the keynote address atthe New Economic School, Page had lived and worked
in Russia between 2003 and 2007. After returningto the United States, Page became acquainted
with at least two Russian intelligence officers, one of' whom was later charged in 2015 with
conspiracy to act as an unregistered agent of Russia. Page's July 2016 trip to Moscow and his
advocacy for pra-Russian foreign policy drew media attention. The Campaign then distanced itself
from Pageand, by late September 2016, removed him fiom the Campaign.
July 2016 was also the month WikiLeaks first i classed emails stolen by the GRU &om the
DNC. On July 22, 2016, WildLeaks posted thousands af internal DNC documents revealing
information about the Clinton Campaign. W ithin days, there was public reporting that U.S.
intelligence agencies had "'high confidence" that the Russian government was behind the theft af
emails and documents fram the DNC. And within a week of the release, a foreign government
informed the FBI about its May 2016 interaction with Papadopoulos and his statement that the
Russian gavernment could assist the Trump Campaign. On July 31, 2016, based on the foreign
gaveriunent reporting, the FBI opened an investigation into potential coordination between the
Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign.
Separately, on August 2, 2016, Trump campaign chairman Paul Manafort met in New York
City with his long-time business associate Konstantin Kilimnik, who the FBI assesses to have ties
to Russian intelligence, Kilimnik requested the meeting to deliver in person a peace plan for
Ukraine that Manafort acknowledged to the Special Counsel's Oflice was a "backdoor" way for
Russia to control part of eastern Ukraine,' both men believed the plan wauld' require candidate
Trump's assent to succeed (were he to be elected President). They also discussed the status af the
U.S. Deparnnent of Justice
II
Trump Campaign and Manafort's strategy for winning Democratic votes in Midwestern states.
Months before that meeting, Manafort had caused internal polling data to be shared with Kilimnik„
and the sharing continued for some period of time after their August meeting.
Enll 2016. On October 7, 2016, the media. released video of candidate Trump speaking in
graphic terms about women years earlier, which was considered damaging to his candidacy. Less
than an hour later, WikiLeaks made its second release: thousands of John Podesta's emails that
had been stolen by the GRU in late March 2016, The FBI and other U.S. government institutions
were at the time continuing their investigation of suspected Russian government efforts to interfere
in the presidential election. That same day, October 7, the Department of Homeland Security and
the Office of the Direotor of National Intelligence issued a joint public statement "that the Russian
Government directed the recent compromises of e-mails Irom US persons and institutions„
including from US political organizations." Those "thefts" and the "disclosures" of the hacked
materials through online platforms such as WikiLeaks, the statement continued, "are intended to
interfere with the US election process."
Kirill Dmitriev, the chief executive officer of Russia's sovdreign wealth fund, was among
the Russians who tiied to make contact with the incoming administration. In early December, a
business associate steered Dmitriev to Erik Prince, a supporter of the Trump Campaign and an
associate of senior Trump advisor Steve Bannon. Dmitriev and Prince later met face-to-face in
January 2017 in the Seychelles and discussed U,S.-Russia relations, During the same period,
another business associate introduced Dmitfiev to a friend of Jared Kushner who had not served
on the Campaign or the Transition Team, Dmitriev and Kushner's friend collaborated on a short
written reconcihation plan for the Umted States and Russia, which Dminiev implied had been
cleared through Putin, The friend gave that proposal to Kushner before the inauguration, and
Kushner later gave copies to Bannon and incoming Secretary of State Rex Tillerson,
On December 29, 2016, then-President Obama imposed sanctions on Russia for having
interfered in the elecnon. Incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn called Russian
Ambassador Sergey Kislyak and asked Russia not to escalate the situation in response to, the
sanctions, The following day, Putin announced that Russia would not take retaliatory measures in
response to the sanctions at that time. Hours later, President-Elect Trump tweeted, "Great move
on delay (by V, Putin)." The next day, on December 31, 2016, Kislyak called Flynn and told him
the request had been received at the highest levels and Russia had chosen not to retaliate as a result
of Flynn's request.
National Security Agency — that concluded with high confidence that Russia had intervened in the
e lection through a variety of ineans to assist Trump's candidacy and harm Clinton's. A
declassified versian of the assessment was publicly released that same day.
Between mid-Januaiy 2017 and early February 2017, three congressional committees —the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence (SSCI), and the Senate Judiciary Committee (SJC) — announced that they would
conduct inquiries, or had already been conducting inquiries, into Russian interference in the
election. Then-FBI Director James Comey later confirmed to Congress the existence of the FBI's
investigation into Russian interference that had begun before the election. On March 20, 2017„ in
open-session testimony before HPSCI, Comey stated:
I have been authorized by the Department of Justice to confirm that the FBI, as part
of our counterintelligence mission, is investigating the Russian govei'nment's efforts
ta interfere in the 2016 presidential election, and that includes investigating the
nature of any links between individuals associated with the Trump oarnpaign and
the Russian government and whether there was any coordination between the
campaign and Russia's efforts... . A s with any counterintelligence investigation,
this will also include an assessment of whether any crimes w'ere committed.
The investigation caiitinucd under then-Director Comey for the next seven weeks until May 9,
2017, when President Trump fired Camey as FBI Director — an action which is analyzed in
Volume II of the report.
On May 17, 2017, Acting Attorney General Rod Rosenstein appointed the Special Counsel
and authorized him to conduct the investigation that Comey had confirmed in his congressional
testimony, as well as matters arising directly from the investigation, and any other matters within
the scope of 28 C.F,R. g 600A(a), which generally covers efforts to interfere with or obstruct the
investigation.
President Trump reacted negatively to the Special Counsel's appointment. He told advisor's
that it was the end of his presidency, sought to have Attorney General Jefferson (JeQ) Sessions
unreouse from the Russia investigation and to have the Special Counsel removed, and engaged in
efforts to curtail the Special Counsel's investigation and prevent the disclosure of evidence to it,
including through public and private contacts with potential witnesses. Those and related actions
are described and analyzed m Volume II of the report.
In reaching the charging decisions described in Volume I of the r'eport, the Office
determined whether the conduct it found amounted to a violation af federal criminal law
chargeable under the Principles of Federal Prosecution, See Justice Manual g 9-27.000 er seq.
(2018)., Thc standard set forth in the Justice Manual ls whether the conduct constitutes a crime; if
so, whether admissible evidence would pmbably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction;
U.S. Department of Justice
//
and whether prosecution would serve a substantial federal interest that could not be adequately
served by prosecution elsewhere or through non-criminal alternatives. See Justice Manual $ 9-
27.220.
Section V of the rcport provides detailed explanations of the Office's charging decisions,
which contain three main components.
First„ the Office determined that Russia's two principal interference operations in 'the 2016
U. S, presidential election — the social media campaign and the hacking-and-dumping operations-
violated U.S. criminal law. Many of the individuals and entities involved in the social media
campaign have been charged with participating in a conspiracy to defraud the United States by
undermining through deceptive acts the work of federal agencies charged with regulating foreign
influence in U.S. elections, as well as related counts of identity theft. See United States v. Internst
Researcit Agency, ei ul., No. lg-cr-32 (D.D.C,), Separately, Russian intelligence offic'ers who
carried out the hacking into Democratic Party computers and the personal email accounts of
individuals affiliated with the Clinton Campaign conspired to violate, among other federal laws,
the federal computer-intrusion statute, and the have been so char ed. Sss United Stores v.
Jfe. k sho cia/, No. 18-cr-215 D . C , , • • •
Second, while the investigation identified numerous links between individuals with ties to
the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign, the evidence was
not sufficient to support criminal charges. Among other things„ the evidence was not, sufficient to
charge any Campaign official as an unregistered agent of the Russian government or other Russian
principal, And our evidence about the June 9, 2016 meetmg and WikiLeaks's releases of hacked
materials was not sufficient to charge a criminal campaign-finance violation. Further, the evidence
was not sufficient to charge that any member of the Trump Campaign conspired with
representatives of the Russian gover nmenttointeifere in the 2016 election.
Third, the investigation established that several individuals affiliated with the Trump
Campaign lied to the Office, and to Congress, about their interactions with Russian-affiliated
individuals and related matters. Those lies materially impaired the investigation of Russian
election interference. The Office charged some of those lies as violations of the federal false-
statements statute. Former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn pleaded guilty to lying about
his interactions with Russian Ambassador Kislyak during the transition period. G e orge
Papadopoulos, a foreign policy advisor dming the campaign period, pleaded guilty to lying to
investigators about, ilirer alia, the nature and timing of his interactions with Joseph Mifsud, the
pmfessor who told Papadopculos that the Russians had dirt on candidate Clinton in the form of
thousands of emails. Former Trump Organization attorney Michael Cohen leaded il to
makin false statements to Con ress about the Trum Moscow r o'ect.
And in February 2019, the U.S, Distnct Court for e Dishict o Columbia foun that
U.S. Department of Justice
The Office investigated several other events that have been publicly reported to involve
potential Russia-related contacts. For example, the investigation established that interactions
between Russian Ambassador Kislyak and Trump Campaign officials both at the candidate's April
2016 foreign policy speech in Washington, D.C„and during the week of the Republioan National
Convention were brief, public, and non-substantive. And the investigation did not establish that
one Campaign official's efforts to dilute a portion of the Republican Party platform on providing
a ssistance to Ukraine were undertaken at the behest of candidate Trump or Russia. T h e
investigation also did not establish that a meeting between Kislyak and Sessions in September
2016 at Sessions's Senate office included any more than a passing mention of the presidential
cairip sigil.
The investigation did not always yield admissible, information or testimony, or a complete
picture of the activities undertaken by subjects of the investigation. Some individuals invoked
their Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination and were not, in the Office's
judgment, appropriate candidates for grants of immunity. The Office limited its pursuit of other
witnesses and information — such as information known to attorneys or individuals claiming to be
members of the media — in light of mternal Department of Justice policies. See, e.g., Justice
Manual 5f 9-13 400, 13 410. Some of the information obtained via court process, moreover, was
presumptively covered by legal privilege and was screened from investigators by a filter (or
"taint") team. Even when individuals testified or agreed to be interviewed, they sometimes
pmvided information that was false or incomplete, leading to some of the false-statements charges
described above. And the Office faced practical limits on its ability to access relevant evidence as
well — numerous wl'tnesses and subjects lived abroad, and documents were held outside'the United
States.
Further, the Office learned that some of the individuals we' interviewed or whose conduct
we investigated — includ'ing some associated with the Trump Campaign~ e l ated relevant
communications or communicated during the relevant period using applications that feature
encryption oi that do not pmvide for long-tenn retention of data or communications records. In
such cases, the Office was not able to corroborate witness statements thmugh comparison to
contemporaneous communications or fully question witnesses about statements that appeared
inconsisterit with other known facts.
Accordingly, while this report embodies factual and legal determinations that the Office
believes to be accurate and complete to the greatest extent possible, given these identified gapa,
the Office cannot rule out the possibility that the unavailable information would shed additional
light on (or cast in a new light) the events described in the report.
10
U.S. Department of Justice
On May 17, 2017, Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein — then serving as Acting
Attorney General for the Russia investigation following the recusal of former Attorney General
Jeff Sessions on March 2, 2016 — appointed the Special Counsel "to investigate Russian
interference with the 2016 presidential election and related matters." Office of the Deputy Att'y
Gen., Order No. 3915-2017, Appotntinent of Sperdal Counsel to Investigate Russian Interference
with the 20I 6 Presidential Election and Related Matters, May 17, 2017) (" Appointment Order' ),
Relying on "the authority vested" in the Acting Attorney General, "including 28 U.S.C. 8 509,
510, and 515," the Acting Attorney General ordered the appointment of a Special Counsel "in
order to discharge [the Acting Attorney General's] responsibility to provide supervision and
management of the Department of Justice, and to ensure a full and thorough invesugation of the
Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election." Appointment Order
(introduction). "The Special Counsel," the Order stated, "is authorized to ronduct the investigation
confirmed by then-FBI Director James B. Comey in testimony before the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence on March 20, 2017," including:
(i) any links and/or coordination between the Russian government and individuals
associated with the campaign of President Donald Trump; and
(ii) any matters that arose or may arise directly from the investigation; and
Appointment Order $ (b), Section 600.4 affords the Special Counsel "the authority to investigate
and prosecute federal crimes committed in the course of, and with intent to interfere with, the
Special Counsel's investigation, such as perjury, obstruction of justice, destruction of evidence,
and intimidation of witnesses." 28 C.F.R. f 600,4(a). The authority to investigate "any matters
that arose... directly from the investigation," Appointment Order $ (b)(ii), covers similar crimes
that may have occurred during the course of the FBI's confirmed investigation before the Special
Counsel's appohitment. "If the Special Counsel believes it is necessary and appropriate," the
Order further provided, "the Special Counsel is authorized to prosecute federal crimes arising from
the investigation of these matters." Id, g(c). Finally, the Acting Attorney General made applicable
"Sections 600.4 through 600.10 of Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations," Id, $ (d).
The Acting Attorney General further clarified the scope of the Special Counsel's
investigatory authority in two subsequent memoranda. A memorandum dated August 2, 2017,
'explained that the Appointment Order had been "worded categorically in order to permit its public
release without confirming specific investigations involving specific. individuals." I t t h en
,confirmed that the Special Counsel had been authorized since his appointment to investigate
allegations that three Trump campaign of fi cial — Carter Page, Paul Manafort, and George
Papadopoulos —"committed a rrime or crimes by colluding with Russian government offickds
with respect to the Russian government's efforts to interfere with the 2016 presidential election."
The memorandum also confirmed the Special Counsel's authority to investigate certain other
matters, including two additional sets of allegations involving Manafort (crimes arising from
payments he received from the Ukrainian government and crimes arising from his receipt of loans
11
U.S. Department of Justice
from a bank whose CEO was then seeking a position in the Trump Administration); allegations
that Papadopoulos committed a crime or crimes by acting as an unregistered agent of the Israeli
government; and four sets of allegations involving Michael Flynn, the former National Security
Advisor to President Trump.
On October 20, 2017, the Acting Attorney General confirmed in a memorandum the
Special Counsel's investigative authority as to ~ eral individuals and entities. First, "as part of a
fidl and thorough investigation of the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016
presidential election," the Special Counsel was authorized to investigate "the pertinent activities
rM;.w.ice n,avoca ~.„ x g. s~.n.,
• "
"Confirmation of the authorization to investigate such individuals," the memorandum
stressed, "does not suggest that the Spe~ial Counsel has made a determination that any of them has
committed a crime," Second, with respect to Michael Cohen, the memorandum recognized the
Special Counsel's authority to investigate "leads relate[d] to Cohen's establishment and use of
Essential Consultants LLC to, inter alia, receive funds &om Russian-backed entities." Third, the
memorandum memorialized the Special Counsel's authority to investigate individuals and entities
who were possibly engaged in "jointly undertaken activity" with existing subjects of the
investigation, including Paul Manafort. Finally, the meinorandum described an FBI investigation
opened before the Special Counsel's appointment into "allegations that [then-Attorney General
Jeff Sessions] made false statements to the United States Senate[,]" and confirmed the Special
Counsel's authority to investigate that matter.
The Special Counsel structured the investigation in view of his power and authority "to
exercise all investigative and pmsecutorial functions of any United States Attorney." 28 C..F,R.
g 600.6. Like a U.S. Attorney's Office, the Special Counsel's Office considered a range of
classified and unclassified information available to the FBI in the course of the Office's Russia
investigation, and the Office structured that work around evidence for possible use in prosecutions
of federal crhnes (assuming that one or more cr'imes were identified that warranted prosecution).
There was substantial evidence immediately available to the Special Counsel at the inception of
the investigation in May 2017 because the FBI had, by that time, already investigated Russian
election interference for nearly 10 months. The Special Counsel's Office exercised its judgment
regarding what to investigate and did not, for instance, investigate every public report of a contact
between the Tmmp Campaign and Russian-affiliated mdividuals and entities.
The Office has concluded its investigation into links and coordination between the Russian
government and individuals associated with the Truinp Campaign. Certain proceedings associated
with the Office's work remain ongoing. After consultation with the Office of the Deputy Att orney
General, the Office has transferred responsibility for those remaining issues to other components
of the Department of Justice and FBI. Appendix D lists those transfers.
Two district courts confirmed the breadth of the Special Counsel's authority to investigate
Russia election interference and links andtor coordination with the Trump Campaign. See Urdted
States v. JVanafort, 312 F. Supp. 3d 60„79-83 (D.D.C. 2018); United Statesv. Manafort, 321 F.
Supp. 3d 640, 6SO-65S (E.D. Va. 2018). In the course of conducting that investigation, the Office
periodically identified evidence of potential criminal activity that was outside the scope of the
Special Counsel's authority established by the Acting Attorney General. After consultation with
U.S, Department of Justice
the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the Office referred that evidence to appropriate law
enforcement authorities, principally other components of the Department of Justice and to the FBI.
Appendix D summarizes those referrals,
To carry out the investigation and prosecution of the matters assigned to him, the Special
Counsel assembled a team that at its high point included 19 attomcys — five of whom joined the
Office from private practice and 14 on detail or assigned &om other D epartment
of Justice
components, These auorneys were assisted by a filter teain of Department lawyers and FBI
personnel who screened materials obtained via comt process for privileged information before
turning those materials over to investigators; a support staff of three paralegals on detail fiom the
Department's Antitrust Division; and an administrative staff of nine responsible for budget,
finance, purchasing, human resources, records, facilities, security, information technology, and
administrative support. The Special Counsel attorneys and support staff were co-located with and
worked alongside approximately 40 FBI agents, intelligence analysts, forensic accountants, a
paralegal, and professional staff assigned by the FBI to assist the Special Counsel's investigation.
Those "assigned" FBI employees remained under FBI supervision at all times; the matters on
which they assisted were supervised by the Special Counsel.'
During its investigation the Office issued more than 2,800 subpoenas under the auspices of
a grand jury sittmg in the District of Columbia; executed nearly 500 search-and-seizure warrants;
obtained more tlmn 230 orders for communications i'ecords under 18 U. S,C. $ 2703(d); obtained
almost 50 orders authorizing use of pen registers; made 13 requests. to foreign governments
pursuant to Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties; and interviewed approximately 500 witnesses,
including almost 80 before a grand jury,
From its inception, the OAice recognized that its investigation could identify foreign
intelligence and oounterintelligence information relevant to the FBI's broader national security
mission. FBI personnel who assisted the Office established procedures to identify and convey
such information to the FBI. The FBI's Counterintelligence Division met vdth the Office regularly
for that purpose for most of the OAlce's tenure, For more than the past year, the FBI also
embedded personnel at the Office who did not work on the Special Counsel's investigation, but
whose purpose was to review the results of the investigation and to send — in writing — summaries
of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information to FBIHQ and FBI Field OAices,
Those communications and other correspondence between the OfAce,and the FBI contain
information derived from the investigation, not all of which is contained in this Volume, This
Volume is a summary, It contains, m the OAice's judgment, that information necessary to account
for the Special Counseps prosecution and declination decisions and to describe the invesfq;ation's
m ainfactualresults.
FBI personnel assigned to the Sperial Counsel's Office were required m adhere to all applicable
federal law and aB Department and FBI regulations, guidelines, and policies. An FBI attorney worked on
FBI-related matters for the Office, such «s FBI compliance with all FBI policies and proc'edures, including
the FBI's Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG). That FBI attorney worked under FBI
legal supervision, not the Special Counsel's supervision.
13
U.S, Department of Justice
The first form of Russian election influence came principally Ixom the Internet Research
Agency, LLC (IRA), a Russian organization funded by Ycvgeniy Viktorovich Prigozhin and
companies he controlled, including Concord Management and Consulting LLC and Concord
Catering (collectively "Concord" ).t The IRA conducted social media operations targeted at large
U,S, audiences with the goal of sowing discord in the U.S. political system.' These operations
constituted "active measures" (atcrrtattme MeponpttttTtrst), a term that typically refers to operations
conducted by Russian security services aimed at influencing the course of international affairs.s
The IRA and its employees began operations targeting the United States as early as 2014.
Using fictitious U.S. personas, IRA employees operated social media accounts and group pages
designed to attract U.S. audiences. These groups and accounts, which addressed divisive U.S.
political and social issues, falsely claimed to be controlled by U.S. activists. Over time, these
social media accounts became a means to reach large U. S, audiences. IRA employees travelled to
the United States in mid-2014 on an intelligence-gathering mission to,obtain information and
photographs for use in their social media posts.
IRA employees posted demgatory information about a number of candidates in the 2016
U.S. presidential election. By carly to mid-2016, IRA operations included supporting the Trump
Campaign and disparaging candidate Hillary Clinton. The IRA made various expenditures to carry
eut those activities, including buying political advertisements on social media m the names of U.S.
persons and entities, Some IRA employees, posing as U.S. persons and without revealing their
Russian association, communicated elechonieally with individuals associated with the Trump
Campaign and with other political activists to seek to coordinate political activities, including the
staging of political rallies. T h e investigation did not identify evidence that any U,S. persons
knowingly or intentionally coordinated with the IRA's interference operation,
By the end of the 2016 U,S, election, the IRA had the ability to reach millions of U.S.
persons thxough their social media accounts. Multiple IRA-contmlled Facebook groups and
s The Office is aware of reports that other Russian entities engaged in similai active measures
operations targeting the United States. Some evidence collected by the Office coxroboratcs those reports,
and the Office has shared that evidence with other offices in the Department of Justice and FBI.
• • s
sss also SM-22 0634, serial 44 (analysis), The FBI case numbex mt e x e, an other FBI case numbers
identified in the report, should bc treated as law cnforc'ement sensitive given the context. The report contains
additional law enfoxecmcnt sensitive information.
t As discussed in Part V below, the active measures investigation has resulted in criminal charges
against 13 individual Russian nationals and three Russian entities, principally for conspiracy to dc&aud the
United States, in violation of 18 U S C. $ 371, gee Volume I, Section V A, trtira; Indicttncnt, Unttsd States
v. Internet Research Agency, et al, I: 18-rx-32 (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2018), Doc, I ("Jntsrnet Jtesearch Agency
Indictment"'),
JntsrnetResearch 2 enc Indictment 52 ,54, 55a 56 74 •
' • • •
14
U.S. Department of Justice
• e • s • • s
I • • •
T he or anization u i ck l re w . • e • •
• • •
The rowih of the or 'zation also led to a more detailed or anizational structure.
• • • •
s Social Media Inf/usncs ia the 20/6 US. E/ection, Hearing Before the Senate Ss/ect CasimNes
an Intelggencs, 115th Cong. 13 (11/U17) (testimony of Colin Stretch, General Counsel of Facebook) (" We
estimate that roughly 29 million people were served content in their News Feeds directly from the IRA's
80,000 posts over the two years. Posts from these Pages were also shared, liked, and followed by people on
Facebook„and, as a result, three times more people may have been exposed to a story that originated from
the Russian operation. Our best estimate is that approximately 126 million people may have been served
content Gom a Page associated with the IRA at some point dming the two-year per'iod."). The Facebook
representative also testified that Facebook had identified 170 Instagram accounts that posted approximately
120,000 pieces of content during that time. Faceboek did not offer an estimate of the audience reached via
Instag ram.
' Twitter, Update on Twitter's Review of the 2016 Ug Election (Jan. 31, 2018).
' See SM-2230634, serial 92.
os es •
e e • •
n s • I •
U.S. Deyariment of Justice
//
• • 4 •
Two individuals headed the IRA" s mana ement: its eneral director Mikhail B strov and
its executive director M ikhail Burchik.
• • • s
As earl asthes rin o f 2 014 theIRAbe. unto hide its fundin and activities.
• • •
The IRA's U.S. o erations are art of a lar er set of interlockin o erations known as
Pro ect Lakhta ' • • • • •
• • • •
Until at least February 2018, Yevgeniy Viktorovich Prigozhin and two Concord comPanies
funded the IRA. Prigozhin is a wealthy Russian businessman who served as the head of Concord.
13
• • •
• •
U.S. Department of Justice
• • • • •
2 • • •
Numerous me ia
sour'ces have reported on Prtgozhin's tses to Putin, and the two ave appeared together in public
photographs.22
• • •
• • 2 •
• •
• • •
• e • 2
• • • • •
U.S, Tieasury Department, "Treasury Sanctions Individuals and Entities in Connection with
Russia's Occupation of Crimea and the Conflict in Ukraine" (Dec. 20, 20163.
20 •
21 • • • • •
'2 See, e.g., Neil MacFarquhar, Yevgeny Prigozi2in, Itrseeian Oligarch Indicted hy U8., Is Known
as "Puiin's Cook", New York'Thnes.(Feb. 16,2018J.
23 • • • • •
• 2 a • •
25 • •
17
U.S. Department of Justice
//
• • •
• •
• • •
• a s•
• • • • •
• • •
z6 ~ • • •
• • •
"T he term "troll" refers to internet users — in this context, paid operatives — who post inflammatory
or otherwise disruptive content on social media or other websites.
U.S. Department of Justice
IRA em lo ees were aware that Pri ozhin was involved in the IRA's U,S. o ' erations
• • •
• a •
In May
2016, IRA emp oyees, claiming to be U.S. soctal activists and administrators o Facebook groups,
recruited U.S. Persons to hold signs (including one in front of the White House) that read *'Happy
55thBirthda DearBoss "asanhoma etc Pri ozhin whose 55thbirthda wason June I 2016 .s'
• • •
• '
The IRA's U.S. operations sought to influence public opinion through online media and
fonuns, By the spring of 2014, the IRA began to consolidate U,S. opei'ations within a sin le
eneral de artment, known internall a s the "Translator"' e e s o t n t d e artment.
• • •
See SM-2230634,
serials 131 & 204.
'~ See SM-2230634, serial 156.
' Internet Jteseerc/r Agency Indictment P 12 b ' see n/so 5/26/16 Farebook Messages, ID
1479936895656747 (United Muslims of America) k - e
ss • • • •
• • •
• • e•
33 • a •
See SM-2230634, serial 205.
'~ See SM-2230634, serial 204 • a • •
20
U.S. Department of Justice
• • •
• a s
• • • •
Prior to travelin l ova and Bo acheva corn iled itineraries and instructions for the tri
• • • •
• a • • •
• a •
• a • •
37 • a •
s' See SM-2230634 serials 150 k 172 • • •
39 • • • •
21
U.S. Deparlment of Justice
//
• • •
• • •
Dozens of IRA employees were responsible for operating accounts and personas on
different U,S. social media platforms, The IRA refened to employees assigned to operate the
social media accounts as "specialists.'~ S tarting as early as 2014, the IRA's U,S. operations
included social media specialists focusing on Facebook, You Tube,, and Twitter.4s The IRA later
added specialists who operated on Tumblr and Instagram accounts.~
Initially, the IRA created social media accounts that pretended to be the personal accounts
of U.S. persons, ' B y early 2015, the IRA began to create larger social media groups or public
social media pages that claimed (falsely) to be affiliated with U,S. political and grassroots
organizations. In certain cases, the IRA created accounts that mimicked real U.S. organizations.
For example, one IRA-controlled Twitter account, @TEN GOP, purported to be connected to the
Tennessee Republican Party. M o r e commonly, the IRA created accounts in the names of
fictitious U.S. organizations and grassroots groups and used these accounts to pose as anti-
immigration groups, Tea Parly activists, Black Lives Matter protestors, and other U.S. social and
political activists.
The IRA closel monitored the activit o f its social media accounts,
• • 9 e
• • • • •
40 • • e •
41 , • • • • •
4r .
• • o•
43 • • •
• • •
• • •
a • • a
By February 2016, internal IRA documents referred to su ort for the Trump Campaign
and opposition to candidate Ciinton.ss For exam Ie, directions to IRA
o erators
"Main idea: Use any opportuni t o critimze Hill C ' n t on and the rest exce t
Sanders and Trum - we su o rt them ."sc
The focus on the U.S. presidential campaign continued throughout 2016. In g~g 2016
internal g @g~ reviewing the IRA-contmlled Faceboolc group ' *Secured Borders," the
• • •
author criticized the "Iower number of posts dedicated to criticizing Hillary Clinton" and reminded
* '
the Facehook specialist "it is imperative to intensify ctiticizing Hillary Clinton.'
IRA employees also acknowled ed that their work focused on influencin t h e U.S.
residential election. • •
• • • •
Man IRA o erations used Facebook accounts created and o crated b its s ecialists.
• • • •
• • o
• • •
• a •
• • •
• •
• a e •
U.S. Department of Justice
groups (with names such as "Being Patriotic," "Stop All Immigrants," "Secured Borders," and
"Tea Party News" ), purported Black social justice groups (" Black Matters," "Blacktivist," and
"Don't Shoot Us"),, LGBTQ groups ("LGBT United" ), and religious groups (" United Muslims of
America" ).
To reach larger U.S. audiences„ the IRA purchased advertisements from Facebook that
promoted the IRA groups on the newsfeeds of U.S. audience members, According to Facebook,
the IRA purchased over 3,500 advertisements, and the expenditures totaled approximately
100i000 ss
Social Media Irtfiaence tn the 2016 IIS. Elect/art, IIem:ing Before the Serrate Select Committee
on Irttelligetrce„115th Cong. 13 (11/I/17) (testimony of Colin Stretch, General Counsel of Facebook).
s 3/18/16 Faeebook Advertisement ID 6045505152575.
+ 4/6/16 Fscebook Advertisement ID 60437402253,19.
ssSee SM-2230634, serial 213 (documenflng politically-oriented advertisements from the larger
set prordded by Facebook).
w 4/19/I 6 Facebook Advertisement ID 6045151094235.
U.S. Department of Justice
Collectively, the IRA's social media accounts reached tens of millions of U.S. persons.
Individual IRA social media accounts attracted hundreds of thousands of followers. For example,
at the time they were deactivated by Facebook in mid-2017„ the IRA *s "United Muslims of
America"Facebook group had over 300„000 fogowers, the "Don't Shoot Us" Facebook group had
over 250,000 followers, the "Being Patriotic' * Facebook group had over 200,000 followers„and
the "Secured Borders" Facebook Stoup had over 130,000 followers,m According to Facebook, in
total the IRA-controlled accounts made over 80,000 posts before their deactivation in August 2017,
and these posts reached at least 29 million U.S persons and "may have reached an estimated 126
million people."m
The IRA s Twitter operations mvolved two strata ies. First IRA s eciahsts o crated
certain Twitter accounts to create individual U.S. ersonas • • •
• • •
• 0 •
• • • •
• •
Social Media I~+uence in the 2626 /JS. Election, Hearing Before the Senate Select Committee
on fntelligence, 115th Cong, 13 (11/I/17) (testimony of Colin Stretch, Genera1 Counsel of Facebook),
m • • •
e • • •
• • • •
U.S. Department of Justice
• • 66
The IRA operated indivi ualize T w itter accounts similar' to the operation of its Facebook
accounts, by continuously posting original content to the accounts while also communicating with
U,S. Twitter users directly (through public tweeting or Twitter's private messaging).
The IRA used many of these accounts to attempt to influence U.S. audiences on the
election. I n dividualized accounts used to influence the U.S. presidential election included
@TEN GOP (described above); @jenn abrams (claiming to be a Virginian Trump supporter with
70,000 followers); ®Famcla Moore13 (claiming to be a Texan Trump supporter with 70„000
followers); and @America' 1st (an anti-immigration persona with 24,000 followers). In May
2016, the IRA created the Twitter account ®march for trump, which promoted IRA-organized
rallies in support of the Trump Campaign (described below). '
• • • •
• • •
Using these accounts and others, the IRA provoked reactions from users and the media. Multiple
IRA-posted tweets gained popularity. U .S. media outlets also quoted bveets from IRA-controlled
accounts and attributed them to the icactions of real U.S. persons. ' Similarly, numerous high-
• c •
Other individualized accounts included @MissouriNcwsUS (an account with 3,800 followers
that posted pro-Sanders and anti-Clinton material).
" See@march for trump, 5/30/16 Tweet (flrst post from account).
69 • • • • •
w For example, one IBA account tweetcd, "To those people, who hate the Confederate flag. Did
you know that the flag and the war wasn't about slavery, it was all about money." Thc tweet received over
40,000 responses. @Jcnn Abrams 4/24/17 (2:37 p,m.) Tweet.
' Josephine Luldto k. Chris Wells, Most Major Outlets Have Vsed Russian Tweets as Sources for
Partisan Opim'an: S~ , Co lumbia Journalism Review (Mar. 8, 2018);see also Twiner Steps Vp to Explain
ttttewYorkValues to Ted Cruz, Washington Post (Jan. 15, 2016) (citing IRA tweet); People Are Slamming
the CJA for Claiming Russia Tried to Help Donald Trump, U.S. News ht World Report g3cc. 12, 2016).
U.S. Department of Justice
profile U.S, persons, including former Ambassador Michael McFaul, R o ger Stone s Sean
Hannity,s» and Michael Flynn Jr.,ss re'tweeted or responded to tweets posted to these IRA-
controlled accounts. Multiple individuals affiliated with the Trump Campaign also promoted IRA
tweets (discussed below).
• • s •
• a •• •
• • •
In January 2018, Twitter publicly identified 3,814 Twitter accounts associated with the
IRA, Ac cording to Twitter, in the ten weeks before the 2016 U.S. presidential election, these
accounts posted approximately 175,993 tweets, "approximately 8,4'l» of which were election-
'
78 • • • •
Eli Rosenbeig, Twitter to Tell 677, 000 Users they grere IInd hy the Russtans. Some Signs Show
the Problem Continues, Washington Past (Jan, 19, 2019),
U,S. Department of Justice
related." Tw i tter also announced that it had notified approximately 1.4 million people who
Twitter believed may have been in contact with an IRA-controlled account.si
The IRA organized and promoted political rallies msidc the United States while posing as
U.S. grassroots activists. F irst, the IRA used one of its preexisting social media personas
(Facebook groups and Twitter accounts, for example) to announce and promote the event. Thc
IRA then sent a large number of direct messages to followers of its social media account asking
them to attend the event. From those who responded with interest in attending, the IRA then sought
a U.S, person to serve as thc event's coordinator. In most cases, the IRA account operator would
tell the U.S. person that they personally could not attend the event due to some preexisting conflict
or because they were somewhere else in the United States.'s The IRA then further promoted the
event by contacting U.S. media about the event and directing them to speak with the coordinator.ss
After the event, the IRA posted videos and photographs of the event to the IRA's social media
accounts.
The Office identified dozens of U.S. rallies organized by the IRA. The earliest evidence of
a rally was a "confederate rally" in November 2015.ss The IRA continued to organize rallies even
after the 2016 U.S, presidential election. The attendance at rallies varied. Some rallies appear to
have drawn few (if any) participants while others drew hundreds. The reach and success of these
rallies was closel m onitored
Twitter, "Update on Twiffer's Review of the 2016 US Election" (updated Jan. 31, 2018), Twitter
also reported identifying 50,258 automated accounts connected to the Russian government, which twccted
more than a million times in the ten weeks before the election.
" Twitter, "Update on Twitter's Review of the 2016 US Election" (updated Jan. 31, 2018).
0/20/169 0 kM g , 1 0 100tl09922909661/M gg gk 2 t I D ~
As early as 2014, the IRA instructed its employees to target U.S, persons who could be
used to advance its operational goals, Initiall r e cruitment focused on U.S. ersons who could
am lif t he content osted th e IRA. •a •
• • •
" The pro- Trump rallies were organized tbmugh multiple Facebook, Twitter, snd email accounts.
See, e.g., Facebook ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber); Facebook ID 1601685693432389 (Being
Patriotic') ; Twitter Account. Nmarch for trump; beingpatriotictigmail.corn. '(Rallies were organized in
New York on June'2S, 2016,' Florida on August 20, 2016; and Pennsylvania on October 2, 2016.)
87 . • • • • •
ss • • • •
31
U.S. Department of Justice,
while posing as a grassroots group called "Black Matters US,'us In February 2017, the persona
"Black Fist" (purporting to want to teach African-Americans to protect themselves when contacted
by law enforcement) hired a self-defense instructor m New York to offer classes sponsored by
Black Fist. The IRA also recruited moderators of conservative social media groups to promote
IRA-generated content,sc as well as recruited individuals to perform political acts (such as walking
around New York City dressed up as Santa Claus with a Trump mask)."
• a • •
• • •
as the IRA's online audience became larger, the IRA tracked U.S.
persons wtth w om they communicated and had successfully tasked with tasks ran in . Irom
or anizin rallies to takin ic t ures with certain olitical messa es .
s • • •
The investigation identified two different forms of connections between the IRA and
members of the Trump Campaign. (The investigation identified no similar connections between
the IRA and the Cihnon Campaign,) First, on multiple occasions, members and surrogates of the
Trump Campaign promoted — typically by linking, retweeting, or similar methods of reposting-
pro-Trump or anti-Clinton content published by the IRA through IRA-controlled social media
accounts. Additionally, in a few instances, IRA employees represented themselves as U,S, persons
to communicate with members of the Trump Campaign in an effort to seek assistance and
coordination on IRA-organized political rallies inside the United States.
Among the U.S. "leaders of public opinion" targeted by the IRA were various members '
and surrogates of the Trump Campaign. In total, Trump Campaign affiliates promoted dozens of
tweets, posts, and other political content created by the IRA.
Posts Born the IRA-controlled Twitter account ®TEN GOP were cited or retweeted by
m ultiple Trump Campaign oIIIcials and surrogates, including Donald J. Trump Jr., E r i c
' Ses, e.g., @DonaldJTrumpJr 10/26/16 Tweet ("RT ®TEN GOP: BREAKING Thousands of
names changed on voter rolls in Indiana. Police Investigating ¹Uoterpraud. ¹DrainTheSwamp.");
@DonaldJTrwnpJr 11/2/16 Tweet ('"RT ®TEN GOP: BREAKING: ¹UoterFraud by counting tens of
thousands of ineligible mail i n H i llary votes being reported in Broward County, Florida.");
@DonaldJTrumpJr 11/8/16 Tweet C'RT @TEN GOP: This vet passed away last month before he could
vote for Trump. Here he is in his ¹MAGA hat. ¹voted ¹ElectionDay."). Trump Jr. retweeted additional
®TEN GOP content subsequent to the election.
U,S, Depar!ment of Justice
Trump,s Kellyanne Conway,s Brad Parscale, 6 and Michael T. Flynn.'4 These posts included
allegations of voter fraud,'s' as well as allegations that Secretary Clinton had mishandled
classified information.' s
IRA employees monitomd the reaction of the Trump I 1!01 ' ALQ
Campaign and, later, Trump Adminishation officials to their
tweets. F o r example, on August 23, 2016, the IRA-
controlled persona "Matt Skiberw Facebook account sent a
message to a U.S. Tea Party activist, writing that "Mr. e l e w r m I est
Trump posted about our event m Miami! This is greatlw'
The IRA employee included a screenshot of candidate
Trump's Facebook account, which included a post about the gcreenehot of Trump Facebook
August 20, 2016 political rallies organized by the IRA. Account /from Matt Shiber)
rn ®EricTrump 10/20/16 Tweet (NRT @TEN GOP: BREAKING Hillary shuts down press
conference when asked about DNC Operatives corruption k, ¹VoterFraud ¹debatenight ¹TrutnpBN ).
'6 @Kellyannepolis 11/6/16 Tweet (NRT ®TEN GOP: Mother of jailed sailor: 'Hold Hillary to
same standards as my son on Classified info' ¹hillarysemail ¹WeinerGate.w),
" ®parscale 10/I 6/16 Tweet (" Thousands of deplorables chanting to the media: 'Tell The 'Auth! '
RT if you are also done w/ biased Media! ¹FridayFeeling").
'm NGenplynn 11/7/I 6 (retweeting @TEN GOP post that included in part w'@realDonaidTrump
N
86 @mike~ence will be our next POTUS 8t, VPOTUS. ).
' ' I T E N GOp 10/11/16 Tweet N( North Camlina finds 2/14 voters over the age of 110!!'g.
'6 WTEN GOP 11/6/16 Tweet ( MMother of jailed sailor: 'Hold Hillary to same standards as my
son on classified info ¹hillaryemiil ¹WeinerGaa.' w).
'@DonaldJTrump Jr 11/7/16 Tweet (NRT®pamela Moore13: Detroit residents speak out against
the failed policies of Obama, Hillary br democrats....").
TEE
@realDonaldTruynp 9/19/17 (7:33 p.m.) Tweet C'THANK YOU for your support Miami! My
team just shared photos fiom your TRUMP SIGN WAVING DAY, yesterday! I love you —and there is no
question — TOGETHER, WE WILL MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN! w).
" ' 2/22/M 9 e I M 2 , I D l t lell09922902001 IM tt e l ' 0* ) t ID ~
U,S. Department of Justice
• • • • •
Starting in June 2016, the IRA contacted dlfl'eront U.S, persons affiliated with the Trump
Campaign in an effort to coordinate pro-Trump IRA-organizedrallies inside the United States. In
all cases, the IRA contacted the Campaign while rlaiming to be U.S, political activists working on
behalf of a conservative grassroots organization. The IRA's contacts included requests for signs
and other materials to use at rallies," as well as requests to promote the rallies and help coordinate
logistics.tss While certain campaign volunteers agreed to provide the requested support (for
example, agieeing to set aside a number of signs), the investigation has not identified evidence
that any Trump Campaign official understood the requests were coming from foreign nationale.
In sum, the investigation established that Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election
through the "acflve measures" social media campaign carried out by the IRA, an organization
funded by Prigozhin and companies that he controlled. As explained futther in Volume I, Section
V.A, infra, the Office concluded (and a grandj ury has alleged) that Prignzhin, his companies, and
IRA employees violated U.S. Iaw through these operations, principally by undetmining through
deceptive acts the work of federal agencies charged with regulating foreign influence in U.S.
elections.
106 ,
• • • •
Beginning in March 2016, units of the Russian Federation's Main Intelligence Directorate
of the General Staff (GRU) hacked the computers and email accounts of organizations, employees,
and volunteers supporting the Clinton Campaign, including the email account of campaign
cliairman John Podesta. Starting in April 2016„ the GRU hacked mto the computer networks of the
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) and the Democratic National
Committee (DNC). The GRU targeted hundreds of email accounts used by Clinton Campaign
employees, advisors, and volunteers. In total, the GRU stole hundreds of thousands of documents
from the compromised email accounts and networks,'cs The GRU later released stolen Clinton
Campaign and DNC documents through online pcrsonas, "DCLeaks" and "'Guccifer 2.0," and later
through the, organization WikiLeaks, The release of the documents was designed and timed to
interfere with thc 2016 U,S. presidential election and undermine the Clinton Campaign.
The Trum Cam ai s h owed interest in the WikiLeaks releases and, in the summer and
fall of 2016 •
• a
er
Wi iLeaks's first C inton-related release a „the Trump Campaign
sta e in contact + about WikiLeaks's activities. The investigation was unable to resolve
WikiLcaks's release of the stolen Podesta emails on October 7,
2016, the same day a video fmm years earlier was published of Trump using graphic language
about wmnen.
Two military units of the GRU carried out the computer intrusions into the Clinton
Campaign, DNC, and DCCC: Military Units 26165 and '74455,U Military Unit 26165 is a GRU
cyher unit dedicated to targeting military, political, governmental, and non-governmental
organizations outside of Russia, including in the United States."' The unit was sub-divided into
departments with different specialties. One department, for example, developed specialized
malicious software *'mahvare" while another de ariment conducted large-scale spearphishing
campaigns 'u a bitcoin mining operation to
" As discussed in Section V below, our Office charged 12 GRU officers for crimes arising from
the hacking of these computers, principally with ccnspinng tc commit computer intrusions, in violation of
18 U.S.C. 81030 and 371. See Volume I, Section V,B, inpa; Indictment, Uaired Statesv. ¹I yhvhc, Nc.
I:18-cr-215 (D.D.C. July 13, 2018),, Doc. I ("¹ tyhrhc lndictmcnt").
'" ¹ iy hshcIndictment $ 1.
"' Separate from this Oflice's indirtment of GRU officers, in October 2018 a grand jury sitting in
the Western District of Pennsylvania returned an indictmcnt charging certain members of Unit 26165 with
backing the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, the World Anti-Doping Agency, and other internadonal sport
associations. United Statesv. Alchsei ger geyevich itforeriers, No. 18-263 (W.D. Pa.).
" A spcarphishing email is designed to appear as 'though it originates from a trusted source, anil
solicits inforrcation to enable the sender to gain access tc au account or network, or causes the recipient tc
U.S, Department, of Justice
//
Military Unit 74455 is a related GRU unit with multiple departments that engaged m cyher
operations. Unit 74455 assisted in the release of documents stolen by Unit 26165, the promotion
of those releases„and the publication of 'anti-Clinton content on social media accounts operated by
the GRU. Officers from Unit 74455 separately hacked computers belonging to state boards of
elections, secretaries of state, and U.S. companies that supplied software and other technology
related to the adminish'ation of U.S. elections."s
Beginning in mid-March 2016, Unit 26165 had primary responsibility for hacking the
DCCC arid DNC, as well as email accounts of individuals affiliated with the Clinton Campaign:"
egan efore the GRU had obtained any cre entials or gamed access
to e se netwoi , i n dicating that the later DCCC and DNC intrusions were not crimes of
opportunity but rather the result of targeting,"
GRU officers also sent hundreds of spearphishing emails to the work and personal email
accounts of Clinton Campaign employees and volunteers, Between March 10, 2016 and March
15, 2016, Unit 26165 appears to have sent approximately 90 spkarphishing emails to email
accounts at hillaryclinton.corn. Starting on March 15, 2016, the GRU began targeting Google
email accounts used by Clinton Campaign employees, along with a smaller mnnber of dnc.org
email accounts."
The GRU spearphishing operation enabled it to gain access to numerous email accounts of
Clinton Campaign employees and volunteers, including campaign chairman John Podesta, junior
volunteers assigned to the Clinton Campaign's advance team, informal Clinton Campaign
advisors, and a DNC employee." G R U o f ficers stole tens of thousands of emails Irom
spearphishing victims, including various Clinton Campaign-related communications.
download malware that enables the sender to gain access to an account or network. ¹I y hshoIndictmknt
$ 10.
" Bitcoin mining consists of unlocking new bitcoins by solving computational problems, II
kept 'its newly mined coins in an account on the bitcoin exchange platform CEX,io. To make
purchases, the ORU muted funds into other accounts thmugh transactions designed to obscure the source
of funds. ¹ /yhsho Indictment $ 62.
" ¹ ty hsho Indictment ti 69.
'" ¹ r yhsho
Indictment $ 9,
'" See SM-2589105, serials 144 rk 495.
117
1is
37
U.S. Deyartment of Justice
//
a Initial Access
By no later than April 12, 2016, the GRU had gained access to the DCCC computer
network using the credentials stolen from a DCCC employee who had been successfully
spearphished the week before. O ver the ensuing weeks, the GRU traversed the network,
identifying different computers conneoted to the DCCC network. By stealing network access
credentials along the way (including those of IT administrators with unrestricted access to the
system), the GRU compromised approximately 29 different computers on the DCCC network."
Approximately six days after first hacking into the DCCC network, on April 18, 2016,
GRU oAicers gained access to the DNC network via a virtual private network (VPN) connection'2
between the DCCC and DNC networks.'2' Between April 18, 2016 and June 82 2016, Umt 26165
compromised more than 30 computers on the. DNC network, including the DNC mail server and
shared file server.'22
Unit 26165 implanted on the DCCC and DNC networks two tyyes of customized
malware s' known as "X-Agent'* and "X-Tunnel"; Mimikatz, a credential-harvesting tool; and
rar.exe, a tool used in these intrusions to compile and comyress materials far exfiltration. X-Agent
was a multi-funotion hacking tool that allovved Unit 26165 to log keystrokes, take screenshots, and
gather other data about the infected computers (e.g., file directories, operating systems}.' 4 X-
Tunnel was a hacking tool that created an encrypted connection between the victim DCCC/DNC
computers and GRU-controlled comyuters outside the DCCC and DNC networks that was capable
of large-scale data transfers, 2 GRU officers then used X-Tunnel to exfiltrate stolen data from the
victun computers.
119
A VPN extends a private network, allowing users to send and receive data across public
networks (such as the internet) as if the connecting computer was dir'ectly connected to the private network
The VPN in this case had been created, to @ve a small number of DCCC employees access to certain
databases housed on the DNC network, Therefore, while the DCCC employees were outside the DNC's
private network2 they could access parts of th'e DNC netwotk from their DCCC computers.
121
SM-2589105-HACK, serial 5.
122
M -2589105-HACK, seri 5 .
' '"Malware" is shortforinalicious software, and here refers to sofhvare designed to allow a third
party to infiltrate a computer without the, consent or knowledge of the computer's user or operator,
124
222
U.S, Department of Justice
To operate X-Agent and X-Tunnel on the DCCC and DNC networks, Unit 26165 officers
set up a group of computers outside those networks to communicate with the implanted
malware,tss The first set of GRU-conttolled computers, known by the GRU as "middle servers,"
sent and received messages to and from malware .on the DNC/DCCC networks,. The middle
servers,in turn,relayed messages to a second setof GRU-conn oiled corn uters labeled internally
by the GRU as an "AMS Panel." The AMS Panel served as a
nerve center through which GRV officers monitored and directed the ma ware's operations on the
DNC/DCCC networks. tsv
The AMS Panel used to connol X A ent during the DCCC and DNC intrusions was housed
on a leased corn uter located near At'tzorla.
"' I n connection with these intmsions, the GRU used computers (virtual private networks,
dedicated servers operated by hosting companies, etc.) that it leased fmm third.-party providers located all
over the world, The investi t i on identified rental a eements and payments for computers located in, inter
alla, all ot' which were used in the operations
targettng the U. S, e ection.
ur Hetv/rs/to Indictment il 25.
39
U,S. Department of Justice
The Arizona-based AMS Panel also stored thousands of files containing keylogging
sessions captured through X-Agent. These sessions were cultured as GRU officers monitored
DCCC and DNC 'employees' work on infected computers regularly between April 2016 and June
2016. Data captured in these keylogging sessions included passwords, internal communications
between employees, banking information, and sensitive personal information.
Officers from Unit 26165 stole thousands of documents from the DCCC and DNC
networks, including significant amounts of data pertaming to the 2016 U.S, federal elections.
Stolen documents included internal strategy documents, fundraising data, opposition research, and
emails from the work inboxes of DNC employees.'3
The GRU began stealing DCCC data shortly after it gained access to the network. On April
14, 2016 (approximately three days affer the initial hrtrusion) GRU officers downloaded rar.exe
onto the DCCC's document server. The, following day, the GRU searched one compromised
DCCC computer for files containing search terms that included "Hillary," "DNC " C ruz," and
"Trump."' ' On April 25, 2016, the GRU collected and compressed PDF and Microsoft documents
from folders on the DCCC's shared file server that pertained to the 2016 election."2 The GRU
appears to have compressed and exfiltrated over 70 gigabytes of data from this file server.'
The GRU also stole documents from the DNC network shortly after gaining access. On
April 22, 2016, the GRU copied files from the DNC network to GRU-controlled computers. Stolen
documents included the DNC's opposition research into candidate Trump.' Bet w een
approximately May 25„2016 and June I, 2016, GRU officers accessed the. DNC's mail server
fmm a GRU-controlled computer leased inside the United States.'3 During these connections,
132
133
134
SM-2589105-HAC s e rial 5,
133
~ See SM-2589105-GJ, serial 649. As part i t s investigation, t e FBI ster received images of DNC
servers and copies of relevant traffic logs.¹tyhsho Indictment g 28-29.
U.S. Department of Justice
Unit 26165 afficers appear ta have stolen thousands of emails and attachments, which were later
released by WikiLeaks in July 2016.'
The GRU's operations extended beyond stealing materials, and included releasing
documents stolen from the Clinton 'Campaign and its supporters. The GRU carried out the
anonymous release through twu fictitious online personas that it created — DCLeaks and Guccifer
2.0 — and later through the organization WikiLeaks.
1. DCLeaks
Th'e GRU began planning the releases at least as early as April 19, 2016, when Unit 26165
registered the domain dcleaks,corn through a service that anonymized the registrant. 7 Unit 26165
paid for the registration using a pool of bitcoin that it had mined, 'ss The dcleaks corn landing page
pointed to different trenches of stolen dacuments, arranged by victim or subject matter. Other
dcleaks.corn pages contained indexes of the stolen emails that were being released (bearing the
sender, recipient, and date of the email). Ta control access and the timing of releases, pages were
sometimes password-protected for a period of time and later made unrestricted to the public.
Starthtg in June 2016, the GRU posted stolen documents onto the website dcleaks.corn,
including documents stolen f'iom a number of individuals associated with the Clintan Campaign.
These documents appeared to have originated from personal email accounts (in particular, Gaagle
and Microsoft accounts), rather than the DNC and DCCC comyuter networks. DCLeaks victims
included an advisor to the Clinton Campaign, a former DNC emyloyee and Clinton Campaign
emyloyee, and four other campaign volunteers, 3 T h e GRU released through dcleaks.corn
thausands of documents, including personal identifying and financial information, internal
correspondence related to the Clinton Campaign and yrior political jobs, and fundraising files and
infarmatian.'
Nety/rshoIndictment $ 29, The last-in-time DNC email released by WikiLeaks was dated May
25, 2016, the same period of time during which the GRU gained access to the DNC's email server.
Netyks/roIndictment $ 45.
'~ Netyks/to Indictment g 35. Approximately a week before the registration of dcleaks,corn, the
same actors attem ted to re 'ster the website electionleaks.corn using the same domain registration service.
, emails belonging
to , and emails fmm 2015 re sting to Repub ican Party employees (un er the portfolio name
"The Unite S tates Republican Pariy"}. "The United States Republican Party" portfolio contained
apyroximately 300 emails fi'om a variety of GOPmembers, PACs, campaigns, state parties, snd businesses
dated between May and October 2015. According to open-source reporting, these victims shared the same
41
U,S, Depariment of Justice
GRU officers operated a Facebook page under the DCLeaks moniker, which they primarily
used to promote releases of materials,'4' The Facebook page was administered through a small
number {rf preexisting GRU-controlled Facebook accounts.'4s
GRU officers also used the DCLeaks Facebook account, the Twitter account ®dcleaks,
and the email account dcleaksproject®Smail.corn to communicate privately with reporters and
other U,S. persons. GRU officers using the DCLeaks persona gave certain reporters early access
to archives of leaked files by sending them links and passwords to pages an the dcleaks.corn
website that had not yet become public. For example, on July 14, 2016, GRU officers operating
under the DCLeaks persona sent a link and password for a nan-public DCLeaks webyage to a U.S;
reporter via the Facebook account.'4' Similarly, on September 14, 2016, GRU officers sent
reporters Twitter direct messages I'rom @dcleaks w ith a password ta another non-yublic part of
the dcleaks.corn wehsite,'®
The DCLeaks.corn website remained oyerational and public until March 2017.
2. Guccifer 2.0
On June 14, 2016, 'the DNC and its cyber-response team announced the breach of the DNC
network and suspected theft of DNC documents. In the statements, the cyber-response team
alleged that Russian state-sponsored actors (which they referred to as "Fancy Bear" ) were
responsible far the breach.'ss Apparently in response to that announcement, on June 15„2016,
GRU officers using the persona Guccifer 2.0 created a WordPress blog. In the hours leading up
to the launch of that WordPress blag, GRU officers logged into a Moscow-based server used and
managed by Unit 74455 and searched for a number of specific words and phrases in English,
including "some hundred sheets," "illuminati," and *'worldwide known." A ppraximately two
hours after the last of those searches„Guccifer 2.0 published its first post, attributing the DNC
server hack to a lone Romanian hacker and using several of the unique English words and phrases
that the GRU officers had searched for that day.'+
Tennessee-based web-hosting comyany, called Sinartech Corporation. William Bastone,RISC E-Mail W'os,
In Foot, IIocked By Bossions, The Smoking Gun (Dec. 13, 2'016).
aa¹tyksho Indictment $ 38.
See, e.g., Facebook Account 100008825623541 (Alice Donavan).
7/14/16 Facebo'ok Message, ID 793058100795341 (DC Leaks) to ID
'"" See, e , 9/14/16 Twitter DM, d c l eaks ta ; 9/14/16 Twitter DM,
Ndcleaks to . The messages read: cHi https://t.co/{JTvKUj{JcGx pass:
KvFsg%*14{Rgpgudtamp; enjoy; )."
Dmitri Alperavitch, Bears in the Midst; Intrusion into th'e Democratic Rational Contnuttee,
CrawdStrike Blog (June 14, 2016), Crowdgnike updated its post after the June 15„2016 post by Gucuifer
2.0 claiming responsibility for the intrusion.
¹t yksho Indictment $$ 4 IA2.
U.S. Department of Justice
That same day, June 15, 2016, the GRU also used the Gueeifer 2,0 WordPress blog to begin
releasing to the public documents stolen from the DNC and DCCC computer networks. The
Guccifer 2,0 persona ultimately released thousands of documents stolen frain the DNC and DCCC
in a series of blog posts between June 15, 2016 and October lg, 2016.'47 Released documents
included opposrtion research performed by the DNC (including a memorandum analyzing
potential criticisms of candidate Trump), internal policy documents (such as recommendations on
haw to address politically sensitive issues), analyses of specific congressional races, and
fundraising documents. Releases were organized around thematic issues, such as specific states
(o,g,, Florida and Pennsylvania) that were perceived as competitive in the 2016 U.S. presidential
election.
Beghming in late June 2016, the GRU also used the Guccifer 2.0 persona to release
documents directly to reporters and other intbrested individuals, Specifically, on June 27, 2016„
Guccifer 2.0 sent an email to the news outlet The Smoking Gun offering to pravide "exclusive
access to some leaked emails linked [toJ Hillary Clinton's staff.'uss The GRU latex sent the
reporter a password and link to a locked portion of the deleaks,corn website that contained an
archive of emails stolen by Unit 26165 from a Clinton Campaign volunteer in March 2016.' T h at
the Guccifer 2.0 persona provided reporters access to a restricted portion of the DCLeaks website
tends to indicate that both personas were aperated by the same or a closely-related group of
people us
The GRU continued its release efforts through Guccifer 2,0 into August 2016. F or
example, on August 15, 2016, the Guceifer 2.0 persona sent a candidate foi the U.S, Congress
documents related to the candidate's opponent.'si On August 22, 2016, the Guccifer 2.0 persona
tmnsferred approximately 2.5 gigabytes of Florida-related data stolen from the DCCC to a U.S.
blogger covering Florida politics.'ss On August 22, 2016, the Guccifer 2.0 persona sent a U.S.
reparter documents stolen from the DCCC pertaining to the Black Lives Matter movement.
ae Releasesof documents on the Guccifer 2,0 blog occurred on June 15,2016; June 20, 2016; June
21, 2016; July 6, 2016; July 14, 2016; August 12, 2016; August 15, 2016; August 21, 2016,' August 31,
2016; September 15, 2016; September 23, 2016; October 4, 2016; and October Ig, 2016.
6/27/16 Email c c [email protected] 'to (subject "leaked emails");•
The GRU was also in contact throu h the Guccifer2.0 ersona with a former
Trum Cam ai n member
3. Use of WikiLeaks
In order to expand its interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the GRU units
transferred many of the documents they stole from the DNC and the chairman of the Clinton
Cainpaign to WikiLeaks. GRU officers used both the DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0 personas to
cominunicate with WikiLeaks through Twitter private messaging and through encrypted channels,
including possibly through WikiLeaks's private communication system.
WikiLeaks, and particularly its founder Julian Assange, privately expressed opposition to
candidate Clmton well before the first release of stolen documents. In November 2015, Assange
wrote to other members and associates of WikiLeaks that "[w]e believe it would be much better
for GOP to win.. . Dems+Media+liberals woudl [sic] then form a block to reign in their worst
qualities... , Wi t h H i l lary i n charge, GOP wi ll b e p ushing for h er w o rst q ualities.,
dems+media+neoliberals will be mute... . She's a bright, well connected, sadisitic sociopath n s
in •
lss • a • + •
[W]e want this repository to become "the place" to search for background on hillary's
plotting at'thc state department during 2009-2013... . F irstly because its useful and will
annoy Hillary, but secondly because we want to be seen to be a resource/player in the US
election, because, eit [sic] may en[]courage people to send us even more important leaks.'
Shortly after the GRU"s first release of stolen do'cuments through dcleaks.corn in June
2016, GRU officers also used the DCLeaks persona to contact WikiLeaks about possible
coordination in the future release of stolen emails. On June 14, 2016, @ dcleaks sent a direct
message to @WikiLeaks, noting, "You announced your organization was preparing to publish
mote Hillary's emails. We are ready to support you, We have some sensitive information too, in
particular, her financial documents, Let" s do it to ether, What do ou think about ublishin our
info at the same moment'7 Thank ou."' v
Around the same time, WikiLeaks initiated communications with the GRU persona
Guccifer 2.0 shortly after it was used to release documents stolen from the DNC. On June 22,
2016, seven days after Guccifer 2.0's first release~ of stolen DNC documents, WikiT,eaks used
Twitter's direct message function to contact the Guccifer 2.0 Twitter account and suggest that
Guccifer 2.0 "[s]end any new material [stolen from the DNC] here for us to review and it will have
a much higher impact than what you are doing." s
On July 6, 2016, WikiLeaks agrdn contacted Guccifer 2.0 through Twitter's private
messaging function, writing, "if you have anything hillary related we want it in the next tweo [sic]
days prefable [sic] because the DNC is approaching and she will solidify bernie supporters behind
her afier," The Guccifer 2.0 persona responded, "ok.. . i see." WikiLeaks also explained, "we
think trump has only a 25% chance of winning against hillary. . . so conflict between bernie and
hillary is interesting."' '
Both the GRU and WikiLeaks sought to hide their communications, which has limited the
Office's ability to collect all of the communications between them. Thus, although it is clear that
td t t DN D d f d t d dt t wd f df d DRD t WR K , d
' ' 3/14/16 Twitter DM, @WikiLeaks to Less than two weeks earlier, the same
account had been used to send a private message opposing the i es of Clinton "in whitehouse, with her
bloodlutt and amitions [sic] of empire with hawkish liberal-interventionist appointees,D 11/19/15 Twitter
Group Chat, Group ID 594242937858486276, @WikiLeaks et al,
"v 6/14/16 Twitter DM, ®dcleaks to @WikiLeaks.
/t/erykshoIndictment t[ 47(a),
"' 7/6/16 Twitter DMs, ®WikiLeaks Sd ®guccifer 2.
U.S. Department of' Justice
The Office was able to identify when the GRU (operating through its personas Guccifer 2 0
and DCLeaks) transferred some of the stolen documents to WikiLeaks thmugh online archives set
up by the GRU. Assan e had access to the internet from the Ecuadorian Embass in London
*
E l a nd.
On July 14, 2016, GRU officers used a Guccifer 2.0 email account to send WikiLeaks an
email'bearing the subject "big archive" and the message "a new attempt,"tss The email contained
an encrypted attachment with the name "wk dnc Iinkl.tat.gpg,'0 s Using the Guccifer 2.0 Twitter
account„GRU officers sent WikiLeaks an encrypted file and instructions on how to open it,tss On
July 18, 2016, WikiLeaks confirmed in a, direct message to the Guccifer 2.0 account that it had
"the IGb or so archive" and would make a release of the stolen documents "this week."' On
July 22, 2016, WiidLeaks released over 20,000 emails and other documents stolen from the DNC
cong>uter networks.'sr The Democratic National Convention began three days later.
The same day, the Twitter account @guccifer 2 sent ®dcleaks a direct message, which
is the first known contact between the personas,' Du r ~ s u bserluent communications, the
oa
'" This was not the GRU's first atlempt at transferring data to WikiLeaks. On June 29, 2016, the
GRU used a Guccifer 2.0 email account to send a lar e en ted f ile to a WikiLeaks email account.
6/29/16 Email, guccifer2®mail,corn (The email appears to have been
undelivered.)
"4 Sse SM-2589105-DCLEAKS, serial 28 (analysis),
"' 6/27/16 Twitter DM, @Guccifer 2 to ®WikiLeaks.
's 7/18/16 Twitter DM, @Guccifer 2 ds @WildLesks.
"r "DNC Email Archive," WikiLeaks (Jul. 22, 2016),available at https://wikileaks,org/dnc-emails.
'" 9/15/16 Twitter DM, @dcleaks to ®WikiLesks.
'+ 9/15/16 Twitter DM, ®guccifer 2 to @dcleaks .
U.S. Department of Justice
Guccifer 2.0 persona informed DCLeaks that WikiLeaks was trying to contact DCLeaks and
arrange for a way to speak through encrypted emails.'7
An analysis of the metadata collected from the WikiLeaks site revealed that the stolen
Podesta emails show a creation date of September 19, 2016.' Ba sed on information about
Assange's computer and its possible operating system, this date may be when the GRU staged the
stolen Podesta emails for transfer to WikiLeaks (as the GRU had previously done in July 2016 for
the DNC emails),'7 T he WikiLeaks site also released PDFs and other documents taken from
Podesta that were attachments to emails in his account; these documents had a creation date of
October 2, 2016, which appears to be the date the auachments were separately staged by
WildLeaks on its site,'is
The Office cannot rule out that stolen documents were n'ansferred to WikiLeaks through
intermediaries who visited during the summer of 2016. For example, public reportmg identified
Andrew Miiller-Maguhn asa WikiLeaks associate who ma have assisted with the transfer of these
stolen documents to WikiLeaks,'is
'i See SM-2589105-DCLEAKS, serial 28; 9/15/16 Twitter D)4 ®Guccifcr 2 tk @WikiLcaks.
rn See SM-2284941, serials 63 8'c 64
172
On October 7, 2016, WikiLeaks released the first emails stolen from the Podesta email
account. In total, WikiLeaks released 33 tranches of stolen emails between October 7, 2016 and
November 7, 2016. The releases included private speeches given by Clinton i n t ernal
communications between Podesta and other high-ranking members of the Clinton Campaign 7'
and correspondence related to the Clinton Foundation,' ' In total, WikiLeaks released over S0,000
documents stolen from Podesta's personal email account. The last-in-time email released from
Podesta's account was dated March 21, 2016, two days after Podesta received a spearphishing
email sent by the GRU.
As reports attributing the DNC and DCCC hacks to the Russian government emerged,
Wiki Leaks and Assange made several public statements apparently designed to obscure the source
of the materials that WiktLeaks was releasing. The file-transfer evidence described above and
other information uncovered during the investigation discredit WildLeaks1s claims about the
source of material that it posted.
Beginning in the summer of 2016, Assange and WikiLeaks made a number of statements
about Seth Rich, a former DNC staff member who was killed in July 2016, The statements about
Rich implied falsely that he had Been the source of the stolen DNG emails. On August 9, 2016,
the @WikiLeaks Twitter account posted: "ANNOUNCE: WikiLeaks has decided to issue a
US$20k reward for information leading to conviction for the murder of DNC staffer Seth Rich."' 6
Likewise, on August 25, 2016, Assange was asked in an interview, "Why are you so interested in
Seth Rich's killer7" and responded, "We' re very interested in anything that might be a threat to
alleged Wikileaks sources." The interviewer responded to Assange's statement by commenting,
"I know you don't want to reveal your source, but it certainly sounds like you' re suggesting a man
who leaked information to WikiLeaks was then murdered." Assange replied, "If there's someorte
who's potentially connected to our publication, and that person has been murdered in suspicious
176
176
circumstances, it doesn't necessarily mean that the two are connected. But it is a very serious
matter...that type of allegation is very serious, as it's taken very seriously by us," s'
After the U.S, intelligence community publioly announced its assessment that Russia was
behind the hacking operation, Assange continued to deny that the Clinton materials released by
WikiLeaks had come from Russian hacking, According 'to media reports, Assange told a U.S,
congressman that the DNC hack was an "inside job," and purported to have "physical proof" that
Russians did not give materials to Assange.'ss
While releasing the stolen emails and documents through DCLeaks, Guccifer 2.0, and
WikiLeaks, GRU officers continued to target and hack victims linked to the Democratic campaign
and, eventually, to target entities responsible for election administration in several states.
On July 27 2016 Unit 26165 targeted email accounts cormected to candidate Clinton's
personal office . Earlier that day, candidate Trump made public statements that
"
included the fol owing: 'Russia, if you' re listening, I hope you' re able to find the 30,000 emails
that are missing. I think you will probably be rewarded mightily by our press."' T h e "30,000
emails" were apparently a reference to emails described in media accounts as having been stored
on a personal server that candidate Clinton had used while serving as Secretary of State,
Within approximately five hours of Trump's statement, GRU officers targeted for the first
time Clinton's personal office. After' candidate Trump's remarks Unit 26165 oreated and sent
malicious links targeting 15 email accounts at the domain including an email
t bel g i g t C I ' 1 id ~ Th l Sg S S d t e d cs (
GRU attempts to compromise accounts heated on this domain, It is unclear how the GRU was
able to identify these email accounts, which were not public. its
Unit 26165 officers also hacked into a DNC account hosted on a cloud-computing service
On September 20, 2016, the GRU began to generate
copies of the DNC data usin function designed to allow users to produce backups of
databases (referred to as "snapshots'9. The GRU then stole those snapshots by moving
them to account that they controlled; from there, the copies were moved to GRU-
controlled computers. The GRU stole approximately 300 gigabytes of data from the DNC cloud-
based account,iss
In addition to targeting individuals involved in the Clinton Campaign, GRU officers also
targeted individuals and entities involved in the administration of the elections. Victims included
U.S. state and local entities, such as state boards of elections (SBOEs), secretaries of state, and
county g overnm
ents, a s well as individuals who worked for those entities," T h e GRU also
targeted private technology firms responsible for manufacturing and administering election-related
software and hardware, such as voter registration software and electronic polling stations.'$ The
GRU continued to target these victims through the elections in November 2016. While the
investigation identified evidence that the GRU targeted these individuals and entities, the Office
did not investigate further. The Office did not, for instance, obtain or examine servers or other
relevant items belonging to these victims, T h e Office understands that the FBI, the U.S,
Deparhnent of Homeland Security, and the states have separately investigated that activity,
By at least the summer of 2016„GRU officers sought access to state and local computer
networks by exploiting known software vulnerabilities on websites of state and local governmental
entities. GRU officers, for example, targeted state and local databases of registered voters using a
technique known as "SQL injection," by which malicious code was sent to the state or local
website in order to run commands (such as exfiltrating the database coritents),'$$ In one instance
in approximately June 2016, the GRU compromised the computer network of the Illinois State
Board of Elections by exploiting a vulnerability in the SBOE's website. The GRU then gained
access to a database containing information on millions of registered Illinois voters,'+ and
extracted data related to thousands of U.S. voters before the malicious activity was identified.'s'
'" ¹ r yhsho
Indictment ti 69.
"s ¹ hs ho Indictment 6 9 ",
$$$
1$9
19$
50
U.S. Deparnnent of Justice
Jl
Unit 74455 also sent spearphishing emails to 'public officials involved in election
administration and personnel at corn anies involved in voting technology. In August 2016, GRU
officers targeted employees o , a voting technology company that developed software
used by numerous U.S. counties to manage voter rolls, and installed malware on thc company
network, Similarly, in November 2016, the GRU sent spearphishing emails to over 120 email
accounts used by Florida county officials responsible for administering the 2016 U.S. election.' '
The spearphishing emails contained an attached Word document coded with malicious software
(commonly referred to as a Trojan) that permitted the GRU to access the infected computer.' s
The FBI was separately responsible for this investigation, We understand the FBI believes that this
operation enabled the GRU to gain access to the network of at least one Florida county
government, The Office did not independently verify that belief and, as explained above, did not
undertake the investigative steps that would have been necessary to do so.
• • • •
e • •
Qn June 12, 2016, Assange claimed in a televised interview to "have emails relating
to H lary Clinton which are pending publication,"ss but provided no additional context.
In debriefin s with the Of fic, former de u c a m a i ch airman Rick Gates said that
• • •
u • •
• • •
See Mahita Gajanan, Ation Assange Timed DNC Email Release for Democrattc Convention,
Time (July 27, 2016) (iiuoting the June 12, '2016 television interview).
'" In February 2018, Gates pleaded guilty, pursuant to a ylca agmemcnt, to a superseding crindnal
information chmging him with conspiring to dcf'raud and commit multiple offenses(i.e., tax fraud, failure
to report foreign bank accounts, and acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign principal) against the
United States, as well as making false statements to our Office. Superseding Criminal Information, United
Statesv. Richard O'. Gates III, 1: 17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc, 195(" Gates Superseding Crimmal
Information" ); Plea Agreement, United Statesv. Richard W. Gates III, 1:17-m-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018 ),
Doc, 205 ("Gates P'lea Agi'cement"). Gates has provided information and in-court testimony that the Office
has deemed to be reliable.
Gates 10/25/18 302, at 1-2.
As explained further in Volume I, Section IV.A.8,inPa, Manafort entered into aplea agreement
with our Office. We determined that he breached the agreement by being untruthful in proffer sessions and
before the grand jury, We have generally recounted his version of events in this report only when his
statements arc sufficiently corroborated to be trustworthy; to identify issues on which Manafort's untruthful
responses may themselves be of evidentiary value; or to provide Manafort's explanations for certain events,
even when we were unable to determine whether that explanation was credible. His account aypcars here
principally because it aligns with those of other witnesses.
19$
U.S, Deparlment of Justice
Michael Cohen, former executive vioe president of the Trump Organization and special
counsel to Donald J. Trump,'0 told the Office that he recalled an incident in which he was in
• • e• •
candidate Trum 's office in Trum Tower
Cohen he r told thc Office that, after WikiLea s's subsequent release of sto1en
DNC emails in July 2016, candidate Trump said to Cohen something to the effect of, I
• • •
• a •• •
Manafort also wante t o e k ept apprised of any
' ' In November 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to a single-count
information charging him with making false statements to Congress, in violation of 18 U.S.C, ii 1001(a) 4
(c). Hc had previously pleaded guilty to several other criminal charges brought by the U.S. Attorney's
Office in the Southern District of New York, after a referral from this Office. In the months leading up to
his false-statements guilty plea, Cohen met with our Office on multiple occasions for interviews and
provided information that the Office has generally assessed to be reliable and that is included in this report.
200 •
201 „ 0 • •
• a 0
202
U,S. Department of Justice
developments with WikiLeaks and separately told Gates to keep in touch g~~ ~ abo ut future
WikiLeaks releases,2 '
According to Gates, by 'the late summer of 2016, the Trump Campaign was planning a
press strategy, a communications cern ai an d massa in b ased on the ossible release of
Clinton emails b W i kiLeaks. ' • • • • •
208 • • • •
• • • ,
candidate Trump told Gates that more re eases of amagmg o r mation would be coming.2 '
• 0. • • •
• • e •
• • • •
Corsi is an au or w o holds a doctorate m olitical science. I n 2016, Corsi also wor ed for the
media outlet WorldNetDail • a • •
2w Gates 4/10/1 8 302, at 3; Gates 4/11/18 302, at 1-2 (SM-2180998); Gates 10/25/1 8 302, at 2,
2IiS
211 •
'+ Corsi first rose to public prominence in August 2004 when he published his book Unfit for
Cominiindi Swift Boat Veterans Speak Our Against Jo/in Esrry. In the, 2008 election cycle, Corsi gained
prominence for heing a leading proponent of the allegation that Barack Obama wss not born in the United
States. Corsi told the Office that Donald Trump expressed interest in his writings, and that he spoke with
Trump on the phone on at less't six occasions, Corsi 9/6/18 302, at 3.
2" Corsi 10/31/18 302, at 2; ' Corsi was first
interviewed on September 6, 2018 at the Special Counse 's of ces in Washmgton, D.C, H e w as
accompanied by counsel throughout the interview'. Corsi was subsequently interviewed on September 17,
2018; September 21, 2018; October 31, 2018; November 1, 2018; and November 2, 2018, Counsel was
U.S. Department of Justice
• e ••
Corsi to d the Of6ce urin
interviews that he "must have" revious d scussed Assan e with Malloch. '
• • • •
According to Ma loch, Corsi asked hun to put Corsi in touch with Assange, w om Corsi
wished to interview. Malloch recalled that Corsi also suggested that individuals in the "orbit" of
U.K. politician Nigel Farage might be able to contact Assange and asked if Malloch knew them.
Malloch told Corsi that he would think about the request but made no actual attempt to connect
Corsi with Assange, "
• • • • •
• • • • •
present for all interviews, and the interviews beginning on September 21, 2018 were conducted pursuant to
a proffer agreement that precluded affirmative use of his statements against him in limited circumstances.
214 •
217 •
218
Malloch denied ever communicatmg with Assange
or WikiLeaks, stating that e not ursue e re uest to contact Assange because he believed he had no
commotions to Assange.
219 •
2N • • • • •
55
U.S. Department of Justice
Malloeh stated to investigators that beginnin in or about Au s t 2016, he and Corsi had
multiple Face Time discussions about WikiLeaks
had made a connection to Assange and that the hacked emai s of Jo P o esta would be release
prior to Election Day and would be helpful to the Trump Campaign. In one conversation in or
around August or September 2016, Corsi told Malloch that the release of the Podesta emails was
coming, after which "we" were going to be in the driver's seat,~'
4 • •
s • •
• • • e
• • • •
• • • a
• • • •
• • •
• 4 • •
• •
221
• • •
• • • e
224 • • •
• 4 •
• 4 •
227 • • •
228 •
• • I •
56
U,S. Dep332tment of Justice
• • •
• • « •
• •
• •
• • •
• • •
• • • •
• • « •
• • •
• I •
230 • •
• • • •
232 •
• • •
234 • • 3 • •
• 0 • •
• 4 •
232
238 • • • •
U.S. Department of Justice
• e •• •
• • 4
• I •
• • • •
• • • 4
• •
'2 Candidate Trump can be heard off camera making graphic statements about women,
244 •
241 •
242 •
242 •
enormous and recalled telling the conference call the Access Hollywood tape was coming. Corsi
stated that he was convinced that his efforts had caused WikiLeaks to release the emails when they
did.255 In a later November 2018 interview, Corsi stated that he thought that he had told people
on a WND conference call about'the forthcoming tape and had sent out a tweet asking whether
anyone could contact Assange, but then said that maybe he had done nothing. 52
The Office investigated Corsi's allegations about the events of October 7 2016 but found
little corroboration for his sile ations about the da .'24'
• s •
Donald Trump Jr. had direct electronic communications with WikiLeaks during the
campaign period. On September 20, 2016, an individual named Jason Fishbein sent WikiLeaks
the password for an unlaunched website focused on Trump's "unprecedented and dangerous" ties
~' During the same interview, Corsi also suggested that he may have sent out public tweets because
he knew Assange was reading his tweets, Our Office was unable to find evidence of any such tweets.
Corsi 9/21/18 302, at 6-7.
2" Corsi11/1/18 302, at6.
255 • 5 •
• • 5 •
250 •
• • 5
251 •
• •
• • • •
U.S. Department of Justice
to Russia, PutinTrump.org.rsr WikiLeaks publicly tweeted: "'Let's bomb Iraq' Progress for
America PAC to launch "PutinTrump.org' at 9:30am. Oops pw is 'putintrump' putintrump.org."
Several hours later, WikiLeaks sent a Twitter direct message to Donald Trump Jr., "A PAC run
anti-Trump site putintrump.org 'is about to launch. The PAC is a recycled pro-Iraq war PAC. We
have guessed the password. It i s ' putintrump,' See 'About' for who i s behind it. A ny
commentsv'ass.
Several hours later, Trump Jr, emailed a variety of s'enior campaign staff:
Guys I got a weird Twitter DM from wikileaks. See below. I tried the password and it
works and the about section they reference contains the next pic in terms of who is behind
it. Not sure if this is anything but it seems like it's really wikileaks asking me as I follow
them and it is a DM. Do you know the people mentioned and what the conspiracy they are
looking for could be'7 These are just screen shots but it's a fully built out page claiming to
be a pAC let me know your thought's and if we want to look into it,rs4
Trump Jr. attached a screenshot of the "About" page for the unlaunehed site PutinTrump.org. The
next day (after the website had launched publicly), Trump Jr. sent a direct message to WikiLeaks:
"Off the record, I don't know who that is but I' ll ask amund. Thanks 3"~sr
On October 3, 2016, WikiLeaks sent another direct message to Trump Jr,, a~king "you
guys" to help disseminate a link alleging cand'idate Clinton had advocated using a drone to target
Julian Assange. Trump Jr, responded that he ah'eady "had done so," and asked, "what's behind
this Wednesday leak I keep reading abouts'oss WikiLeaks did not respond,
On October 12, 2016„WikiLeaks wmte again that it was "lpuat to see you and your dad
talking about our publications. Stmngly suggest your dad tweets this link if he mentions us
wlsearch,tk.'us~ WikiLeaks wrote that the link would help Trump in "digging through" leaked
emails and stated, "we just released Podesta emails Part 4."+s Two days later, Trump Jr. publicly
twreted thc wlsearch.tk link.s
60
U.S. Department of Justice
Throughout 2016„ the Trump Campaign expressed interest in Hillary Clinton's private
email server and whether approximately 30,000 emails from that server had in fact been
permanently destroyed, as reported by the media. Several individuals associated with the
Campaign werc contacted in 2016 about various efforts to obtain the missing Clinton emails and
other stolen material in support of the Trump Campaign, Soine of these contacts werc met with
skepticism,a nd nothing came of them; others were pursued to some degree. The investigation did
I
not find evidence that the Trump Campaign recovered any such Clinton emails, or that these
contacts werc part of a coordinated effort between Russia and the Trump Campaign.
In the spring of 2016, Trump Campaign advisor Michael Caputo learned through a F lorida-
based Russian business partner that another Florida-based Russian, Henry Oknyansky (who also
went by the name Henry Oreenberg), claimed to have information pertaining to Hillary Clinton,
Caputo notified Roger Stone and brokered communication between Stone and Oknyansky.
Oknyansky and Stone set up a May 2016 in-person meeting.'~
Oknyansky claimed to the Office that Resin's motivation was financial. According to
Oknyansky, Rasin had hied unsuccessfully to shop the Clinton information around to other
interested parties, and Oknyansky would receive a cut if the information was sold.is~ Resin is
noted in public source documents as the director and/or registered agent for a number of Florida
companies, none of which appears to be connected to Clinton, The Office found no other ciddence
that Rasin worked for Clinton or any Clinton-related entitics.
The Office did not locate Rasin in the United States, although the Office confirmed Rasin
had been issued a Florida driver's license. The Office otherwise was unable to determine the
content and origin of the information he purportedly offered to Stone. Finally, the investigation
did not identify evidence of a connection between the outreach or the meeting and Russian
interference efforts.
After candidate Trump stated on July 27, 2016, that he hoped Russia would "find the
30„000 emails that are missing," Trump asked individuals affiliated with his Campaign to find the
deleted Clinton emails.244 Michael Flynn —who would later serve as National Security Advisor in
the Trump Administtation — recalled that Trump made this request repeatedly, and Flynn
subsequently contacted multiple people in an effort to obtain the emails,2m
Barbara Ledeen and Peter Smith were among the people contacted by Flyrm. Ledeen, a
long-time Senate staffer who had previously sought the Clinton emails, provided updates to Flynn
about her efforts throughout the summer of 2016.~s Smith, an investment advisor who was active
in Republican politics, also attempted to locate and obtain the deleted Clinton emails.~s
Ledeen began her efforts to obtain the Clinton emails before Flynn's request, as early as
December 2015.~s On December 3, 2015, she emailed Smith a proposal to obtain the emails,
stating, "Here is the proposal I briefiy mentioned to you, The person I described to you would be
happy to talk with you either in person or over the phone. The person can get the emails which I,
Were classified and 2. Were purloined by our enemies. That would demonstrate what needs to be
demonstrated."
Attached to the email was a 25-page proposal stating that the "Clinton email server was, in
all likelihood, breached long ago," and that the Chinese, Russian, and Iranian intelligence services
could "re-assemble the server's email content." s The proposal called for a three-phase approach.
The first two phases consisted of open-source analysis. The third phase consisted of checking with
certain intelligence sources "that have access thmugh liaison work with various foreign services"
to determine if any of those services had gotten to the server. The proposal noted, "Even if a
single email was recovered and the providence [sic] of that email was a foreign service, it'would
be catastrophic to the Clinton campaign[.]" Smith forwarded the email to two colleagues and
wrote, 'We can discuss to whom it should be referred." ' On December 16, 2015, Smith informed
Ledeen that he declined to participate in her "initiative." According to one of Smith's business
associates, Smith believed Ledeen's initiative was not viable at that time.tis
Just weeks after Trump's July 2016 request to find the Clinton emails, however, Smith
tried to locate and obtain the emails himself. He created a company, raised tens of thousands of
dollars, and recruited security experts and business associates, Smith made claims to others
involved in the effort (and those from whom he sought funding) that he was in contact with hackers
with "ties and affiliations to Russia" who had access to the emails, and that his efforts were
coordinated with the Trump Campaign.s7s
On August 28, 2016, Smith sent an email from an encrypted account with the subject "Sec.
Clinton's unsecuredprivate email server" to an undisclosed list of recipients,, including Campaign
co-chairman Sam Clovis. The email stated that Smith was "fj]ust finishing two days of sensitive
meetings here in DC with involved groups to poke and probe on the above. It is clear that the
Clinton's home-based, unprotected servei was hacked with ease by both State-related players, and
*'
private mercenaries. Parties with varying interests, are circling to release ahead of the election.
On September 2, 2016, Smith directed a business associate to establish KLS Research LLC
in furtherance ofhis search for the deleted Clinton emails. 7 One of the purposes of KLS Research
was to manage the funds Smith raised in support of his initiative. s KLS Reseat'ch received over
$30,000 during the presidential cainpaign, although Smith represented that he raised even more
nloiley,
Smith recruited multiple people for his initiative, including security experts to search for
and authenticate the emails 7s In early September 2016, as part of his recruitment and fundraising
effort, Smith circulated a document stating that his initiative was "in coordination" with the Trump
Campaign, "to the extent permitted as an independent expenditure organization," + The document
listed multiple individuals aAiliated with the Trump Campaign, including Flynn, Clevis„Barmen,
and Kellyanne Conway.z c The investigation established that Smith communicated with at least
Flynn and Clavis about his search for the deleted Clinton emails,' " but the Office did not identify
evidence that any of the listed individuals initiated or directed Smith's efforts;
In September 2016, Smith and Ledeen got back in touch with each other about their
respective efforts. Ledeen wrote to Smith, *'wondering if you had some more detailed reports or
memos or other data you could share because we have come a long way in our efforts since we
last visited.. . . We would need as much technical discussion as possible so we could marry it
czsz
againstthe new data we have found and then could share it back to you 'your eyes only,'
Ledeen claimed to have obtained a trove of emails (from what she described as the "dark
web") that purported to be the deleted Clinton emails, Ledeen wanted to authenticate the emails
and solicited contributions to fund that effort. Erik Prince provided fimding to hire a tech advisor
to ascertain the authenticity of the emails. According to Prince, the tech advisor determined that
the emails were not authentic.ass
A backup of Smith's computer contained two files that had been downloaded from
WikiLeaks and that were originally attached to emails received by John Podesta. The files on
Smith's computer had creation dates of October 2, 2016, which was prior to the date of their release
by WikiLeaks. Forensic examination, however, established that the creation date did not reflect
when the files were downloaded to Smith's computer. (It appears the creation date was when
WikiLeaks staged the document for release, as discussed in Volume I, Section III,B3,c, supra,z~)
The investigation did not otherwise identify evidence that Smith obtained the files before their
release by WikiLeaks.
Smith continued to send emails to an undisclosed recipient list about Clinton's deleted
emails until shortly before the election, For example, on October 28, 2016„Smith wrote that there
was a "tug-of-wai' going on within WikiLeaks over its planned releases in the next few days," and
that WikiLeaks "has maintained that it will save its best revelations for last, under the theory this
allows little time for response prior to the U.S. election November 8." " A n attachment to the
email claimed that %ikiLeaks would release "All 33k deleted Emails" by "November 1st," No
emails obtained from Clinton's server were subsequently released.
Smith di'afted mulnple emails stating or intimating that he was in contact with Russian
hackers. For example, in one such email, Smith claimed that, in August 2016, KLS Research had
organized meetings with parties who had access to the deleted Clinton emails, including parties
with ' *ties and affiliations to Russia,azss The investigation did not identify evidence that any such
meetings occurred Associates and security experts who worked with Smith on the initiative did
not believe that Smith was in contact with Russian hackers and were aware of no such
connection. si The investigation did not establish 'that Smith was in contact with Russian hackers
or that Smith, Ledeen, or other individuals in touch with the Trump Campaign ultimately obtained
the deleted Clinton ernails.
In sum, the investigation established that the GRU hacked into email accounts of persons
aAiliated with the Clinton Campaign, as well as the computers of thc DNC and DCCC. The GRU
then extiltrated data related to the 2016 election from these accounts and computers, and
disseminated that data through fictitious onlme personas (DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0) and later
through V/ikiLeal<s. The investigation also established that, the Trum Cam ai n dis la ed
interest in the WikiLeaks releases, and that
As
explain in V o lume I, Section V.B,inPa, the evidence was su icient to support computer-
intrusion and other char es a ainst GRU oBicers for their role in election-related hackin .
• a •
IV. RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT LINKS TO ANII CONTACTS V/ITH THE TRUMP CAMPAIGN
*
The Office identified multiple contacts — "links,' in the words of the Appointment Order-
between Trump Campaign officials and individuals with ties to the Russian government. The
Office investigated whether those contacts constituted a third avenue of attempted Russian
interference with or influence on the 2016 presidential election. In particular„ the investigation
examined whether these contacts involved or resulted in coordination or a c<mspiracy with the
Trump Campaign and Russia, including with respect to Russia providing assistance to the
Campaign in exchange for any sort of favorable treatment in the future. Based on the available
information, the investigation did not establish such coordination.
This Section describes the prinoipal links between the Trump Campaign and individuals
overnm
with ties to the Russian g ent, including some contacts with Campaign officials or associates
that have been publicly reported to involve Russian contacts. Bach subsection begins with an
over'view of the Russian contact at issue and then describes in detail thc relevant facts, which are
generally presented in chronological order, beginning with the early months of the Campaign and
extending through the post-election, transition period.
Outreach from individuals with ties to Russia continued in the. spring and summer of 2016,
when Trump was moving toward — and eventually becoming — the Republican nominee for
President. As set forth below, the Office also evaluated a series of links during this period:
outreach to tw o o f T r ump's then-recently named foreign policy advisors, including a
representation that Russia had "dirt" on Clinton in the form of thousands of emails (Volume I,
Sections, IV.A.2 dk IV.A.3); dealings with a D.C.-based think tank that specializes in Russia and
has connections with its goveriunent (Volume I, Section IV.A.4); a meeting at Trump Tower
between the Campaign and a Russian lawyer promising dirt on candidate Clinton that was "part of
Russia and its government's support for [Trump]" (Volume I, Section IV,A,5); events at the
Republican National Convention (Volume I, Section IV.A,6); post-Convention contacts between
Trump Campaign officials and Russia's ambassador to thc United States (Volume I, Section
IV.A.7); and contacts 'through campaign chairman Paul Manafort, who had previously worked for
a Russian oligarch and a pro-Russian political party in Ukraine (Volume I, Section IV.A.8).
tw For example, on August 18, 2015., on behalf of the editor-in-chief of the internet newspaper
Vzg/ycd, Georgi Asatryan emailed campaign press secretary Hope Hicks asking for a phone or in-person
candidate interview. 8/18/15 Email, Asatryan to Hicks. One day earlier, the publication's founder (and
former Russian parliamentarian) Konstantin Rykov had registered two Russian websites — Trump2016,ru
and DonaldTrump2016xu. No interview took place.
U,S. Department of Justice
The Trump Organization has pursued and completed projects outside the United States as
part of its real estate portfolio. Some projects have involved the acquisition and ownership
(through subsidiary corporate structures) of property. In other cases„ the Trump Organization has
executed licensing deals with real estate developers and management companies, often local to the
country where the p rojectw
as located.t's
Between at least 2013 and 2016, the Trump Organization explored a similar licensing deal
in Russia involving tbe construction of a Trump-branded property in Moscow. T he project,
commonly referred to as a '"Trump Tower Moscow" or *'Trump Moscow" project, anticipated a
combination of commercial, hotel, and residential properties all within the same build'ing.
Between 2013 and June 2016, several employees of the Trump Organization, including then-
president of the organization Donald J. Trump, pursued a Moscow deal with several Russian
counterparties. From the fall of 2015 until the middle of 2016, Michael Cohen spearheaded the
Trump Organization's pursuit of a Trump Tower Moscow project, including by reporting on the
project's status to candidate Trump and other executives in the Trump Organization. sc
The Trump Organization and the Crocus Group, a Russian real estate conglomerate owned
and controlled by Ares Agalarov„began discussing a Russia-based real estate project shortly after
tbe conclusion of the 2013 Miss Universe pageant in Moscow. i" t Donald J. Trump Jr. served as
the primary negotiator on behalf of the Trump Organization; Emm Agalarov (son of Aras
Agalarov) and Irakli "Ike" Kaveladze represented the Crocus Group during negotiations, ra with
the occasional assistance of Robert Goldstone.
In December 2013„Kaveladze and Trump Jr, negotiated and signed preliminary terms of
See, e.g., Interview of: Donald J. Trump, Jr, Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 151-52
(Sept. 7, 2017) (discussing licensing deals of'specific projects),
" As noted in Volume I, Section III.D.1, supra„ in November 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty to
making false statements to Congress concerning, among other things, the duration of the Trump Tower
Moscow project. See Information $ 7(a), IInited States v. IvTtchael Cohen, I;18-cr-850 (S,D.N.Y. Nov, 29,
2018)„Doc. 2 (" Cohen Information*').
u See Interview of; Donald J. Trwnp, Jr, Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 13 (Sept. 7,
2017) ("'Following the pageant the Trump Organization and Mr..Agalarov's company, Crocus Group, began
preliminarily discussion [sic] potential real estate projects in Moscow,"), As has been widely reported, the
Miss Universe pageant —which Trump co-owned at the time —was held at the Agalarov-owned Crocus
City Hall in Moscow in November 2013. Both groups were involved in organizing the pageant, and Ares
Agalarov's son Emin was a musical performer at thc event, which Trump attended.
Kaveladze 11/16f17 302, at 2, 4-6; OSC-
KAV 00385 (12/6f13 Email, Trump Jr. to Kaveladze k E. al arov).
293
U.S. Deparlment of Justice
an agreement for the Trump Tower Moscow project.see On December 23, 2013, alter discussions
with Donald J. Trump, the Trump Organization agreed to accept an arrangement whereby the
organization received a flat 3.5% commission on all sales, with no licensing fees or incentives.'
The parties negotiated a letter of intent during January and February 201 4.2ss
From January 2014 through November 2014, the Trump Organization and Crocus Group
discussed development plans for the Moscow project. Some time before January 24, 2014, the
Crocus Group sent the Trump Organization a proposal for a 800-unit, 194-meter building to be
constructed at an Agalarov-owned site in Moscow called "Crocus City," which had also been the
site of the Miss Universe pageant, 7 In February 2014, Ivanka Trump met with Emin Agalarav
and taured the Crocus City site during a visit to Moscow.rss From March 2014 through July 2014,
the groups discussed "design standards" and other architectural elements.+ For example, in July
2014, members of the Trump Organiz'ation sent Crocus Group counterparties questions about the
'*demographics of these prospective buyers" in the Crocus City area, the development of
n eighboring parcels in Crocus City, and concepts for redesigning portions af the building.s I n
August 2014, the Trump Organization requested specifications for a competing Marriott-branded
tower being built in Crocus City.' '
68
U.S. Department of Justice
(e)
In the late summer of 2015; the Trump Organization received a new inquiry about pursuing
a Trump Tower project in Moscow. In approximately September 2015, Felix Sater, a New York-
based real estate advisor, contacted Michael Cohen, then-executive vice president of the Trump
Organization and special counsel to Donald J. Trump. at Sater had previously worked with the
Trump Organization and advised it on a number of domestic and international projects. Sater had
explored the possibility of a Trump Tower project in Moscow while working with the Trump
Organization and therefore knew of the organization"s general interest in completing a deal
there. cs Sater had also served as an informal agent of the Trump Organization in Moscow
previously and had accompanied Ivanka Trump and Donald Trump Jr. to Moscow in the mid-
2000s.'"
Sater contacted Cohen on behalf of I.C. Expert Investment Company (I.C, Expert), a
Russian real-estate development corporation controlled by Andrei Uladimirovlch Rozov. S a t er
had known Rozov sinceapproximately 2007 and, in 2014, had served as an agent on behalf of
Rozov during Rozov's purchase of a building in New York City.sss Sater later contacted Rozov
and proposed that I.C. Expert pursue a Trump Tower Moscow project in which I,C, Expert would
license the name and brand from the Trump Organization but construct the building on its own.
Sater worked on the deal with Rozov and another 'employee of I.C, Expert,s's
Cohen was the only Trump Organization representative to negotiate directly with I.C.
Expert or its agents. In approximately September 2015, Cohen obtained approval to negotiate with
I.C. Expert from candidate Trump, who was then president of the Trump Organization, Cohen
provided updates directly to Trump about the project throughout 2015 and into 2016, assuring him
the project was continuing. ' C o hen also discussed the Trump Moscow project with Ivanka
Trump as to design elements (such as possible architects to use for the project ") and Donald J.
Trump Jr, (about his experience in Moscow and possible involvement in the projects n) during the
fall of 2015.
Sater rcvided information to our Of6ce in two 2017 interviews conducted under a proffer
agreem
ent
305
Also during the fall of 2015, Cohen communicated about the Trump Moscow proposal with
Giorgi Rtslduladze, a business executive who previously had been involved in a development deal
with the Trump Organization in Batumi, Georgia. is Cohen stated that he spoke to Rtskhiladze in
part because Rtskhiladze had pursued business ventures in Moscow, including a licensing deal with
the Agalarov-owned Crocus Grou, '4 On September 22, 2015, Cohen forwarded a preliirunary
design study for the Trump Mascow project to Rtskhiladze, adding "I look forward to your reply
about this spectacular project in Moscow." Rtskhiladze forwarded Cohen's email to an associate
and wrote, "[i] f we could organize the meeting in New York at the highest level of the Russian
Government and Mi'. Trump this project would definitely receive the worldwide attention.'o'
Between approximately October 13, 2015 and November 2, 2015, the Trump Organization
(through its subsidiary Trump Acquisition, LLC) and I.C. Expert completed a letter of intent (LOI)
for a Trump Moscow property, The LOI, signed by Trump far the Trump Organization and Rozov
an behalf of I.C. Expert, was "intended to facilitate further discussions" in order to "attempt ta
Rtskhiladze was a U.S.-based executive of the Georgian company Silk Road Group. In
approximately 2011, SHk Road Gmup and the Trump Organization entered into a licensing agreement to
build a Trump-branded property in Batumi, Georgia. Rtskhiladze was also
' involved m discussions for a
-t • »» • ' » a» » K~ » . » » O»»»
»»'• 'm »R».m>»,~
" C ohen 9/12/18 302, at 12; see also Rtskhiladze 5/10/18 302, at 1.
"~ 9/22/I 5 Email, Rtskhiladze to Nizharadze.
" 9/24/1 5Email, Rtskhiladze to Cohen.
'~ 9/24/I 5 Email, Rtskhiladze to Cohen.
'" 9/27/1 5 Email, Rtskhiladze to Cohen,
" C ohen 9/12/18 302, at 12,
70
U.S. Department of Justice
enter into a mutually acceptable agreement" related to the Trump-branded project in Moscow.'~c
The LOI contemplated a development with residential, hotel, commercial, and office components,
and called for "[a]pproximately 250 6rst class, luxury residential condomimums," as well as "[o]ne
first class, luxury hotel consisting of approximately 15 floors,and containing not fewer than 150
hotel rooms, *'z' For the residential snd commercial portions of the project„ the Trump
Organization would receive between I'/o and 5'%%d of all condominium sales, z plus 3'%%d of all rental
and other revenue.sz' For the project's hotel portion, the Trump Organization would receive a base
fee of 3%%d of gross operating revenues for the first five years and 4%%dthereafter, plus a separate
incentive fee of 20~/o of operating profit. 's4 Under the LOI, the Trump Organization also would
receive a $4 million "up-&out fed" prior to groundbreaking. s' Under these 'terms, the Trump
Organization stood to earn substantial sums over the lifetime of the project, without assuming
significant liabilities or financing commitments.sis
On November 3,, 2015, the day after the Trump Organization transmitted the LOI, Sater
emailed Cohen suggesting that the Trump Moscow project could be used to increase candidate
Trump "s chances at being elected, writing
Buddy our boy can become Fresident of the USA and we can engineer it, I will get all of
Putins team to buy in on this, I will manage this process.... M ichael, Futin gets on stage
with Donald for a ribbon cutting for Trump Moscow, and Donald owns th'e republican
nomination. And possibly beats Hillary and our boy is in... . IVe will manage this process
better than anyone. You and I will get Donald and Vladimir on a stage together very
shortly. That the game changer.s
Donald doesn't stare down, he negotiates and understands the economic issues and Putin
only want to deal with a pragmatic leader, and a sliccessful business man is a good
candidate for someone who knows how to negotiate. "Business, politics, whatever it all is
the same for someone who knows how to deal"
~' l l/2/1 5 Email, Cohen to Rczov et al. (attachment) (hereinafter "LOI"); see also10/1 3/15 Email,
Sater to Cohen /k Davis (attaching proposed letter of intent).
x uI,QI p, 2
s' The LOI called for the Trump Organization to receive 5~/o of all gross sales up to, $100 million;
4'I of all gross sales from $100 migion to $250 million; 3'%%d of ail gross sales from $250 million to $500
million,' 2'lo of all gross sales from $500 million to $1 billion; and I~%%dof all gross sales over $1 billion.
LOI, Schedule 2.
~i' LOI, Schedule 2,
s LOI, Schedule 1.
'~r LOT, Schedule 2,
71
U.S, Depariment of Justice
//
I think I can get Putin to 'say that at the Trump Moscow press conference.
If he says it we own this election. Americas most difficult adversary agreeing that Donald
i s a gaod guy to negotiate... .
We can own this election.
Michael my next steps are very sensitive with Putins very very close people, we can pull
this off,
Michael lets go, 2 boys from Brooklyn getting a USA president elected. This is goad really
good.szs
According to Cohen, he'did not consider the political import of the Trump Moscow project
to the 2016 U,S. presidential election at the time. Cohen also did not recaE candidate Trump or
anyone affiliated with the Trump Campaign discussing the political implicatians af the Trump
Moscow project with him. H owever, Cohen recalled conversations with Trump in which the
candidate suggested that his campaign would be a signiftcant uinfomerciain for Trump-branded
properties.' s
Given the size of the Trump Moscow project, Sater and Cohen believed the project required
approval (whether express or implicit) from the Russian national government, including fmm the
Presidential Administration of Russians S ater stated that he therefare began to contact the
Presidential Administration tlnaugh another Russian business contact. ' I n early negotiations
with the Trump Organization, Sater had alluded to the need for government approval and his
attempts to set up meetings with Russian officials, On October 12, 2015, for example, Sater wrote
to Cohen that "all we need is Putin on board and we are golden" and that a '*meeting with Putin
'
and top deputy is tentatively set for the 14th [af Octoberj.'a •
this meeting
was being coordinated by associates in Russia and that he had no djrect mteraction with the Russian
gavemment, '
Approximately a month latet', after the LOI had been signed, Lans Erchova emailed Ivanka
Trump on behalf of Erchova's then-husband Dmitry Klokov, ta offer Klokov's assistance to the
Trump Campaign.s'4 Klokov was at that Eme Director of External Communications for pJSC
Federal Grid Company of Unified Energy System, a large Russian electricity transmission
Ivauka Trump received an email from a woman who identified herself as "Lans E. Alexander,"
which said in part, "If you ask anyone who knows Russian ta google my husband Dmitry Klokov, you' ll
see who he is close to and that he has done Putin's political campaigns." 11/16/15 Email, Emhava to
I. Trump.
U.S, Department of Justice
company, and had been previously employed as an aide and press secretary to Russia's energy
minister. Ivanka Trump forwarded the email to Cohen. ' H e told the Office that, after receiving
this inquiry, he had conducted an internet search for Klokov's name and concluded (incorrectly)
that Klokov was a former Olympic weightlifter.'ss
Between November 18 and 19, 2015, Klokov and Cohen had at least one telephone call
and exchanged several emails, Describmg himself in emails to Cohen as a "trusted person" who
could offer the Campaign "political synergy" and "synergy on a government level," Klokov
recommended that Cohen travel to Russia to speak with him and an unidentified intermediary.
Klokov said that those conversations could facilitate a later meeting in Russia between the
candidate and an individual Klokov described as "our person of interest." ' I n an email to the
Office, Erchova later identified the "person of interest" as Russian President Vladimir Putin.'
In the telephone call and follow-on emails with Klokov, Cohen discussed his desire to use
a near-term trip to Russia to do site surveys and talk over the Trump Moscow project w]th local
developers. Cohen registered his willingness also to meet with Klokov and the unidentified
intermediary, but was emphatic that all meetings in Russia involving him or candidate Trump-
including a possible meeting between candidate Trump and Putin — would need to be "in
conjunction with the development and an official visit" with the Trump Organization receiving a
formal invitation to visit,s ( K l okov had written previously that "the visit [by candidate Trump
to Russia] has to be informal.")'
Klokov had also previously recommended to Cohen that he separate their negotiations over
a possible meeting between Trump and "the person of interest" from any existing busmess tracks4'
Re-emphasizing that his outreach was not done on behalf of any business, Klokov added in second
email to Cohen that, if publicized well, such a meeting could have "phenomenaV' impact "in a
business dimension" and that the "person of interest['s'j" "most important support" could have
significant ramifications for the "level of projects and their capacity." Klokov concluded by tellmg
Cohen that there was "no bigger warranty in any project than (the] consent of the person of
interest." ~ Cohen rejected the proposal, saying that "[c]urrently our LOI developer is in talks
with Vp's Ch'ief of Staff and ai'ranging a formal invite for the two to meet.es4s This email appears
to be their final eitchange, and the investigation did not identify evidence that Cohen brought
Klokov's initial offer of assistance to the Campaign's attention or that anyone associated with the
Tmmp Organization or the Campaign dealt with Klokov at a later date. Cohen explained that he
did not pursue the proposed meeting because he was already woriung on the Moscow Project with
Sater, who Cohen understood to have his own connections to the Russian government.i
By late December 2015, however, Cohen was complaining that Sater had not been able to
use those connections to set up the promised meeting with Russian government officials. Cohen
told Sater that he was "setting up the meeting myself.'" On January 11, 2016, Cohen emailed
the office of Dmitry Peskov, the Russian government's pxess secretary, indicating that he desired
contact with Sergei Ivanov, Putin's chief of staff. Cohen erroneously used the email address
"[email protected]" instead of "Pr~eskova®prpxess.gov.ru," so the email apparently
did not g o t h rough.'i On J a nuary 14 , 2 016, Cohen emailed a d i f ferent address
(info®prpress.gov.ru) with the following message:
Two days latex, Cohen sent an email to Pr~eskova®prpxess.gov.ru, repeating his request to speak
witll Sei'gei Ivaiiov.
Cohen testified to Congress, and initially told the Office, that he did not recall receiving a
response to this email inquiry and that he decided to terminate any further work on the Trump
Moscow project as of January 2016. Cohen later admitted that these statements were false. In
74
U,S, Department of Justice
fact, Cohen had received (and recalled receiving) a response to his inquiry, and he continued to
work on and update candidate Trump on the project through as late as June 2016.' '
On January 20, 2016, Cohen received an email from Elena Poliakova, Peskov's personal
assistant. Writing from her personal email account, Poliakova stated that she had been trying to
reach Cohen and asked that he call her on the personal number that she provided.ssc Shortly after
receiving Poliakova's email, Cohen called and spoke to her for 20 minutes. " Cohen described to
Poliakova his position at the Trump Organization and outlined the proposed Truinp Moscow
pr'oject, including information about the Russian counterparty with which the Trump O rgan
ization
had parmered. Cohen requested assistance in'moving the project forward, both in securing land to
build the project and with financing, According to Cohen, Poliakova asked detailed questions and
took notes, stating that she would need to follow up with others in Russia. ss
Cohen could not recall any direct follow-up from Poliakova or from any other
representative of the Russian government, nor did the Office identify any evidence of direct
follow-up. However, the day after Cohen's call with Poliakova, Sater texted Cohen, asking him
to "[c]all me when you have a few minutes to chat... It's about Putin they called today,'0's Sater
then sent a draft invitation for Cohen to visit Moscow to discuss the Trump Moscow project,'s"
along with a note to "[t]ell me if the letter is good as amended by me or make whatever changes
you want and send it back to me.'nss After a further round of edits, on January 25, 2016, Sater
sent Cohen an invitation — signed by Andrey Ryabinskiy of the company MHJ — to travel to
"Moscow for a working visit" about the "prospects of development and the construction business
in Russia," "the various land plots available suited for construction of this enormous Tower," and
"the opportunity to co-ordinate a follow up visit to Moscow by Mr, Donald Trump."" A c cording
Cohen Information $$ 4, 7. Cohen's interactions with President Trump and the President's
lawyers when preparing his congmssional testimony are discussed further in Volume II. See Vol. II, Section
II.K.3, /nPa.
1/20/16 Email, Poliakova to Cohen (5;57 a.m.) ('"Mr. Cohen[,] I can't get through to both your
phones. Pls, call me.*').
sn Telephonerecords show a 20-minute callon January 20 2016 between Cohen and the number
Poliakova provided in her email. Call Records of Mchael Cohen After
the call, Cohen saved Poliakova's contact Information in his Tnunp Organization Outlook contact list,
I/20/16 Cohen Microsoft Outlook Entry (6:22 a.m.).
" C ohen 9/12/18 302, at 2-3,
's' FS00011 (I/21/16 Text Messages, Sater to Cohen).
'rs The invitation purported to b'e from Genbank, a Russian bank that was„according to Sater,
worki'ng at the behest of a larger bank, VTB, and would consider providing financing. FS00008 (12/31/15
Text Messages, Sater its Cohen). Additimml information about Genbank can be foundirrPa.
ss' FS00011 (I/21/16 Text Message, Sater to Cohen (7;44 p.m.)); I/21/16 Einail, Sater to Cohen
(6:49 p.m,).
1/25/1 6 Email, Sater to Cohen (12.'01 p.m.) (attachment).
U.S, Department of Justice
to Cohen, he elected not to travel at the time because of concerns about the lack of concrete
proposals about land plots that could be considered as options for the project, s
The late January communic'ation was neither the first nor the last time that Cohen
contemplated visiting Russia in pursuit of' the Trump Moscow project. Begiiming in late 2015,
Sater repeatedly tried to arrange for Cohen and candidate Trump, as representatives of the Trump
Organization, to travel to Russia to meet with Russian government officials and possible financing
partners. In December 2015, Sater sent Cohen a number of emails about logistics for traveling to
Russia for meetings.sss On December 19, 2015, Sater wmte:
Please call me I have Evgeney [Dvoskin] on the other line.[' ] He needs a copy of your
and Donald's passports they need a scan of every page of the passports. Invitations tk
Visas will be issued this week by VTB Bank to discuss financing for Trump Tower
Moscow. Politically neither Putins office nor Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot issue
invite, so they are inviting commercially/ business. VTB is Russia's 2 biggest bank and
VTB Bank CEO Andrey kostin, will be at all meetings with Putin so that it is a business
meeting not political. We will be invited to Russian consulate this week to receive invite
dc have visa issued.
In response„Cohen texted Sater an image of his own passport. ' Cohen told the Office that at one
point he requested a copy of candidate Trump's passport from Rhona Graff, Trump's executive
assistant at the Trump Organization, and that Graff later brought Trump's passport to Cohen's
76
U.S,, Department of Justice
office.'s The investigation did not, however, establish that the passport was forwarded to Sater, 4
Into the spring of 2016, Sater and Cohen continued to discuss a trip to Moscow in
connection with the Trump Moscow project. On April 20, 2016, Sater wrote Cohen, "[t]he People
. wanted to know when you are coming7"sss On May 4, 2016,, Sater followed up'1
I had a chat with Moscow. ASSUMING the trip does happen the question is before or after
the convention. I said I believe, but don't know for sure, that's it's probably after the
convention. Obviously the pre-meeting trip (you only) can happen anytime you want but
the 2 big guys where [sic] the question, I said I would confirm and revert... . L et me
know about If I was right by saying I believe after Cleveland and also when you want to
speak to them and possibly fly over.ss'
Cohen responded, "My trip before Cleveland. Trump once he becomes the nominee after the
convention."
The day after this exchange, Sater tied Cohen's travel to Russia to the St, Petersburg
International Economic Forum (" Forum" ), an annual event attended by prominent Russian
politicians and businessmen. Sater told the Office that he was informed by a business associate
that Peskov wanted to invite Cohen to the Forum.' O n May 5, 2016, Sater wrote to Cohen:
Peskov would like to invite you as his guest to the St. Petersburg Forum which is Russia's
Davos it's June 16-19. He wants to meet there with you and possibly introduce you to
either Putin or Medvedev, as they are not sure if I or both will be there.
This is perfect. The entire business class of Russia will be there as well.
He said anything you want to discuss including dates and subjects are on the table to
discuss[,]ass
The following day, Sater asked Cohen to confirm those dates would work for him to travel; Cohen
wrote back, "[wjorks for me.'"s'
77
U.S. Department of Justice
On June 9, 2016, Sater sent Cohen a notice that he (Sater) was completing the badges for
the Forum, adding, "Putin is there on the 17th very strong chance you will meet him as welL"'»'
On June 13, 2016, Sater forwarded Cohen an invitation to the Forum signed by the Director of the
Roscongress Foundation, the Russian entity organizing the Forum. Sa ter also sent Cohen a
Russian visa application and asked him to send two passport photos.s7 According to Cohen, the
invitation gave no indication that Peskov had been involved in inviting him. Cohen was concerned
that Russian officials were not actually involved or were not interested in meeting with him (as
Sater had alleged), and so he decided not to go to the Forum,'+ On June 14, 2016, Cohen met
Sater in the lobby of the Trump Tower in New York and informed him that he would not be
traveling at that time.
The investigation identified evidence that, during the period the Trump Mosoow project
was under consideration, the possibility of candidate Trump visiting Russia arose in two contexts.
First, in interviews with the Office, Cohen stated that he discussed the subject of traveling
to Russia with Trump twice.' once in late 2015; and again in spring 2016.s7s According to Cohen,
Trump indicated a willingness to travel if it would assist the project significantly. On one occasion,
Trump toid Cohen to speak with then-campaign matiager Corey Lewandowski to coordinate the
candidate's schedule, Cohen recalled that he spoke with Lewandowski, who suggested that they
speak again when Cohen had actual dates to evaluate. Cohen indicated, however, that he knew
that travel prior to the Republican National Convention would be impossible given the candidate's
preexisting commitments to the Campaign,
Second, like Cohen, Trump received and turned down an invitation to the St. Petersburg
International Economic Forum. In late December 2015, Mira Duma—a contact of Ivanka Trump's
from the fashion industry — first passed along invitations for Ivanka Trump and candidate T rump
from Sergei Prikhodko, a Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation.sw On January 14,
2016, Rhona Graff sent an emedl to Duma stating that Trump was "honored to be asked to
participate in the highly prestigious" Forum event, but that he would "have to decline" the
invitation given his "very grueling and full travel schedule" as a presidential candidate. s Graff
78
U.S. Department of Justice
//
asked Duma whether she recommended that Graff "send a krmal note to the Deputy Prime
Minister" declining his invitation; Duma replied that a formal note would be "great."'ts
It does not appear that Graff prepared that note immediately. According to written answers
from President Trump,sta Graff received an email from Deputy Prime Minister Prikhodko on
March 17, 2016, again inviting Trump to participate in the 2016 Forum in St. Petersburg.s" Two
weeks later, on March 31, 2016, Graff prepared for Trump's signature a two-paragraph letter
declining the invitation.s's The letter stated that Trump's "schedule has become extremely
demanding" because of the presidential campaign, that he "already ha[d] several commitments in
the United States" for the time of the Forum, but that he otherwise "would have gladly given every
consideration to attending such an important event.'uss Graff forwarded the letter to another
executive assistant at the Trump Organization with instructions to print the document on letterhead
for Trump to sign:ss4
At approximately the same time that the letter was being prepared, Robert Foresman —a
New York-based investment banker — began reaching out to Graff to secure an in-person meeting
with candidate Trump, According to Foresman, he had been asked by Anton Kobyakov, a Russian
presidential aide involved with 'the Roscongress Foundation, to see if Trump could speak at the
Forum. " F o resman first emailed Graff on March 31, 2016, following a phone introduction
brokered thmugh Trump business associate Mark Burnett (who pmduced the television show The
Apprenrfce). In his email, Foresman referenced his long-standing personal and professional
expertise in Russia and Ukraine, his work setting up an early "private channel" between Vladimir
*'
Putin and former U.S. President George W. Bush, and an "approach he hadreceived fmm "senior
Kremlin oflicials" about the candidate, Foresman asked Graff for a meeting with the candidate,
Corey Lewandowski, or "'another relevant person" to discuss this and other "concrete things"
Foresman felt uncomfortable discussing over "unsecure emaiL" s O n A pril 4, 2016, Gruff
forwarded Foresman's meeting request to Jessica Macchia, another executive assistant
to Trump.ssr
With no response I'orthcoming, Foresman twice sent reminders to Graff — first on April 26
and again on April 30, 2016. Gr aff sent an apology to Foresman and forwarded his April 26
email (as well as his initial March 2016 email) to Lewandowski. rs On May 2, 2016, Graff
forwarded Foresman's April 3Q email — which suggested an alternative meeting with Donald
Trump Jr, or Eric Trump so that Foresman could convey to them information that "should be
conveyed to [the candidate] personally or [to] someone [the candidate] absolutely trusts" — to
policy advisor Stephen Miller. s
No communications or other evidence obtained by the Office indicate that the Trump
Campaign learned that Foresman was reaching out to invite the candidate to the Forum or that the
Campaign otherwise followed up with Foresman until slier the election, when he interacted with
the Transition Team as he pursued a possible position in the incoming Administration. in When
interviewed by the Office, Foresinan denied that the specific "appmach" from "senior Kremlin
officials" noted in his March 31, 2Q16 email was anything other 'than Kobyakov's invitation to
Roscongress. According to Foresman, the "concrete things" he referenced in the same email were
a combination of the invitation itself, Foresman's personal perspectives on the invitation and
Russia policy in general, and details of a Ukraine plan supported by a U.S. think tank (East'West
Institute), Foresman told the Office that Kobyakov had extended similar invitations through him
to another Republican presidential candidate and one other politician. Foresman also said that
Kobyakov had asked Foresman to invite Trump to speak after that other presidential candidate
withdrew from the race and the other politician's participation did not work out, Fin ally,
Foresman claimed to have no plans to establish a back channel involving Trump, stating the
reference to his involvement in the IIush-Putin back channel was meant to burnish his credentials
to the Campaign. Foresman commented that he had not recognized any of the experts announced
as Trump's foreign policy team in Maich 2016, and wanted to secure an in-person meeting with
the candidate to share his professional background and policy views, including that Trump should
decline Kobyakov's invdation to speak at the Forum.s s
George Papadopoulos was a foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign from March
2016 to early October 2016,'ss In late April 2016, Papadopoulos was told by London-based
professor Joseph Mifsud, immediately after Mifsud's return from a trip to Moscow, that the
Russian government had obtained "dirt" on candidate Clinton in the form of thousands of emails.
One week later, on May 6, 2016, Papadopoulos suggested to a representative of a foreign
governm
ent that the Trump Campaign had received indications from the Russian government that
it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous r'elease of information that woul'd be
damaging to candidate Clinton.
Papadopoulos shared information about Russian "dirt" with people outside of the
Campaign, and the Office investigated whether be also provided it to a Campaign official.
Papadopoulos and the Campaign officials with whom he interacted told the Office that they did
' not recall that Papadopoulos passed them the information. Throughout therelevant period of time
and for several months thereafter, Papadopoulos worked with Mifsud and two Russian nationale
to arrange a meeting between the Campaign and the Rus'sian g overnm
ent.
That meeting never
caine 'to pass.
In March 2016,, Papadopoulos became a foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign.ss'
As early as the summer of 2015, he had sought a role as a policy advisor to the Campaign but, in
a September 30, 2015 email, he was told that the Campaign was not hiring policy advisors.see In
late 2015, Papadopoulos obtained a paid position on the campaign of Republican presidential
candidate Ben Carson.ssi
Although Carson remained in the presidential race until early March 2016, Papadopoulos
had stopped actively working for his campaign by early February 2016. A t th at time,
Papadopoulos reached out to a contact at the London Centre of International Law Practice
(LCILP), which billed itself as a "unique institution.. . c omprising high-level professional
international law practitioners, dedicated to the advancement of global legal knowledge and the
practice of international law." Pa padopoules said that he had finished his role with the Carson
s' Papadopoulos met with our Office for debriefings on several occasions in the summer and fall
of 2017, atter he was arrested and charged in a sealed criminal complaint with making false statements in
a January 2017 FBI interview about, inter alia, the timing, extent, and nature of his interactions and
communications with Joseph Mifsud and two Russian nationalsi Giga Polonskaya and Ivan Timofeev,
Papadopoulos later pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to an information charging him with
making false statements to the FBI, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 8 1001(a).
d Tr anscript of D onald Trump's /deeting with the Washington J'osi Editorial Board,
Washington Post (Mar. 21, 2016).
"' 7/15/15 LinkedIn Message, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (6.'57 a.m.); 9/30/15 Email, Glassner
to Papadopoulos (7:42;21 a.m,).
sn Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2.
'w Papadopoulos 8/I 0/I 7 302, at 2; 2/4/16 Email„Papadopoulos to Idris.
'w London Cenne of International Law Practice, at https:/hvww, Icilp.org/ (via web,archive.org).
81
U.S. Department of Justice
campaign and asked if LCILP was hiring.4 ' I n early February, Papadopoulos agreed to join
LCILP and anived in London to begin worksm
As he was taking his position at LCILP, Papadopoulos contacted Trump campaign manager
Corey Lewandowsid via LinkedIn and emailed campaign official Michael Glassner about his
interest in joining the Tnunp Campaign." On M aroh 2, 2016, Papadopoulos sent Glassner
another message reiterating his interest ies Glassner passed along word of Papadopoulos's interest
to another campaign official, Joy Luti',s, who notified Papadopoulos by email that she had been
told by Glassner to introduce Papadopoulos to Sam Clevis, the Trump Cainpaign's national co-
chair and chief policy advisor.
At the time of Papadopoulos's March 2 emad, the media was criticizing the Trump
Campaign for lack of experienced foreign policy or national security advisors within its ranks.4 s
To address that issue, senior Campaign officials asked Clevis to put.a foreign policy team together
on short notice. ' A f ter receiving Papadopoulos's name from Lutes, Clevis performed a Google
semch on Papadopoulos, learned that he had worked at the Hudson Institute, and believed that he
had credibility on energy issues. On Ma rch '3, 2016, Clevis arranged to speak with
Papadopoulos by phone to discuss Papadopoulos joinmg the Campaign as a foreign policy advisor,
and on March 6, 2016, the two spoke.4 s Papadopoulos recalled that Russia was mentioned as a
topic, and he understood Irom the conversation that Russia would be an important aspect of the
Campaign's foreign policy. s At the end of the conversation, Clovis offered Papadopoulos a role
as a foreign policy advisor to the Campaign, and Papadopoulos accepted the offer.4'
(6:05:47 p.m.),
4w 3/6/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis (4:24i21 p.m.).
4w Statement of Offense $ 4, United Statesv. George Papadopoidos, 1:17-cr-1 82 (D.D.C. Oct. 5„
2017), Doc. 19 ('Papacfopoulos Statement of Offense" ).
"' Papadopoulos 8/10/17302, at2.
U.S. Department of Justice
//
to Rome, Italy, as part of his duties with LCILP.»" The purpose of the trip was to meet officials
affiliated with Link Campus University, a for-profit institution headed by a former Italian
governm
ent official.» s During the visit, Papadopoulos was introduced to Joseph Mifsud.
See, e .,
• • • •
On March 17, 2016, Papadopoulos returned to London. s F our days later, candidate
Trump publirly named him as a member of the foreign policy and national security advisory team
chaired by Senator Jeff Sessions, describing Papadopoulos as "an oil and energy consultant" and
an "[c]xcellent guy,'"i'
On March 24, 2016, Papadopoulos mct with M ifsud in L ondon.sss M i fsud was
accompanied by a Russian female named Olga Polonskaya. Mifsud introduced Polonskaya as a
former student ofhis who had connections to Vladimir Putin. ss Payadopoulos understood at the
time that Polonskaya may have been Putin's niece but later learned that this was not true,4s4 During
the meeting, Polonskaya offered to help Papadopoulos establish contacts in Russia and stated that
the Russian ambassador in London was a friend ofhcrs.4ss Based on this interaction, Papadopoulos
expcctcd Mifsud and Polonskaya to introduce him to the Russian ambassador in London, but that
did not occur,
Following his meeting with Mifsud, Papadopoulos sent an email to members of the Trump
Campaign's foreign policy advisory team, The subject lme of the message was '"Meeting with
Russian leadership —
deluding Putin."" T h e message stated in pertinent part:
I just finished a very productive lunch with a good friend of mine, Joseph Mifsud, the
director of the London Academy ef Diplomacy — who introduced me to both Putin's niece
and the Russian Ambassador in London — who also acts as the Deputy Foreign Minister.+'
The topic of the lunch was to arrange a meeting between us and the Russian leadership to
discuss U.S.-Russia ties under President Trump, They are keen to host us in a "neutral"
city„or directly m Moscow. They said the leadership, including Putin, is ready to meet with
us and Mr, Trump should there be interest, Waiting for everyone's thoughts on moving
forward with this very important issue,4 s
Papadopoulos's message came at a time when Clovis perceived a shift in the Campaign's approach
toward Russia — from one of engaging with Russia thmu h the NATO framework and takin a
stron stance on Russian a e s sion in Ukraine
Clovis's response to Papadopoulos, however, did not reflect that shiit. R eplying to
Papadopoulos and the other members of the foreign policy advisory team copied on the initial
email, Clovis wrote:
This is most informative. Let me work it through the campaign. No commitments until we
see how this plays out. My thought is that we probably should not go forward with any
meetings with the Russians until we have had occasion to sit with our NATO allies,
especiaIly France, Germany and Great Britain. We need to reassure om' allies that we are
not going to advance anything with Russia until we have everyone on the same page.
The Campaign held a meeting of the foreign policy advisory team with Senator Sessions
and candidate Trump approximately one week later, on March 31, 2016, in Washington, D.C.4sr
The meeting — which was intended to generate press coverage for the Campaign s — took place at
the Trump International HoteL4s Papadopoulos flew to Washington for the event. At the meeting,
Senator Sessions sat at one end of an oval table, while Trump sat at the other, As reflected in the
photograph below (which was posted to Trump's Instagram account), Papadopoulos sat between
the two„two seats to Sessions's left:
March 3/,.2N 4 itteettng of Foreign Potter Team, with Papadopo aloe(Fottrth fram Right of Candidate Trump)
During the meeting, each of the newly announced foreign policy advisors introduced
themselves and briefly described their areas of a~silence or expertise, ' Papadopoulos spoke
about his previous work in the energy sector and then brought up a potential meeting with Russian
officials.t's Specifically, Papadopoulos told the group that he had learned thmugh his contacts in
London that Putin wanted to meet with candidate Trump and that these connections could help
art'ange that meeting.
ti. George Papadottoutos Learns Tliat Russia Has "Dirt" in the Form of Ciinton
Emaits
Whatever Sessions'.s precise words at the March 31 meenhg, Papadopoulos did not
understand Sessions or anyone cise in the Trump Campaign to have directed that he refrain from
itmkmg further efforts to arrange a meeting between the Campaign and the Russian government,
To the contrary, Papadopoulos told the Office that he understood the Campaign to be supportive
of his efforts to arrange such a meeting.~t Ac cordingly, when he returned to London,
Papadopoulos resumed those efforts.eet
Throughout April 2016, Papadopoulos continued to correspond with, meet with, and seek
Russia contacts thmugh Mifsud and, at times, Polonskaya,e For example, within a week of her
initial March 24 meeting with him, Polonskaya attempted to send Papadopoulos a text message-
which email exchanges show t o h ave been drafted or e dited by M i f sud — addressing
Papadopoulos's "wish to engage with the Russian Federation,"444 When Papadopoulos learned
from Mifsud that Polonskaya had tried to message him, he, sent her an email seeking another
meeting. Po l onskaya responded the next day that she was "back in St. Petersburg" but "would
be very pleased to support [Papadopoulos's] initiatives between our two countries" and "to meet
[him] again."+e Papadopoulos stated in reply that he thought "a good step" would be to introduce
him to "the Russian Ambassador in London,"' and that he would like to talk to the ambassador, "or
anyone else you recommend, about a potential foreign policy trip to Russia.'get
Mifsud, who had been copied on the email exchanges, replied on the morning of April 11,
2016. He wrote, "This is already been agreed, I am flying to Moscow on the 18th for a Valdai
meeting, plus other meetings at the Duma, We will talk tom'orrow." s The two bodies referenced
by Mifsud are part of or associated with the Russian government: the Duma is a Russian legislative
assembly,~a while "Valdai" refers to the Valdai Discussion Club, a Moscow-based group that "is
close to Russia's foreign-policy establishment."es Papadopoulos thanked Mifsud and said that he
would see him "tomorrow,'+st For her part, Polonskaya responded that she had "already alerted
my personal links to our conversation and your request," that "we are all very excited the
possibility of a good relationship with Mr. Trump,",and that "[t]he Russian Federation would love
to welcome him once his candidature would be officially announced." t
t ' Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 4-5; Papadopoulos 8/11/17 302, at 3; Papadopoulos 9/20/1/ 302,
at 2.
Papadopo rdos Statement of Offense $ 10.
Papadopoaloe Statement of Offense Q 10-15.
"ie 3/29/16 Emails, Mifsud toPolons
kaya(339 am, and536 am),
a' 4/10/1 6 Email, Papadopoulos to Polonskaya (2 45: 59 p m ).
a' 4/11/16 Email, Polonskaya to Papadopoulos (3:11;24 a,m.).
' 4/11/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Polonskaya (9:21i56 a.m.).
a' 4/11/16 Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos (11;43:53).
i Papadopoaloe Statement of, Offense $ 10(c).
" A nton Ttoianovski, Pariri Ally )Fares of Arms Race as Raeeia Considers Response io US
Nuclear Stance, Washington Post (Feb. 10, 2018).
en 4/11/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Mlfsud (11:51:$3 a.m.),
' 4/12/16 Email, Polonskaya to Papadopoulos (4.47:06 a.m.),
U.S, Department of Justice
//
Following the meeting, Mifsud traveled as planned to Moscow, »» On April 18, 2016,
while in Russia, Mifsud introduced Papadopoulos over email to Ivan Timofeev, a member of the
Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). '» M i fsud had described Timofeev as having
connections with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA),s»r the executive entity in Russia
responsible for Russian foreign relations.~»s Over the next several weeks, Papadopoulos and
Timofeev had multiple conversations over Skype and email about setting "the groundwork" for a
"potential" meeting between the Campaign and Russian government officials. Papadopoulos
told the Office that, on one Skype call, he believed that his conversation with Timofeev was being
monitored or supervised by an unknown third party, because Timofeev spoke in an official manner
and Papadopoulos heard odd noises on the lme." T i mofeev also told Papadopoulos in an April
25,2016 email that he had just spoken "to Igor Ivanov[] the President of RIAC and former Foreign
Minister of Russia," and conveyed Ivanov's advioe ab'out how best to arrange a "Moscow visit." "
After a stop in Rome, Mifsud returned to England on April 25„2016.4m The next day,,
Papadopoulos met Mifsud for breakfast at the Andaz Hotel (the same location as their last
meeting). s D u ring that meeting, Mifsud told Papadopoulos that he had met with high-level
Russian government officials during his recent trip to Moscow. Mifsud also said that, on the trip,
he learned that the Russians had obtained "dirt" on candidate Hillary Clinton, As Payadopoulos
later stated to the FBI, Mifsud said that the "dirt" was in the form of "emails of Clinton," and that
they "have thousands of emails."»s» On May 6, 2016, 10 days after that meeting with Mifsud,
P apadopoulos suggested to a representative of a foreign government that the Trump Campaign had
received indications from the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the
anonymous release of information that would be damaging to Hillary Clinton."s»
While he was discussing with his foreign contacts a potential meeting of campaign officials
with Russian government officials, Papadopoulos kept campaign officials apprised of his efforts.
On April 25, 2016, thc day be fore Mifsud told Papadopoulos about the emails, Papadopouloswrote
to senior policy advisor StephenMiller that "[t]he Russian government has an open invitation by
Putin for Mr. Trump to meet hhn when he is ready," and that "[t]he advantage of being in London
overnm
is that these g ents t end to speak a bit more operdy in 'neutral' cities."4»s On April 27, 2016,
after his meeting with Mifsud, Papadoyoulos wrote a second message to Miller stating that "some
interesting messages [were] coming in from Moscow about a trip when the time is right."4»7 The
same day, Papadopoulos sent a similar email to campaign manager Corey Lewandowski, telling
Lewandowski that Papadopoulos had "been receiving a lot of calls over the last month about Putin
wanting to host [Trump] and the team when the time is right.'"»»
"" Papadopoalos Statement of Offense g 14; 4/25/1 6 Text Messages, Mifsud ir. Payadopoulos.
Papadopou1os Statement of Offense [ 14,
4" This information is contained in the FBI case-opening document and related materials.
d»saeminatiets: The foreign government conveyed this information to 'the U.S. government on July 26,
2016, a few days after WikiL'eaks's release of Clinton-related emails. The FBI opened its investigation of
yotential coordination between Russia and the Trump Campaign a few days later based on the information.
4/25/16 Email, Papadopoulos to S. Miller (8:12;44 p.m,).
"»7 4/27/16 Email, Papadoyoulos to S. Miller (6:55:58 y.m.).
"" 4/27/16 Email, Papadoyoulos to Lewandowski (7:15:14 p.m.).
i~» 5/4/16 Email, Payadopoulcs to Lewandowski (8.'14:49 a.m.).
4~' 5/5/1 6 Email, Payadoyoulos to Clovis (7:15.'2 l p.m.).
U.S. Department of Justice
//
to discuss."4 ' Manafort forwarded thc message to another Campaign official, without including
Payadopoulos, and stated: '"Let[']s discuss. We need someone to communicate that [Trump] is
not doing these trips. I t should be someone low level in the Campaign so as not to send
any signal.*'47
On June I, 2016, Papadopoulos replied to an earlier email chain with Lewandowski about
a Russia visit, asking, if Lewandowski *'want[ed] to have a eall about this topic" and whether "we
were following up with it." s A f ter Lewandowski told Papadopoulos to "connect with" Clovis
because he was "running point," Payadopoulos emailed Clovis that "the Russian MFA" was asking
him '"if Mr. Trump is interested in visiting Russia at some point,"474 Papadopoulos wrote in an
email that he "[w]anted to pass this info along to you for you to decide what's best ta do with it
and what message I should send (or ta ignore)."47s
After several email and Skype exchanges with Timofeev, 7 Papadopaulos sent one more
email to Lewandowski on June 19, 2016, Lewandowski's last day as campaign manager.477 The
email stated that "[t]he Russian ministry of foreign affairs" had contacted him and asked whether,
if Mr. Trump could not travel to Russia, a campaign representative such as Papadoyoulos could
attend meetings.47s Papadoyoulos tald Lewandowski that he was "willing to make the iriy off the
record 'if it's in the interest of Mr. Trumy and the campaign to meet specific people.'~7s
90
U.$. Department of Justice
//
ditectly with Clovis and Phares in connection with the summit of the Transatlantic Parliamentary
Group on Counterterrorism (TAG), a group for which Phares was co-secretary general. s' On July
16, 2016, Papadopoulos attended the TAG summit in Washington, D.C., where he sat next to
Clovis (as reflected in the photograph below).4ss
" Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 16-17," 9th TAG Surrtmit in 1Fashington DC, Transatlantic
Parliament Group onCounter Tertorism,
9th Tst G Summit /rt Washington DC, Transatlantic Parliament Group on Counter Terrorism.
journal that he kept at the time.4ss Those notes, which are reyrinted in part below, appear to refer
to potential September 2016 meetings in London with representatives of the '*office of Putin," and
suggest that Phares, Clevis, and Papadopoulos ("Walid/Sam me'"3would attend without the official
backing of the Campaign ("no oilictal letter/no message from Trump" ). '
September:
Have an exploratory meeting
te or lose. In September — if allowed + /~+ l 4'PQ + ~
they will blast Mr. Trump. t $e- f/ f Q I ~ ~ r 4 r i s~ i
W e want t h e m eeting i n
ws/ (I+ /nr, y ~.
London/England
Walid/Ssm me
• hr t„~
(<
+~
No offtcial letter/no message
from Tnunp
They are talking to us.
'@/ 1 I<pl /
-Itis a lot of risk,
-Office of Putin.
-Explore: we are a campaign.
Later communications indicate that Clavis determined that he (Clovis) could not travel.
On August 15, 2016, Papadoyoulos emailed Clovis that he had received requests from multiple
foreign governments, "even Russ(at]," for "closed door workshops/consultations abroad," and
'asked whether there was still interest for Clevis, Phares, and Papadoyoulos "m go on that trip.'@
Clovis copied Phares on his response, which said that he could not "travel before the election" but
that he "would encourage [Payadopoulos] and Walid to make the trips, if it is feasible."
Papadopoulos was dismissed from the Trump Campaign in early October 2016, after an
interview he gave to the Russian news agency Interfax generated adverse publicity.s 2
When interviewed, Papadopoulos and the Campaign officials who interacted with him told
the Office that they could not recall Papadopoulos's sharing the mformation that Russia had
obtained "dirt" on candidate Clinton in the form of emails or that Russia could assist the Campaign
through 'the anonymous release of information about Clinton. Papadopoulos stated that he could
not clearly recall having told anyone on the Campaign and wavered about whether he accurately
remembered an incident in which Clovis had been upset after hearing Papadopoulos tell Clovis
that Papadopoulos thought "they have her emails." ' T h e Campaign officials who interacted or
corresponded with Papadopoulos have similarly stated, with varying degrees of certainty, that he
did not teH them. Senior policy advisor Stephen Miller, for example, did not remember hearing
anything from Papadopoulos or Clavis about Russia having emails of or dirt on candidate
Clinton.4ve Clovis stated that he did not recall anyone, including Papadopoulos, having given him
n on-public information that a forei n overnment m' t be in ossession of material dame 'n t o
Hills Cl i nton,4
George Papadopoulos: Sanctions Have Done Little Mare Than to Turn Russia Tovvards China,
Interfax (Sept. 30, 2016}.
4 ' Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 14-15; Def. Sent. Mem., United States v. George Papadopoutos,
I:17-or-182 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 2018}, Doe. 45,
4v4See footnote 465 of Volume I, Section IV.A.2.d, supra.
Papadopouios 8/10/I 7 302, at S; Papadopoulos 8/11/17 302, at 5„' Papadopoulos 9/20/17 302,
at 2.
n' S. MIIIer 12/14/17 302, at 10.
U.S. Department of Justice
II
The Office investigated another Russia-related contact with Papadopoulos. The Office wss
not fully able to explore the contact because the individual at issue — Sergei Millian — remained
out of the country since the inception of our investigation and declined to meet with members of
the Office despite our repeated efforts to obtain an interview.
Papadopoulos first connected with Millian vm Linkedln on July 15, 2016, shortly after
Papadopoulos had attended the TAG Summit with Cfovis.s® Millian„sn American citizen who is
a native of Bclarus, introduced himself "as president of [the] Ncw York-based Russian American
Chamber of Commerce," and claimed that through that position he had "insider knowledge snd
direct access to the top hierarchy in Russian politics,'u " Papadopoulos asked Timofeev whether
he had heard of Millian.'9 Although Timofcev said no, P apsdopoulos met Millian in Ncw York
City, ~ The meetings took place on July 30 snd August I, 2016.9 9 Afterwards, Millian invited
Papsdopoulos to attend —and potentially speak at — two international energy conferences,
including one that was to be held in Moscow in September 2016.994 papadopoulos ultimately did
not attend either conference.
On July 31, 2016, following his first in-person meeting with Millian„Pspadopoulos
emailed Trump Campaign official Bo Dcnysyk to say that he had been contacted "by some leaders
of Russian-American voters here in the US about their interest in voting for Mr. Trump," and to
ask whether he should "put you in touch with their group (US-Russia chamber of commerce}."sm
Denysyk thanked Papadopoulos "for taking the initiative,"' but asked him to "hold off with
499
outi each to Russian-Americans" because "too many articles" had already portrayed the Campaign,
then-campaign chairman Paul Manafort, and candidate Trump as "being pro-Russian."'
On August 23, 2016, Millian sent a Facebook message to Papadopoulos promising that he
would '"share with you a disruptive technology that might b'e instrumental in your political work
for the campaign," Pa padopoulos claimed to have no recollechon of this matter."
On November 9, 2016, shortly after the election, Papadopoulos ananged to meet Millian
in Chicago to discuss business opportunities, mcluding potential work with Russian "billionaires
who are not under sanctions."s' T he meeting took place on November 14, 2016, at the Trump
Hotel and Tower in Chicago. + According to Papadopoulos, the two men discussed partnering on
business deals, but Papadopoulos perceived that Millian's attitude toward him changed when
Papadopoulos stated that he was only pursuing private-sector opportunities and was not interested
in a job in the Administration. " The two remained in contact, however, and had extended online
discussions about possible business opportunities in Russia. '4 The two also arranged to meet at a
Washington, D.C. bar when both attended Trump's inauguration in late January 2017.s"
Carter Page worked forthe Trump Campaign from January 2016 to September 2016, He
was formally and publicly announced as a foreign policy advisor by the candidate in March
2016,s's Page had lived and worked in Russia, and he had been approached by Russian intelligence
officers several years before he volunteered for the Trump Campaign. During his time with the
Campaign, Page advocated pro-Russia foreign policy positions and traveled to Moscow in his
personal capacity. Russian intelligence officials had formed relationships with Page in 2008 and
2013 and Russian officials may ham fdcused on Page in 2016 because of his affiliation with the
Campaign. However, the investigation did not establish that Page coordinated with the Russian
government in its efforts to interfere with the 2016 presidential election.
Before he began working for the Cainpaign in January 2016, Page had substantial prior
experience studying Russmn policy issues and living and working in Moscow. From 2004 to 2007,
Page was the deputy branch manager of Merrill Lynch's Moscow office.s' There, he worked on
transactions involving the Russian energy company Gazprom and came to know Gazprom's
deputy chief financial officer, Sergey Yatsenko."s
In 2008, Page founded Global Energy Capital LLC (GEC), an investment mana ement and
sdviso f i r m focused on the ene'r s ector in emerging markets. 'v
The company otherwise had no sources of income,
Page was force t o draw down his life savings to support himself and pursue his business
venture. ' Pa e asked Yatsenko to work with him at GEC as a senior advisor on a contin enc
basis
In 2008, Page met Alexander Bulatov, a Russian government official who worked at the
Russian Consulate in New York. Pa e later learned that Bulatov was a Russian intelli ence
$24
officer>
' Test/teeny of Carter Page, Hearing Before the U,S. House of Representattves, Permanent Select
Canon/ace on Jntetitgenoe, 115th Cong. 40 (Nov. 2, 2017) (exhibit).
'" Page 3/30/17 302, at 10.
519
520
Gazprom thinking that if they have a project, he could... rise up. Maybe he can.. . [I]t's obvious
that he wants to earn lots of money."sos Podobnyy said that he had led Page on by "feed[lug] him
empty promises" that Podobnyy would use his Russian business connections to help Page.sic
Podobnyy told the other intelligence officer that his method of recruiting foreign sources was to
promise them favors and then discard them once he obtained relevant information from them. s'
In 2015, Podobnyy and two other Russian intelligence officers were charged with
conspii'acy to act as an unregistered agent of a foreign government. Th e criminal complaint
detailed Podobnyy's interactions with aml conversations about Page, who was identified only as
"Male-1.'"'s Based on the criminal complaint's description of the interactions, Page was aware
that he was the individual described as "Male-l,"'~ Page later spoke with a Russian government
official at the United Nations General Assembly and identified himself so that the official would
understand he was "Male-1" from the Podobn c orn laint. I Pa e told the official that.he "didn' t
do anything"
In interviews with the FBI before the Office's opening, Page acknowledged that he
understood that the individuals he had associated with were members of the Russian intelligence
services,, but he stated that he had only pmvided immaterial non-public information to them and
that he did not view this relationship as a backchannel.ssi Page told investigating agents that "the
more immaterial non-public information I give them, the belier for this country,'uss
In January 2016, Page began volunteering on an informal, unpaid basis for the Trump
Campaign after Ed Cox, a state Republican Party official, introduced Page to Trump Campaign
officials.sss Page told the Gffice that his goal in working on the Campaign was to help candidate
Trump improve relations with Russia. To that end, Page emailed Campaign officials offering
his thoughts on U.S.-Russia relations, prepared talking points and briefing memos on Russia, and
proposed that candidate Trump meet with President Vladimir Putin in Moscow.
In communications with Campaign officials, Page also repeatedly touted his high-level
contacts in Russia and his ability to forge connections between candidate Trump and senior.
Russian governmental officials, For example, on January 30, 2016, Page sent an email to senior
Campaign officials stating that he had "spent the past week in Europe and ha[d] been in discussions
with some individuals with dose ties to the Kremlin" who recognized that Trump could have a
"game-changing effect. . . in bringing the end of the new Cold War." T he e mail stated that
"[t]hrough [his] discussions w'ith these high level contacts," Page believed that "a direct meeting
in Moscow between Mr[.] Trump and Putin could be arran ed." 54' P e c losed the email b
criticizin U .S; sanctions on Russia.544
On March 21, 2016, candidate Trump formally and publicly identified Page as a member
of his foreign policy team to advise on Russia and the energy sector.~s Over the next several
m onths, Page continued providing policy-related work product to Campaign officials, F or
example, in April 2016, Page provided feedback on an outline for a foreign policy speech that the
candidate gave at the Mayflower Hotel,547see Volume I, Sec'tion IV.A.4, tnPa. In May 2016, Page
prepared an outline of an energy policy speech for the Campaign and then traveled to Bismarck,
North Dakota, to watch the candidate deliver the speech.s 5 Chief policy advisor Sam Clovis
expressed appreciation for Page's work and praised his work to other Campaign officials.+5
Page's afllliation with the Trump Campaign took on a higher profile and drew the attention
of Russian officials after the candidate named him a foreign p'olicy advisor. As a result,, in late
April 2016, Page was invited to give a speech at the July 2016 commencement ceremony at the
54' See, e,g., 1/30/16 Email, Page to Cilassner et al.," 3/17/16 Email, Page to Clovis (attaching a
"President's Daily BrieP prepared by Page that discussed the "severe de at i on of U.S.-Russia relations
following Washington's meddling" in Ukraine);
5 1/30/16 Email, Page to Glassner et al.
545 1/30/1 6 Email, Page to Glassner et al.
Transcript of D onald Trurn 's Meettn w i t h the Washington Past Editorial Board,
Washington Post (Mar. 21, 2016);
547
5 See, e.g., 3/28/I 6 Email, Clovis to Lewandowski et al. (forwarding notes prepared by Page and
stating, "I wanted to let you know the type of work some o'f our advisors are capable of.").
U.S. Department of Justice
//
New Economic School (NES) in Moscow. ' Th e NES commencement ceremony generally
featured high-profile speakers; fol example, President Barack Obama delivered a commencement
address at the school in 2009, NE S officials told the Office that the interest in inviting Page to
speak at NES was based entirely on his status as a Trump Campaign advisor who served as the
candidate's Russia expert.552 Andrej Krickovic, an associate of Page's and assistant professor at
the Higher School of Economics in Russia, recommended that NES rector Shlomo Weber invite
Page to give the commencement address based on his connection to the Trump Campaign.55'
Deni's Klimentov, an employee of NES, said that when Russians learned of Page's involvement in
the Trump Campaign in March 2016, the excitement was yalyable.'56 Weber recalled that in
summer 2016 there was substantial interest in the Trump Campaign in Moscow, and he felt that
bringing a member of the Campaign to the school would be beneficial.
Page was eager to accept the invitation to speak at NES, and he sought approval from
Trumy Campaign officials to make the trip to Russia.' O n May 16, 2016, while that request was
still under consideratiori, Page emailed Clovis, J.D. Gordon, and Walid Phares and suggested that
candidate Trmnp take his place speaking at the commencement ceremony in Moscow, 5 On June
19, 2016, Page followed up again to request approval to speak at the' NES event and to reiterate
that NES would love to have Mr, Trump speak at this annual celebration" in Page's place.556
Campaign manager Corey Lewandowski responded the same day, saying, "If you want to do this,
it would be out side [sic] of your role with the DJT for President campaign. I am certain Mr.
Trump will not be. able to attend."s 6
In early July 2016, Page traveled to Russia for the NES events. On July 5, 2016, Denis
Klimentov, copying his brother, Dmitri Klimentov,56e emailed Maria Zakharova. the Director of
the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Information and Press Deyartment, about Page's visit and
his connection to the Trump Campaign. ' Denis Klimentov said in the email that he wanted to
draw the Russian government's attention to Page's visit in Moscow.56t His message to Zakharova
99
U.S. Department of Justice
II
On July 7, 2016, Page delivered the first of his two speeches in Moscow at NES.sss In the
speech, Page criticized the U.S. government's foreign policy toward Russia, stating that
"Washington and other Western capitals lieve impeded potential progress through their often
hypocritical focus on ideas such as democratization, inequality, corruption and mgiine change.'usr
On July 8, 2016, Page delivered a speech during the NES commencement.sss After Page delivered
his commencement address, Russian Deputy Prime Minister and NES board member Arkady
Dvorkovich spoke at the ceremony and stated that the sanctions the United States had imposed on
Russia had hmt the NES,ss' Page and Dvorkovich shook hands at the commencement ceremony,
and Weber recalled that Dvorkovich made statements to Pa e about workin t o ether in the
future.'"
Page said that, during his time in Moscow, he met with friends and associates he knew
from when helived in Russia,including Andrey Baranov, a former Gazprom employee who had
become the head of investor relations at Rosnefts a Russian energy company.sr Page stated that
he and Baranov talked about "immaterial non-public" information.srs Page believed he and
Baranov discussed Rosneft president Igor Sechin, and he thought Baranov might have mentioned
'n Page 3/10/17 302, at 3; Page 3/30/I 7 302, at 3; Page 3/31/1 7 302, at 2.
'w Page 3/30/17 302, at 3.
100
U.S. Department of Justice
the possibility of a sale of a stake in Rosnelt in passing.' 4 Page recalled mentioning his
involvement in the Trump Campaign with Baranov, although he did not remember details of the
conversation,'7 Page also met with individuals from Tatneft, a Russian energy company, to
discuss possible business deals, including having Page work as a consultant.
On July g, 2016, while he was in Moscow, Page emailed several Campaign officials and
suited he would send "a readout soon regarding some incredible insights and outreach I' ve received
from a few Russian legislators and senior members of the Presidential Administration here."~
Qn July 9, 2016, Page emailed Clovis, writing in pertinent part;
Russian Deputy Prime minister and NES board member Arkady Dvorkovich also spoke
before the event. In a private conversation, Dvorkovich expressed strong support for Mr.
Trump and a desire, to work together toward devising better solutions in response to the
vast range of cunent. international problems. Based on feedback from a diverse array of
other sources close to the Presidential Administration, it was readily apparent that this
sentiment is widely held at all levels of government.s
T e 0 fice was unab e to obtiun a i t ional evi ence or testimony about who Page
may have met or communicated with in Moscow; thus, Page's activities in Russia — as described
in his emails with the Campaign —were not fully explained.
SS2
101
U.S. Department of Justice
ll
d. Later Cam
paign Workand Jfernovaf from rite Cantpulgn
In July 2016, alter returning from Russia, Page traveleil to the Republican National
Convention in Cleveland.s" W hile there, Page met Russian Ambassador to the United States
Sergey Kislyak; that interaction is described in Volume I, Section IV.A.6,a, infra.s 4 Page later
emailed Campaign officials with feedback he said he received fmm ambassadors he had met at the
Convention, and he wrote that Ambassador Kisl ak was ver worried about candidate Clinton's
world views.
Following the Convention, Page's trip to Moscow and his advocacy for pro-Russia foreign
policy drew the media's attention and began to generate substantial press coverage. The Campaign
responded by distanoing itself from Page, describing him as an "informal foreign policy advisor"
who did "not speak for Mr. Trump or the campaign," s On September 23, 2016, Yahoo! News
reported that U.S. intelligence officials were investigating whether Page had opened private
communications with senior Russian officials to discuss U.S. sanctions policy under a possible
Trump Administration,sss A Campaign spokesman told Yahoo! News that Page had "no role" in
the Campaign and that the Campaign was "not aware of any of his activities, past or present."s s
On September 24, 2016, Page was formally remaved from the Campaign,sss
Although Page had been removed from the Campaign, after the election he sought a
position in the Trump Administration. in On November 14, 2016, he submitted an application to
the Transition Team that inflated his credentials and experiences, stating that in his capacity as a
Trump Campaign foreign policy advisor he had met with "top world leaders" and "effectively
"s See, e,g., Steven Mufson tk Tom Hamburger, Trump Advisor's Public Comments, Ties to
Moscow Stir Unease in Both Parties, Washington Post (Aug. 5, 2016).
"s Michael Isikoff, U Z Intel Oltf cials Probe Ties Between Trtonp Adviser ond Kremlin, Yahoo l
News (Sept. 23, 2016).
Michael Isikoff, US, Intel Officials Probe Ties Between Trump Adviser and Kremlin, Yahoo!
News (Sept. 23, 2016),'see also 9/25/16 Email, Hicks to Conway bt Bannon (instructing that inquiries about
Page should be answered with "[h]e wss announced as an informal adviser in March Since then he hss
had no rale or official contact with the campaign. We have no knowledge of activities past or present and
he now officially hss been removed from all lists etc."),
' ' Page 3/16l17 302, at 2; see, e.g., 9/23/16 Email, J. MIIIer to Bannon Bc S, Miller (discussing
plans to remove Rage froin the campaign).
591
, "Transition Online Farm," 11/14/16 ~
102
U.S. Department of Justice
//
responded to diplomatic outreach efforts from senior government officials in Asia, Europe, the
Middle Eam, Attica, [and] the Americas."ss Page received no response Irom the Transition Team.
When Page took a personal ttip to Moscow in December 2016„he met again with at least one
Russian government official; That interaction and a discussion of the December trip are set forth
in Volume I, Section IV.B.6, inPu.
Members of the Trump Campaign interaeted on several occasions with the Center for the
National Interest (CNI), principally through its President and Chief Executive Officer, Dimitri
Simes. CNI is a think tank with expertise in and connections to the Russian government, Simes
was born in the former Soviet Union and immigrated to the United States in the 1970s. In April
2016, candidate Trump delivered his first speech on foreign policy and national security at an event
hosted by the7/uii onal Interest„a publication affiliated with CNI. Then-Senator Jeff Sessions and
Russian Ambassador- Kislyak both attended the event and, as a result, it gained some attention in
relatiott to Sessions's confirmation hearings to become Attorney General. Sessions had various
other contacts with CNI during the campaign period on foreign-policy matters, including Russia.
Jared Kushner also interacted with Simes about Russian issues during the campaign. The
investigation did not identify evidence that the Campaign passed or received any messages to or
from the Russian government through CNI or Simes.
Dimitri Simes is president and CEO of CNI and the publisher and CEO of the Ji/utrbnal
Interest. + Simes was born in the former Soviet Union, emigrated to the United States in the early
1970s, and joined CNI's predecessor after working at the Carnegie Endmvment for International
103
U,S. Department of Justice
Peace. Si m es personally has many contacts with current and former Russian government
officials,sos as does CNI collectively. A s CNI stated when seeking a grant from the Carnegie
Corporation in 2015, CNI has "unparalleled access to Russian officials and politicians among
Washington think tanks,"soo in part because CNI has arranged for U.S. delegations to visit Russia
and for Russian delegations to visit the United States as part of so-called "Tiack II" diplomatic
efforts soo
On March 14, 2016, CNI board member Richard Plepler organized a luncheon for CNI and
its honorary chairman, Henry Kissinger, at the Time Warner Building in New York.s ' The idea
behind the event was to generate interest in CNI's work and recruit new board members for CNI soo
Along with Sim'es, attendees at the event included Jared Kushner, son-in-law of candidate
Trump.~ Kushner told the Office that the event came at a time when the Trump Campaign was
having trouble securing support from experienced foreign policy professionals and that, as aresult,
he decided to seek Simes's assistance during the March 14 event.s "
Simes and Kusimer spoke again on a March 24, 2016 telephone call,~' three days after
Trump had publicly named the team of foreign policy advisors that had been put together on short
notice.o+ On March 31, 2016, Simes and Kushner had an in-person, one-on-one meeting in
Kushner's New York office. " D uring that meeting, Simes told Kushner that the best way to
handle foreign-policy issues for the Trump Campaign would be to organize an advisory group of
experts to meet with candidate Trump and develop a foreign policy appmach that was consistent
with Trump's voice, Si mes believed that Kushner was receptive to that suggestion.
Simes also had contact with other individuals associated with the Trump Campaign
regarding the Campaign's foreign policy positions, For example, on June 17, 2016, Simes sent
J.D, Gordon an email with a "memo to Senator Sessions that we discus'sed at our recent meeting"
104
U.S. Department of )ustice
//
and asked Gordon to both read it and share it with Sessions. The memorandum proposed building
a "small and carefully selected group of experts" to assist Sessions with the Campaign, operating
under the assumption "that Hillary Clinton is very vulnet'able on national security and foreign
policy issues."' The memorandum outlined key issues for the Campaign, including a "new
beginning with Russia "s m
During both their March 24 phone call and their March 31 in-person meeting, Simes and
Kushner discussed the possibility of CNI hosting a foreign policy speech by candidate Trump. "
Following those conversations, Simes agreed that he and others associated with CNI would
provide behind-the-scenes input on the substance of the foreign-policy speech and that CNI
officials would ooordinate the logistics of the speech with Sessions and his staff, including
Sessions's chief of staff, Rick Dearborn/"
In mid-April 2016, Kushner put Simes in contact with senior policy advisor Stephen Miller
and forwarded to Simes an outline of the foreign-policy speech that Miller had prepared. ' Simes
sent back to the Campaign bullet points with ideas for the speech that he had drafted with CNI
Executive Director Paul Saunders and board member Richard Burt,s'4 Simes received subsequent
draft outlmes from Miller, and he and Saunders spoke to Miller by phone about substantive
changes to the speech.ms It is nnt clear, however, whether CNI officials received an actual draft
of the speech for comment; while Saunders recalled having received an actual draft, Simes did not,
and the emails that CNI produced to this Offlce do not contain such a draft s'
After board members expressed concern to Simes that CNI's hosting the speech could be
perceived as an endorsement of a particular candidate, CNI decided to have its publication, the
National Interest, serve as the host and to have the event at the National Press Club. ' K u s bner
later requested that the event be moved to the Mayflower Hotel, which was another venue that
Simes had mentioned during initial discussions with the Campaign, in order to address concerns
about security and capacity. ' s
105
U.S. Department of Justice
//
On April 25, 2016, Saunders booked event rooms at the Mayflower to host both the speech
and a VIP reception that was to be held beforehand.ms Saunders understood that the reception-
at which im itees would have the chance to meet candidate Trump — would be a small event,
Saunders decided who would attend by looking at the list of CNI's invitees to the speech itself and
then choosing a subset for the reception.m' CNI's invitees to the reception included Sessions and
Kislyak.mt The week before the speech Simes had informed Kislyak that he would be invited to
the speech, and that he would have the opportunity to meet Trump.s+
When the pre-speech reception began on April 27, a receiving line was quickly organized
so that attendees could meet Trump. S e ssions first stood next to Trump to introduce him to the
members of Congress who were in attendanoe. ' A f ter those members had been introduced,
Simes stood next to Trump arid introduced him to the CNI invitees in attendance, including
Kislyak.+s Simes perceived the introduction to be positive and Iriendly, but thought it clear that
Kislyak and Trump had just met for the first time.s 7 Kislyak also met Kushner during the pre-
speech reception, The two shook hands and chatted for a minute or two, during which Kushner
recalled Kislyak saying, "we like what your candidate is saying.. . it's refreshing/+zs
Several public reports state that, in addition to speaking to Kushner at the pre-speech
reception, Kislyak also met or conversed with Sessions at that time.s~s Sessions stated to
investigators, however, that he did not remember any such conversation. t N or did anyone else
affiliated with CNI or the National Interest specifically recall a conversation or meeting between
Sessions and Kislyak at the pre-speech reception. " I t appears that, if a conversation occurred at
the pre-speech reception, it was a brief one conducted in public view, similar to the exchange
between Kushner and Kislyak,
'" Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 11-12; C00006651-57 (Mayflower Group Sales Agreement),
s Saunders 2/1 5/18 302, at 12-13,
' Saunders 2/15/1 8 302, at 12.
's C00002575 (Attendee List); C00008536 (4/25/1 6 Email, Simes to Kusbner (4:53;45 p.m.)).
'~ Simes 3/8/18 302, at 19-20.
The Offlce found no evidence that Kislyak conversed with either Trump or Sessions after
the speech, or would have had the apportunity to do sa. Simes, for example, did not recall seeing
Kislyak at the post-speech luncheon,s and the only witness who accounted for Sessions's
whereabouts stated that Sessions may have spoken to the press after the event but then departed
for Capitol Hill . Sa unders recalled, based in part on a food-related request he received fram a
Campaign staff member, that Trump left the hotel a few minutes after the speech to go to the
airport.m4
In the wake of Sessions's confnmation hearings as Attorney General, questions arose about
whether Sessions's campaign-period interactions with CNI apart tram the Mayflower speech
included any additional meetings with Ambassador Kislyak or involved Russian-related matters.
With respect ta Kislyak contacts, on May 23,2016, Sessions attendedCNI's Distinguished Service
Award dinner at the Four Seasons Hotel in Washington, D,C. s Sessions attended a prc-darner
reception and was seated at one of two head tables I'o r the event ms A seating chart prepared by
Saunders indicates that Sessions was scheduled to be seated next to Kislyak, who appears to have
responded to the invitation by indicating he would attend the event ss" Sessions, however, did not
remember seeing, speaking with, or sitting next to Kislyak at the dinner. s Although CM board
member Charles Boyd said he may have seen Kislyak at the dinner ss Simes, Saunders, and Jacob
Heilbrunn — editor of the Not/ann/ Interest —all had no recollectian of seemg Kislyak at the May
23 event.s K i s lyak also does not appear in any of the photos from the event that the Gffice
obtained.
In the summer of 2016, CNI organized at least two dinners in Washington, D.C. for
Sessions to meet with experienced foreign policy professionals/4' The dinners included CNI-
afflliated individuals, such as Richard Burt and Zalmay Khalilzad, a former U.S. ambassador to
Afghanistan and Iraq and the person who had introduced Trump before the April 27, 2016 foreign-
107
U.S. Department of Justice
/'/
policy speech.~r Khalilzad also met with Sessions one-on-one separately fi'om the dinners.sos At
the dinners and in the meetings, the participants addressed U,S. relations with Russia, including
how U.S. relations with NATO and European countries affected U.S. policy toward Russia.s44 But
the discussions were not exclusively focused on Russia,~' K h alilzad, for example, recalled
discussing "nation-building" and violent extremism with Sessions.s~s In addition, Sessions asked
Saunders (of CNI) to draft two memoranda not specific to Russia: one on Hillary Clinton's foreign
policy shortcomings and another on Egypt.
Between the April 2016 speech at the Mayflower Hotel and the presidential election, Jared
Kushner had periodic, contacts with Simes. T h ose contacts consisted of both in-person meetings
and phone conversafions, winch concerned how to address issues relating to Russia in the
Campaign and how to move forward with the advisory gmup of foreign policy experts that Simes
had proposed.s Simes recalled that he, not Kushner, initiated all conversations about Russia, snd
that Kushner never asked him to set up back-channel conversations with Russians.ss According
to Simes, afier the Mayflower speech in late April, Simes raised the issue of Russian contacts with
Kushner, advised that it was bad optics for the Campaign to develop hidden Russian contacts, and
told Kushner both that the Campaign should not highlight Russia as an issue and should handle
any contacts with Russians with care.s ' Kuslmer generally provided a similar account of his
interactions with Simes,s's
Among the Kushner-Simes meetings was one held on August 17, 2016, at Simes's request,
in Kushner's New York office, The meeting was to address foreign policy advice that CNI was
providing and how to respond to the Clinton Campaign's Russia-related attacks on candidate
Trump. s' In advance of the meeting„Simes sent Kushner a "Russia. Policy Memo" laying out
"what Mr. Trump may want to say about Russia."ss" In a cover email transmitting that memo and
a phone call to set up the meeting, Simes mentioned "a well-documented story of highly
questionable connections between Bill Clinton" and the Russian government, "parts of [which]"
(according to Simes) had even been "discussed with the CIA and the FBI in the late 1990s and
shared with the [Independent Counsel] at the end of the Clinton presidency."~s K ushner
forwarded the email to senior Trump Campaign officials Stephen Miller, Paul Manafort, and Rick
Crates, with the note "suggestion only." Man afort subsequently forwarded the email to his
assistant and scheduled a meeting with Simes.ssr (Manafort was on 'the verge of leaving the
Campaign by the time of the scheduled meeting with Simes, and Simes ended up meeting only
with Kushner).
During the August 17 meeting, Simes provided Kushner the Clinton-related information
that he had romised.ass Simes told Kushner that
Simes perceived that Kushner did not find the information to be of interest or use to the
Campaign because it was, in Simes*s words, "old news,"'ast When interviewed by the Office,
Kushner stated that he believed that there was little chance of something new being revealed about
the Clintons given their long career as public figures, and that he never received from Simes
information that could be "opemtionalized" for the Trump Campaign,+t D espite Kushner's
'" Simes 3/8/18 302, at 29-30; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 6; Kushner 4/I I/18 302, at 12; C00007269
(8/I 0/16 Meeting Invitation, Verges to Simes et al.); D JTFP00023484 (8/I I/16 Email, Hagan to Manafort
(5:57:15 p.m.)).
~ C00007981-84 (8/9/16 Email, Simes to Kushner (6.'09:21 p.m.)). T h'e memorandum
recommended "downplaying Russia as a U.S. foreign policy priority at this time" and suggested that "some
tend to exaggerate Putin's flaws," The memorandum also recommended, approaching general Russian-
related questions in the framework of "how to work with Russia to advance important U.S. national
i nterests" and that a Trump Administration "not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy," T h e
memorandum did not discuss sanctions but did address how to handle Ukraine-related questions, including
questions about Russia" s invasion and annexation of Crimea.
~r C00007981 (8/9/16 Email, Simes to Kushner (6.09:21 P.m.)).
" DJTFP00023459 (8/10/16 Email, Kushner to S. Miller et al. (11:30:13 a.m.)),
DJTFP00023484 (8/I I/16, Email, Hagan to Manafort (5:57:15 p,m.)).
" Simes 3/8/18 302, at 29-30; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 6; Kushner 4/I I/18 302, at 12,
'rr Simes 3/8/18 302, at 30; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 6.
" Simes 3/8/18 302, at 30.
"' Simes 3/8/18 302, at 30; Simes 3/27/I 8 302, at 6.
' Kushner 4/I I/18 302, at 12.
109
V,S. Department of Justice
//
reaction, Simes believed that he provided the same information at a small group meeting of foreign
policy experts that CNI organized for Sessions.
On June 9, 2016, senior representatives of the Trump Campaign met in Trump Tower with
a Russian attorney expecting to receive derogatory information about Hillary Clinton from the
Russian government. The meeting was proposed to Donald Trump Jr. in an email Irom Robert
Goldstone, at the request ofhis then-client Emin Agalarov, the son of Russian real-estate developer
Aras Agalarov. Goldstone relayed to Trmnp Jr. that the "Crown prosecutor of Russia... offered
to provide the Trump Campaign with some official documents and information that would
incriminate Hillary and her dealings with Russia" as "part of Russia and its government's support
for Mr. Trump." Trump Jr. immediately responded that "if it's what you say I love it,*' and arranged
the meeting thmugh a series of emails and telephone calls.
Trump Jr. invited campaign chairman Paul Manafort and senior advisor Jared Kushner to
attend the meeting, and both attended. Members of the Campaign discussed the meeting before it
occurred, and Michael Cohen recalled that Trump Jr. may have told candidate Trump about an
upcoming meeting to receive adverse infor'mation about Clinton, without linking the meeting, to
Russia. According to written answers submitted by President Trump, he has no recollection of
learning of the meeting at the time, and the Office found no documentary evidence showing that he
was made aware of 'the meeting — or its Russian connection — before it occurred.
The Russian attorney who spoke at the meeting, Natalia Veselnitskaya, had previously
worked for the Russian government and maimained a relationship with that government throughout
this period of time. She claimed that funds derived from illegal activities in Russia were provided
to Hillary Clinton and other Democrats. Trump Jr. requested evidence to support those claims, but
Veselnitskaya did not provide such information. She and her associates then turned to a critique of
the origins of the Magnitsky Act, a 2012 statute that imposed finanoial and travel sanctions on
Russian officials and that resulted in a retaliatory ban on adoptions of Russian children. Trump Jr.
suggested that the issue could be revisited when and if candidate Trump was elected, After the
election, Veselnitskaya made additional efforts to follow up on the meeting, but the Trump
Transition Team did not engage.
110
U.S. Department of Justice
//
— worked with Trump in connection with the 2013 Miss Universe pageant in Moscow and a
potential Trump Moscow real-estate project 66' The relationship continued over time, as the parties
pursued the Trump Moscow project in 2013-2014 and exchanged gifts and letters in 2016.666 For
example, in April 2016, Trump responded to a letter fram Aras Agalarov with a handwritten
note.~ A ras Agalarov expressed interest in Trump's campaign, passed on "congratulations" for
winning in the primary and — according to one email drafted by Goldstone — an '*offer" of his
"support and that af many of his important Russian friends and colleagues[,] especially with
reference to U.S./Russian relations." 6
ol stone understood
Russian political connection, and Emin Aga arov indrcated that e attorney was a prosecutor. 7s
Goldstone recalled that the information that mi ht interest the Trum s involved Hill Cli n ton
Kaveladze
11/16/17 302, at 3; hugart 9 25/1 7 302, at 2-3;
Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 10; ~
• 4 Kaveladze 1 1/16/17 302, at 5-6; 4/25/1 6 Email, Graff'to Goldstone.
' RG000033-34 (4/25/16 Email, Graff to Goldstone (attaduncnt)).
"' DJTJR00008 2/29/16 Email Goldstone ta Tram Jr. et al, •
674
U.S, Department of Justice
//
675
m' In December 2018, a grand jury in the Southern District of New York returned an indictment
charging Veselnitskaya with obstructing the Prsvezon litigation discussed in the text above. Sec Indictment,
United States v. I /Iatatta Vladlmirovna Peselnitskaya, No. 18-cr-904 (S.D,N, Y,). The indictment alleges,
among other things, that Veselnitskaya lied to the district court about her relationship to the Russian
Prosecutor General*s Offiee and her involvement in responding to a U.S. document request sent to the
Russian government,
'V i /i u l l /2 0 / / / B IN / / // 8 /* C ~ lt i/ i d '~ SR~
ins Testimony of Natalia Veselnitskaya Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary (Nov, 20, 2017)
at 33; Keir Simmons A Rachel Elbaum„Russtan Lawyer Jrssslnttsttaya Says Shs Didn 't Give Trump Jr.
Info on Clinton, NBC News (July 11, 2017); Maria Tsvetkova //h Jack Stubbs, Moscow Lawyer II7to Mat
Trump Jr. Had Busstan Spy Agency As Client, Reuters (July 21, 2017); Andrew E, Kramer gc Sharon
Lapraniere„Lawysr IPho Ipas Said to Have Dirt an Cltnton Had. Clossr Ties to Kremlin, than Shs Let On,
New York Times (Apr. 27, 2018),
s~ See Pub. L. No. 112-208 tj) 402, 404(a)(1), 126 Stat, 1502„1502-1506. Sergei Magnitsky was
a Russian tax speciahst who worked for William Browder, a former investment fund manager in Russia.
Browder hired Magnitsky to investigate tax fraud by Russian ofhcials, and Magnitsky was charged with
help'mg Browder embezzle money. Afier Magnitsky died in a Russian prison, Browder lobbied Congress
to pass the Magnitsky Act. See, e,g.,Andrew E. Krsmer, Turning Tables tn Magnitshy Case, Russia
Accuses ¹mssts of Murder, New York Times (Oct. 22, 2017); Testimony of Natalia Veselnitskaya Before
the Senate Committee on Judiciary (Nov. 20, 2017), Exhibits at 1-4; Rosie Gray,,Bill Browdsr 's Tesgmony
to ths Senate Juch'ctary Commtttee, The Atlantic (July 25, 2017),
"' Ellen Barry,It ussta Bars I B Americans After Sanctions byUSNew York Times (Apr. 13, 2013);
Tom Porter, Supportsrs of the Magnttshy Act Claim They' ve Bean Targets of Russian Assassination and
Eidnapptng Bigs, Newsweek (July 16„2017).
's' Testimony of Natalia, Veselnitskaya Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary (Nov. 20, 2017),
at 21.
Sse Veseinitskaya Decl., Unttsd States v, Prevsson Holdings, Ltd, No. 13-cv-6326 (S.D.N.Y.);
sec Prsveson Holdings, Second Amended Complaint; Prsvszon Hotdtngs, Mem. and Order; Prcvsson
Holdings, Deposition of Oleg Lurie.
112
U.S, Department of Justice
//
appears to have been involved in an April 2016 approach to a U.S. congressional delegation in
Moscow offering "confidential information" f'rom *'the Prosecutor General of Russia" about
"interactions between certain political forces in our two countries.'
Shartly after his June 3 call with Emin Agalaiov, Goldstone emailed Trump Jr.css The
email stated:
Goodmorning
Ernielust calledsndsskmtmetocontent ycuwith somethingvmyinteresting,
1'heCrownprosecutor ofRussiamet withhisfather AranIbis m
orning endintheir m
eeting ogersdtoprovidetheTrumpcampaignvdth
someoffidsl documentsandinformation that wouldincriminate Hilaryendherdealingswith Rurwtssndwould bevery usefulto yourfather.
This isobviouslyveryhighlevel sndsensitiveinformskonbutis pmtofRussiaandIts government's supporttcr Mr.Trump- helpedalongby
ArsesndEmin.
Whatdoyouthink is thebest wsyto handlethis informationsndwouldyoubeable tospeak to Eminshout it direcgyy
I canalso sendthis infotoyourfather vis Rhons,butft Isultra sensitivesowantedto sendto youlrst,
Best
RobGoldstone
Within minutes af this email, Trump Jr. responded, enudling back: "Thanks Rob I appreciate that.
I am on the road at the moment but perhaps I just speak to Emin first. Seems we have some time
and if it's what you say I love it especially later in the summer. Could we do a call first thing next
week when I am back?~ G o ldstone conveyed Trump Jr.'s interest to Emin Agalarov, emailing
that Trump Jr. "wants ta speak personally on the issue." sc
On June 6, 2016, Emin Agalarov asked Goldstane if there was "[a]ny news„" and Goldstone
explained that Trump Jr. was likely still traveling for the "final elections.. . where [T]rump will
be 'crowned' the official nominee.*+s On the same day, Galdstone again emailed Trump Jr. and
asked when Tmmp Jr. was "free to talk with Emin about this Hillary info.cess Trump Jr. asked if
See Gribbin tt/31/17 3'02, at 1-2 tb 1A (undated one-page docuinent given to congressianal
delegation). The Russian Prosecutor General is an official with bmad national responsibilities in the
Russian legal system. See FederalLaw ari the Froseerttar's Office af the Russtirn Federation (1992,
amended 2004),
" RG000061 (6/3/16 Email, Goldstone to Trumy Jr.); DJTJR00446 (6/3/16 Email, Goldstone to
Donald Trump Jr,),' @DanaldJTrumy Jr 07/1 1/17 (11:00) Tweet.
"' DJTJR00446 (6/3/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone),' NDonaldJTrumpJr 07/11/17 (11.00)
Tweet; RG000061 (6/3/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone).
RG000062 (6/3/16 Email, Goldstone dr Trump Jr.).
" RG000063 (6/6/16 Emu' A, Agalarov to Goldstone); RG000064 (6/6/16 Email, Goldstone to
A. Agalarov),
' RG000065 (6/6/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.); DJTJR00446 (6/6/16 Email, Goldstone to
Trumy Jr,).
113
U.S. Department of Justice
//
they could "speak now," and Goldstone arranged a call between Trump Jr. and Emin Agalarov ssa
On June 6 and June 7, Trump Jr. and Emin Agalarov had multiple brief calls.
Also on June 6, 2016, Aras Agalarov called Ike Kaveladze and asked him to attend a
meeting in New York with the Trump Organization, s' Kaveladze is a Georgia-born, naturalized
U.S. citizen who worked in the United States for the Crocus Group and reported to Aras
Agalarov, K a v eladze told the Of6ce that, in a second phone call on June 6, 2016, Aras Aga1arov
asked Kaveladze if he knew anything about the Magnitsky Act, and Aras sent him a short synopsis
for the meeting and Veselnitskaya's business card. According to Kaveladze, Ares Agalarov said
the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the Magnitsky Act, and he asked Kaveladze to
translate.'"
On June 7, Goldstone emailed Trump Jr, and said that "Emin asked that I schedule a
meeting with you and [t]he Russian gove
rnmentattorneywho is flying over from Moscow." ss
Trump Jr, replied that Manafort (identified as the "campaign boss"), Jared Kushner, and Trump
Jr. would likely attend.ss' Goldstone was su rised to learn that Trump Jr., Manafort, and Kushner
would attend s+ Kaveladze
'
Early on June &, 2016 Kushner emailed his assistant, asking her to discuss a 3:00 p.m.
"' DJTJR00445 6/6/1 6 Emai Goldstone snd Trump Jr.); RG000065-67 (6/6/16 Email, Goldstone
and Trump Jr.);
w' DJTJR00499 Call Records of Donald Trump Jr. ' ); Call Records
of Donald Trump Jr.
an Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 6;
114
U,S. Department of Justice
//
meeting the following day with Trump Jr,sss Later that day, Trump Jr. forwarded the entirety of
his email correspondence regarding the meeting with Goldstone to Manafort and Kushner, under
thesubject line "F%: Russia - Clinton —private and confidential„" adding a note that the "[m]ecting
*' c
got moved to 4 tomorrow at my offices. Kushner then sent his assistant a second email,
informing her that the [m]ecting udth don jr is 4pm now." ' M anafort responded„"See you
then. P .7m
Rick Gates, who vras the deputy campaign chairman, stated during interviews with the
Office that in the days before June 9, 2016 Trump Jr. announced at a regular morning meeting of
senior campaign staff and Trump family members that he had a lead on negative information about
the Clinton Foundation. ' Gates believed that Trump Jr. said the information was coming from a
group in Kyrgyzstan and that he was introduced to the group hy a friend.~ G ates recalled that
the meeting was attended by Trump Jr., Eric Trump, Paul Manafort, Hope Hicks, and, joining late,
Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner. According to Gates, Manafort warned the group that the
meeting likely would not yield vital htformation and they should be carefuhz s Hicks denied any
knowledge of the June 9 meeting before 2017,7 and Kushner did not recall if the planned June 9
meeting came up at all earlier that week.7w
Michael Cohen recalled being in Donald J, Trump's office on June 6 or 7 when Trump Jr.
told his father that a meeting to obtain adverse information about Clinton vvas going forwai'd.
Cohen did not recall Trump Jr. stating that the meeting was connected to Russia.ice From the tenor
of the conversation, Cohen believed that Trump Jr. had previously discussed the meeting with his
father, although Cohen was not involved in any such conversation.t In a n interview with the
Senate Judiciary Committee, however, Trump Jr. stated that he did not inform his father about the
115
U.S. Department of Justice
//
emails or the upcoming meeting, " Similarly, neither Manafort nor Kushner recalled anyone
informing candidate Trump of the meeting, including Trump Jr. ' President Trump has stated to
this OAice, in written answers to questions, that he has "no recollection of learning at the time"
that his son, Manafort, or "Kushner was considering participating in a meeting in June 2016
conce
rningpo tentially negative information about Hillary Clinto'n," '
Veselnitskaya was in New York on June 9, 2016, fm appellate proceedings in the Prevemn
civil forfeiture liti ation. 54 That da, Veselnitskaya called Rinat Akhmetshin, a Soviet-born U.S.
lobbyist, and when she learned that he was in New York, invited him
to lunch. metshin told the 0 fice that he had worked on issues relating to the Magnitsky
Act and had worked on the Prevason litigation, is K a veladze and Anatoli Samochorno, a
"I nterview of: Donald J. Tnaep, Jr., Senate Judidiary Committee, 115th Cong. 28-29, 84, 94-95
(Sept. 7, 2017). The Senate Judiciary Committee interview was not under oath„but Trump Jr. was advised
that it is a violation of 18 U SC. 3 1001 to make materially false statements in a congressional investigation,
Jd. at 10-11,
ns Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 3-4; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 10,
"' Written Responses of Donald J. Trenp (Nov. 20, 2018), at 8 (Response to Question I, Parts (a)-
(c)). We considered whether one sequence of events suggested that candidate Trump had contemporaneous
knowledge of the June 9 meeting. On June 7, 2016 Trump announced his mtention to give "a major speech"
"probablyMonday of next week" — which would have been June 13— about "all ofthe things that have
taken place with the Clintonsy See,e.g., phillip Bump, 8%at we know about the Trump Tower meeting,
Washington Post (Aug. 7, 2018). Following the June 9 meeting, Trump changed the subject of his planned
speech to national security. But the Office did not find evidence that the original i'dea for the speech was
connected to the anticipated June 9 meeting or that the change of topic was attributable to the failure of that
meeting to produce concrete evidence about Clinton. Other events, such as the Pulse nightclub shooting
on June 12, could well have caused the change. The President's written answers to our questions state that
the speech's focus was altered "[i]n light of' the Pulse nightclub shooting. See Written Responses,supra.
As for the original topic of the June 13 speech, Trump has said that "he expected to give a speech referencing
the publicly available, negative information about the Clintons," and that the draft of the speech prepared
by Campaign staff "was based on publicly available material, including, in particular, information trom the
book Clinton Cash by peter Schweizery Written Responses,supra. In a later June 22 speech, Trump did
speak extensively about allegations that Clinton was corrupt, drawing I'rom the Clinton Cash book, See
Fu11 Transcri'pt; Donald Trump IttyC Speech on Stp/res of the Elec//on, politico,corn (June 22, 2016).
m Testimony of Natalia Veselnitskaya Before the Senate Cominittee on Judiciary (Nov. 20, 2017l
at 41, 42; Alison Frankel, How Did Russian Lawyer Yeso/nits/raya Get into U,S. for Trump Tower jdrsting 7
Reuters, (Nov. 6, 2017); Michael Kranish et al., Russian Lawyer who Jdet with Trump Jr. Has Long History
Fighting Sanctions, Washington Post (July 11, 2017); see OSC-KAV00113 (6/8/16 Email, Goldstone to
Kaveladze); RG000073 (6/8/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.); Lieberman 12/13/17 302, at 5; seealso
Preveson Holdings Order (Oct. 17, 2016);
515
116
U.S. Department of Justice
//
Russian-born translator who had assisted Veselnitska a with Ma nitsky-related lobbying and the
Preveson ease, also attended the lunch. '" Veselnitska a said she was
meeting and
asked Akhmetshin w at s e should te 1 un . A cc or ing to several participants m the lunch,
Veselnitskaya showed Akhmetshin a document alleging financial misconduct by Bill Browder and
the Ziff brothers (Americans with business m Russia, and those individuals subse uentl makin
olitical donations to the DNC.7is
The group then went to Trump Tower for the meeting.7 '
Trump Jr., Manafort, and Kushner participated on the Trump side, while Kaveladze,
Samochomov, Akhmetshin, and Goldstone attended with Veselnitskaya. ' The Office spoke to.
every participant except Veselnitska a and Trum Jr„ the latter of whom declined to 4'e voluntaril
interviewed b the Office
Gol stone recalled that Trump Jr, invited Veselmtskaya to egm but did not
say an i n g about the subject uf the meeting.726 participants agreed that Veselnitskaya stated that
the Ziff brothers had broken Russian laws and had donated their profits to the DNC or the Clinton
Campaign."26 She asserted that the Ziff brothers had engaged in tax evasion and money laundering
725
726
117
U.S. Department of Justice
Akhmetshin then spoke about U.S, sanctions imposed under the Magnitsky Act and
Russia's response prohibiting U.S. adoption of Russian childrenon Several participants recalled
that Trump Jr. commented that Trump is a private citizen, and there was nothing they could do at
that time.v's Trump Jr. also said that they could revisit the issue if and when they were in
governm
ent, 7 s Notes that Manafort took on his phone reflect the general flow of the conversation,
although not all of its details.7'4
At some point in the meeting, Kushner sent an iMessage to Manafort stathrg "waste of time,"
followed immediately by two separate emails to assistants at Kushner Companies with requests that
729 .
Akhmetshin 11/14/17 302, at 12.
~0 Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 8; • v
Bill browder
Offshore - Cyprus
133m shares
Companies
Not invest - loan
Value i'n Cyprus as inter
lllici
Active sponsors of RNC
Browder hired Joanna Glover
Tied into Cheney
Russian adoption by American families
118
U.S. Department of Justice
they call him to give him an excuse to leave,vss Samochornov recalled that Kushner departed the
meetmg before it concluded; Veselnitskaya reoalled the same when interviewed by 'the press in
July 2017,7"
Ueselnitskaya's press interviews and written statements to Congress differ materially from
other accounts. In a July 2017 press interview, Veselnitskaya claimed that she has no connection
to the Russian government and had not referred to any derogatory information concerning the
Clinton Campaign when she met with Trump Campaign officials.v V eselnitskaya's November
2017 written submission to the Senate Judiciary Committee stated that the purpose of the June 9
meeting was not to connect with "the Trump Campaign" but t'ather to have "a private meehng with
Donald Trump Jr.— a friend of my good acquaintance's son on the matter of assisting me or my
colleagues in informing the Congress members as to the criminal nature of manipulation and
interference with the legislative activities of the US Congress." s In other words„Veselnitskaya
claimed her focus was on Congress and not the Campaign. No witness, however„recalled any
reference to Congress during the meeting, Veselnitskaya also maintained that she "aMended the
meeting as a lawyer of Denis Katsyv," the previously mentioned owner of Prevezon Holdings, hut
she did not "introduce [her]self in this capacity," '
In a July 2017 television interview, Trump Jr. stated that while he had no way to gauge the
reliability, credibility, or accuracy of what Goldstone had stated was the purpose of the meeting,
if "someone has information on our opponent.. . maybe this is something. I should hear them
out."""o Trump Jr. further stated in September 2017 congressional testitnony that he thought he
should "listen to what Rob and his colleagues had to say."tet D epending on what, if any,
information was provided, Trump Jr. stated he could then "consult with counsel to make an
informed decision as to whether to give it any further consideration."
NOSC00003992 (6/9/16 Text Message, Kushner to Manafort); Kushner 4ll I/18 302, at 9;
Vargss 4l4/18 302, at 7; NOSC00000044 (6/9/16 Email, Kushner to Verges); NOSC00000045 (6/9/16
Email, Kushner to Cain).
7" Samochotnov 7/12/17 302, at 4; Kushner 4/11/1 8
302, at 9-10', see also Interview of: Donald J, Trump, Jr., Senate Judicimy m mi t tee,115th Cong. 48-49
(Sept. 7, 2017),
Ittastan Lawyer Veselnitshaya Says She Didn't Give T ump Jr. Info on Clinton, NBC News
(July 11, 2017).
' Testimony of Natalia Veselnttshaya before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
115" Cong. 10 (Nov 20, 20171.
s Testimony ofNatalia Veselnitsttaya before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
I I Su Cong. 21 (Nov. 20, 2017).
nn Sean Hannity, Transcript-Donald Trump Jr, Fox News (July 11, 2017).
r ' Interview of: Donald J. Trump, Jr, Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 16 (Sept. 7, 2017).
r s Interview of: Donald J. Trump, Jr, Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 16-17. (Sept. 7,
2017).
119
U,S, Department of Justice
Afterthe June 9meetin concluded Goldstonea olo izedto Trum Jr.747 Accordingto
Goldstone, he told Trump Jr. arid
told Emin A a larov i n a ho n e call t hat th e meetin w a s about ado tion '
745
Veselnitskaya and Aras Agalarav made at least two unsuccessful attempts after the election
to meet with Trump representatives to convey similar information about Browder and the
Magnitsky Act.7~ On November 23, 2016, Kaveladze emailed Goldstone about setting up another
meeting "with T people" and sent a document bearing allegations similar to those conveyed an
June 9. ' K a veladze followed up with GoldMne, stating that "Mr. A," which Goldstone
understood to mean Aras Agalarav, called to ask about the meeting, " G oldstone emailed the
document to Rhona Graff, saying that "Aras Agalarov has asked me to pass on this document in
the hope it can be passed on to the appropriate team. If needed, a lawyer representing the case is
744
120
U.S. Deparhnent of Justice
//
in New York currently and happy to me'et with any member of his transition team."" According
to Goldstone, around January 2017, Kaveladze contacted him again to set up another meeting, but
Goldstone did not make the request. T h e investigation did not identify evidence of the transition
team following up,
Participants in the June 9, 2016 meeting began receiving inquiries from attorneys
representing the Trump Organization starting in approximately June 2017. 3 On approximately
June 2, 2017, Goldstone spoke with Alan Garten, general counsel of the Trump Organization,
about his participation in the June 9 meeting, T h e same day, Goldstone emailed Veselnitskaya's
name to Guten, idendfying her as the "woman who was the attorney who spoke at the meeting
fmm Moscow."7rs Later in June 2017, Goldstone participated in a lengthier call with Garten and
Alan Futerfas, outside counsel for the Trump Organization (and, subsequently, personal counsel
for Trump Jr.).7'7 On June 27, 2017, Goldstone emailed Emin Agalarov with the subject "Trump
attorneys" and stated that he was "interviewed by attorneys" about the June 9 meeting who were
'"concerned because it links Don Jr. to officials from Russia — which he has always denied
meeting,"733 Goldstone stressed that he "did say at the time this was an awful idea and a terrible
meeting." Em i n Agalarov sent a screenshot of the message to Kaveladze,
The June 9 meeting became public in July 2017. In a July 9, 2017 text me'ssage to Ernin
Agalarov, Goldstone wrote "I made sure I kept you and your father out of [t]his story," ' and "[i] f
contacted I can do a dance and keep you out of It,"7'7 Goldstone added, '%BI now investigating,"
and "I hope this favor was worth for your dad — it could blow up." On J uly 12, 2017 Emin
Agalarov complained to Kaveladze that his father, Aras, "never listens" to him and that theh'
121
U,S, Department of Justice
//
relationship with "mr T has been throw'n down the drain."766 The next month, Goldstone
commented to Emin Agalarov about the volume of publicity the June 9 meeting had generated,
stating that his "reputation [was] basically destroyed by this dumb meeting which your father
insisted on even though Ike, and Me told him would be had news and not to de."7 6 Goldstone
added, "I am not able to respond out of courtesy to you and. your father. So am painted as some
mysterious link to Putin."766
After public reporting on the June 9 meeting began, representatives fr'om the Trump
Organization again reached out to participants. On July 10, 2017, Futerfas sent Goldstone an email
with a proposed statement for Goldstone to issue, which read:
As the person who arranged the meeting, I can definitively state that the statements I have
read by Donald Trump Jr. are 100/6 accurate. The meeting was a complete waste of time
and Don was never told Ms. Veselnitskaya's name prior to the meeting. Ms. Veselnitskaya
mostly talked about the Magnitsky Act and Russian adoption laws and the meeting lasted
20 to 30 minutes at most. There was never any follow up and nothing ever came of the
meetmg,
On the Russian end, there were also communications about what participants should say
about the June 9 meeting, Specifically, the organization that hired Samochornov — an anti-
Magnitsky Act group controlled by Veselnitskaya and the owner of Prevezon —offered to pay
$90,000 af Samochornov*s legal fees.77' A t V eselnitskaya's request, the organization sent
Samochornov a transcript of a Veselnitskaya press interview, and Samochornov understood that
the organization would pay his legal fees only i f 'he made statements consistent with
Veselnitskaya's."+ Samochomov declined, telling the Office that he did not want to perjure
766
himself.~s The individual who conveyed Veselnitskaya's request to Samochornov stated that he
did not expressly condition payment on following Veselnitskaya's answers but, in hindsight,
recognized that by sending the transcript, Samochornov could have interpreted the offer of
assistance to be conditioned on his not contradicting Veselnitskaya's account.~4
Volume II, Section II.G, inPa, discusses interactions between President Trump, Trump Jr„
and others in June and July 2017 regarding tlie June 9 meeting.
Trump Campaign officials met with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak during the week
of the Republican National Convention. The evidence indicates that those interactions were brief
and non-substantive. During platform committee meetings immediately before the Convention,
J.D. Gordon, a senior Campaign advisor on policy and national security, diluted a proposed
amendment to the Republican Party platform expressing support for providing "lethal"' assistance
to Ukraine in response to Russian aggression. Gordon requested that platform committee
personnel revise the proposed amendment to state that only "appropriate" assistance be provided
to Ukraine. The original sponsor of the "lethal" assistance amendment stated that Gordon told her
(the sponsor) that he was on the, phone with candidate Trump in connection with his request to
dilute the language. G ordon denied making that statement to the sponsor, although he
acknowledged it was possible he mentioned having previously spoken to the candidate about the
subject matter. The investigation did not establish that Gordon spoke to ot was directed by the
candidate to make that proposal. Gordon said that he sought the change because he believed the
proposed language was inconsistent with Trump's position on Uluaine.
In July 2016, Senator Sessions and Gordon spoke at the Global Partners in Diplomacy
event, a conference co-sponsored by the State Department and the Heritage Foundation held in
C leveland, Ohio t h e same week a s t h e R epublican National Convention (RNC o r
"Convention" ).~ Approximately 80 foreign ambassadors to the United States, including Kislyak,
were invited to the conference,
On July 20, 2016, Gordon and Sessions delivered their speeches at the conference. In
his speech, Gordon stated in pertinent part that the United States should have better relations with
rn Gordon 8/29/I 7 302, at 9; Sessions I/17/18 302, at 22; Allan Smith, W'e Itow Snow More About
why JegSesstons and a Russian Antbassador Crossed Paths at the Republican Convention, Business Insider
(Mar. 2, 2017),
' Gordon 8/29/I 7 302, at 9; Laura DeMsrco, Global Cleveland and Sen. /Job Corker Jtretcotne
International Republican Ãati on a/ Convention Guests,Cleveland Plain Dealer (July 20, 2016).
Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9; Sessions I/17/18 302, at 22.
U.S. Department of Justice
Russia. ' During Sessions's speech, he took questions from the audience, one of which may have
been asked by Kislyak.+8 When the speeches concluded, several ambassadors lined up to greet
the speakers. s Gordon shook hands with Kislyak and reiterated that he had meant what he said
in the speech about improving U,S.-Russia relations. s Sessions separately spoke with between
six and 12 ambassadors, including Kislyak.sss Although Sessions stated during interviews with
the Office that he had no specific recollection of what he discussed with Kislyak, he believed that
the two spoke for only a few minutes and that they would have exchanged pleasantries and said
same things about U.S.-Russia relations. "
Later that evcniiq;, Gordon attended a reception as part of the conference.s'4 Gordon ran
into Kislyak as the two prepared plates of food, and they decided to sit at the same table to eat.sss
They werc joined at that table by the ambassadors Irom Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and by Trump
Campaign advisor Carter Page.sse As they ate, Gordon and Kislyak talked for what Gordon
estimated to have been three to five minutes, during which Gordon again mentioned that he meant
what he said in his speech about improving U,S.-Russia relations.7'r
In preparation for the 2016 Convention, foreign policy advisors to the Trump Campaign,
working with the Republican National Cammittec„reviewed the 2012 Convention's foreign policy
platform to identify divergence between the earlier platform and candidate Trump's positions.s s
The Campaign team discussed toning down language from the 2012 platform that identified Russia
as the country's number one threat, given the candidate's belief that there needed to be better U.S.
relations with Russia.sss The RNC Platform Committee sent the 2016 draft platform to the
National Security and Defense Platform Subcommittee on July 10, 2016, the evening before its
Although only delegates could participate in formal discussions and vote on the platform,
the Trump Canipaign could request changes, and members of the Trump Campaign attended
committee meetings. s' John Mashburn, the Campaign's policy director, helped oversee the
Campaign's involvement in the platform committee meetings, He t old the Office that he
directed Campaign staff at the Convention, including J.D. Gordon, to take a hands-off approach
and only to challenge platform planks if they directly contradicted Trump's wishes.im
On July 11, 2016, delegate IJiana Denman submitted a proposed platform amendment that
included provision of armed support for Ukraine. s4 The amendment described Russia's "ongoing
military aggression" in Ukraine and announced "support" for "maintaining (and, if warranted,
increasing} sanctions against Russia until Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity are fully
restored" and for "providing lethal defensive weapons to Ukraine's armed forces and greater
coordination with NATO on defense planning,"7ss Gordon reviewed the proposed platform
changes, including Denman's. s G ordon stated that he flagged this amendment because of
Trump's stated position on Ukraine, which Gordon personally heard the candidate say at the March
31 foreign policy meeting — namely, that the Europeans should take primary responsibility for any
assistance to Ukrame, that there should be improved U.S.-Russia relations, and that he did not
want to start World War III over that region. ' G ordon told the OQice that Trump's statements
on the campaign trail following the March meeting underscored those positions to the point where
Gordon felt obliged to object te the pmposed platform change and seek its dilution,
On July 11, 2016, at a meeting of the National Security and Defense Platform
Subcommittee, IJenman offered her amendment. Go r don and another' Campaign smffer, Matt
Miller, approached a committee co-chair and asked him to table the amendment to permit further
discussion,' ' G ordon's concern with the amendment was the language about providing "lethal
125
U.S. Department of Justice
I/
defensive weapons to Ukraine.*' ' M i l ler did not have any independent basis to believe that this
*
language contradicted Trump's views and relied on Gordon s recollection of the candidate's
views.'+
According to Denman, she spoke with Gordon and Matt Miller, and they told her that they
had to clear the language and that Gordon was "talking to New York,"'s i Denman told others that
she was asked by the two Trump Campaign staffers to strike "lethal defense weapons" from the
proposal but that she refused.sc Denman recalled Gordon saying that hewas on the phone with
candidate Tmmp, but she was skeptical whether that was true. Go r don denied having told
Denman that he was on the phone with Truinp, although he acknowledged it was possible that he
mentioned having previously spoken to the candidate about the subjectmatter ~ Gordon's phone
records reveal a eall to Sessions's office in Washington that afternoon, but do not include calls
directly to a number associated with Trump."" And according to the President's written answers
to the Office's questions, he does not recall being involved in the change in language of the
platform amendment.ses
Gordon stated that he tried to reach Rick Dearborn, a senior foreign policy advisor, and
Mashburn, the Campaign policy director, Gordon stated that he connected with both of them (he
could not recall if by phone or in person) and apprised them of the language he took issue with in
the proposed amendment. Gordon recalled no objection by either Dearborn or Mashburn and that
all three Campaign advisors supported the alternative formulation ("appmpriate assistance" ).sos
13earbom recalled Gordon warningth
em about the amendment, but not weighing in because
Gordon was more familiar with the Campaign's foreign policy stance," M a shburn stated that
Gordon reached hhn, and he told Gordon that Trump had not taken a stance on the issue and that
the Campaign should not intervene. "
When the amendment came up again in the committee's proceedings, the subcommittee
changed the amendment by striking the "lethal defense weapons" language and replacing it with
"appropriate assistance." ' Go r don stated that he and the subcommittee co-chair ultimately
a greed to replace the language about armed assistance with "appropriate assistance.""' T h e
subcommittee accordingly approved Denman*s amendinent but with the term "appropriate
assistanceys'~ Gordon stated that, to his recollection, this was the only change sought by the
Campaign.s's Sam Clovis, the Campaign*s national co-chair and chief policy advisor, stated he
was surprised by the change and did not believe it was in line with Trump's stance."s Mashburn
stated that when he saw the word "appropriate assistance," he believed that Gordon had violated
Mashbum's directive not to intervene. '
Ambassador Kislyak continued his efforts to interact with Campaign officials with
responsibility for the foreign-policy portfolio — among them Sessions and Gordon — in the weeks
after the Convention. The Office did not identify evidence in those interactions of coordination
between the Campaign and the Russian government.
Also in August 2016, a representative of the Russian Embassy contacted Sessions's Senate
office about setting up a meeting with Kislyak.srs At the time, Sessions was a member of the
u Ho ff 5/26/1 7 302, at 2-3; see Denman 12/4/1 7 302, at 2-3; Gordon 8/29/1 7 302, at 11,
"' Gordon 8/29/1 7 302, at 11; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 12,
su Hoff 5/26/i 7 302 at 2-3
"-~ Gordon 2/14/1 9 302, at 6.
"s Clovis 10/3/17 302, at 10-11.
sn Mashburn 6/25/18 302) at 4.
"' DJTFP00004828 (8/3/1 6 Email, Pchelyakov [[email protected]] to Gordon).
" DJTFP00004953 (8/8/16 Email, Gordon to [email protected]),
n' Luff 1/30/18 302, at 5.
127
U,S, Department of Justice
//
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and would meet with foreign oIIIclals in that capacity.ss' But
Sessions's staff reported, and Sessions himself acknowledged, that meeting requests from
ambassadors increased substantially in 2016, as Sessions assumed a prominent role in the Trump
Campaign and his name was mentioned for potential cabinet-level positions in a f uture
Trump Administration.s~~
On September 8, 2016, Sessions met with Kislyak in his Senate office.s ' Sessions said
that he believed he was doing the Campaign a service by meeting with foreqpt ambassadors,
including Kislyak.s~ He was accompanied in the meeting by at least two of his Senate staff:
Sandra Luff, his legislative director; and Pete Landrum, who handled military affairs.' s The
meeting lasted less than 30 minutes, S essions voiced concerns about Russia's sale of a missile-
defense system to Iran, Russian planes buzzing U,S. military assets in the Middle East, and Russian
aggression in emerging democracies such as Ukraine and Moldova.~" K i s lyak offered
explanations on these issues and complained about NATO land forces in former Soviet-bloc
countries that border Russia.sts Landrum recalled that Kislyak referred to the presidential
campaign as "an interesting campaign,''sss and Sessions also recalled Kislyak saying that the
Russian government was receptive to the overtures Trump had laid out during his campaign.
None of the attendees, though, remembered any discussion of Russian election interference or any
request that Sessions convey information from the Russian governm ent tothe Trump Campaign.ss'
During the meeting, Kislyak invited Sessions to further discuss U. S,-Russia relations with
him over' a meal at the ambassador's residence. ss Sessions was non-committal when Kislyak
extended the invitation. After the meeting ended, Luff advised Sessions against accepti'ng the one-
an-one meeting with Kislyak, whom she assessed to be an "old school KGB guy/ s' Neither Luff
nor Landrum recalled that Sessions followed up on the invitation or made any further effort to dine
Sessions I/17/18 302, at 23. Sessions also noted that ambassadors came to him for information
about Tmmp snd hoped he would pass along information to Trump. Sessions I/17/18 302, at 23-24,
' Sessions I/17/I 8 302, at 23; Luff I/30/18 302, at 6; Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 5.
'" Luff I/30/I 8 302, at 5; Landrum 2/27/I 8 302, at 4.
128
U.S. Department of Justice
//
or meet with Kislyak before the November. 2016 election.ssx Sessions and Landrum recalled that,
after the election, some efforts were made to arrange a meeting between Sessions and Kislyak.'ss
According,to Sessions, the request came through CNI and would have involved a meeting between
Sessions and Kislyak, two other ambassadors, and the Governor of Alabama. ' S e ssions,
however, was in New York on the day of'the anticipated meeting and was unable to attend. 7 The
investigation did not identify evidence that the two men met at any point after their September 8
meeting.
8. Paul Manafoit
Paul Manafort served on the Trump Campaign„ including a period as campaign chairman„
from March to August 2016. s' M anafort had connections to Russia through his prior work for
Russian oligarch Oleg 13eripaska and later through his work for a pro-Russian regime in Ukraine.
Manafort stayed in touch with these contacts during the campaign period through Konstantin
Kilimnik, a Io~ i me Manafoit employee who previously ran Manafort's office in Kiev and who
the FBI assesses to have ties to Russian intelligence.
Manafart instructed Rick Gates, his deputy on the Campaign and a longtime employee,s s
to provide Kilimnik w'ith updates on the Trump Campaign — including internal polling data,
although Manafort claims not to recall that specific instruction. Manafort expected Kilimnik to
share that information with others in Ukraine and with Deripaska. Gates periodically sent such
polling data to Kilimnik during the campaign.
On August 21, 2018, Manafort was convicted in the Eastern Distdct of Virginia an eight tax,
Foreign Bank Account Registration (FBAR), and bank fraud charges. On September 14, 2018, Manafort
pleaded guilty in the District of Columbia ta (I) conspiracy to defraud the United States and canspiracy to
commit offenses against the United States (money laundering, tax fraud, FBAR, Fareqpr Agents
Registration Act (FARA), and FARA false statements), and {2) conspiracy to obstruct justice (witness
tampering), Manafort also admitted criminal conduct with which he had been charged in the Eastern
District of Virginia, but as to which the jury hung. The conduct at issue in both cases involved Manafort's
work in Ukraine and the money he earned for that work, as well as crimes after the Ukraine work ended.
On March 7, 2019, Manafoit was sentenced to 47 months af imprisonincnt in the Virginia prosecution. On
March 13, the district court in D,C. sentenced Manafort to a total term of 73 months: 60 months on the
Count I conspiracy (with 30 af those months to run r ancurrent to the Virginia sentence), and 13 months on
the Count I conspiracy, to be served consecutive ta the other two sentences. The two sentences resulted m
a total term of 90 months.
" A s noted in Volume I, Section III.D.l.b, supra, Gates pleaded guilty to two ariminal charges in
the District of Columbia, including making s false statement ta the FBI, pursuant to a plea agreement, He
has provided information and in-court testimony that the Office has deemed to be reliable, See also
Transcript at 16, United Statesv. Poul Z /vlonafort, Jr,, I;17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2019), Doc. 514
('7ettotafort 2/13/19 Transcript" ) (court's explaiiatian of reasons to credit Gates's statements in one
in~ a c).
129
U,S. Depattment of Justice
//
Manafort also twice met Kilimnik in the United States during the campaign period and
conveyed campaign information. The second meeting took place on August 2, 2016, in New York
City. K i limnik requested the meeting to deliver in person a message from former Ukrainian
President Viktor Yanukovych, who was then living in Russia. The message was about a peace
plan for Ukraine that Manafort has since acknowledged was a "backdoor" means. for Russia to
control eastern Ukraine. Several months later, after the presidential election, Kilimnik wrote an
email to Manafort expressing the view — which Manafort later said he shared — that the plan's
success would requii'e U.S. support to succeed; "all that is required to start the process is a very
minor 'wink' (or slight push) fiom [Donald Trump] *+a The email also stated that if Manafort
were designated as the U.S. representative and started the process, Yanukovych would ensure his
reception in Russia "at the very top level."
Manafort communicated with Kilimnik about peace plans for Ukraine on at least fout
occasions after their first discussion of the topic on August 2; December 2016 (the Kilimnik email
described above); January 2017; February 2017; and again in the spring of 20lg. The Office
reviewed numemus Manafoit email and text communications, and asked President Trump about
th'e plan in written questions.'t' The investigation did not uiu:over evidence of Manafort's passing
along im formation about Ukt ainian peace plans to the candidate or anyone else in the Campaign or
the Administraffon. The Offfce was not, however, able to gain access to all of Manafort's
electronic communications (in some instances„messages were sent using encryption applications).
And while Manafort denied that he spoke to members of the Trump Campaign or the new
Administration about the peace plan, he lied to the Office and the grand jury about the peace plan
and his meetings with Kilimnik, and his unreliability on this subject was among the reasons that
the district judge found that he breached his cooperation agreement.sa
The Office could not reliably determine Manafort's ose m sharin internal oiling data
with Kilimnik during the campaign period. Manafort did not see
a downside to sharing campaign information, and tol Gates at his role in t C ampaign would
au Accordmg to the President's written answers, he does not remember Manafort communicating
to him any particular positions that Ukraine or Russia would want the United States to support. Written
Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018),. at 16-17 (Response to Ouestion IV, Part (d)).
Manafort made several false statements duiing debriefings. Based on that conduct, the Offioe
determined that Manafort had breached his plea agreement and could not be a cooperating witness. The
judge presiding in Manafort's D.C. criminal case found by a preponderance of the evidence that Manafort
intentionally made multiple false statements to the FBI, the Office, and the grand jury concerning bis
interactions and communications with Kilimnik (and concerning two other issues). Although the report
refers at times to Manafort's statements, it does so only when those statements are sufficiently corroborated
to be trustworthy, to identify issues on which Manafort's untruthful responses may themselves be of
evidentiary value, or to provid'e Manafort's explanations for certain events, even when we werc unable to
determine whether that explanation was credible.
130
U.S. Department of Justice
//
be "good for business" and potentially a way to be made whole for work he previously completed
in the Ukraine, As to Deripaska, Manafort claimed that by sharing campaign information with
him, Deripaska might see value in their relationship and resolve a "disagreement" — a reference to
one or more outstanding lawsuits. Because of questions about Manafart *s credibility and our
limited ability to gather evidence on what happened to the palling data after it was sent ta Kilimnik,
the Office could not assess what Kilimnik (or others he may have given it to) did with it. The
Office did not identify evidence of a connection between Manafort's sharing polling data and
Russia's interference in the election, which had already been reported by U.S. media outlets at the
time of the August 2 meeting. The investigation did not establish that Manafort otherwise
coordinated with the Russian government on its election-interference efforts.
anu
u. Puul M fort' s Tiesto aussie antiUkraine
Manafort's Russian contacts during the campaign and transition periods stem from his
consulting work far Deripaska from approximately 2005 to 2009 and his separate 'political
consulting work in Ukraine from 2005 to 2015, including through his company DMP International
LLC (DMI). K i limnik worked for Manafort in Kiev during this entire period and continued to
communicate with Manafort through at least June 2018. K i limnik, wha speaks and writes
Ukrainian and Russian, facilitated many of Manafart's communications with Deripaska and
Ukramian oligarchs.
In 2007, Deripaska invested through another entity in Pericles Emerging Market Partners
L.P. ("Pericles"), an investment fund created by Manafort and former Manafort business pattner
Richard Davis. The Pericles fund was established to pursue investments in Eastern Europe.s 7
Deripaska was the sole investor,sos Gates stated in interidews with the OIIIce that the venture led
t a pinchuk et aL, Russian Tycoon Derittoska in putin Delegotion to Chino, Reuters (June 8, 2018).
'u 6/23/05 Memo, Manafort 6't Davis to Dcripaska tb Rothchild.
' ' Gates 2/2/18 302, at 7,
' Manafort 9/20/18 302, at 2-5; Manafort Income by Year, 2005 — 2015; Manafort Loans from
Wire Transfers, 2005 — 2015,
to Gates 3/12/18 302, at 5.
i4' Mansfort 12/16/15 Dep., at 157:8-11.
131
U.S. Department of Justice
//
to a deterioration of the relationship between Msnafort and Deripaska.'4' In particular, when the
fund failed, litigation between Manafort and Deripaska ensued. Gates stated that, by 2009,
Manafort's business relationship with Deripaska had "dried up." A cc ording to Gates, various
interactions with Deripaska and his intermediaries over the past few years have involved trying to
resolve the legal dispute.s ' As described below, in 2016, Manafort, Gates, Kilimnik, and others
engaged in efforts to revive the Deripaska relationship and resolve the litigation.
Kilimnik is a Russian national who has lived in both Russia and Ukraine- and was a
longtime Manafort employee.s's Kilimnik had direct and close access to Yanukovych and his
senior entourage, and he facilitated communications between Manafort and his clients, including
Yanukavych and multiple Ukrainian oligarchs, ' K i l inmik also maintained a relationship with
Deripaska's deputy, Viktor Boyarkin, s a Russian national who previously served in the defense
attache office of thc Russian Embassy to the United States.sss
Manafort told 'the Office that he did not believe Kilimnik was working as a Russian
"'spy."' The FBI, however, assesses that Kilimnik has ties to Russian intelligence. S e veral
pieces of the 0'ffice's evidence — including witness interviews and emails obtained thro~ c o urt-
authorized search warrants — support that assessment:
• Ki l imnik was born on April 27„1970, in Dnipmpetrovsk Oblast, then of the Sov'iet Union,
and attended the Military Institute of the Ministry of Defense ffom 1987 until 1992.s ' Sam
Patten, a business partner to Kilimnik, s stated that Kilimnik told him that he was a
translator in the Russian army for seven years and that he later worked in 'the Russian
armament industry selling arms and military equipment.sss
• U.S. government visa records reveal that Kilimnik obtained a visa to travel to the Uhited
States with a Russian diplomatic passport in 1997. s~
• Ki l i mnik worked for the International Republican Institute's (IRI} Moscow office, where
he did translation wotk and general office management fi'om 1998 to 2005.ses While
another offlcial recalled the incident differently,sss onc former associate of Kilimnik's at
IRI told the FBI that Kilimnik was fired from his post because his links to Russian
intelligence were too strong. The same individual stated that it was well known at IRI that
ICilimnik had links to the Russian g overnm
ent.
• Jo nathan Hawker, a British national who was a public relations consultant at FTI
Consulting, worked with DMI on a public relations campaign for Yanukovych. After
Hawker's work for DMI ended, Kilimnik contacted Hawker about working for a Russian
133
U.S. Department of Justice
//
• Ga tes suspected that Kilimnik was a "spy," a view that he shared with Manafort, Hawker,
and Alexander van der Zwaan, a n attorney who had worked with DMI on a report for
the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.s7'
Manafort served on the Trump Campaign from late March to August 19, 2016. On March
29, 2016, the Campaign announced that Manafort would serve as the Campaign's "Convention
Manager/a ' On M a y 1 9, 2016, Manafort was promoted to campaign chairman and chief
strategist, and Gates, who had been assisting Manafort on the Campaign, was appointed deputy
campaign chairman,'7
Thomas Barrack and Roger Stone both recommended Manafort to candidate Trump.svs In
early 2016, at Manafort's request, Barrack suggested to Trump that Manafort join the Campaign
to manage the, Republican Convention. St one had worked with Manafort from approximately
1980 until the mid-1990s through various consulting and lobbying firms. Manafort met Trump in
1982 when Trump hired the Black, Manafort, Stone and Kelly lobbying firm,'7 Over the years,
Manafort saw Trmnp at political and social events in New York City and at Stone's wedding, and
Trump requested VIP status at the 1988 and 1996 Republi'can conventions worked by Manafort.s7s
'a Hawker 1/9/1 8 302, at 13; 3/I 8/14 Email, Hawker gc Tulukbaev.
' van der Zwaan pleaded guilty in the U, S. District Court for the Distric't of Columbia to making
fhlse statements to the Special Counsel's Office. Plea Agreement, United States v. Alex van der Zwaan,
1:18-cr-31 (D,D.C. Feb, 20, 2018), Doc. 8.
"e Hawker 6/9/18 302, at 4; van der Zwaan 11/3/17 302, at 22. Manafort said in an interview that
Gates had joked with Kilimnik about Kilimnik's going to meet with his KGB handler. Manafort 10/16/18
302, at 7.
" Press Release —Donald J. T rum
pannounces Campaign Convention Manager Paul J. Manafort,
The American Presidency Project- U C. Santa Barbara (Mar..29, 2016).
Gates I/29/18302,at8;MeghanKeneally, Timeline ofMcmafort'srolein the TrumpCampaign,
ABC News (Oct. 20, 2017).
" G ates 1/29/1 8 302, at 7-8; Manafort 9/11/1 8 302, at 1-2; Barrack 12/12/17 302, at 3.
'"' Barrack 12/12/17 302, at 3; Gates 1/29/18 302, at 7-8.
m' Manafort 10/1 6/18 302, at 6.
'" Msnsfort10/16/18 302, at 6.
134
U.S. Department of Justice
Immediately upon joining the C ampaign,Manafort directed Gates to prepare for his review
separate memoranda addressed to Deripaska, Akhmetov, Serhiy Lyovochkin, and Boris
Kolesnikov, t h e l ast three being Ukrainian oligarchs who were senior Opposition Bloc
officials, T h e memoranda described Manafort's appointment to the Trump Campaign and
indicated his willingness to consult on Ukrainian politics in the future. On March 30, 2016, Gates
emailed the memoranda and a press release announcing Manafort's appointment to Kilimnik for
translation and dissemination. ' Manafort later followed up with Kilimnik to ensure his messages
had been delivered, emailing on April 11, 2016 to ask whether Kilimnik had shown "our friends"
the media coverage of his new role." K i l i mnik replied, "Absolutely. Every article." Manafort
further asked; "How do we use to get whole. Has Ovd [Oleg Vladimirovich Denpaska] operation
seen?" Kilimnik wrote back the same day, "Yes, I have been sending everything to Victor
[Boyarkin, Deripaska's deputy], who has been forwarding the coverage directly to OVD."ss3
Gates reported that Manafort said that being hired on the Campaign would be "good for
business" and increase the likelihood that Manafort would be paid the approximately $2 million
he was owed for previous political consulting work in Ukraine. G a t es also explained to the
Office that Manafort thought his role on the Campaign could help "confirm" that Deripaska had
dropped the Pericles lawsuit, and that Gates believed Manafort sent polling data to Deripaska (as
135
U.S. Department of Justice
//
discussed further below) so that Deripaska would not move forward with his lawsuit against
Manafort. " Gates further stated that Deripaska wanted a visa to the United States, that Deripaska
could believe that having Manafort in a position inside the Campaign or Administration might be
helpful to Deripaska, and that Manafort's relationship with Trump could help Deripaska in other
ways as well.ss Gates stated, however, that Manafort never told him anything specific about what,
if @nything, Manafort might be offering Deripaska.ssv
Gates also reported that Manafort instructed him in April 2016 or early May 2016 to send
Kilinmik Campaign internal polling data and other updates so that Kilimnik, in turn, could share
it with Ukrainian oli archs.s's Gates understood that the information would also be shared with
Deripaska .sss Gates reported to the Office
that he did not know why Mana ort wanted him to send pollmg tnformation, but Gates thought it
was a way to showcase Manafort's work, and Manafort wanted to open doors to jobs atter the
Trump Campaign ended.ses Gates said that Manafort's instruction included sending internal
polling data prepared for the Trump Campaign by pollster Tony Fabrizio,ss' Fabrizio had worked
with Manafort for years and was brought into the Campaign by Manafort. Gates stated that, in
accordance with Manafort" s instruction, he periodically sent Kilimnik polling data via WhatsApp;
Gates then deleted the communications on a daily basis. ' G ates further told the Office that, after
Manafort left the Campaign in mid-August, Gates sent Kilimnik polling data less frequently and
that the data he sent was more publicly available information and less internal data.sss
' ' Gates 2/2/I 8 302, at 11,' Gates 9/27/18 302 {serial 740), at 2.
's Gates 2/2/I 8 302, at 12.
' Gates 2/2/18 302, at 12,
sss Gates I/31/18 302, at 17; Gates 9/27/18 302 (serial 740), at 2. In a later 'interview with the
Office, Gates stated that Manafort directed him to send polling data to Kilimnik after a May 7, 2016 meeting
between Manafoit and Kilimnik in New York, discussed in Volume I„Section IV.A.8,b,iii, infra. Gates
11/7/18 302, at 3.
's Gates 9/27/18 302, Part II, at 21
w Gates 2/12/18 302, at 10; Gates I/31/18 302, at 17.
"' Gates 9/27/18 302 (serial 740), at 2; Gates 2/7/18 302, at 15.
s Gates I/31/18 302, at 17.
srs Gates 2/I 2/I 8 302, at 11-12, According to Gates, his access to internal polling dat@ was more
limited because Fabrizio was himself distanced from the Campaign at that point.
136
U.S. Department of Justice
Manafort's role in it , and assessed Trump's prospects for victo .sss M anafort did not
acknowled' e instructin Gates to send Kilimnik internal data,
The Office also obtained contemporaneous emails that shed light an the purpose of the
communicahons with Deripaska and that are consistent with Gates's account. For example, in
response to a July 7, 2016, email lram a Ukrainian reporter about Manafort's failed Deripaska-
backed investment, Manafort asked Kilimnik whether there had been any movement on "this issue
with our friend." st Gates stated that "our f'riend" likely referred ta Deripaska,sss and Manafort
*
told the OAice that the "issue' (and "aur biggest interest," as stated below} was a solution to the
Deripaska-Pericles issue.sss Kilimnik replied:
0'ur friend [Boyarkin] said there is lately significantly more attention to the campaign in
his boss' [Deripaska's] mind, and he will be most likely looking for ways to reach out to
yau pretty soon, understanding all the time, sensitivity. I am m'o re than sure that it will be
resolved and we will get back to the original relationship with V.'s boss [Deripaska].s s
Eight minutes later, Manafort replied that Kilimnik should tell Boyarkin's "boss," a reference to
Deripaska, "that if he needs private briefings we can accommadate." ' M anafort has alleged to
the Office that he was willing to brief Deripaska only on public campaign matters and gave an
example; why Trump selected Mike Pence as the Vice-Presidential running mate.sss Manafort
said he never gave Deripaska a briefing.s M anafort noted that if Trump won, Deripaska would
want to use Manafort to advance whatever mterests Deripaska had in the United States and
elsewhere.ss4
~ 8/18/16 Email, Kilimmkto Dirkse; 8/18/16 Email, Kilimnikto Schultz; 8/1S/16 Email, Kilimnik
to Maison; 7/27/16 Email, Kilimnik to Ash; 8/18/16 Email, Kilimnik to Ash; 8/18/16 Email, Kilimnik to
Jackson„' 8/I 8/16 Email, Kilimnik to Mendoza-Wilson,' 8/19/1 6 Email, Kilimnik to Patten,
896
137
U.S. Department of Justice
//
Manafort twice met with Kilimnik in person during the campaign period — once in May
and again in August 2016, The first meeting tookplace on May 7, 2016, in New York City.sos In
the days leading to the meeting, Kilimnik had been working to gather information about the
political situation in Ukraine. That included information gleaned from a trip that former Party of
Regions official Yuriy Boyko had recently taken to Moscow —strip that likely included meetings
between Boyko and high-ranking Russian officials. s KIlimnik then traveled to Washington, D,C.
on or about May 5, 2016; while in Washington, Kilimnik had pm-arranged meetings with State
Department employees.s
Late on the evening of May 6, Gates arranged for Kilimnik to take a 3:00 a.m. train to meet
Manafort in New York for breakfast on May 7.+ A ccording to Manafort, during the meeting, he
and Kilimnik talked about events in Ukraine, and Manafort briefed Kilimnik on the Trump
Campaign, expecting Kilimnik to pass the information back to individuals in Ukraine and
elsewhere.s s Manafort stated that Opposition Bloc members recognized Manafort's position on
the Campaign was an opportunity, but Kilimnik did not ask for anything, 'c Kilimnik spoke about
a plan of Boyko to boost election participation in the eastern zone of Ukraine, which was the base
for the Opposition Bloc.m' Kilimnik returned to Washington, D.C. right after the meeting with
Manafort.
Manafort met with Kilimnik a second time at the Grand Havana Club in New York City
on the evening of August 2, 2016. The events leading to the meeting are as follows; On July 28,
2016, ICiilmnik flew from Kiev 'to Moscow, ' Th e next day, Kilimnik wrote to Manafort
requesting that they meet, using coded language about a conversation he had that day, ' I n an
email with a subject Ime "Black Caviar," Kilimnik wrote;
I met today with the guy who gave you your biggest black caviar jar several years ago. We
spent about 5 hours talking about his story, and I have several important messages fi om
him to you. He asked me to go and brief'you on our conversation. I said I have to run it
by you first, but in principle I am prepared to do it... . It has to do about the future of his
w' 4/26/16 Email, Kilimnik to Purcell, at 2; Gates 2/2/18 302, at 12; Patten 5/22/18 302, at 6-7;
Gates 11/7/18 302, at 3.
" 5/7/16 Email, Kilimnik to Charap tk Kimmage; 5/7/16 Email, Kasanof to Kilimnik;
"' 5/6/16 Email, Manafort to Gates; 5/6/16 Email, Gates to Kilimnik.
' ' Manafort 10/11/1 8 302, at 1.
ns Manafort 10/11/18 302, at 1,
s" Manafort 10/11/18 302, at 1.
'" 7/25/16 Email, Kilimnik to [email protected](2:17:34 a.m.).
'i 7/29/16 Email, Kilimnik to Manafort (10:51 a,m,),
U.S. Department of Justice
//
Manafort identified "the guy who gave you your biggest black caviar jar" as Yanukovych. He
explained that, in 2010, he and Yanukovych had lunch to celebrate the recent presidential election.
Yanu'kovych gave Manafort a large jar of black caviar that was worth approximately $30,000 to
$40,000s' Manafort's identiftcation of Yanukovych as "the guy who gave you your biggest black
caviar jar" is consistent, with Kilimnik being in Moscow — where Yanukovych resided — when
Kilimnik wrote "I met today with the u " and'with a December 2016 email in which Kilimnik
referred to Yanukovych as "BG," s's Manafort replied to Kilimnik's July 29
email, "Tuesday [August 2] is best... Tues or wads inNYC.' '
Three days later, on July 31, 2016, Kilimnik flew back to Kiev from Moscow, and on that
same day, wrote to Manafort that he needed "about 2 hours" for their meeting "because it is a long
caviar story to telL" ' K i l i mnik wrote that he would arrive at JFK on August 2 at 7:30 p.m., and
he and Manafort agreed to a late ditmer that night,sts Documentary evidence — including fllght,
phone, and hotel records, and the timing of text messages exchangedms —confirms the dinner toolc
place as planned on August 2.~t
As to the contents of the meeting itself, the accounts of Manafort and Gates —who arrived
late to the dinner — differ in certain respects. But their versions of events, when assessed alongside
available documentary evidence and what Kilimnik told business associate Sam Patten, indicate
that at least three principal topics were discussed,
First, Manafort and Kilimnik discussed a plan to resolve the ongoing political problems in
Ukraine by creating an autonomous republic in its more industrialized eastern region of Donbas, s
and having Yanukovych, the Ukrainian President ousted in 2014, elected to head that republic.
That plan, Manafort later acknowledged, constituted a "backdoor" means for Russia to control
eastern Ukraine.922 Manafort initially said that, ifhe had not cut off the discussion, Kilimnik would
have asked Manafort in the August 2 meeting to convince Trump to come out in favor of the peace
plan,and Yanukovych would have expected Manafort to use his connections in Europe and
Ukraine to support the plan. 2 Manafort also initially told the Office that he had said to Kilimnik
that the plan was crazy, that the discussion ended, and that he did not recall Kilimnik askin
Manafort to reconsider the lan after their Au s t 2 meetin . Ma n afort said
Second, Manafort briefed Kilimnik on the state of the Trump Campaign and Manafoit's
plan to win the election,s" That briefing encompassed the Campaign's messaging and its internal
polling data. According to Gates, it also included discussion of "battleground" states, which
Manafort identified as Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Minnesota.92' Manafort did not
refer ex licitl t o "battle u n d"' states in his tellin of the Au ust 2 discussion,
prime minister. The plan emphasized that Yanukovych would be an ideal candidate to bring peace to the
regioii as prime ininister of the republic, snd facilitate the reintegration of the re ion into Ukraine with the
suppori of the U.S. and Russian presiderns. As noted above, according to the written
documentation describi t h e l aii for the lan to work, bath U.S. snd Russian support were necessary.
2/21/1 8 Email, Manafort, Ward, 8'. Fabrizio, at 3-5,
~2 Manafoit 9/11/18 302, at 4;
140
U.S. Department of Justice
Third, according to Gates and what Kilimnik told Patten, Manafort and Kilimnik discussed
two sets of fmancial disputes related to Manafort's previous work in the region. Those consisted
of the unresolved Deripaska lawsuit and the funds that the Opposition Bloc owed to Manafort for
his political consulting work and how Manafort might be able to obtain payment,s'
After the meeting, Gates and Manafort both stated that they left separately from Kilimnik
because they knew the media was Iracking Manafort and wanted to avoid media reporting on his
connections ta Kilimnik.ss»
c. Post-Resignation Activities
Manafort resigned fram the Trump Campaign in mid-August 2016, ayyroximately two
weeks after his second meeting with Kilimnik, amidst negative media reporting about his political
consulting work for the pro-Russian Party of Regions in Uluaine, D espite his resignation,
Manafort continued to offer advice to various Campaign officials through the November election,
Manafort told Gates that he still syoke with Kushner, Bannon, and candidate Trump,sss and some
of those post-resignation contacts are documented in emails. For example, on October 21, 2016,
Manafart sent Kushner an email and attached a strategy memorandum proposing that the
Campaign make the case against Clinton "as the failed and corrupt champion of the establishment"
and that "Wikileaks provides the Trump campaign the ability to make the case in a very credible
way — by using the words of Clinton, its campaign officials and DNC members."sss Later, in a
November 5, 2016 email to Kushner entitled "Securing the Victory," Manafort stated that he was
"really feeling good about our prospects on Tuesday and focusing on preserving the victory," and
that he was concerned the Clinton Campaign would respond to a loss by "mav[ing] immediately
to discredit the [Trump] victory and claim voter fraud and cyber-iraud, mcluding the claim that
the Russians have hacked into the voting machines and tampered with the results/"8 "
Trump was elected President on November 8, 2016, Manafort told the Office that, in the
wake af Trump's victary, he was not interested in an Administration job. M anafort instead
preferred to stay on the "outside," and monetize his campaign position to generate business given
his familiarity and relationship with Trump and the incoming Administration. Man afart
appeared to follow that plan, as he traveled to the Middle East, Cuba, South Korea, Japan, and
China and was paid to explain what a Trump presidency would entail.sss
Manafort's activities in early 2017 included meetings relating to Ukraine and Russia. The
141
U.S. Department of Justice
//
first meeting, which took place in Madrid, Spain in January 2017, was with Georgiy Oganov.
Oganov, who had previously worked at the Russian Embassy in the United States, was a senior
executive at a Deripaska company and was believed to report directly to Deripaska.s M anafort
initially denied attending the meeting. When he later acknowledged it, he claimed that the meeting
had been arranged by his lawyers and concerned only the Pericles lawsuit.s4' Other evidence,
however, provides reason to doubt Manafort*s statement that the sole topic of the meeting was the
Pericles lawsuit. In particular, text messages to Manafort from a number associated with Kflimnik
suggest that Kilimnik and Boyarkin — not Manafort's counsel — had arranged the meeting between
Manafort and Oganov.sos Kilimnik's message states that the meeting was supposed to be "not
about money or Pericles" but instead "about recreating [the] old friendship" — ostensibly between
Manafort and Deripaska — "and talking about global politics."s4' Manafort also replied by text that
he "need[a] this finished before Jan. 20,"s which appears to be a reference to resolving Pericles
before the inauguration.
On January 15, 2017, three days after his return from Madrid, Manafort emailed K.T.
McFarland, who was at that time designated to be Deputy National Security Advisor and was
formally appointed to that position on January 20, 2017, M an afort's January 15 email to
McFarland stated: "I have some important information I want to share that I picked up on my
travels over the last month." te Manafort told the Office that the email referred to an issue
regarding Cuba, not Russia or Ukraine, and Manafort had traveled to Cuba in the past month. e
Either way, McFarland — who was advised by Flyim not to respond to the Manafort inquiry-
appears not to have responded to Msnafort.s4s
Manafort told the Office that around the time of the Presidential Inauguration in January„
he met with K ilimnik and Ukrainian oligarch Serhiy Lyovochkin at the Westin Hotel in
Alexandria, Virginia.s~ During this meeting, Kilimnik again discussed the Yanukovych peace
plan that he had broached at the August 2 meeting and in a detailed December 8, 2016 message
found in K i limnik's DMP email account, In th at December 8 email, which Manafort
4 Kalashnikcva 5/17/18 302, at 4; Gary Lee, Soviet Eothaesy'e Identity Crisis, Washington Post
{Dec, 20, 1991); Georgy g Oganov Executive prof<& k Biography,Bloomberg (Mar. 12, 2019J.
" Manafort 9/11/1 8 302, at 7.
~s Text Message, Manafort 4 Kilimnik,
t Text Message, Manafott k Kilimnik; Manafort 9/12/18 302, at 5.
e+ Text Message, Manafort gc Kilimnik.
~' 1/15/17 Email, Manafort, McFarland, k Flynn.
~e 1/1 5/17 Email, Manafort, McFarland, k Flynn.
" M anafort 9/11/18 302, at 7.
t 1/15/17 Email, Manafcrt, McFarland, 4 Flynn; McFarland 12/22'/l7 302, at 1'8-19,
Manafort 9/1 1/18 302, at 7; Manafort 9/21/18
302„at 3; I 19/17 8t 1/22/ 7 Kilimnik CBP Recor s, Jan, 19 and 22, 2017; 2016-17 Text Messages,
Killmnik 8'c Patten, at 1-2.
5
142
U.S. Deparhnent of Justice
acknowledged having read, " Kilimn'ik wrote, "[a]11 that is required to start the process is a very
minor 'wink' (or slight push) Irom DT" — an apparent reference to President-elect Trump — "and
a decision to authorize you to be a 'special representative' and manage this process." Kilimnik
assured Manafort, with that authority, he "could start the process and within 10 days visit Russia
[Yanukovych] guarantees your reception at the very top level," and that "DT could have peace in
Ukraine basically within a few months after inauguration." s
On February 26, 2017, Manafort met Kilimnik in Madrid, where Kilimnik had flown from
Moscow.sss In his first two interviews with the Office, Manafort denied meeting with Kilimnik
on his Madrid trip and then — after being confmnted with documentary evidenoe that Kil imnik was
in Madrid at the same time as him — recognized that he met him in Madrid. Manafort said that
Kilimnik had updated him on a oriminal investigation into so-called "black ledger" payments to
Manafort that was bein c onducted b U k raine's National Anti-Corru tion Bureau.
Manafort remained in contact with Kilimnik throughout 2017 and into the spring of 2018.
143
U,S. Department of Justice
//
Those contacts included matters pertaining to the criminal charges brought by the Office,~s and
the Ukraine peace plan. In early 2018, Manafort retained his longtime polling firm to craft a draft
poll in Utuaine, sent the pollsters a three-page primer on the plan sent by Kilimnik, and worked
with Kilimnik to formulate the polling questions,~ The primer sent to the pollsters specifically
called for the United States and President Trump to support the Autonomous Republic of Donbas
with Yanukovych as Prime Minister,ss' a'nd a series of questions in the draft poll asked for opinions
on Yanukovych's role in resolving the conflict in Donbas,v z (The poll was not solely about
Donbas; it also sought participants' views on leaders apart from Yanukovych as they pertained to
the 2019 Ukraine presidential election.)
The Office has not uncovered evidence that Manafort brought the Ukraine peace plan to
the attention of the Trump Campaign or the Trump Administration, Kilimnik continued his efforts
to promote the peaoe plan to the Executive Branch (e.g., U,S. Department of State) into the summer
of 2018,363
Trump was elected President on November 8, 2016, Beginning immediately after the
election, individuals connected to the Russian govenunent started contacting officials on the
Trump Campaign and Transition Team through multiple channels — sometimes through Russian
Ambassador Kislyak and at other times through individuals wbo sought reliable contacts through
U.S. persons not formally tied to the Campaign or Transition Team. The most senior levels of the
Russian government encouraged these efforts. The investigation did not establish that these efforts
reflected or constituted coordination between the Trump Campaign and Russia in its election-
interference activities.
As soon as news broke that Trump had been elected President, Russian government
officials and prominent Russian businessmen began trying to make inroads into the new'
Administration. They appeared not to have preexisting contacts and struggled to cormect with
senior officials amund the President-Elect. As explained below, those efforts entailed both official
contact through the Russian Embassy in the United States and outieaches —sanctioned at high
levels of the Russian government — through business rather than political contacts,
144
U.S. Department of Justice
At approximately 3. a.m. on election night, Trump Campaign press secretary Hope Hicks
received a telephone call on her personal cell phone from a person who sounded foreign but was
calling from a nmnber with a DC area code,ss» Although Hicks had a hard time understanding the
person, she could make out the words "'Putin call."ss Hicks told the caller to send her an email.+
The followingm
orning,onNovember 9, 2016, Sergey Kuznetsov, an official at the Russian
Embassy to the United States, emailed Hicks lrom his Gr ail address with the subject line,
"Message from Putin."ss Attached to the email was a message from Putin, in both English and
Russian, which Kuznetsov asked Hicks to convey to the President-Elect.s ' In the message, Putin
offered his congratulations to Trump for his electoral victory, stating he "look[ed] forward to
working with [Trump] on leading Russian-American relations out of crisis,"ss
Hicks forwarded the emrdl to Kushner, asking, "Can you look into this'? Don't want, to get
duped but don't want to blow off Putinl nt K u shner stated in Congressional testimony that he
believed that it would be possible to verify the authenticity of the forwarded email through the
Russian Ambassador, whom Kushner had previously met in April 2016, ' U n able to recall the
Russian Ambassador's name, Kushrier emailed Dimitri Simes of CNI, whom he had consulted
previously about Russia, see Uolume I, Section IU.A.4, supra, and asked, "What is the name of
Russian ambassador?'o~ K ushner forwarded Simes's response —which identified Klslyak by
name — to Hicks.s~ After checking with Kushner to see what he had learned, Hicks conveyed
Putin's letter to transition officials.s» Five days later, on November 14, 2016, Trump and Putin
spoke by phone in the presence of Transition Tcain members, including incoming National
Security Advisor Michael Flynn.
145
U.S, Department of Justice
As Russian officials in the United States reached out to the President-Elect and his team, a
number of Russian individuals working in the private sector began their own efforts to make
contact. Petr Aven, a Russian national who heads Alfa-Bank, Russia's largest commercial bank,
described to the Office interactions with Putin during this time period that might account for the
flurry of Russian activity.ws
Aven told the Office that he is one of approximately 50 wealthy Russian businessmen who
regularly meet with Putin in the Kremlin; these 50 men are often referred to as "oligarchs.'"w
Aven told the Office that he met on a quarterly basis with Putin, mcluding in the fourth quarter
(Q4) of 2016, shortly after the U.S. Presidential election.~ A ven said that he took these meetings
seriously and understood that any suggestions or critiques that Putin made during these meetings
were implicit directives, and that there would be consequences for Aven if he did not follow
through. 9 As was typical, the 2016 Q4 meeting with Putin was preceded by a preparatory meeting
with Putin's chief of staff, Anton Vaino. 8
According to Aven, at his Q4 2016 one-on-one meeting with Putin,ss' Putin raised the
prospect that the United States would impose additional sanctions on Russian interests, including
sanctions against Aven and/or Alfa-Bank,sss Putin suggested that Aven needed to take steps to
protect himself and Alfa-Bank. 8 Aven also testified that Putin spoke of the difficulty faced by
the Russian govenuuent in getting in touch with the incoming Trump Administration,s@
According to Aven, Putin indicated that he did not know with whom formally to speak and
generally did not know the people amund the President-Elect. 89
9'8 Aven mvided information to the Office in an interview and through an attorney proffer,~
989
U.S. Department of Justice
Aven told Putin he would take steps to protect himself and the Alfa-Bank
shareholders om potential, sanctions, and one of those steps would be to try to reach out to the
incoming Administration to establish a line of communication.vs A v o n described Putin
responding with skepticism about Avon's prospect for success.s'7 According to Aven, although
Putin did not exp'ressly direct him to reach out to the Trump Transition Team, Aven understood
that Putin expected him to try to respond to the concerns he had raised. Avo n's efforts, are
described in Volume I, Section IV,B.51is>pa.
Aven's description of his interactions with Putin is consistent with the behavior of Kirill
Dmitriev, a Russian national who heads Russia's sovereign wealth fund and is closely connected
to Putln. Dmitriev undertook efforts to meet members of the incoming Trump Administration in
the months after the election, Dmitriev asked a close business associate who worked for the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) royal court, George Nader, to introduce him to Trump transition officials,
and Nader eventually arranged a meeting in the Seychelles between Dmitrlev and Erik Prmce, a
Trump Campaign supporter and an associate of Steve Bannon. ' I n addition, the UAE national
secmity advisor introduced Dmitriev to a hedge fund manager and friend of Jared Kushner, Rick
Gerson, in late November 2016. In December 2016 and January 20176 Dmitriev and Gerson
worked on a proposal for reconciliation between the United States and Russia, which Dmitriev
implied he cleared through Putin, G erson provided that pmposal to Kushner before the
inauguration, and Kushner later gave copies to Bannon and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson.
u. JI@ckgrorrrrrf
Dmitriev is a Russian national who was appointed CEO of Russia's sovereign wealth fund,
the Russi'an Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), when it was founded in 2011.'9 Dmitriev reported
directly to Putin and frequently referred to Putin as his "boss,' 9'
RDIF has co-tnvested in various projects with UAE sovereign wealth funds. Dm i t riev
regularly interacted with Nader, a senior advisor to UAE Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed
986
987
Aven 8/2/18 302, at 6.
Aveu 8/2/18 302, at 4-8;
989 Nader provided infomtation to the Office in inulti le interviews, all but one of which were
conductedunder a proffer agreement The
invest' ators also interviewed Prince un er a proffer agreement. Bannon was interviewed by the OQice,
under a proffer agreement.
Kirill Dm i t riev Bi o graphy, R u ssian D i r ect In vestment F u nd, o va rluble u r
https;//rdif ru/En~ e r son dmitriev kiriIV, See o/so Overview, Russian Direct Investment Fund,
available
ar https://rdif,ru/Eng About/.
"" Gerson 6/15/18 302, at I, See also, s.g., 12/14/16 Tern Message, Dmltriev to Gersou; I/9/17
Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson.
U.S. Department of Justice
//
(Crown Prince Mohammed), in connection with RDIF's dealings with the. UAE. 9 Putin wanted
Dmitriev to be in charge of both the financial and the political relationship between Russia and the
Gulf states, in part because Dmitriev had been educated in the West and spoke English fluently.'
Nader considered Dmitriev to be Putin's interlocutor in the Gulf region, and would relay
Dmitriev's views directly to Crown Prince Mohammed.s '
Nader developed contacts with both U.S. presidential campaigns during the 2016 election,
and kept Dmitriev abreast of his efforts to do so. 0 According to Nader, Dmitriev said that his
and the government of Russia's preference was for candidate Trum to win, and asked Nader to
assist him in meetin members of the Trum Cam ai n.999
Nader did not
introduce Dnutrtev to anyone associated with the Trump Campatgn afore the election.999
Erik Prince is a businessman who had relationships with various individuals associated
with the Trump Campaign; including Steve Bannon, Donald Trump Jr., and Roger Stone.'003
Prince did not have a formal role in the Campaign, although he offered to host a fundraiser for
9~ Nader 1/22/18 302, at 1-2; Nader 1/23/1 8 302, at 2-3; 5/3/16 Email, Nader to Phares; ~
1001
1002
1003
1004
Trump and sent unsolicited policy papers on issues such as foreign policy, trade, and Russian
ele'ction interference to Bannon.' "
After the ele'ction, Prince frequently visited transition ofQces at Trump Tower, primarily
to meet with Bannon but on occasion to meet Michael Flynn and others.'mv Prince and Bannon
would disouss, inter alia, foreign policy issues and Prince's recommendations regarding who
should be appointed to fill key national securi os i tions.' Alt h ough Prince was not formall
affiliated with the transition, Nader received assurances
that the incoming Administration considered Prince a trusted associate.'0
At approximately 2;40 a.m. on November 9, 2016 news re orts stated that candidate
Clinton had called President-Elect Tr to c oncede. At
' 0 Prince 4/4/1 8 302, at 1, 3-4; Prince 5/3/18 302, at 2; Bannon 2/14/1 8 302, at 19-20; 10/18/16
Email, Prince to Bannon.
'~ Flynn 11/20/17 302„at 6; Flynn 1/11/18 302, «t 5; Flynn 1/24/18 302, at 5-6; Flynn 5/1/18 302,
at 11; Prince 4/4/18 302, at 5, 8; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 20-21; 11/1Z/16 Email, Pr'ince to Corallo,
Prince 4/4/18 302, at 5; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 21.
1000
1010
Nader 1/22/18 302, at 5-61 ~
101i
1012
1013
1010
1015
U.S. Department of Justice
//
Later that morning, Dmitriev contacted Nader, who was in New York, to request a meeting
with the "key people" in the incoming Administration as soon as possible in light of the '"[g]rest
results.""' He asked Nader to convey to the incoming Administration that "we want to start
rebuilding the relationship in whatever is a comfortable pace for them. We understand all of the
sensitivities and are not in a rush."" ' Dm i t riev and Nader had previously discussed Nader
introducing him to the contacts Nader had made within the Trump Campaign.' " D m itriev also
told Nader that he would ask Putin for permission to travel to the United States, where he would
be able to speak to media outlets about the positive impact of Trump's election and the need for
reconciliation between the United States and Russia, ' '
Later that day, Dmitriev flew to New York, where Peskov was separately traveling to
attend the chess tournament.'~ D m i triev invited Nader to the opening of the tournament and
noted that, if there was "a chance to see anyone key from Trump camp," he "'would love to start
building for the future.'u~' Dmitriev also asked Nader to invite Kushner to the event so that he
(Dmitriev) could meet him.' Nad er did not pass along Dmitriev's invitation to anyone
connected with the incoming Administration,' s A lthough one World Chess Federation official
recalled hearing from an attendee that President-Elect Trump had stopped by the tournament, the
investigation did not establish that Trump or any Campaign or Transition Team official attended
the event.'~4 And the President's written answers denied that he, had."
Nader stated that Dmitriev continued to press him to set up a meeting with nansition
officials, and was particularly focused on Kushner and Trump Jr,' Dmi u iev told Nader that
Putin would be ver r a teful to Nader and that a meetin would make histo
"" 11/9/1 6 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (9:34 a.m.); Nader 1/22/18 302, at 4,
"'r 11/9/16 Text Message, Dmi1riev to Nader (11:58 p.m.).
i Nader 1/22/18 30'2,at3.
" s 11/9/16 Text Messa e Dmitriev to Nader 10:06 am.), 11/9/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to
Nader (10:10 a.m.);
11/9/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (IQ:08 a.m.); 11/9/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to
Nader (3:40 p.m.); Nader 1/22/18 302, at 5.
'+' 11/9/1 6 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (7:10 p.m,),
11/10/16 Text Message, Dmiti'iev to Nader (5:20 a.m,..
' " Nader 1/22/18 3Q2, at 5-6.
"+ Marinello 5/31/18 302, at 2-3; Nader 1/22/18 302, at 5-6.
' " Written Responses of Donahl J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 17-18 (Response to Q'uestion V,
Part (a),
Nader 1/22/18 302, at 6;
M
' ' Nader 1/22/18 302 at61
150
U.S. Department of Justice
//
1028
Accordmg to Na er, Dmitriev was very
anxious to connect w th the incoming A in i slration and told Nader that he would tiy other routes
to do so besides Nader himself,'03' Nader did not ultimately introduce Dmitriev to anyone
associated with the incoming Administration during Dmitriev's post-election trip to New York '0 '
In early December 2016, Dmitriev again broached the topic of meeting incoming
Administration officials with Nader in January or February.3033 Dmitriev sent Nader a list of
publicly available quotes of Dmitrlev speaking positively about Donald Trump "in case they
[were] helpful '»033
Nader traveled to New York in early January 2017 and had lunchtime and dinner meetings
w ith Erik Prince on January 3, 2017,' 3 N ader and Prince discussed Dmitriev.' ' Nad er
informed Prince that the Russians were looking to build a link with the incoming Trump
Administration.'030 ' he told Prince that Dmitriev had been us Nad er to
introduce him to someone from e i ncomin A dministration
.' 33 Nader suggested, in light of Prince' s
relationship with Transition Team officials, that Prmce and Dmitriev meet to discuss issues of
mutual concern, 3030 Prince told Nader
that he needed to think further about it and to check with Transition Team o icials.'039
After his dinner with Prince, Nader sent Prince a link to a Wikipedia entry about Dmitriev,
and sent Dmitriev a message stating that he had just met "with some key people w'ithin the family
and inner circle" — a reference to Prince — and that he had spoken at length and positively about
1039
12/8/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (12:10:31 a.m.),' l2/8/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to
Nader ft2:10.57 a.m,),
"' Prince 4/4/18 302, at,8.
'" ' Prince 5/3/1 8 302, at 3,'
1030
1033
1039
151
U.S. Deparlment of Justice
Dmitriev.'c4' Nader told Dm'itriev that the people he met had asked for Dmitriev's bio, and
Dmitriev replied that he would update and send it,'c ' Nader later received from Dmitriev two
filesconce
rningDm itriev,' one was a two-page biography, and the other was a list of Dmitriev's
positive quotes about Donald Trump.'s4s
The next morning, Nader forwarded the message and attachments Dmitriev had sent him
to Prince.' Na der wmte to Prince that these documents were the versions*to' be used with some
additional details f o r t h em" ( w it h " t hem" r eferring t o m e mbers o f t h e i n coming
Administration).' ~ Prince opened the attachments at Trump Tower within an hour of receiving
them,' 4 Prince stated that, while he was at Trump Tower that day, he spoke. with Kellyanne
Conway, Wilbur Ross, Steve Mnuchin, and others while waiting to see 8'annon, ~ C ell-site
location data for Prince's mobile phone indicates that Prince remained at Trump Tower for
approximately three hours.'~i Prince said that he could not recall whether durin t hose three
hours he met with Barmen and discussed Dmitriev with him.'s4
Prince booked a ticket to the Seychelles on January 7, 2017.' s The following day, Nader
wrote to Dmitriev that he had a "pleasant, surprise" for him, namely that he had armnged for
Dmitriev to meet "a Special 6uest" from "the New Team," referring to Prince.' ' Nader asked
Dmitriev if he could come to the Seychelles for the meeting on January 12, 2017, and Dmitriev
a~ ed 1052
The following day, Dmitriev sou ht assurance from Nader that the Seychelles meeting
would be worthwhiLe. Dmitriev w'as not enthusiastic about the idea of
meeting with Prince, and that Nader assure i m that Prince wielded infiucnce with the incoming
'" ' 1/4/17 Text Message, Nader to Prince 1/4/17 Text Messa es, Nader to Dmitriev (524 a.m.-
5:26 a.m.); Nader '1/22/1 8 302, at 8-9;
' ' 1/4/17 Text Messages, NaderEr,Dmitriev (7:24:27 a,m.).
' is 1/4/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev to Nader (7:75-7:29 a.m.)
1/4/17 Text Messages, Nader to Prince.
1/4!17 Text Messages, Nader' to Prince;
"" Prince5/3/18 302, at1-3.
""Prince5/3/18302, at2-3.
'~ Cell-site location data for Prince's mobile phone
" ' Prince 5/3/18 302, at 3.
1049
Administration,' 4 Nader wrote to Dmitriev, "This guy [Prince] is designated by Steve [Bannon]
to meet you! I know him snd he is very very well connected and trusted by the New Team. His
sister is now a Ministei of Education."' ss According to Nader, Prince had led him to believe that
Bannon was aware of Prince' s upcoming meeting with Dmitriev, and Prince acknowledged that it
was fair for Nader to think that Prince would pass information on to the Transition Team.' s
Barmen, however, told the Office that Prince did not tell him in advance about his meeting
with Dmitriev '0'2
Dmitriev arrived with his wife in the Seychelles on January 11, 2017, and checked into the
Four Seasons Resort where Crown Prince Mohammed and Nader were staying.' s Prince amved
that same day.'" P r ince and Dmitriev met for the first time that afternoon in Nader's villa, with
Nader present,' 0 The initial meeting lasted approximately 30-45 minutes.' 0'
>004
1/9/17 Text Message, Nader to Dmitriev (2:12:56 p,m.); Nader 1/19/18 302, at 13; ~
1003
153
U.S. Department, of Justice
//
1066
topic of Russian interference m the 2016 election did not come up,
Prince a ded t t e wo u m f orm Bannon about his meeting with Dmitricv, an that if there was
interest in continuin the discussion, Bannon or someone else on the Transition Team would do
so 107i
Afterwards„Prince returned to his room, where he learned that a Russian aircraft carrier
had sailed to Libya, which led him to call Nader and ask him to set up another meeting with
Dmitriev." A c c ording to Nader, Prince called and said hc had checked with his associates back
home and needed to convey to Dmitriev that Libya was "off the table." 0 Nader wrote to
Dmitriev that Prince had "received an urgent message that he needs to convey to you immediately,"
and arranged for himself, Dmitriev, and Prince to meet at a restaurant on the Four Seasons
property.
At the second meeting, Prince told Dmitricv that the United Slates could not acce t an
Russian involvement in Lib a because it would make the situation there much worse.'
md
1068
Prince,
however, denied that and rec e t a t e was m n g these remarks to Dmitriev not in ari o ial capacity
for the transition but based on his experience as a former naval officer. Prince 5/3/18 302, at 4.
U,S. Department of Justice
1077
Atter the brief second meeting concluded, Nader and Dmitriev discussed what had
transpired.' ' Dmitriev told Nader that he wss disappointed in his meetings with Prince for two
reasons: first, he believed the Russians needed to be communicating with someone who had more
authority within the incoming Administmtion than Prince had.' ss Second, he had hoped to have
a discussion of greater substance, such as outlinin a strata ic roadmap for both oountries to
follow.' 0 D mitriev told Nader that Prince's comments ~
were insulting
Hours after the second meeting, Prince sent two text messages to Bannon from the
Seychelles.' t As described further below, investigators were unable to obtain the content of these
or other messages between Prince and Bannon, and the investigation also did not identify evidence
of any further communication between Prince and Dmitriev after their meetings in the Seychelles.
iii. Erik Prince 's Meeting with Steve Jlannon after the Seychelles Trip
After the Seychelles meetings, Pdnce told Nader that he would inform Bannon about his
discussion with Dmitriev and would convey that someone within the Russian power structure was
interested in seeking better relations with the incoming Administration.icss On January 12, 2017,
Prince contacted Bannon's personal assistant to set up a meeting for the following week.' '
Several days later, Prince messaged her again asking about Bannon's schedule.icss
Prince said that he met Barmen at Bannon's home after returning to the United States in
mid-January and briefed him about several topics, including his meeting with Dmitriev.' ' P r ince
told the, Office that he explained to Bannon that Dmitriev was the head of a Russian sovereign
wealth fund and was interested in improving relations between the United States and Russia.' '
Prince had on his cellphone a screenshot of Dmitriev's Vikipedia page dated January 16, 2017,
107'/
155
U.S. Department of Justice
and Prince told the Office that he likely showed that image to Barmen.'ms Prince also believed he
provided Bannon with Dmitriev's contact information.' s According to Prince, Bannon instructed
Prince not to follow up with Dmitriev, and Prince had the impi'ession that the issue was not a
priority for Bannon.' s Pr i nce related that Bannon did not appear angry, just relatively
uninterested.
Bannon, by contrast, told the Office that he never discussed with Prince anything regarding
Dmitriev, RDIF, or any meetings with Russian individuals or people associated with Putin.' m
Bannon also stated that had Prince mentioned such a meeting, Bannon would have remembered it,
and Barmen would have objected to such a meeting having taken place.'cm
The conflicting accounts provided by Bannon and Prince could not be independently
clarified by reviewing their communications, because neither one was able to produce any of the
messages they exchanged in the time period surrounding the Seychelles meeting. Prince's phone
contained no text messages prior to March 2017, though provider records indicate that he and
Bannon exchanged dozens of messages.' s Prince denied deleting any messages but claimed he
did not know why there were no messages on his device before March 2017,' s Bannon's devices
similarly contained no messages in the relevant time period, and Bannon also stated he did not
know why messages did not appear on his device.' s Bannon told the Office that, during both the
months before and after the Seychelles meeting, he regularly used his personal Blackberry and
personal email for work-related communications (including those with Prince), and he took no
steps to preserve these work communications.' '
Dmitriev's contacts during the transition period were not limited to those facilitated by
Nader, In approximateiy late November 2016, the UAE national security advisor introduced
Dmitriev to Rick Gerson, a friend of Jared Kushner who runs a hedge fund in New York.' as
Gerson stated he had no formal role in the transition and had no mvolvement in the Trump
'" ' Prince 5/3/18 302, «t 5; I/1 6/17 Image on Prince Phone (on fil'e with the Office).
' ' Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5.
156
U.S. Department of Justice
Campaign other than occasional casual discussions about the Campaign with Kushner,' ss After
the. election, Gerson assisted the transition by arranging meetings f'o r transition officials with
former UK prime minister Tony Blair and a UAE delegation led by Crown Prince Mohammed. nc
When IJmitriev and Gerson met, they principally discussed potential joint ventures
between Gerson's hedge fund and RDIF."m D m itriev was interested in improved economic
cooperation between the United States and Russia and asked Gerson who he should meet with in
the incoming Administration who would be helpful towards this goal."m Gerson replied that he
would try to figure out the best way to arrange appropriate introductions, but noted that
confidentiality would be required because of the sensitivity of holding such meetings before the
new Administration took power, and before Cabinet nominees had been confirmed by the
Senate." s Gerson said he would ask Kushner and Michael Flynn who the "key person or people"
were on the topics of reconciliation with Russia, joint security concerns, and economic matters."
Dmitriev told Gerson that he had been tasked by Putin to develop and execute a
reconciliation plan between the United States and Russia. He noted in a text message to Gerson
that if Russia was approached with respect and willingness to understand our position, we can
have Major Breakthroughs quickly.'0'c' Gerson and Dmitriev exchanged ideas in Decemb'er 2016
about what such a reconciliation plan would include." s Gerson told the Office that the Transition
Team had not asked him to engage in these discussions with Dmitriev, and that he did so on his
own initiative and as a private citizen." 7
On January 9, 2017, the same day he asked Nader whether meeting Prince would be
worthwhile, Dmitriev sent his biography to Gerson and asked him if he could "share it with Jared
(or somebody else very senior in the team) —so that they know that we are focused from our side
on improving the relationship and my boss asked me to play a key role in that"" s Dminiev also
asked Gerson if he knew Prince, and if Prince was somebody important or worth spending time
157
U.S. Department of Justice
with.' s A l ler his trip to the Seychelles, Dmitriev told Gerson that Bannon had asked Prmce to
meet with Dmitriev and that the two had had a positive meeting.""
On January 16, 2017, Dmitriev consolidated the ideas for U.S,-Russia reconciliation that
h e and Gerson had been discussing into a two-page document that listed five main points; ( 1)
jointly fighting terrorism; (2) jointly engaging in anti-weapons of mass destruction efforts; (3)
developing "win-win" economic and investment initiatives; (4) maintaining an honest, open, and
continual dialogue regarding issues of disagreement; and (5) ensuring proper communication and
trust by "key people" fmm each country."" O n January 18, 2017, Gerson gave a copy of the
document to Kushner.'" K u shner had not heard of Dmitriev at that time."' G erson explained
that Dmitriev was the head of RDIF, and Gerson may have alluded to Dmitriev's being well
connected.nis K ushner placed the document in a file and said he would get it to the right
people." K us hner ultimately gave one copy of the document to Barmen and another to Rex
Tillerson; according to Kushner, neither of them followed up with Kushner about it." ' On
January 19, 2017, Dmitriev sent Nader a copy of the two-page document, telling him that this was
"a view from our side that I discussed in my meeting on the islands, and with you and with our
friends. Please share with them- we believe this is a good foundation to start Irom. 0"
Gerson informed Dmitriev that he had given the docmnent to Kushner soon after deliver'ing
it." " O n January 26, 2017, Dmitriev wrote to Gerson that his "boss" — an apparent reference to
Putin — was asking if there had been any feedback on the proposal.n's Dmitriev said, "[w]e do
not want to rush things and move at a comfortable speed. At the same time, my boss asked me to
try to have the key US meetings in the next tvvo weeks if possible.'0's' He informed Gerson that
Putin and President Trump would speak by phone that Saturday, and noted that that information
was ' very confidentia1.»1 nl
The same day, Dmitriev wrote to Nader that be had seen his "boss" again yesterday who
had "emphasized that this is a great priority for us and that we need to build this communication
158
U.S. Department of Justice
channel to avoid buteaucracy.""s O n January 28, 2017, Dmiti'iev texted Nader that he wanted
"to see if I can confirm to my boss that your friends may use some of the ideas fmm the 2 pager I
sent you in the telephone, call that will happen at 12 EST, ni~ an apparent reference to the call
scheduled between President Trump and Putin. Nader replied, "Definitely paper was so submitted
to Team by Rick and me, They took it seriously! 'ui+ Afier the call between President Trump and
Putin occurred, Dmitriev wrote to Nader that "the call went very well. M y boss wants me to
continue making some public statements that us [sic] Russia cooperation is good and
important.*" Gerson also wrote to Dmitriev to say that the call had gone well, and Dmitriev
i'eplied that the document they had draited together "played an important role Juis
Gerson and Dmitriev appeared to stop communicating with one another in approximately
March 2017, when the investment deal they had been working on together shmved no signs of
progressing." 7
Bob Foresman, the UBS investment bank executive who had previously tried to !ransmit
to candidate Trump an invitation to speak at an economic forum in Russia, see Volume I, Section
I V.A.l.d.ii, supra, may have provided similar information to the Transition Team. Accord~ t o
1/28/17 Text Message, Gerson to Dmitriev; U29/17 Text Message, Dmitiiev to Gersnn.
nit Gerson 6/15/1 8 302, at 4; 3/21/17 Text Message, Geison to Dminiev.
F oresman, at thc end of an early December 2016 meeting with incoming National Security Advisor
Michael Flynn and his designated deputy (K.T. McFarland) in New York, Flynn asked Foresman
for his thoughts on Kislyak. Foresman had not met Kislyak but told Flynn that, while, Kislyak was
an important person, Kislyak did not have a direct line to putin."'x F oresman subsequently
traveled to Moscow„ inquired of a source he believed to be close to Putin, and heard back from
that source that Ushakov would be the official channel for the incoming U.S. national security
advisor."s F oresman acknowledged that Flynn had not asked him to undertake that inquiry in
Russia but told the Deice that he nonetheless felt obligated to report the information back to Flynn,
and that he worked to get a face-to-face meeting with Flynn in January 2017 so that he oould do
so,"s» Email correspondence suggests that the meeting ultimately went forward,'"' but Flynn has
no recollection of it or of the earlier December meeting." (T h e investigation did not identify
evidence of Flynn or Kushner meeting with Ushakov after being given his name."s )
In the meantime, although he had already foxxned the impression that Kislyak was not
necessarily the right point of contact," s Kushner went forward with the meeting that Kislyak had
r equested on November 16. I t took place at Trump Tower on November 30, 2016,0's A t
Kushner's invitation, Flynn also attended; Bannon was invited but did not attend." c During the
meeting, which lasted approximately 30 minutes, Kushner expressed a desire on the part of the
incoming Administtation to start afresh with U.S.-Russian relations." ' K u shner also asked
Kislyak to identify the best person (whether Kislyak or someone else) with whom to direct future
discussions — someone who had contaot with Putin and the ability to speak for him,"4x
The three mcn also discussed U.S. policy toward Syria, and Kislyak floated the idea of
having Russian generals brief the Transition Team on the topic using a secure communications
line. ' s A f ter Flynn explained that there was no secure line in the Transition Team offices,
160
U.S, Department of Justice
//
Kushner asked Kislyak if t hey could communicate using secure facilities at the Russian
Embassy t t44 Kislyak quickly rejected 'that idea» ss
On December 6, 2016„ the Russian Embassy reached out to Kushner's assistant to set up a
second meeting between Kislyak and Kushner.» e Kushner declined several proposed meeting
dates, but Kushner's assistant indicated that Kislyak was very insistent about securing a second
meeting. '" K ushner told the Office that he did not want to take another meeting because he had
already decided Kislyak was not the right channel for him to communicate with Russia, so he
arranged to have one of his assistants, Avi Berkowitz, meet with Kislyak in his stead,»4s Although
D
embassy official Sergey Kuzuetsov wrote to Berkowitz that Kislyak thought it "important to
"continue the conversation with Mr. Kushner in person,'u'4v Kislyak nonetheless agreed to meet
instead with Berkowitz once it berame apparent that Kushner was unlikely to take a meeting.
Berkowitz met with Kislyak on December 12, 2016, at Trump Tower." o The meeting
lasted only a few minutes, during which Kislyak indicated that he wanted Kushner to meet
someone who had a direct line to Putin: Scrgey Gorkov, the head of the Russian-government-
owned bank Vnesheconombank (VEB).
Kushner agreed to meet with Gorkov.' ' T he one-on-one meeting took place the next day,
December 13, 2016, at the Colony Capital building in Manhattan, where Kushner had previously
scheduled meetings." s V E B was (and is) the subject of Department of Treasury economic
sanctions imposed in response to Russia's annexation of Crimea.»ss Kushner did not, however,
recall any discussion during his meeting with Gorkov about the sanctions against VEB or sanctions
more generally."+ K ushner stated in an interview that he did not engage in any preparation for
161
U.S. Department of Justice
the meeting and that n o one on the Transition Team even did a G oogle search for
Gorkov's name "ss
At the start of the meeting, Gorkov presented Kushner with two gifts: a painting and a bag
of soil from the town in Belarus where Kushner's family originated."
The accounts from Kuslmer and Gorkov differ as to whe'ther the meeting was diplomatic
or business in nature. Kushner told the Office that the meeting was diplomatic, with Gorkov
expressing disappointment with U.S.-Russia relations under President Obama and hopes for
improved relations with the incoming Administration. us7 According to Kushner, although Gorkov
told Kushner a little bit about his bank and made some statements about the Russian economy, the
two did not discuss Kushner's companies or private business dealings of any kind." s (At the time
of the meeting, Kushner Companies had a debt obligation coming due on the building it owned at
666 Fifth Avenue, and there had been public reporting both about efforts to secure lending on the
property and possible conflicts of interest for Kushner arising out of his company's borrowing
from foreign landers,"'s)
In contrast, in a 2017 public statement, VEB suggested Gorkov met with Kushner in
Kushner's capacity as CEO of Kushner Companies for the pmpose of discussing business, rather
than as part of a diplomatic effort. I n particular, VEB characterized Gorkov's meeting with
Kushner as part of aseries of "roadshow meetings" with "representatives of major US banks and
business circles," which included "negotiations*' snd discussion of the "most promising business
lines and sectors.""
Foresman, the investment bank executive mentioned in Volume I, Sections IV,A.I and
IV.B.3, supra, told the Office that he met with Gorkov and VEB deputy chairman Nikolay
Tsekhomsky in Moscow just before Gorkov left for New York to meet Kushner 0 s' According to
F oresman, Gorkov and Tsekhomsky told him that they were traveling to New York to discuss post-
election issues with U S, financial institutions, that their trip was sanctioned by Putin, and that they
would be reporting back to Putm upon their return.'"
Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 19. Berkowitz, by contrast, stated to the Office that be had googled
Gorkov's name and told Kusbner that Gorkov apyeared tc be a banker. Berkcwitz 1/1 2/1 8302, at 8,
"" Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 19-20.
'"s Kushner Stmt. at 8.
' ' K.ushner Stmt. at 8.
"" Se ct e g.> Peter Grant Donald Trump Son-in Law Jared Kushner Could Face Hts Own Conflict-
of Interest Questions, Wall Street Jour'nal fNov. 29, 2016),
'" Patrick Reevell tie Matthew Mosk, Russian Banker Sergey Gorhov Brushes oP Questions About
Me'sting with Jared Kushner, ABC News lJune 1, 2017).
F oresman 10fl7/1 8 302 at 14 15
'" F oresman 10/17/18 302, at 15-16.
U.S. Depar!ment of Justice
ll
The investigation did not resolve the. apparent conflict in the accounts of Kushner and
Gorkov or determine whether the meeting was diplomatic in nature (as Kushner stated), focused
on business (as VEB's public statement indicated), or whether it involved some combination of
those matters or other matters. Regardless, the investigation did not identdy evidence that Kushner
and Gorkov engaged in any substantive follow-up after the meeting.
Rather, a few days after the meeting, Gorkov's assistant texted Kushner's assistant, "Hi,
please inform your side that the information about the meeting had a very positive response!" '6s
Over the following weeks, the two assistants exchanged a handful of additional cordial texts.
On February 8, 2017, Gorkov's assistant texted Kushner's assistant (Berkowitz) to try to set up
another meeting, and followed up by text at least twice in the days that followed.n66 According
to Berkowitz, he did not respond to the meeting request in light of the press coverage regarding
the Russia investigation, and did not tell Kushner about the meeting request." 6
In December 2016, weeks after the one-on-one meeting with Putin described in Volume I,
Section IV.B.l.b, supra, Petr Aven attended what he described as a separate "all-hands" oligarch
meeting between Putin and Russia's most prominent businessmen." As i n Avon's one-on-one
meeting, a main topic of discussion at the oligarch meeting in December 2016 was the prospect of
forthcoming U.S, economic sanctions."60
After the December 2016 all-hands meeting, Aven tried to establish a connection to the
Trump team. A v en instructed Richard Burt to make contact with the incoming Trump
Administration. Burt was on the board of directors for LetterOne (L I), another company headed
by, Avon„and had done work for Alfa-Bank."6 B urt had previously served as U.S. ambassador
to Germany and Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, and one of his
primary roles with Alfa-Bank and Ll was to facilitate introductions to business contacts in the
United States and other Western countries." 0
While at a LI board meeting held in Luxembourg in late December 2016, Avenpulled Burt
aside and told him that he had spoken to someone high in the Russian government who expressed
u60 AKIN GUMP BERKOWITZ 0000011 (12/19/16 Text Message, Ivsnchenko to Berkowitz
(9:56 a.m„)).
n+ AKIN GUMP BERKOWITZ 0000011-15 (12/1'9/16 — 2/16/17 Text Messages, Ivanchenkc
k Berkowitz).
"" A K I N G UMP BERXOWITZ 0000015 (2/8/17 Text Message, Ivsnchenko to Berkowitz
(10;41 a,m.)).
u66 Berkowitz 3/22/18 302, at 4-5.
" 0 Aven 8/2I18 302, at 7;,
1160
163.
U,S. Department of Justice
//
interest in establishing a communications channel between the Kremlin and the Trump Transition
Team." ' Aven asked for Burt's help in contacting members of the Tmnsition Team." A l t hough
Bmt had been responsible for helping Aven build connections in the past, Burt viewed Aven *s
request as unusual and outside the normal realm of his dealings with Aven."
Burt, who is a member of the board of CNI (discussed at Volume I, Section IV.A.4,
supru),n i decided to approach CNI president Dimitri Simes for help facilitating Aven's request„
recalling that Simes had some relationship with Kushner." ' A t the time, Simes was lobbying the
Trump Transition Team, on Burt's behalf, to appoint Burt U.S. ambassador to Russia.'
Burt contacted Simes by telephone and asked if he could arrange a meeting with Kushner
to discuss setting up a high-level communications channel between Putin and the incoming
Administration." Si mes told the Office that he. declined'and stated to Burt that setting up such
a channel was not a good idea in light of the media attention surrounding Russian influence in the
U.S. presidential election."7' According to Simes„he understood that Burt was seeking a secret
channel, and Simes did not want CNI to be seen as an intermediary between the Russian
government and the incoming Adminishation," s Based on what Simes had read in the media, he
stated that he already had concerns that Trump"s business connections could be exploited by
Russia, and Simes said that he did no't want CNI to have any involvement or apparent involvement
in facilitating any connection."
In an email dated December 22, 2016, Burt recounted for Aven his conversation with
Simes:
Through a trusted third party, I have reached out to the very influential person I mentioned
in Luxembourg conc
erning
Project A. There is an interest and an understanding for the
need to establish such a channel. But the individual emphasized that at this moment, with
so much intense interest in the Congress and the media over the question of cyber-hacking
(and who ordered what), Project A was too explosive to discuss. The individual agreed to
discuss it again after the New Year. I trust the individual's instincts on this.
According to Burt, the "very influential person" referenced in his email was Simes, and the
reference to a "trusted third party" was a fabrication, as no such third party existed. "Project A"
was a term that Burt created for Aven's effort to help establish a communications channel between
Russia and the Trump team„which he used in light of the sensitivities surrounding what Aven was
requesting, especially in light of the recent attention to Russia' s influence in the U, S. presidential
election."B According to Burt, his report that there was "interesf' in a communications channel
reflected Simes's views, not necessarily those of the Transl'tion Team, and in any event, Burt
acknowledged that he added some "hype" tc' that sentence to make it sound like there was more
interest from the Transition Team than may have actually existed."+
Aven replied to Burt's email on the same day> saying "Thank you. A l l clear."' ~
According to Aven, this statement indicated that he did not want the outreach to continue."" B urt
spoke to Aven some time thereafter about his attempt to make contact with the Trum team
ex lamin to Aven that the current environment made it impossible,
.' "9 Burt did not recall discussing Avon's request with Sunes again, nor dtd
e recal spe i ng to anyone else about the request."
In the first quarter of 2017, Aven met again with Putin and other Russian officials." B At
that meeting, Putin asked about Aven's attem t to build relations with the Trum Administration
and Aven recounted his lack of success.'"9
Putin continued to inquire about Aven's e orts to connect to the Trump
Administration in several subsequent quarterly meetings." t
Aven also told Putin's chief of staff that he had been subpoenaed by the FBI."9 A s part
of that conversation, he, reported that he had been asked by the FBI about whether he had worked
to create a back channel between the Russian government and the Trump Administration." 9
1191
According to Avon, the official showed no emotion in response to this report and did not appear
to care "~
In December 2016, more than two months after he was removed from the Trump
Gainpaign, former Campaign foreign policy advisor Carter Pa e a ain visited Moscow in an
attem t to ursue business o ortunities."9
On December 9, 2016, Page went to dinner with NES employees Shlomo Weber and
Andrej Krickovic." We ber had contacted Dvorkovich to let him know that Page was in town
and to invite him to stop by the dinner if he wished to do so, and Dvorkovich came to the restaurant
1' or a few minutes to meet with Page."9 Dvorkovich congratulated Page on Trumlr's election and
expressed interest in starting a dialogue between the United States and Russia.' 9 D vorkovich
asked Page if he could facilitate connecting Dvorkovich with individuals involved in the transition
to be in a discussion of future coo oration.'
1196
1197
1293
U,S. Deparlment of Justice
Incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn was the Transition Team's primary
conduit for communications with the Russian Ambassador and dealt with Russia on two sensitive
matters during the transition period: a United Nations Security Council vote and the Russian
governm
ent' s reaction to the United States's imposition of sanctions for Russian interference in
the 2016 election.'2 2 Despite Kushner's conclusion that Kislyak did not wield influence inside
the Russian gavernment, the Transition Team tumed to Flynn's relationship with Kislyak on
both issues. As to'the sanctions, Flynn spake by phone to K.T, McFarland, his incoming deputy,
to prepare for his call ta Kislyak; McFarland was with the President-Elect and other senior
members af the Transition Team at Mar-a-Laga at the time. Although ttansition officials at Mar-
s-Lago had some concern about possible Russian reactions to the sanctions, the investigation did
not identify evidence that the President-Elect asked Flynn to make any request to Kislyak. Flynn
asked Kislyak not ta escalate the situation in response to U.S. sanctions imposed on December 29,
2016, and Kislyak later reported to Flynn that Russia acceded to that request,
On December 21, 2016, Egypt submitted a resolution ta the United Nations Security
Council calling on Israel to cease settlement activities in Palestinian territory.' The Security
Council, which includes Russia, was scheduled to vote on the resolution the following day.'
There was speculation in the media that the Obama Administration would not oppose the
resolution.'2'e
1205
12SS
'2' As discussed further in Volume I, Section V.C.4,inPa, Flynn pleaded guilty ta making false
statements to the FBI, in violation of 18 U.S,C. 5 1001, about these cammunications with Ambassador
Kislyak. Plea Agteement, United Statesv Michael T Flynn, No. I;17er2 32 (DDC . Dec. I, 2017), Doc,
3. Flynn's plea agreement requised that he cooperate with this Oflice, and the statements from Flynn in
this report reflect his cooperation over the course af multiple debrieftngs in 2017 snd 2018.
' Karen De Young, How the US. Came to Abstat'n on a UN R esottttton Condemning hraeli
Settlements, Washington Post (Dec. 28, 2016l.
' ss Katen Dc Young, How the US. Came to Abstain on a UN. Resolution Condemning Israeli
Settlements, Washington Post (Dec, 28, 20163.
' w Michelle Nichals St Lesley Wroughtan, US. Intended to Allow Passage of UM Drag Critical
of Israe/,Reuters (Dec. 21, 2016l.
U.S, Department of )ustice
//
According to Flynn, the Transition Team regarded the vote as a significant issue and
wanted to support Israel by opposing the resolution.' " On December 22, 2016, multiple members
of the Transition Team, as well as President-Elect Trump, communicated with foreign goverrunent
officials to determine their views on the resolution and to rally support to delay the vote or defeat
the resolution.' 's Kushner led the effort for the Transition Team; Flynn was responsible for the
Russian government.' " M i nutesafter an early morning phone call with Kushner on December
22, Flynn oalled Kislyak.' ' A c cording to Flynn, he informed Kislyak about the vote and the
Transition Team's opposition to the resolution, and requested that Russia vote against or delay the
resolution.'s" Later that day, president-Elect Trump spoke with Egyptian president Abdel Fattah
al-Sisi about the vote.'s' U l timately, Egypt postponed the vote.n'
On December 23, 2016, Malaysia, New Zealand, Senegal, and Venezuela resubmitted the
resolution.' " Throughout the day, members of the Transition Team continued to'talk with foreign
leaders about the resolution, with Flynn continuing to lead the outreach with the Russian
govermnent through Kfslyak.'s' W hen Flynn again spoke with Kislyak, Kislyak informed Flynn
that if the resolution came to a vote, Russia would not vote against it.'s2 The resolution later
passed 14-0, with the United States abstaming,'+~
Flynn was also the Transition Team member who spoke with the Russian government when
the Obama Administration imposed sanctions and other measures against Russia in response to
Russia's interference in the 2016 presidential election. On December 28, 2016, then-President
Obama signed Executive Order 13757, which took effect at 12:01 a.m. the following day and
imposed sanctions on nine Russian individuals and entities.'s' On December 29, 2016, the Obama
Administration also expelled 35 Russian governm
ent officials and closed two Russian
governm
ent-owned compounds in the United States, nss
During the rollout of the sanctions, President-Elect Trump snd multiple Transition Team
senior officials, including McFarland, Steve Bsnnon, and Reince Priebus, were staying at the Mar-
e-L'ago club in Palm Beach, Florida Flynn was on vacation in the Dominican Republic, sts but
was in daily contact with McFarland,'~
The Transition Team and President-Elect Trump were concerned that these sanctions
would harm the United States's relationship with Russia.'~ A l though the details and timing of
sanctions were unknown on December 28, 2016, the media began reporting that retaliatory
measures fmm the Obama Administration against Russia were forthcoming.'~' When asked about
imposing sanctions on Russia for its alleged interference in the 20'l6 presidential election,
President-Elect Trump told the media, "I think we ought to get on with our lives. ut
Russia initiated the outreach to the Transition Team. On the evening of December 28,
2016, Kislyak texted Flynn, "can you kindly call me back at your convenience."'its Flynn did not
respond to the text message that evening. Someone trom the Russian Embassy also called Flynn
the next morning, at 10:38 a,m„but they did not talk.'
The sanchons were announced publicly on December 29„2016.' ' At 1:53 p.m. that day,
McFarland began exchanging emails with multiple Transition Team members and advisors about
the impact the sanctions would have on the incoming Administration.'ss At 2:07 p.m., a Transition
Team member texted Flynn a link to a New York Times article about the sanctions.' A t 2 : 2 9
' ' Taking Additional Steps to Address the ¹ ti onal Emergency grtth Respect to Sign
ificant
hfahctous Cyber-Enabled Acti vi ties, The White House, Office of thePress Secretary (Dec. 29, 2016).
m' Statement by the President on Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and
Harassment, The White House, (&ice of the press Secretary (Dec. 29, 2016).
'sit Flynn 11/16/1 7 302, at 14; McFarland 12/22/1 7 302, at 3-8; Barman 2/12/18 302, at 5,
' s' Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 5; Flynn 1/19/1 8 302, at 1,' McFarland 11/22/17 302, at 3-9.
' ' F l y r m l l / 17/17302,at3.
Christine Wang, US to announce new sancti ons against Russia in response to election hacking,
CNBC (Dec. 28, 2016).
Jolm Wagner, Trump on alleged election interference by Russia: "Get on with our lives",
Washington Post (Dec. 29, 2016).
"+s SF000006 (12/28/16 Text Message, Kislyak to Flynn).
u" Cag Records of Michael T, Flynn
'"' Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 2-3; McFariand 12/22/17 302, at 4-5.
' n 12/29/16 Email, McFsrland to O' Brien et al.; 12/29/16 Email, McFerland to Flynn et al.
"" SF000001 (12/29/16 Text Message, Flaherty to Flynn).
169
U,S. Department of Justice
//
p.m., McFarland called Flynn„but they did not talk.'t'4 Shortly thereafter, McFarland and Bannon
discussed the sanctions.'ts According to McFarland, Bannon remarked that the sanctions would
hurt their ability to have good relations with Russia, and that Russian escalation would make things
more difficult.'t s McFarland believed she told Bannon that Flynn was scheduled to talk to Kislyak
later that night.' ' M c Farland also believed she may have discussed the sanctions with Priebus,
and likewise told him that Flynn was scheduled to talk to Kislyak that night.' ss At 3:14 p.m.,
Flynn texted a Transition Team member who was assisting McFarland, "Time for a ca11777'uass
The Transition Team member responded that MeFarland was on the phone with Tom Bossett, a
Transition Team senior official, to which Flynn responded, "Tit for tat w Russia not good. Russian
AMBO reaching out to me today. 0'~
Flynn recalled that he chose not to communicate with Kislyak about the sanctions until he
had heard from the team at Mar-a-Lago.'t4' He first spoke with Michael Ledeen,'~t a Transition
Team member who advised on foreign policy and national security matters, for 20 minutes.n~'
Flynn then spoke with McFarland for almost 20 minutes to discuss what, if anything, to
communicate to Kislyak about the sanctions,' On that eall, McFarland and Flynn discussed the
sanctions, including their potential impact on the incoming Trump Administration's foreign policy
goals.' 4 McFarland and Flynn also discussed that Transition Team members in Mar-a-Lago did
not want Russia to escalate the situation.' 4 T hey both understood that Flynn would relay a
message to Kislyak in hopes of making sure the situation would not get out of hand.'
170
U.S. Department of Justice
Immediately after speaking with McFarland, Flynn called and spoke with Kislyak,' as
Flynn discussed multiple topics whh Kislyak, including the sanctions, scheduling a video
teleconference between President-Elect Trump and Putin, an upcoming ten'orism conference, and
Russia's views about the Middle East,'~ W i t h respect to the sanctions, Flynn requested that
Russia not escalate the situation, not get into a "tit for tat," and only respond to the sanctions in a
reciprocal manner.' s
Multiple Transition Team members were aware that Flynn was speaking with Kislysk that
day. In addition to her conversations with Bannon and Reince Priebus, at 4:43 p,m., McFarland
sent an email io Transition Team members about the sanctions, informing the gmup that "Gen
[F]lyim is talking to russian ambassador this evening." " Le ss than an hour later, McFarland
briefed President-Elect Trump. Bannon, Priebus, Sean Spicer, and other Transition Team members
were present.'s s During the briefing, President-Elect Trump asked McFarland if the Russians did
"it," meaning the intrusions intended to influence the presidential election. i i M cFarland said
yes, and President-Elect Trump expressed doubt that it was the Russians.' 4 M cFarland also
discussed potential Russian responses to the sanctions, and said Russia's response would be an
indicator of what the Russians wanted going forward.' Pr e sident-Elect Trump opined that the
sanctions provided him with leverage to use with the Russians,'a s McFarland recalled that at the
end of the meeting, someone may have mentioned to President-Elect Trump that Flynn was
speaking to the Russian ambassador that evening.'
After the briefing, Flynn and McFarland spoke over the phone.'s" Flynn reported on the
substance of his call with Kislyak, including their discussion of the sanctions.'s A c cording to
McFarlsnd, Flynn mentioned that the Russian response to the sanctions was not going to be
escalatory because they wanted a good relationship with the incoming Administration,'~
McFarland also gave Flynn a summary of her recent briefing with President-Elect Trump.'ss'
171
U.S. Department of Justice
//
The next day, December 30, 2016, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov remarked that
Russia would respond in kind to the sanctions,'ssr Putin super'seded that comment two hours later,
releasing a statement that Russia would not take retaliatory measures in response to the sanctions
at that time,tsm Hours later President-Elect Trump tweeted, "Great move on delay (by V,
Putin) su 44 Shortly thereafter, Flynn sent a text message to McFarland summarizing his call with
Kislyak from the day before, which she emailed to Kushner, Baimon, Priebus, and other Transition
Team members,'~ T h e text message and email did not include sanctions as one of the topics
discussed with Kislyak.'s s Flynn told the Office that he did not document his discussion of
sanctions because it could be perceived as getting in the way of the Obama Administration's
foreign policy,'
On December 31, 2016, Kislyak called Flynn and told him the request had been received
at the highest levels and that Russia had chosen not to retaliate to the sanctions in response to the
request.' ss Two hours later, Flynn spoke with McFarland and relayed his conversation with
Kislyak.' ss A ccording to McFarland, Flynn remarked that the Russians wanted a better
relationship and that the relationship was back on track.'s" F l ynn also told McFarland that be
believed his phone call had made a difference.'sn McFarland recalled congratulating Flynn in
response. s~ Flynn spoke with other Transition Team members that day, but does not recall
whether they discussed the sanctions.'s~ Flynn recalled discussing the sanctions with Bannon the
nextday and thatBannon appeared to know aboutFlynn *s conversation with Kislyak,~74 Baonon,
Comment by foreign tv/In/ster Ssrgsy Lavrov on recent VS sanctions and the expulsion of
Russian diplomats,Moscow,,December 20, 2016; The Mini sti'y of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
(Dec. 30, 2016 (5:32 a.m,)).
Statement of the President of the Rtsrstan Federation, Kremlin, Office of the President (Dec.
30, 2016 (7:15 a.m.)).
' ' g realDonatdTrump 12/30/16 (11:41 s,m,) Tweet.
'sm 12/30/16 Email, Flynn to McFarland; 12/30/16 Email, McFarland to Kushner et al,
' ' l2/30/16 Email, McFarland to Kushner et al.
Flynn 11I1711 7 302, at 4.
'~' Call Records of Michael T. Flynn ; Flynn 11/1 7/17 302, at 1;
Flynn 1/19/17 302, at 3; Flynn Statement of Offense g 3(g),
u 4 Call Records of Michael T. Flynn ; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 5;
Flynn I/19/17 302, at 3; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10.
' 4 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10,
uv' McFarland 12/22/17 302 at 10
' n McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10.
tsrs Flynn 11/17/1 7 302 at 5 6
sn4 Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 1; Flynn 11/20/17 302, at 3; Flynn 1/19/17 302„at 5; Flynn Statement
of Offense $ 3(h).
172
U.S. Department of Justice
for his part, recalled meeting with Flynn that day, but said that he did not r'emember discussing
sanctions with him.' 7'
Additional information about Flynn's sanctions-related discussions with Kislyak, and the
handling of those discussions by the Transition Team and the Trump Administration, is provided
in Volume II of this report.
In sum, the investigation established multiple links between Trump Campaign officials and
individuals tied to the Russian government, Those links included Russian offers of assistance to
the Campaign. In some instances, the Campaign was receptive to the, offer, whHe in other instances
the Campaign officials shied away. U l t imately, the investigation did not establish that the
Campaign coordinated or conspired with the Russian government in its election-interference
activities.
The Appointment Order authorized the Special Counsel's Office "to prosecute federal
crimes arising &om [its] investigation" of the matters assigned to it. I n deciding whether to
exercise this prosecutorial authority, the Office has been guided by the Principles of Federal
Prosecution set forth in the Justice (formerly U.S. Attorney's) Manual. In particular, the Office
has evaluated whether the conduct of the individuals considered for prosecution canstituted a
federal offense and whether admissible evidence would probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain
@ conviction for such an offense. Justice Manual ) 9-27.220 (2018). Where the answer to those
questions was yes, the Office further considered whether the prosecution would serve a substantial
federal intere< the individuals were subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction, and
there existed an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution, Id.
As expl@ined below, those considerations led the Office to seek charges against two sets of
Russian nationals for their roles in er etratin the active-measures social media cern ai n and
corn uter-intmsion o etations,
The Of ice
sunilarly determined that the contacts etween Campaign o im s and Russia-linked individuals
either did not involve the commission af a federal crime or, in the case of campaign-finance
offenses, that our evidence was not sufficient to obtain and sustain a criminal conviction. At the
same time, the Office concluded that the Principles of Federal Prosecution supported charging
certain individuals connected to the Campaign w'ith m@king false statements or otherwise
obstructing this investigation or parallel congressianal investigations.
'On F'ebruary 16, 2018, a federal gr@nd jury in the District af Columbia returned an
indictment charging 13 Russian nationals and three Russian entities — including the Internet
Research Agency (IRA) and Concord Management and Consulting LLC (Concord) — with
violating U.S. criminal laws in order to interfere with U.S. elections and political processes.' ts
The indictment charges all of the defendants with conspiracy to defiaud the United States (Count
One), three defendants with conspiracy to commit wire &aud and bank fraud (Count Two), and
five defendants with aggravated identity theft (Counts Three through Eight). Internet Itesearc)t
Agency Indictment. Concord, which is one of the entities charged in the Count One conspiracy,
entered an appearance through U S. counsel and moved to dismiss the charge on multiple grounds.
In orders and memorandum opinions issued on August 13 and November 15, 2018, the district
court denied Concord's motions to dismiss. United Statesv, Concord Management dl Consulting
LLC, 347 F. Supp. 3d 38 (D.D.C. 2018), United Statesv, Concord Irianagetnent dt Constdting
LLC, 317 F, Supp. 3d 598 (D.D.C, 2018), As of this writing, the prosecution of Concord remains
ongoing before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The ather defendants remain
at large.
' r' A more detailed explanation of the charging decision in this case is set forth in a separate
memorandum provided to the Acting Attorney General before the mdictment.
174
U,S, Deparlment of Justice
Although members of the IRA had contact with individuals affiliated with the Trump
Campaign, the indictment does not charge any Trump Campaign official or any other U.S, person
with participating in the conspiracy. That is because the investigation did not identify evidence
that any U.S. person who coordinated or communicated with the IRA knew that he oi she was
speaking with Russian nationale engaged in the criminal conspiracy. The Office therefore
determined that such persons did not have the knowledge or criminal purpose required to charge
them in the conspiracy to defraud the United States (Count One) or in the separate count alleging
a wire- and bank-fraud conspiracy involving the IRA and two individual Russian nationale (Count
Two) .
The Office did, however, charge one U.S, national for his role in supplying false ar stolen
bank account numbers that allowed the IRA conspirators to access U.S. online payment systems
by circumventing those systems' security features. On February 12, 2018, Richard Pinedo pleaded
guilty, pursuant ta a single-count information, to identity Iraud, in violation of 18 U,S.C.
g 1028(a)(7) and (b)(1)(D}. Plea Agreement, Ututed States v. Richard Pinedo, No. I:18-cr-24
(D.D.C, Feb. 12, 2018), Doc. 10. The investigation did not establish that Pinedo was aware of the
identity of the IRA members who purchased bank account numbers from him, Pinedo's sales af
account numbers enabled the IHA members to anonymously access a financial network through
which they transacted with U S. persons and companies. SeeGov't Sent. Mem. at 3„United States
v. Ri chord Ei nedo, No. I:18-cr-24 (D.D.C, Sept. 26, 2018), Doc. 24, On October 10, 2018, Pinedo
was sentenced to six months of imprisonment, to be followed by six months of home confinement,
and was ordered to complete 100 hours of community service.
On July 13, 2018„a federal grand jury in the District of Columbia returned an indictment
charging Russian military intelligence officers from the GRU with conspiring to hack into various
U,S. computers used by the Clinton Campaign, DNC, DCCC, and other U.S,. persons, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. 8 1030 and 371 (Count One); committing identity theA and conspiring ta commit
money laundering in furtherance of that hacking conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. g' 1028A
and 1956(h) (Counts Two through Ten}; and a separate conspiracy to hack into the computers of
U.S, persons and entities responsible for the admiiiistration of the 2016 U.S. election, in violation
of 18 U,S.C. $$ 1030 and 371 (Count Eleven), //ety/tshoIndictment.'s A s of this writing, all 12
defendants remain at large.
The ¹t y hsho indictment alleges that the defendants conspired with one another and with
others to hack into the computers of U,S. persans and entities involved in the 2016 U.S. presidential
election, steal documents fi'om those computers, and stage releases of the stolen documents ta
interfere in the election. ¹ / y hsho Indictment $ 2, The indictment also describes how, in staging
'i" T he Office provided a more detailed explanation of the charging decision in this case in
meetings with the Office of the Acting Att orneyGeneral before the indicnnent.
I /5
U.S. Deparlment of Justice
the releases, the defendants used the Guccifer 2.0 persona to disseminate documents through
WikiLeaks. On July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks released over 20,000 emails and other documents that
the hacking conspirators had stolen from the DNC. NetyksJtoIndictment $ 48, In addition, on
October 7, 2016, WiktLeaks began releasing emails that some conspirators had stolen from Clinton
Campaign chairman John Podesta, after a successful spearphishing operation. Ne t ykslto
Indictment $ 49.
• •
• • • •
6. CJtarging Decision As to
• • • • •
• • •
The Office also considered, but ruled out, charges on the theory that the post-hacking sharing
and dissemination of emails could constitute trafficking in or receipt of stolen pi'operly under the National
Stolen Property Act (NSPA), 18 U.S.C. 8 2314 and 2315. The statutes comprising the NSPA cover
'"goods, wares, or merchandise," and lower courts have largely understood, that phrase to be limited to
tangible items since the Supreme Court's decision in Dowling v, United States, 473 U.S, 207 (1985). See
UnitedStates v.yjiia Zhang, 995 F. Supp.2d 340, 344-48 (E.D, pa, 2014) (collecting cases). Orie of those
post-Dowling decisions — United States v. Brown, 925 F,2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1991) — speciTically held that
the NSPA does not reach "a computer program in source code form," even though that code was stored in
tangible items (i.e., a hard disk and in a three-ring notebook). Jd.at 1302-03. Cony ass, in turn, cited the
Brown opinion in explaining the need for amendments to 18 U.S.C. I 1030(a}(2) that "would ensure that
the thefi of intangible information by the unauthorized use of a computer is prohibited in the same way theft
of physical iteins [is] protected." S. Rep, 104-357, at 7 (1996). That sequence of events would make it
diffieult to argue that hacked emails in electronic form, which are the relevant stolen items here, constitute
"goods, wares„or merchandise" within the meaning of the NSPA.
176
Harm to Ongoing Matter
• • •
• • o •
• l •
• I •
1279 • • • •
U.S. Department of Justice
• • 1
2. Potent" 1 S t ' 0
Applying the Principles of Federal Prosecution, however, the Office determined that
prosecution of this potential violation was not warranted. Those Principles instruct prosecutors to
consider, among other things, the nature and seriousness of the offense, the person's culpability in
connection with the offense, and the probable sentence to be im osed if the r osecution is
successful. Justice Manual 9 -27.230,
179
U.S. Department of Justice
One of the interactions between the Trump Campaign and Russian-aAiliated individuals-
the June 9, 2016 meeting between high-ranking campaign officials and Russians promising
derogatory information on Hillary Clinton — implicates an additional body of law; campaign-
finance statutes, Schemes involving the solicitation or receipt of assistance from foreign sources
iaise difficult statutory and constitutional questions. As e l a ined below the Office evaluated
those questions in connection with the June 9 meeting
The Office ultimately concluded that, even if the principal egal questions were resolved favorably
to the governm ent, a prosecution would encounter diffirulties proving that Campaign officials or
individuals connected to the Campaign willfully violated the law.
Finally, although the evidence of contacts between Campaign officials and Russia-
affiliated individuals may not have been sufficient to establish or sustain criminal charges, several
U.S. persons connected to the Campaign made false, statements about those contacts and took other
steps to obstruct the Office's investigation and thos'e of Congress. This Office has therefore
charged some of those individuals with making false statements and obstmcting justice.
As an initial matter, this Office evaluated potentially criminal conduct that involved the
collective action of multiple individuals not under the rubric of "collusion," but through the lens
of conspiracy law, In so doing, the Office recognized that the word "collud[ej" appears in the
Acting Att orney General's August 2, 2017 memorandum„ it has frequently been invoked in public
reporting;. and it is sometimes referenced in antitrust law, see, e:g., Brooke Group v. Browri dI
}Yilliamsoir Tobacco Cor/z, 509 U.S, 209, 227 (1993). But collusion is not a specific offense or
theory of liability found in the U,S. Code; nor is it a term of art in federal criminal law. To the.
contrary, even as defined in legal dictionaries, collusion is largely synonymous with conspiracy as
that crime is set forth in the general federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. g 371. Bee Block's Law
Dictionary 321 (10th ed. 2014) (collusion is "[a]n agreement to defraud another or to do or obtain
something forbidden by law"); I Alexander Burrill, 3 Law Dictionary 'and Glossary 311 (1871)
(" An agreement between two or more persons to defraud another by the forms of law, or to employ
such forms as means of accomplishing some unlawful object."); I Bouvier*sLaw Dicfionury 352
180
U.S. Department of Justice
(1897) (" An agreement between two or more persons to defraud a person of his rights by the forms
of law, or to obtain an object forbidden By law."),
For that reason, this Office's focus in resolving the question of joint criminal liability was
on conspiracy as defined in federal law, not the commonly discussed term "collusion." The Office
considered in parncular whether contacts between Trump Campaign officials and Russia-linked
individuals could trigger liability for the crime of conspiracy — either under statutes that have their
own conspiracy language (e.g., 18 U.S.C. 8 1349, 1951{a)), or under the general conspiracy
statute (18 U,S,C. $ 371). The investigation did not establish that the contacts described in Volume
I, Section IV, euiira, amounted to an agreement to commit any substantive violation of federal
criminal law — mcluding foreign-influence and campaign-finance laws, both of w hich are
discussed further below, The Office therefore did not charge any individual associated with the
Trump Campaign with conspiracy to commit a federal offense arising from Russia contacts,either
under a specific statute or under Section 371's offenses clause,
The Office also did not charge any campaign official or associate with a conspiracy under
Section 371's defraud clause. That clause criminalizes participating in an agreement to obstruct a
lawful function of the U.S. government or its agencies through deceitful or dishonest means.See
Dermis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 861 (1966)I 'Hammerschmidt v. United States,265 U,S.
182, 188 (1924}; see also United Statesv. Concord Mgmt. dr Consulting LLC, 347 F. Supp. 3d 38,
46 (D,D.C. 2018). The investigation did not establish any agreement among Campaign offlcials-
or between such officials and Russia-linked individuals — to interfere w'ith or obstruct a lawful
function of a government agency during the campaign or transition period. And, as discussed in
Volume I, Section V.A, supra, the investigation did not identify evidence that any Campaign
official or associate knmvingly and intentionally participated in the conspiracy to de&aud that the
Office charged„namely„ the active-measures conspiracy described in Volume I, Section II, supra.
Accordingly, the Office did not charge any Campaign associate or' other U.S. person with
conspiracy to defraud the United States based on the Russia-related contacts described in Section
IV above.
The Office next assessed the potential liability of Campaign-affiliated individuals under
federal statutes regulating actions on behalf of, or work done for, a foreign government.
a. Governing Law
Under 18 U.S.C. $ 951, it is generally illegal to act in the United States as an agent of a
foreign government without providing notice to the Attorney General. Although the defendant,
must act on behalf of a foreign governm
ent (asappealedto other kinds of foreign entities), the acts
need not involve espionage; rather, acts of any type suffice for liability, See United Statesv.
Duran, 596 F.gd I'283, 1293-94 (11th Cir. 2010}; United Statesv. Latchin, 554 F,3d 709, 715 (7th
Cir. 2009); United States v. Dumeisi, 424 F.3d 566, 581 (7th Cir. 2005). An "agent of a foreign
govemlilent i s an i i ldividual wh o a grees to operate in the United States subject to the
direction or control of a foreign government or officiaL" 18 U.S.C, $ 951(d).
181
U.S. Depaitment of Justice
The crime defined by Section 951 is complete upon knowingly acting in the United States
as an unregistered foreign-government agent. 18 U.S.C. $ 951(a). The statute does not require
willfulness, and knowledge of the notification requirement is not an element of the offense. United
Statesv. Camp, 529 F3d 980, 998-99 (11th Cir. 2008);Duran, 596 F.3d at 1291-94; Durnets/,
424 F.3d at 581.
The Foreign Agents Registratian Act (FARA) generally makes it illegal'to act as an agent
of a foreign principal by engaging in oertain (largely political) activities in the United States
without registering with the Attorney General. 22 U.S.C. f$ 611-621. The triggering agency
relationship must be with a foreign principal or "a person any of whose activities are directly or
indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, finanoed, or subsidized in whole or in major part by a
foreign principal." 22 U.S.C. $ 611(o)(1), That includes a foreign government ar political party
and various foreign individuals and entities. 22 U, S.C. $ 611(b). A covered relationship exists if
a person "acts as an agent, representative, employee, or servant" ar "in any other capacity at the
order, request, or under the [foreign principal's] direction or oontrol." 22 U.S.C. f 611(c)(1}. It
is sufffcient if the person agrees, consents, assuines or purports to act as, or who is or holds
himself out to lx;, whether or not pursuant to contractual relationship, an agent of a foreign
principal," 22 U.S.C. 5 611(c)(2).
The triggering activity is that the agent "directly ot through any other person" in the United
States (I) erigages in "political activities for or in the interests of [the] foreign principal," which
includes attempts to influence federal officials or the public, (2) acts as "public relations counsel,
publicity agent, information-service employee or political consultant for or in the interests of such
foreign principal"; (3) "solicits, collects, disburses, or dispenses conuibutions, loans, money, or
other things of value for or in the interest of such foreign principal"', or (4) "'represents the interests
of such foreign principal" before any federal agency or official. 22 U.S.C. $ 611(c)(1).
It is a crime to engage in a "[w]illful violation of any provision of the Act or any regulation
thereunder." 22 U.S.C. 4 618(a)(1), It is alsa a crime willfully to make false statements or
omissions of material facts in FARA registration statements or suppl'ements. 2 2 U .S.C.
g 618(a)(2). Most violations have a maximum penalty of five years of imprisonment and a 810,000
fine. 22 U.S.C, ) 618.
b. Application
The investigation uncovered extensive evidence that Paul Manafort's and Richard Gates's
pre-campaign work for the government of Ulaaine violated FARA. Manafort and Gates were
charged for that conduct and admitted to it when they pleaded guilty to superseding criminal
informations in the District of Columbia prosecution,' Th e evidence underlying those charges
is not addressed in this report because it was discussed in public court documents and in a separate
's" GatesSuperseding Criminal Information; Waiver of Indictment, United Statesv. Richard It'.
Gates III, I;17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doo, 203,' Waiver of Trial by Jury, United Statesv. Richard
IF: Gates III„ I;17-cr-201 (D.B.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 204; GatesPlea Agreement; Statement of Offense,
United States v. Richard gr. Gates III, I:17-cr-201 (D,D.C, Feb. 23, 2018), Doo, 206; Plea Agreement,
UnitedStates v. Paid J Ivianafort Jr., I:17 cr 201 (D D C. Sept. 14, 2018), Doc. 422; Statement of Offense,
United States v. Pau/ J. /danafort, Jr., 1;17-or-201 (D.D,C. Sept, 14, 2018), Doc. 423.
U.S. Department of Justice
prosecution memorandum submitted to the Acting Attorney General before the original indictment
in that case.
The investigation did not, however, yield evidence sufficient to sustain any charge that any
individual affiliated with the Trump Campaign acted «s an agent of a foreign pr'incipal within the
meaning of FARA or, in terms of Section 951, subject to the direction or control of the government
of Russia, or any o6icial thereof, In particular, the Office did not fmd evidence likely to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campaign officials such as Paul Manafort, George Papadopoulos,
and Carter Page acted as agents of the Russian ovemment — or at its direction control or
re uest~ u r i n t he relevant time eriod.' ~
Finally, the Office investigated whether one of the above campaign advisors — George
Papadopoulos — acted as an agent of, or at the direction and control of, the government of Israel.
While the investigation revealed significant ties between Papadopoulos and Israel (and search
warrants were obtained in patt on that basis), the Office ultimately determined that the evidence
was not sufficient to obtain and sustain a 'conviction under FARA or Section 951.
3, ~c a a
Several areas of the Office's investigation involved efforts or offers by foreign nationals to
provide negative information about candidate Clinton to the Trump Campaign or to distribute that
information to the public, to the anticipated benefit of the Campaign. As explained below, the
Oflice considered whether two of those efforts in particular — the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump
oai . • a •
"o On four occasions, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) issued warrants based
on a fuiding of probable cause to believe that Page was an agent of a foreign power. 50 U.S,C, g$ 1801(b)„
*
1805(a)(2)(A), The FISC s probable-cause finding was based on a different (and lower) standard than the
one governing the Office's decision whether to bring charges against Page, which is whether admissible
evidence would likely be sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Page acted as an agent of the
Russian Federation during the period at issue. Cf, Uaaitsd Statesv, Cardoza, 713 F.3d 656, 660 (D.C. Cir.
2013) (explaining that probable cause requires only "a fair probability," snd not "certainty, or pmof beyond
a reasonable doubt, or proof by a preponderance of the evidence" ).
U.S. Department of Justice
Towei' • •
the campaign-finance aws. The Offlce determined that the evidence was not sufficient to charge
either incident as a criminal violation.
"[T]he United States has a compelling interest.. . in limiting the participation of foreign
citizens in activities of democratic self-goveriunent, and in thereby preventing foreign influence
over the U.S. political process." Bluman v. FEC, 800 F, Supp. 2d 281, 288 (D.IJ.C, 2011)
(Kavanaugh, J., for three-judge court), ag'd, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012). To that end, federal campaign-
finance law b roadly prohibits foreign nationals from making contributions, donations,
expenditures, or other disbursements in connection with federal, state, or local candidate elections,
and prohibits anyone from soliciting, accepting, or receiving such contributions or donations, As
relevant here, foreign nationals may not make — and no one may "solicit, accept, or receive" from
them — "a contribution or donation of money or other thing of value" or "an express or implied
promise to make a contribution or donation, in connection with a Federal, State, or local election."'
52 U,S,C. g'30121(a)(1)(A), (a)(2).'~s The term "contribution," which is used thmughout the
campaign-fmance law, "includes" "any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or
anything of value made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal
office." 52 U,S,C. $ 30101(8)(A)(i). It excludes, among other things, "the value of [volunteer]
services." 52 U.S.C. $ 30101(8)(B)(i).
Foreign nationals are also baired from making "an expenditure, independent expenditure,
or disbursement for an electioneering communication," 52 U.S,C, ( 30121(a)(1)(C), The term
"expenditure" "includes" "any purchase, payment, distribution, loan,, advance, deposit, or gift of
money or anything of value, made by any person foi the purpose of influencing any election for
Federal office." 52 U,S.C. $ 30101(9)(A)(i). It excludes, among other things, news stories and
non-partisan get-out-the-vote activities. 52 U.S.C. $ 30101(9)(B)(i)-(ii). A n " independent
expenditure" is an expenditure '"expressly advocating the election or defeat of'a clearly identified
candidate*' and made independently of the campaign. 52 U.S.C. ( 30101(17). An "electioneering
communication" is a broadcast communication that 'refers to a clearly identified candidate for
Federal offire" and is made within specified time periods and targeted at the relevant electorate,
52 U.S.C. f 30104(f)(3).
The statute defines "foreign national" by reference to FARA and the Immigration and
Nationality Act, with minor modification. 52 U.S,C. $ 30121(b) (cross-referencing 22 U.S.C.
) 6'11(b)(1)-(3) and 8 U.S,C. f 1101(a)(20), (22)). That definition yields five, sometimes-
overlapping categories of foreign nationals, which include all of the individuals and entities
relevant for present purposes —namely, foreign govenunents and political parties„ individuals
' Camps'ign-finance law also places financial limits on conb'ibutions, 52 U.S.C. ( 30116(a), and
prohibits contributions Iiom corporations, banks, and labor unions, 52 U,S.C. 8 30118(a); seeCiriaens
United v FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 320 (2010). Because the, conduct that the Office investigated involved
possible electoral activity by foreign nationals, the foreign-contributions bau is the most readily applicable
provision,
184
U,S. Department of Justice
outside of' the U.S. who arc not legal permanent residents, and certain non-U.S, entities located
outside of the U,S,
The Office considered whether to charge Trump Campaign officials with crimes in
connection with the Junc 9 meeting described in Volume I, Section IVA.5, supra. The Office
concluded that, in light of the government's substantial burden of praaf on issues of intent
("knowing" and "willful" ), and thc difficulty af establishing the value of the offered information,
criminal charges would not meet the Justice Manual standard that "the admissible evidence will
probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction." Justice Manual 8 9-27220.
In brief; the key facts are that, on June 3, 2016, Robert Goldstone emailed Donald Trump
Jr., to pass along from Emin and Aras Agalarov an "offer*' Iram Russ'ia's "Crown prosecutor*' ta
"theTrump campaign" of*'offlcial dacumcnts and infarmation that would incriminate Hillary and
her dealings with Russia and would be very useful to [Trump Jr.'s] father." The email described
this as "very high level and sensitive information" that is "part of Russia and its government's
supyort to Mr, Tnunp-helped along by Aras and Emin." Trump Jr, responded.' "if it's what yau
say I love it especially later in the summer," T rump Jr. and Emin Agalarov had follow-up
conversations and, within days, scheduled a meeting with Russian representatives that was
attended by Trumy Jr., Manafort, and Kushner. The communications setnng up the meeting and
the attendance by high-level Campaign representatives support an inference that the Campaign
anticipated receiving derogatory documents and information from official Russian saurces that
could assist candidate Trump's electoral prospects.
This series of events could implicate the federal election-law ban on contributions and
donations by foreign nationals, 52 U.S.C. t) 30121(a)(1)(A). Specifically, Goldstone passed along
an offer purportedly from a Russian gav'ernment official to provide "official documents and
mformation" to the Trump Camyaign for the purposes of influencing the presidential election.
Trump Jr. appears to have accepted that offer and to have arranged a meeting to receive those
materials, Documentary evidence in the form of email chains supports the inference that Kushner
and Manafort were aware of that purpose and attended the June 9 meeting anticipating the receipt
of helpful information to the Campaign from Russian sources.
The Office considered whether this cvidcnce would establish a conspiracy to violate the
foreign contributions ban„ in violation of 18 U.S.C. ) 371; the solicitation of an illegal foreign-
source contribution; or the acceptance ar receipt of "an express or implied promise to make a
185
U.S. Department of Justice
The phrases "thing of value" and "anything of value" are broad and i'nclusive enough to
encompass at least some forms of valuable information. Throughout the United States Code, these
phrases serve as "term[a] of art" that are construed "broad[ly]." United Statesv. Xi&en, 967 F.2d
539, 542 (11th Cir. 1992) ger curiam) ("thing of value" includes "both tangibles and intangibles" );
seealso, e.g., 18 U.S.C, )$ 201(b)(1), 666(a)(2) (bribery statutes);id. $ 641 (theft of government
property). For example, the term "thing of value"' erieompasses law enforcement reports that
would reveal the identity of informants, Umted Statesv. Girard, 601 F,2d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1979);
classified materials, United Statesv. Ftnvler, 932 F.2d 306,, 310 (4th Cir. 1991); confidential
information about a competitive bid, United Statesv. Matztdn, 14 F.3d 1014, 1020 (4th,Cir. 1994);
secret grand jury information, United States v. Jeter, 775 F.2d 670, 680 (6th Cir. 1985); and
information about a witness's whereabouts, United States v. Sheher, 618 F.2d 607, 609 (9th Cir,
1980) ger curiam). And in the public corruption context, '*'thing of value' is defined broadly to
include the value which the defendant subjectively attaches to the items received," United States
v, Renzi, 769 F.3d 731, 744 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Federal Election Commission (FEC) regulations recognize the value to a campaign of' at
least some forms of information, stating that the term "anything of value" includes "the provision
o f any goods or services without chaige," such as "membership lists" snd "mailing lists." 1 1
C,F.R, $ 100.52(d}(1). The FEC has concluded that the phrase includes a state-by-state list of
activists. See Citizensfor Responsibility and Ethics in IVashtngton v. FEC, 475 F.3d 337, 338
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (describing the FEC's findir~s). Likewise, polling data provided to a campaign
constitutes a "contribution," FEG Advisory Opinion 1990-12 (Strub'), 1990 %L 153454 (citing 11
C.F.R, t) 106,4(b)). And in the specific context of the foreign-contributions ban, the FEC has
concluded that "election materials used in previous Canadian campaigns," including "flyers,
advertisements, door hangers, tri-folds, signs, and other printed material," constitute "anything of
186
U.S. Deparnnent of Justice
//
value," even though "the value of these materials may be nominal or difficult to ascertain." FEC
Advisory Opinion 2007-22 (Hurysz), 2007 WL 5172375, at "5,
These authorities would support the view that candidate-related opposition research given
to a campaign for the purpose of influencing an election could constitute a conixibution to which
the fore@n-source ban could apply. A campaign can be assisted not only by the provision of funds,
but also by the provision of derogatory information about an opponent. Political campaigns
frequently conduct and pay for opposition research, A foreign entity that engaged in such research
and provided resulting information to a campaign could exert a greater effect on an election, and
a greater tendency to ingratiate the, donor to the candidate, than a gift of money or tangible things
of value, A t t h e same time, no judicial decision has treated the voluntary provision of
uncompensated opposition research or similar information as a thing of value that could amount
to a contribution under campaign-finance law. Such an interpretation could have implications
beyond the foreign-source ban, see 52 U.S.C. $ 30116(a) (imposing monetary limits on campaign
contributions), and raise First Amendment questions. Those questions could be especially difficult
w here the information consisted simply of the recounting of historically accurate facts. It i s
uncertain how courts would resolve those issues.
Even assuming that the promised "documents and information that would incriminate
Hillary" constitute a "thing of value" under campaign-finance law, the government would
encounter other challenges in seeking to obtain and sustain a conviction. Most significantly, the
goveinment has not obtained admissible evidence that is likely to establish the scienter requirement
beyond a reasonable doubt. To prove that a defendant acted "knowingly and willfully," the
governm
ent w ould have to show that the defendant had general knowledge that his conduct was
unlawful. U S. Department of Justice, Federal/Prosecution of Eiection Offenses 123 (8th ed. Dec.
2017) ("Etecrion Offenses"); see Blumrtn, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 292 (noting that a willful violation
requires "proof of the defendant's knowledge of the law"); Darrielcxy/r, 917 F, Supp, 2d at 577
(" knowledge of general unlawfulness"), "This standard creates an elevated scienter element
requiring, at the very least, that application of the law to the facts in question be fairly clear. When
there is substantial doubt concerning whether the law applies to the facts of a particular matter, the
offender is more likely to have an intent defense," ElectionOffenses 123,
On the facts here, the government would unlikely be able to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the June 9 meeting participants had general knowledge that their conduct was unlawful.
The investigation has not developed evidence that the participants in the meeting were familiar
with the foreign-contribution ban or the application of federal law to the relevant factual context.
The government does not have strong evidence of surreptitious behavior or efforts at concealment
at the time of the June 9 meeting, While the government has evidence of later efforts to prevent
disclosure of the nature of the June 9 meeting that could cirrumstantially provide support for a
showing of scienter, see Volume II„Section II.G, inPa, that concealment occurred more than a
year later, involved individuals who did not attend the June 9 meeting, and may mflect an intention
to avoid political consequences rather than any prior knowledge of illegality. Additionally, in light
of the unresolved legal questions about whether giving "documents and information" of the sort
offered here constitutes a campaign contribution, Trump Jr. could mount a factual defextse that he
187
U.S. Department of Justice
did not believe his response to the offer and the June 9 meeting itself violated the law. Given his
less direct involvement in arranging the June 9 meeting, Kushner could likely mount a similar
defense, And, while Manafart is experienced with political campaigns, the Office has not
developed evidence showing that he had relevant knowledge of these legal issues.
The Office would also encounter difficuhy proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
value of the promised documents and information exceeds the $2,000 threshold for a criminal
violation, as well as the $25,000 threshold for felony punishment. See52 U,S,C, tj 50109(d)(1).
The type of evidence commonly used ta establish the value of non-monetary conttibutions — such
as pricing the contribution on a conunercial market or determitung the upslream acquisition cost
or the cost of distribution — would likely be unavailable or inefl'ective in this factual setting.
Although damaging apposition research is surely valuable to a campaign, it appears that the
information ultimately delivered in the meeting was not valuable. And while value in a conspiracy
may well be measured by what the participants expected to receive at the time of the agreement,
see, e.g., United Statesv. Tombrella, 666 F.2d 485, 489 (11th Cir, 1982), Goldstone's description
of the offered material here was quite general. His suggestion af the information's value —i.e.,
that it would "incriminate Hillary" and "would be very useful to [Trump Jr.'s] father" — was non-
specific and may have been understood as being of uncertain worth or reliability, given
Goldstone's lack of direct access to the original source. The uncertainty over what would be
delivered could be reflected in Trump Jr.'s response ("if it 's what you say I love it") (emphasis
added).
Accordingly, taking into account the high burden to establish a culpable mental state in a
campaign-finance prosecution and the difficulty in establishing the tequired valuation, the Office
decided not to pursue criminal campaign-finance charges against Trump Jr. or other campaign
officials for the events culminating in the June 9 meeting.
c. AJtplicatton to
• • •
U.S. Department of Justice
s • • •
• • • • •
• • •
• • • •
U.S. Department of Justice
it 8 'illfulness
190
U.S, Department of Justice
• • • •
• • • •
The Office determined that certain individuals associated with the Campaign lied to
investigators about Campaign contacts with Russia and have taken other actions to interfere with
the investigation, As explained below, the Office therefore charged some U.S. persons connected
to the Campaign with false statements and obstruction offenses.
%hether the statement was made to law enforcement or congressional investigators, the
governm ent must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the same basic non-jurisdictional elements:
the statement was false, fictitious, or fraudulent; the defendant knew both that it was false and that
it was unlawful to make a false statement; and the false statement was material, See, e.g., United
States v. Srnitk„831 F.3d 1207, 1222 n,27 (9th Cir. 2017) (listing elements); see also Ninth Circuit
Pattern Instmction 8.73 gr cmt. (explaining that the Section 1001 jury instruction was modified in
light of the Department of Justice' s position that the phrase aknowingly and willfully *' in the statute '
requires the defendant! s knowledge that his or her conduct was unlawful). In the D.C. Circuit, the
government must prove that the statement was actually false; a statement that is misleading but
"literally true" does not satisfy Section 1001(a)(2), See United Statesv. Milton, 8 F.3d 39,, 45
191
U.S. Department of Justice
(D.C. Cir. 1993); United Statesv. Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 832-33 4 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1993). For that
false statement to qualify as "material," it must have a natural tendency to influence, or be capable
of influencing, a discrete decision or any other function of the agency to which it is addressed, See
United States v. Go@dr)t, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United Statesv. Moore, 612 F.3d 698, 701
(D.C, Cir. 2010).
Perjury. Under the federal perjury statutes, it is a crime for a witness testifying under oath
before a grand jury to knowingly make any false material declaration. See 18 U.S.C. 6 1623. The
government must prove four elements beyond a reasonable doubt to obtain a conviction under
Section 1623(a): the defendant testified under oath before a federal grand jury.; the defendant's
testimony was false in one or more respects; the false testimony concerned matters that were
material to the grand jury investigation; and the false testimony was knowingly given. United
States v. Bridges, 717 F.2d 1444, 1449 n.30 (D.C, Cir. 1983). The general perjury statute, 18
U.S.C. II 1621, also applies to grand jury testimony and has similar elements, except thatit requires
that the witness have acted willfully and that the g overnm
ent s atisfy "strict common-law
requirements for establishing falsity." See Drinnv. United States, 442 U. S, 100, 106 k n.6 (1979)
(explaining "the two-w4tness rule" and the corroboration that it demands).
Obstruction of Justice, Th ree basic elements are common to the obstruction statutes
pertinent to this Office's charging decisions: an obstructive act; some form of nexus between the
obstructive act and an oAicial proceeding; and criminal (i.e., corrupt) intent. A detailed discussion
of those elements, and the law governing obstruction of justice more generally, is included in
Volume II of the report.
i. George Papadopotdos
During the interview., Papadopoulos lied about the timing, extent„and rtature of his
communications with Joseph Mifsud, Olga Palonskaya, and Ivan Timofeev. With respect to
timing, Papadopoulas acknowledged that he had met Mifsud and that Mifsud told him the Russians
had "dirt" on Clinton in the form af "thousands of emails," But Papadopoulos stated multiple
times that those communications occurred before he joined the Trump Campaign and that it was a
"very strange coincidence" to be told af the "dirt" before he started working for the Campaign.
This account was false. Papadopoulos met Mifsud for the first time on approximately March 14,
2016, after Papadopoulos had already learned he would be a foreign policy advisor for the
Cainpaign, Mifsud showed interest in Papadopaulos only after learning of his role on the
Campaign. And Mifsud told Papadopoulos about the Russians possessing "diit" an candidate
Clinton in late April 2016, more than a month after Papadopoulos had joined the Campaign and
U.S, Department of Justice
been publicly announced by candhlate Trump, Statement of Offense P 25-26, United States v,
George Popodopoulos, No. I:17-cr-182 (D.D.C. Oct, 5, 2017), Dos. 19 ("Papadopoulos Statement
of Offense"').
Papadopoulos also made false statements in an effort to minimize the extent and
importance of his communicatians with Mi'fsud. F o r example, Papadopoulos stated that
"[Mifsud]'s a nothing," that he thought Mifsud was "just a guy talk[ing] up ronnections or
something," and that he believed Mifsud was "BS'ing to be completely honest with you." In fact,
however, Papadoyoulos understood Mifsud to have substantial connections to high-level Russian
government officials and that Mifsud spoke with some of those officials in Moscow before telling
Payadopaulos about the "dirt." Papadopoulos also engaged in extensive communications over a
period of months with Mifsud about foreign policy issues for the, Campaign, including efforts to
arrange a "history making" meeting between the Campaign and Russian g overnm
ent officials. In
addition, Papadopoulas failed ta inform investigators that Mifsud had introduced him to Timofeev,
the Russian national who Papadopaulos understood to be connected to the Russian Ministry of
Fareign Affairs, despite being asked if he had met with Russian nationale or "[a]nyone with a
Russian accent" during the campaigrL Papodopoulos Statement of Offense $$ 27-29,
Papadayoulos also falsely claimed that he met Polonskaya before he joined the Campaign,
and falsely told the FBI that he had "no" relationship at all with her, He stated that the extent of
their communications was her sending emails — '"Just, 'Hi, how are you7' That's it." I n truth,
however„Papadopoulos met Polonskaya on March 24, 2016, after he had joined the Campaign; he
believed that she had connections to high-level Russian government offlcials and could help him
arrange a potential foreign policy trip to Russia. During the campaign he emailed and spoke with
her over Skyye an numerous occasions about the potential foreign policy trip to Russia.
Papadopo ulosStatement of Offense $I[ 30-31.
Papadopoulos's false statements in January 2017 impeded the FBI's investigation into
Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. M ost immediately, those statements
hindered investigators' ability to effectively question Mifsud when he was interviewed in the lobby
of a Washington, D,C. hotel on February 10, 2017. SeeOov't Sent. Mem. at 6, United Statesv.
George Popodopoulos, No. I;17-cr-182 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2017), Dac. 44. During that interview,
Mifsud admitted to knowing Payadapaulas and ta having introduced him ta Polonskaya and
Timafeev. But Mifsud denied that he had advance knowledge, that Russia was in possession af
emails damaging to candidate Clinton, stating that he and Papadopoulos had discussed
cybersecurity and hacking as a larger issue and that Papadopoulos must have misunderstood their
conversation. Mifsud also falsely stated that he had not seen Papadopoulos since the meeting at
which Mifsud introduced him to Polonskaya, even though emails, text messages, and other
information show that Mifsud met with Papadopoulos on at least twa ather occasions — Ayril 12
and April 26, 2016, In addition, Mifsud omitted that he had drafted (or edited) the follow-up
'message that Polonskaya sent to Papadapoulos fallowing the initial meeting and that, as reflected
in the language of that email chain (" Baby, thank youl" ), Mifsud may have been involved in a
personal relationship with Polonskaya at the time. T he false information and omissions in
Papadopoulos's January 2017 interview undermined investigators' ability to challenge Mifsud
when he made these inaccurate statements.
U.S, Department of Justice
Given the seriousness of the lies and omissions and their effect on the FBI's investigation,
the Office charged Papadopoulos with making false statements to the FBI, in violation of 18 U S C.
5' 1001. Information, United Staresv. George Papadopoulos, No. I:17-cr-182 (D.D.C, Oct. 3,
2017), Doc; 8, On October 7, 2017, Papadopoulos pleaded, guilty to that charge pursuant to a plea
agreement, On September 7, 2018, he was sentenced to 14 days of imprisonment, a $9,500 line,
and 200 hours of community service.
Michael Flynn agreed to be interviewed by the FBI on January 24, 2017, four days after he
had officially assumed his duties as National Security Advisor to the President. During the
interview, Flynn made several false statements pertaining to his communications with the Russian
ambassador.
First, Flynn made two false statements about his conversations with Russian Ambassador
ICislyak in late December 2016, at a time when the United States had imposed sanctions on Russia
for interfering with the 2016 presidential election and Russia was considering its response. See
Flynn Statement of Offense. Flynn told the agents that he did not ask Kislyak to refrain from
escalating the situation in response to the United States's imposition of sanctions. That statement
was false. On December 29, 2016, Flynn oalled Kislyak to request Russian resiraint. Flynn made
the call immediately after speaking to a senior Transition Team official (K.T. McFarland) about
what to communicate to Kislyak. Flynn then spoke with McFarland again after the Kislyak call to
report on the substance of that conversation. Flynn also falsely told the FBI that he did not
remember a follow-up conversation in which Kislyak stated that Russia had chosen to moderate
its response to the U.S. sanctions as a result of Flynn's request, On December 31, 2016, Flynn in
fact had such a conversation with Kislyak, and he again spoke with McFarland within hours of the
call to relay the substance of his conversation with Kislyak. See Flynn Statement of Offense g 3.
194
U,S. Department of Justice
Second, Flynn made false statements about calls he had previously made to representatives
of Russia and other countries regarding a resolution submitted by Egypt to the United Nations
Security Council an December 21, 2016. Specifically, Flynn stated that he only asked the
countries' positions on how they would vote on the resolution and that he did not request that any
of the countries take any particular action on the resolution. That statement was false, On
December 22, 2016, Flynn called Kislyak, informed him of the incoming, Trump Administration's
apposition to the resolution, and requested that Russia vote against or delay the resolution. Flynn
also falsely stated that Kislyak never described Russia's response to his December 22 request
regarding the resolution. Kislyak in fact told Flynn in a conversation on December 23, 2016, that
Russia would not vote against the resolution if it came to a vote. See Flynn Statement of Offense
$4.
Flynn made these false statements to the FBI at a time when he was serving as National
Security Advisor and when the FBI had an open investigation into Russian interference in the 2016
presidential election, including the nature of any links between the Trump Campaign and Russia,
Flynn's false statements and omissions impeded and otherwise had a mater'isl impact on that
ongoing investigation, Flynn Statement of Offense $$ 1-2. They also came shortly before Flynn
made separate submissions to the Department of Justice, pursuant to FARA, that also contained
materially false statements and amissions. Id P 5. Based onthetatalityof thatconduct,the Office
decided to charge Flyrm with making false statements to the FBI, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
g 1001(a), On December 1, 2017, and pursuant to a plea agreement, Flynn pleaded guilty to that
charge and also admitted his false statements to the Department in his PARA fili'ng. See id; Plea
Agreement, United States v. Mtchttel T. Flynn, No. I;17-cr-232 (D.D,C,.Dec. I, 201TI, Doc, 3.
Flynn is awaiting sentencing,
Michael Cohen was the executive vice president and special counsel to the Trump
Organization when Trump was president of the Trump Organization. Information $1, United
States v. Cohen„No, I;18-or-850 (S.D.N.Y. Nov, 29, 2018), Dao. 2 ("Cohen Information"). From
the fail of 2015 thmugh approximately June 2016, Cohen was involved in a project to build a
Trump-branded tawer and adjoining development in Moscow. The projeot was known as Trump
Tower Moscow.
In 2017, Cohen was called to testify before the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence (HPSCI) snd the Senate Selec't Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), both of which were,
investiganng Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election snd possible links between
Russia and the presidential campaigns. In late August 2017, in advance of his testimony, Cohen
caused a two-page statement to be sent to SSCI and HPSCI addressing Trump Tower Moscow,
Cohen Information 'f[$ 2-3. The letter contained three representations relevant here. First, Cahen
stated that the Trump Moscow project had ended in January 2016 and that he had briefed candidate
Trump on the project only three times before making the unilateral decision to terminate it.
Second„Cohen represented that he never agreed to travel to Russia in connection with the project
and never considered asking Trump to travel for the project. Third, Cohen stated that he did not
recall any Russian government contact about the project, including any response to an email that
195
U.S, Department of Justice
Each of the foregoing representations in Cohen's twa'-page statement was false and
misleading. Consideration of the project had extended through approximately June 2016 and
included more than three progress reports from Cohen to Trump, Cohen had discussed with Felix
Sater his own travel to Russia as part of the project, and he had inquired about the possibility of
Trump traveling there — bath with the candidate himself and with seniar campaign official Corcy
Lewandowski. Cohen did recall that he had received a i esponse to the email that he sent to Russian
government spokesman Dmitry Peskov — in particular, that he received an email reply and had a
follow-up phone conversation with an English-speaking assistant to Peskov in mid-January 2016.
Cohen Information $ 7, Cohen knew the statements in the letter to be false at the time, and
admitted that hc made them in an effort (I) to minimize the links between the project and Trump
(who by this time was President), and (2) to give the false impression that the project had ended
before the first vote in the Republican Party primary process, in the hopes of limiting the ongoing
Russia investigations. Jd.
Given the nature of the false statements and thc fact that he repeated them during his initial
interview with the Office, we charged Cohen with violating Section 1001, On November 29, 2018,,
Cohen pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to a smgle-count information charging him
with making false statements in a matter within the jurisdiction of the legislative branch, in
violatian af 18 U,S,C. ) 1001(a)(2) and (c). Cohen Information. The case was transferred to the
district judge presiding over the separate prosecution of Cohen pursued by the Southern District
of New York (affer a referral fram our Office). On December 7, 2018, this Office submitted a
letter to that judge recommending that Cohen's cooperation with our investigation be taken into
account in sentencing Cohen on both the false-statements charge and the offenses in the Southern
District prosecution. On December 12, 2018, the judge sentenced Cohen to two months of
imprisonment an the false-statements count, to run concurrently with a 36-month sentence
imposed on the other counts.
U.S. Department of Justice
• •
• • •
• • •
As set forth in Volume I, Section IV.A.6, supra, the investigation established that„while a
U.S, Senator and a Trump Campaign advisor, former Attorney General Jeff Sessions interacted
with Russian Ambassador Kislyak during the week of the Republican National Convention in July
2016 and again at a meeting in Sessions's Senate office in September 2016. The, investigation also
established that Sessions and Kislyak both attended a reception held before candidate Trump's
197
U.S. Department of Justice
foreign policy speech at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C., in April 2016, and that it is
possible that they met briefly at that reception.
The Office ronsidered whether, in light of these interactions, Sessions committed perjury
before, or made false statements to, Congress in connection with his confirmation as Attorney
General. hi January 2017 testimony during his confirmation hearing, Sessions stated in response
to a question about Trump Campaign communications with the Russian government that he had
"been called a surrogate at a time or two in that oampaign and I didn't have — did not have
communications with the Russians,"' In writ'ten responses submitted on January 17, 2017, Sessions
answered "[n]o" to a question asking whether he had "been in contact with anyone connected to
any part of the Russian government about the 2016 election, either before or after election day,"
And, in a March 2017 supplement to his testimony, Sessions identified two of the campaign-period
contacts with Ambassador Kislyak noted above, which had been reported in the media following
the January 2017 confirmation hearing. Sessions stated in the supplem'ental response that he did
"not recall any discussions with the Russian Ambassador, or any other representatives of the
Russian government, regarding the political campaign on these occasions or any other occasion."
Although the investigation established that Sessions interacted with Kislyak on the
occasions described above and that Kislyak mentioned the presidential campaign on at least one
occasion, the evidence is not sufficient to prove that Sessions gave knowingly false answers to
Russia-related questions in light of the wording and context of those questions, With respect to
Sessions* s statements that he did "not recall any discussions with the Russian Ambassador.. .
regarding the political campaign" and he had not been in contact with any Russian official "about
the 2016 election," the evidence conce
rning thcna ture of Sessions's inter'actions with Kislyak
makes it plausible that Sessions did not recall discussing the campaign with Kislyak at the time of
his statements. Similarly, while Sessions stated in his January 2017 oral testimony that he '*did
not have communications with Russians," he did so in response to a question that had linked such
communications to an alleged "continuing exchange of i nformation" between the Truinp
Campaign and Russian government intermediaries, Sessions later explained to the Senate and to
the Office that he understood the question as narrowly calling for disclosure of interactions with
Russians that involved the exchange of campaign information, as distinguished from more routine
contacts with Russian nationals. G iven the context in which the question was asked, that
understanding is plausible.
Accordingly, the Offiice concluded that the ciddence was insufficient to prove that Ses'sions
was willfully untruthful in his answers and thus insufficient to obtain or sustain a conviction for
perjury or false statements, Consistent with the principles of Federal prosecution, the OIIIce
therefore determined not to pursue charges against Sessions and informed his counsel of that
decision in March 2018.
The Office considered whether, during the course of the investigation„other individuals
interviewed either omitted material information or provided information determined to be false.
Applymg thc Principles of Federal Prosecution, the Office did not seek criminal charges against
any individuals other than those listed above, I n some instances, that decision was due to
19B
U.S. Department of Justice
evidentiary hurdles to proving falsity. In others, the Office determined that the witness ultimately
provided truthful information and that considerations of culpability, deterrence, and resource-
reservation wei hed a i nst rosecution. See Justice Manual 9- 2 7.220 9-27.230.
199
U.S. Departtnent of Justice
Volume II of II
Washington, D.C.
March 2019
U.S. Department of Justice
INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME II .
I. The President Orders McGahn to Deny that the President Tried to Fire the
Special Counsel .. . 113
1, The Press Reports that the President Tried to Fire thc Special Counsel............. 11'3
2. The President Seeks to Have McGahn Dispute the Press Reports ..........,.......... 114
J. ThePresidcnt's Conduct Towards Flynn, Manafort,g g ~ .... „ .......................... 120
1. Conduct Directed at Michael Flynn 120
2. Conduct Ditected at Paul Manafort ... . 122
• • • •
. 128
K. The President's Conduct Involving Michael Cohen .. 134
1. Candidate Trump's Awareness of and Involvement in the Trump Tow'er
Moscow Project .....................,......................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . .
134
2. Cohen Determines to Adhere to a Party Line" Distancing Candidate
Trump From Russia ... 13g
3. Cohen Submits False Statements to Congress Minimizing the Trump
Tower Moscow Project in Accordance with the Party Linc ..................,. ... 139
4. The President Sends Messages of Support to Cohen...............,.............,.
5. Thc President's Conduct After Cohen Began Caoperating with the
Government..., ........,..........
L. Ovetarching Factual Issues .... 156
III. LEGAL DEFENSES TO THE APPLICATION OF OBSTRUCTION-OF-JUSTICE STATUTES TO THE
PRESIIIENT.. 159
A. Statutory Defenses to the Applicatian of Obstruction-Of-Justice Provisions
t o the Conduct Under Investigation ..................., ..... , . . 160
1. The Text of Section 1512(c)(2) Prohibits a Broad Range of Obstructive
Acts............ . , . . . . . . . . .
nl
U.S. Department of Justice
INTRGIIUcTIoiv To VoLUNK II
This repart is submitted to the Attorney General pursuant ta 28 C.F.R. $ 600.8(c), which
states that, "[a]t the conclusion of the Special Caunsel's work, he.. . shall provide thc Attorney
General a confidential report explaining the prosecution or declination decisions [the Spe~ial
Counsel] reached."
Beginning in 2017, the President of the United States took a variety af actions towards the
ongoing FBI investigation into Russia's interference in the 2016 presidential election and i elated
matters that raised questions about whether he had obstructed justice. The Order appointing the
Special Counsel gave this Office jurisdiction to investigate matters that arose directly from the
FB1's Russia investigation, including whether the President had obstructed justice in connection
with Russia-related investigations. The Special Counsel's jurisdiction also covered potentially
obstructive acts related to the Special Counsel's investigation itself. This Volume of our report
summarizes our obstruction-of justice investigation of the President.
We first describe the considerations that guided our obstruchon-of justice investigation,
and then provide an overview of this Volume:
Second, while the OLC opinion concludes that a sitting President may not be prosecuted,
it recognizes that a criminal investigation during the President's term is permissible.s The OLC
opinion also recognizes that a President does not have immunity after he leaves office.4 And if
individuals other than the President committed an obstmction offense, they may be prosecuted at
this time. Given those considerations,, the facts known to us, and the strong public interest in
' 2 Sitting President's Amenatntity to Indictment ond Criminal Prosecution,24 Op. O.L.C. 222,
222, 260 (2000) (OLC Op.).
See U.S. COIIST. Art. 1 I 2, cl. 5; I 3, cl. 6; cj OLC Op. at 257-258 (discussing relationshiP
between impeachment and criminal prosecution of a sitting President).
' OLC Op. at 257 n.36 ("A grand jury could continue to gather evidence throughout the period of
immunity" ).
" OLC Op. at 255 (" Recognizing an immunity from prosecution for a sitting President would not
preclude such pmsecution once the President's tenn is over or he is otherwise removed from office by
resignation or impeachment'*).
U.S. Department of Justice
safeguarding the integrity of the criminal justice system, we conducted a thorough factual
investigation in order to preserve the evidence when memories were fresh and documentary
materials were available.
Third, we considered whether to, evaluate the conduct we investigated under the Justice
Manual standards governing prosecution and declination decisions, but we determined not to apply
an approach that could potentially result in a judgment that the president committed crimes. The
threshold step under the Justice Manual standards is to assess whether a person's conduct
"constitutes a federal offense." U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Manual 5 9-27.220 (2018] (Justice
Manual). Fairness concerns counseled against potentially reaching that judgment when no charges
can be brought. The ordinary means for an individual to respond to an accusation is through a
speedy and public trial,. with all the procedural protections that surround a criminal case. An
individual who believes he was wrongly accused ean use that process to seek to clear his name. In
contrast, a prosecutor's judgment that crimes were committed, but that no charges will be brought,
affords no such adversarial opportunity for public name-clearing before an impartial adjudicator,s
The concernsabout the fairness of such a determination would be heightened in the case
of a sitting President, where a federal prosecutor's accusation of a crime, even in an internal report,
could carry consequences that extend beyond the realm of criminal justice. OLC noted similar
concerns about scaled indictments. Even if an indictment were sealed during the President's term,
OLC reasoned, "it would be very difficult to preserve [an indictment's] secrecy,' * and if an
indictment became public, "[t]he stigma and opprobrium" could imperil the President's ability to
govern."s Although a prosecutor*s internal report would not represent a formal public accusation
akin to an indictment, the possibility of the report's public disclosure and the absence of a neutral
adjudicatory forum to review its findings counseled against potentially determining "that the
person*s conduct constitutes a federal offense." Justice Manual tj 9-27220.
Fourth, if we had confidence after a thorough investigation of the facts that the President
clearly did not commit obstruction of justice, we would so state. Based on the facts and the
applicable legal standards, however, we are unable to reach that judgment, The evidence we
obtained about the President's actions and intent presents difficult issues that prevent us from
conclusively determining that no criminal conduct occurred. Accordingly, while this report does
not conclude that the President committed a crime, it also does not exonerate him.
This report on our investigation consists of four parts. Section I provides an overview of
obstruction-of-justice principles and summarizes certain i nvestigatory and e videntiary
considerations. Section II sets forth the factual results of oui obstruction investigation and
analyzes the evidence. Section Ill addresses statutory and constitutional defenses. Section IU
statesour conclusion.
' For that reason, criticisms have been lodged against the practice of naming unindicted co-
conspirators in an indictment, See United States v. Jtriggs, 514 F.2d 794, 802 (5th Cir. 1975) ('"The courts
have struck down with strong language efforts by grand juries to accuse persons of crime while affording
them no forum in which to vindicate themselves."); see also Justice Manual $ 9-1 L130.
OLC Op. at 259 k n38 (citagon omitted).
U.S. Department of Justice
Our obstruction-of justice inquiry focused on a series of actions by the President that
related to the Russian-interference investigations, including the President's conduct towards the
law enforcement officials overseeing the investigations and the witnesses to relevant events.
The Campaign's response toreports about Russian support for Trump. During the 2016
presidential campaign, questions arose abaut the Russian government's apparent support for
candidate Trump. After WikiLeaks released politically damaging Democratic Party emails that
were reported to have been hacked by Russia, Trump publicly expressed skepticism that Russia
was responsible for the hacks at the same time that he and other Campaign officials privately
sought information • '' ' about any further planned WikiLeaks
releases. Trump also enied having any business in or connections to Russia, even though as late
as June 2016 the Trump Organization had been pursuing a licensing deal for a skyscraper to be
built in Russia called Trump Tower Moscow. Aller the election, the President expressed concerns
to advisars that rrparts of Russia's electian interference might lead the public to question the
leg'timacy of his election.
Conduct involving FRJ Director Comey uud Jtdtchuel Flynn. In mid-January 2017,
incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn falsely denied ta the Vice President, other
administration officials, and FBI agents that he had talked to Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak
about Russia's response to U.S. sanctions on Russia for its election interference. On January 27,
the day after the President was told that Flynn had lied to the Vice President and had made similar
statements to the FBI, the Piesident invited FBI Director Comey to a private dinner at the White
House and told Comey that he needed loyalty. On February 14, the day alter the President
requested Flynn's resignation, the President told an outside advisor, "Now that we tired Flynn, the
Russia thing is over." The advisor disagreed and said the investigations would continue,
Later that aflernoo, the President cleared the Oval Office to have a one-on-one meeting
with Camey. Referring to the FBI's investigation of Flynn, the President said, "I hope you can
see your way clear to letting this go, to letting Flynn go. Hc is a good guy. I hope you can let this
go." Shortly after requesting Flynn's resignation and speaking privately to Comey, the President
sought to have Deputy National Security Advisor K.T. McFai land draft an internal letter stating
that the President had not directed Flynn to discuss sanctians with Kislyak. McFarland declined
because she did not know whether that was true, and a White House Counsel's Office attorney
thought that the request would look like a quid pro quo for an ambassadorship she had been offered.
disclosed at a congressional hearing that the FBI was mvestigating "the Russian government's
efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election," including any links or coordination between
the Russian government and the Trump Campaign. In the following days, the President reached
out to the Director of National Intelligence and the leaders of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA) to ask them what they could do to publicly dispel
the suggestion that the President had any connectian to the Russian election-interference effort.
The President also twice called Comey directly, notwithstanding guidance from McGahn to avoid
direct contacts w'ith the Department of Justice. Comey had previously assured the President that
*
the FBI was not investigating him personally, and the President asked Camey to "lifl the cloud'
of the Russia investigation by saying that publicly.
The appointment of o Special Connsel and efforts to remove him. On May 17, 2017, the
Acting Attorney General for the Russia inves'tigation appointed a Special Counsel to coriduct the
investigation and related matters. The President reacted to news that a Special Counsel had been
appointed by telling advisors that it was "the end of his presidency" and demanding that Sessions
resign. Sessions submitted his resignation, but the President ultimately did not accept it. The
President told aides that the Special Counsel had conflicts of interest and suggested that the Special
Counsel therefore cauld not serve. The President's advisors told him the asserted conflicts were
meritless and had already been considered by the Department of Justice.
On June 14, 2017, the media reported that the Special Counsel's Offlce was investigating
whether the President had obstructed justice. Press reports called this "a major turning point" in
the investigation: while Comey had told the President he was not under investigation, following
Comey's firing, the President naw was under investigation. The President reacted to this news
with a series of tweets criticizing the Department of Justice and the Special Counsel*s
investigation. On June 17, 2017, the President called McGahn at home and diiected him to call
the Acting Attorney General and say that the Special Counsel had conflicts of interest and must be
removed. McGahn did not carry out the direction, however, deciding that he would resign rather
than trigger what he regarded as a potential Saturday Night Massacre.
U.S. Department of Jusfice
Efforts to curtail the Special Counsel's investigation. Two days afier directing McGahn
to have the Special Counsel removed, the President made another attempt to affect the course of
the Russia investigation. On June 19,2017, the President met one-on-one in the Oval Office with
his former campaign manager Corey Lcwandowski, a uusted advisor outside the govcrnmen, and
dictated a message for Lewandowski to deliver to Sessions. The message said that Sessions should
publicly announce that, notwithstanding his recusal from the Russia investigation, the investigation
was "very unfair" to the President, the President had done nothing wrong, and Sessions planned to
meet with the Special Counsel and "let [him] move forward with investigating election meddling
for future elections." Lewandowski said he understood what the President wanted Sessions to do.
Onc month later, in another private ineeting with Lewandowski on July 19, 2017, the
President asked about the status of his message for Sessions to limit the Special Counsel
investigation to future election interference. Lewandowski told the President that the message
would bc delivered soon. Hours afier that meeting, the President publicly criticized Sessions in an
interview with the New York Times, and then issued a series of tweets making it cleat that
Sessions's job was in jeopardy. Lewandowsld did not want to deliver the President's message
personally, so hc asked senior White House official Rick Dearborn to deliver it to Sessions.
Dearborn was uncomfortable with the task and did not follow through.
Efforts to prevent public disclosure of evidence. In the summer of 2017, the President
learned that media outlets were asking questions about the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower
between senior campaign officials, hicluding Donald Trump Jr., and a Russian lawyer who was
said to be offering damaging information about Hillary Clinton as "part of Russia and its
government's support for Mr. Trump." On several occasions, the President directed aidesnot to
publicly disclose the emails setting up the June 9 meeting, suggesting that the cmails would not
leak and that the number of lawyers with access to them should be limited. Before the emails
became public, the President edited a press statement for Trump Jr. by deleting a line that
acknowledged that the meeting was with "an individual who [Trump Jr.] was told might have
information helpfiil to the campaign and instead said only that the meeting was about adoptions
of Russian children. When the press asked questions about thc President's involvement in Trump
Jr.'s statement, the President's personal lawyer repeatedly denied the President had played any
role.
Further efforts to have the Attorney General take control of the investigation. In early
summer 2017, the President called Sessions at home and again asked hiin to reverse his recusal
from the Russia investigation. Sessions did not reverse his recusal. In October 2017, the President
mct privately with Sessions in the Oval Office and asked him to "take [a] look" at investigating
Clinton. I n D ecember 2017, shortly after Flynn pleaded guilty pursuant to a cooperation
agreement, the President met with Sessions in the Oval Office and suggested, according to notes
taken by a senior advisor, that if Sessions unrecused and took back supervision of the Russia
investigation, he would be a "hero." The President told Sessions, *'I'm not going to do anything
or direct you to do anything. I just want to be treated fairly." In response, Sessions volunteered
that he had never seen anything "improper" on the campaign and told the President there was a
"whole new leadershipteam" in place. He did not unrecuse.
Efforts to have hfcGahn deny that the President had ordered him to have the Special
Counsel removed. In early 2018, the press reported that the President had directed McGahn to
U.S, Department of Justice
have the Special Counsel removed in June 2017 and that McGahn had threatened to resign rather
than carry out the order. The President reacted to the news stories by directing White House
officials to tell McGahn to dispute thc story and create a record stating he had not been ordered to
have the Special Counsel removed. McGahn told those officials that the media reports were
accurate in stating that the, President had direrted McGahn to have thc Special Counsel removed.
The President then met with McGahn in the Oval Office and again pressured him to deny thc
reports. In the same meeting, the Pi'esident also asked McGahn why he had told the Special
Counsel about the President's effort to remove the Special Counsel and why McGahn took notes
ofhis conversations with the President. McGahn refused to back away from what he remembered
happening and perceived the President to be testing his mettle.
Condacttowards Flynn, Manufori,g+ +~. After Flyim withdrew from ajoint defense
agreement with the President and began cooperating with th'e government, the President's personal
counsel left a message for Flynn's attorneys reminding them of the President's warm feelings
towai'ds Flynn, which he said "still iemains," and asking for a "heads up" if Flynn knew
"information that implicates the President." When Flynn's counsel reiterated that Flynn rould no
longer share information pursuant to a joint defense agreement, the President's personal counsel
said he would make sure that the President knew that Flynn's actions reflected "hostility" towards
the President. D uring Manafort's prosecution and when the jury in his criminal tr'ial was
deliberating, the President praised Manafort in public, said that Manafort was being treated
unfairly, and declined to rule out a pardon. Atter Manafort was convicted, the President called
Manafort "a brave man" for refusin t o "break" and said that "fli i n " " almost ou ht to be
outlawed,"
Condaci irivoiving Michael Cohen. Thc President's conduct towards Michael Cohen, a
foimer Trump Organization executive, changed fiom praise for Cohen when he falsely minimized
the President's involvement in the Trump Tower Moscow project, to castigation of Cohen when
he became a cooperating witness. From September 2015 to June 2016, Cohen had pursued the
Trump Tower Moscow project on behalf of the Trump Organization and had briefed candidate
Trump on thc project numerous times, including discussing whether Trump should traveJ to Russia
to advance the deal. In 2017, Cohen provided false testiinony to Congress about the project,
including stating that he had only briefed Trump on the project three times and never discussed
travel to Russia with him, in an effort to adhere to a "parly line*' that Cohen said was developed to
minimize the President's connections to Russia. While preparing for his rongressional testimony,
Cohen had extensive discussions with thc President's personal counsel, who, according to Cohen,
said that Cohen should "stay on message" and not contradict the President. Atter the FBI searched
Cohen's home and office in April 2018, the President publicly asserted that Cohen would not
"flip," contacted him directly to tell him to "stay strong," and privately passed messages of support
to him. Cohen also discussed pardons with the President's personal counsel and believed that if
he stayed on message he would be taken care of. But after Cohen began cooperating with the
government in the summer of 2018, the President publicly criticized him, called him a "rat," and
suggested that his family members had committed crimes.
U.S. Department of Justice
Overurefrlng factual issles. We did not make a traditional prosecution decision about
these facts, but the evidence we obtained supports several general statements about the President's
c oil duct.
Although the series of events we investigated involved discrete acts, the overall pattern of
the President" s conduct towards the investigations can shed light on the nature of the President's
acts and the. inferences that can be drawn about his intent. In particulw; the actions we investigated
can be divided into two phases, ret)ecting a possible shift in the President's motives. The first
phase covered the period from the President's first interactions with Comey through the President's
firing of Comey. During that time, the President had been repeatedly told he was not personally
under investigation. Soon atter the firing of Comey and the appointment of the Special Counsel,
however, the President became aware that his own conduct was being investigated in an
obstruction-of justice inquiry. At that point, the President engaged in a second phase of conduct,
involving public attacks on the investigation, non-public efforts to control it, and efforts in both
public and private to encourage witnesses not to cooperate with the investigation. Judgments about
the nature of thc President's motives during each phase would be informed by the totality of the
evidence.
Srararory defenses. Consistent with precedent and the Department of Justice's general
approach to interpreting obstruction statutes, we concluded that several statutes could apply here.
See 18 U.S,C. 8 1503, 1505, 1512(b)(3), 1512(c)(2). Section 1512(c)(2) is an omnibus
obstruction-of justice provision that covers a range of obstructive acts directed at pending or
contemplated official proceedings. No principle of statutory construction justifies narrowing the
provision to cover only conduct that impairs the integrity or availability of evidence. Sections
1503 and 1505 also offer broad protection against obstructive acts directed at pending grand jury,
U.S. Department of Justice
judicial, administrative, and congressional proceedings, and they aiv, supplemented by a provision
in Section 1512(b) aimed specifically at conduct intended to pr'event or hinder the communication
to law eiiforcement of infoimation related to a federal crime.
Constitutional defenses. As for constitutional defenses arising from the President's status
as the head of the Executive Branch, we recognized that the Department of Justice and the courts
have not definitively resolved these issues. We therefore examined those issues through the
framework established by Supreme Court precedent governing separation-of powers issues. The
Department of Justice and the President's personal counsel have recognized that the President is
subject to statutes that prohibit obstruction of justice by bribing a witness or suborning perjury
because that conduct does not implicate his constitutional authority. With respect to whether the
President can be found to have obstructed justice by exercising his powers under Article II of the
Constitution, we coiic luded that Congress has authority to prohibit a President's corrupt use of his
authority in order to protect the integrity of the adminisbation of justice.
Under applicable Supreme Court precedent, the Constitution does not categorically and
permanently immunize a President for obstructing justice through the use of his Article II powers.
The separation-of-powers doctrine authorizes Congress to protect official proceedings, including
those of courts and grand juries, froin corrupt, obsbuctive acts regardless of their source. We also
concluded that any inroad on presidential authority that would occur &om prohibiting corrupt acts
docs not undermine the President's ability to fulfill his constitutional mission. T he term
"corruptly" sets a demanding standard. It requires a concrete showing that a person acted with an
intent to obtain an improper advantage for himself or someone else, inconsistent with official duty
and the rights of others. A preclusion of "corrupt" official action does not diminish the President's
ability to exercise Article II powers. For example, the proper supervision of criminal law does not
demand freedom for the President to act with a corrupt intention of shielding himself from criminal
punishment, avoiding financial liability, or preventing personal embarrassment. To the contrary,
a statute that prohibits official action undertaken for such corrupt purposes furthers, rather than
binders, the impartial and evenhanded administration of the law. It also aligns with the President's
constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws. FinaHy, we concluded that in the rare case in
which a criminal investigation of the President's conduct is justified, inquiries to determine
whether the President acted for a corrupt motive should not impermissibly chill his performance
of his constitutionally assigned duties. The conclusion that Congress may apply the obstruction
laws to the President's corrupt exeicise of the powers of oAice accords with our constitutional
system of checks and balances and the principle that no person is above the law.
CoNct.ustoiv
Because we detenmned not to make a traditional prosecutorial judgment, we did not draw
ultimate conclusions about the President's conduct. T h e evidence we obtained about the
President's actions and intent presents difficult issues that would need to be resolved if we were
making a traditional prosecutorial judgment. At the same time, if we had confidence after a
thorough investigation of the facts that the President clearly did not commit obstruction of justice,
we would so state. Based on the facts and the applicable legal standards, we are unable to reach
that judgment. Accordingly, while this report does not conclude that the president committed a
crime, it also does not exonerate him.
U.S. Department of Justice
The May 17, 2017 Appointment Order and the Special Counsel regulations provide this
Office with jurisdiction to investigate "federal crimes committed in the course of, and with intent
to interfere with„ the Special Counsel's investigation, such as perjury, obstruction of justice,
destruction of evidence„and intimidation of witnesses." 28 C.F.R. $ 600.4(a). Because of that
description of our jurisdiction, we sought evidence for our obstruction-of justice investigation with
the elements of obstrurtion offenses in mind. Our evidentiary analysis is similarly focused on the
elements of such offenses, although we do not draw conclusions on the ultimate questions that
govern a prosecutorial decision under the Principles of Federal Prosecution. SeeJustice Manual
$ 9-27.000 et seq. (2018).
Here, we summarize the law interpreting the elements of potentially relrvant obstruction
statutes in an ordinary case. This discussion does not address the unique constitutional issues that
arise in an inquiry into official acts by the President. Those issues are discussed in a later section
of this report addressing constitutional defenses that the President's counsel have raised. See
V olume II, Section III.B, inPa.
Three basic elements are common to most of the relevant obstruction statutes: (I ) an
obstructive act;(2) a nexus betwee'n the obstructive act and an official proceeding; and (3) a corrupt '
intent. See, e.g.,18 U.S.C. $$ 1503, 1505, 1512(c)(2). We describe those elements as they have.
been interpreted by the couits. We then discuss a more specific statute aimed at witness tampering,
see 18 U,S.C. ti 1512(b), and describe the requirements for attempted offenses and endeavors to
obstruct justice, see 18 U.S.C. gg 1503, 1512(c)(2).
fJbstructive act. Ob struction-of justice law "reaches all corrupt conduct capable of
producing an effect that prevents justice Irom being duly administered, regardless of the means
employed." Um ted States v. Stlverman, 745 F.2d 1386, 1393 (11th Cir. 1984) (interpreting 18
U.S.C. ts 1503). An "effort to influence" a proceeding can qualify as an endeavor to obstruct
justice even if the effort was "subtle or circuitous" and "however cleverly or with whatever
cloaking of purpose" it was made. United States v. Jioe, 529 F.2d 629, 632 (4th Cir. 1975); see
aiso United Statesv. Quattrone„441 F3d 153, 173 (2d Cir. 2006). The verbs "'obstruct or impede'
are broad" and "'can refer to anything that blocks, makes difficult, or hinders." /tdarinetto v. United
States, 138 S. Ct. 1101, 1106 (2018) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted).
An improper motive can render an actor's conduct criminal even when the conduct would
otherwise be lawful and within the actor's authority. See United Statesv, Cueto, 151 F.3d 620,
631 (7th Cir. 1998) (afflrming obstruction conviction of a criminal defense attorney for "litigation-
related conduct" ); United Statesv. Cintoio, 818 F.2d 980, 992 (1st Cir. 1987) ("any act by any
party — whether lawful or unlawful on its face — may abridge ( J1503 if performed with a corrupt
motive").
599 (1995). In Section 1505, the nexus can include a connection to a "pending" federal agency
proceeding or a congressional inquiry or investigation, Under both statutes, the government must
demonstrate "a relationship in time„causation, or logic" between the obstructive act and the,
proceeding orinquiry tobe obstructed. Id. at599; see alsoArthur AndersenLLP v. United States,
544 U.S. 696, 707-708 (2005). Section 1512(c) prohibits obstructive efforts aimed at official
proceedings including judicial or grand jury proceedings. 18 U.S.C. Ij 1515(a)(1)(A). "For
purposes of" Section 1512, "an official 'proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted
atthe time ofthe offense." 18U.S.C. $ 1512(f)(1). Although aproceedingneednot already be in
progress to trigger liability under Section 1512(c), a nexus to a contemplated proceeding still must
be shown. United Statesv. young, 916 F.3d 368, 386 (4th Cir..2019); United Statesv. Petruk, 781
F.3d 438, 445 (8th Cir. 2015); United Statesv. Phillips, 583 F.3d 1261, 1264 (10th Cir. 2009);
United States v. Iteich, 479 F.3d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 2007). The nexus requirement narrows the
scope of obstruction statutes to ensure that individuals have "fair warning" of what the law
proscribes. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 600 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The nexus showing has subjective and objective components. As an objective matter, a
defendant must act "in a manner that is likely to obstruct justice," such that the statute "excludes
defendants who have an evil purpose but use means that would only unnaturally and improbably
be successful." Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 601-602 (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted).
"[T]he endeavor must have the natural and probable effect of i nterfering with the due
administration of justice." Id a t 599 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A s a
*'
subjective matter, the actor must have "contemplated a particular, foreseeable proceeding.
Petruk, 781 F.3d at 445-446.. A defendant need not directly impede the proceeding. Rather, a
nexus exists 'if "discretionary actions of a third person would be required to obstruct the judicial
proceeding if it was foreseeable to the defendant that the third parly would act on the [defendant's]
communication m such a way as to obstruct the judicial proceeding." United Statesv. Martinez,
862 F.3d 223, 238 (2d Cir. 2017) (brackets, ellipses, and internal quotation marks omitted).
Corruptly. The word "corruptly" provides the intent element for obstructionofj ustice and
means acting "knowingly and dishonestly" or 'With an improper motive." Un ited Statesv.
It tchardson, 676 F.3d 491, 508 (5th Cir. 2012); United Statesv, Gordon, 710 F.3d 1124, 1151
(10th Cir. 2013) (to act corruptly means to "act[] with an improper purpose and to engage in
conduct knowingly and dishonestly with the specific intent to subvert, impede or obstruct" the
relevant proceeding) (some quotation marks omitted); see 18 U.S.C. $ 1515(b) (" As, used in section
1505, the term 'corruptly' means acting with an improper purpose, personally or by influencing
another. *'); see also Arthur Andersen„544 U.S. at 705-706 (interpreting "corruptly*' to mean
"wrongful, immoral, depraved, or evil" and holding that acting "knowingly . . . corruptly" in 18
U.S.C. $ 1512(b) requires ",consciousness of wrongdoing" ). The requisite showing is made when
a person acted with an intent to obtain an "improper advantage for [him]self or someone else,,
inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others." BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIQNARY 276 (3d
ed. 1969); see United States v. Pasha, 797 F.3d 1122, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2015);Aguilar„515 U.S. at
616 (Sealia, J., concuning in part and dissenting in part) (characterizing this definition as the
"longstanding and well-accepted meaning" of "cori uptly").
%Itness tatnpering. A more specific provision in Section 1512 prohibits tampering with a
witness. See18 U.S.C. I) 1512(b)(1), (3) ( m
akingitscrimeto "k
n owinglyuse[] intimidation . . .
or corruptly persuade[] another person," or "engage[] in misleading conduct towards another
10
U.S; Department of Justice
person," with the intent to ' *influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official
p roceeding" or to "hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer. . .
of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense"). To
establish cormpt persuasion, it is sufficient that the defendant asked a potential witness to lie to
investigators in contemplation of a likely federal investigation into his conduct. United Statesv.
Edlind, 887 F.3d 166, 174 (4th Cir, 2018); United Statesv. Sparks, 791 F.3d 1188, 1191-1192
(10th Cir. 2015); United Statesv. Byrne, 435 F.3d 16„23-26 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v.
LaShay, 417 F.3d 715, 718-719 (7th Cir. 2005); United Statesv. Burns, 298 F.3d 523, 539-540
(6th Cir. 2002); Urdted Statesv. Pennington, 1 68 F.3d 1060, 1066 (8th Cir. 1999). T h e
"persuasion" need not be coercive, intimidating, or explicit; it is sufficient to "urge," *'induce,"
'"ask[]," "argu[e],'* "giv [e] reasons," Sparks, 791 F.3d at 1192, or "coach[] or remind[] witnesses
by planting misleading facts„'* Edlind, 887 F.3d at 174. Corrupt persuasion is shown "where a
defendant tells a potential witness a false story as if the story were true, intending that the witness
believe the story and testify to it." United Statesv. Rodolitz„786 F.2d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1986); see
Umted Statesv. Gabriel, 125 F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir. 1997). It also covers urging a witness to recall
a fact that the witness did not Iotow, even if the fact was actually true. See LaShay,417 F.3d at
719. Corrupt persuasion also ean be shown in certain circumstances when a person, with an
improper motive, urges a witness not to cooperate with law enforcement. See United Statesv.
Shotts, 145 F.3d 1289, 1301 (11th Cr. 1998) (telling Secretary "not to [say] anything [to the FBI]
and [she] would not be bothered").
When the charge is acting with the intent to hinder, delay, or prevent the communication
of information to law enforcement under Section 1512(b)(3), the "nexus'* to a proceeding inquiry
articulated in Aguilar — that an individual have "knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the
judicial proceeding," 515 U.S. at 599 — does not apply because the obstructive act is aimed at the
communication of information to investigators, not at impeding an official proceeding.
Acting "knowingly . . . corruptly" requires proof that the individual was "conscious of
wrongdoing." Arthur Andersen,544 U.S. at 705-706 (declining to explore "[t]he outer limits of
this element" but indicating that an instruction was infirm where it permitted conviction even if
the defendant "honestly and sincerely believed that [the] conduct was lawful" ). It is an affirmative
defense that "the conduct consisted solely of lawful conduct and that the defendant' s sole intention
was to encourage, induce, or cause the other person to testify truthfully." 18 U.S.C. $ 1512(e).
Attempts and endeavors. Section 1512(c)(2) covers both substantive obstruction offenses
and attempts to obstruct justice. Under general prinriples of attempt law, a person is guilty of an
attempt when he has the intent to commit a substantive offense and takes an overt act that
constitutes a substantial step towards that goal. See United Statesv. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S.
102„106-107 (2007). "[T]he act [must be] substantial, in that it was strongly corroboraflve of the
defendant's criminal purpose." United Statesv. Pratt, 351 F.3d 131, 135 (4th Cir. 2003). While
"mere abstract talk" does not suffice, any "concrete and speciflc" acts that corroborate the
defendant's intent can constitute a "substantial step." United Statesv. Irving, 665 F.3d 1184, 1198-
1205 (10th Cir. 2011). Thus, *'soliciting an innocent agent to engage in conduct constituting an
element of the crime" may qualify as a substantial step. Model Penal Code 5 5.01(2)(g); see United
Statesv. Laeas, 499 F.3d 769, 781 '(8th Cir. 2007).
11
U.S. Department of Justice
The omnibus clause of 18 U.S.C. $ 1503 prohibits an "endcavoi" to obstruct justice, which
sweeps more broadly than Section 1512's attempt provision. See United States v. Satnpsan, 898
F.3d 287, 302 {2d Cir. 2018); Umted Statesv. Leisure, 844 F.2d 1347, 1366-1367 (8th Cir. 1988)
(collecting cases). "It is well established that a[n] [obstruction-of justice] offense is complete
when one corruptly endeavors ta obstruct or impede the due administration of justice; the
prosecution need not prove that the due administration of justice was actually obstructed ar
impeded." United States v. Davis,854 F3d 1276, 1292 (11th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation maiks
omitted).
After the appointment of the Special Counsel, this Office obtained evidence about the
following events relating to potential issues of obstruction of justice involving the President:
{a) The President's January 27, 2017 dinner with former FBI Director James Camey in which
the President reportedly asked for Comey's loyalty, one day after the White House had
been briefed by the Department of Justice on contacts between former National Security
Advisor Michael Flynn and the Russian Ambassador;
(b) The President's February 14, 2017 meeting with Comey in which the President reportedly
asked Comey not ta pursue an investigation of Flynn;
(c) The President*s private requests to Camey to make public the fact that the President was
not the subject of an FBI investigation and to lift what the President regarded as a cloud;
(d) The President's outreach to the Director of National Intelligence and the Directors of the
National Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency about the FBI's Russia
investigation;
(e) The President's stated rationales for terminating Comey on May 9, 2017, including
statements that could reasonably be understood as acknowledging that the FBI's Russia
investigation was a factor in Comey's teimination; and
(I) The President's reported involvement in issuing a statement about the June 9, 2016 Trump
Tower meeting between Russians and senior Trump Campaign officials that said the
meeting was about adoption and omitted that the Russians had offered to provide the
Trump Campaign with derogatory information about Hillary Clinton.
Taking into account that information and our analysis af applicable statutory and constitutional
principles (discussed below in Volume II, Section III, inPa), we,determined that there was a
sufficient factual and legal basis to further investigate patential obstruction-of justice issues
involving thc President.
voluntary basis when possible, and used legal process where appropriate. These investigative steps
allowed us to gather a substantial amount of cadence,
We also sought a voluntary interview with the President. After more than a ear of
discussion, the President dec! ined to be interviewed.
In assessing thc evidence we obtained, we relied on common principles that apply in any
investigation. The issue of criminal intent is often inferred from circumstantial evidence. See,
e.g., United States v. Croieou, 819 F.3d 1293, 1305 (11th Cir. 2016) ("[G]uilty knowledge can
rarelybe established by directevidence.... Therefore„mens rea elements such as knowledge or
intent inay be proved by circumstantial evidence,"') (internal quotation marks omitted); United
States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 36 (2d Cir. 2012') (" The government's case rested on
circumstantial evidence, but the mens reo elements of knowledge and intent can oiten be proved
through circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.") (internal
quotation marks omitted). The principle that intent can be inferred irom circumstantial evidence
is a necessity in criminal cases, given the right of a subject ta assert his privilege against compelled
self-incriminauon under the Filth Amendment and therefore decline to testify, A ccordingly.
determinations an intent are &equcntly reached without the opportunity to i nterview an
investigatary subject.
Obstruction-of justice cases are consistent with this rule. See, e.g., Edlind, 887 F.3d at
174, 176 (relying on "significant circumstantial evidence that [thc defendant] was conscious ofhcr
wrongdoing" in an obstruction case; "[b]ecause evidence of intent will almost always be
circumstantial, a defendant may be found culpable where the reasonable and forcsccable
consequences of her acts are the obstruction af justice") (internal quotation marks, ellipses, and
punctuation omitted); Quaiirone„441 F.3d at 173-174. Circumstantial evidence that illuminates
intent may include a pattern af potentially obsnuctive acts. Fed. R. Evid, 404(b) (" Evidence of a
c riine, wrong, or other act. . . may be admissible .. . [ta] prov[e] motive, oppoitunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident."); see, e.g., United
Siares v, Franlrltouser, 80 F.3d 641, 648-650 (1st Cir. 1996);. United States v. Arnold, 773 F.2d
823, 832-834 (7th Cir. 1985); Ciniolo, 818 F.2d at 1000.
Credibility judgments may also be made based on objective facts and circumstantial
evidence. Standard jury instructions highlight a variety of factors that are often relevant in
U,S. Department of Justice
assessing credibility. These include whether a witness had a reason no't to tell the truth; whether
the witness had a good memory; whether the witness had the opportunity to observe the events
about which he testified; whether thc witness's testimony was corroborated by other witnesses;
and whether anything the witness said or wrote previously contradicts his testimony. See, e.g.,
First Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions 1) 1.06 (2018); Fifth Circuit Pattern J'ury Instructions
(Criminal Cases) $ 1.08 (2012)„Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction $ 3.01 (2012),
In addition to those general factors, we took into account more specific factors in assessing
thc credibility of conflicting accounts o'f the facts. For example, contemporaneous written notes
can provide strong corroborating evidence. SeeUnited States v. Wohles, 422 U.S. 225, 232 (1975)
(thc fact that a "statement appeared in the contemporaneously recorded report. . . would tetid
*
strongly to corroborate the investigator's version of the interview' ). S imilarly, a witness's
recitation of his account betore he had any motive to fabricate also supports the witness's
credibility. See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 158 (1995) ("A consistent statement that
predates the motive is a square rebuttal of the charge that the testimony was contrived as a
consequence of that motive.'"). Finally, a witness's false description of an encounter can imply
consciousness of wrongdoing. See Al-Adahi v. Ohama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(noting the "well-settled principle that false exculpatory statements are evidence — otten strong
evidence — of guilt" ). We applied those settled legal principles in evaluating the factual results of
our investigation.
14
U.S. Department of Justice
This section of the report details the evidence we obtained. We first provide an overview
of how Russia became an issue in the 2016 presidential campaign„and how candidate Trump
responded, We then turn to the key events that we investigated: the President's conduct concerning
the FBI investigation of Michael Flynn; the President's reaction to public confirmation of the FBI's
Russia investigation„events leading up to and surrounding the tenninanon of FBI Director Comey;
efforts to terminate the Special Counsel; efforts to curtail the scope of the Special Counsel's
investigation; efforts to prevent disclosure of information about the June 9, 2016 Trump Tower
meeting between Russians and senior campaign officials; efforts to have the Attorney General
unrecuse; and conduct towards McGahn, Cohen, and other witnesses.
We summarize the evidence we found and then analyze it by reference to the three statutory
obstruction-of justice elements: obstructive act, nexus to a proceeding, and intent. We focus on
elements because, by regulation, the Special Counsel has "jurisdiction.. . to investigate... federal
crimes committed in the course of, and with intent to interfere with, the Specml Counsel's
investigation, such as perjury, obstruction of justice, destruction of evidence, and intimidation of
witnesses." 2 8 C.F.R. 4 600.4(a). C onsistent with our jurisdiction to investigate federal
obstruction crimes„we gathered evidence that is relevant to the elements of those crimes and
analyzed them within an elements framework — while refraining from reaching ultimate
conclusions about whether crimes were committed, for the ieasons explained above. This section
also does not address legal and constitutional defenses raised by counsel for the, President; those
defenses are analyzed in Volume II, Section III, inpdd.
Du'ring the 2016 campaign, the media raised questions about a poss'ible connection between
the Trump Campaign and Russia.i The questions intensified after WikiLeaks released politically
damaging Democratic Parly emails that were reported to have been hacked by Russia. Trump
responded to questions about possible connections to Russia by denying any business involvement
in Russia — even though the Trump Organization had pursued a business project in Russia as late
as June 2016. Trump also expressed skepticism that Russia had hacked the emaib at the same
d d d t d d Pid d i P i t iy ddt ' y m ti ~ d t y
further planned WikiLeaks releases. After the election, when questions persisted about possible
links between Russia and the Trump Campaign, the President-Elect continued to deny any
connections to Russia and privately expressed concerns that reports of Russian election
' interference might lead the public to question the legitimacy of his election.'
" This section summarizes and cites various news stories not for the truth of the infoimation
contained in the stories, but rather to place candidate Trump's response to those stories in context. Volume
I of this report analyzes the underlying facts of several relevant events that were reported on by the media
during the campaign.
d As discussed in Volume I, while the investigation identified numerous links between individuals
with ties to the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign, the evidence
was not sufficient to charge that any member of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with
representatives of the Russian government to interfere in the 2016 election.
1$
U.S. Department of Justice
On June 16, 2015, Donald J. Trump declared his intent to seek nomination as the
Republican candidate for President.s By early 2016, he distinguished himself among Republican
candidates by speaking of closer ties with Russia,'e saying he would get along well with Russian
President Vladimir Putin," questioning whether the NATO alliance was obsolete,'s and praising
Putin as a "strong leader."s The, press reported that Russian political analysts and commentators
perceived Trump as favorable to Russia.'4
Beginning in February 2016 and continuing through the summer, the media reported that
several Trump campaign advisors appeared to have ties to Russia. For example, the press reported
that campaign advisor Michael Flynn was seated next to Vladimir Putin at an RT gala in Moscow
in December 2015 and that Flynn had appeared regularly on RT as an analyst.' T he press also
reported that foreign policy advisor Carter Page had ties to a Russian state-run gas company,' and
that campaign chairman Paul Manafort had done work for the "Russian. backed former Ukrainian
president Viktor Yanukovych."' I n addition, the press raised questions during the Republican
16
U .S.Department of Justice
National Convention about the Trump Campaign's involvement in changing the Republican
platform's stance on giving "weapons to Ukraine to fight Russian and rebel forces."'
On June 14„2016, a cybersccurity firm that had conducted in-house analysis I' or the
Democratic National Committee (DNC} posted an announcement that Russian government
hackers had infiltrated the DNC's computer and obtained access to documents."
On July 22, 2016, the day before the Democratic National Convention, WikiLcaks posted
thousands of hacked DNC documents revealing sensitive internal deliberations. is Soon thereatler„
Hillary Clinton's campaign manager publicly contended that Russia had hacked the DNC emails
and arranged their release in order to help candidate Trump. ' On July 26, 2016, the New York
Times reported that U.S. "intelligence agencies ha[d] told the White House they now have 'high
confidence' that the Russian government was behind the theft of emails and documents from the
Democratic National Committee." s
Within the Trum. Cam al n, aides reacted with enthusiasm to reports of the backs.s'
discussed with Campaign officials that WikiLeaks
woul r elease the hacked material. S o me wimesses said that Trump himself discussed the
+
possibility of upcoming releases a~ , M ic hael Cohen, then-executive vice resident of the
Trum Or anization and s ecial counsel to Trum, recalled hearin
" Josh Rogin„Trump campaign guts GOP 's anti-Russia stance on Ukraine, Washington Post,
Opinions (July IS, 2016}. The Republican Platform events are described in Volume I, Section IV.A.6,
supra.
" Bears in the Idtdstt Jntrusion inta the Democratic 8/at/anal Committee, CrowdStrike (June 15,
2016} (post originally appearing on June 14, 2016, according to records of the gming provided by
CrowdStrike}; Ellen Nakashima, Russian government hackers penetrated DIIC, stale apposition research
an Trump, Washington Post (June 14, 2016}.
' Tom Hamburger and Karen Tumulty, WikiLeaks releases thousands of documents about Clinton
~i n t ernal deliberations,
Washington Post (July 22, 2016}.
' Amber Phillips, Clintan campmgn manageri Russians leaked Democrats ' smails to help Donald
Trump, Washington Post (July 24, 2016}.
" David E. Sanger and Edc Scbmitt, Spy Agency Consensus Grows That Russia Hacked D./V.C.,
New York Times (July 26, 2016}.
i' Gates 4/10/18 302, at 5; Newman 8/23/18 302, at 1.
i Gates 4/11/18 302, at 2-3 (SM-2180998}; Gates 10/25/18 302, at 2; see also Volume I, Section
III.D.1, supra.
" Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 8; see a/so Volume I, Section III.D. I, supra. According to Cohen, after
WikiLesks"s subs imnt release of stolen DNC etnails on July 22, 2016, Tiump said to Cohen words tother
effectof, • Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 10. Cohen's role in the candidate's and later
17
U.S. Department of Justice
and - ' I ' ' ' • .~ Manafort said that shortl after WikiLeaks's Jul 22
2016 release ofhacked documents he s oke to Trump • + ' •
; Manafort recalled at Trump responded that
Manafort shou d keep Trump u dated.' D e uty campaign manager
Rick Gates said that Manaiort was ettin re ssure about information and that
Manafort instructed Gates status updates on u comin releases. A t ound
the same time, Gates was with Trump on a trip to an airport
d Il gt f ft tg ll d d T t ld G t tg t 1 f d ~i g
"
information would be coming.z' • • ' ' '
Campaign,' and in the summer of 2016, the Campaign was planning a communications strategy
based on the possible release of Clinton emails by WikiLeaks.s'
3. The Trum Cam ai n Reacts to Alle ations That Russia was Seekin to Aid
~ dhd t T
C
In the days that followed WikiLeaks*s July 22, 2016 release of barked DNC emails, the
Trump Campaign publicly rejected suggestions that Russia was seeking to aid candidate Trump.
On July 26, 2016, Trump tweeted that it was "[c]razy" to suggest that Russia was "dealing with
Trump"s2 and that "[fjor the record," he had "ZERO investments in Russia."'s
In a press conference the next day, July 27, 2016, Trump characterized '"this whole thing
with Russia" as "a total detlection" and stated that it was "farfetched" and "ridiculous."s Trump
said that the assertion that Russia had hacked the emails was unproven, but stated that it would
give him "no pause" if Russia had Clinton's emails. ' Trump added, "Russia, if you' re listening,
I hope you*re able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing. I think you will probably be rewarded
Pi'esident's activities, and his own criminal conduct, is described in Volmne II, Section II.K, infra„and in
Volume I, Section IV.A.1, supra.
TdCohen 8/7/18 302, at 8.
" Gates 4/11/18 302, at 1-2 (SM-2180998); Gates 10/25/18 302, at 2 (messa in strate w as bein
formed in June/Jul t imeframe based on claims b A ssan e on June 12, 2016,
•• •• ).
u @realDonaldTrump 7/26/16 (6;47 P.m. ET) Tweet.
dg@realDonaldTrump 7/26/16 (6:50 p.m. ET) Tweet.
Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016).
Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016),
U.S, Deparnnent of Justice
mightily by our prrss/n T rump also said that "there's nothing that I can think of that I'd rather
do than have Russia friendly as opposed to the way they are right now," and in response to a
question about whether he would recognize Crimea as Russian territory and consider lifting
sanctions, Trump replied, "We' ll be looking at that. Yeah, we' ll be looking."s'
During the press conference, Trump repeated "I have nothing to do with Russia" five
es.ss He stated that "the closest [he] came to Russia" was that Russians may have purchased a
home or condos Irorn him.ss He said that after he held the Miss Universe pageant in Moscow in
2013 he had been interested in working with Russian companies that'"wanted to put a lot of money
into developments in Russia" but "it never worked out:"4s He explained, "[fjrankly, I didn't want
to do it for a couple of different reasons. But we had a major developer... that wanted to develop
property in Moscow and other places. But we decided not to do it.~' The Trump Organization,
however, had been pursuing a building project in Moscow — the Trump Tower Moscow project-
from approximately September 2015 through June 2016, and the candidate was regularly updated
on developments, including possible trips by Michael Cohen to Moscow to promote the deal and
by Trump himself to hnalize it,sz
Cohen recalled speaking with Trump after the press conference about Trump's denial of
any business dealings in Russia, which Cohen regarded as untrue. ' Trump told Cohen that Trump
Tower Moscow was not a deal yet and said, "Why mention it if it is not a deal?'S4 According to
Cohen, at around this time, in response to Trump* s disavowal of connections to Russia, campaign
Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016). Within five hours
of Trump's remark, a Russian intelligence service began targeting email accounts associated with Hillary
Clinton for possible, hacks. See Volume I, Section III, supra. In w ritten answers submitted in this
investigation, the President stated that he made the "Russia, if you' re listening" statement "in jest and
sarcastically, as was apparent to any objective observer,*' Written Responses of Donald I, Trump (Nov. 20,
2018), at 13 (Response to Question II, Part (d)).
in Donald Tramp News Conference, Daral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016). I n his written
answers submitted in this investigation, the President said that his statement that "we' ll be looking" at
Crimea and sanctions "did not communicate any position." Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov.
20, 2018), at 17 (Response to Question IV, Part (g)).
' Donald Tramp News Conference, Daral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016).
Donald TrumpNews Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016).
' Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016).
' Donald Trump News Conference, Dora/, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016).
ss The Trump Tower Moscow project and Trump's involvement in it is discussed in detail in
Volume I, Section IV.A. I, supra, and Volume II, Section II.K, infra.
+ Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 4.
' Cohen 9/18/I 8 302, at 4-5.
U.S. Department of Justice
advisors had developed a "party line" that Trump had no business with Russia and no connections
to Russia.ss
In addition to denying any connections with Russia, the Trump Campaign reacted to reports
of Russian election interferenee in aid of the Campaign by seeking to distance itself from Russian
contacts. For example, in August 2016, foreign policy advisor J.D. Gordon declined an invitation
to Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak*s residence because the timing was "not optimal'* in view
of media reports about Russian interference. On August 19, 2016, Manafort was asked to resign
amid media coverage scrutinizing his ties to a pro-Russian political party in Ukraine and links to
Russian business.s And when the media published stories about Page's connections to Russia in
September 2016, Trump Campaign officials terminated Page's association with the Campaign and
told the press that he had played "no role*' in the Campaign.ss
On October 7, 2016, WikiLeaks released the first set of emails stolen by a Russian
intelligence agency ffom Clinton Campaign chairman John Podesta.ss The same day, the federal
government announced that "the Russian Govei'nment directed the recent compromises of e-mails
from US persons and institutions, including &om US political organizations."' T he government
statement directly linked Russian hacking to the releases on WikiLeaks, with the goal of interfering
with the presidential election, and concluded "that only Russia's senior-most officials could have
authorized these activities" based on their "scope snd sensitivity.'n'
On October 11, 2016, Podesta stated publicly that the FBI was investigating Russia's
hacking and said that candidate Trump might have known in advance that the hacked emails were
going to be released.sz Vice Presidential Candidate Mike Pence was asked whether the Trump
Cohen 11/20/18 302, at I; Coh'en 9/18/18 302, at 3-5. The formation of the "party line" is
described in greater detail in Volume II, Section II,K, tnPa.
DJTFP00004963 (8/8/16 Email„Gonion to Pchelyakov) (ststing that "[t]hese days are not
optimal for us, as we are busily knocking down s stream of false media stories"). The invitation and
Gordon's response are discussed in Volume I, Section IV.A.7,a, supra.
" See, e.g, Amber Phillips, Paul /v/anafart's oompltcatod ttes to Ukratne, oxplatnsd, Washington
Post (Aug. 19, 2016) (" There were also a wave of fresh headlines dealing with investigations into
[Manafort's] ties to a pro-Russian political party in Ukraine."); Tom Winter 8s Ken Dilanian,Donald Trump
Aids Paul /V/anafort Scrutinized for Russian Business Ties, NBC (Aug. 18, 2016). R e levant events
involving Manafort are discussed in Volume I, Section IV.A.S, supra.
'" Michael Isikoff, U 8. intel oPoials probe ties bsmssn Trump adviser and Rrsmttn, Yahoo News
(Sep. 23; 2016); see, e.g., 9/25/16 Email, Hicks to Conway k, Barmen; 9/23/16 Email, J. Miller to Barmen
4 S. Miller; Page 3/I 6/17 302, at 2.
' @WikiLeaks 10/7/16 (4:32 p.m. ET) Tweet.
Joint Statement from the Department Of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of
National Inteffigence on Election Security, DHS (Oct. 7, 2016).
' Joint Statement from the Department Of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of
National Intelligence on Election Security, DHS (Oct. 7, 2016).
ta John Wagner /k Anne Gears~ Cllnton campaign chairman ties emat/ hack to Russians, sug gests
Trump bad early warning, Washington Post (Oct. 11, 2016).
U,S, Department of Justice
Campaign was "'in cahoots'" with WikiLeaks in releasing damaging Clinton-related information
and responded, "Nothing could be further from the truth.*' '
On November S, 2016, Trump was elected President. Two days later, Russian officials
told the press that the Russian government had maintained contacts with Trump's "immediate
entourage" during the campaign.ss In response, Hope Hicks, who had been the Trump Campaign
spokesperson, said, "We are not aware of any campaign representatives that were in touch with
any foreign entities before yes'terday, when Mr. Trump spoke with many world leaders."ss Hicks
gave an additional statement denying any contacts between the Campaign and Russia: "It never
happened. There was no communication between the campaign and any foreign entity during the
campaign."ss
On December 10, 2016, the press reported that U.S. intelligence agencies had "concluded
that Russia interfered in last month's presidential election to boost Dohald Trutnp's bid for the
White House." R eacting to, the story the next day, President-Elect Trump stated, "I think it' s
ridiculous. I think it's just another excusepss Hc continued that no one really knew who was
responsible for the hacking, suggesting that the intelligence community had "no idea if it's Russia
or China or somebody. It could be somebody sitting in a bed some place."s' The President-Elect
Louis Nelson, Pence denies Trump camp in cahoots with Wthtbea/ts, Politico (Oct. 14, 2016).
Ivan Nechcpurenko,I/use/an Ogicta/s Were in Contact With Trump Allies, Diplomat Says,.New
York Times (Nov. 10, 2016)(quoting Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov saying„"[t]herc
were contacts" and "I cannot say that all, but a number of them maintained contacts with Russian
representatives'*'); Jim Heintz A Matthew Lee,Russia eyes better ties with Trump; says contacts underway,
Associated Press (Nov. 11, 2016) (quoting Ryabkov saying, "I don't say that all of them, but a whole array
of theta supported contacts with Russian teprescntativcs").
Ivan Nechepurenko, I/ossian Of/'iota/s Were in Contact With Trump Allies, Diplomat Says,New
York Times (Nov. 11, 2016) (quoti'ng Hicks).
Jim Heintz /k Matthew Lee, Russia eyes better ties with Trump; says contacts underway,
Associated Press (Nov. 10, 2016) (quoting Hicks). Hicks recalled that after she made that statement, she
spoke with Campaign advisors Kellyanne Conway, Stephen Miller, Jason Migcr, and probably Kushner
and Barmen to ensure it was accurate, and there was no hesitation or pushback from any of thetn. Hicks
12/8/17 302, at 4.
" D amien Gayle, CIA conclmies Russia interfered to he/p Trump win election, say reports,
Guardian (Dec. 10, 2016).
Chris Wallace Hosts "Fox Ii/ews Sunday, " Interview with President-E/ect Donald Trump, CQ
Newsmaker Transcripts (Dec. 11, 2016).
ss Chris Wallace Hosts "Fax b/ews Sunday, " Interview with President-E/ect Donald Trump, CQ
Ncwsmaker Transcripts (Dec. 11, 2016).
U.S. Deparbnent of Justice
also said that Democrats were "putting [j out" the story of Russian interference '*because they
suffered one of the greatest defeats in the history of politics."
On December 18, 2016, Podesta told the press that the election was "distorted by the
Russian intervention'* and questioned whether Trump Campaign officials had been "in touch with
the Russians. s' The same day, incoming Chief of Staff Reince Priebus appeared on Fax News
Sunday and declined to say whether the President-Elect accepted the intelligence community's
determination that Russia intervened in the election.es When asked about any contact or
coordination between the Campaign and Russia, Priebus said, "Even this question is insane. Of
course we didn't interface with the Russians." P riebus added that "this whole thing is a spin job"
and said, *'the real question is, why the Democrats . , arc doing everything they can to delegitimize
the outcome of the election7"s4
On December 29, 2016, the Obama Administration announced that in response to Russian
cyber operations aimed at the U.S. election, it was imposing sanctions and other measures on
seveial Russian individuals and entities ss When first asked about the sanctions, President-Elect
Trump said„"I think we ought to get on with our lives." H e then put out a statement that said
"It' s time for our country to move on to bigger and better things," but indicated that he would meet
with intelligence community h;aders the following week for a briefing on Russian interference,
The briefing occurred on January 6, 2017.es Following the briefing, the intelligence community
released the public version of its assessment, which concluded with high confidence that Russia
had intervened in the election through a variety of means with the goal of harming Clinton*s
Chris Wallace Hosts "Fox News Sunday," Interview with President-Elect Donald Ti'ump, CO
Newsmaker Transcripts (Dec. 11, 2016).
' David Morgan, Clinton campmgn: It's an 'open tluestion' if Trump team colluded with Russia,
Reuters Business Insider (Dec. 18, 2016).
' Chris Wallace Hosts "Fox News Sunday, " Interview with Incoming White House Chief of Staff
Reince Priebus, Fax News (Dec. 18, 2016).
' Chris Wallace Hosts "Fox News Sunday, " Interview with Incoming White House Chief of Staff
Reince Priebus, Fox News (Dec. 18, 2016).
4 Chns Wallace Hosts "Fox News Sunday, " Interview with Incoming White House Chief of Staff
Reince Priebus, Fox News (Dec. 18, 2016).
' Statement. by the Presi dera on Acgons in Response to Russian Ivfalicious Cyber Activity and
Harassment, White House (Dec. 29, 2016); see also Missy Ryan et al., Obama administration announces
measures to punish Russiafor 2016 election interference, Washington Post (Dec. 29, 2016).
' John Wagner„Trump on alleged election interfeience by Russia: 'Get on with our lives,'
Washington Post (Dec. 29, 2016).
Missy Ryan et al„Qbaina administration announces m easures to punish Russia for 201 6 election
interference, Washington Post (Dec. 29, 2016).
" Comey 11/15117 302, at 3.
U.S. Department of Justice
electability. ' T he assessment furtherconcluded with high confidence that Putin and the Russian
government had developed a clear preference for Trump.
Several days later, BuzzFeed published unverified allegations compiled by former British
intelligence officer Christopher Steele during the campaign about candidate Trump's Russia
connections under the headline "These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia." ' In a
press conference the next day, the President-Elect called the release "an absolute disgrace" and
said, "I have no dealings with Russia. I have no deals that could happen in Russia, because we' ve
stayed away.... So I have no deals„ I have no loans and I have no dealings. We could make deals
in Russia very easily if we wanted to, I just don't want to because I think that would be a conflict:"
Several advisors recalled that the President-Elect viewed stories about his Russian
connections, the Russia investigations, and the intelligence community assessment of Russian
interference as a threat to the legitimacy of his electoral victory.ts H/cks, for example, said that
the President-Elect viewed the intelligence community assessment as his "Achilles heel" because,
even if Russia had no impact on the election, people would think Russia helped him win, taking
away from what he had accomplished. S ean Spicer, the first White House communications
director, recalled that the President thought the Russia story was developed to undermine the
legitimacy of his e/ection.ts Gates said the President viewed the Russia investigation as an attack
on the legitimacy of his win.ts And Priebus recalled that when the intelligence assessment came,
out, the President-Elect was concerned people would question the legitimacy of his win.w
m Office of the Director of National Intefligence, Russia 's Infl uenc Campaign Targeting /hc 20/6
US Pres/'den//a/ E/ection, at 1 (Jan. 6, 2017).
's Office of the Director of National Intelligence,Russia's Influenc CampaignTargeting the 20/6
US Presidcntia/ E/ecti cn, at 1 (Jan. 6, 2017).
Ken Bensinger et al„T/tese Rcpor/s Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia, Buzzpeed (Jan. 10,
2017).
' Dona/d Trump 's /Yews Ccnferencci Fu// Transcript and Video, New York Times (Jan. 11,
2017), available athttps://www.nytimes.corn/2017/01/11/us/politics/trump.-press-conference-
transcript.hunt.
n Priebus 10/13/17 302, at'7; Hicks 3/1 3/18 302, at 18; Spicer 10/I 6/17 302, at 6; Barman 2/14/1 8
302, at 2; Gates 4/1 8/18 302, at 3 scc Pompeo 6/28/17 302, at 2 (the President believed that the purpose of
the Russia investigation was to delegitimize his presidency).
' H icks 3/1 3/1 8 302, at 18.
s Spicer 10/17/17 302, at 6.
' Gates 4/18/18 302, at 3.
w Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 7.
U.S. Department of Justice
During the presidential transition, incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn had
two phone calls with the Russian Ambassador to the United States about the Russian response to
U.S. sanctions imposed because of Russia's election inteiference. After the press reported on
Flynn's contacts with the Russian Ambassador, Flynn lied to incoming Administration oAicials
by saying he had not discussed sanctions on the calls. The officials publicly repeated those lies in
press interviews. T h e FBI, which previously was investigating Flynn for other matters,
interviewed him about the calls in the first week after the inauguration, and Flynn told similar lies
to the FBI. On January 26, 2017, Department of Justice (DOJ) officials notified the White House
that Flynn and the Russian Ambassador had discussed sanctions and that Flynn had been
interviewed by the FBI, The next night, the President had a private dinner with FBI Director James
Camey in which he asked for Comey's loyalty. On February 13, 2017, the President asked Flynn
to resign. The following day, the President had a one-on-one conversat'ion with Comey in which
he said, "I hope you can see your way clear to letting this go, to letting Flynn tm."
Evidence
Shortly after the election, President-Elect Trump announced he would appoint Michael
Flynn as his National Security Advisor,ts For the next two months, Flynn played an active role on
the Presidential Transition Team (PTT) coordinating policy positions and communicating with
foreign g overnm
ent officials, including Russian Ambassador to the United States Setgey
Kislyak.ss
On December 29, 2016, as noted in Volume II, Section II.A.4, supra, the Obama
Administration announced that it was imposing sanctions and other measures on several Russian
individuals and entities. Th at day, multiple members of the PTT exchanged emails about the
sanctions and the impact they would have on the incoming Administration, and Flynn informed
members of the PTT that he would be speaking to the Russian Ambassador later in the day.s'
' Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 7; President Elect Donald J Trump Selects US. Senator deff Sessions for
Attorney General, It. Gen. Michael Flynn as Assistant to the President for National Security Af'fairs and
US. Rep. Mke Pompeo as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, President-Elect Donald J. Trump
PressRelease (Nov. 18, 2016); see also, e.g., Bryan Bender, Trump names Mike Flynn national security
adviser,Politico, Wov. 17, 2016),
w Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 8-14; Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 3-$.
Statement by the President on Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and
Harassment, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (Dec. 29, 2016).
" '12/29/16 Email, O' Brien to McFarland et al.; 12/29/16 Email, Bossert to Flynn et al.; 12/29/16
Email, McFarland to Flynn et al.; SF000001 (12/29/16 Text Message, Flynn to Flaheity) ("Tit for tat w
Russia not good. Russian AMBO reaching out to me today.'*); Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 2.
U.S. Department of Justice
Flynn, who was in the Dominican Republic at the time, and K.T. McFarland, who was slated to
become the Deputy National Security Advisor and was at the Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida with
the President-Elect and other senior staff, talked by phone about what, if anything, Flynn should
communicate to K islyak about the sanctions. McF arland had spoken with incoming
Administration officials about the, sanctions and Russia's possible responses and thought she had
mentioned in those conversations that Flynn was scheduled to speak with Kislyak." B ased an
those conversations, McFarland informed Flynn that incoming Administration officials at Mar-a-
Lago did not want Russia to escalate the situation.'4 At 4:43 p.m. that afternoon, McFgrland sent
an email to several officials about the sanctions and informed the group that "Gen P']lynn is talking
to russian ambassador this evening."'s
Approximately one hour later, McFarland met with the President-Elect and senior officials
and briefed them on the sanctions and Russia's possible responses." Incoming Chief of Staff
Reince Pricbus recalled that McFarland may have mentioned at the meeting that the sanctions
situation could be "cooled down*' and nat escalated. M c Farland recalled that at thc end of' the
meeting„someone may have mentioned to the President-Elect that Flynn was speaking to the
Russian Ambassador that evening.s' MeFarland did not recall any response by the, President-
Elect.+ Priebus recalled that the President-Elect viewed the sanctions as an attempt by the Obama
Administration to embarrass him by delegitimizing his election.~
Immediately after discussing the sanctions wtth McFarland an December 29, 2016, Flynn
called Kislyak and requested that Russia respond to the sanctions only in a reciprocal manner,
without escalating the situation. ' A f ter the call, Flynn briefed McFarland on its substance. s
Flynn told McFarland that the Russian response to the sanctions was not going ta be escalatory
because Russia wanted a good relationship with the Trump Administration. On Decembet 30,
2016, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would not take retaliatory measures
w Statement of Offense at 2-3, United Slates v. Michael 7: Flynn, I:17wr-232 (D.D.C. Dcc. 1,
2017), Doc. 4 (Flynn Statement of Offense); Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 3-4; Flynn 11/20/17 302, at 3;
McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 6-7.
'McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 4-7 (recalling discussians about this issue with Barman and Priebus).
'4 Flynn Statement of Offense, at 3; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 3-4; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 6-7.
25
U.S. Department of Justice
in response to the sanctions at that time and would instead "plan... further steps to restore Russian-
US relations based on the policies of the Trump Administration."s4 Following that announcement,
the President-Elect tweeted, "Great move on delay (by U. Putin) - I always knew he was very
smart!*~s
On December 31, 2016, Kislyak called Flynn and told him that Flynn's request had been
received at the highest levels and Russia had chosen not to retaliate in response to the request.se
Later that day, Flynn told McFarland about this follow-up conversation with Kislyak and Russia's
decision not to escalate the sanctions situation based on Flynn's request." M cFarland recalled
that Flynn thought his phone call had made a differenre. ' F lynn spoke with other incoming
Administration officials that day, but does not recall whether they discussed the sanctions.s'
Flynn recalled discussing the sanctions issue with incoming Administration official
Stephen Bannon the next day.' Fly n n said that Bannon appeared to know about Flynn"s
conversations with Kislyak, and he and Bannon agreed that they had "stopped the train on Russia's
response" to the sanctions.' ' On January 3, 2017, Flynn saw the President-Elect in person and
thought they discussed the Russian reaction to the sanctions, but Flynn did not have a specific
recollection of telling the President-Elect about the substance ofhis calls with Kislyak.'
Members of the intelligence community were surprised by Russia* s decision not to retaliate
in response to the sanctions.' s When analyzing Russia's response, they became aware of Flynn's
discussion of sanctions with Kislyak.' P r eviously, the FBI had opened an investigagon of Flynn
based on his relationship with the Russian government.'" F lynn's contacts with Kislyak became
a key component of that investigation.'
e» Statetitent by the president of Russia, president of Russia (Dec. 30, 2016) 12/30/16.
On January 6, 2017, as noted in Volume II, Section II.A.4, supra, intelligence officials
briefed President-Elect Trump and the incoming Administration on the intelligence community's
assessment that Russia had interfered in the 2016 presidential election.' Wh en the briefing
concluded, Comey spoke with the President-Elect privately to brief him on unverified, personally
sensitive allegatians compiled by Steele.'" Ac c ording to a memoiandum Comey drafted
immediately after their private discussian, the President-Elect began the meeting by telling Comcy
he had conducted himself honorably over the prior year and had a great reputation,' The
President-Elect stated that he thought highly of Comey, looked forward ta working with him, and
hoped that he planned to stay on as FBI director." C omey responded that he intended to continue
serving in that role."' C omey then briefed the President-Elect on the sensitive material in the
Steele reporting." C omcy recalled that the President-Elect seemed defensive, so Comey decided
Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee,
115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, farmer I?irector of the FBI, at
1-2);
' ' Comey 11/15/17 302, at 3; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select
InteBi genes Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Camey, former
Director of the FBI, at 1-2).
' s Ccsney 1/7/17 Memorandum, at 1. Camey began drafting the memorandum summarizing the
meeting immediately after it occurred. Comey 11/1.5/17 302, at 4. He finished the memorandum that
evening and finalized it the following mo
rning. Com
ey 11/15/17 302, at 4.
Camey 1/7/17 Memorandum, at I; Comey 1 1/15/17 302, at 3. Comey identified several other
occasions in January 2017 when the President reiterated that he hoped Comey would stay on as FBI director.
On January 11, President-Elect Trump called Comcy to discuss the Steele reports and stated that hc thought
Coincy was doing great and the President-Elect hoped he would remain in his position as FBI director.
Camey 11/15/17 302, at 4; Hearing on Russian Election I nterferenceBefore theSenate Select Intelligence
Committee„115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (testimony of James B. Comey, foimer Director of the FBI), CQ
Cong. Transcripts, at 90. ('*[D]uring that call, he asked me again, 'Hope you' re going to stay, you' re doing
a great job.' And I told him that I intended to."). On January 22, at a White House reception honoring law
enforccincnt, the President greeted Camey and said he looked forward to working with him, Hearing on
Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017)
(testimony of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI), CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 22. And as discussed
in greater detail in Volume II, Section II.D, tnPo, on January 27, the President invited Comey to dinner at
the White House and said he was glad Camey wanted ta stay on as FBI I?irector.
"' Comey 1/7/17 Memorandum, at 1; Camey 11/15/17 302, at 3.
"' Camey 1/7/17 Memorandum, at 1-2; Comey 11/15/17 302, at 3. Comey's briefing included the
Stccle reporting's unverified allegation that the Russians had compromising tapes of the President involving
conduct when he was a private citizen during a 2013 trip to Moscow far the Miss Universe Pageant. During
the 2016 presidential campaign, a similar claim may have reached candidate Trump, On October 30, 2016,
Michael Cohen received a text from Russian businessman Giorgi Rtskhiladzc that said, "Stopped flow of
tapes ftoin Russia but not sure if there's anything else. Just so you know. . . . " 1 0/30/16 Text Message,
Rtskhiladze to Cohen. Rtskhiladzc said '"tapes'* referred to coinpromising tapes of Trump mmored to be
held by persons associated with the Russian real estate congloinerate Crocus Group, which had. helped host
U.S. Department of Justice
to assure him that the FBI was not investigating him personally.ns Comey recalled he did not
want the President Elect to think o f the conversation as a "J. Edgar Hoover move.""
On January 10, 2017, the media reported that Comey had briefed the President-Elect on
the Steele reporting," and BuzzFecd News published information compi'led by Steele online,
stating that the information included "specific, unverified, and potentially unverifiable allegations
of contact between Trump aides and Russian operatives u" T he next day, the President-Elect
expressed concern to intelligence commumty leaders about the fact that the informatiori had leaked
and asked whether they could make public statements refuting the allegations in the Steele
reports." z
the2013 Miss UniversePageant inRussia. Rtskhiladze4/4/18302, at12. Cohen saidhe spoke to Trump
about the issue atter receiving the texts from Rtskhiladze. Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 13. Rtskhiladze said he
was told the tapes were fake, but he did not communicate that to Cohen. Rtskhiladze 5/10/18 302, at 7.
" Comey 11/15/17 302, at 3-4; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select
Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Camey, former
Director of the FBI, at 2).
ns Comey 11/15/17 302, at 3.
See, e g., Evan Perez et al., Intel chiefs presented Trump with claims of Russian efforts to
compromise him, CNN (Jan. 10, 2017; updated Jan. 12, 2017).
'i Ken Bensinger et al., These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia, BuzzFeed News
(Jan. 10, 2017).
" See1/11/17 Email, Clapper to Camey ("Hc asked if I could put out a statement. He would prefer
*'
of course that I say the documents are bogus, which, of course, I can't do. ); 1/12/17 Email, Comey to
Clapper ("He called me at 5 yesterday and we had a very similar conversation."); Comey 11/15/17 302, at
4-5.
See 20I 6 Presidential, Election Investigation Fast Facts, CNN (first published Oct. 12, 2017;
updated Mar. 1, 2019) (summarizing starting dates of Russia-related investigations).
" Joint Statement on Conimittee Inqutry inta Russian Intelligence Activities, SSCI (Jan. 13, 2017).
" JointStatement on Progress of Bipartisan HPSCIInq'airy ituo Russian Active Measures, HPSCI
(Jan. 25, 2017).
' ' Joint Statementfrom Senators Graham and W%itehouse an Investi gati on into Russian Influence
on Democratic/Potions'Elections (Feb. 2, 2017).
28
U.S. Department of Justice
On January 12, 2017, a Washington Post columnist reported that Flynn and Kislyak
communicated on the day the Obama Administration announced the Russia sanctions.' z The
column questioned whether Flynn had said something to "undercut the U.S. sanctions" and
whether Flynn's communications had violated the letter or spirit of the Logan Act.'~
President-Elect Trump called Priehus after the story was published and expressed anger
about it.'z Priebus recalled that the President-Elect asked, "What the hell is this all about?'n~
Priebus called Flynn and told him that the President-Elect was angry about the reporting on Flynn's
conversations with Kislyak.'" F l ynn recalled that he felt a lot of pressure because Priebus had
spoken to the "boss" and said Flynn needed to "kill the story.'nz' Flynn diiected McFarland to
call the Washington Post columnist and in form him that no discussion of sanctions had occurred.'z
McFarland recalled that Flynn said words to the effect of, "I want to kill the story." zs McFarland
made the call as Flynn had requested although she knew she was providing false information, and
the Washington Post updated the column to refiect that a "Trump official" had denied that Flynn
and Kislyak discussed sanctions.'
When Priebus and other incoming Adminisuation officials questioned Flynn internally
about the Washington Post column, Fly'nn maintained that he had not discussed sanctions with
Kislyak.' ' Flynn repeated that c,laim to Vice President-Elect Michael Pence and to incoming press
secretary Sean Spicer.' ' I n subsequent media interviews in mid-January, Pence, Priebus, and
David Ignatius, 5'hy did Obama dawdle on Russia 's hacking?, Washington Post (Jan. 12, 2017).
' s David Ignatius, IFky didOb orna dawdle oo Russia's hacking?, Washington Post (Jan. 12, 2017).
The Logan Act makes it a crime for "[a]ny citizen of the United States, wherever he inay be" to '"without
authority of the United States, directly or indirectly commence[] or carr[y] on any correspondence or
intercourse with any foreign government or any ofiicer or agent thereof, in relation to any disputes or
contmversies with the United States, or to defeat the nieasures of the United Statesy 18 U.S.C. g 953.
os Priebus I/18/18 302, at 6.
'~ Pfiebus 1/18/18 302, at 6.
' ' Priebus I/18/I 8 302, at 6.
'" Flynn 1 I/21/17 302, at 1;, Flynn 11/20/1 7 302, at 6.
o' McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 12-13.
'~ McFarland 12/22/1 7 302, at 12.
' ' McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 12-13; McFarland 8/29/17 302, at 8; see David Ignatius„Why did
Obama dawdleon Russia's /iacking?, Washington Post (Jan. 12, 2017).
' ' Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 1, 8; Flynn I/19/18 302, at 7; Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 7-8; S. Miller
8/31/17 302, at 8-11.
oi Flynn 11/1 7/I 7 302, at I, 8; Flynn I/19/18 302, at 7; S.Miller 8/31/17 302, at 10-11.
U,S. Department of Justice
Spicer denied that Flynn and Kislyak had discussed sanctions, basing those denials on their
conversations with Flynn.'
The public statements of incoming Administration officials denying that Flynn and Kislyak
had discussed sanctions alarmed senior DOJ officials, who were aware that the statements were
not true s Those officials were concerned that Flynn had lied to his colleagues —who in turn had
unwittingly misled the American public — creating a compromise situation for Flynn because the
Department of Justice assessed that the Russian government could prove Flynn lied."s The FBI
investigative team also believed that Flynn's calls with Kislyak and subsequent denials about
discussing sanctions raised potential Logan Act issues and were relevant to the FBI's broader
Russia investigation.' s
On January 20, 2017, Piesident Trump was inaugurated and Flynn was sworn in as
National Security Advisor. On January 23, 2017, Spicer delivered his first press briefmg and stated
that he had spoken udth Flynn the night before, who confirmed that the calls with Kislyak were
about topics unrelated to sanctions.'s" Spiccr's statements added to thc Department of Justice's
concerns that Russia had leverage over Flynn based on his lies and could use that derogatory
information to compromise him.' s
On January 24, 2017, Flynn agreed to be interviewed by agents from the FBI.'" D u ring
the interview, which took place at the White House, Flynn falsely stated that be did not ask Kislyak
to refrain from escalating the situation in response to the sanctions on Russia imposed by the
Obama Administration.'s' F l ynn also falsely stated that he did not remember a follow-up
conversation in which Kislyak stated that Russia had chosen to moderate its response to those
sanctions as a result of Flynn's request.'+
Face the Nation Interview with Vice President-Elect Pence, CBS (Jan. 15, 2017); Julie
Hirschfield Davis et al., 1'rutnp National Security Advisor Called Russian Envoy Day Before Sanctions
Were /reposed, Washington Post (Jan. 13, 2017); bfeet the Press Interview with Reince Priebus, NBC (Jan.
15, 2017).
Yates g/15/17 302, at 2-3; McCord 7/17/17 3 02, at 3-4; McCabe g/17/17 302, at 5 (DO I officials
were "really freaked out about it").
' ' Yates g/15/17 302, at 3; McCord 7/1 7/17 302, at 4.
'" McCord 7/1 7/17 302, at 4; McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 5-6.
Sean Spicer, Jfhtte House Dat7y Briefing, C-SPAN (Jan. 23, 2017).
' ' Yates g/15/17 302, at 4; Axelrod 7/20/17 302, at 5.
'i Flynn Statement of Offense, at 2.
'® F/Jstn Statement of Offense, at 2.
"' Flynn Statement of Offense, at, 2. On December 1, 2017, Flynn admitted to making these false
statements and pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. ri 1001, which makes it a crime to knowingly and
willfully "make[] any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation" to federal law
enforcement offici'als. See Volume I, Section IV.A.7, supra,
30
U.S. Department of Justice
On January 26, 2017„Acting Attorney General Sally Yates contacted White House Counsel
Danald McGahn and informed him that she needed to discuss a sensitive matter with him in
person.'4 L ater that day, Yates and Mary McCord, a senior national security aAicial at the
Department of Justice, met at the White House with McGahn and White House Counsel's Office
attorney James Burnham.'~s Yates said that the public statements made by the Vice President
denying that Flynn and Kislyak discussed sanctions were not uue and put Flynn in a potentially
compromised position because the Russians would know'he had lied.'44 Yates disclosed that Flynn
had been interviewed by the FBI.' S h e declined to answer a specific question about how Flynn
had performed during that interview,' b ut she indicated that Flynn's statements to the FBI were
similar to the statements he had made to Pence and Spicer denying that he had discussed
sanctions.'~r McGahn came away from the meeting with the impression that the FBI had not
pinned Fl)mn down in lies,' b u t he asked John Eisenberg, who served as legal advisor to the
National Security Council, to examine potential legal issues raised by Flynn*s FBI interview and
his contacts with Kislyak.'4s
That afternoon, McGahn notified the President that Yates had come to the White House to
discuss concerns about Flynn.' M c Gahn described what Yates had told him, and the President
asked him to repeat it, so he did.'si McGahn recalled that when he described the FBI interview of
Flynn, he said that Flynn did not disclose having discussed sanctions with Kislyak, but that there
may not have been a clear violation of 18 U.S.C. $ 1001." T h e President asked about Section
1001, and McGahn explained the law to him, and also explained the Logan Act.'s' The President
Yates 8/15/17 302, at 6; M cCoid 7/17/17 302, at 6; SCR015 000198 (2/15/17 Draft
Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President).
Yates 8/15/17 302, at 6-8; McCord 7/17/17 302, at 6-7; Burnham 11/3/17 302, at 4;
SCR015 000198 (2/15l17 Draft Memorandum to file from thc Office of the Counsel to the President).
'i' McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 5; Yates 8/15ll7 302, at 7; McCord 7/17/17 302, at 7; Bumham
11/3/17 302, at 4.
'"' Yates 8/1S/17 302, at 7; McCard 7/17/17 302, at 7.
'ir SCR01S 000198 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the
President); Bumham 11l3ll 7 302, at 4.
"s McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 5.
' ' SCR015 000198 (2/15/17 Dratt Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the
President}; McGahn 11/30/1 7 302, at 6, 8.
'" McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 6; SCR015 000278 (White House Counsel's Office Memorandum
re: "Flyim Tick Tock') (on January 26, "McGahn IMMEDIATELY advises PQTUS" ); SCR015 000198
(2/15/17 Draft Memorandum ta file tram the Office at' the Counsel to the President),
"' McGahn 11/30l17 302, at 6.
'+ McGshn 11/30/17 302, at 7.
" M cGshn 11/30/17 302, at 7.
31
U.S, Department of Justice
instructed McGahn to work with Priebus and Bannon to look into the matter further and directed
that they not discuss it with any other officials.is4 Priebus recalled that the President was angry
with Flynn in light of what Yates had told the White House and said, "not again, this guy, this
stuff "'
That evening, the President dined with several senior advisors and asked the group what
they thought ab'out FBI Director Comeys as According to Director of National Intelligence Dan
Coats, who was at the dinner, no one openly advocated terminating Comey but the consensus on
him was not positive.' C o ats told the group that he thought Comey was a good director.' Coats
encouraged the President to meet Comey face-to-face and spend time with him before making a
decision about whether to retain him.'
The next day, January 27, 2017, McGahn and Eisenberg discussed the results of
Eisenberg's initial legal research into Flynn's conduct, and specifically whether Flynn may have
violated the Espionage Act, the Logan Act, or 18 U.S.C. f 1001.' Ba sed on his preliminary
research, Eisenberg informed McGahn that there was a possibility that Flynn had violated 18
U.S.C. $ 1001 and the Logan Act.'s' Eisenberg noted that the United States had never successfully
prosecuted an individual under the Logan Act and that Flyrm could have possible defenses, and
" M cGahn 11/30/17 302, at 7; SCR015 000198-99 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the
Office of the Counsel to the President).
Priebus 10/1 3/17 302, at 8. Several witnesses said that the President was unhappy with Flynn
for other reasons at this time. Bannon said that Flynn's standing with the President was not good by
December2016. Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 12. The President-Electhad concerns because President Obama
had warned him about Flynn shortly atter the election. Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 4-5; Hicks 12/8/17 302, at
7 (President Obama's comment sat with President-Elect Trump more than Hicks expected). Priebus said
that the President had become unhappy with Flynn even before the story of his calls with Kislyak broke
and had become so upset with Flynn that he would not look at him during intelligence briefings. Priebus
1/18/18 302, at 8. Hicks said that the President thought Flynn had bad judgment and was angered by tweets
sent by Flynn and his son, and she described Flynn as "bemg on thin ice" by early February 2017. Hicks
12/8/17 302, at 7, 10.
" Coats 6/14/17 302, at 2.
ui Coats 6/14/17 302, at 2.
us Coats 6/14/17 302„at 2.
'" Coats 6/14/17 302, at 2.
" S CR015 000199 (2/15/17 Dratt Memorandum to file &om the Office of the Counsel to the
President); McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 8.
aa SCR015 000199 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the
President); Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 9.
IJ.S. Department of Justice,
told McGahn that he believed it was unlikely that a prosecutor would pursue a Logan Act charge
under the circumstances.'
That same morning, McGahn asked Yates to return to the White House to discuss Flynn
again.'" In that second meeting, McGahn expressed doubts that the Department of Justice would
bring a Logan Act prosecution against Flynn„but stated that the White House did not want to take
action that would interfere with an ongoing FBI investigation of Flynn." Y a tes responded that
Department of Justice had notified the White House so that it could take action in response to the
information provided.'ss McGahn ended the meeting by asking Yates for access to the underlying
information the Department of Justice possessed pertaining to Flynn's discussions with Kislyak."
Also on January 27, the President called FBI Director Comcy and invited him to dinner
that evening.' P r iebus recalled that before the dinner, he told the President something like, "don' t
talk about Russia, whatever you do," and the President promised he would not talk about Russia
at the dinner.'e McGahn had previously advised the President that he should not 'communicate
directly with the Department of Justice to avoid the perception or reality of political interference
in law enforcement.' W h en Bannon learned about the President's planned dinner with Camey,
he suggested that he or Priebus also attend, but the President stated that he wanted to dine with
Comey alone.' C o mey said that when he ari'ived for the dinner that evemng, he was surprised
and concerned to see that no one else had been invited. n
'" SCR015 000199 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file &om the Office of the Counsel to the
President); Eiscnberg 11/29/17 302, at 9.
'" SCR015 000199 (2/15/17 Dratt Memorandum to file from the Deice of the, Counsel to the
President); McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 8; Yates 8/15/17 302, at 8.
Yates 8/15/17 302, at 9; McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 8.
'" Y ates 8/15/17 302, at 9; Burnharn 11/3/17 302, at 5; see SCR015 00199 (2/15/17 Dratt
Memorandum to file from the Office af the Counsel to the President) ("Yates was unwilling to confirm or
deny that there was an ongoing investigation but did indicate that the Department of Justice would not
object to the. White House taking action against Flynn."3.
'" Yates 9/15/17 302, at 9; Burnhain 11/3/17 302, at 5. In accordance with McGahn's request, tire
Department of Justice made the underlying information available and Eisenberg viewed the information in
early Februaty. Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 5; FBI 2/7/17 Electronic Communication, at I (dccumenting
2/2/17 meeting with Eisenberg).
'" Comey 11/15/17 302, at 6„SCR012b 000001 (President's Daily Diary, 1/27/1 7);Hearing an
Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017)
(Statement for. the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 2-3).
us Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 17.
' ' SeeMcGahn 11/30/17 302, at 9; Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 2; Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 17.
' ' Bannon 2/12/18 302„at 17.
' ' Hearing on Russian Election Interference Befare the Senate Select Intelligence Committee,
115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at
3); see Camey 11/15/17 302, at 6.
U.S, Department of Justice
According to Comey's account, at one point during the dinner the President stated, "I need
loyalty, I expect loyalty.'uss Comey did not respond and the conversation moved on to other
topics, but thc President returned to the subject of Comey's job at the end of the dinner and
r epeated, "I need loyalty Ju s Comey responded, "You will always get honesty from me."" T h e
President said, "That's what I want, honest Ioyalty.'nsi Comey said, "You will get that from
m ~usz
After Comey *s account of the dinner became public, the President and his advisors disputed
that he had asked for Comey's loyalty.'+ The President also indicated that he had not invited
Comey to dinner, telling a reporter that he thought Comey had "asked for the dinner" because "he
wanted to stay on.'us B u t substantial evidence corroborates Comey's account of the dinner
invitation and the request for loyalty. The President's Daily Diary confirms that the President
"extend[ed] a dinner invitation" to Comcy on January 27.' " With respect to the substance of the
dinner conversation, Comey docuinented the President's request for loyalty in a memorandum he
began drafting the night of the dinner;" senior FBI officials recall that Comey told them about
the loyalty request shortly after the dinner occurred.„"' and Comey described the request while
'" Comey I/28/17 Memorandum, at 3; Comey 11/15/17 302, at 71 Hsartng on Rvsstan Election
Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for
the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 4).
Camey 1/28/17 Memorandum, at 3; Comey 11/15/17 302, at 7; Hearing on Russian Election
Interference Before ths Senate Select Intslggence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for
the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 4).
'" See, e.g„M i c hael S. Schmidt, In a Private Dinner, Tramp Demanded Loyalty. C a mey
Demurred., New York Times (May 11, 2017) (quoting Sarah Sandeis as saying, "[The President] would
never even suggest the expectation of personal loyalty" ); Ali Vitsli, Tramp Never Asked for Camey's
Loyally, President 's Personal Lawyer Says,NBC (June 8, 2017) (quoting the President's personal counsel
as saying, "The president also never told Mr. Comey, 'I need loyalty, I expect loyalty,' in form or
substancep); Remarks by President Tmmp in Press Conference, White House (June 9, 2017) ("I hardly
know the man. I'm not going to say 'I want you to pledge agegiance.' Who would do that'? Who would
ask a man to pledge allegiance under oath?"). In a private conversation with Spicer, the President stamd
that he had never asked for Comey's loyalty, but added that if he had asked for loyalty, "Who caresT'
Spicer 10/16/17 302, at 4. The President also told McGahn that he never said what Comey said he had.
McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 17.
'+ Interview of Donald J. Trump,NBC (May 11, 2017),
'" SCR012b 000001 (President's Daily Diary„ 1/27/17) (reflecting that the President called Comey
in themorning onJanuaiy 27 and "[t]he purpose of the call was to extend a dinner invitation"). In addition,
two witnesses corroborate Comey's account that the President reached out to schedule the dinner, without
Comey having asked for it. Piiebus 10/13/17 302, at 17 (the President asked to sohedule the January 27
dinner because he did not know much about Comey and intended to ask him whether he wanted to stay on
as FBI Director); Rybicki 11/21/18 302, at 3 (recalling that Camey told him about the President's dinner
invitation on the day of the dinner).
ns Camey 11/15/17 302, at 8; Hearing on Russian E/ection Interference Before the Senate Ss?ect
lntslli genes Cammiges, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Camey, former
Directorofthe FBI,at4).
"" McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 9-10; Rybicki 11/2VI8 302, at 3. After leaving the White House,
Comey called Deputy Director of the FBI Andrew McCabe, summarized what he and the President had
discussed, including the President's request for loyalty, and expressed shock over the President's request.
McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 9. Camey also convened a meeting with his senior leadership team to discuss what
the President had asked of him during the dinner and whether he had handled the request for loyalty
properly. McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 10; Rybicki 11/21/18 302, at 3. In addition, Comey distributed his
35
U.S. Department of Justice
under oath in congressional proceedings and in a subsequent interview with investigators subject
to penalties for lying under 18 U.S.C, g 1001. Comey *s memory of the details of the dinner,
including that the President requested loyalty, has remained consistent throughout."s
The week of February 6, Flynn had a one-on-one conversation with the President in the
Oval Office about the negative media coverage of his contacts with Kislyak.'s Flynn recalled that
the President was upset and asked him for information on the conversations.' F l y nn listed the
specific dates on which he remembered speaking with Kislyak, but the President corrected one of
the dates he listed.'s' The President asked Flynn what he and Kislyak discussed and Flynn
responded that he might have talked about sanctions.'s
memorandum documenting thc dinner to his senior leadership team, and McCabe confirmed that the
memorandum captured what Camey said on the telephone call immediately following the dinner. McCabe
8/17/17 302, at 9-10.
'w Thare also is evidence that coiiuborates other aspects of the memoranda Comey wrote
documenting his interactions with the President. For example, Corriey recalled, and his inemoranda reflect,
that he told the President in his January 6, 2017 meeting, and on phone calls on March 30 and April 11,
2017, that the FBI was not investigating the President personally. On May 8, 2017, during White House
discussions about firing Comey, the President told Rosenstein and others that Camey had told him three
times that he was not under investigation, including once in person and twice on the phone. Gauhar-000058
(Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes).
'" Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 5; FBI 2/7/17 Electronic Communication, at 1 (documenting 2/2/17
meeting with Eisenberg).
' ' Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 6.
'" Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 9; SCR015 000200 (2/15/17 Dratt Memorandum to file from the
Office of the Counsel to the President).
Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 9.
na Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 2.
w4 Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 2.
'ss Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 2.
'" Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 2-3.
U,S. Department of Justice
On February 9, 2017, the Washington Post reported that Flynn discussed sanctions with
Kislyak the month before the President took office.' Afi e r thc publication of that story, Vice
President Pence learned of the Department of Justice's notification to the White House about the
content of Flynn's calls,iss He and other advisors then sought access to an'd reviewed the
underlying information about Flynn's contacts with Kislyak.'w FBI Deputy Director Andrew
McCabe, who provided the White House officials access to the information and was present when
they reviewed it, recalled the. officials asking him whether Flynn's conduct violated the Logan
Act.s" McCabe responded that he did not know, but the FBI was investigating the matter because
. it was a possibility.2 ' Based on the evidence of Flynn's contacts with Kislyak, McGahn and
Priebus concluded that Flynn could not have forgotten the details of th'e discussions of sanctions
and had instead been lying about what he discussed with Kislyak.s F l ynn had also told White
House officials that the FBI had told him that the FBI was closing out its investigation of him,s
but Eisenberg did not believe him. m After reviewing the materials and speaking with Flynn,
McGahn and Pi iebus concluded that Flynn should be terminated and recommended that course of
action to the President.~s
That weekend, Flynn accompanied the President to Mar-a-Lago.s s Flynn recalled that on
February 12, 2Q17, on the return flight to D.C. on Air Force One, the President asked him whether
he had lied to the Vice President.' Fl y nn responded that he may have forgotten details of his
calls, but he did not think he lied.2 The President responded, "Okay. That's fine. I got it/a®
Greg Miller et al., b/atlanal security adviser Flynn discussed sanctions with Russian
ambassador, despite denials, ogUctals say, Washington Post (Feb. 9, 2017).
" S CR015 000202 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the
President); McGahn 11/30/17 302„at 12,
' s SCR015 000202 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the
President); McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 11-13; Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 10; McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 12.
' M cCabe 8/17/17 302, at 13.
' McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 13.
McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 12; Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 8; Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 10;
SCR015 000202 (2/15/17 Drafi Memorandum to file fi'om the Office of the Counsel to the President).
aa McGahn i 1/30/17 302, at 11; Eisenberg 1 I/29/17 302, at 9; Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 11.
"" Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 9.
' SCRQ15 000202 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the
President); Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 10; McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 12.
" F lynn 11/17/17 302, at 8.
'm Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 9; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 8.
" F lynn 11/17/17 302, at 8; Flynn 1/19/18302, at 9.
iw Flynn 1/19/1 8 302, at 9.
37
U.S. Department of Justice
//
On February 13, 2017, Priebus told Flynn he had to resign. ' F lynn said he wanted to say
goodbye to the President, so Priebus brought him to the Oval Offic. " P r iebus recalled that the
President hugged Flynn, shook his hand, and said, "We' ll give you a good recommendation.
Y ou're a good guy. We' lltake care ofyou," '
Talking points on the resignation prepared by the White House Counsel's Office and
d'istributed to the White House communications team stated that McGahn had advised the
President that Flynn was unlikely to be prosecuted, and the Presiderit had determined that the issue
with Flynn was one of trust.z's Spicer told the press the next day that Flynn was forced to resign
"not based on a legal issue, but based on a trust issue, [where] a level of trust between the President
and General Flynn had etoded to the point where [the President] felt he had to make a change.'a'4
On February 14, 2017, the day after Flynn's resignation, the President had lunch at thc
White House with New Jersey Governor Chris Christie.z's According to Christie, at one point
during thc lunch the President said, "Now that we fired Flynn, the Russia thing is over." ' C hristie
*
laughed and responded, "No way."z' He said, "this Russia thing is far from over" and ' [w]e'll be
here on Valentine's Day 2018 talking about this." ' T h e President said, "[w]hat do you mean?
Flynn met with the Russians. That was the problem. I fired Flynn. It's over."z's Christie recalled
responding that based on his experience both as a prosecutor and as someone who had been
investigated, firing Flynn would not end the investigation.~ C hristie said there was no way to
make an investigation shorter, but a lot of ways to make it longer.z The President asked Christie
what he meant, and Christie told the President not to talk about thc investigation even if he was
frustrated at times.tsi Christie also told the President that hc would nevet bc able to get rid of
Flynn, "like gum on the bottom of your shoe." '
Towards the end of the lunch, the President brought up Camey and asked if Christie was
still friendly with him.t C h ristie said he wasas The President told Christie to call Comey and
tell him that the President "really like[a) him. Tell him he's part of the team.*ate At the end of the
lunch, the President repeated his request that Christie reach out to Comey.s C hr'istic had no
intention of complying with the President's request that he contact Camey.~s He thought the
President's request was "nonsensical" and Christie did not want to put Comey in the position of
having to receive such a phone calL C h r istie thought it would have been uncomfortable to pass
on that message/e
At 4 p.m. that atternoon, the President met with Comey, Sessions, and other officials for a
homeland security briefing. s At th e end of the briefing„ the President dismissed the other
attendees and stated that hc wanted to speak to Comey alone. S essions and senior advisor to the
President Jared Kushncr remained in the Oval Office as other participants left, but thc President
excused them, repeating that he wanted to speak only with Comey.sss At some pomt after others
had left the Oval Office, Priebus opened the door, but the President sent him away.'~
According to Comey's account of the meeting, once they were alone, the President began
the conversation by saying, "I want to talk about Mike Flynn."~" The President stated that Flynn
had not done anything wrong in speaking with the Russians, but had to bc terminated because he
had misled the Vice President."' T h e conversation turned to the topic of leaks of classified
information, but the President returned to Flynn, saying "he is a good guy and has been through a
lot." ' T he President stated, "I hope you can see, your way clear to letting this go, to letting Fly nn
go.Hc isa good guy. Ihope you can letthisgo."" Camey agreed that Flynn "isagood guy,"
but did not commit to ending the investigation of Flynn.ss Comey testified under oath that he
took the President's statement "as a direction" because of the President's position and the
circumstances o f the one-'on-one meeting.~
" C omey 11/15/17 302, at 10;, Comey 2/14/17 Memorandum, at 1; Hcaring on Russian Election
Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for
the Record of James B. Comcy, former Dircctoi of the FBI, at 4). Sessions mcallcd that thc President asked
to speak to Comey alone and that Sessions was one of the last to leave thc room; he desrribed Comey's
testimony about the events leading up to the private meenng with the President as "pretty accurate."
Sessions I/I 7/18 302, at 6. Kushner had no recollection of whether the President asked Camey to stay
behind. Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 24.
n" Coiney 2/14/17 Memorandum, at 2; Pricbus 1'0/13/17 302, at 18.
Comcy 11/1 5/17 302, at 10; Comey 2/14/17 Memorandum, at I; Hearing on Russian Election
Inter
ference Before the Senate Ss/cct I mmittee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for
ntelligenceCo
the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 4).
Comey 2/14/17 Memorandum, at 1;Hearing on Russian Elscd on Interference Before the Senate
Select Intelll genes Commgtee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey,
former Director of the FBI, at 5).
" Comey 11/15/17 302, at 10; Comey 2/14/17 Memorandum, at 2; Hearing on Russian Election
Interference Before the Senate Select Intslggence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8„2017) (Statement for
the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 5).
" Hearing on Russian Election Iraerference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee,
115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Camey, former Director of the FBI, at
5); Comey 2/14/17 Memorandum, at 2. Camey said he was highly confident that the words in quotations
in his Memorandum documenting this meeting were the exact words used by the President. He said he
knew' from the outset of the meeting that he was about to have a conversation of consequence, and he
remembered the words used by the President and wrote them down soon alter the meeting. Comey 11/15/17
302, at 10-11.
Comey 11/1 5/17 302, at 10; Comey 2/1 4/17 Memorandum, at 2.
s Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee,
115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 3 1) (testimony of James B. Camey, former Director
of the FBI). Comey further stated, "I mean, this is the president of the United States, with me alone, saying,
'I hope' this, I took it as, this is what he wants me to do." Id.; see alsoComey 11/15/17 302, at 10 (Comey
took thc statement as an order to shut down the Flynn investigation).
40
U.S. Department of Justice
Shortly aller meeting with the President, Comcy began drafling a memorandum
documenting their conversation.'"' Comey also met with his senior leadership team to discuss the
President's request, and they agreed not to inform FBI officials working on the Flynn case of the
President's statements so the officials would not be influenced by the request.sss Comey also asked
for a meeting with Sessions and requested that Sessions not leave Comey alone with the President
again.2ss
After Flynn was forced to resign, the press raised questions about why the President waited
more than two weeks after the DOJ notification to remove Flynn and whether the President had
known about Flynn's contacts with Kislyak before the DOJ notification.24" The press also
continued to raise questions about connections between Russia and the President*s campaign.sss
On February 15, 2017, the President told reporters, "General Flynn is a wonderful man. I think
he's been treated very, very unfairly by the media/as On February 16, 2017, the President held
ao Comey 11/15/17 302, at 11; Hearing on Russian Election Interferenee Before the Senate Select
Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the record of James B. Camey, former
Director of the FBI, at 5).
rs Comey 11/15/17 302, at 11; Rybicki 6/9fl7 302, at 4,' Rybicki 6/22/17 302, at I; Hearing on
Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Seleetfntelftgenee Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8,2017)
(Statement for the record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 5-6).
"' Comey I lfl5fl 7 302, at 11; Rybicki 6/9/17 302, at 4-5; Rybicki 6/22/17 30$ at 1-2; Sessions
I/17/18 302, at 6 (confirming that later in the week following Cbmey's one-on-one meeting with the
President in the Oval Office, Comey told the Attorney General that he did not want to be alone with the
President); Hunt 2/I/18 302, at 6 (within days of the February 14 Oval Office meeting, Comey told Sessions
he did not think it was appropriate for the FBI Director to meet alone with the President); Rybicki I 1/21fl 8
302, at 4 (Rybicki helped to schedule the meeting with Sessions because Comey wanted to talk about his
concerns about meeting with the President alone); Hearing on Russian ElecBon Interferenee Befog the
Senate Select, Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the record of James B.
Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 6).
~4 See, e,g., Sean Spicer, White, House Daily Briefing, C;SPAN (Feb. 14, 2017) (questions from
the. press included, "if [the Ptesident] was notified 17 days ago that Flynn had misled the Uice President,
other officials here, and that he was a potential threat to blackmail by the Russians, why would he be kept
an for almost three weeks?" and "Did the President instruct [Flynn] to talk about sanctions with the [Russian
ambassador]'?") Priebus recalled that the President initially equivocated on whether to fire Flynn because
it would generate negative press to lose his National Security Advisor so carly in his term. Priebus 1/1 8/18
302, at 8.
ms E.g., Sean Sullivan et al., Senators frets both parties pledge to deepen probe of Russia and the
20I 6 election, Washington Post (Feb. 14, 2017); Aaron Blake, 5 times Donald Trump 's team denied contact
ivith Russia„ Washington Post (Feb. 15, 2017); Oren Derail,Donald Trump 's ties to Russia ga back 30
years, USA Today (Feb. 15, 2017); Pamcla Brown et al., Trump aides were in constant touch with senior
Russian o+ ieiais dut'ing campaign, GNN (Feb. 15, 2017); Austin Wright, Camey briefs senators amid furor
over TrumpRussia ties, Politico (Feb. 17, 2017); Megan Twohey k Scott Shane A BaekChannel Plan for
Ukraine andRussta, Courtesy of Trump Associates, New York Times (Feb. 19, 2017).
" Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel in Joint Press Conference,
White House (Feb. 15, 2017).
41
U.S; Department of Justice
a press conference and said that he removed Flynn because Flynn "didn't tell the Vice President
of the United States the facts, and then he didn't remember. And that just wasn't acceptable to
me. u4 The President said he did not direct Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak„but *'it
certainly would have been okay with me if he did. I would have dit ected him to do it if I thought
he wasn't doing it. I didn't direct him, but I would have directed him because that's his job."2"s
In listing the reasons for terminating Flynn, the President did not say that Flynn had lied to him.'"
The President also denied having any connection to Russia, stating, "I have nothing to do with
Russia. I told you, I have no deals there. I have no anything."~sc The President also said he "had
nothing to do with" WikiLeaks's publication of information hacked from the Clinton campaign.is'
On February 22, 2017, Priebus and Barmen told McFarland that thc President wanted her
to resign as Deputy National Security Advisor, but they suggested to her that the Administration
could make her the ambassador to Singapore. s The next day, the President asked Priebus to have
McFarland draft an internal email that would confirm that the President did not direct Flynn to call
the Russian Ambassador about sanctions. Pr i ebus said he told the President he would only
direct MoFarland to write such a letter if she were comfortable with it." P riebus called McFarland
into his office to convey the President's request that she memorialize in writing that the President
did not direct Flynn to talk to KislyakP' M cFarland told Priebus she did not know whether the
President had directed Flynn to talk to Kislyak about sanctions, and she declined to say yes or no
Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2017).
' ' Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2017). The President
also said that Flynn's conduct "wasn't wrong — what he did in terms of the information he saw." The
*
president said that Flynn was just "doing the job," and "if anything, he did something right.'
' ' Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2017); Priebus
1/18/I 8 302, at 9.
' Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2017).
" Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2017).
" K TM F 00000047 (McFarland 2/26/17 Memorandum for the Record); McFarland 12/22/17 302,
at 16-17.
is' See Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 11; sec o/so KTMF 00000048 (McFarland 2/26I17 Memorandum
for the Record); McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 17.
~ Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 11.
us KTMF 00000048 (McFarland 2/26/17 Memorandum for the Record); McFarland 12/22/17 302;
at 17.
U.S. Department of Justice
to the request.~~ Pricbus understood that McFarland was not comfortable with thc President's
request, and he recommended that she talk to attorneys in the White House Counsel's Office. "
McFarland then reached out to Eiscnberg."' M cFarland told him that she had been fired
from her job as Deputy National Security Advisor and offered the ambassadorship in Singapore
but that the President and Priebus wanted a letter from hcr denying that the President directed
Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak.~v E isenberg advised McFarland not to write the
requested letter.~4c As documented by McFarland in a contemporaneous "Memorandum for the,
Record ** that shc wrote because she was concerned by the President's request: "Eisenberg.. .
thought the requested email and letter would be a bad idea —from my side because the email would
be awkward. %hy would I be cmailing Priebus to make a statement for the record7 But it would
also be a bad idea for the President because it looked as if my ambassadorial appointment was in
some way a quid pro quo."~ ' Later that evening, Pricbus stopped by McFarland*s office and told
her not to write the email and to forget he even mentioned it.s+
Around the same time, the President asked Priebus to reach out to Flynn and let him know
that the President still cared about him.~s Priebus called Flynn and said that hc was checking in
and that Flynn was an American hero. ss~ Priebus thought the President did not want Flynn saying
bad things about him.~ss
On Match 31,, 2017, following news that Flynn had offered to testify before thc,FBI and
congressional investigators in exchange for immunity, the President twected, '"Mike Flynn should
ask for immunity in that this is,a witch hunt (excuse for big election loss), by media k Dems, of
" K T M F 00000047 (McFartand 2/26/17 Memorandum for the Record) ("I said I did not know
whether he did or didn' t, but was in Maralago the week between Christmas and New Year's (while Flynn
was on vacation in Carribean) and I was not aware of any Flynn-Tmmp, cr Trump-Russian phone calls" );
McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 17.
" P riebus 1/18/18 302„at 11.
"' McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 17.
"a McF arland 12/22/17 302, at 17.
'w KTMF 00000048 (McFarland 2/26fl 7 Memorandum for the Record); McFarland 12/22/17 302,
at 17.
en KTMF 00000048 (McFarland 2/26/17 Memorandum for the Record); see McFarland 12/22/17
302, at 17.
' ~ McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 17; KTMF 00000048 (McFarland 2/26/17 Memorandum for the
Record).
Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 9.
~s" Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 9; Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 9.
"5 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 9-10.
U.S. Department of Justice
historic proportion! "2 s In late March or early April, the President asked McFarhmd to pass a
message to Flynn telling him the President felt bad for him and that he should stay strong.s '
In analyzing the President's conduct related to the Flynn investigation, the following
evidence is relevant to the elements of obsuuction of justice:
a. Obs t ructive act. According to Comey's account of his February 14, 2017 meeting
in the Oval Office, the President told him, "I hope you can see your way clear to letting this go, to
letting Flynn go.... I hope you can let this go." In analyzing whether these statements constitute
an abstructive act, a threshold question is whether Comey's account of the interaction is accurate,
and, if so, whether the President's statements had the tendency to impede the administration of
justice by shutting down an inquiry that could result in a grand jury investigation and a criminal
charge.
After Camey's account of the President's request to "let[] Flynn go" became public, the
President publirly disputed several aspects of the story. The President tald the New York Times
that he did not "shoo other people out of the room" when he talked to Corney and that he did not
remember having a one-on-one conversation with Camey.ass The President also publicly denied
that he had asked Camey ta "let[] Flynn go" or otherwisc communicated that Camey should drop
the investigation of Flynnses In private, the President denied aspects ofComey*s accaunt to White
House advisors, but acknowledged ta Priebus that he brought Flynn up in the meeting with Comey
and stated that Flynn was a goad guy.s D espite those denials, substantial evidence corroborates
Comey's account.
'w @realDonaldTrump 3/31/17 (7:04 a.m. ET) Tweet; see Shane Harris at al., /vft/te Flynn Oj[ers
to Testify in Exchange for Immunity, Wall Street Journal (Mar. 30, 2017).
"' McFarland 12/22/17 302„at 18.
" E xcerpts From The Times's Jntervievr With Trttmp, New York Times (July 19, 2017). Hicks
recalled that the President told her he had never asked Comey to stay behind tn his office. Hicks 12/8/17
302, at 12.
In a statement on May 16, 2017, the White House said: "While the President has repeatedly
expressed his view that General Flynn is a decent man who served and protected our country, the President
has never asked Mr. Comey or anyone else to end any investigation, including any invesngation involving
General Flynn.. . . T his is not a truthful or accurate portrayal of the conversation between the President
and Mr. Comeyy SeeMichael S. Schmidt, Comey Memorandum Says Trump Asked Him to End Fiynn
Invest/ gnnnn, New York Times (May 16, 2017) (quoting White House statement); grealDonaldTrump
12/3/17 (6:IS a.m, ET) Tweet ("I never asked Comey to stop investigating Flynn. Just more Fake News
covering another Comey lie I").
m' Pricbus recalled that the President acknowledged telgng Comey that Flynn was a good guy and
he hoped "everything worked out for him." P riebus 10/13/17 302, at 19. M cGahn recalled that the
President denied saying to Comey that he hoped Comey would let Flynn go, but added that he was "allowed
to hope." The President told McGahn he did not think he had crossed any lines. McGahn 12/14/I 7 302, at
g.
U.S. Department of Justice
First, Comey wrote a detailed memorandum of his encounter with the President on the
same day it occurred. Comey also told senior FBI officials about the meeting with the President
that day, and their recollections of what Comcy told them at the time are consistent with Comey's
account t 0
Second, Comey provided testimony about the president's request that he let[] Flynn go"
under oath in congressional proceedings and in interviews with federal investigators subject to
penalties for lying under 18 U.S.C. $ 1001. Comey's recollections of the encounter have remained
consistent over time.
Third, the objective, corroborated circumstances of how the one-on-one meeting came to
occur support Comey's description of the event. Comcy recalled that the Prcsidcnt cleared thc
room to speak with Comey alone after a homeland security briefing in the Oval Offlce, that
Kushncr and Sessions lingered and had to be shooed out by the President, and that Priebus briefl
opened the door during the meeting, prompting the President to wave him away. While the
President has publicly denied those details, other Administration oAicials who were present have
confirmed Comey's account of how hc ended up in a one-on-one meeting with the President.si'
And the President acknowledged to Pricbus and McGahn that he in fact spoke to Comcy about
Flynn in their one-on-one meeting.
Fourth, the President's decision io clear the room and, in particular, to exclude the Attorney
Genaial from the meeting signals that the President wanted to be alone with Comey, which is
consistent with the delivery of a message of the type that Comey recalls, rather than a more
innocuous conversation that could have occurred in the presence of the Attorney General.
Finally, Comey's reaction to thc President's statements is consistent with the President
having asked him to "let[] Flynn go." Camey met with the FBI leadership team, which agreed to
keep the President's statements closely held and not to inform the team working on the Flynn
investigation so that they would not be influenced by the President's request. Comey also promptly
mct with thc Attorney General to ask him not to be lefl alone with the President again„an account
verified by Sessions, FBI Chief of Staff James Rybicki, and Jody Hunt, who was then the Attorney
General's chief of stafK
A second question is whether the President's statements, which were not phrased as a direct
order to Comey, could impede or interfere with the FBI's investigation of Flynn. While the
President said he "hope[d]" Comcy could "let[] Flynn go," rather than affirmatively directing him
to do so, the circumstances of the conversation show that the President was asking Comey to close
the FBI *a investigation into Flynn. First, the President arranged the meeting with Comey so that
they would be alone and purposely excluded the Attorney General, which suggests that the
President meant to make a request to Comey that he did not want anyone else to hear. Second,
because the President is the head of the Executive Branch, when he says that he "hopes*' a
subordinate will do something, it is reasonable to expect that the subordinate will do what the
President wants. Indeed, the President repeated a version of "let this go'" three times, and Comey
testified that he understood the President's statements as a directive, which is corroborated by the
way Comey reacted at the time.
At the time of the president! s one-on-one meeting with Comey, no grand jury subpoenas
had been issued as part of the FBI's investi ation into Fl nn. But Fl rm's lies to the FBI violated
federal criminal law„ , and resulted in Flynn's
prosecution for violating Ig U.S.C. ) 1001. By the time the President spoke to Comey about
Flynn, DOJ officials had informed McGahn, who informed the President, that Flynn's statements
to senior White House officials about his contacts with Kislyak were not true and that Flynn had
told the same version of events to the FBI. McGahn also informed the President that Flynn's
conduct could violate 18 U.S.C. $ 1001. After the Vice President and senior White House officials
i'eviewed the underlying information about Flynn's calls on February 10, 2017, they believed that
Flynn could not have forgotten his conversations with KisJyak and concluded tha't he had been
lying. In addition, the President's instruction to the FBI Director to "let[] Flyim go" suggests his
nn
awareness that Fly could face .ci iminal exposure for his conduct andwas at risk of prosecution.
But McFarland did not iecall providing the President-Elect with Flynn's read-out of his
calls with Kislyak, and Flynn does not have a specific recollection of telling the President-Elect
directly about the calls. Bannon also said he did not recall hearing about the calls fiom Flynn.
And in Febmary 2017, the President asked Flynn what was discussed on the calls and whether he
had lied to the Vice President, suggesting that he did not already know. Our investigafion
accordingly did not produce evidence that established that the President knew about Flynn's
discussions of sanctions before the Department of Justice notified the White House of those
discussioris in late January 2017. The evidence also does not establish that Flynn otherwise
46
U.S. Department of Justire
possessed information damaging to the President that would give the President a personal incentive
to end the FBI's inquiry into Flynn's conduct.
Evidence does establish that the President connected the Flynn investigation to the FBI's
broader Russia investigation and that he believed, as hc told Christie, that terminating Flynn would
end "the whole Russia thing." Flynn's firing occurred at a time when the media and Congress
were raising questions about Russia's interfercncc in the election and whether members of the
President's campaign had colluded with Russia. Multiple witnesses recalled that the President
viewed the Russia investigations as a challenge to the legitimacy of his election. The President
paid careful attention to negative coverage of Flynn and reacted with annoyance and anger when
the story broke disclosing that Flynn had discussed sanctions with Kislyak. Just hours before
meeting one-on-one with Comey, the President told Christie that firing Flynn would put an cnd to
the Russia inquiries. And after Christie pushed back, telling the President that firing Flynn would
not end the Russia investigation, thc President asked Christie to reach out to Comey and convey
that thc Pi'esident lilo:d him and he was part of "the team." That aRemoon, the President cleared
the room and asked Comey to "let[] Flynn go."
We also sought evidence relevant to assessing whether the President*s direction to Comey
was motivated by sympathy towards Flynn. I n public statements the President repeatedly
described Flynn as a good person who had been harmed by the Russia investigation, and the
President directed advisors to reach out t o F lynn to te ll h im t he P resident "care[d]"
about him and felt bad for him. At the same time, multiple senior advisors, including Bannon,
Priebus, and Hicks, said that the President had become unhappy with Flynn well before Flynn was
forced to resign and that the President was I'rcquently irritated with Flynn. Priebus said he believed
the President's initial reluctance to fire Flynn stemmed not from personal regard, but from concern
about the negaUve press that would be generated by firing the National Security Advisor so early
in the Adminisuation. And Pricbus indicated that the President's post-firing expressions of
support for Flynn were motivated by the President's desire to keep Flynn from saying negative
things about him.
The way in which the President communicated the request to Comey also is relevant to
understanding the President's intent. When the President first learned about the FBI investigation
into Flynn, he told McGahn, Bannon, and Priebus not to discuss the matter with anyone else in the
Whit'e House. The next day, thc President invited Comey for a one-on-one dinnei against the
advice of an aide who recommended that other White House officials also attend. At the dinner,
the President asked Com'ey for "loyalty"' and, at a different point in the conversation, mentioned
that Flynn had judgment issues. When the President met with Comey the day after Flynn's
termination — shortly after being told by Christie that firing Flynn would not end thc Russia
investigation —the President cleared the room, even excluding the Attorney General, so that he
could again speak to Comey alone. The President's decision to meet one-on-one with Comey
contravened the advice of the White House Counsel that the President should not communicate
directly with the Department of Justice to avoid any appearance of interfering in law enforcement
activities. And the President later denied that he cleared the room and asked Comcy to "let[] Flynn
go" — a denial that would have been unnecessary if he believed his request was a proper exercise
of prosecutorial discretion.
47
EES. Department of Justice
//
Finally, thc President's effort to have McFarland write an internal email denying that the
President had directed Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak highlights the President's concern
about being assaciated with Flynn's conduct. The evidence does not establish that the President
was trying to have McFarland lie. The President's request, however, was sufficiently uregular
that McFarland — wha did not know the full extent of Flynn's communications with the President
and thus could not make the representation the President wanted — felt the need to draft an internal
memorandum documenting tbc President's request, and Eisenberg was concerned that the request
would look like a quid pro quo in exchange far an ambassadorship,
In early March 2017, the President learned that Sessions was considering recusing fiom
the Russia investigation and tried to prevent the recusal. After Sessions announced his recusal on
March 2, the President expressed anger at Sessions for the decision and then privately aslred
Sessions to "unrecuse.*' On March 20, 2017, Comey publicly disclosed the existence of the FBI*a
Russia investigation. I n the days that followed, the President contacted Comey and other
intelligence agency leaders and asked them to push back publicly on the suggestion that the
President had any connection to the Russian election-interference effort, in order to "lilt the cloud"
of the ongoing investigation.
Evidence
In late February 2017, the Department of Justice began an internal analysis of whether
Sessions should recuse &am the Russia investigatian based on his role in the 2016 Trump
Campaign. ' O n March 1, 2017, the press reported that, in his January confirmation hearing to
become Attorney General, Senator Sessions had not disclosed two meetings he had with Russian
Ambassador Kislyak before the presidential election, leading to congressional calls for Sessions
to recuse or for a special counsel to investigate Russia's interference in the presidential election.
Also on March I, the President called Comey and said he w'anted to check in and see how
Cainey was doing.' ' A ccording to an email Camey sent to his chief af staff after the call, the
**
President "talked about Sessions a bit, said that he had heard Comey was "doing great," and said
that he hoped Comey would came by to say hello when he was at the White House. s Comey
interpreted the call as an effort by the President to "pull [him] in," but he did not perceive the call
as an attempt by the President to find out what Comey was doing with thc Flynn investigation,
The next morning, the President called McGahn and urged him to contact Sessions to tell
him not to recuse himself,trom the Russia investigation.'rs McGahn understood the Presiderit to
be concerned that a recusal would make Sessions look guilty for omitting details in his
confirmation hearing leave the President unprotected from an investigation that could hobble the
presidency and derail his policy objectives; and detract from favorable press coverage of a
Presidential Address to Congress the President had delivered earlier in the week. s McGahn
reached out to Sessions and reported that the President was not happy about the possibility of
recusal. S e ssions replied that he intended to follow the rules on recusal.s ' McGahn reported
back to the President about the call with Sessions, and the President I'eiterated that he did not want
Sessions to recuse.~' Throughout the. day, McGahn continued trying on behalf of the President to
avert Sessions*s recusal by speaking to Sessions's personal counsel, Sessions's chief of staff, and
Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, and by contacting Sessions himself two more times.s"
Sessions recalled that other White House advisors also called him that day to argue against his
recusal.s~
That atternoon, Sessions announced his decision to recuse "from any existing or future
inveshgations of any matters related in any way to the campaigns for President of the United
States." s Sessions believed the decision to recuse was not a close call, given the applicable
of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI) ("[H]e called me one day.. .. [H]e just called to check in
and tell me I was doing an awesome job, and wanted to see how I was doing.").
'~ Comey 11/I 5/17 302, at 17-18.
~" McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 16.
McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 16-17; see SC AD 00123 (Donaldson 3/2/17 Notes) (" Just in the
middle of another Russia Fiasco.").
s" Sessions I/17/18 302, at 3.
' ' McGahn I I/30/17 302, at 17.
"~ McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 17.
rs McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 18-19; Sessions I/17/18 302, at 3; Hunt 2/I/18 302, at 4; Donaldson
11/6/17 302, at 8-10; see Hunt-000017; SC AD 00121 (Donaldson 3/2/17 Notes).
~+ Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 3.
'~ Attorney General Sessions Statement on Recusal, Department of Justice Press Release (Mar. 2,
2017) (" During the course of the last several weeks, I have met with the relevant senio'r career Department
officials to discuss whether I should recuse myself fmm any matters arising from thc campaigns for
President of the United States. Having concluded those meetings today, I have decided to recuse myself
from any exisgng or future investigations of any matters related in any way to the campaigns for President
of the United States."). At the time of Sessions's recusal, Dana Boente, then the Acting Deputy Attorney
G eneraland U.S. Attorney forthe Eastern District of V irginia, became the Acung Attorney Generalfor
campaign-related matters pursuant to an executive order specifying the order of succession at the
Department of Justice. Id. (" Consistent with the succession order for the Department of Justice,. .. Dans
Boente shall act as and perform the functions of the Attorney General with respect to any matters from
U.S. Department of Justice
//
language in thc Code of Federal Begulations (CFR), which Sessions considered to be clear and
decisive.z S essions thought that any argument that the CFR did not apply to him was "very
thin." ' S essions got the impression, based on calls he received from White House officials, that
the President was very upset with him and did not think he had done his duty as Attorney
Generakz's
Shortly after Sessions announced his recusal, the White House Counsel's Office directed
that Sessions should not be contacted about the matter. ' I nternal White House Counsel's Office
notesfiom March 2,2017, state "No contactw/Sessions" and "No comms /Serious concerns about
obstruction."
On March 3, the day after Sessions's recusal, McGahn was called irito the Oval Office.zin
Other advisors were there, including priebus and Barmen.'sz T h c president opened the
conversation by saying, "I don't have a lawyer."zss The President expressed anger at McGahn
about the recusal and brought up Roy Cohn, stating that he wished Cohn was his attorney.zs4
MrGahn interpreted this comment as directed at him, suggesting that Cohn would fight for the
which I have recused myself to the extent they exist."); sea Exec. Order No. 13775, 82 Fed. Reg. 10697
(Feb. 14, 2017).
zs' Sessions 1/17/I 8 302, at 1-2. 28 C.F.R. 5 45.2 provides that "no employee shall participate in a
criminal investigation or prosecution if he has a person'al or political relationship with. .. [a]ny person or
organization substantially involved in the conduct that is the subject of the investigation or prosecution,"
and defines "political relationship*' as "a rlose identification with an elected official, a candidate (whether
or not successful) for elective, public office, a political party, or a campaign organization, arising from
service as a principal adviser thereto or a principal official thereof."
' Sessions 1/1 7/18 302, at 2.
" Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 3.
' Donaldson 11/6/17302,at ll; SC AD 00123(Donaldson3/2/17Notes). It isnotclear whether
the President was aware of the White House Counsel's Office direction not to contact Sessions about his
recusal.
" SC AD 00123 (Donaldson 3/2/17 Notes). McGahn said he believed the note "No comms /
Serious concerns about obstruction" may have referred to concerns McGahn had about the press team
saying "crazy things" and trying to spin Sessions's recusal in a way that would raise concerns about
obsuuction. McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 19. Donaldson recalled that "'No comms" referred to the order that
no one should contact Sessions. Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 11.
" McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 2.
" M cGahn 12/12/17 302, at 2.
zs' McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 2.
i McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 2. Cohn.had previously served as a lawyer for the President during
his career as a private businessman. Priebus recalled that when the President talked about Cohn, he said
Cohn would win cases for hiin that had no chance, and that Cohn had done incredible things for him.
Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 5. Bannon recalled the President describing Cohn as a winner and a fixer, someone
who got things done, Barmen 2/14/18 302, at 6.
U.S. Department of Justice
President whereas McGahn would not.rss The President wanted McGahn to talk to Sessions about
the recusal, but McGahn told the President that DOJ ethics oflicials had weighed in on Sessions's
decision to recuse.~s The President then brought up former Attorneys General Robert Kennedy
and Eric Holder and said that they had protected their presidents. sr The President also pushed
back on the DOJ contacts policy, and said words to the effect of, '"You' re telling me that Bobby
and Jack didn't talk about investigations? Or Obama didn't tell Eric Holder who to investigate7"' '
Bannon recalled that the President was as mad as Bannon had ever seen him and that he screamed
at McGahn about how weak Sessions was.sw Bannon recalled telling the President that Sessions's
recusal was not a surprise and that before the inauguration they had discussed that Sessions would
have to recuse from campaign-related investigations because of his work on t he Trump
Campaign. o
That weekend, Sessions and McGahn flew to Mar-a-Lago to meet with the President.M'
Sessions recalled that the President pulled him aside to speak to him alone and suggested that
Sessions should "unrecuse" from the Russia investigation. r The President contrasted Sessions
with Attorneys General Holder and Kennedy, who had developed a strategy to help their presidents
where Sessions had not. o Sessions said he had the impression that the President feared that the
investigation could spin out of control and disrupt his ability to govern, which Sessions could have
helped avert if he were still overseeing it.sos
O'n March 5, 2017, the White House Counsel's Office was informed that the FBI was
asking for transition-period records relating to Flynn — indicating that the FBI was still actively
investigating him. O n March 6, the President told advisors he wanted to call the Acting Attorney
General ta find out whether the White House or the President was being investigated, although it
is not clear whether the President knew at that time of the FBI's recent request concerning Flynn."
On March 9, 2017, Comey briefed the "Gang of Eight" congressional leaders about thc
FBI's investigation of Russian interference, including an identification af thc principal U,S.
subjects of the investigation. Al t hough it is unclear whether the President knew of that briefing
at the time, notes taken by Annie Donaldson, then McGahn's chief of staff, on March 12, 2017,
state, "POTUS in panic/chaos... Need binders to put in front of POTUS. (I) All things related
to Russia/a T h e week after Camey's briefing, the White Hause Counsel *s Office was in contact
with SSCI Chairman Senator Richard Burr abaut the Russia investigations and appears ta have
received information about the status of the FBI investigation.'c'
On March 20, 2017, Comey was scheduled to testify before HPSCI. ' I n advance of
Comey's testimony, congressional officials made clear that they wanted Camey to provide
information about the ongoing FBI investigation."' Dana Boentc, who at that time was the Acting
Attorney General for the Russia investigation, authorized Comey to confirm the existence of the
Russia investigation and agreed that Comey should decline to comment on whether any particular
individuals, including the President, were being investigated. ts
" D onaldson 11/6/17 302, at 14; scc SC AD 000168 (Danaldson 3/6/17 Notes) ("POTUS wants
to call Dana [then the Acting Attorney General far campaign-related investigations]I Is investigation / Na /
Wc know something on Flynn / GSA got contacted by FBI / There's something hot").
' ' Camey 11/15/17 302, at 13-14; SNS-Classified-0000140-44 (3/8/17 Email, Gauhar to Page et
al).
SC AD 00188 (Donaldson 3/12/18 Notes). Donaldson said she wss not part of the conversation
that led to these notes, and must have been told about it from athers. Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 13.
Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 14-15. On March 16, 2017, 'the White House Counsel's OAice was
*"
briefed. by Senator Burr on the existcncc af "4-5 targets." Danaldson 11/6/17 3K, at 15. Thc "targets
w ere identified in notes taken by Donaldson as "Flynn (FBI was in — wra in u «D OJ lookingforphone
records"; "Comey«Manafort (Ukr + Russia, not campaign)"; "Carter Page (8
game)' *; and "Greek Guy" (potentially referring to George Papadopou os, later charged with violating 18
U.S.C. [1 1001 forlyingtothe FBI). SC AD 00198(Donaldson 3/16/17Notes). Donaldson and McGahn
both said they believed these were targets of SSCI. Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 15; McGahn 12/12/17 302,
at 4. But SSCI does not formally investigate individuals as "targets'*; the notes on their face reference the
FBI„ the Department of Justice, and Comey; and the noma track the background materials prepared by the
FBI for Camey's briefing to the Gang af 8 on Match 9. Sce SNS-Classified-0000140-44 (3/8/17 Email,
Gauhar to Page et al.); sesalso Danaldsan 11/6/1 7 302, at 15 (Donaldson could nat rule out that Burr had
tald McGahn those individuals were the FBI's targets).
" Hearing on Ralston Election Tampenng Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence
Committee>115th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017).
"' Comey 11/15/17 302, at 16; McCabc 8/17/17, at 15; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 1.
" B acntc I/31/1 8 302„at 5; Comcy 11/1 5/17 302, at 16-17.
U.S. Department of Justice
//
In his opening remarks at the HPSCI hearing, which were dratted in consultation with the
Department of Justice, Comey stated that he had "been authorized by the Department of Justice to
confirm that the FBI, as part of [its] counterintelligence mission, is investigating the Russian
government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election and that includes investigating
the nature of any inks between individuals associated with the Trump campaign and the Russian
governm
ent and whether there was any coordination between the campaign and Russia's efforts.
As with any counterintelligence investigation, this will also include an assessment of whether any
crimes were committed.'*s's Comey added that he would not comment further on what the. FBI
was "doing and whose conduct [it] [was] examining" because the investigation was ongoing and
classified — but he observed that he had "taken the extraordinary step in consultation with the
Department of Justice of briefing this Congress's leaders... in a classified setting in detail about
the investigation.'o'4 Comey was specifically asked whether President Trump was "under
investigation during the campaign" or "under investigation now." ' C omey declined to answer,
stating, ' *Please don't over interpret what I' ve said as — as the chair and ranking know,, we have
bri efed him iti great 'detail on the subjects of the investigation and what we'rc doing, but I'm not
*'s'4 Comey was also asked whether the FBI was
gonna answer about anybody in this forum.
investigating the information contained in the Steeh: repoiting, and he declined to answer."
According to McGahn and Donaldson„ the President had expressed frustration with Comey
before his March 20 testimony, and the testimony made matters worse. 's The President had
previously criticized Comey for too frequently making headlines and for not attending intelligence
briefings at the White House, and the President suspected Comey of leaking certain information
to the media. 's McGahn said the President thought Comey was acting like "his own branch of
government." z
m' Hearing an Russian Election Tampering Before the House permanent Select Intslligsncc
Committee, 115th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 11) (testimony by FBI Director James
B. Comey); Comey 11/15/17 302, at 17; Boente 1/31/18 302, at 5 (confirming that the Department of Justice
authorized Comey's remarks).
Hearing on Russian EIection Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence
Committee, 115th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 11} (testimony by FBI Director James
B. Comey ).
Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence
Committee, 115th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 130) (question by Rep. Swalwell).
" Hearing on Russian Election Tamper/ng Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence
Committee, 115th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) ('CQ Cong, Transcripts, at 130) (testimony by FBI Director James
B. Comey}.
Hearing on Russian. Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intstltgsncs
Committee, 115th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 143} (testimony by FBI Director James
B. Comey).
'i' Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 21; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 7.
" D onaldson 11/6/17 302, at 21; McGahn 12/1 2/17 302, at 6-9.
"' McGabn 12/12/17 302, at 7.
53,
U,S. Department of Justice
Press reports following Comey's March 20 testimony suggested that the FBI w as
investigating the President, contraiy to what Comey had told the President at the end,of the January
6, 2017 intelligence assessment briefing. ' M cGahn, Donaldson, and senior advisor Stephen
Miller recalled that the President was upset with Comey's testimony and the press coverage that
followed because of the suggestion that the President was under investigation. z Notes from the
White House Counsel's Office dated March 21, 2017, indicate that the President was "beside
himself" over Comey's testimony,. ' The President called McGahn repeatedly that day to ask him
to intervene with the Department of Justice, and, according to the notes, the President was *getting
'
hotter and hotter, get rid?'nm Officials in the White House Counsel's Office became so concerned
that the President would fire Coniey that they began drafting a memorandum that examined
whether the President needed cause to terminate the FBI director.
At the President*s urging, McGahn contacted Boente several times on March 21, 2011, to
seek Boente's assistance in having Camey or the Department of Justice correct the misperception
that the President was under investigation.sic Boente did not specifically recall the conversations,
although he did remember one conversation with McGahn around this time where McGahn asked
if there was a way to speed up or end the Russia investigation as quickly as possible.'s' Boente
said McGahn told him the President was under a cloud and it made it hard for him to govern. ss
Boente recalled telling McGahn that there was no good way to shorten the investigation and
attempting to do so could erode confidence 'in the investigation's conclusions.sz' Boente said
McGahn agreed and dropped the issue. ' The President also sought to speak with Boente directly,
but McGahn told the President that Boente did not want to talk to the President about the request
u Eg., Matt Apuzzo et al., FB.I. Is Investigagng Trump's Russia Ties, Comey Confirms, New
York Times (Mar. 20, 2017); Andy Greenberg, The FBI Has Been Investigating Trump 's Russia Ties Since
July, Wired (Mar. 20, 2017); Julie Borger k, Spencer Ackerman, Trump-Russia collusion is heing
investigated hy FBI, Comey coriPrms, Guardian (Mar. 20, 2017); see Comey 1/6/17 Memorandum, at 2.
n Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 16-17; S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 4; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 5-7.
n' SC AD 00213 (Donaldson 3/21/17 Notes), The notes from that day also indicate that the
President referred to the "Comey bombshell" which "made [him] look like a fool." S C A D 00206
(Donaldson 3/21/17 Notes).
SC AD 00210 (Donaldson 3/21/17 Notes).
SCR016 000002-05 (White House Counsel *s Office Memoranduin). White House Counsel's
Office attorney Uttam Dhillon did not recall a triggering event causing the White House Counsel's Office
to begin this research. Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 5. Metadsta from the document, which was provided by
the White House, establishes that it was created on March 21, 2017.
t' Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 16-21; McGshn 12/12/17 302, at 5-7.
' Boente 1/31/18 302, at 5.
Boente 1/31/18 302, at 5.
"' Boente 1/31/18 302, at 5.
to intervene with Comey. s' McGahn recalled Boente telling him in calls that day that he did not
think it was sustainable for Comey to stay on as FBI director lbr the next four years, which
McGahn said he conveyed to the President,s ' Boente did not recall discussing with MeGahn or
anyone else the idea that Comey should not continue as FBI director.s '
In the weeks following Comey's March 20, 2017 testimony, the President repeatedly asked
intelligence community officials to push back publicly on any suggestion that the President had a
connection to the Russian election-interference effort.
On March 22, 2017, the President asked Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats and
CIA Director Michael Pompeo to stay behind in the Oval Office after a Presidential Daily
Briefing."4 According to Coats, the President asked them whether they could say publicly that no
link existed between him and Russia.s s Coats responded that the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI} has nothing to do with investigations and it was not his role to make a public
statement on the Russia investigation.sss Pompeo had no recollection of being asked to stay behind
atter th'e March 22 briefing, but he recalled that the President regularly urged officials to get the
word out that he had not done anything wrong related to Russia."r
Coats told this Of5ce that the President never asked him to speak to Comey about the FBI
investigation. s Some ODNI staffers, however, had a different recollection of how Coats
described the meeting immediately atter it occurred. According to senior ODNI official Michael
Dempsey, Coats said atter the meeting that the President had brought up thc Russia investigation
and asked him to co'ntact C'omey to see if there was a way to get past the investigation, gct it over
with, end it, or words to that effect.sss Dempsey said that Coats described the President *s
comments as falling "somewhere between musing about hating the investigation" and wanting
Coats to "do something to stop it." De m psey said Coats made it clear that he would not get
involved with an ongoing FBI investigation.s" Edward Gistaro, another ODNI offtcia1, recalled
"' SC AD 00210 (Donaldson 3/21/17 Notes); McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 7; Donaldson 11/6/17
302, at 19.
McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 7; Burnham 11/03/17 302, at 11.
'+ Boente 1/31/18 302, at 3.
55
U.S. Department of Justice
//
that right after Coats's meeting with the President, on the walk from the Oval Office back to the
Eisenhower Executive Office Building, Coats said that the President had kept him behind to ask
him what he could do to "help with the investigation.*'~2 Another ODNI staffer who had been
waiting for Coats outside the Oval Office talked to Gistaro a few minutes later and recalled Gistaro
reporting that Coats was upset because the President had asked him to contact Comey to convince
him there was nothing to the Russia investigation.
On Saturday, March 25, 2017, three days atter the meeting in the Oval Once„ the President
called Coats and again complained about the Russia investigations, saying words to the effect of,
"I can't do anything with Russia, there's things I'd like to, do with Russia, with trade, with ISIS,
they' re all over me with this/a44 Coats told the President that the investigations were going to go
on and the best thing to do was to let them run their course.s4 Coats later testified in a
congressionalhearing that he had "never felt pressure to intervene or interfere in any way and
shape — with shaping intelligence in a political way, or in relationship . . . t o an ongoing
investigation.'
On March 26, 2017, the day atter the President called Coats, the President called NSA
Director Admiral Michael Rogers. 4 T h e President expressed frustrationwith the Russia
investigation, saying that it made relations with the Russians difficult.s s The president told
Rogers "the thing with the Russians [wa]s messing up" his ability to get things done with Russia.~'
The President also said that the news stories linking him with Russia were not true and asked
Rogers if he could do anything to refute the stories.see Deputy Director of the NSA Richard
Ledgett, who was present for the call„said it was the most unusual thing he had experienced in 40
years of government service. s' After the call concluded, Ledgett prepared a memorandum that
he and Rogers both signed docuiiMnting the content of the conversation and the President*s
request, and they placed the memorandum in a safe.sss But Rogers did not perceive the President's
request to be an order„and the President did not ask Rogers to push back on the Russia
investigation itself sss Rogers later testified in a congressional hearing that as NSA Director he
had "never been directed to do anything [he] believe[d] to be illegal, immoral, unethical or
inappropriate*' and did "not recall ever feeling pressured to do so/os4
In addition to the specific comments made to Coats, Pompeo, and Rogers, the President
spoke on other occasions in the presence of intelligence community oAicials about the Russia
investigation and stated that it interfered with his ability to conduct foreign relations.'s' On at least
two occasions, the President began Presidential Daily Briefings by stating that there was no
collusion with Russia and he hoped a press statement to that effect could bc issued.'s Pompeo
recalled that the President vented about the investigation on multiple occasions, complaining that
there was no evidence against him and that nobody would publicly defend him.s 7 Rogers recalled
a private conversation with the President in which he "vent[ed]" about the investigation,, said he
had done nothing wrong, and said something like the "Russia thing has got to go away."'s' Coats
recalled the President bringing up the Russia investigation several times, and Coats said hc finally
told the President that Coats's job was to provide intelligenec and not get involved in
investigations.' '
On the morning of March 30, 2017, the President reached out to Comey directly about the
Russia invesngation. A c c ording to Comey's contemporaneous record of the conversation, the
President said "he was trying to run the country and the cloud of this Russia business was making
that difficult." m The President asked Comey what could be done to "lift the cloud." ss Comey
explained "that we were running it down as quickly as possible and that there would be great
benefit, if we didn't find anything, to our Good Housekeeping seal of approval, but we had to do
our work. ass Comey also told the President that congressional leaders were aware that the FBI
was not investigating thc President personally. 4 The President said several times, "We need to
get that fact out."sss The President commented that if there was "some satellite" (which Comey
took to mean an associate of the President's or the campaign) that did something, "it would be
good to find that out" but that he himself had not done anything wrong and he hoped Comey
"would find a way to get out that we weren't investigating him/ass After the, call ended, Comey
called Boente and told him about the conversation, asked for guidance on how to respond, and said
he was uncomfortable with direct contact Irom the president about the investigation. s
On the morning of April 11, 2017, the President called Camey again,sss According to
Comey's contemporaneous record of the conversation, the President said he was "following up to
see if [Comey] did what [the President] had asked last time — getting out that he personally is not
under investigation." s' Comey responded that he had passed the request to Boente but not heard
back, and he informed the President that the traditional channel for such a request would be to
s ' Comey 3/30/17 Memoraiidum, at 1. Comey subsequently testified before Congress about this
conversation and described it to our Office; his recollections were consistent with his memorandum.
Hearing on Russian Election Interfsi ence Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong.
(' June 8, 201 7) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 6); Comey
11/15/17 302, at 18.
" C omey 3/30/17 Memorandum, at I; Camey 11/15/17 302, at 18.
m' Comey 3/30/17 Memorandum, at I; Comey 11/15/17 302, at 18.
' 4 Comey 3/30/1 7 Memorandum, at I; Hearing on Russian Election Intevference Before the Senate
Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statemeni, for the Record of James B. Comey,
former Director of the FBI, at 6).
' Comey 3/30/17 Memorandum, at ]; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate
Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey,
former Director of the FBI„at 6).
w Camey 3/30/I 7 Memorandum, at I; Hcanng an Russian Election Interference Before the Senate
Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement foi' the Record of James B. Comey,
former Director of the FBI, at 6-7).
' " Comey 3/30/17 Memorandum, at 2; Boente I/31/18 302, at 6-7; Hearing an Russian Election
Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Comm/tree, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for
the Record of James B. Comey, foimer Diiector of the FBI, at 7).
" SCR012b 000053 (President's Daily Diary, 4/11/17, reflecting call to Comey from 8:27 — 8:31
a.m.); Camey 4/11/17 Memorandum, at 1 ("I returned the president's call this morning at 8:26 am BDT.
We spake for about four minutes.").
' Comey 4/11/17 Memorandum, at 1. Comey subsequently testified before Congress about this
conversation and his recollections were consistent with his memo. He a ring on Russian Election
Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for
the Record of James B. Comey, forme'r Director of the FBI, at 7).
U.S. Department of Justice
//
have thc White House Counsel contact DOJ leadership, ' T he President said he would take that
step."' The President then added, "Because I have been very loyal to you, very loyal, we had that
thing, you know."sv In a televised interview that was taped early that aflemnoo, the President was
asked if it was too late for him to ask Comey to step down; the President responded, "No, it's not
too late, but you know, I have confidence in him. We' ll see what happens. You know, it's going
to be interesting.'o7s After the interview, Hicks told the President she thought the President's
comment about Comey should be removed from the broadcast of the interview, but the President
wanted to keep it in, which Hicks thought was unusual.
Later that day, the President told senior advisors, including McGahn and Priebus, that he
had reached out to Comey twice in recent weeks."s The President acknowledged that MrGahn
would not approve of the outreach to Corncy because McGahn had previously cautioned the
President that he should not talk to Comey directly to prevent any perception that the White House
was interfering with investigations.s T he President told McGahn that Comey had indicated the
FBI could make a public statement that the President was not under investigation if the Department
of Justice approved that action.'v A fler speaking with the President, McGahn followed up with
Boente to relay the President's understanding that the FBI could make a public announcement if
the Deparnnent of Justice cleared it.s M c Gahn recalled that Boente said Comey had told him
there was nothing obstructive about the calls from the President, but they made Comey
uncomfortable.sw According to McGahn, Bocnte responded that he did not want to issue a
statement about the President not being under investigation because of the potential political
ramifications and did not want to order Comey to do it because that action could prompt the
appointmcnt of a Special CounseL" B o ente did not recall that aspect of his conversation with
McGahn, but did recall telling McGahn that the direct outreaches from thc President to Camey
were a problem.ssi Boente recalled that McGahn agreed and said he would do what he could to
address that issue.s~
Aiiulysis
In analyzing the Pr'esident's reaction to Sessions's recusal and the requests hc. made. to
Coats, Pompeo, Rogers, and Comey, the following evidence is relevant to the elements of
obstruction of justice:
a, Obs t ructive act. T h e evidence shows that, aller Comey's March 20, 2017
testimony, the President repeatedly reached out to intelligence agency leaders to discuss the FBI's
investigation. But witnesses had different recollections of the precise content of those outreaches.
Some ODNI officials recalled that Coats told them immediately aller the March 22 Oval OI5ce
meeting that the President asked Coats to intervene with Comey and "stop" the investigation. But
the first-hand witnesses to the encounter remember the conversation differently. Pompeo had no
memory of the specific ineeting, but generally recalled the President urging officials to get the
word out that the President had not done anything wrong related to Russia. Coats recalled that the
President asked that Coats state publicly that no link existed between the President and Russia, but
did not ask him to speak with Camey or to help end the investigation. The other outreaches by the
President during this period were similar in nature. The Presiderit asked Rogers if he could do
anything to refute the stories linking the President to Russia, and the President asked Comey to
make a public statement that would "lift the cloud" of the ongoing investigation by making clear
that the President was not personally under investigation. These requests, while significant enough
that Rogers thought it important to document the encounter in a written memorandum, were not
interpreted by the officials who received them as directives to improperly interfere with the
investigation.
c. Int ent, As described above, the evidence does not establish that the Prerddent asked
or directed intelligence agency leaders to stop or interfere with the FBI's Russia investigation-
*
and the President affirmatively told Comey that if "some satellite' was involved in Russian '
election interference "it would be good to find that out." But the President's intent in trying to
prevent Sessions's recusal, and in reaching out to Coats, Pompeo, Rogers, and Comey following
The evidence shows that the President was focused on the Russia investigation's
implications for his presidency — and, specifically, on dispelling any suggestion that hc was under
investigation or had links to Russia. In early March, thc President attempted to prevent Sessions's
recusal, even after being told that Sessions was following DOJ conflict-of-interest rules. After
Sessions recused, the White House Counsel's Office 0 icd to cut off further contact with Sessions
about the matter, although it is not clear whether that direction was conveyed to the President. The
President continued to raise the issue of Sessions's recusal and, when he had the opportunity, he
pulled Sessions aside and urged him to unrecuse. The President also told advisors that he wanted
an Attorney General who would protect him, the way he perceived Robert Kennedy and Eric
Holder to have protected thcii presidents. The Prcsi'dent made statements about being able to direct
the course of criminal investigations, saying words to the effect of, "You' re telling me that Bobby
and Jack didn't talk about investigational Or Obama didn't tell Eric Holder who to investigate'I"
Aller Comey publicly confirmed the existence of the FBI's Russia investigation on March
20, 2017, the President was "beside himself" and expressed anger that Comey did not issue a
statement correcting any misperception that the President himself was under investigation. The
President sought to speak with Acting Attorney General Bocnte directly and told McGahn to
contact Boente to request that Comey make a clarifying statement. The President then asked other
intelligence community leaders to make public statements to refute the suggestion that the
President had links to Russia, but the leaders told him they could not publicly comment on the
investigation. On March 30 and Apt il 11, against the advice of White House advisors who had
informed him that any direct contact with the FBI could be perceived as improper interference in
an ongoing investigation, the President inade personal outreaches to Comey asking him to "lift the
cloud" of the Russia investigation by making public the fact that the President was not personally
under investigation.
Evidence indicates that the President was angered by both the existence of the Russia
inves'tigation and the public reporting that he was under investigation, which he knew was not true
based on Comey's representations. The President complained to advisors thatif people thought
Russia helped him with the election, it would detract fiom what he had accomplished.
Other evidence indicates that the President was concerned about the impact of the Russia
investigation on his ability to govern. The President complained that the perception that he was
under investigation was hurting his ability to conduct foreign relations, particularly with Russia.
The President told Coats he "can*t do anything with Russia," he 'told Rogers that "the thing with
the Russians'* was interfering with his ability to conduct foreign affairs, and he told Comey that
"he was trying to run thc country and the cloud of this Russia business was inaking that difficult."
U.S. Department of Justice
Overview
Comey was scheduled to testify before Congress on May 3, 2017. Leading up to that
testimony, the President continued to tell advisors that he wanted Comey to make public that the
President was not under investigation. At the hearing, Comey declined to answer questions about
the scope or subjects of the Russia investigation arid did not state publicly that the President was
not under investigation. Two days later, on May 5„2017, the President told close aides hc was
going to fire Comey, and on May 9, he did so, using his official termination letter to make public
that Co'mey had on three occasions informed the President that he was not under investigation.
The President decided to fire Comey before receiving advice or a recommendation from the
Department of Justices but he approved an initial public account of the termination that attributed
it to a recommendation from the Department of Justice based on Comey's handling of the Clinton
email investigation. Afier Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein resisted attributing the firing
to his recommendation, the President acknowledged that hc intended to fire Comey regardless of
the DOJ recommendation and was thinking of the Russia investigation when he made the decision.
The President also told the Russian Foreign Minister, "I just fired the head of the F.B.I. He was
crazy, a real nut job. I faced great pressure because of Russia. That's taken off. .. . . V m not
under investigation."
Evidence
1. Come T e stifies Before the Senate Judici C omm ittee and Declines to
Answer uestions About Whether the President is Under Investi ation
On May 3, 2017, Comey was scheduled to testify at an FBI oversight hearing before the
Senate Judiciary Committee.ass MeGahn recalled that in the week leading up to the hearing, the
President said that it would be thc last straw if Comey did not take the opportunity to set the record
straight by publicly announcing that the President was not under investigation.s+ The President
had previously told McGahn that the perception that the President was under investigation was
hurting his ability to carry out his presidential duties and deal with foreign leaders.ass At thc
hearing, Comey declined to answer questions about the status of the Russia invesfigation, stating
"[t]he Department of Justice ha[d] authorized [him] to confirm that [the Russia investigation]
exists," but that he was "not going to say another word about it" until the investigation was
completed. " Comey also declined to answer questions about whether investigators had "ruled
Heanng on Oversight of the FBI before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. (May 3,
2017).
ss4 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 10-11.
n' McGahn 12/12/1 7 302, at 7, 10-11 (McGahn believed that two foreign leaders had expressed
sympathy to the Piesident, for being under investigation); SC AD 00265 (Donaldson 4/11/17 Notes) ("P
Called Comcy — Day we told him not to? ' Y o u are no't under investigation' NK/China/Sapping
Credibility" ).
's Hearing on FBI Oversight Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. (CQ Cong.
Transcripts, at 70) (May 3, 2017) (testimony by FBI Director James Cuiue''. Comcy repeated this point
U,S. Department of Justice
//
out anyone in thc Ttump campaign as potentially a target of th[e] criminal investigation," including
whether the FBI had "ruled out the president of the United States." sv
Comey was also asked at the hearing about his decision to announce 11 days before the
presidential election that the FBI was reopening the Clinton email investigation.ss' Comey stated
that it made him "mildly nauseous to thmk that we might have had some impact on the election,"
but added that "even in hindsight" he "would make the same decision."ss He later repeated that
he had no regrets about how he had handled the email investigation and believed he had "done thc
right thing at each turn.'"
In the afternoon following Comcy's testimony, thc President met with McGahn„Sessions,
and Sessions*s Chief of Staff Jody Hunt.'s' At that meeting, the President asked McGahn how
Comey had done in his testimony and McGahn relayed that Comey had declined to answer
questions about whether the President was under investigation.sss The President became very
upset and directed his anger at Sessions.s~ According to notes written by Hunt, the President said,
"This is terrible Jeff. I t ' s all because you recused. AG i s supposed to be most important
appointment. Kennedy appointed his brother. Obama appointed Holder. I appointed you. and you
recused yourself. You Ietl mc on an island. I can't do anything." 4 The President said that the
recusal was unfair and that it was interfering with his ability to govern and undermining his
authority with foreign leaders.s Sessions responded that he had had no choice but to recuse, and
it was a mandatory rather than discretionary decision.'~ Hunt recalled that Sessions also stated at
several times during his testimony. See id. at 26 (explaining that he was "not going 'to say another peep
about [the investigation] until we' rc done"); id. at 90 (stating that he would not provide any updates about
the status of investigation "before the matter is concluded" ).
" Hearing on FBI Oversight Before the Senate Jurf/ciury Commi uee, 115th Cong. (May 3, 2017)
(C(J Cong, Transcripts, at 87-88) (questions by Sen, Blumenthal and testimony by FBI Director James B.
Comey).
Hearing on FBI Oversight Before the Senate Jurficirey Comm//tee, 11$th Cong. (May 3, 2017)
(CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 1$) (qucstion by Sen, Feinstein).
Bearing on FBI Oversight Before the Senate, Juegciury Committee, 115th Cong. (May 3, 2017)
(C() Cong. Transcripts, at 17) (testimony by FBI Director James B. Comey').
" H earing on FBI Overs/ g/rr Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. (May 3, 2017)
(CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 92) (testimony by FBI Director James B. Comcy).
s ' Sessions I/I 7/1 8 302, at 8; Hunt 2/I/18 302; at 8.
Sessions 1/I 7/18 302, at 8; Hunt-000021 (Hunt 5/3/17 Notes); McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 6.
s" Sessions Il17/18 302, at 8-9.
' Hunt-000021 (Hunt 5/3/17 Notes). Hunt said that he wrote down notes describing this meeting
and others with the President atter the events occurred. Hunt 2/I/17 302, at 2.
s Hunt-00002.1-22 (Hunt 5/3/17 Notes) ("I have foreign leaders saying they are sorry I am being
invesdgated."); Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 8 (Sessions recalled that a Chinese leader had said to the President
that hc was sorry the President was under investigation, which the President interpreted as undermining his
authority); Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 8.
'" Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 8; Hunt-000022 (Hunt 5l3l17 Notes).
63
U.S. Department of Justice
//
some point during the conversation that a new Cart at the FBI would be appropriate and the
President should consider replacing Comey as FBI director.' Ac c ording to Sessions, when the
meeting concluded, it was clear that the President was unhappy with Comcy, but Sessions did not
think the President had made the decision to terminate Camey.iw
Bannon recalled that the President brought Comey up with him at least eight times on May
3 and May 4, 2017. w According to Bannon, the President said the same thing each time: "He
told me three times I'm not under investigation. He's a showboater. He's a grandstander. I don' t
know any Russians. There was no collusion."»m Bannon told the President that he could not fire
Comey because "that ship had sailed."»in Bannon also told the President that firing Comey was
not going to stop the investigation, cautioning him that he could fire the FBI director but could not
fire the FBI.»'
The weekend following Corney's May 3, 201 7 testimony, thc President traveled to his
resort in Bedminster, New Jersey," A t a dinner on Friday, May 5, attended by thc President and
various advisors and fainily members, including Jared Kushner and senior advisor Stephen Miller„
the President stated that he wanted to remove Comey and had ideas for a letter that would be used
to make the announcement.~» The President dictated arguments and sperific language for the
letter, and Miller took notes.» s As reflected in the notes, the President told Miller that the letter
should stait, "While I greatly appreciate you informing me that I am not under investigation
concerning what I have often stated is a fabricated story on a Trump-Russia relationship-
pertaining to the 2016 presidential election, please be informed that I, and I believe the American
*'»~ Following the
public — including Ds and Rs — have lost faith in you as Director of the FBI.
dinner, Miller prepared a termination letter based on those notes and research he. conducted to
support the President*s arguments.»~ Over the weekend„ the President provided several rounds of
" Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 20-21; see Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 28.
'" S. Millet 10/31/17 302, at 4-5; SCR025 000019 (President*s Daily Diary, 5/4/17).
edits on the draft letter." s Miller said the President was adamant that he not tell anyone at the
White House what they were preparing because the President was worried about leaks.
In his discussions with Miller, the President made clear that he wanted the letter to open
with a reference to him not being under investigation.»" M i ller said hc believed that fact was
important to the President to show that Comey was not being terminated based on any such
investigation. " According to Miller, the President wanted to establish as a factual matter that
Comey had been under a "review period" and did not have assurance from the President that he
would be permitted to keep his job.4's
The final version of the termination letter prepared by Miller and the President began in a
way that closely tracked what the President had dictated to Miller at the May 5 dinner "Dear
Director Comey, While I greatly appreciate your informing me, on three sepamte occasions, that I
am not under investigation concerning the fabricated and politically-motivated allegaflons of a
Trump-Russia relationship with respect to the 2016 Presidential Election, please be informed that
I, along with members of both political parties and, most importantly, the American Public, have
lost faith in you as the Director' of the FBI and you are hereby terminated."4' The four-page letter
went on to critique Comey*s judgment and conduct, including his May 3 tesflmony before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, his handling of the Clinton email investigation, and his failure to hold
leakers accountable.4'" The letter stated that Comey had "asked [the President] at dinner shortly
after inauguration to let [Comey] stay on in the Director's role, and [the President] said that [he]
would consider it," but the President had "concluded that [he] ha[d] no alternative but to find new
*'"'
leadership for the Bureau — aleader that restores confidence and trust.
In the morning of Monday, May 8, 2017, the President mct in the Oval Office with senior
advisors, including McGahn, Priebus, and Miller, and informed them he had decided to terminate
Comey. ' T h e President read aloud the first paragraphs of the termination letter hc wrote with
Miller and conveyed that the decision had been made and was not up for discussion.s'" The
President told the group that Miller had researcheil the issue and determined the President had the
authority to terminate Camey without cause.e" In an effort to slow down the decision-making
process, McGahn told the President that DOJ leadership was currently discuss~ Camey's status
and suggested that White House Counsel's Office attorneys should talk with Sessions and Rod
Rosenstein, who had recently been confirmed as the Deputy Attorney General.4's McGahn said
that previously scheduled meetings with Sessions and Rosenstein that day would be an opportunity
to find out what they thought about firing Camey.4's
At noon, Sessions, Rosenstein, and Hunt met with McGahn and White House Counsel's
Office attorney Uttam Dhil Ion at the White House.4z' McGahn said that the President had decided
to fire Comey and asked for Sessions's and Rosenstein's views.sss Sessions and Rosenstein
criticized Comey and did not raise concerns about replacing him,4s' McGahn and Dhillon said the
fact that neither Sessions nor Rosenstein objected to replacing Comey gave them peace of mind
that the President's decision to fire Comey was not «n attempt to obstruct justice. An Oval
Office meeting was scheduled later that day so that Sessions and Rosenstein could discuss the
issue with the President.
At around 5 p.m., the President and several White House officials met with Sessions and
Rosenstein to discuss Camey.4zs The President told the group that he had watched Comey's May
'o S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 11 (obscrving that the President started the meeting by saying, "I'm
going to read yau a letter. Don't talk me out of this. I' ve made my decision."); Dhillon 11/21/17 302,. at 6
(the President announced in an irreversible way that he was firing Comey); Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 13
(the President did not leave whether or not ta fire Comey up for discussion); Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 25;
McGabn 12/12/17 302, at 11-12,
"D hillon 302 11/21/17, at 6; Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 13; McGshn 12/12/17 302, at 11.
" McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 12, 13; S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 11; Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 7.
Because of the Attorney Generaps recusal, Rosenstein became the Acting Attorney General for the Russia
invesdgation upon his confirmatio as Deputy Attorney General. See 28 U.S.C. li 508(a) (" In case of a
vacancy in the office of Attorney General, or of his absence or disability, the Deputy Attorney General may
exercise all the duties of that office").
' M cGahn 12/12/17 302, at 12.
sn Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 7; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 13; Gauhar-000056 (Gauhsr 5/16/17
Notes); see Gauhar-000056-72 (2/11/19 Memorandum to File attaching Gauhar handwritten notes) ("Ms.
Gauhar determined that she likely recorded all these nates during one or more meetings on. Tuesday„May
16, 2017.").
McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 13; see Gauhsr-000056 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes).
"' Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 7-9,' Sessions I/17/18 302, at 9; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 13.
"i McGahn 12/I 2/17 302, at 13; Dhillon 11/21/I 7 302, at 9.
"n Hunt-000026 (Hunt 5/8/17 Nates); see Gauhsr-000057 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes).
i' Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at 2; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 14; eee Gauhar-000057 (Gauhar 5/16/17
Notes).
V .S.Department of Justice
I/
3 testimony over the weekend and thaught that something was "not right" with Camey.~'? The
President said that Comey should be removed and asked Sessions and Rosenstein for their
views.4's Hunt, who was in the roam, recalled that Sessions responded that he had previously
recommended that Comey be replaced.~~ McGahn and Dhillon said Rosenstein described his
conceins about Comey's handling. of the Clinton email investigatian. '
The President then distributed capies of the termination letter he had drafted with Miller,
and the discussion turned to the mechanics ofhow ta fire Comey and whether the President's letter
should be used.~" McGahn and Dhillon urged the President ta permit Comey to resign, but the
President was adamant that he be fired.4 The group discussed the possibility that Rosenstein and
Sessions could pravide a recommendation in writing that Comey should be removed.~as The
President agreed and told Rosenstein to draft a memorandum, but said he wanted to receive it fn st
thing the next morning.~s4 Hunt's notes reflect that the President told Rosenstein to include in his
recommendation the fact that Comey had refused to confirm that the President was not personally
under investigation.ass Accoiding to notes taken by a senior DOJ official of Rosenstein's
description of his meeting with the President, the President said, "Put the Russia stuff in the
memo."4ss Rosenstein responded that the Russia investigagon was not the basis of his
recommendatian, so he did not think Russia should be mentioned.i The President told
Rosenstein he would appreciate it if Rosenstein put it in his letter anyway. When Rosenstein
'
left the meeting, he knew that Comey would be terminated, and he told DOJ colleagues that his
own reasons for replacing Comey were "not [the President's] reasons."4~
On May 9, Hunt delivered to the White House a letter from Sessions recommending
Comey's removal and a memorandum f'rom Rosenstein, addressed to the Attorney General, titled
"Restoring Public Confidence in the FBI,*~4c McGahn recalled that the President liked the DOJ
letters and agreed that they should provide the foundation for a new cover letter from the President
accepting the recommendation to terminate Comeyan N otes taken by Donaldson on May 9
reflected the view of the White House Counsel's Office that the President's original termination
*
letter should "[n]ot [see the] light of day*' and that it would be better to offer "[n]o other rationales'
for the firing than what was in Rosenstein's and Sessions's memoranda.44i The President asked
Miller to draft a new terminahon letter and directed Miller to say in the letter that Comey had
informed the President three times that he was not under investigation.~ M cGahn, Priebus, and
a
Dhillon objected to including that language, but the President insisted that it be included.
McGahn, Priebus, and others perceived that language to be the most important part of the letter to
' Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at 2; Gauhar-000059 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes) ("DAG reasons not their
reasons [PDTUS]"); Gauhar-000060 (Gauhar 5/16/I 7 Notes) ("I" draft had a recommendation. Took it out
b/c knew decision had already been made."),
i4 Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at 4; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 15; 5/9/I 7 Letter, Sessions to President
Trump (" Based on my evaluation, and for the reasons expressed by the Deputy Attorney General in the
attached meinorandum, I have concluded that a fresh start is needed at the leadership of the FBI."); 5/9/I'7
Memorandum, Rosenstein to Sessions (concluding with, "The way the Director handled the conclusion of
the email investigation was wrong. As a result, the FBI is unlikely to regain public and congressional trust
until it has a Director who understands the gravity of the mistakes and pledges never to repeat them. Having
refused to admit his ermrs, the Director cannot be expected to implement the necessary corrective actions.").
' S. Miller 10/31/17 302,, at 12; McGabn 12/12/1 7 302„at 15; Hunt-000031 (Hunt 5/9/17 Notes).
' SC AD 00342 (Donaldson 5/9/17 Notes). Donaldson also wrote "[i]s this the beginning of the
end?" because she was worried that the decision to terminate Comey and the mannet' in which it was carried
out would be the end of the presidency. Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 25.
""' S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 12; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 15; Hunt-000032 (Hunt 5/9/17 Notes).
4ii McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 15; S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 12; Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 8, 101
Priebus 10/1 3/17 302, at 27; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 14-15; Hunt-000032 (Hunt 5/9/I 7 Notes).
U.S. Department of Justice
//
thc President."ss Dhillon made a final pitch to the President that Comey should be permitted to
resign, but thc President refused.sss
Around thc time the President's Ieuer was finalized, Priebus summoned Spicer and the
press team to the Oval Office, where they were told that Comey had been terminated for the reasons
stated in the letters by Rosenstein and Sessions.4" To announce Comey's termination, the White
House released a statement, which Priebus thought had been dictated by the President."ss In full,
the statement read: "Today, President Donald J. Trump informed FBI Direct'or James Comey that
he has been terminated and removed from office. President Trump acted based on the clear
recommendations of both Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein and Attorney General Jeff
Sessions."~'
That evening, FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe was summoned to meet with thc
President at the White House.ss The President told McCabe that he had fired Comey because of
the decisions Comey had made in the Clinton email investigation and for many other reasons.ss'
The President asked McCabe if he was aware that Comey had told the President three times that
he was not under investigation.sss The President also asked McCabe whether many people in the
FBI disliked Comey and whether McCabe was patt of the "resistance" that had disagreed with
Comcy's decisions in the Clinton investigation.sss McCabe told the President that he knew Comey
had told the President he was not under investigation, that most people in the FBI felt positively
about Comey, and that McCabe worked "very closely" with Comey and was part of all the
decisions that had been made in the Clinton investigation.
Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 10; Etsenberg 11/29/17 '302, at 15 (providing the view that the
President's desire to include the language about not being under investigation was the "driving animus of
the whole thing"); Bumham 11/3/17 302, at 16 (Burnham knew the only line. the President cared about was
thc linc that said Comey advised the President on three separate occasions that the President was not under
investigation). A ccording to Hunt's notes, the reference to Comey's statement would indicate that
"'notwithstanding" Comcy's having informed the President that he was not under investigation, the
President was terminating Comey. Hunt-000032 (Hunt 5/9/17 Nates). McGahn said he believed the
President wanted the language included so that people would not thinlc that the President had terminated
Comey because thc President was under investigation. MeGahn 12/12/17 302, at 15,
s McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 15; Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 25„see SC AD 00342 (Donaldson
5/9/17 Notes) (" Resign vs. Removal.— POTUS/removal.").
Spicer 10/16/17 302, at 9; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 16.
"ts Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 28.
Statement of the Press Secretary, The White House, OAice of the Press Secretary (May 9, 2017),
' McCabc, 9/26/17 302, at 4; SCR025 000044 (President's Daily Diary, 5/9/17); McCabe 5/10/17
Memorandum, at 1.
s ' McCabe 9/26/1 7 302, at 5; McCabc 5/10/17 Memorandum, at 1.
4s' McCabc 9/26/17 302, at 5; McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at 1-2.
's McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 5; McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at 1-2.
'" McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 5; McCabc 5/10/17 Memorandum, at 1-2.
U.S. Department of Justice
II
Later that evening, the President told his cominunicatians team he was unhappy with the
press, caverage of Comey's termination and ordered them to go out and defend him."'s The
Ptesident also called Chris Christie and, accardmg to Chi istic, said he was getting "killed" in the
press over Comey's termination.«s' The President asked what he should do.«s7 Christie asked,
"Did you fire [Comey] because of what Rod wrote in the memo?",, and the President responded,
"Yes."«ss Christie said that the President should "get Rod out there'* and have him defend the
decision. ' T he President told Christie that this was a "good idea" and said he was going to call
Rasenstein right away.«+
That night, the White House Press Office called the Department of Justice and said the
White Hause wanted to put out a statement saying that it was Rosenstein's idea to fire Camey:«"
Rosenstem told other DOJ officials that he would not participate in putting out a "false story."«s'
The President then called Rosenstein directly and said he was watching Fox News, that the
coverage had been great, and that he wanted Rosenstein to do a press conference.«ss Rosenstein
responded that this was not a gaod idea because if the press asked him, he would tell the truth that
Comey's firing was not his idea. «' «Sessions also informed the White House Counsel's Office that
evening that Rosenstein was upset that his memorandum was being partrayed as the reason for
Camey's termination.«s'
In an unplanned press conference late in the evening of May 9, 2017, Spicer'told reporters,
"It was all [Rosenstein], No one from the White House. It was a DOJ decision."«~ That evening
and the next morning, White House officials and spokespeople continued to maintain that the
«s' Spicer 10/16/17 302, at 11; Hicks 12lg/17, at 18; Sanders 7/3/1 8 302, at 2.
70
U.S, Department of Justice
//
President's decision to terminate Comey was driven by the recommendations the President
received from Rosenstein nnd Sessions." s
In the morning on May 10, 2017, P iesident Trump met with Russian Foreign Minister
Sergey Lavrov and Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislynk in the Oval Office. ns The media
subsequently reported that during the May 10 meeting the President braught up his decision the
prior day to terminate Camey, telling Lavrov and Kislyak; "I just fired the head of the F.B.I. He
wns crazy, a real nut job. I faced great pressure because of Russia, That's taken off... . I ' m not
under investigation.'"'s The President never denied making those statements, and the White House
did not dispute the account, instead issuing a statement that said: "By grandstnnding and
politicizing the investigation into Russia's actions, James Camey created unnecessary pressure on
our ability to engage and negotiate with Russia. The investigation would have always continued,
and obviously, the termination of Comey would not have ended it. Once again, the real story is
that our national security hns been undermined by thc leaking of private and highly classified
infoimatian.' *si Hicks said that when she told the President abaut the reports on his meeting with
Lavrov,he did not look concerned and said afComey, "he iscrazy."m' When McGahn asked thc
President about his comments to Lavrov, the President said it was good that Comey was fired
because that took the pressure off by making it clear that he was not under investigation so he
could getmore work done. '
That same marning, on May 10, 2017, the President called McCabe.ss' According to a
memorandum McCabe wrote following the call, the President asked McCabe to come over to thc
White House to discuss whether the President should visit FBI headquarters and make a speech to
See, e.g., Sarah Sanders, White House Daily B r iefing, C-SPAN ( M ny 1 0, 2 017);
SCR013 001088 (5/10/17 Email, Hemming to Cheung et al.) (internal White House email describing
comments on the Camey tet mination by Vice President Pence).
~' SCR08 000353 (5/9/17 White House Document, "Working Visit with Foreign Minister Sergcy
Lavrav of Russia" ); SCR08 001274 (5/10/17 Email„Ciaramella to Kelly et ak). The meeting had been
planned on May 2, 2017, during a telephone ca[I between the President and Russian President Vladimir
Putin, and the meegng date was confirmed on May 5, 2017, thc same day the President dictated ideas for
the Camey termination letter to Stephen Miller. SCR08 001274 (5/10/17 Email„Ciaramclla to Kelly ct
ah),
' Matt Apuzzo et al., Trump Told Bussions That Firing "Nut Joh" Comey Eased Pressure From
Investigation, New York Times (May 19, 2017).
' SCR08 002117 (5/19/17 Email, Walters to Farhi,(CBS News)); see Spicer 10/16/17 302, at 13
(noting he would have been told to "elean it up" if the reporting on the meeting with thc Russian Foreign
Ministei was iriaccurate, but he was never told ta concct the rcparting); Hicks 12/8/1 7 302, at 19 (recalling
thnt the President never denied making the statements attributed to him in the Lavrov meeting and that the
President had said similar things about Comey in an off-the-record meeting with reporters on May 18, 2017„
calling Comey a "nut jab" and "crazy" ).
rn Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 19.
mi McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 18.
ms SCR025 000046 (President's Daily Diary, 5/10/17); McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at 1.
71
U.S. Departinent of Justice
//
employees.sr4 The President said he had received "hundreds" of messages from FBI employees
indicating their support for terminating Camey.4~' The President also told McCabe that Camey
should nat have been permitted to travel back to Washington, D.C. on the FBI's airplane after he
had been terminated and that he did not want Comey '"in the building again," even to collect his
belongings.4's When McCabe met with the President that afternoon, the President, without
prampting, told McCabe that people in the FBI loved the President, estimated that at least 80Ãsof
the FBI had vated for him„and asked McCabe who he had voted for in the 2016 presidential
election, 'r
In the afternoon of May 10,2017, deputy press secretary Sarah Sanders spoke to the
President about his decision ta fire Comey and then spoke to reporters in a televised press
conference.srs Sanders told reporters that the President, the Department of Justice, and bipartisan
members of Congress had lost confidence in Camey, "[a]nd most importantly, the rank and file of
the FBI had lost confidence in their director. A c cordingly, the President accepted the
recommendatian of his Deputy Attorney General to remove James Comey from his position."~
In response to questions from reporters, Sanders said that Rosenstein decided "on his own'" to
review Comby's performance and that Rosenstein decided '"on his own" to come to the President
on Monday, May 8 to express his raneerns about Comey. When a reporter indicated that the "vast
majority" of FBI agents supported Comey, Sanders said, "Look, we' ve heard from countless
members of thc FBI that say very different things." ' F al l owing the press conference, Sanders
spake to the President, who told her she did a gaod job and did not paint out any inaccuracies in
her comments."" Sanders told this Office that her reference to hearing tram "countless members
of the FBI" was a "slip of the tongue."4ss She also recaged that her statement in a separate press
interview that rank-and-file FBI agents had lost confidence in Comey was a comment she made
"in the heat of the moment" that was not founded on anything. s
Also on May 10, 2017, Sessions and Rosenstein each spoke, to McGahn and expressed
concern that the White House was creating a narrative that Rosenstein had initiated the decision to
McCahe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at 1; Rybicki 6/13/17 302, at 2. Comey had been visiting the
FBI's Las Angeles office when he found out he had been terminated. Comey 11/15/17 302, at 22.
s" McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at 1-2. McCabe*s memorandum documenting his meeting with
the President is consistent with nates taken by the White House Counsel's Office. See SC AD 00347
(Donaldson 5/10/17 Notes).
ios Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 4; Sarah Sanders, JFhiteHouse Daily Briefing,.C-SPAN (May 10, 2017}.
Sarah Sanders, White House Doily Briefing, C-SPAN (May 10, 2017}; Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 4.
i" Sarah Sanders, gunite House DailyBriefing, C-SPAN (May 10', 2017}.
" Sanders 7/3/18 302„at 4.
4 Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 4.
Sanders 7/3/1 8 302, at 3.
U.S. Department of Justice
//
fire Comey.ss4 The White House Counsel's Office agreed that it was factually wrong to say that
the Department of Justice had initiated Comey's termination,s' and Mc6ahn asked attorneys in
the White House, Counsel's Office to work with the press office to correct the narrative.s+
The next day, on May 11, 2017, the President participated in an interview with Lestcr Holt.
The President told White House Counsel's Office attorneys in advance of the interview that the
comm
unications team could not get the story right, so he was going on Lester Holt to say what
really happened.ssi During thc interview, the President stated that he had made the decision to fire
Comcy before the President met with Rosenstein and Sessions. The President told Holt, "I was
going to fire regardless of recommendation. . . . [ R osenstein] made a recommendation. But
regardless of recommendation, I was going to fire Comey knowing there was no good time to do
it."4 T he President continued, "And in fact, when I decided to just do it, I said to myself — I said,
you know, this Russia thing with Trump and Russia is a made-up story. It's an excuse by the
Democrats for having lost an election that they should've won."4s'
In response to a question about whether hc was angry with Comey about the Russia
investigation, the President said, "As far as I'm concerned, I want that thing to be absolutely done
properlyys The President added that he realized his termination of Comey "probably maybe will
confuse people" with the result that it "might even lengthen out the investigation," but hc "ha[d]
to do the ri@t thing for the American people" and Comey was "the wrong man for that position."4m
The President described Camey as "a showboat*' and "a grandstander," said that "[t]he PBI has
been in turmoil," and said he wanted "to have a really competent, capable director."4ss The
President affirmed that he expected the new FBI director to continue the Russia investigation.ess
On the evening of May 11, 2017, following the Lester Holt interview, the President
twcctcd, "Russia must bc laughing up their sleeves watching as the U.S. tears itself apart over a
Democrat EXCUSE for losing the election."4" T h e same day, the media reported that the
President had demanded that Comey pledge his loyalty to the President in a private dinner shortly
uw McGahn 12/1 2/17 302, at 16-17; Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 26; see Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at
Interview with President Donald Trump, NBC (May 11, 2017) Transcript, at 2.
"" Interview with Presideni Donald Trump,.NBC (May 11, 2017) Transcript, at 2.
w Inierview with President Donald Trump, NBC (May 11, 2017) Transcript, at 3.
"" Interview with President Donald Trump,NBC (May 11, 2017) Transcript, at 3.
uu Interview with President Donald Trump,NBC (May 11, 2017) Transcript, at 1, 5.
'~ Interview with President Donald Trump, NBC (May 1 1, 2017) Transcript, at 7.
73
U.S. Department of Justice
after being sworn in.4vs Late in the morning of May 12, 2017, the President tweeted, "Again, the
story that there was collusion between the Russians Jk Trump campaign was fabricated by Dcms
as an excuse for losing the election."ese The President also tweeted, "James Comey better hope
that there are no 'tapes' of our conversations before hc starts leaking to the press!*' and "When
James Clapper himself, and virtually everyone else with knowledge of the witch hunt, says there
is no collusion, when does it end?" si
In analyzing the President's decision to fire Comey, the following evidence is relevant to
the elements of obstruction of justice:
a. Obs tructive act. The act of firing Comey removed the individual overseeing the
FBI's Russia investigation. The President knew that Comey was personally involved in the
investigation based on Comey's briefiiig of the Gang of Eight, Comey's March 20, 2017 public
testimony about the investigation, and the President's one-on-onc conversations with Camey.
Firing Comey would qualify as an obstructive act if it had the natural and probable effect
of interfering with or impeding the investigation — for example, if the termination would have the
effect of delaying or disrupting the investigation or providing the President with the opportunity
to appoint a director who would take a different approach to the investigation that the President
perceived as more protective of his pcisonal interests. Relevant circumstances bearing on that
issue include whether the President's actions had the potential to discourage a successor director
or other law enforcement officials in their conduct of the Russia investigation. The President fired
Camey abruptly without offering him an opportunity to resign, banned him from the FBI building,
and criticized him publicly, calling him a "showboat" and claiming that the FBI was "in turmoil"
under his leadership, And the President followed the termination with public statements that were
highly critical of the investigation; for example, three days after firing Comey, the President
referred to the investigation as a "witch hunt" and asked, "when does it end7" Those actions had
thc potential to affect a successor director's conduct of the investigation.
The anticipated effect of removing the FBI director, however, would not necessarily be to
prevent or impede the FBI from continuing its investigation. As a general matter, FBI
investigations run under the operational direction of FBI personnel levels below the FBI director.
Baimon made a similar point when he told the President that he could fire the FBI director, but
could not fire the FBI. The White House issued a press statement the day after Comey was fired
that said, "The investigation would have always continued, and obviously, the termination of
Comey would not have ended it." I n addition, in his May 11 interview with Lester Holt, the
President stated that he understood when he made the decision to fire Comey that the action might
prolong the investigation. And the President chose McCabe to serve as interim director, even
Michael S. Schmidt, In u private Dlriner, Trump Demanded Loya/ry. Camey Demurred, New
York Times (May 11, 2017).
"' @realDonaldTrump 5/12/17 (7:51 a.m. ET) Tweet.
"" ®reaIDonaldTrump 5/12/17 (8:26 a.m. ET) Tweet; greaIDonaldTnunp 5/12/17 (8;54 a.in. ET)
Tweet.
U.S. Department of Justice
/7
though McCabe told the President he had worked "very closely" with Camey and was part of all
the decisions made in the Clinton investigation.
Several facts would be relevant to such a showing. At, the time the President fired Comcy,
a grand jury had not begun to hear evidence related to the Russia investigation and no grand jury
subpoenashad been issued. On March 20, 2017, however, Camey had announced that the FBI
was investigating Russia's interference in thc election, including "an assessmcnt of whether any
crimes were committed." It was widely known that the FBI, as part of the Russia investigation,
was investigating the hacking of the DNC's computers — a clear rriminal offense.
In addition, at the time the President fired Comey, evidence indicates the President knew
that Flynn was still under criminal investigation and could potentially be prosecuted, despite the
President's February 14, 2017 request that Comey "let/] Flynn go." On March 5, 2017, the White
House Counseps Office was informed that the FBI was asking for transition-period records
relating to Flynn — indicating that the FBI was still actively investigating him. The same day, the
Piesident told advisors he wanted to call Dana Boente, then the Acting Attorney General for the
Russia investigation, to find out whether thc White House or the President was being investigated.
On March 31, 2017, the President signaled his awareness that Flynn remained in legal jeopardy by
tweeting that "Mike Flynn should ask for immunity" before hc agreed to provide testimony to the
FBI or Congress. And in late March or early April, the President asked McFarland to pass a
message to Flynn telling him that the President felt bad for h]m and that he should stay strong,
further demonstrating the President's awareness of Flynn's criminal exposure.
c. Int e nt, Subsmntial evidence indicates that the catalyst for the President's decision
to fire Comcy was Comey's unwillingness to publirly state that the President was not personally
under investigation, despite the President's repeated requests that Comey make such an
announcement. In the week leading up to Comey's May 3, 2017 Senate Iudiciaty Committee
testimony„ the President told McGahn that it would be the last straw if Comey did not set the recoid
straight and publicly announce that the President was not under investigation. But during his May
3 testimony, Comey refused to answer questions about whether the President was being
investigated. Comey's refusal angered the President, who criticized Sessions for leaving him
isolated and exposed, saying "You left me on an island." Two days later, the President told
advisors he had decided to fire Camey and dictated a letter to Stephen Miller that began with a
reference to the fact that the President was not being investigated: "While I greatly appreciate you
informing me that I am not under investigation concerning what I have often stated is a fabricated
story on a Trump-Russia relationship. . . ." Th e President later asked Rosenstein to include
"Russia" in his memorandum and to say that Camey had told the President that he was not under
investigation. And the President's final termination letter included a sentence, at the President's
insistence and against McGahn's advice, stating that Comey had told thc President on three
separate occasions that he was not under investigation.
The President's other stated rationales for why he fired Comey are not similarly supported
by the evidence, The termination letter the President and Stephen Miller prepared in Bedminster
U.S. Department of Justice
//
cited Comey's handling of the Clinton email investigation, and the President told McCabe he fired
Comey for that reason. But the facts surrounding Comey's handling of the Clinton email
investigation were well known to the President at the time he assumed oHice„and the President
had made it clear to both Comey and the President's senior staff in early 2017 that he wanted
Comey to stay on as director. And Rosenstein articulated his criticism of Comey's handling of the
Clinton investigation after the President had already decided to fire Comey. The President's draft
termination letter also stated that morale in the FBI was at an all-time low and Sanders told the
press after Comey's termination that the White House had heard from "countless" FBI agents who
had lost confidence in Comey. But the evidence does not support those claims. The President told
Comey at their January 27 dinner that "the people of the FBI really like [hiin]," no evidence
suggests that the President heard otherwise before deciding to terminate Camey, and Sanders
acknowledged to investigators that her comments were not founded on anything.
We also considered why it was important to the President that Comey announce publicly
that he was not under investigation. Some evidence indicates that the President believed that the
erroneous perception he was under investigation harmed his ability to manage domestic and
foreign affairs, particularly in dealings with Russia. The President told Comey that thc "cloud" of
"this Russia business" was making it difficult to run the countiy, The President told Sessions and
McGahn that foieign leaders had expressed sympathy to him for being under investigation and that
the perception he was under investigation was hurting his ability to address foreign relations issues.
The President complained to Rogers that "the thing with the Russians [was] messing up" his ability
to get things done with Russia, and told Coats, "I can't do anything with Russia, there's things I'd
like to do with Russia, with trade, with ISIS, they'rc all over me with this." Thc President also
may have viewed Comey as insubordinate for his failure to make clear in the May 3 testimony that
the President was not under investigation.
Other evidence, however„ indicates that the President wanted to protect hunself fiom an
investigation into his campaign. The day atter learning about the FBI's interview of Flynn, the
President had a one-on-one dinner with Comey, against the advice of senior aides, and told Comey
he needed Comey's "loyalty." When the President later asked Comey for a second time to make
public that he was not under investigation, he brought up loyalty again, saying "Because I have
been vciy loyal to you, very loyal, we had that thing, you know." After the President learned of
Sessions's recusal from the Russia investigation, the President was furious and said he wanted an
Attorney General who would protect him the way he percc'ived Robert Kennedy and Eric Holder
to have protected their presidents. The President also said he wanted to be able to tell his Attorney
General "who to investigate.'"
In addition, the President had a motive to put tlie FBI's Russia investigation behind him.
The evidence does not establish that the termination of Comey was designed to cover up a
ronspiracy between the Trump Campaign and Russia: As dcscrdied in Volume I, the evidence
uncovered in the investigation did not establish that the President or those close to him vere
involved in the charged Russian computer-hacking or active-measure conspiracies,or that the
President otherwise had an unlawful relationship with any Russian official, But the evidence does
indicate that a thorough FBI investigation would uncover facts about the campaign and the
President personally that the President could have understood to be crimes or that would give rise
to personal and political concerns. Although the President publicly stated during and after the
election that he had no connection to Russia, the Trump Organization, through Michael Cohen,
U;S, Department of Justice
Il
was pursuing the proposed Trump Tower Moscow project tlu'ough June 2016 and candidate Trump
was repeatedly briefed on the ro ress of those efforts.4ss In addition, some witnesses said that
a • •
Trum was aware that •
at a time when public reports stated that Russian intelligence officials were behind the
hacks, and that Trump privately sought information about future WikiLeaks releases.sss Morc
broadly, multiple witnesses described the Presideiit's preoccupation with press coverage of the
Russia investigation and his persistent concern that it raised questions about the legitimacy of his
eIection.s
Finally, the President and White House aides imtially advanced a pretextual reason to the
press and the public for Comey's termination. In the immediate aftermath of the firing, the
President dictated a press statement suggesting that he had acted based on the DO J
recommendations, and White House press officials repeated that story. But the President had
decided to fire Comey before the White House solicited those recommendations. Although the
President ultimately acknowledged that he was going to fire Comey regardless of the Department
of Justice's recommendations, he did so only after DOJ officials made clear to him that they would
resist the White House's suggestion that they had prompted the process that led to Comey's
termination. The initial reliance on a pretextual justification could support an inference that the
President had concerns about providing the real reason for the firing, although the evidence does
not resolve whether those concerns were personal„political, or both.
0vervieiv
The Acting Attorney General appointed a Special Counsel on May 17, 2017, prompting
the President to state that it was the end of his presidency and that Attorney General Sessions had
failed to protect him and should resign. Sessions submitted his resignation, which the President
ultimately did not accept. The President told senior advisors that the Special Counsel had conflicts
*'
of interest, but they responded that those claims weie "ridiculous and posed no obstacle to the
Special Counsel*s service. Department of Justice ethics officials similarly cleared the Special
Counsel's service. On June 14, 2017, the press reported that the President was being personally
investigated for obstruction of justice and the President responded with a series of tweets
77
U.S. Department of Justice
//
criticizing the Special Counsel's investigation. That weekend, the President called McGahn and
directed him to have the Special Counsel removed because of asserted conflicts of interest,
McGahn did not carry out the instruction for fear of being seen as triggering another Saturday
Night Massacre and instead prepared to resign. McGahn ultimately did not quit and the President
did not follow up with McGahn on his request to have the Special Counsel removed.
Evidence
On May 17, 2017, Acting Attorney General Rosenstein appointed Robert S. Mueller, III as
Special Counsel and authorized him to conduct the Russia investigation and matters that arose
from the investigation. ' T he President learned of the Special Counsel's appointment from
Sessions, who was with the President, Hunt, and McGahn conducting interviews for a new FIII
Director.~s Sessions stepped out of thc Oval Office to take a call from Rosenstein, who told him
about the Special Counsel appointment, and Sessions then returned to inform the President of the
news."' A c cording to notes written by Hunt, when Sessions told the President that a Special
Counsel had been appointed, the President slumped back in his chair and said, "Oh my God, This
is terrible. This is the end of my Presidency. I'm fucked."' 4 The President became angry and
lambasted the Attorney General for his decision to recuse Rom the investigation, stating, "How
could you let this happen, Jeff/'dos The President said the position of Attorney General was his
most important appointment and that Sessions had "let [him] down," contrasting him to Eric
Holder and Robert Kennedy."' S essions recalled that the President said to him,"you were
supposed to protect me," or words to that effect. ' The President returned to the,consequences of
the appointment and said, Everyone tells me if you get one of these independent counsels it ruins
your presidency. It takes years and years and I won't be able to do anything. This is the worst
thing that ever happened to me,'n
"' Oifice of the Deputy Attorney General„Order No. 3915-2017, AItlt otnttnent of Special Counsel
to Investigate Russian Interference with the 2016 Presidential Election and Related Matters (May 17,
2017).
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 13; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 18; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 4; Hunt-000039
(Hunt 5/17/17 Notes).
"' Sessions I/17/1 8 302, at 13; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 18„McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 4; Hunt-000039
(Hunt 5/17/17 Notes).
"' Hunt-000039(Hunt 5/17/1 7 Nates),
Hunt-000039 (Hunt 5/17/17 Notes); Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 13-14.
s ' Hunt-000040; see Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14.
' " Sessions 1/17/1 8 302, at 14.
"' Hunt-000040 (Hunt 5/1 7/17 Notes)„see Sessions 1/1 7/18 302, at 14. Early the next morning,
the President tweeted, "This is the single greatest witch hunt of a politician in American histo'ry!"
®realDonaldTrump 5/18/17 (7;52 a.m. ET) Tweet,
U.S. Department af Justice
'//
The President then told Sessions he should resign as Attorney General.se' Sessions agreed
to submit his resignation and left the Oval Office. " Hicks saw the President shortly affer Sessions
departed and described the President as being extremely upset by thc Special Counsel's
appointment. " Hicks said that she had only seen the President like that one other time, when the
Access Hollywood tape came out during the campaign."s
The next day, May 18, 2017, FBI agents delivered to McGahn a preservation notice that
discussed an investigation related. to Comey's termination and directed the White House ta
preserve all relevant documents. " When he received the letter, McGahn issued a document hold
to White House staff and instructed them not to send out any burn bags over the weekend while
he sorted things out.s'4
Also on May 18, Sessions finalized a resignation letter that stated, "Pursuant to our
conversationof yesterday, and at your request, I hereby offer my resignation." ' Sessions,
accompanied by Hunt, brought the letter to the White House and handed it to the President.s's The
President put the resignation letter in his pocket and asked Sessions several times whether he
wanted to continue serving as Attorney General." Sessions ultimately told the President he
wanted ta stay, but it was up to the President. " The President said he wanted Sessions to stay. '
At the conclusion of the meeting, the President shook Sessions's hand but did not return the
resignation letter. ~
When Priebus and Bannon learned that the President was holding onto Sessions's
resignation letter, they became concerned that it cauld be used to influence the Department af
Justice. ' P riebus told Sessions it was nat good for the President to have the letter because it
79
I.S. Department of Justice
//
would function as a kind of "shock collar" that the President could use any time he wanted; Priebus
said the President had "DOJ by the throat." s P riebus and Bannon told Sessions they would
attempt to get the letter back from the President with a notation that he was not accepting
Sessions's resignation.sos
On May 19, 2017, the Pi'esident left for a 0 ip to the Middle East.s~ Hicks recalled that on
the President's flight from Saudi Arabia to Tel Aviv, the President pulled Sessions's resignation
letter from his pocket, showed it to a group of senior advisors, and asked them what he. should do
about it.'s' D uring thc trip, Priebus asked about the resignation letter so hc could return it to
Sessions, but the President told him that the letter was back at the White House, somewhere in the
residence. I t was not until May 30, three days after the President returned from the trip, that the
Pmsident returned the letter to Sessions with a notation saying, "Not accepted."s2
2. The President Asserts that the S ecial Counsel has Conflicts of Interest
In the days following the Special Counsel's appointment, the President repeatedly told
advisors, inoluding Priebus, Bannon, and McGahn, that Special Counsel Mueller had conflicts of
interest. s The President cited as conflirts that Mueller had interviewed for the FBI Director
position shortly before being appointed as Special Counsel, that he had worked for a law firm that
represented people affiliated with the President, and that Mueller had disputed certain fees relating
to his membership in a Trump golf course in Northern Uirginia. 2s The President's advisors pushed
"i Hunt-000050 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes); Pricbus 10/13/17 302, at 21; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 21.
so Hunt-000051 (Hunt 5/18/1 7 Notes).
"" SCR026 000110 (President's Daily Diary, 5/19/17).
" H i cks 12/8/17 302, at 22.
Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 21. Hunt *a notes state that when Pricbus returned from the trip, Priebus
told Hunt that the President was supposed to have given him the letter, but when he asked for it, the
President "slapped the desk*' and said he had forgotten it back at the hoteL Hunt-000052 (Hunt Notes,
undated).
" Hunt-000052-53 (Hunt 5/30/17 Notes); 5/18/17 Letter, Sessions to President Trump (resignation
letter). Robert Porter, wbo was the White House Staff Secretary at the time, said that In the days after the
President returned.from the Middle East trip, tbc President took Sessions's letter out of a drawer in the Oval
Office and showed it to Porter. Porter 4/13/18 302, at S. •
'~ Pricbus 1/18/18 302, at 12„Barmen 2/14/18 302, at 10; McGahn 3/8/1S 302, at 1; McGahn
12/14/17 302, at 10; Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 12.
' Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 121 Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 10. In October 2011, Mucller resigned his
family's meinbership from Trump National Golf Club in Sterling, Virginia, in a letter that noted that "we
live in the District and find that we are unable to make full use of the Club*' and that inquired "whether we
would be entitled to a refund of a portion of om initial membership fee," which was paid in 1994. 10/12/11
Letter, Muelh:rs to Trump National Golf Club. About two weeks later, the controller of the club responded
that the Mucllers' resignation would bc effective October 31, 2011, and that they would be *'placed on a
waitlist to be refunded on a first resigned / first refunded basis" in accordance with the club's legal
U.S. Depaitment of Justice
back on his assertion of conflicts, telling the President they did not count as true conflicts.mo
Bannon recalled telling the President that the purported conflicts were "ridiculous" and that none
of them was real or could come close to justifying precluding Mueller trom serving as Special
Counsel. iu As for Muellei's interview for FBI Director, Bannon recalled that the White, House
had invited Mueller to speak to the President to offer a perspective on the institution of the FBI."'
Bannon said that, although thc White House thought about beseeching Mueller to become Director
again, he did not come in looking for the job.' B a rman also told the President that the law' firm
position did not amount to a conflict in the legal community. s And Bannon told the president
that the golf course dispute di'd not rise to the level of a conflict and claiming one was "ridiculous
and petty."~s The President did not respond when Bannon pushed back on the stated conflicts of
interest.
Gn May 23, 2017, the Department of Justice announced that ethics officials had determined'
that the Special Counsel's prior law firm position did not bar his service, generating media reports
that Mueller had been cleared to serve.s M c Gahn recalled that around the same time, the
President complained about the asserted conflicts and prodded McGahn to reach out to Rosenstein
about the issue.s M c Gahn said he responded that he could not make such a call and that the
President should instead consult his personal lawyer because it was not a White Hous'e issue. 's
Contemporaneous notes of a May 23, 2017 conversation between McGahn and the President
reflect that McGahn told the President that he would not call Rosenstein and that he would suggest
that the President not make such a call either.'s' McGahn advised that the President could discuss
the issue with his personal attorney but it would "look like still trying to meddle in [the]
investigation" and "knocking out Mueller" would be "[a]nother fact used to claim obst[ruetion] of
documents. 10/27/11 Letter, Muelleis to Trump National Golf Club. The Muellers have not had further
contact with the club.
s Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 3, Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 13 (confirming that he, Priebus, and McGahn
pushed back on the asserted conflicts).
' ' Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 12-13.
'i' Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 12.
ss Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 12,
"' Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 12.
' Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 13.
s~ Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 12.
"i Matt Zapotosky k Mates Gold, Justice Department ethics experts clettr /rfuetter ta leod Russia
probe, Washington Post (May 23, 2017).
McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 10; Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 12.
s s McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1. McGahn and Donaldson said that after the appointment of the Special
Counsel, they considered themselves potential fact witnesses and accordingly told the President that
inquiries related to the investigation should be brought to his personal counsel. McGahn 12/14/17 302, at
7; Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at 5.
+ SC AD 00361 (Donaldson 5/31/17 Notes),
81
U.S. Department of Justice
//
just[ice]." ' M cGahn told the President that his "biggest exposure" was not his act of firing
Comey but his "other contacts" and "calls," and his "ask re: Flynn."+ By the, time McGahn
provided this advice to the President, there had been widespread reporting on the President's
request for Comey's loyalty, which the President publicly denied; his request that Camey "let[j
Flynn go," which the President also denied; and the President's statement to the Russian Foreign
Minister that the termination of Comey had relieved "great pressurcn related to Russia, which the
President did not deny.sss
On June 8, 2017, Comey testified before Congress about his interactions with the President
before his termination, including the request for loyalty, the request that Comey "let[} Flynn go,"
and the request that Comey "lift the cloud" over the presidency caused by the ongoing
investigation.'44 Comey's testimony led to a series of news reports about whethei the President
had obstructed justice.'4s On June 9„2017, the Special Counsel's Office informed the White House
Counsel*s Office that investigators intended to interview intelligence community officials who had
allegedly been asked by the President to push back against the Russia investigation.s4s
On Monday, June 12, 2017, Christopher Ruddy, the chief executive of Newsmax Media
and a longtime friend of the President's, met at the White House with Priebus and Bannon.ss
Ruddy recalled that they told him the President was strongly considering firing the Special Counsel
See, e,g„M i c hael S. Schmidt, In a I ' r lvaie Dinner, Trump Demanded Loyalty. Comey
Demurred., New York Times (May 11, 2017}; Michael S. Schmidt„Comey Irfemorandum Says Trump
Asked Him to End Flynn Investigation, New York Times (May 16, 2017); Matt Apuzzo et al., Trump Told
Itusstans Thai Firing 'Nut Iob ' Comey Eased Pressure From Investigation, New York Times (May 19,
2017).
Heanng on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Inielll gence Committee,
115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comcy, former Director of the FBI, at
5-6). Comey tcstified that he deliberately caused his memorandum documenting the February 14, 2017
meeting to be leaked to the Ncw York Times in response to a tweet from the President, sent on May 12,
2017, that stated "James Comey better hope that there are no 'tapes' of our conversations before he staits
leaking to the press!," and because he thought sharing the memorandum with a reporter "might pmmpt the
appointment of a special counsel.*' Hearing on Eusslan Election Interference Before the Senate Select
Intelhgence Comml tree, 115th Cong. (Junc 8, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 55} (testimony by James B.
Camey, former Director of the FBI).
'"' See, e,g, Matt Zapotosky, Comey lays out the case that Trump obstructedj us/lee, Washington
Post (June 8, 2017) ("Legal analysts said Comey's testimony clarified and bolstered the case that the
president obstructed justice.*').
6/9/17 Email, Special Counseps Office to the White House Counsel's Office. This Office made
the notification to give thc White House an opportunity to invoke executive privilege in advance of the
interviews. On June 12, 2017, the Special Counsel's Office interviewed Admiral Rogers in the presence of
agency counsel. Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 1. On Junc 13, the Special Counsel's Office interviewed Ledgett.
Ledgett 6/13/17 302, at l. On June 14, the Office interviewed Coats and other personnel from his office.
Coats 6/14/17 302, at 1; Gistaro 6/14/17 302, at 1; Culver 6/14/17 302, at 1.
s Ruddy 6/6/18 302, at 5.
82
U.S. Department of Justice
//
and that he would do so precipitously, without vetting the decision through Administration
officials,s4s Ruddy asked Priebus if Ruddy could talk publicly about the discussion they had about
the Special Counsel, and Priebus said he could. Pr i ebus told Ruddy he hoped another blow up
like the one that followed the termination of Comey did not happen.'ss Later that day, Ruddy
stated in a televised interview that the President was "considering perhaps terminating the Special
Counsel" based on purported conflicts of interest.ss' Ruddy later told another news outlet that
"Trump is definitely considering" terminating the Special Counsel and "it's not something that' s
being dismissed."" R uddy's comments led to extensive coverage in the media that the President
was considering firing the Special Counsel.sss
White House officials were unhappy with that press coverage and Ruddy heard from
friends that the President was upset with him.ss4 On June 13, 2017, Sanders asked the President
for guidance on how to respond to press inquiries about the possible firing of the Special
CounseL T h e President dictated an answer, which Sanders delivered, saying that "[w]hile the
president has every right to" fire the Special Counsel, "he has no intention to do so."s s
Also on June 13, 2017, the President's personal counsel contacted the Special Counseps
Office and raised concerns about possible conflicts.s r The President's counsel cited Mueller's
previous partnership in his law firm, his interview for the FBI Director position, and an asserted
personal relationship he had with Comey.s" That same day, Rosenstein had testified publicly
beforeCongress and said he saw no evidence of good cause to terminate the Special'Counsel,
including for conflicts of interest.sts Two days later, on June 15, 2017, the Special Counsel's
83,
U.S, Department of Justice
//
Office informed the Acting Attorney General's office about the areas af concern raised by the
President's counsel and told the President's counsel that their concerns had been communicated to
Rasenstein so that the Department of Justice could take any appropriate action. 'e
3. The Press Re orts that the President is Bein I nvesti ated for Obstruction of
Justice and the President Directs the White House Co sel ta Have the S ecial
Counsel Removed
On the evening of June 14, 2017, the Washington Post published an article stating that the
Special Counsel was investigating whether the President had attempted ta obstruct justice.set This
was the first public report that the President himself was under investigation by the Special
Counsel's Office, and cable news networks quickly picked up on the report.'e The Post story
stated that the Special Counsel was interviewing intelligence community leaders, including Coats
and Rogers, about what the President had asked them to do in response to Comey's March 20,
2017 testimony; that the inquiry into obstruction marked "a major turmng point" in t he
investigation; and that while "Trump had received private assurances from then-FBI Director
James B. Comey starting in January that he was nat personally under investigation," "[o]fficials
say that changed shortly after Comey's firing."' Th at evening,at approximately 10;31 p,tn., the
President caflcd McGahn on McGahn's personal cell phone and they spoke for about 15
minutes. s4 McGahn did not have a clear memory of the call but thought they might have discussed
the stories reporting that the President was under investigation.se'
Beginning early the next day, June 15, 2017, the President issued a series of tweets
acknowledging the existence of the obstruction investigation and criticizing it. He wrote: "They
made up a phony collusion with the Russians story, found zero proaf, so now they go for
obstruction of justice on the phony stary. Nice"; " "You are witnessing the single greatest WITCH
HUNT in American political history — led by some very bad and conflicted people!"," and
"'Crooked H destroyed phones w/ hammer, 'bleached' emails, dc had husband meet w/AG days
before she was cleared — /k they talk about obstructionv"sss The next day, June 16, 2017, the
President wrote additional tweets criticizing the investigation: "Afler 7 months of investigations
k. committee hearings about my 'collusion with the Russians,' nobody has been abl'e to show any
proof. Sadp' ss and "I am being invesfigated for firing the FBI Director by the man who told me
to fire the FBI Director! Witch Hunt."'"'
On Saturday, June 17, 2017, the President called McGahn and directed him to have the
Special Counsel removed. i' McCrahn was at home and the President was at Camp David. In
interviews with this Office, McGahn recalled that the President called him at home twice and on
both'occasions directed him to call Rosenstein and say that Mueller had conflicts that precluded
him from serving as Special Counsel. "
On the first call, McGahn recalled that the President said something like„"You gutta do
this. You gotta call Rod.*' McGahn said he told the President that he would see what he could
do.s ' McGahn w'as perturbed by the call and did not intend to act on the request.' H e and other
advisors believed the asserted,conflicts were "silly" and "not real," and they had previously
communicated that view to the President.sw McGahn also had made clear to the President that the
White House Counsel's Office should not be involved in any effort to press the issue of conflicts."'
McGahn was conrerned about having any role in asking the Acting Attorney General to fire the
Special Counsel because he had grown up in the Reagan era and wanted to be more like Judge
Robert Bork and not "Saturday Night Massacre Berk."sis McGahn considered the President's
request to be an inflection point and he wanted to hit the biakcs.
%hen the President called McGahn a second time to follow up on the order to call the
Department of Justice, McGahn recalled that the President was more direct, saying something like,
"Call Rod„ tell Rod that Mueller has conflicts and can't be the Special Counsel/ss' M cGahn
recalled the President tefling him "Mucller has to go" and "Call me back when you do it."s~
MrGahn understood the President to be saying that the Special Counsel had to be removed by
Rosenstein.ss' To end the conversation with the president, MeGahn left thc president with the
impression that McGahn would call Rosenstein.s 4 McGahn recalled that he had already said no
to the President's request and hc was worn down, so he just wanted to get off the phone,ss
McGahn recalled feeling trapped because he did not plan to foflow thc President's dii'ective
but did not know what he would say the next time the President cafled.sss McGahn decided he had
to resign,s'i He called his personal lawyer and then called his chief of staff, Annie Donaldson, to
inform her of his decision.'s' He then drove to the office to pack his belongings and submit his
resignation letter. Don aldson recalled that McGahn told her the President had called and
demanded he contact the Department of Justice and that the President wanted him to do something
that McGahn did not want to do.s® McGahn told Donaldson that the President had called at least
twice and in one of the calls asked "have you done it'P"»' McGahn did not tell Donaldson the
specifics of the President's request because he was consciously trying not to involve her in the
investigation, but Donaldson inferred that the President's directive was related to the Russia
investigation. t Donaldson prepared to resign along with McGahn. 's
That evening, McGahn called both Priebus and Bannon and told th'em that he intended to
resign,s~ McGahn recalled that, after speaking with his anomey and given the nature of the
President's request, hc decided not to share details of the President*s request with other White
House staff."' Priebus recalled that McGahn said that the President had asked him to "do crazy
shit," but hc thought McGahn did not tell him the specifics of the President's request because
McGahn was trying to protect Priebus from what he did not need to know.sss Priebus and Bannon
both urged McGahn not to quit, and McGahn ultimately returned to work that Monday and
remained in his position." H e had not told the President directly that he planned to resign, and
when they next saw each other the President did not ask McGahn whether he had followed through
with calling Rosenstein. s'
Around the same time, Chris Christie recalled a telephone eall with the President in which
the President asked what Christie thought about the President firing thc Special Counsel.
Christie advised against doing so because there was no substantive basis for the President to fire
the Special Counsel, and because the President would lose suppoit from Republicans in Congress
if he did so.s
Artufysis
In analyzing the President*s direction to McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed,
the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice:
a. Obs tructive act. As with the President's firing of Comey, the attempt to remove
the Special Counsel would qualify as an obstructive act if it would naturally obstruct the
wr McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 3-4; Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at 4-5. Donaldson said shc believed
McGahn consciously did not share details with her because he did not want to drag hcr into the
investigation. Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at 5; sac Mc6ahn 2/28/19 302, at 3,
ss' Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at 5.
" McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 10; Call Records of Don McGatmt McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 3-4;
Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 6-7.
"' McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 4. Priebus and Bannon confirmed that McGahn did not tell them the
specific details of the President's request, Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 7; Barmon 2/14/18 302, at 10.
"' Pricbus 4/3/18 302, at 7.
wr McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 3; McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 3-4.
'w McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 3.
Christie 211 3/19 302, at 7. Christie did not recall the precise date of this call, but believed it was
alter Christopher Wray was announced as the nominee to be the new FBI director, which was on June 7,
2017. Christie 2/13/19 302, at 7. Telephone records show that the President called Christie twice after that
time period, on July 4, 2017, and July 14, 2017. Call Records of Chris Christie.
' Christie.2113/1 9 302, at 7.
U,S. Department of Justice
investigation and any grand jury proceedings that might flaw from the inquiry. Even if the removal
rosec
of the lead p utor would not prevent the investigation fi om continuing under a new appointee,
a factfinder would need to consider whether the act had the potential to delay further action in the
investigation, chill the actions of any replacement Special Counsel, or otherwise impede the
investigation.
A threshold question is whether'the President in fact directed McGahn to have the Special
Counsel removed. After news organizations reported that in June 2017 the President had ordered
McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed, the President publicly disputed these accounts, and
privately told McGahn that he had,simply wanted McGahn to bring conflicts of interest to the
Department of Justice's attention. See Volume II, Section II.I, infra. Some of the President's
specific language that McGahn recalled from the calls is consistent with that explanation.
Substantial evidence, however, supports the conclusion that the President went further and in fact
directed McGahn to call Rosenstein to have the Special Counsel removed.
First, McGahn *s clear recollection was that the President directed him to tell Rosenstein
not only that canflicts existed but also that "Mueller has to go." McGahn is a credible witness
with no motive to lie or exaggerate given the position he held in the White House.s ' McGahn
spoke with the President twice and understood the directive the same way both times, making it
unlikely that he misheard or misinterpreted the President's request. In response to that request,
McGalm decided ta quit because he did not want ta participate in events that he described as akin
to the Saturday Night Massacre. He called his lawyer, drove to the White House, packed up his
office, prepared to submit a resignation letter with his chief of staff„ told Priebus that the President
had asked him to "do crazy shit," and informed Priebus and Bannon that he was leaving. Those
acts would be a highly unusual reaction ta a request 'to convey infarmation to the Department of
Justice.
Secand, in the days before the calls ta McGahn, the President, through his counsel, had
already brought the asserted conflicts to the attention of the Department of Justice. Accordingly,
the President had no reason to have McGahn call Rosenstein that weekend to raise conflicts issues
that already had been raised.
Third, the President's sense of urgency and repeated requests to McGahn to take immediate
action on a weekend — "You got'ta do this. You gotta call Rod." — support McGahn's recollection
that the President wanted the Department of Justice to take action to remove the Special Counsel.
Had the President instead sought only to have the Department of Justice re-examine asserted
conflicts to evaluate whether they posed an ethical bar, it wauld have been unnecessary to set the
process in motion on a Saturday and to make repeated calls to McGahn.
Finally, the Presiiient had discussed "knocking out Mueller" and raised conflicts of interest
in a May 23, 2017 call with McGahn, reflecting that the, President connected the conflicts to a plan
to remove the Special Counsel. And in the days leading up ta June 17, 2017, the President made
clear to Priebus and Bannon, wha then told Ruddy, that the President was considering terminating
"' When this Office first interviewed McGahn about this topic, he was reluctant ta share detailed
inforination about what had occurred and only did so after continued questioning, See McGahn 12/14/17
302 (agent notes).
U,S. Department af Justice
the Special Counsel. Also duting this time period, the President reached out to Christie to get his
thoughts on firing the Special Counsel. This evidence shows that the President was not just seeking
an examination of whether conflicts existed but instead was looking to use asserted conflicts as a
way to terminate the Special Counsel.
Substantial evidence indicates that by June 17, 2017, the President knew his conduct was
under investigation by a federal prosecutor who could present any evidence of federal crimes to a
grand jury. On May 23, 2017, McGahn explicitly warned the President that his "biggest exposure"
was not his act of firing Comey but his "other contacts" and "calls," and his "ask re: Flynn." By
early June, it was widely reported in the media that federal prosecutors had issued grand jury
subpoenas in the Flynn inquiry and that the Special Counsel had taken over the Flynn
investigation.em On June 9, 2017, the Special Counsel's Office informed the White House that
investigators would be interviewing intelligence agency offioials wha allegedly had been asked by
thc President to push back against the Russia investigation. On June 14, 2017, news outlets began
reporting that the President was himself being investigated far obstruction of justice. Based on
widespread reparting, the President knew that such an investigation could include his request far
Comey's loyalty; his request that Comey "let[] Flynn go"; his autreach to Coats and Rogers; and
his termination af Comey and statement to thc Russian Foreign Minister that the termination had
relieved "great pressure" related to Russia. And on June 16, 2017, the day before he directed
McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed, the President publicly acknowledged that his
conduct was under investigation by a federal prosecutor, tweeting, "I am being investigated for
firing the FBI Director by the man wha told me ta fire the FBI Directar!"
Intent. Substantial evidence indicates that the President's attempts to remove thc
Special Counsel were linked to the Special Counsel's oversight of investigations that involved the
President's conduct — and, most immediately, to reports that the President was being investigated
for potential obstruction af justice.
Before the President terminated Comey, the President considered it critically important that
he was not under investigation and that the public not erroneously think he was being investigated.
As described in Volume II, Section II.D, suprtz, advisors perceived the President, while hc was
dralting the Comey termination letter, to be concerned more than atiything else about getting out
that he was nat personally under investigation. When the President learned of the appointment of
the Special Counsel on May 17, 2017, he expressed further concern about the investigation, saying
"[t]his is the end of my Presidency." The President also faulted Sessions for recusing, saying nyou
w eresupposed to pratectme."
On June 14, 2017, when the Washington Post reported that the Special Counsel wss
investigating the President for obstruction of justice, the President was facing what he had wanted
See, e.g., Evan Perez et al., CNN exclusivet Grand jury subpoenos issued in FBFs Russia
investigation, CNN (May 9, 2017); Matt Ford, 8%y Jdueller ls Taking Over the Miohae/Flynn Grand Jury,
The Atlantic (June 2, 2017).
U.S. Department of Justice
ii
to avoid: a criminal investigation into his own conduct that was thc subject of widespread media
attention. The evidence indicates that news of the obstruction investigation prompted the President
to call McGahn and seek to have,the Special Counsel iemoved. By mid-June, the Department of
Justice had already cleared the Special Counsel's service and the President's advisors had told him
that the claimed conflicts of interest were "silly" and did not provide a basis to remove the Special
Counsel. On June 13, 2017, the Acting Attorney General testified before Congress that no good
cause for removing the Special Counsel existed, and the President dictated a press statement to
Sanders saying he had no intention of firing the Special Counsel. But the next day, the media
reported that the president was under investigation for obstruction of justice and the Special
Counsel was interviewing witnesses about events related to possible obstruction — spurring the
President to write ciitical tweets about the Special Counsel's investigation. The President called
McGahn at home that night and then called him on Saturday from Camp David. The evidence
accordingly indicates that news that an obstruction investigation had been opened is what led the
President to call McGahn to have the Special Counsel terminated,
There also is evidence that the President knew that he should not have made those calls to
McGahn. The President made the calls to McGahn after McGahn had specifically told the
Prcsidcnt that the White House Counsel's Offlice —and McGahn himself — could not be involved
in pressing conflicts claims and that thc President should consult with his personal counsel if he
wished to raise conflicts. Instead of rc!ying on his personal counsel to submit the conflicts claims,
thc President sought to use his official powers to remove the Special Counsel. And after the media
reported on the President's actions, he denied that he ever ordered McGahn to have the Special
Counsel terminated and made repeated efforts to have McGahn deny the story, as discussed in
Volume II, Section II.I, infra. Th ose denials arc contrary to the evidence and suggest the
President's awareness that the direction to McGahn could be seen as improper.
Overissue
Two days after the President directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed, the
President made another attempt to affect the course of the Russia investigation. On June 19, 2017,
the President met one-on-one with Corey Lewandowski in the Oval Office and dictated a message
to be delivered to Attorney General Sessions that would have had the effect of limiting the Russia
investigation to future election interference only. One month later, the President met again with
Lewandowski and followed up on the request to have Sessions limit the scope of the Russia
investigation. Lcwandowski told thc President the message would be delivered soon. Hours later,
the President publicly criticized Sessions in an unplanned press interview, raising questions about
Sessions's job security.
On June 19, 2017, two days alter the President directed McGahn to have the Special
Counsel removed, the President met one-on-one in the Oval Office with his former campaign
90
U.S, Department of Justice
//
During the June 19 meeting, Lewandowski recalled thah after some small talk, the
President brought up Sessions and criticized his recusal from the Russia investigation.s s Thc
President told Lewandowski that Sessions was weak and that if thc President had known about the
likelihood of recusal in advance, he would not have appointed Sessions.so' The president then
asked Lewandowski to deliver a message to Sessions and said '*write this down."s r This was the
first time the President had asked Lewandowski to take dictation, and Lewandowski wrote as fast
as possible to make sure he captured the content correctly.' '
The President directed that Sessions should give a speech publicly announcing:
I know that I recused myself from certain things having to do with specific areas. But our
POTUS... is being treated very unfairly. He shouldn't have a Special Prosecutor/Counsel
b/c he hasn't done anything wrong. I was on the campaign w/ him for nine months, there
were no Russians involved with him. I know it for a fact b/c I was there. He, didn't do
anything wrong except he ran the greatest campaign in American history.
'
The dictated message went on to state that Sessions would meet with the Special Counsel to limit
his jurisdiction to future election interference:
Now a group of people want to subvert the Constitution of the United States, I am going
to meet with the Special Prosecutor to explain this is very unfair and let the Special
Prosecutor move forward with investigating election meddling for future elections so that
nothing can happen ln future elections."
' Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 7; Dearborn 6/20/18 302,, at 1 (describing Lewandowski as a "comfort to
the President" whose loyalty was appreciated). Kelly said that when he wss Chief of Staff and the President
had meetings with friends like Lewsndowski, Kelly tried not to be there and to push the meetings to the
residence to create distance from the West Wing. Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 7.
"' Lewsndowski 4/6/18 302, at 2.
'® Lcwandowski 4/6/18 302, at 2.
'r Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 2.
"' Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 3.
w' Lewandowski 4/6/1 8 302, at 2-3; Lcwandowski 6/19/17 Notes, at 1-2.
' Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 3; Lewsndowski 6/19/17 Notes, at 3.
91
U.S. Department of Justice
The President said that if Sessions delivered that statement he would be the "most popular guy in
the country." " Lewandowski told the President he understood what the President wanted Sessions
to do sii
Lewandowski wanted to pass the message to Sessions in person rather than over the
phone. 's He did not want to meet at the Department of Justice because he did not want a public
log of his visit and did not want Sessions to have an advantage over him by meeting on what
Lewandowski described as Sessions's turf. ' Lewandowski called Sessions and arranged a
meeting for the following evening at Lewandowski's office, but Sessions had to cancel due to a
last minute confiict. ' S hortly thereafter, Lewandowski Iefi Washington, D.G., without having
had an opportunity to meet with Sessions to convey the President's message."' L ewandowski
stored the notes in a safe at his home, which he stated was his standard procedure with sensitive
items "'
Following his June meeting with the President, Lewandowski contacted Rick Dearborn,
then a senior White House official, and asked if Dearborn could pass a message to Sessions."'
Dearborn agreed without knowing what the message was, and Lewandowski later confirmed that
Dearborn would meet with Sessions for dinner in late July and could deliver the message then.sw
Lewandowski recalled thinking that the President had asked hini to pass the message because the
President knew Lewandowski could be trusted, but Lewandowski believed Dearborn would be a
bettermessenger because he had a longstanding relationship with Sessions and because Dearborn
was in the government while Lewandowski was not. 2
On July 19, 2017, the President again met with Lewandowski alone in the Oval Office.s~'
In the preceding days, as described in Volume II, Section II.O, inPa, emails and other information
about the June 9, 2016 meeting between several Russians and Donald Trump Jr., Jared Kushner,
and Paul Manafort had been publicly disclosed. In the July 19 meeting with Lewandowski, the
President raised his previous request and asked if Lewandowski had talked to Sessions.
Lewandowski told the President that the message would be delivered soon.@' Lewandowski
recalled that the President told him that if Sessions did not meet with him, Lewandowski should
tell Sessions he was fired. s4
Immediately following the meeting with the President, Lewandowski saw Dearborn in the
anteroom outside the Oval Office and gave him a typewritten version of thc message thc President
had dictated to be delivered to Sessions. Le wandowski told Dearborn that the notes were the
message they had discussed, but Dearborn did not recall whether Lewandowski said the message
was from the President. s The message "definitely raised an eyebrow" for Dearborn, and hc
recalled not w'anting to ask where it came from or think further about doing anything with it. mr
De'arborn also said that being asked to serve as a messenger to Sessions made him
uncomfortable. s He recalled later telling Lewandowski that he had handled the situation, but he
did not actually follow through with delivering the message to Sessions, and he did not keep a
copy of the typewritten notes Lewandowski had given him 6ss
Within hours of the President's meeting with Lewandowski on July 19, 2017, the President
gave an unplanned interview to the New York Times in which he criticized Sessions's decisionto
recuse from the Russia investigation.' ' T h e President said that "Sessions should have never
recused himself, and if he was going to recuse himself, he should have told me before he took the
*' ' Sessions* s recusal, the President said„was "very
job, and I would have picked somebody else.
unfair to the president. How do you take a job and then recuse yourself? If he would have recused
himself before thc job, I would have said, 'Thanks, Jef, but I can' t, you know, I'm not going to
take you.' l t"s extremely unfair, and that's a mild word, to the president." st Hicks, who was
present for the interview, recalled trying to "throw [herselfj between the reporters and [the
President]" to stop parts of the interview, but the President "loved thc interview."i'
Later that day, Lewandowski met with Hicks and they discussed the President's New York
Times interview. s4 Lewandowski recalled telling Hicks about the President's request that he meet
with Sessions and joking with her about the idea of firing Sessions as a private citizen if Sessions
would not meet with him. ss As Hicks remembered the conversation, Lewandowski told her the
President had recently asked him to meet with Sessions and deliver a message that he needed to
do the "right thing" and resign.m' While Hicks and Lewandowski were togcthci; thc President
called Hicks and told her he was happy with how coverage of his New York Times interview
criticizing Sessions was playing out em
Three days later, on July 21, 2017, the Washington Post reported that U.S. intelligence
intercepts showed that Sessions had discussed campaign-related matters with the Russian
ambassador, contrary to what Sessions had said publicly.ms That evening, Priebus called Hunt to
talk about whether Sessions might be fired or might resign.s'v Priebus had previously talked to
Hunt when the media had reported on tensions between Sessions «nd the President, and, after
speaking to Sessions, Hunt had told Priebus that the President would have to fire Sessions if hc
wanted to remove Sessions because Sessions was not going to quit.s4 According to Hunt, who
took contemporaneous notes of the July 21 call, Hunt told Priebus that, as they had previously
discussed, Sessions had no intention of resigning.'4' Hunt asked Priebus what the President would
' Peter Baker ct at„Excerprs From The Times 's Interview gqrb Tramp, New York Times (July
19, 2017).
' Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 23.
'm Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 10; Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 6.
" Lewandowski 4/6/1 8302, at 6.
"' Hicks 3/13/1 8 302, at 10. Hicks thought that the President might be able to make a recess
appointment of a ncw Attorney General because thc Senate was about to go on recess. Hicks 3/13/18 302,
at 10. Lewandowski recalled that in the attar«con of July 19, 2017, following h'is meeting with the
President, hc conducted research on recess appointments but did not share his research with the President.
Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 7,
"t Lewandowski 4/6/1 8 302, at 6.
Adam Bntous et al., Sess/ons disctsssed Tramp campaign-related masters with Russian
ambassador, US. inde/Iigenceintercepts s/raw, Washington Post (July 21, 2017). The underlying events
concerning the Sessions-Kislyak contacts are discussed in V olume 1, Section IV.A.4.c, supra.
sm Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 23.
"' Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 23.
' ' Hunt.2/1/18 302, at 23-24; Hunt 7/21/17 Notes, at 1.
U.S. Deparhnent of Justice
//
accompgsh by firing Sessions, pointing out there was an investigation before and there would be
an investigation atter.s"s
Early the f o llowing morning, July 22 , 2 017, the President tweeted, "A n ew
INTELLIGENCE LEAK from the Amazon Washington Post, this time against A,G. Jeff Sessions.
These illegal leaks, like Comey's, must stop!"~s Approximately onc hour later, the President
twceted, "So many people are asking why isn't the A.G. or Special Council looking at thc many
Hillary Clinton or Camey crimes. 33,000 e-mails deleted?"~ L ater that morning, while aboard
Marine Onc on the, way to Norfolk, Virginia, the President told Priebus that he had to gct Sessions
to resign immediately. s The President said that the counuy had lost confidence in Sessions and
the negative publicity was not tolerable. is According to contemporaneous notes taken by Priebus,
the President told Priebus to say that he "need[cd] a letter of resignation on [his] desk immediately"
and that Sessions had "no choice" but "must immediately resign."~t Priebus replied that if they
fired Sessions, they would never gct a new Attorney General confirmed and that the Department
of Justice and Congress would turn their backs on the President, but thr, President suggested he
could make a recess appoinuncnt to replace Sessions.s"
Priebus believed that the President's request was a problem, so he called McGahn and
asked foi advice, explaining that he did not want to pull the trigger on something that was "all
wrong.*'~s Although the President tied his desire for Sessions to resign to Sessions's negative
press and poor performance in congressional testimony, Priebus believed that the President's
desire to replace Sessions was dkven by the President's hatred of Sessions's recusal from the
Russia investigation.~ M cGahn told Priebus not to follow the President's order and said they
should consult their personal counsel, with whom they had attorney-client privilege.s" McGahn
95
U.S. Department of Justice
//
and Priebus discussed the possibility that they would both have to resign rather than carry out the
President'sorder to fire Sessions.s
That afternoon, the President followed up with Priebus about demanding Sessions's
resignation, using woi'ds to the effect of, "Did you get it? Are you working on it?"sss Priebus said
that he believed that his job depended on whether he followed the order to remove Sessions,
although the President did not directly say so.~'4 Even though Priebus did not intend to carry out
the President's directive, he told the President hc would get Sessions to resign. ' Later in the day,
Priebus called the President and explained that it would be a calanuty if Sessions resigned because
Priebus expected that Rosenstein and Associate Attorney General Rachel Brand would also resign
and the President would bc unable to get anyone else confirmed.sss ThePresident agieed to hold
off on demanding Sessions "s resignation until after the Sunday shows the next day„ to prevent the
shows from focusing on thc firing.s i
By the end of that weekend, Priebus recalled that the President relented and agreed not to
ask Sessions to resign. s Over the next several days, the President tweeted about Sessions. On
the morning of Monday, July 24, 2017, the President criticized Sessions for neglecting to
investigate Clinton and called him "beleaguered." s On July 25, the President tweeted, "Attorney
Genrral Jeff Sessions has taken a VERY weak position on Hillary Clinton crimes (where are E-
mails & DNC server) & Intel leakcrs!" s The following day, July 26, the President tweeted, "Why
didn't A.G. Sessions replace Acting FBI Director Andrew McCabe, a Comey friend who was in
charge of Clinton investigation.*'ss' According to Hunt, in light of the president's frequent public
attacks, Sessions prepared another resignation letter and for the rest of the year carried it with him
in his pocket every time he went to the White House as'
'" McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 11; RP 000074 (Pricbus 7/22/17 Notes) (" discuss resigning
together*').
"' Priebus 1/18/1 8 302, at 14; Priebus 4/3/1 8 302, at 4.
"4 Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 4.
' Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 15.
's' Pricbus 1/18/18 302, at 15.
'" Priebus 1/18/1 8 302„at 15.
sw Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 15.
' @realDonaldTrump 7/24/17 (8:49 a.m. ET) Tweet ("So why aren't the Committees and
investigators, and cf course our beleaguered A,G., looking into Crooked Hillarys crimes & Russia
relations?" ).
"' @realDonaldTrump 7/25/17 (6:12 a.m. ET) Tweet. The President sent another tweet shortly
before this one asking "where is the invesdgation A.G." @rcalDcnaldTrump 7/25/17 (6:03 a.m. ET) Tweet.
' ' @realDonaldTrump 7/26/17 (9i48 a.m. ET) Tweet,
' i Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 24-25.
IJ.S. Department of Justice
//
The President sought to have Sessions announce that the President "shouldn't have a
Special Prosecutor/Counsel" and that Sessions was going to "meet with the Special Prosecutor to
explain this is very unfair and let the Special Prosecutor move forward with investigating election
meddling for future elections so that nothmg can happen in future elections." The Pi esident wanted
Sessions to disregard his recusal Irom the investigation, which had followed from a formal DOJ
ethics review, and have Sessions declare that he knew "for a fact" that "there were no Russians
involved with the campaign" because he "was there." The President further dircctcd that Sessions
should explain that the President should not be subject to an investigation "because he hasn't done
anything wrong." Taken together, the President's directives indicate that Sessions was being
instructed to tell the Special Counsel to end the existing investigation into the President and his
campaign„with the Special Counsel being permitted to "move forward with investigating election
meddling for future elections."
See Vo ume II, Section II.G, inPa. To satisfy the nexus requirement,
it would be necessary to show that limiting the Special Counsel's investigation would have the
naturaland probable effectofimpeding thatgrandjury proceeding.
c. Inte n t. Substantial evidence indicates that the President's effort to have Sessions
limit thc scope of the Special Counsel's investigation to future election interference was mtended
to prevent further investigative scrutiny of the President's and his campaign's conduct.
As previously described, see Volume Il, Section II.B, supra, the President knew that the
Russia investigation was focused in part on his campaign, and he perceived allegagons of Russian
interference to cast doubt on the legitimacy of his election. The President further knew that the
investigation had broadened to include his own conduct and whether he had obstructed justice.
Those investigations would not proceed if the Special Counsel's jurisdiction were limited to future
election interference, only.
The timing and circumstances of the President's actions support the conclusion that hc
sought that result. The President's initial direction that Sessions should limit the Special Counsel's
investigation came just two days after the president had ordered McGahn to have the Special
Counsel removed, which itself followed public reports that the President was personally under
U.S. Department of Justice
investigation for obstruction of justice. The sequence. of those events raises an inference that after
seeking to terminate the Special Counsel, the President sought to exclude his and his campaign's
conduct from the investigation's scope. The President raised the matter with Lewandowski again
on July 19, 2017, just days afier emails and information about the June 9, 2016 meeting between
Russians and senior campaign officials had been publicly disdosed, generating substantial media
coverage and investigative interest.
The manner in which the President acted provides additional evidence ofhis intent. Rather
than rely on official channels„ the President met with Lewandowski alone in the Oval Office. The
President selected a loyal *'devotee" outside the White House to deliver the message, supporting
aii inference that he was working outside White House channels, including McGahn, whn had
previously icsisted contacting the Department of Jusfice about the Special Counsel. The President
also did not contact the Acting Attorney Creneral, who had just testified publicly that there was no
cause to remove the Special Counsel. Instead, the President tried to use Sessions to restrict and
redirect the Special Counsel's investigation when Sessions was recused and could not properly
take any action on it.
The July 19, 2017 events provide further evidence of the President's intent. The President
followed up with Lewandowski in a separate one-on-one meeting onc month after he first dictated
the message for Sessions, demonstrating he still sought to pursue the request. And just hours afier
Lewandowski assured the President that the message would soon be delivered to Sessions, the
President gave an unplanned interview to the New York Times in which he publicly attacked
Sessions and raised questions about his job security. Four days later, on July 22, 2017, the
President directed Priebus to obtain Sessions's resignation, That evidence could raise an inference
that the President wanted Sessions to realize that his job might be on the line as he evaluated
whether to comply with the President's direction that Sessions publicly announce that,
notwithstanding his recusal, he was going to confine the Special Counsel's investigation to future
election interference.
G. The President's Efforts to Prevent Disclosure of Kmails About the June 9, 2016
Meeting Between Russians and Senior Campaign Officials
OvervJeiv
By June 2017, the President became aware of emails setting up the June 9, 2016 meeting
between senior campaign officials and Russians who offered derogatory information on Hillary
Clinton as "part of Russia and its government's support for Mr. Trump." On multiple occasions
in late June and early July 2017, the President directed aides not to publicly disclose the emails,
and he. then dictated a statement about the meeting to bc issued by Donald Trump Jr, describing
the meeting as about adoption.
Evidence
1. The President Learns About the Existence of Emails Concernin the June 9
2016 Trum Tower Mectin
In mid-June 2017 —the same week that the President first asked Lewandowski to pass a
message to Sessions —senior Admiiustration officials became aware of emails exchanged during
U.S. Department of Justice
the campaign arranging a meeting between Donald Trump Jr., Paul Manafort, Jared Kushner, and
a Russian attorney.s As described in Volume I, Section IV,A.5, supra, the emails stated that the
"Crown [P]rosecutor of Russia" had offered "to provide the Trump campaign with some ofIIcial
documents and information that would incriminate Hillary and her dealings with Russia" as part
of "Russia and its government's support for Mr. Trump."ss~ Trump Jr. responded, "[I]f it's what
you say I love it," s and he, Kushner, and Manafort met with the Russian attorney and several
other Russian individuals at Trump Tower on June 9, 2016. s At the meeting, the Russian attorney
claimed that funds derived from illegal activities in Russia were provided to Hillary Clinton and
other Democrats, and the Russian attorney then spoke about the Magnitsky Act, a 2012 U.S. statute
that imposed financial and travel sanctions on Russian officials and that had resulted in a retaliatory
ban in Russia on U.S. adoptions of Russian children.s
According to written answers submitted by the President in response to questions Irom this
Office, the President had no recollection of learning of the meeting or thc emails setting it up at the
time the meeting occurred or at any other time before the election.sss
The Trump Campaign had previously received a document request Irom SSCI that called
*
for the production of various information, including, "[a] list and a description of all meetings'
between any "individual affiliated with the Truinp campaign" and "any individual formally or
informally affiliated with the Russian government or Russian business interests which took place
between June 16, 2015, and 12 pm on January 20, 2017," and associated records. s Trump
Organization attorneys became aware of the June 9 meeting no later than the first week of June
2017, when they began interviewing the meeting participants, and the Trump Organization
attorneysprovided the emails setting up the meeting to the President's personal counsel.' Mark
Corallo, who, had been hired as a spokesman for the President's personal legal team, recalled that
he learned about the June 9 meeting around June 21 or22, 2017.s" Priebus recalled learning about
the June 9 meeting from Pox News host Sean Haiuuty in late June 2017.s Priebus notified one
of the President's personal attorneys, who told Priebus he was already working on it.' ' B y late
June, several advisors recalled receiving media inquiries that could telate to the June 9 meeting.srs
Communications advisors Hope Hicks and Josh Raffel recalled discussing with Jared
Kushner and Ivanka Trump that the emaiis were damaging and would inevitably be leaked.srs
Hicks and Raffel advised that the best strategy was to proactively release the emails to the press.srs
On or about June 22, 2017, Hicks attended a meeting in the White House residence with the
President„Kushner, and Ivanka Trump.' A c cording to Hicks, Kushner said that he wanted to fill
the President in on something that had been discovered in the documents he was to provide to the
congressional committees involving a meeting with him, Manafort„and Trump Jr.ms Kushner
brought a folder of documents to the meeting and tried to show them to the President, but the
President stopped Kushner and said he did not want to know about it, shutting the conversation
down.srs
On June 28, 2017, Hicks viewed the emails at Kushner's attorney's office. s She recalled
being shocked by the emails because they looked "really bad/"s ' The next day, Hicks spoke
privately with the President to mention her concern about the emails„which she understood were
soon going to be shared with Congress, T h e President seetncd upset because too many people
knew about thc emails and he told Hicks that just one lawyer should deal with the matter,s The
Pt'esident indicated that he did not think the emails would leak, but said they would leak if everyone
had access to them.
100
U.S. Department of Justice
Later that day, Hicks, Kushncr, and Ivanka Tmmp went together to talk to the President. "
Hicks recalled that Kushner told the President the June 9 meeting was nota big deal and was about
Russian adoption, but that emails. existed setting u'p the meeting.sss Hicks said she wanted to get
in front of the story and have Trump Jr. telcasc tbe emails as part of an interview with "softball
questions." " T he President said he did not want to know about it and they should not go to the
press. s Hicks warned the President that the emails were "really bad" and the story would be
"massive" when it broke, but the President was insistent that he did not want to talk about it and
said he did not want details sss Hicks recalled that the President asked Kushner when his document
production was due.~ Kushner responded that it would be a couple of weeks and the President
said, "then leave it alone.'+st Hicks also recalled that thc President said Kushner's attorney should
give the emails to whomever he needed to give them to, but the President did not think they would
be leaked to the press.sss Raffel later heard from Hicks that the President had directed the group
not to be proactive in disclosing the cmails because the President believed they would not leak.ss
3. The President Directs Trum J t'.'s Res ouse to Press In uiries About the
~J 9M 9
The following week, the President departed on an overseas trip for the G20 summit in
Hamburg, Germany, accompanied by Hicks, Raffel, Kushner, and lvanka Trump, among others.
On July 7, 2017, while the President was overseas, Hicks and Raffel learned that the New York
Times was working on a story about the June 9 meeting.ss' The next day, Hicks told the president
about the story and he directed her not to comment.sss Hicks thought the President's reaction was
odd because he usually considered not responding to the press to be the ultimate sin. ~ Later that
day, Hicks and the President again spoke about the story. s Hicks recalled that the President asked
her what the meeting had been about, and she said that she had been told the meeting was about
Russian adoption. w The President responded, "then just say that." '
Qn the flight home from the G20 on July 8, 2017, Hicks obtained a draft statement about
the meeting to be released by Trump Jr. and brought it to the President,~" The draft statement
began with a reference to the information that was offered by the Russians in setting up the
meeting: "I was asked to have a meeting by an acquaintance I knew from the 2013 Miss Universe
pageant with an individual who I was told might have information helpful to the campaign." ~
Hicks again wanted to disclose thc entire story, but the President directed that the statement not be
issued because it said too much. s The President told Hicks to say only that Trump Jr. took a brief
meeting and it was about Russian adoption.'~ A fter speaking with the President, Hicks texted
Trump Jr. a revised statement on the June 9 meeting that read:
It was a short meeflng. I asked Jared and Paul to stop by. We discussed a program about
the adoption of Russian children that was active and popular with American families years
ago and was since ended by the Russian government, but it was not a campaign issue at
that time and there was no follow up.
Hicks's text concluded, "Arc you ok with this7 Attributed to you." 4 Trump Jr. responded by
text message that he wanted to add the word "primarily' * be fore "discussed" so that the statement
would read, "We ~rimarfl discussed a program about the adoption of Russian children,'us~ Trump
Jr. texted that he wanted the change because "[t]hey started with some Hillary thing which was hs
and some other nonsense which we shot down fast. ess Hicks textcd back, "I think that's right too
but boss man womed it invites a lot of questions[.] [U]ltimately [d]efer to you and [your attorney]
on that word Bc I know it *a important and I think the mention o f a campaign issue adds som
ething
to it in case we have to go further." Tr u mp Jr. responded, "If I don't have it in there it appears
as though I'm lying later when they inevitably leak something.""' Trump Jr.'s statement — adding
102
U.S. Department of Justice
the word "primarily" and making other minor additions — was then provided to the New York
Times."' The full statement provided to the Times stated:
It was a short introductory meeting. I asked Jared and Paul to stop by. We primarily
discussed a program about the adoption of Russian children that was active and popular
with American families years ago and was since ended by the Russian governmen, but it
was not a campaign issue at the time and there was no follow up. I was asked to attend thc
meeting by an acquaintance, but was not told the name of the person I would be meeting
with beforehand.~'t
The statement did not mention the offer of derogatory information about Clinto'n or any discussion
of thc Magnitsky Act ot U.S. sanctions, which were the prmcipal subjects of the meeting, as
described in Volume I, Section IV.A.5, supra.
A short while later, while still on Air Force One, Hicks learned that Priebus knew about
the emails, which further convinced her that additional information about the June 9 meeting would
leak and the White House should 4'e proactive and gct in front of the story. ' H i cks recalled again
going to the President to urge him that they should be fully transparent about the, June 9 meeting,
but hc again said no, telling Hicks, "You' ve given a statetnent. We' re done.""4
Later on the flight home, Hicks went to the President's cabin, where the President was on
thc phone with otic of his personal attorneys. ' A t one point the President handed the phone to
Hicks, and the attorney told Hicks that he had been working with Circa News on a separate story,
and that she, should not talk to the New York Times. '
Before the President's flight home from the G20 landed, the New York Times published
its story about the June 9, 2016 meeting. ' I n addition to the statement from Trump Jt'., the Times
story also quoted a statement from Corallo on behalf of the President's legal team suggesting that
the meeting might have been a setup by individuals working with the firm that produced the Steele
reporting.~" C orallo also worked with Circa News on a story published an hour later that
'" Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 6; see Jo Becker et al., Trump Team Mcr With Lawyer Linked ra Emmlin
During Campmgn,New York Times (July 8, 2017).
tn See Jo Becker et al., Trunip Team Mei With Lawyer Linked to Kremlin During Campaign, New
York Times (July '8, 2017).
" Hicks3/13/18 302,at6;Rachel 2/8/18 302,at9-10.
' Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 12; Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 10.
" Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 7.
" Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 7.
" See Jo Becket et al., Trump Team Mei ]Kith Lawyer Linked ro Krein Jin During Campaign, New
York Times (July 8, 2017); Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 10.
" gee Jo Becker et al., Trump Team Met With Lawyer Linked /a % em/in During Campaign, New
York Times (July 8, 2017).
103
V.S. Department of Justice
/I
questioned whether Democratic operatives had arranged the June 9 meeting to create the
appearanceof improper connections between Russia and Trump family members.tts Hicks was
upset about Corallo's public statement and called him that evening to say the President had not
approved the statement.
The next day, July 9, 2017, Hicks and the President called Corallo together and the
President criticized Corallo for the statement hc had released.7" Corallo told the President the
statement had been authorized and further observed that Trump Jr.'s statement was inaccurate and
that a document existed that would contradict it.'s' Corallo said that he purposely used theterm
"document" to refer to the emails setting up the June 9 meeting because hc did not know what the
President knew about the emails." C o mllo recalled that when he referred to the "document" on
the call with the President, Hicks responded that only a few people had access to it and said "it
will never get out/o2t Corallo took contemporaneous notes of the call that say: "Also mention
existencc of doc. Hope says 'only a few people have it. It will never get out/oa s Hicks later told
investigators that she had no memory of making that comment and had always believed the emails
would eventually be leaked, but she might have been channeling the President on the phone call
because it was clear to her throughout her conversations with the President that he did not think
thc emails would leak.tts
On July 11, 2017, Trump Jt. posted redacted images of the emails setting up the June 9
meeting on Twitter; thc New York Times reported that he.did so "[a]fter being told that The Times
was about to publish the content of the emails." m Later that day, the media reported that the
President had been personally involved in preparing Trump Jr.'s initial statement to thc Ncw York
Times that had claimed the meeting "primarily"' concerned "a program about the adoption of
Russian children." s Over the next several days,the President's personal counsel repeatedly and
"' See Donald Trump dr, gathered ~ he r s of campaign for meeti ng with Russtan lawyer before
election, Cima News (July 8, 2017).
' ' Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 8; Carallo 2/15/18 302, at 6-7.
cn Corallo 2/15/18 302, at 7.
t+ Corallo 2/15/18 302, at 7.
"' Corallo 2/15/18 302, at 7-9.
nn Corsllo 2/15/18 302, at 8.
" Corallo 2/15/1 8 302, at 8; Corallo 7/9/1 7Notes (mgunday 9a — Hope calls w/ PQTUS on line" ).
Corallo said he is "10058 confident" that Hicks said "It will never get out" on the call. Corallo 2/15/18 302,
at 9.
n' Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 9.
" @DonaldJTrumpJR 7/11/17 (11:01 a.tn. ET) Tweet; Jo Becker et al., Russian Dirt on Clinton?
'I Love It, ' Donald Trump Jr. Said; New York Times (July 11, 2017).
+s See, e.g., peter Baker gt Maggie Habcrman, Rancor at White House as Russia Story Re
fuses to
Let the Page Turn, New York Times (July 11, 2017) (reporting that the President "signed off' on Trump
Jr.'s statement).
U.S, Department of Justice
//
inaccurately denied that the President played any role in drafting Trump Jr.'s statement. x After
consulting with the President on the issue, White House Press Secretary Sarah Sanders told the
media that the President "certainly didn't dictate" the statement, but that "he weighed in, offered
suggestians like any father would do.""e Several months later, the President's personal counsel
stated in a private communicatian ta the Special Counsel's Office that "the President dictated a
short but accurate response to thc New York Times article on behalf of his son, Danald Trump,
Jr."is' The Presiderit later told the press that it was "irrelevant" whether he dictated the statement
and said, "It's a sta'tcment to the New York Times.... That's nat a statement ta a high tribunal of
*" '
judges.'
On July 19, 2017, the President had his follow-up meeting with Lewandowski and then
met with reporters for the New York Times. In addition ta criticizing Sessions in his Times
interview, the President addressed the June 9, 2016 meeting and said he "didn't know anything
about the meeting" at the time. Th e President added, "As I' ve said — most other people, yau
know, when they call up and say, 'By the way, we have information on your opponent,' I think
most politicians — I was just with a lot of people, they said.. . , ' W ho wouldn't have taken a
meeting like that7* " s s
Anttfysis
In analyzing the President's actions regarding the disclosure of information about the June
9 meeting, the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice:
a. Obs t ructive act. On at least three occasions between June 29, 2017, and July 9,
2017, the President directed Hicks and ath'ers not to publicly disclose information about the June
gee,eg., David Wright, Trump lowyer; President wos aware of "nothing ", CNN (July 12, 2017)
(ttuoting the President's personal attorney as saying, "I wasn't involved in the statement dratbng at all nor
was the President."); see also Good Morning America, ABC {July 12, 2017) (" The President didn't sign
off on anything... . The President wasn*t involved in that."); Meet the Press, NBC (July 16, 2017) ("I da
want to be clear — the President was not involved in the drafting of the statement.').
"' Sarah Sanders, grhite House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (Aug. 1, 2017); Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 9
(the President told Sanders he "weighed in, as any father would*' and knew she intended to tell the press
what he 'said}.
' 1/29/18 Letter, Presiiient's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's OBice, at 18.
'" Remarks by President Trump in Press Gaggle (June 15, 2018).
ut peter Baker et al., Excerpts From The Times's Interview With Trttmp, New York Times (July
19, 2017).
a peter Baker et al., Excerpts From The Times 's Interview JBth Trump, New York Times (July
19, 2017).
105
U.S. Department of Justice
I/
9, 2016 meeting between senior campaign officials and a Russian attorney. On June 29, Hicks
warned the President that the emails setting up the June 9 meeting were "really bad" and thc story
would be "massive" when it broke, but the President told her and Kushner to "leave it alone."
Early on July g, atter Hicks told the President the New York Times was working on a story about
the June 9 meeting, the President directed hcr not to comment, even though Hicks said that the
President usually consi'dered not respondi'ng to the press to be the ultimate sin. Later that day, the
President icjccted Trump Jr.'s draft statement that would have acknowledged that the meeting was
w ith "an individual who I was told might have information helpful to the campaign." T h e
President then dictated a statement to Hicks that said the meeting was about Russian adoption
(which the President had twice been told was discussed at the meeting). The statement dictated
by the President did not mention the offer of derogatory information about Clinton.
Each of these efforts by thc President involved his communications teain and was directed
at the press. They would amount to obstructive acts only if the President, by taking these actions,
sought to withhold information from or mislead congressional investigators or the Special Counsel.
On May 17, 2017, the President's campaign received a document request from SSGI that clearly
covered the June 9 meeting and underlying emails, and those documents also plainly would have
been relevant to the Special Counsel's investigation.
But the evidence does not establish that the President took steps to prevent the emails or
other information about the June 9 meeting from being provided to Congress or the Special
Counsel. The series of discussions in which the President sought to limit access to the emails and
prevent their public release occurred in the context of developing a press strategy. The only
evidence we have of the President discussing the production of documents to Congress or the
Special Counsel is the conversation on June 29, .2017, when Hicks recalled the President
acknowledging that Kushner's attorney should provide emails related to the June 9 meeting to
whomever he needed to give, them to. We do not have evidence of what the President discussed
with his own lawyers at that time.
c. Int e nt. The eviderice establishes the President's substantial involvement in the
communications strategy related to information about his campaign's connections to Russia and
his desire to minimize publIc disclosures about those connections. The President became aware
of the emails no later than June 29, 2017, when he discussed them with Hicks and Kushner, and
he could have been aware of them as early as June 2, 2017, when lawyers for the Trump
Organization began interviewing witnesses who participated in the June 9 meeting. The President
thereaIIer repeatedly rejected the advice of Hicks and other staffcrs to publicly release in formation
about the June 9 meeting, The President expressed concern that multiple people had access to the
emails and instrurted Hicks that only one lawyer should deal with the matter. And the President
106
U.S, Department of Justice
//
dictated a statement to be released by Trump Jr. in response to the first press accounts of the June
9 meeting that said the meeting was about adoption.
But as described above, thc evidence does not establish that the President intended to
prevent the Special Counsel's Office or Congress Rom obtaining the emails setting up the Junc 9
meeting or other information about that meeting. The statement recorded by Corallo — that the
emails "will never get out" — can be explained as retlecting a belief that the emails would not be
mad'e public if the President's press strategy were followed, even if the emails were provided to
Congress and the Special Counsel.
Overview
From summer 2017 through 2018, the President attempted to have Attorney General
Sessions reverse his recusal, take control of the Special Counsel's investigation, and order an
investigation of Hillary Clinmn.
Evidence
1. The President A ain Seeks to Have Sessions Reverse his Recusal
Atter returning Sessions's resignation letter at the end of May 2017, but before the
President's July 19, 2017 New York Times interview in which he publicly criticized Sessions for
recusing from the Russia investigation, the President took additional steps to have Sessions reverse
his recusal. In particular, at some point atter the May 17, 2017 appointment of the Special Counsel,
Sessions recalled, thc President called him at home and asked if Sessions would "unrecuse"
himself.' Ac cording to Sessions, the President asked him to reverse his recusal so that Sessions
could direct the Department of Justice to investigate and prosecute Hillary Clinton, and the "gist"
of the conversation was that th'e President wanted Sessions to unrecuse from "all of it," including
the Special Counsel's Russia investigation. x Sessions listened but did not respond, and he did
not mversc his recusal or order an investigation of Clinton. s
In early July 2017, the President asked Staff Secretary Rob Porter what he thought of
Associate Attorney General Rachel Brand." Porter recalled that the President asked him if Brand
was good, tough, and "on the team."4' The President also asked if Porter thought Brand was
interested in being responsible for the Special Counsel's investigation and whether she would want
"' Sessions I/17/18 302, at 15. That was the second time that the President asked Sessions to
reverse his recusal fmm campaign-related investigations. Sec Uolume II, Section II.C. I, supra (describing
President's March 2017 request at Mar-a-Lago for Sessions to unrecuse).
"' Sessions I/17/18 302, at 15.
' Sessions I/17/18 302, at 15.
" Porter 4/13/18 302, at 11; Porter 5/8/18 302, at 6.
Porter 4/13/I 8 302, at 11; Porter 5/8/18 302„at 6.
U.S. Department of Justice
//
to be Attorney General one day. 4' Because Porter knew Brand, the President asked him to sound
her out about taking responsibility for the imestigation and being Attorney General.i~s
Contemporaneous notes taken by Porter show that the President told Porter to "Keep in touch with
your friend," in reference to Brand. 4' Later, the President asked Porter a few times in passing
whether he had spoken to Brand, but Porter did not reach out to her because he was uncomfortable
with the task.i~ In asking him to reach out to Brand, Porter understood the President to want to
find someone to end the Russia investigation or fire the Special Counsel, although the President
never said so explicitly. 4 P o rter did not contact Brand because he was sensitive to the
implications of that action and did not want to be involved in a chain of events associated with an
effort to end the investigation or fue the Special Counsel.i4s
McGahn recalled that during the summer of 2017, he and the President discussed the fact
that if Sessions were no longer in his position the Special Counsel would report directly to a non-
recused Attorney General.' M c Gahn told the President that things might not change much under
a new Attorney General.i4s McGahn also recalled that in or around July 2017, the President
frequently brought up his displeasure with Sessions.' ' H icks recalled that the President viewed
Sessions's recusal from the Russia investigation as an act of disloyalty. s In addition to criticizing
Sessions's recusal, the President raised other concerns about Sessions and his job performance
with McGahn and Hicks.i"
"" Porter 4/13/18 302, at 11; Porter 5/8/18 302, at 6. Because of Sessions's recusal, if Rosenstein
were no longer in his position, Brand would, by default, become the DOJ official in charge of supervising
the Special Counsel's investigation, and if both Sessions and Rosenstein were removed, Brand would be
next in line to become Acting Attorney General for all DOJ matters. See 28 U.S.C. 5 508.
"' Porter 4/13/18 302, at 11; Porter 5/8/18 302, at 6.
ii' SC RRP000020 (Porter 7/10/17 Notes).
Portei 4/13/18 302, at 11-12. Brand confirmed that no one ever raised with her the prospect of
taking over the Russia investigation or becoming Attorney General. Brand 1/29/19 302, at 2.
"' McGalm 12/14/17 302,, at 11.
108
U.S. Department of Justice
Later in 2017, the President continued to urge Sessions to reverse his recusal from
campaign-related investigations and considered replacing Sessions with an Attorney General who
would not be recused.
On October 16, 2017, the President met privately with Sessions and said that the
Department of Justice was not invesggating individuals and events that the President thought the
Department should be investigating.'" According to contemporaneous notes taken by Porter, who
was at the meeting, the President mentioned Clinton's emails and said, "Don't have to tell us, just
take [a] look."ass Sessions did not offer any assurances or promises to the President that the
Department of Justice would comply with that request.'s4 Two days later, on October 18, 2017,
thc President tweeted, "Wow, FBI confirms report that James Comey drafted letter exonerating
Crooked Hillary Clinton long before investigation was complete. Many people not interviewed,
including Clinton herself. Camey stated under oath that he, didn't do this-obviously a fix'? Where
is Justice Deptg" s On October 29, 2017, the President tweeted that there was "ANGER k,
UNITY" over a "lack of investigation" of Clinton and "the Comey fix„" and concluded: "DO
SOMETHING!-'"
On December 6, 2017, five days after Flynn pleaded guilty to lying about his contacts with
the Russian government, the President asked to speak with Sessions in the Oval OAice at the end
of a cabinet meeting.i'i D uring that Oval Office meeting, which Porter attended, thc President
again suggested that Sessions could "unrecuse," which Porter linked to taking back supervision of
the Russia investigation and directing an investigation of Hillary Clinton.i Acc ording to
contemporaneous notes taken by Porter, the President said, "I don't know if you could un-recuse
yourself. You'd be a hero. Not telling you to do anything. Dershowitz says POTUS can gct
involved. Can order AG to investigate. I don "t want to get involved. I * m not going to gct involved.
I'm not going to do anything or direct you to do anything. I just want to be treated fairly.'css
According to Porter's notes, Sessions responded, "We are taking steps; whole new leadership
109
U.S. Department of Justice
//
team. Professionals; will operate according to the law." s S essions also said, "I never saw
anything that was improper," which Porter thought was noteworthy because it did nat fit with the
previous discussion about Clinton.se' Potter understood Sessions to be reassuring the President
that hc was on the President's team. m
At the end of December, the President told the New York Times it was "too bad" that
Sessions had recused himself from the Russia investigation. Wh en asked whether Holder had
been a more loyal Attorney General to President Obama than Sessions was to him, thc President
said, "I don't want to get into loyalty, but I will tell yau that, I will say this: Holder protected
President Obama. Totally pratected him. When you look at the things that they did, and Holder
protected the president. And I have great respect for that, I *ll be honest." 4 Later in January, the
President brought up the idea of replacing Sessions and told Porter that he wanted to "clean house"
at the Department of Justice.sm In a meeting in the White House residence that porter attended on
January 27, 2018, Porter iecalled that the President talked about the great attorneys he had in the
past with successful win records, such as Roy Cobn and Jay Goldberg, and said that one of his
biggest failings as President was that he had not surrounded himself with good attorneys, citing
Sessions as an example. ss The President raised Sessions's recusal and brought up and criticized
the Special Counsel's investigation.
Over the next several months, thc President continued to criticize Sessions in tweets and
media interviews and on several occasions appeared to publicly encourage him to take action in
the Russia investigation despite his recusal. e O n June 5, 2018, for example, the President
tweeted, "The Russian Witch Hunt Hoax continues, all because Jeff Sessions didn't tell me he was
going to recuse himself... . I would have quickly picked someone else. So much time and money
wasted, so many lives ruined . . . a n d Sessions knew better than most that there was No
Collusion! "isa On August I, 2018, the President tweeted that "Attorney General Jeff Sessions
should stop this Rigged Witch Hunt right now." ' O n August 23, 2018, the President publicly
criticized Sessions in a press interview and suggested that prosecutions at the Department of
Justice were politically motivated because Paul Manafort had been prosecuted but Democrats had
not.~ ' The President said, "I put in an Attorney General that never took control of the Justice
Department, Jeff Sessions.ave That day, Sessions issued a press statement that said, "I took controi
of the Department of Justice the day I was sworn in... . While I am Attorney General, the actions
of the Department of Justice will not be improperly influenced by political considerations."w' Thc
next day, the President tweeted a response: "'Department of Justice will not be improperly
influenced by political considerations.' Jeff, this is GREAT„what everyone wants, so look into
all of the corruption on the 'other side' including deleted Emails, Comey lies gc leaks, Mueller
conflicts„McCabe, Strzok, Page, Ohr, FISA abuse, Christopher Steele dt his phony and corrupt
Dossier, the Clinton Foundation, illegal surveillance of Tnuup campaign, Russian collusion by
Dems — and so much more. Open up the papers dr documents without redaction7 Come on Jeff,
you can do it, the counuy is waiting!"~i
On November 7, 201 8, the day aller the midterm elections, the President replaced Sessions
with Sessions's chief of staff as Acting Attorney General.
In analyzing the President's efforts to have Sessions unrecuse himself and regain control
of the Russia investigation, the following considerations and evidence are relevant to the elements
of obstruction of justice:
a. Obstructive act. To determine if the President's efforts to have the Attorney General
unrecuse could qualify as an obstructive act, it would be necessary to assess evidence on whether
those actions would naturally impede the Russia investigation. That inquiry would take into
account the supervisory role that the Attorney General, if unrecuscd, would play in the Russia
investigation. It also would have to take iiito account that the Attorney General's recusal covered
(" Jeff Sessions should be ashamed of himself for allowing this total HOAX to get started in the first
plaec1").
@reaIDonaldTrump 6/5/18 (7:31 a,m. ET) Tweet.
" @realDonaldTrump 8/1/18 (9:24 a.m. ET) Tweet.
rn Fox & Friends Interview of President Tnunp, Fox News (Aug. 23, 2018).
" Fox /it Friends Interview of President Trump, Fax News (Aug. 23, 2018).
u' Sessions 8/23/1 8 Press Statement.
"i @reaIDonaldTrump 8/24/18 (6;17 a.in. ET) Tweet; g realDonaldTrump 8/24/I 8 (6;28 a.m. ET)
Tweet.
"' @reaIDonafdTrump 11/7/18 (2:44 p.m. ET1 Tweet.
111
U.S. Depariment of Justice
//
other campaign-related matters. The inquiry would not turn on what Attorney General Sessions
would actually do if unrecused, but on whether the efforts to reverse his recusal would naturally
have had the effect of impeding 'the Russia investigation.
On multiple occasions in 2017, the President spoke with Sessions about reversing his
recusal so that he could take over the Russia investigation and begin an investigation and
prosecution of Hillary Clinton. For example, in early summer 2017, Sessions recalled the
President asking him to unrecuse, but Sessions did not take it as a directive, When the President
raised the issue again in December 2017, the President said, as recorded by Porter, "Not telling
you to do anything... . I 'm not going to get involved. I'm not going to do anything or direct you
to do anything. I just want to be treated fairly." The duration of the President's efforts — which
spanned from March 2017 to August 2018 — and the fact that the President repeatedly criticized
Sessions in public and in private for failing to tell the President that he would have to recuse is
relevant to assessing whether the President's efforts to have Sessions unrecuse could qualify as
obstructive acts.
c. Intent. There is evidence that at least one purpose of the President's conduct toward
Sessions was to have Sessions assume control over the Russia investigation and super'vise it in a
way that would restrict its scope. By the summer of 2017, the President was aware that the Special
Counsel was investigating him personally for obsnuction of justice. And in the wake of the
disclosures of emails about the June 9 meeting between Russians and senior members of the
campaign, see Volume II, Section II.G, supra, it was evident that the investigation into the
campaign now included the President's son, son-in-law„and former campaign manager. The
President had pteviously and unsuccessfully sought to have Sessions publicly announce that the
Special Counsel investigation would be confined to future election interference. Yet Sessions
remained recused. In December 2017, shortly after Flynn pleaded guilty, the President spoke to
Sessions in the Oval Office with only Porter present and told Sessions that he would be a hero if
he unrecused. Porter linked that request to the President's desire that Sessions take back
s upervision of the Russia investigation and direct an investigation of Hillary Clinton. T h e
Ptesident said in that meeting that he "just want[ed] to be treated fairly," which could reflect his
perception that it was unfair that he was being investigated while Hillary Clinton was not. But a
principal effect of that act would be to restore supervision of the Russia investigation to the
Attorney General — a position that the President &equently suggested should be occupied by
someone like Eric Holder and Bobby Kennedy, who the President described as protecting their
E g., Del quentinWilbur & Byron Tau, Special Counsel Robert ildueller Jtnpanels Washington
Grand Jury in Russia probe,Wall Street Journal (Aug. 3, 2017),' Caml D. Leonnig et aL, Special Counsel
Mueller using grandj uryin federal coun'in Washington as part of Russia investigation, Washington Post
(Aug. 3, 2017).
112
U.S. Department of Justice
//
presidents. A reasonable inference from those statements and the President's actions is that the
President believed that an unrecused Attorney General would play a protective role and could
shield the President from the ongoing Russia investigation.
I. The P resident Orders McGahn to Deny that the, President Tried to Fire the
Special Counsel
In late January 2018, the media reported that in June 2017 the President had ordered
McGahn to have the Special Counsel fired based on purported conflicts af interest but McGahn
had refused, saying he would quit instead. Afler the story broke, thc President, through his
petsanal counsel and two aides, sought to have McGahn deny that he had been directed to remove
the Special Counsel. Each time he was approached, McGahn responded that he wauld not refute
the press accounts because they were accurate in reporting on the President's effort ta have the
Special Counsel removed. The President later personally met with McGahn in the Oval Office
with only the, Chief of Staff present and tried to get McGahn to say that the President never ordered
him ta fire the Special Counsel. McGahn refused and insisted his memory of the President's
direction to rcmove the Special Counsel was accurate. In that same meeting, the President
challenged McGahn for taking notes of his discussions with the President and asked why he had
told Special Counsel investigators that hc had been directed to have the Sperial Counsel removed,
Evidence
On January 25, 2018, the New York Times teported that in June 2017, the President had
ordered McGahn to have the Department at' Justice fire the Special Counsel.s+ According to the
article, "[a]mid the first wave of news media reports that Mr. Mueller was examining a possible
obstruction case. the president began ta argue that Mr. Mueller had three conflicts of interest that
disqualified him from overseeing the investigation.'o" T he article further reported that "[a]fler
receiving the president's arder to fire Mr. Mueller, the White House counsel... refused ta ask the
Justice Department to dismiss the, special counsel, saying he would quit instead." ' T h e article
stated that the president "ultimately backed down after the W'hite House counsel threatened to
resign rather than carry out the directive.*' s After the article was published, the President
rn Michael S. Schmidt Bc Maggie Haberman„Ti'ump Ordered Mueller Fired, but Backed Off When
White House Counsel Threatened to Quit, New York Times (Jan. 25. 2018).
' Michael S. Schmidt kt Maggie Haberrnan, Trump Ordered Mueller" Fired, but Backed Off When
White House Counsel Threatened to Quit,,New Yark Times (Jan. 25. 2018).
w Michael S. Schmidt tk Maggie Haberman,T rumpOrdered Mueller Fired, but Backed Off When
White House Counsel Threatened to Quit, New York Times (Jan. 25. 2018).
"' Michael S. Schmidt b'c Maggie Haberman, Trump Ordered Mueller Fired, but Backed Off When
White Howe Counsel Threatened to Quit, New York Times (Jan. 25. 2018),
113
U.S. Department of Justice
//
dismissed the story when asked about it by reporters, saying, "Fake news, folks. Fake news. A
typical New York Times fake story."
The next day, the Washington Post reported on the same event but added that McGahn had
not told the President directly that he intended to resign rathei than carry aut the directive to have
the Special Counsel terminated.tss In that respect, the Post story clarified the Times story, which
could be read to suggest that MeGahn had told the President of' his intention to quit, causing the
President to back down from the order to have the Special Counsel fired.s"
2. The President Seeks ta Have McGahn Dis ute the Press Re orts
On January 26, 2018, the President's personal counsel called McGahn's attorney and said
that the President wanted McGahn to put out a statement denying that he had been asked to fire
the Special Counsel and that he had threatened to quit in protest.ss4 McGahn's attorney spoke with
McGahn about that request and then called the President's persaiial counsel ta relay that McGahn
would not make a statement."' McGahn*sattorney informed the President's personal counsel that
the Times story was accurate in reporting that the President wanted the Special Counsel
removed.s' A ccordingly, McGahn's attorney said, although the article was inaccurate in some
other respects, McGahn cauld not comply with the President's request to dispute the story."s
Hicksrecalled relayingto thePresidentthatone ofhis attorneys had spoken toMcGahn's attorney
about the issue. "
' Sophie Tatum tk Kara Scannell, Trump denies he cagedfor Mueller 's firing, CNN (Jan. 26,
2018); Michael S. Schmidt ik Maggie Habermsn, Truinp Ordered Mueller Fired, but Backed Off 87ten
IVhite House Counsel Threatened to Quit, New York Times (Jan. 25, 2018).
The Post article stated, '"Despite internal objections, Trump ilecided to assert that Mueller had
unacceptable conflicts of interest and moved to remove him from his position.. . . I n response, McGahn
said he would not remain at the White House if Trump went through with the move.. .. McGahn didnot
deliver his resignation threat directly to Trump but was serious about his threat to leave." Rosalind S.
Helderman bt Josh Dawsey, Trump moved to fire Mueller in dune, bringing IIVute House counsel to the
brink of leaving, Washington Post (Jan. 26, 2018).
ns Rosalind S. Heldermsn tk Josh Dawsey, Trump moved to fire Mueller in Jtme, bringing While
House counsel to the brink of leaving, Washington Past (Jan. 26, 2018); see McGahn 3/8/17 302, at 3-4.
s~ McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 3 (agent nate).
ns McGahn 3/8/I 8 302, at 3 (agent note).
s' MBGahn 3/8/18 302, at 3-4 (agent note).
nn McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4 (agent nate).
" Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 11. Hicks also recalled that the President spoke an the phone that day
'with Chief of Staff John Kelly and that the President said Kelly told him that McGahn had totally refuted
the story and was going to put out a statement. Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 11. But Kelly said that he did not
speak to McGahn when the article came aut and did not tell anyone he had done so. Kelly 8/2/18 302, at
1-2.
114
U.S. Department of Justice
//
Also on January 26, 2017, Hicks recalled that the President asked Sanders to contact
McGahn about the story. " McGahn told Sanders there was na need to respond and indicated that
some of the article was accurate. Co nsistent with that position, McGahn did not correct the
Times story.
Gn February 4, 2018, Priebus appeared on Meet the Press and said he had not heard the
President say that he wanted the Special Counsel fired.xw A fter Priebus's appearance, the
President called Priebus and said he did a great jab on Meet the Press. The President also told
Priebus that thc President had "never said any of those things about" the Special Counsel.xm
The next day, on February 5, 2018, the President complained about the Times article to
Partcr.' 4 The President told Porter that the article was "bullshit" and he had not sought to
terminate the Special Counsel. s The President said that McGahn leaked to thc media to make
himself look good. T h e President then directed Porter to tell McGahn to create a record to make
clear that th'e President never directed McGahn to fire the Special Counsel. Porter thought the
matter should be handled by the White House communications office, but the President said he
wanted McGahn to write a letter to the file "foi' our records*' and wanted something beyond a press
statement to demonstrate that the reporting was inaccui'ate. s The Presidentreferred ta McGahn
as a "lying bastard" and said that he wanted a record from him. 's Porter recalled the Picsident
" H i cks 3/13/18 302, at 11. Sanders did not recall whether the President asked her to speak to
McGshn or if she did it on her own. Sanders 7/23/18 302, at 2.
xw Sanders 7/23/18 302, at 1-2.
"' Meet the Press Interview with Reince Priebus, NBC (Feb. 4, 2018).
' Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 10.
'" Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 10.
Porter 4/13/18 302, at 16-17. Porter did not recall the timing of this discussiiin with the
President. Porter 4/13/I 8 302, at 17. Evidence indicates it was February 5, 2018. On the back of a pocket
card dated Februaiy 5, 2018, Porter took notes that are consistent with his description of the discussion:
"COS: (I) Letter from DM — Never tlu'eatened ta quit — DJT never told him to fire M." SC RRP000053
(Porter Undated Notes). Porter said it was possible he took the notes an a day other than February 5. Porter
4/13/18 302, at 17. But Porter also said that "COS" referred to matters he wanted to discuss with Chief of
Staff Kelly, Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17, and Kelly took notes dated February 5, 2018, that state "POTUS-
Don McGahn letter — Mueller + resigning." WH000017684 (Kelly 2/5/18 Notes). Kelly said he did nat
recall what the notes meant, but thought the President may have "mused" about having McGahn write a
letter. Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 3. McGahn recalled that Porter spoke with him about the President's request
about twa weeks atter the New York Times story was published, which is consistent with the discussion
taking place on or about February 5. McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4.
" Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17.
' Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17.
"' Parter 4/13/I& 302, at17.
'" Potter 4/13/18 302, at 17; Porter 5/8/18 302, at 18.
"w Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17; Porter 5/8/18 302, at 18.
115
U.S. Department of Justice
//
saying something to the effect of, "If he doesn't write a letter, then maybe I' ll have to get rid of
him.""
Later that day, Porter spoke to McGahn to deliver the President's message."' Porter told
McGahn that he had to write a letter to dispute that he was ever ordered to terminate thc Special
Counsel. 4 McGahn shrugged off the request, explaining that the media reports were true.s s
McGahn told Porter that the President had been insistent on firing the Special Counsel and that
McGahn had planned to resign rather than carry out the order, although he had not personally told
the President he intended to quit.' P o rter told McGahn that the President suggested that McGahn
would be fired if he did not write the letter. s McGahn dismissed the threat, saying that the optics
would be terrible if the President followed through with firing him on that basis.' MeGahn said
he would not write the letter the President had requested.' Porter said that to his knowledge the
issue of McGahn's letter never came up with the President again, but Porter did recall telling Kelly
about his conversation with McGahn.scs
The next day, on February 6, 2018, Kelly soheduled time for McGahn to meet with him
and the President in the Oval Office to discuss the Times article. s The morning of the meeting,
the President's personal counsel called McGahn's attorney and said that the President was going
to be speaking with McGahn and McGahn could not resign no matter what happened m the
meeting."
The President began the Oval Oftice meeting by telling McGahn that the New York Times
story did not "look good" and McGahn needed to correct it. " M cGahn recalled the President
said, "I never said to fire Mueller. I never said 'fire.' This story doesn't look good. You need to
correct this. You' re the White House counsel."'s
McGahn 3/8/18 302 at 4; WH000017685 (Kelly 2/6/18 Notes). McGahn recalled that, before
the Oval Office meeting, he told Kelly that he was not inclined to fix the article. McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4.
"a McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5 (agent nate); 2/26/19 Email, Counsel for Don McGahn to Special
Counsel's Office (confirming Februaiy 6, 2018 date of call from the President's personal counsel).
"' McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4; Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 2.
"s McGshn 3/8/18 302, at 4; Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 2.
116
U,S. Department of Justice
//
In response, McGahn acknowledged that he had not told the President directly that he
planned to resign, but said that the story was otherwise accurate. ' The President asked McGahn,
"Did I say the word 'flre*?" ' MrGahn responded, "What you said is, 'Call Rod [Rosenstein]„
tell Rod that Mueller has conflicts and can't be the Special Counsel.'"" ' T he President responded,
"I never said that." 's The President said he merely wanted McGahn to raise the conflicts issue
with Rosenstein and leave it to him to decide what to do.st~ McGahn told the President he did not
understand the conversation that way and instead had heard, "Call Rod. There are conflicts.
Mueller has to go." ' T h e President asked McGahn whether he would "do a correction," and
McGahn said no. ' M cGahn thought the President was testing his mettle to see how committed
McGahn was to what happened. s Kelly described the meeting as "a little tense."+'
The President also asked McGahn in the meeting why he had told Special Counsel's Office
investigators that the President had told him to have the Special Counsel removed.+~ McGahn
responded that hc had to and that his conversations with the President were not protected by
attorney-client privilege."' The President then asked, "Whatabout these notes? Why do you take
notes? Lawyers don't take notes. I never had a lawyer who took notes." s M cGahn responded
that he keeps notes because he is a "real lawyer" and explained that notes create a record arid are
nota bad thing.'~ The President said, "I *ve had a lot of great lawyers, like Roy Cohn. He did not
take notes.''sss
Mer the Oval Office meeting concluded, Kelly recalled McGahn telling him that McGahn
and the President "did have that conversation" about removing the Special Counsel. ' M cGahn
recalled that Kelly said that he had pointed out to the President after the Oval Office that McGahn
117
U.S. Depaitment of Justice
//
had not backed down and would not budge."' Following thc Oval Office meeting, the President's
personal counsel called McGahn's counsel and relayed that the President was "fine" with
McGahn.szs
Analysis
In analyzing the President's efforts to have McGahn deny that he had been ordered to have
the Special Counsel removed, the following evidence is relevant to the elements af obstruction of
justice:
a. Obs t ructive act. The President's repeated effoits to get McGahn to create a record
denying that the President had directed him to remove the Special Counsel would qualify as an
obstructive act if it had the natural tendency to constrain McGahn from testifying truthfully or to
undermine his credibility as a potential witness if he testified consistently with his memory, rather
than with what the record said,
There is same evidence that at the time the New York Times and Washington Post stories
wet e published in late January 2018, the President believed the stories were wrong and that he had
never told McGahn to have Rosenstein remove the Special Counsel. The President correctly
understood that McGahn had not told the President directly that he planned to resign. In addition,
the President told Priebus and Porter that he had not sought to terminate the Special Counsel, and
in the Oval Office meeting with McGahn, the President said, "I never said to fire Mueller. I never
said 'fire.'" T hat evidence could indicate that the President was not attempting to persuade
McGahn to change his story but was instead offering his awn — but different — recollection of the
substance of his June 2017 conversations with McGahn and McGahn's reaction to them.
Other evidence cuts against that understanding of the President's conduct. As previously
described, see Volume II, Section II.E, supra, substantial evidence supports McGahn's account
that the President had directed him to have the Special Counsel removed, including the timing and
context of the President's directive; the manner in which McGahn reacted; and the fact that the
President had been told the conflicts were insubstantial, were being considered By the Department
of Justice, and should be raised with the President's personal counsel rather than brought to
McGahn. In addition, the President's subsequent denials that he had told McGahn to have the
Special Counsel removed were carefully worded. When first asked about the New York Times
story, the President said, "Fake news, folks. Fake news. A typical New York Times fake story."
And when the President spoke with McGahn in the Oval Office, he focused en whether he had
**'
used the word "fire,'" saying„"'I never said to fire Mueller. I never said 'fire and "Did I say the
word 'fire 7" The President's assertion in the Oval Office meeting that he had never directed
McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed thus runs counter to the evidence.
In addition, even if the President sincerely disagreed with McGahn's memory of the June
17, 2017 events, the evidence indicates that the President knew by the time of the Oval Office
sss McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5. Kelly did not recall discussing the Oval Oftice meeting with the
President after the fact. Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 2. Handwritten notes taken by Kelly state, "Don[:] Muelier
discussion in June. - Barman Pi'iebus - came out okay." WH000017685 {Kelly 2/6/18 Notes).
s McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5 {agent note'j.
118
U.S. Department of Justice
//
meeting that McGahn's account differed and that McGahn was fum in his views. Shortly aller the
story broke, the President's counsel told McGahn's counsel that the Piesident wanted McGahn to
make a statement denying he had been asked to fire the Special Counsel, but McGahn responded
through his counsel that that aspect of the story was accurate and he therefore could not comply
with the President's request. The President then directed Sanders to tell McGahn to correct the
story, but McGahn told her he would not do so because the story was accurate in reporting on the
President's oider. Consistent with that position, McGahn never issued a correction. More than a
week later, the President brought up the issue again with Porter, made comments indicating the
President thought McGahn had leaked the story, and directed Porter to have McGahn create a
record denying that the President had tried to fire the Special Counsel. At that point, the President
said he might "have to get rid o f ' McGahn if McGahn did not comply. McGahn again refused and
told Porter, as he had told Sanders and as his counsel had told the President's counsel, that the
President had in fact ordered him to have Rosenstein remove the Special Counsel, That evidence
indicates that by the time of the Oval Office meeting the President was aware that McGahn did not
think the story was false and did not want to issue a statement or create a written record denying
facts that McGahn believed to be true. The President nevertheless persisted and asked McGahn to
repudiate facts that McGahn had repeatedly said were accurate.
To establish a nexus, it would be necessary to show that the President's actions would have
the natural tendency to affect such a pmceeding or that they would hinder, delay, or prevent the
communication of information to investigators. Because McGahn had spoken to Special Counsel
htvestigators before January 2018, the President could not have been seeking to influence his pfiior
statements in those interviews, But because McGahn had repeatedly spoken to investigators and
the obstruction inquiry was not complete, it was foreseeable that he would be interviewed again
on obstruction-related topics. If the President were focused solely on a press strategy in seeking
to have McGahn refute the New York Times article, a nexus to a proceeding or to further
investigative interviews would not be shown. But the President's efforts to have McGahn wr'ite a
letter "for our records" approximately ten days after the stories had come out — well past the typical
"' 1/29/18 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 1-2 (" In our
conversation of January 8, your office identified the following topics as areas you desired to address with
the president in order to complete your investigation on the subjects of alleged collusion and obstruction of
justke"; listing 16 topics).
119
U.S. Department of Justice
//
time to Issue a correction fox a news story — indicates the President was not focused solely on a
press strategy„but instead likely contemplated the ongoing investigation and any proceedings
arising from it.
Several facts support that conclusion. The President made repeated attempts to get
McGahn to change his story. As described above, by the time of the last attempt, the evidence
suggests that the President had been told on multiple occasion~ that McGahn believed the President
had ordered him to have the Special Counsel terminated. McGahn interpreted his encounter with
the President in the Oval Office as an attempt to test his mettle and sec how committed he was to
his memory of what had occuried, The President had already laid the groundwork for pressing
McGahn to alter his account by telhng Porter that it might be necessary to fire McGahn if he did
not deny the story, and Porter relayed that statement to McGahn. Additional evidence of the
President's intent may be gleaned from thc fact that his counsel was sufficiently alarmed by the
prospect of the President's meeting with McGahn that he called McGahn's counsel and said that
McGahn could not resign no matter what happened in the Oval Office that day. The President's
counsel was well aware of McGahn*s resolve not to issue what he believed to be a false account
of everits despite the President's request. Finally, as noted above, the President brought up the
Special Counsel investigation in his Oval Office meeting with McGahn and ciiticized him for
telling this Office about the June 17, 2017 events. The President's statements reflect his
understanding — and his displeasure — that those events would be part of an obstruction-of justice
mqutiy.
In addition to the interactions with McGahn described above, the President has taken other
actions directed at possible witnesses in the Special Counsel's investigation, including Flynn,
Manafort, gg g a nd as described in the next section, Cohen. When Flynn withdrew from a joint
defense agreement with the President; the President's personal counsel stated that Flynn's actions
would be viewed as reflecting "hostility" towards the President. During Manafort's prosecution
and while the jury was deliberating, the President repeatedly stated that Manafort was bein treated
unfairl and made it known that Manafort could receive a ardon. • e
As previously noted, see Volume II, Section II.B, supra, the President asked for Flynn's
resignation on February 13„2017. Following Flynn's resignation, the President made positive
public comments about Flynn, describing him as a "wonderful man," "a fine person," and a "very
120
U.S. Department of Justice
//
good person."" The President also privately asked advisors to pass messages to Flynn conveying
that the President still cared about him and encouraging him to stay strong.
In late November 2017, Flynn began to cooperate with this Office. Qn November' 2017,
Flynn withdrew from a joint defense agreement he had with the President.~s Flynn's counsel told
the President's personal counsel and counsel for the White House that Flynn could no longer have
confidential communications with the White House or the president.ss4 Later that night, the
President's personal counsel left a voicemail for Flynn's counsel that said;
I understand your situation, but let me see if I can't state it in starker terms. . . . [I ] t
w ouldn't surprise me if you' ve gone on to make a deal with.. . the government,.. . [ I ] f
.. . there's information that implicates the President, then we' ve got a national security
issue, .. . sa, you know„ . . . w e need some kind ofheads up. Um, just for the sake of
protecting all aur interests if we can.. . . [ R]emember what we' ve ahvays said about the
'president and his feelings toward Flynn and, that still remains .. . .sss
On November 23, 2017, Flynn's attorneys returned the call from tim President's personal
counsel to acknowledge receipt of the voicemail. 4 Flynn's attorneys reiterated that they were no
longer in a position to share information under any sort of privilege. Ac c ording to Flynn's
attorneys, the President's personal counsel was indignant and vocal in his disagreement.s's The
President's persanal counsel said that he interpreted what they said to him as a reflection of Flynn's
"' See, s,g., /Iemar/is By Presigent Trump in Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2018)
(staling that "Flynn is a fine person" and "I don't think [Flynn] did anything wrang. If anything, he did
something right... Yau know, he was just doing his job"); Interview of Donald J, Trump, NBC (May 11,
2017) (statmg that Flynn is a "veiy gaod person").
"' Ses Priebus I/18/17 302, at 9-10 (the Pmsident asked Priebus ta contact Flynn the week he was
terminated to convey that the President sdll cared about him and felt bad about what happened to him;
Priebus thought the President did not want Flynn to have a problem with him); McFarland 12l22/17 302,
at 18(about a month or twa atter Flynn was terminated, the President asked McFarland to get in touch with
Flynn and tell him that he was a good guy, he should stay strong, and the President felt bad for him); Flynn
I/19/18 302, at 9 (recalling the call from Priebus and an additional call from Hicks wha said she wanted to
relay on behalf af the President that the President hoped Flynn was okay); Christie 2l13/19 302, at 3
(describing a phone conversation between Kushner and Flynn the day atter Flynn was tired where Kushner
said, "Yau know the President respects you. The President cares about you. I' ll get the President ta send
aut a positive tweet about you later," and the President nodded his assent to Kushner's comment pramising
a tweet).
4" Counsel for Flynn 3/1/18 302, at 1,
' Counsel for Flynn 3/I/18 302, at I,
' l l/22/I 7 Voicemail Transcript, President's Personal Counsel to Counsel far Michael F lyan.
4 Counsel for Flyiin 3/I/18 302, at 1.
Counsel for Flynn 3/I/18 302, at 1,
"' Counsel for Flyim 3/I/18 302, at 1.
121
U.S. Department of Justice
//
hostility towards the President and that he planned to inform his client of that interpretation.sss
Flynn's attorneys understood that statement to be an attempt to make them reconsider their position
because the President's personal counsel believed that Flynn would be disturbed to know that such
a message would be conveyed to the President,'4'
On October 27, 2017, a grand jury in the District of Columbia indicted Manafort and former
deputy campaign manager Richard Gates on multiple felony counts, and on February 22, 2018, a
grand jury in the Eastern District of Virginia indicted Manafort and Gates on additional felony
" C ounsel for Flynn 3/I/18 302, at 2. Because of attorney-client privilege issues, we did not seek
to interview the President's personal counsel about thc extent to which he discussed his statements to
Flynn's attorneys with the President.
' ' Counsel for Flynn 3/1/18 302, at 2.
' Information, United Statesv. Michael T, Flynn, I:17-ci<32 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2017), Doc. 1; Plea
Agreement, United States v. Michael T. Flynn, 1:17-cr-232 (D,D.C. Dec. I, 2017), Doc. 3.
President Trump Remarits on Tax Reform and Michael Flynn's Guiliy Plea, C-SPAN (Dec. 2,
2017).
President Trump Rentarhs on Tax Reform and Michael Flynn's Guilty Plea, C-SPAN (Dec. 2,
2017).
4 See®realDonaldTrump 12/2/17 (9;06 p.m. ET) Tweet ("So General Flynn lies to the FBI and
his life is destroyed, while Crooked Hillary Clinton„on that now famous FBI holiday 'interrogation' with
no swearing in and no recording, lies many times.. . and nothing happens to her7 Rimed system, or just
a double standardT'); President Ttump Departure Remarks, C-SPAN (Dcc. 4, 2017) (" Well, I feel badly
fot' General Flytm. I tbe1 very badly. He's led a very strong life. And I feel very badly.").
'"' president Trump grhtte Jfouse Departure, C-SpAN (Dec. 15, 2017).
122
V.S. Department of Justice
//
counts.ss Thc charges in both cases alleged ctiminal conduct by Manafort that began as early as
2005 and continued through 2018.sst
In January 2018, Manafort told Gates that he had talked to the President's personal counsel
and they were "going to take care of us/a4' Manafort told Gates it was stupid to plead, saying that
he had been in touch with the President's personal counsel and repeating that they should "sit tight"
and "we' ll be taken care of/ass Gates asked Manafort outright if anyone mentioned pardons and
Manafort said no one used that word,"
As the proceedings against Manafort progressed in court„ the President told Porter that he
never liked Manafort and that Manafort did not know what he was doing on the campaign."' The
President discussed with aides whether and in what way Manafort might be cooperating with the
Special Counsel's investigation, and whether Manafort knew any information that would be
harmful to the President.
In public, the President made statements criticizing the prosecution and suggesting that
Manafort was being treated unfah.ly. On June 15, 2018, before a scheduled court hearing that day
on whether Manafort's bail should be revoked based on ncw charges that Manafort had tampered
with witnesses while out on bail, the President told the press, "I feel badly about a lot of them
4 Indictment, United Slates v. Pau/ J. Manafort, Jr. and Richard W Gates III, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C.
Oct, 27, 2017), Doc. 13 ("Manafort and Gates D.D.C. Indicttnent"); Indictmcnt, United Statesv. Paul J.
Manafort, Jr. and Richard IK Gates III, 1:18-cr-83 (E.D. Va. Feb. 22, 2018), Dcc. 9("Manafort and Gates
E.D. Va. Indictmcnt")
'"' Manafort and Gates D JJ.C. Indictment; Manafort and Gates E.D. Va. Indictment.
s4 Gates 4/18/18 302, at 4. In February 2018, Gates pleaded guilty, pursuant to a co'operation plea
agreement, to a superseding criminal information charging him with conspiring to defraud and commit
multiple offenses (t, e., tax &aud, failure to report foreign bank accounts, and acting as an unregistemd agent
of a f oreign principal) against the United States, as well as making false statements to our
Office. Superseding Criminal Information, United States v. Rtchard W Gates III, 1:17-cr-2Q1 (D.D.C. Feb.
23, 2Q18), Doc. 195; Plea Agreement, United States v. Ibchard W. Gates III, I:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb, 23,
2018), Doc. 205 Gates has provided information and in-court testimony that the OIBcc has deemed to be
reliable.
'" Gates 4/18/18 302, at 4.
' Gates 4/18/18 302, at 4, Manafott told this Office that he never told Gates that he had talked to
thc President's personal counsel ot suggested that they would be taken care of. Manafort also said hc hoped
for a pardon but never discussed one with 'the President, although he noticed the President's public
comments about pardons. Manafort 10/I/18 302, at 11. As explained in Volume I, Section IV.A.8, supra,
Manafort entered into a plea agrccmcnt with our Office. The U.S. District Court fot' the District of
Columbia determined that he bteachcd the agreement by being untruthful in proffer sessions and before the
grand jury. Order, United Statesv. Manafort, I:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2019), Doc. 503.
s" porter 5/8/18 302, at 11. priebus recalled that the president never really liked Msnafort. Scc
priebus 4/3/18 302, at 11. Hicks said that candidate Trump trusted Manafort *s judgment while hc worked
on the Campaig/t, but she also once heard Trump tell Gates to keep an eye on Manafort, Hicks 3/13/18
302, at 16.
'" Porter 5/8/18 302, at 11; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 14,
123
U,S. Department of Justice
//
because I think a lot of it is very unfair. I mean, I look at some of them where they go back 12
years. Like Manafort has nothing to do with our campaign. But I feel so — I tell you, I feel a little
badly about it. They went back 12 years to get things that he did 12 years ago? . .. I feel badly
for some people, because they' ve gone back 12 years to find things about somebody, and I don' t
think it's right." s I n response to a question about whether he was considering a patdon for
Manafort or other individuals involved in the Special Counsel's investigation, the President said,
"I don't want to talk about that. No, I don't want to talk about that... . But look, I do want to see
people treated fairly. That's what it's all about."ss4 Hours later, Manafort's bail was revoked and
the President tweeted, "Wow, what a tough sentence for Paul Manafort, who has represented
Ronald Reagan, Bob Dole and many other top political people and campaigns. Didn't know
Manafort was the head of the Mob. What about Comey and Crooked Hillary and all the others?
Very unfair!" s
Immediately following the revocation of Manafort's bail, the President's personal lawyer,
Rudolph Giuliani, gave a series of interviews in which he raised the possibility of a pardon for
Manafort. Giuliani told the New York Daily News that "[w]hen the whole thing is over, things
might gct cleaned up with some prcsidcntial pardous."sse Giuliani also said in an interview that,
although the President should not pardon anyone while the Special Counsel's investigation was
ongoing, "when the investigation is concluded, he's kind of on his own, right?'" In a CNN
interview two days later, Giuliani said, '"I guess I should clarify this once and for all. . . . T h e
president has issued no pardons in this investigation. The president is not going to issue pardons
in this investigation... . When it's over, hey, he's the president of the United States. He retains
his pardon power. Nobody is taking that away from him." s Giuliani rcj ected the suggestion that
his and the President's comments could signal to defendants that they should not cooperate in a
criminal prosecution because a pardon might follow, saying the comments were "certainly not
intended that way." Gi u liani said the comments only acknowledged that an individual involved
in thc investigation would not be "excluded fie [a pardon], if in fact the president and his advisors
... come to the conclusmn that you have been treated unfairly?neo Giuliani observed that pardons
were not unusual in political investigations but said, "That doesn't mean they' re going to happen
" Remarks by President Trump in Press Gaggle, White House (June 15, 2018).
" Remarks by President Trump in Press Gaggle, White House (June 15, 2018),
s" @realDonaldTrump 6/15/18 (1:41 p.m. ET) Tweet.
Chris Sommerfeldt, Jiudy Giuliani says Mueller probe 'might get cleaned up ' with. 'presidential
pat dons ' in light of Pau/ Manafort going to jail, New York Daily News (June 15, 2018).
" Sharon LaFranicre, Judge Orders paul Manafort Jailed Before Trial, Citing New Obstruction
Charges,New York Times (June 15, 2018) (quoting Giuliani).
" State of the Union with Jake Tapper Transcript, CNN (June 17, 2018); see Karcun Demirjian,
Giuhani suggests Trump tnay pardon Manafort after Mueller 's probe, Washington Post (June 17, 2018).
" State of the Union with Jake Tapper Transcript, CNN (June 17, 2018).
State of the Union with Jake Tapper Transcript, CNN (Junc 17, 2018).
124
V.S. Depattment of Justice
//
here. Doesn't mean that anybody should rely on it. .. . Big signal is, nobody has been pardoned
yet »861
On July 31„2018, Manafort's criminal trial began in the Eastern District of Virginia,
generating substantial news coverage.ssz The next day, the President tweeted, "This is a terrible
situation and Att orneyGeneral Jeff Sessions should stop this Rigged Witch Hunt right now, before
it continues to stain our country any further. Bob Mueller is totally conflicted, and his 17 Angry
Democrats that are doing his dirty work are a disgrace to USAF'+s Minutes later, the President
tweeted,"Paul Manafort worked for Ronald Reagan, Bob Dole and many other highly prominent
and respected poliUcal leaders. He worked for me for a vety short time. Why didn't government
tell me that he was under investigation. These old charges have nothing to do with Collusion — a
Hoax! *'~ L ater in the day, the President tweeted, "Looking back on history, who was treated
worse, Alfonse Capone, legendary mob boss, killer and 'Public Enemy Number One„' or Paul
Manafort, political operative Bz Reagan/Dole darling, now serving solitary confinement — although
convicted of nothing? Where is the Russian Collusion?"'s' The president's tweets about the
Manafott trial were widely covered by the press. s When asked about the President's tweets,
Sanders told the press, "Certainly, the President's been clear. He thinks Paul Manafort's been
treated unfairly."sss
On August 16, 2018, the Manafort case was submitted to the jury and deliberations began.
At that time, Giuliani had recently suggested to reporters that the Special Counsel investigation
needed to be "done in the next two or three weeks,»sss and media stories reported that a Manafort
acquittal would add to criticism that the Special Counsel investigation was not worth the time and
expense, whereas a conviction could show that ending the investigation would be premature."s
"State of the Union with Jake Tapper Transcript, CNN (June 17, 2018).
Sos, e,g., Katelyn Polantz, Takeaways from day one of the Pau/Manafort trial, CNN (July 31,
2018); Frank Bruni,Paul Manafort's Trial Is Donald Trump's, Too, New York Times Opinion (July 31,
201 8); Rachel Weiner et al.,paul Manafort trial Day Jk gri tnsssss dsscri be extravagant clothing purchases,
home remodels, lavish cars paid with wire transfers, Washington Post (Aug. I, 2018).
"s ®reaIDonaldTtump 8/I/18 (9:24 a.m. ET) Tweet. Later that day, when Sanders was asked
about the President's tweet, she told reporters, "It's not an order. It's the President's opinion." Sarah
Sanders, g?rite House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (Aug. I, 2018).
~ ®realDonaldTrump 8/I/18 (9:34 a.m. ET) Tweet.
"' @reaIDonaldTrump 8/I/18 (I I:35 a.m. ET) Tweet.
Bse, e.g., Carol D. Leonnig et al., Trump calls Manafort prosecution "a boas," says Sessions
should stop Muellsr tnvssttgation "right now", Washington Post (Aug. I, 2018); Louis Nelson, Trump
claims Manafort case has "nothing to do with collusion", Politico (Aug. 1. 2018).
's' Sarah Sanders, grhtte IIouss Daily Br/sftng, C-SPAN (Aug. I, 2018).
"s Chris Strohm Bt Shannon Pettypiece, Mueller probe Doesn't Need to Shut Down Before
Midterms, Dff tcials Say, Bloomberg (Aug. 15, 2018).
un See, e.g., Katelyn polantz et al., Manafortj ury ends first day of dsgbsrations without a verdjct,
CNN (Aug. 16, '2018); David Voreacos, JYAat Musller 's Manafort Case Means for the Trump Battle to
U.S. Department of Justice
//
Qn August 17, 2018, as jury deliberations continued, the President commented on the trial from
the South Lawn of the White House. In an impromptu exchange with reporters that lasted
approximately five minutes, the President, twice called the Special Counsel's investigation a
"rigged witch hunt."' Wh en asked whether he would pardon Manafort if he was convicted, the
President said, "I don't talk about that now. I don't talk about that.'" ' The President then added,
without being asked a further question, "I think the whole Manafort trial is very sad when you look
at what's going on there. I think it's a very sad day for our country. He worked for me for a very
short period of time. But you know what, he happens to be avery good person. And I think it' s
very sad what they' ve, done to Paul Manafort Ja~ The President did not take further questions.'7s
In response to the President's statements, Manafort's attorney said, "Mr. Manafort really
appreciates the support of President Trump."~4
On August 21, 2018, the jury found Manafort guilty on eight felony counts. Also on
August 21, Michael Cohen pleaded guilty to eight offenses, including a campaign-finance
violation that he said had occurred "in coordination with, and at the direction of, a candidate for
federal officepsss The President reacted to Manafort's convictions that day by telling reporters,
"Paul Manafort's a good man" and "it's a very sad thing that happened." s T h e President
described the Special Counsel's inves!Jgation as "a witch hunt that ends in disgrace."sw The next
day, the President tweeted, "I feel very badly for Paul Manafort and his wonderful family. 'Justice'
took a 12 year old tax case, among other things, applied trem'endous pressure on him and„unlike
Michael Cohen, he refused to 'break' — make up stories in order to get a 'deal.' Such respect for
a brave man! "sis
In a Fox News interview on August 22, 2018, the President said: "[Cohen] makes a better
deal when he uses me, like everybody else. And one of the reasons I respect Paul Manafort so
much is he went through that trial — you know they make up stories. People make up stories. This
Come,Bloomberg (Aug, 2, 2018); Csabby Morrongiello, JJ%at a guilty verdict for Manafort would mean
for Trump and Musller, Washington Examiner (Aug. 18, 2018).
President Triunp Remarks on John Brennan and Mueller Pmbe, C-SPAN (Aug. 17, 2018).
"' President Trump Remarks on John Brennan and Mueller Probe, C-SPAN (Aug. 17, 2018).
" President Trump Remarks on John Brennan and Mueller Probe, C-SPAN (Aug. 17, 2018).
' ' President Trump Remarks on John Bmnnan and Mueller Probe, C-SPAN (Aug. 17, 2018).
Trump calls Manafort "very good person, " All In with Chris Hayes (Aug. 17, 2018) (transcript);
M anqfort la wyer: JV e app
reciate Trump 's su pport, CNN (Aug. 1 7 , 20 1 8)
(https:/lwww.cnn.corn/videos/politics/2018/08/17/paul-manafort-attorney-ti ump-jury-deliberations-
schneider-lead-vpx,cnn).
to Transcript at 23, United States v. Michael Cohen, 1:18-cr-602 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2018), Doe.
7 (Cohen 8/21/18 Transcript).
'ss J'resident Trump Remarks on Manafort Trial, C-SPAN (Aug. 21, 2018).
126
U.S. Department of Justice
//
whole thing about flipping, they call it, I know all about flipping/"t ' T h e President said that
flipping was "not fair" and "almost ought to be outlawed." sc In response to a question about
whether he was considering a pardon for Manafort, the President said, "I have great respect for
what he'sdone, in terms ofwhat he's gone through.... He worked formany, many peoplemany,
many years, and I would say what he did, some of the charges they threw against him, every
consultant, every lobbyist in Washington ptobably does." ' G iuliani told journalists that the
President "really thinks Manafort has been horribly treated'* and that he and the President had
discussed the political fallout if the President pardoned Manafort. s The next day, Giuliani told
the Washington Post that the President had asked his lawyers for advice on the possibility of a
pardon for Manafort and other aides, and had been counseled against considering a pardon until
the investigation concluded.
On September 14, 2018, Manafort pleaded guilty to charges in the District of Columbia
and signed a plea agreement that required him to cooperate with investigators.sss Giuliani was
reported to have publicly said that Manafort remained in a joint defense agreement with the
President following Manafort's guilty plea and agreement to cooperate, and that Manafort's
attorneys regularly briefed the President's lawyers on the topics discussed and the information
Manafort had provided in interviews with the Special Counsel's Otftce." On November 26, 2018,
the Special Counsel's Office disclosed in a public. court flling that Manafort had breached his plea
agreement by lying about multiple subjects. ss The next day, Giuliani said that the President had
been "upset for weeks" about what he considered to be '"the un-American, horrible treatment of
Fox & Friends Exxotusive Interview with President Trump, Fox News (Aug. 23, 2018) (recorded
the previous day).
'" Fox & Friends Exclusive Interview with President Trump, Fox News (Aug. 23, 2018) (recorded
the previous day).
' Fox & Friends Exclusive Interview with President Trump, Fax News (Aug, 23, 2018) (recorded
the previous day).
' Maggie Habermantie Katie Rogers, "How Did IFe End Up Horsy" Trump grondsrs as the WWte
House Soldiers On, New York Times (Aug. 22, 2018).
s" Carol D. Leonnig tk Josh Dawsey, Trump recently sought tu's lawyers' advice an possibility of
pardoning Manafort, Giuliani says, Washington Post (Aug. 23, 2018).
' Plea Agreement, United States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jt'., 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 2018),
Doc. 422.
's' Karen Freifeld Ec Nathan Layne, Trump lawyer: Manafort said nothing damaging in Muelier
interviews, Reuters (Oct. 22, 2018); Michael S. Schmidt et al„ Ma
nafort ' s Lcnvysr Said to Brief Trump
Attorneys on Jtrhat He Told Mueller, New York Times (Nov. 27, 2018);Dana Bash, Manafort team briefed
Giuliani on M uel / s r mee t ings, CNN„ Poste d 11/2 8 /18, avai l able at
https://www.cnn.corn/videos/politics/2018/11/28/manafort-lawyers-keeping-trump-lawyers-giuliani-
updated-mueller-probe-bash-sot-nr-vpx,cnn; see Sean Hanuity, Interview with Eudy Giuliam', Fox News
(Sept. 14, 2018) (Giulianii "[T]here was a quote put out by a source close to Mana'fort that the plea
agreement has, and cooperation agreement has, nothing to do with the Trump campaign... . N ow, I know
that because I' ve been privy to a lot of facts I can't repeat,").
' Joint Status Report, United States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr,, (D,D.C Nov. 26, 2018), Doc. 455.
127
U.S. Department of Justice
//
Manafort." In an interview on November 28, 2018, the President suggested that it was "very
brave" that Manafort did not "flip":
If you told the truth, you go to jail, You know this flipping stuff is temble. You flip and
you lie and you get — the prosecutors will tell you 99 percent of the time they can get people
to flip. It's rare that they can' t. But I had three people: Manafort, Corsi — I don't know
c „ i , b th , fu r r w t th y a s*d . " ' u t'wt, c '~ . If
actually very brave.sss
In response to a question about a potential pardon for Manafort, the President said, "It was never
discussed, but I wouldn't take it off the table. Why would I take it off the table?"
• • • •
s • • •
• • • • •
• • •
• a •• •
• • • • •
Stephen Collinson, Trump appears consumed by Mueller investigation as details emerge, CNN
(Nov. 29, 2018).
"Corsi" is a reference to Jerome Corsi, who was involved in efforts
to coordinate with WikiLeaks and Assuage, and w o stat p u blicly at t at nme that he had refused a plea
offer from the S ecial Counsel's Office because he was "not going to sign a lie." Sara Murray gc Eli
Watkins, • says be won 't agree to plea deal, CNN (Nov. 26, 2018).
Marisa Schultz tk Nikki Srhwab, Oval Offtce Interview with President Trump: Trump says
pardon for Paul Manafort still a possibility, New York Post (Nov. 28, 2018). That one day, the President
tw'ected: "While the disgusting Fake News is doing everything within their power not to report it that way,
at least 3 major players are intimating that the Angry Mueller Gang of Deme is viciously telling witnesses
to lie about facts tk they will get relief. This is our Joseph McCarthy Er'a!" @reaIDonatdTrump 11/28/18
(8:39 a.m. ET) Tweet.
Marisa Schultz tk Nikki Schwab, Pew forts Post Oval Opice Interview with President Trump:
Trump says pardon for Paul Manafort still a possibility, New York Post (Nov. 28, 2018).
mt ,
• • • • •
• • • • •
sm • • • • •
• • • •
U.S, Department of Justice
//
• • •
• • •
• • •
• e 9 •
• • • • •
• • • • •
• • 9
• • • 8 •
895 • • • • 8
• • •
897 • • • • 8
• • •
• 0
129
U.S. Department of Justice
//
• • • • •
• • • • •
• • • •
8 • • • •
• • • 8 •
• • 8
• • • • •
• • •
• e • •
900 0 • • •
901 • I • • •
• I 8
• • • •
• e 8 • •
905 • 4 • •
006 • • • •
907 • • • •
908 • • 8 • •
130
U.S. Department of Justice
//
Analysis
a. Ob' structive act. The President's actions towards witnesses in the Special Counsel's
investigation would qualify as obsuuctivc if they had the natural tendency to. prevent particular
witnesses from testifying truthfully, or otherwise would have the piobable effect of influencing,
delaying, or preventing their testimony to law enforcement.
With regard to Flynn, the President sent private and public messages to Flynn encouraging
him to stay s@ong and conveying that the President still cared about him before hc began to
cooperate with the government. When Flynn's attorneys withdrew him from a joint defense
agreement with the President, signaling that Flynn was potentially cooperating with the
government, the President*s personal counsel initially reminded Flynn's counsel of the President's
warm feelings towards Flynn and said "that sflll remains." But when Flynn's counsel reiterated
that Flynn could no longer share information under a joint defense agreemcn't, the President's
personal counsel stated that the decision would be interpreted as reflecting Flynn's hostility
towards the President. That sequence of events could have had thc potential to affect Flynn*s
decision to cooperate, as well as the extent of that cooperation. Because of privile'ge issues,
however, vve could not determine whether the President was personally involved in or knew about
the specific message his counsel delivered to Flynn' s counsel.
With respect to Manafort, there is evidence that thc President's actions had the potential to
influence Manafort's decision whether to cooperate with the government. The President and his
personal counsel made repeated statements suggesting that a pardon was a possibility ibr Manafort,
while also making it clear that thc President did not want Manafort to "fhp" and cooperate with
the government. On June 15, 2018, the day the judge presiding over Manafort's D.C. case was
considering whether to revoke his bail, the President said that he "felt badly" for Manafort and
stated, "I think a lot of it is very unfair." A nd when asked about a pardon for Manafort, the
President said, "I do want to see people treated fairly. That's what it's all about." Later that day,
atter Manafort's bail was revoked, the Presiderit called it a "tough sentence" that was "Very
unfair!" Two days later, the President's personal counsel stated that individuals involved in the
Special Counsel's investigation could receive a pardon "if in fact the |P]resident and his advisors
.. . come to the conclusion that you have been treated unfairly" — using language that paralleled
how the. President had already described the treatment of Manafort. Those statements, combined
with the President's commendation of Manafort for being a "brave man" who "refused to 'break',"
suggested that a pardon was a more likely possibility if Manafort continued not to cooperate with
thc governm
ent. And while Manafort eventually pleaded gmlty pursuant to a cooperation
agreement, he was found to have violated the agreement by lying to investigators,
The President's public statements during the Manafort trial, including during jury
delibeiations, also had the potential to influence the trial jury. On the second day of trial, for
example, the President called the prosecution a "terrible situation" and a "hoax" that "continues to
stain our country" and referred to Manafort as a SReagari/Dole darling" who was "serving solitary
confinement" even though he was "convicted of nothing." Those statements were widely picked
up by the press. While jurors werc instructed not to watch or read news stories about the case and
131
U.S. Department of Justice
//
are presumed to follow those instructions, the President's statements during the trial generated
substantial media coverage that could have reached jurors if they happened to see the statements
or learned about them from others. And the president's statements during jury deliberations that
Manafott "happens to be a very good person" and that "it's very sad what they' ve done to Paul
Manafort" had the potential to influence jurors who learned of the statements, which the President
made just as jurors were considering whether to convict or acquit Manafort.
• • • •
Evidence concerning the President's conduct towards Manafort indicates that the President
intended to encourage Manafort to not cooperate with the government. Before Manafort was
convicted, the President repeatedly stated that Manafort had been treated unfairly. One day after
Manafort was convicted on eight felony charges and potentially faced a lengthy prison term, the
President said that Manatort was "a brave man" for refusing to "break" and that "flipping" "almost
*'
ought to be outlawed. At the same time, although the President had privately told aides he did
not like Manafort, he publicly called Manafott "a good man" and said he had a "wonderful family."
And when the President was asked whether he was considering a pardon for Manafort, the
President did not respond directly and instead said he had "great respect for what [Manafort)'s
done, in terms of what he's gone through.*' The President added that "some of the charges they
threw against him, every consultant, every lobbyist in Washington probably does." In light of the
President's counsel's previous statements that the investigations "might get cleaned up with some
presidential pardons" and that a pardon would be possible if the President come[a] to the
conclusion that you have been treated unfairly," the evidence supports the inference that the
132
U.S. Department of 3ustice
President intended Manafort to believe that he could receive a pardon, which would make
cooperation with the government as a means of obtaining a lesser sentence unnecessary.
We also examined the evidence of the President's intent in making public statements about
Manafort at the beginning of his trial and when the jury was deliberating. Some evidence supports
a conclusion that the Ptesident intended, at least in part, to influence the jury. The trial generated
widespread publicity, and as the jury began to deliberate, commentators suggested that an acquittal
would add to pressure to end the Special Counsel's investigation. By publicly stating on the second
day of deliberations that Manafort *'happens to be a very good person" and that "it's very sad what
they' ve done to Paul Manafort" right afler calling the Special Counsel's investigation a ' rigged
witch hunt," the President's statements could, if they reached jurors, have the natural tendency to
engender sympathy for Manafort among jurors, and a factflnder could infer that the President
intended that result. Butthere are alternative explanations for the President's comments, including
that he genuinely felt sorry for Manafort or that his goal was not to influence the jury but to
influence public opinion. The President's comments also could have been intended to continue
sending a message to Manafort that a pardon was possible. As described above, the President
made his conunents about Manafort being "a very good person" immediately after declining to
answer a question about whether he would pardon Manafort.
o • • • •
133
U,S. Department of Justice
Overview
Evidence
The President's interactions with Cohen as a witness took place against the background of
the President's involvement in the Trump Tawer Moscow project.
As described in detail in Volume I, Section IVA.I, supra, from September 2015 until at
least June 2016, the Trump Organization pursued a Trump Tower Moscow project in Russia, with
negotiations conducted by Cohen, then-executive vice president of the Trump Organization and
special counsel to Donald J. Trump.s ' Th e T rump Organization had previously and
'w In August 2018 and November 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty ta multiple crimes of deception,
including making false statements to Congress about the Trump Tower Moscow project, as described later
in this section. When Cohen first met with investigators fmm this Office, he repeated the same lies he told
Congress about the Trump Tower Moscaw project. Cohen 8/7/18 302„at 12-17. But a&sr Cohen pleaded
guilty to offenses in the Southern District af New York on August 21, 2018, he met with investigators again
and corrected the record. The Office found Cohen's testimony in these subsequent proffer sessions to be
consistent with and carroborated by other information obtained in the course of the Office's investigation.
The Office's sentencing submission in Cohen's criminal case stated: "Starting with his second meeting with
the [Special Counsel's Office] in September 2018, the defendant has accepted responsibility not only for
134
U.S. Deparhnent of Justice
//
In the fall of 2015, Trump signed a Letter of Intent for the project that specified highly
lucrative terms for the Trump Organization. ' I n December 2015, Felix Satei; who was handling
negotiations between Cohen and the Russian corporation, asked Cohen for a copy of his and
Trump's passports to facilitate travel to Russia to meet with government oAicials and possible
financing partners.s's Cohen recalled discussing the trip with Trump and requesting a copy of
Trump's passport from Trump's personal secretary, Rhona Gruff. '
By January 2016, Cohen had become frustrated that Sater had not set up a meeting with
Russian governm
ent officials, so Cohen reached out directly by email to the office of Dmitry
135
U.S. Department of Justice
//
Peskov, who was Putin's deputy chief of staff and press secretary. ' On January 20, 2016, Cohen
received an email response from Elena Poliakova, Peskov's personal assistant, and phone records
confirm that they then spoke for approximately twenty minutes, during which Cohen described the
Trump Tower Moscow project and requested assistance in moving the project forward.s" Cohen
recalled briefing candidate Trump about the call soon afterwards.' Cahen told Truinp he spoke
with a woman he identified as "someone from the Kremlin," and Cohen reported that she was very,
professional and asked detailed questions about the project. z' Cohen recalled telling Trump he
urished the Trump Organization had assistants who were as competent as the woman fram the
Kremlin.esz
Cohen thought his phone call renewed interest in the project. s The day after Cohen's call
with Poliakova, Sater texted Cohen, asking him to "[c]all me when you have a few minutes to chat
.. . I t's about Putin they called today."sz4 Sater told Cohen that the Russian government liked the
project and on January 25, 2016, sent an invitation far Cohen to visit Moscow "for a working
visit.'" Af t er thc outreach from Sater, Cohen recalled telling Tnuup that he was waiting to hear
back on moving the project forward.+e
After January 2016, Cohen continued to have conversations with Sater about Trump Tower
Moscow and continued to keep candidate Trump updated about those discussions and the status
of the project.ms Cohen recaged that he and Trump wanted Trump Tower Moscow to succeed and
t hat Trump never discouraged him from warking on the project because of the campaign.'z I n
Match or April 2016, Trump asked Cohen if anything was happening in Russia. z Cohen also
"' See FS00004 (12/30/15 Text Message, Cohen to Sater); TRUMPORG MC 000233 (I/11/16
Email, Cohen t o p r ~ [email protected] iu); MDC-H-000690 (I/14/16 E mail, C ohen t o
[email protected]); TRUMPORG MC 000235 (I/16/16 Einail, Cohen to pr~skava®prpress.gav.ru).
" I/20/16 Email, Paliakova to Cohen; Call Records of Michael Cohen. (Showing a 22-minute call
on January 20, 2016, between Cohen and the number Paliakava provided in her smail); Cohen 9/12/18 302,
at 2-3. After the call, Cohen saved Poliakova*s contact information in his Tmmp Organization Outlook
contact list. I /20/16 Cohen Microsoft Outlook Entry (6:22 a,m.).
e Cohen 11./20/18 302, at 5.
' Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5-6; Cohen I I/12/18 302, at 4.
s Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5.
"' Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 5.
s'4 FS00011 (I/21/16 Text Messages, Sater Rs Cohen),
136
U.S. Department of Justice
//
recalled briefing Donald Trump Jr. in the spring — a conversation that Cohen 'said was not "idle
chit chat"' because Trump Tower Moscow was potentially a $1 billion deal,s
Cohen recalled that around May 2016, he again raised with candidate Trump the possibility
of a trip to Russia to advance the Trump Towe«Moscow project. m At that time, Cohen had
received several texts from Sater seeking to arrange dates for such a trip. O n May 4, 2016, Sater
wrote to Cohen, '"I had a chat with Moscow. ASSUMING the trip does happen the question is
before or aftei the convention... . . Obviously the premeeting trip (you only) can happen anytime
you want but the 2 big guys [is] the question. I said I would confirm and revert:" Cohen
responded, "My trip before Cleveland. T r ump once he becomes the nominee after the
convention."s+ On May 5, 2016, Sater followed up with a text that Cohen thought he probably
read to Trump:
Peskov would like to invite you as. his guest to the St. Petersburg Forum which is
Russia's Davos it's June 16-19. He wants to meet there with you and possibly
introduce you to either Putin or Medvedev.... This is perfect. The entire business
class of Russia will be there as well. He said anything you want to discuss including
dates and subjects are on the table to discuss.s
Cohen recalled d'iscussing 'the invitation to the St. Petersburg Economic Fomm with
candidate Trump and saying that Putin or Russian Prime Minister Dmilry Medvedev might be
there." C ohen remembered that Trump said that he would be, willing to travel to Russia if Cohen
could "lock and load" on the deal." I n June 2016, Cohen decided not to attend the St. Petersburg
Economic Forum because Sater had not obtained a formal invitation for Cohen from Peskov.sss
Cohen said he had a quick conversation with Trump at that time but did not tell him that the project
was over because he did not want Trump to complain that the deal was on-again-off-again if it
were revived.
During the summer of 2016, Cohen recalled that candidate Trump publicly claimed that he
had nothing to do with Russia and then shortly afterwards privately checked with Cohen about the
status of the T«ump Tower Moscow project, which Cohen found "interesting." At some point
137
U.S. Department of Justice
//
that summer, Cohen recalled having a brief conversation with Trump in which Cohen said the
Trump Tower Moscow project was going nowhere because the Russian development company
had not secured a piece af property for the project.~' T rump said that was "too bad," and Cohen
did not recall talking with Trump about the project after that.'sz Cohen said that at no time during
the campaign did Trump tell him not to pursue the project or that the project should be
abandoned.~'
As previausly discussed,see Volume II, Section II.A, supra, when questions about possible
Russian support for candidate Trump emerged during the 2016 presidential campaign, Trump
denied having any personal, financial, or business connection to Russia, which Cohen described
as the "party line" or "message" to follow far Trump and his senior advisors.s~
After the election, the Trump Organization sought to formally close out certain deals in
advance of the inaugumtlons s Cohen i ecalled that Trump Tower Moscow was on the list of deals
to be closed out. In appmximately January 2017, Cohen began receiving inquiries fram the
media abaut Trump Tower Moscow, and he recalled speaking to the President-Elect when those
inquiries came in.ess Cohen was concerned that truthful answers about the Trump Tower Moscow
project might not be consistent with the "message" that the President-Elect had no relationship
with Russia.
In an effort to "stay on message," Cohen told a New York Times reporter that the Trump
Tower Moscow deal was not feasible and had ended in January 2016. ' Cohen recalled that this
was part of a "script" or talking points he had developed with President-Elect Trump and others to
' Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2. Cohen could not recall the precise timing of this conversation, but said
he thought it occurred in June ar July 2016. Cohen recalled that the canversation happened at some point
after candidate Trump was publicly stating that he had nothing to da with Russia. Cohen 3/19/19 302, at
2.
" Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2.
"s Cohen 3/1 9/19 302, at 2.
~s Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 1; Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 3, 5; Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 9.
' Cohen 9/1 8/18 302, at 1-2; see also Rtskhiladze 4/4/18 302, at 8-9.
ss' Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 1-2.
dismiss the idea of a substantial connection between Trump and Russia.' ' Cohen said that he
discussed the talking points with Trump but that he did not explicitly tell Trump he thought they
were untrue because Trump already knew they were untrue.ss' Cohen thought it was important to
say the deal was done in January 2016, rather than acknowledge that talks continued in May and
June 2016, because it limited the period when candidate Trump could be alleged to have a
relationship with Russia to an early point in the campaign, before Trump had become the party' s
presumptive nominee. 2
In early May 2017, Cohen received requests from Congress to provide testimony and
documents in connection with congressional investigations of Russian interference in the 2016
election.sss At that time, Cohen understood Congress's interest in him to be focused on thc
allegations in the Steele reporting concerning a meeting Cohen allegedly had with Russian officials
in Prague during the campaign. s Cohen had never traveled to Prague and was not concerned
about those allegations, which he believed were provably false. s On May 18, 2017, Cohen met
with the President to discuss the request from Congress, and the President instructed Cohen that
he should cooperate because there was nothing there.
Cohen eventually entered into a joint defense agreement (JDA) with the President and other
individuals who were part of the Russia investigation.'s I n t he months leading up to his
congressional testimony, Cohen frequently spoke with the President's personal counsel.s s Cohen
139
U.S. Department of Justice
said that in those conversations 'the President's personal counsel would sometimes say that he had
just been with the President. s Cohen recalled that the President's personal counsel told him the
JDA was working well together and assured him that there was nothing there and if they stayed on
message the investigations would come to an end soon.sm At that time, Cohen's legal bills were
being paid by thc Trump Organization„sm and Cohen was told not to worry because the
investigations would be over by summer or fall of 2017. Co h en said that the President's
personal counsel also conveyed that, as part of the JDA, Cohen was protected, whioh he would not
be if he "went rogue." Co hen recalled that the President's personal counsel reminded him that
"the President loves you" and told him that if hc stayed on message, the President had his back.ss"
In August 2017, Cohen began drafting a statement about Trump Tower Moscow to submit
to Congress along with his document production.~ The final version of the statement contained
several false statements about the project.ss First, although the Trump Organizafion continued to
pursue the, project until at least Jun'e 2016, the statement said, "The proposal was under
consideration at the Trump Organization from September 2015 until the end of January 2016. By
the end of January 2016, I determined that the proposal was riot feasible for a variety of business
reasons and should not be pursued further. Based on my business determinations, the Trump
Organization abandoned the proposal,*' ' Second,although Cohen and candidate Trump had
discussed possible travel to Russia by Trump to pursue the venture, the statement said, "Despite
overtures by Mr. Sater, I never considered asking Mr. Trump to travel to Russia in connection with
this proposal. I told Mr. Sater that Mr. Trump would not travel to Russia unless there was a
definitive agreement in place.*eas Third, although Cohen had regularly briefed Trump on the status
Trump Tower Moscow. The President's personal counsel declined and, through his own counsel, indicated
that he could not disaggregate information he had obtairied from Cohen from information he had obtained
from other parties in the JDA. In view of the admonition this Office gave to Cohen's counsel to withhold
communications that could be covered by privilege, the President's personal counsel's uncertainty about
the provenance of his own knowledge, thc burden on a privilege holder to establish the elements to support
a claim of privilege, and the substance of the statements themselves, we have included relevant statements
Cohen provided in this report. If the statements were to be used in a context beyond this report, further
analysis could be warranted.
" C ohen 11/20/18 302, at 6.
' Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 2, 4.
"' Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4.
' Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 8; Cohen 11/20/1 8 302, at 3-4.
Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4.
Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 11; Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 2.
' P-SCO-000003680 and P-SCO-0000003687 (8/16/17 Email and Attachment, Michael Cohen"s
Counsel to Cohen). Cohen said it was not his idea to write a letter to Congress about Trump Tower Moscow.
Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 7.
" P-SCO-00009478 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq, (Aug. 28, 2017)).
"" P-SCO-00009478 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017)).
P-SCO-00009478 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017)).
140
U.S. Deparlment of Justice
of the project and had nunterous conversations about it, the statement said, "Mr. Trump was never
in contact with anyone about this pioposal other than me on three occasions, including signing a
non-binding letter of intent in 2015."" F o urth, although Cohen *s outreach to Peskov in January
2016 had resulted in a lengthy phone call with a representative tram the Kremlin, the statement
said that Cohen did "not recall any response to my email [to Peskav], nor any other contacts by
me with Mr. Peskov or other Russian government officials about the proposal."s
Cohen's statement was circulated in advance to, and edited by, members of the JDA.s '
Be fore the statement was finalized, early dratts contained a sentence stating, "The building project
led me ta make limited contacts with Russian government officials."st' In thc final version of the
statement, that line was deleted.' C ohen thought he was told that it was a decision of the JDA to
take out that sentence, and hc did nat push back on the deletion.ws Cohen recalled that he told the
President's personal counsel that he would not contest a decision of the JDA.~'
Cohen also recalled that in drafting his statement 'for Congress„he spoke with the
President's personal counsel about a different issue that connected candidate Trump to Russia:
Cohen's efforts to sct up a meeting between Trump and Putin in New York during the 2015 United
Natians General Assembly.ws In September 2015, Cohen had suggested the meeting to Trump,
who told Cohen to reach out to Putin's office about it." C ohen spoke and emailed with a Russian
official about a possible meeting, and recalled that Trump asked him multiple times for updates on
the proposed meeting with putin.ws When Cohen called the Russian official a second time, she
told him it would not follow proper protocol for Putin to meet with Trump, and Cohen relayed that
' ' P-SCO-00009478 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017)).
" P-SCO-00009478 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen„Esq. (Aug, 28, 2017)).
"' Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 8-9. Cohen also testified in Congress that the President *s counsel
reviewed and edited the statement. Heonng on Issues Re/used io Trump Orgonisorion IIefare the House
Oversight and Reforin Cornint/tee, 116o Cang. (Peb, 27, 2019) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 24-25) (testimony
by Michael Cohen). Because of concerns about the common interest privilege, we did not abtain or i eview
all drafts of Cohen's statement. Based on the drafts that werc released tbmugh this Office's filter process,
it appears that the substance of the four principal false statements described above were contained in an
early draft prepared by Cohen and his counsel. P-SCO-0000003680 and P-SCO-0000003687 (8/16/17
Email and Attachment, Cohen's counsel to Cohen).
" P-SCO-0000003687 (8/16/1 7 Dratt Statement af Michael Cohen); Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4.
w' Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4. A different linc stating that Cahen did "not recall any response to my
email [ta Peskav in January 2016], nor any other contacts by me with Mr. Peskov or other Russian
government officials about the proposal" remained in the draft. See P-SCO-0000009478 (Statement of
Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017)).
w Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4.
" Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5.
' Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 10-11.
"' Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 11; Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 4.
sa Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 11; Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 5.
141
IJ.S. Department of Justice
//
message to Trump.s s Cohen anticipated he might be asked questions about the proposed Trump-
Putin meeting when he testified before Congress because hc had talked about the potential meeting
on Sean Hannity's radio show.s C ohen recalled explaining to the President's pei'sonal counsel
the "whole story" of the attempt to set up a meeting between Trump and Putin and Trump's role
in it. " Cohen recalled that he and the President" s personal counsel talked about keeping Trump
out of the narrative, and the President's personal counsel told Cohen the story was not relevant and
should not be included in his statement to Congress.ss~
Cohen said that his "agenda" in submitting the statement to Congress with false
representations about the Trump Tower Moscow project was to minimize links between the project
and the President, give the false impression that the project had ended before the first pi'csidential
primaries, and shut down further inquiry into Truinp Tower Moscow, with thc aim of limiting the
ongoing Russia investigations. Co hen said he wanted to protect the President and be loyal to
him by not contradicting anything the President had said. 4 Cohen recalled he was coiicerned that
if he told the truth about getting a response from the Kremlin or speaking to candidate Trump about
travel to Russia to pursue the project, he would contradict the message that no connection existed
between Trump and Russia, and he rationalized his decision to provide false testimony because
the deal never happened. He w as not,concerned that the story would be contradicted by
individuals who knew it was false because hc was sticking to the party line adhered to by the whole
group.ass Cohen wanted the support of'the President and the White House, and he believed that
following the party linc would help put an end to the Special Counsel and congressional
investigations.s i
Between August 18, 2017, when the statement was in an initial draft stage, and August 28,
2017, when thc statement was submitted to Congress, phone records reflect that Cohen spoke with
the President's personal counsel almost daily.s s On August 27, 2017, the day before Cohen
submitted the statement to Congress, Cohen and the President's personal counsel had numerous
contacts by phone, including calls lasting three„ four, six, eleven, and eighteen minutes.sss Cohen
recalled telling thc President's personal counsel, who did not have first-hand knowledge of the
project, that there was more detail on Trump Tower Moscow that was not in the statement,
including that there were more communications with Russia and more communications with
candidate Trump than the statement reflected.s c Cohen stated that the President's personal
counsel responded that it was not necessary to elaborate ar include those details because the project
did not progress and that Cohen should keep his statement short and "tight" and the matter would
soon come to an end. " C ohen recalled that the President's personal counsel said "his client"
appreciated Cohen, that Cohen should stay on message and not contradict thc President, that there
was no need to muddy the water, and that it was time to move an. s Cohen said he agreed because
it was what he was expected ta do. s Affer Cohen later pleaded guilty to making false statements
to Congress about the Trump Tower Moscow project, this Office sought to speak with the
President's personal counsel about these conversations with Cohen, but counsel declined, citing
potential privilege concerns.
At the same time that Cohen finalized his written submission to Congress, he served as a
source for a Washington Post story published on August 27, 2017, that reparted in depth for the
first time that the Trump Organizatian was "pursuing a plan to develop a massive Trump Tawcr
in Moscow" at the same time as candidate Trump was "running for president in late 2015 and early
2016," T h e article reported that "the project was abandoned at the end of January 2016, just
before the presidential primaries began, several people familiar with the proposal said."ws Cohen
recalled that in speaking to the Post, he held ta the false story that negotiations for the deal ceased
in January 2016.aw
2/8/19 email, Counsel for personal counsel ta the President ta Special Counsel's Office.
' Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 7; Carol D. Leannig ct al., Trump 's busmess sought deal on a Trump
Tower ln Moscow while he ran for prcsidcnh Washington Past (Aug. 27, 2017).
' Carol D. Leonnig et al., Trump 's business sought deal on a Trump Tower in Jrfoscow while he
ran for president, Washington Post (Aug. 27, 2017).
'" Cohen 9/1 8/18 302„at 7.
U.S. Department of Justice
//
On August 28, 2017, Cohen submitted his statement about the Trump Tower Moscow
project to Congress."' Cohen did not recall talking to the President about the specifics of what
the statement said or what Cohen would later testify to about Trump Tawer Moscow,ws He
recalled speaking to the President more generally about how he planned to stay on message in his
testimony.mm On September 19, 2017, in anticipation of his impending testimony, Cohen
orchestrated the public release of his opening remarks to Congress, which criticized the allegations
in tbe Steele material and claimed that the Trutnp Tower Moscow project "was terminated in
January of 2016; which oecuned before the Iowa caucus and months before the very erst
primary."' ' Cohen said the release of his opening remarks was intended to shape the narrative
and let other people wha might be witnesses know what Cohen was saying so they could follow
the same message.' Co hen said his decision was meant ta mirrar Jared Kushner's decision to
release a statement in advance of Kushner's congressional testimony, which the President's
personal counsel had told Cohen the President liked.tsm Cohen recalled that on September 20,
2017, after Cohen's opening remarks had been printed by the media, the President's personal
counsel told him that the President was pleased with the Trump Tower Moscow statement that had
gone out.
On October 24 and 25, 2017, Cohen testified before Congress and repeated the false
statements he had included in his written statement about Trump Tower Moscow.'o s Phone
records show that Cohen spoke with the President's personal counsel immediately after his
testimony on both days.'
In January 2018, the media reported that Cohen had arranged a $1 30,000 payment during
the campaign to prevent a woman tram publicly discussing an alleged sexual encounter she had
Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 6. Phone records show that the President's personal counsel called
Cohen on the morning af September 20, 2017, and they spoke for approximately 11 minutes, and that they
had two more cantacts that day, one af which lasted approximately 18 minutes. Gall Records of Michael
Cohen. (Reflecting three contacts on September 20, 201 7„with calls lasting for 11 minutes 3 seconds; 2
seconds; and 18 minutes 38 seconds).
Cohen Information, at 4; Executive Session, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S.
House of Representatives, Interview af Michael Cohen (Oct. 24, 2017), at 10-11, 117-119.
'"' Call Records af Michael Cohen. (RetlectIng two contacts on October 24, 2017 (12 minutes 8
secondsand 8 minutes 27 seconds) and three contacts on October 25, 2017 (1 secand; 4 minutes 6 seconds;
and 6 minutes 6 seconds)).
144
U.S. Department of Justice
//
with the President before he ran for office.' Th i s Offme did not investigate Cohen's campaign-
period payments to women.' s However, those events, as described here, are potentially relevant
to the President's and his personal counsel's interactions with Cohen as a witness who later began
to cooperate with the government.
On February 13, 2018, Cohen released a statement to news organizations that stated, "In a
private transaction in 2016, I used my own personal funds to facilitate a payment of $130,000 to
[the woman]. Neither the Trump Organization nor the Trump campaign was a party to the
transaction with [the woman], and neither reimbursed me for the payment, either directly or
indirectly,"' s In congressional testimony on February 27, 2019, Cohen testified that he had
discussed what to say about the payment with the President and that the President had directed
*
Cohen to say that the President "w'as not knowledgeable... of [Cohen s] actions" in making the
payment.' 'c On February 19, 2018, the day aIIer the New York Times wrote a detailed story
attributing the payment to Cohen and describing Cohen as the President's "fixer,*' Cohen received
a text message from the President's personal counsel that stated, "Client says thanksfor what you
do ~ucu
On April 9, 2018, FBI agents working with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern
District of New York executed search warrants on Cohen's home, hotel room, and office.'"' That
day, the President spoke to reporters and said that he had "just heard that they broke into the office
of one of my personal attorneys — a good man."' The President called the searches "a real
disgrace" and said, "It's an attack on our country, in a true sense. It's an attack on what we al!
' " Sec, c.g., Michael Rothfeld & Joe Palazzolo, Trump Lawyer Arranged 8130,000 Payment for
Adult-Film Star 's Silence,Wall Street Journal (Jan. 12, 2018).
s The Office was authorized to investigate Cohen's establishment and use of Essential
Consultants LLC, which Cohen created to facilitate the $1 30,000 payment during the campaign, based on
evidence that thc entity received funds from Russian-backed entities. Cohen's use of Essential Consultants
to facilitate the $130,000 payment to the woman during the campaign was part of the Office's referral of
certain, Cohen-i elated matters to the U.S. Attorney's Officc for the Southern Distt ict of New York.
' ' Sec, e.g., Mark Barman, Longtime Trump attorney says hs made 8130,000payment to Stormy
Daniels udth his money, Washington Post (Fcb. 14, 2018).
Hearing on Issues Belated to Trump Organization Before the House Oversight and Itcform
Comm tttcs, 116u Cong. (Feb. 27, 2019) (CQ Cong. Transci ipts, at 147-148) (testimony of Michael Cohen).
Toll records show that Cohen was connected to a White House phone number for approximately five
minutes on Januaiy 19, 2018, and for approximately seven minutes on January 30, 2018, and that Cohen
called Melania Trump's cell phone several times between January 26, 2018, and January 30, 2018. Call
Records of Michael Cohen.
"" 2/19/18 Text Message, President" s personal counsel to Cohen; see Jim Rutenberg et aL, Tools
of Trump 's Fixer: I'ayouts, Intimt dail on and the Tabloids, New York Times (Feb. 18, 2018).
'ms Gov't Opp. to Det: Mot. for Temp. Restraining Order, In the Matter of Search Warrants
Executed on Aprtl 9, 2018, 18-mj-3161 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2018), Doc. 1 (" On April 9, 2018, agents fmm
the New York field. office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.. . executed search warrants for Michael
Cohen's residence, hotel room, office, safety deposit box, snd electronic devices."),
' " Remarks by President Trump Before Meeting with Senior Military Leadership, White House
(Apr. 9, 2018).
U.S. Department of Justice
//
stand for."' '4 Cohen said that after the seaichcs he was concerned that he was "an open book,"
that he did not want issues arising from the payments to women to "come out," and that his false
statements to Congress were "a big concern.'u "s
A few days after the searches, the president called Cohen." ie According to Cohen, the
President said he wanted to "check in" and asked if Cohen was okay, and the President encouraged
Cohen to "hang in there" and "stay strong." ' C ohen also recalled that following the searches he
heard from individuals who were in touch with the President and relayed to Cohen thc President's
* p p a t e .'"" C h Il d th t ~ , fH 1 f th P id t' , h d t
to say that he was with "the Boss in Mar-a-La o and the President had said "he loves you" and
notto worry.' 'v Cohen recalled that for the Trump
Organization, told him, "the boss loves you." And Co en said that , a friend
of the President's, told him, "everyone knows the boss has your back."
On or about April 17, 2018,, Cohen began speaking with an attorney, Robert Costello, who
had a close relationship with Rudolph Giuliani, one of the President's personal lawyers.' m
Costello told Cohen that he had a "back channel of communication" to Giuliani, and that Giuliani
had said the "channel" was "crucial" and "must be maintained.'nm' On April 20, 2018, the New
York Times published an article about the President's relationship with and treatment of Cohen.'e~~
The President responded with a series of tweets predicting that Cohen would not '"flip":
The New York Times and a third rate reporter... are going out of their way to destroy
Michael Cohen and his relationship with me in the hope that he will 'flip,' They use non-
existent'sources' and a drunk/drugged up loser who hatesMichael, a fine person with a
wonderful family. Michael is a businessman for his own account/lawyer who I have always
liked Be respected. Most people will flip if the Government lets them out of u ouble, even
"'i Remarks by President Trump Before Meeting with Senior Military Leadership, White House
(Apr. 9, 2018).
ieu Cohen 10/17/18 302 at 11
'"6 Cohen 3/19/1 9 302, at 4.
"i' Cohen 3/19/19 '302i at 4.
"" Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 11.
' ' Cohen9/12/18302,at 11.
" 0 Cohen 9/12/1 8 302, at 11.
'w' Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 11.
4/17/18 Email, Citron to Cohen; 4/19/18 Email, Costello to Cohen; MC-SCO-001 (7/7/18
redacted billing statement from Davidoff, Hutcher k Citron to Cohen).
'" 4 /21/18 Email, Costello to Cohen.
See Maggie Haberman et at„Michael Cohen Has Said He grould Take a Ballet for Trump.
Maybe Hot Anymore., New York Times (Apr. 20, 2018).
146
U,S. Department of Justice
//
if it means lying or making up stories. Sorry, I don't see Michael doing that despite the
humble Witch Hunt and the dishonest media! 'm'
In an email that day to Cohen, Costello wrote that he had spoken with Giuiiani.'m' Costello told
Cohen the conversation was "Very Very Positive[.] You are 'loved'.. . they are in our corner... .
Sleep well tonight[], you have friends in high places."'
Cohen said that following these messages he believed he had the support of the White
House if he continued to toe the party line, and he determined to stay on message and be part of
the team.'m At the time, Cohen's understood that his legal fees were still being paid by the Trump
Organization, which he said was important to him.'ss Cohen believed he needed thc power of the
President to take care of him, so he needed to defend the President and stay on message.'
Cohen also recalled speaking with the President's personal counsel about pardons alter the
searches of his home and offlce had occurred, at a time when the media had reported that pardon
discussions were orcurring at the White House.' ' Cohen told the President's personal counsel
he had been a loyal lawyer and servant, and he said that after thc searches he was in an
uncomfortable position and wanted to know what was in it for him." s According to Cohen, the
President's personal counsel responded that Cohen should stay on message, that the investigation
was a witch hunt, and that everything would be fine.'+s C ohen understood based on this
conversation arid previous conversations about pardons with the President's personal counsel that
as long as he stayed on message, he would be taken care of by the President, either through a
pardon or through the investigation being shut down."
147
U.S. Department of Justice
//
On April 24, 2018, the President responded to a reporter's inquiry whether he would
consider a patdon for Cohen with, "Stupid question." ' O n June 8, 2018, the President said he
"hadn't even thought about" pardons for Manafort or Cohen, and continued, "It's far too early to
be thinking about that. They haven't been convicted of anything. There's nothing to pardon."'c s
And on June 15, 2018, the President expressed sympathy for Cohen, Manafort, and Flynn in a
press interview and said, "I feel badly about a lot of them, because I think a lot of it is very
unfair. *'csr
5. The President's Conduct After Cohen Be an Coo cretin with the Government
On July 2, 2018, ABC News reported based on an "exclusive'* interview with Cohen that
Cohen "strongly signaled his willingness to cooperate with special counsel Robert Mueller and
federal prosecutors in the Southern District of New York — even if that puts President Trump in
jeopardy?u ss That week, the media reported that Cohen had added an attorney to his legal team
who previously had worked as a legal advisor to President Bill Clinton.'
Beginning on July 20, 2018, the media reported on the existencc of a recording Cohen had
made of a conversation he had with candidate Trump about a payment made to a second woman
who said she had had an affair with Trump.' + O n July 21, 2018, the President responded".
"Inconceivable that the governm ent would brcalc into a lawyer's office (early in the morning)-
almost unheard of. Even more inconceivable that a lawyer would tape a client — totally unheard
of & perhaps illegal. The good news is that your favorite President did nothing wrong!"' ' On
July 27, 2018, after the media reported that Cohen was willing to inform investigators that Donald
Trump Jr. told his father about the Junc 9, 2016 meeting to get "dirt" on Hillary Clintoa,'~z the
President twceted: "[S]o the Fake News doesn't waste my time with dumb questions, NO, I did
NOT know of thc meeting wtth my son, Don jr. Sounds to me like someone is trying to make up
"" Remarks by President Trump and President Macron of France Before Restricted Bilateral
Meeting,, The White House (Apr. 24, 2018).
'm' president Donald Trump Holds Media Before Departing f' or the G-? Summit, CQ
Availability
Ncwsmakcr Transcripts (June 8, 2018).
'"' Remarks by President Trump in Press Gaggle, The White House (June 15, 2018).
'"' EXCLUSIVE: Michael Cohen says family and country, not President Trump, is his f trst
loyalty', ABC (July 2, 2018). Cohen said in the interview, "To be crystal clear, my wife, my daughter and
my son, snd this country have my ftrst loyalty."
See e.g, Darren Samuelsohn,Michael Cohen hires Clinton scandal veteran Lenny Davis,
Politico (July 5, 2018).
" ' See; e.g.,Matt Apuzzo et al., Michael Cohen Secretly Taped Trump Discussing Payment to
Playboy Model,New York Times (July 20, 2018).
"o lwrcalDonaldTrump 7/21/18 (8:10 a.m. ET) Tweet,
' s See, e.g, Jim Sciutto, Cuoma Prime Time Transcript, CNN (July 26, 2018).
U.S. Department of Justice
II
stories in order to get himself out of an unrelated jam (Taxi cabs maybe?). He even retained Bill
ru
and Crooked Hillary's lawyer. Gee, I wonder if they helped hiin make the choice!
On August 21, 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty in the Southern District of New York to eight
felony charges, including two counts of campaign-finance violations based on the payments he
had made during the final weeks of the campaign to women who said they had affairs with the
President.' » During the plea hearing, Cohen stated that he had worked "at the direction of" the
candidate in making those payments."»' T h e next day, the President contrasted Cohen's
cooperation with Manafort's refusal to cooperate, twceting, "I feel very badly for Paul Manafo'rt
and his wonderful family, 'Justice' took a 12 year old tax case, among other things„applied
tremeiidous pressure on him and, unlike Michael Cohen, he refused to 'break' — make up stories
in order to get a 'deal.' Such respect for a brave man!"" s
On September 17, 2018, this Office submitted written questions to the President that
included questions about the Trump Tower Moscow project and attached Cohen's written
statement to Congress and the Letter of Intent signed by the President."» A mong other issues,
the questions asked the President to describe the timing and substance of discussions he had with
Cohen about the project, whether they discussed a potential nip to Russia, and whether the
President "at any time direct[ed] or suggest[ed] that discussions about the Trump Moscow prnject
should cease," or whether the President was "informed at any time that the project had been
abandoned.'uc»s
On November 20, 2018, the President submitted written responses that did not answer those
questions about Trump Towci Moscow directly and did not provide any information about the
timing of the candidate*s discussions with Cohen about the project or whether he participated in
any discussions about th'e project being abandoned or no longer pursued.'~' Instead, the
President's answers stated in relevant part:
I had few conversations with Mr. Cohen on this subject. As I recall, they were brief, and
they were not memorable. I was not enthused about the proposal, and I do not recall any
discussion of travel to Russia in connection with it. I do not remember discussing it with
s @realDonaldTrump 7/27/18 (7.'26 a.m. ET) Tweet; ®realDonaldTrump 7/27/18 (7:38 a.m. ET)
Tweet; @realDonaldTrump 7/27/18 (7:56 a.m. ET) Tweet. At thc time of these tweets, the press had
reported that Cohen's financial interests in taxi cab medallions were being scrutinized by investigators.
Sss„ag., Matt Apuzzo et al., Michael Cohen Secretly Taped Trump Discussing Payment to Playboy Model,
New York Times (July 20, '2018).
"4' Cohen. Information.
'" C ohen 8/21/18 Transcript, at 23.
"»' ®rcalDonaldTrump 8/22/18 (9:21 a.m. ET) Tweet
"»s 9/17/18 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to President's Personal Counsel (attaching written
quesuons for the President, with attachments).
'»»' 9/17/18 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to President's Personal Counsel (attaching written
questions for the President), Question III, Parts (a) through (g),
"" Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018).
149
U.'S. Deparlment of Justice
ll
anyone else at the Trump Organization, although it is possible. I do not recall being aware
at the time of any communications between Mr. Cohen and Felix Sater and any Russian
government official regarding the Letter of Intent.'
On November 29, 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress
based on his statements about the Trump Tower Moscow project.'cs' In a plea agreement with this
Office, Cohen agreed to provide truthful information regarding any and all matters as to which
this Office deems relevantfn s Later on November 29, after Cohen's guilty plea had become
public, the President spoke to reporters about the, Trump Towei Moscow project, saying:
I decided not to do the project . . I d ecided ultimately not to do it. There would have
been nothing wrong ifl did do it. Ifl did do it, there would have been nothing wrong. That
was my business.... It was an option that I decided not to do... . I decided not to do it,
The primary reason.. . I was focused on running for President... . I was running my
business whge I was campaigning. There was a good chance that I wouldn't have won, in
which case I would *ve gone back into the business. And why should I lose lots of
opportunities7" s
The President also said that Cohen was "a weak person. And by being weak, unlike other people
that you watch — he is a weak person. And what he's trying to do is get a reduced sentence. So
he's lying about a project that everybody knew about. ness The President also brought up Cohen's
written submission to Congress regarding the Trump Tower Moscow project: "So here's the story;
Go back and look at the paper that Michael Cohen wrote before he testified in the House and/or
Senate. It talked about his position.'* s T he President added, "Even if +chen] was right, it
doesn't matter because I was allowed to do whatever I wanted during the campaign."'
In light of the President's public statements following Cohen's guilty plea that he "decided
not to do the project," this Office again sought information from the President about whether he
parlicipated in any discussions about the project being abandoned or no longer pursued, including
when he "decided not to do the project„" who he spoke to about that decision, and what motivated
" ' Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 201$), at 15 (Response to Question III, Parts
(8) through (g)).
ie ' Cohen Information; Cohen 8/21/18 Transcript.
' " Plea Agreement at 4, United States v. Mc/tact Cohen, 1:18-cr-850 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29,,2018).
'"' Presfdent Trump Departure. Remarks, C-SPAN (Nov. 29, 2018). In contrast to the President's
remarks following'Cohen's guilty plea„Cohen's August 28, 2017 statement to Congress stated that Cohen,
not the President, "decided to abandon the proposal" in late January 2016; that Cohen "did not ask or brief
Mr. Trump.. . before I made the decision to terminate further work on the proposal"; and that the decision
' to abandon the proposal was "unrelated" to the Campaign. P-SCO-000009477 (Statement of Michael D.
Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017)).
s pres/dent Trump Departure Remarks, C-SPAN (Nov. 29, 2018).
' " Prestdent Trump Departure Remarks, C-SPAN (Nov. 29, 2018/.
' ' President Ti ump Departure Remarks, C-SPAN (Nov. 29, 2018).
150
U.S. Department of Justice
the decision.' Th e Office also again asked for the timing of the President's discussions with
Cohen about Trump Tower Moscow and asked him to specify "what period of the campaign" he
was involved in discussions concerning the project.' ss In response, thc President's personal
counsel declined to provide additional information from the President and stated that "the President
has fully answered the questions at issue."'
In the weeks following Cohen's plea and agreement to provide assistance to this Office,
t he President repeatedly implied that Cohen's 'family members were guilty of crimes. O n
December 3, 2018, after Cohen had filed his sentencing memorandum, the President tweeted,
"'Michael Cohen asks judge for no Prison Time.' You mean he can do all of the TERRIBLE,
unrelated to Trump, things having to do with Iraud, big loans, Taxis, etc., and not serve a long
prison term'? He makes up stories to get a GREAT 0 ALREADY reduced deal for himself, and
get his wife and father-in-law (who has the money P) off Scott Free. He lied for this outcome and
shoul inm o inion serve a fulland corn letesentence."'"
On December 12, 2018, Cohen was sentenced to three years of imprisonment.' s The next
day, the President sent a series of tweets that said:
I never directed Michael Cohen to break the law... . Those charges were just agreed to by
birn in order to embarrass the president and get a much reduced prison sentence, which he
did — including the fact that his family was temporarily let og the hootr. As a lawyer,
Michael has great liability to me! "m
On December 16, 2018, the President twceted, "Remember, Michael Cohen only became a 'Rat'
after the FBI did something which was absolutely unthinkable gc unheard of untg the Witch Hunt
was illegally started. They BROKE INTO AN ATTORNEY *S OFFICE! Why didn't they bre'ak
into the DNC to get the Server, or Crooked's officev'n es
In January 2019, after the media reported that Cohen would provide public testimony in a
congressional heming, the President made additional public comments suggesting that Cohen's
' '" 1/23/19 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to President's Personal Counsel.
' ' (IrealDonaidTrump 12/13/1 8 (8:17 a.m. ET„S:25 a.m. ET, and 8:39 a.m. ETJ Tweets (emphasis
added).
"w wrealDonaldTrump
t 12/16/18 (9:39 a.m. ET) Tweet.
151
U.S. Department of Justice
//
family members had committed crimes. In an interview on Fox on January 12, 2019, the President
was asked whether he was worried about Cohen's testimony and responded:
[I]n oi'der to get his sentence reduced, [Cohen] says "I have an idea, I' ll ah, tell — I' ll give
you same information on the president." Well, there is na infoimation. But he shmdd give
information maybe on his father-ln-law because /hat 's the one that people east Io look ot
because where does that money —that's the mosey in the family. And I guess he didn' t
want Lo talk about his father-in-law, he's trying to get his sentence reduced. So it's ah,
pretty sad. Yau know, it's weak and it's very sad to watch a thing like that.'
On January 18, 2019, the President tweeted, "Kevin Corke, NFoxNews 'Don't forget,
Michael Cohen has already been convicted of perjury and fraud, and as recently as this week, the
Wall Street Journal has suggested that he may have stolen tens of thousands of dollars. ...' L ying
to reduce his jail time! Flrateh father-ln-law/in ss
On January 23, 2019, Cohen postponed his congressional testimany, citing threats against
his family.' Th e next day, the President tweeted, "Sa interesting that bad lawyer Michael Cohen,
who sadly will not be testifying before Congress, is using the lawyer of Croaked Hillary Clinton
to represent him — Gee, how did that happen?"' m
Also in January 2019, Giuliani gave press interviews that appeared to confirm Cohen's
account that the Trump Orgamzation pursued the Trump Tower Moscow project well past January
2016. Giuhani stated that "it's our understanding that [discussians about the Trump Moscow
project] went on throughout 2016. Wercn't a lot of them, but there were conversations. Can't be
sure of the exact date. But the president can remember having conversations with him about it.
The president also remembers —yeah, probably up — could be up ta as far as October,
November."'sm In an interview with the New York Times, Giuliani quoted the President as saying
that the discussions regarding the Trump Moscow project were "going on from the day I
announced to the day I wondu s On January 21, 2019, Giuliani issued a statement that said: "My
recent statements about discussions during thc 2016 campaign between Michael Cohen and
candidate Donald Trump about a potential Trump Moscow 'project' were hypothetical and not
based on conversations I had with the president. ns '
Icosi ne Pirro Interview with President Trump, Fox News (Jan. 12, 2019) (emphasis added).
®realDanatdTrump 1/18/19 (10:02 a.m. ET) Tweet (emphasis added).
Statement by Lanny Davis, Cohen's personal counsel (Jan. 23, 2019).
"m ®reaIDanaldTrump 1/24/19 (7:48 a.m. ET) Tweet.
'Ms Meet the Press Interview with Rudy Giuliani, NBC (Jan. 20, 2019).
' " Mark Mazzetii et at., Moscow Skyscraper TaLks Continued Through "the Day I g'on, " Trump
Is Said to Acknowledge,New York Times (Jan. 20, 2019).
" ' Maggie Haberman, Glulianl Says His Moscow Trump Tower Comments 8'ere "Hypothetical",
New York Times (Jan. 21, 2019), In a letter to this Office, the President's caunsel stated that Giuliani's
public comments "were not intended to suggest nor did they reflect knowledge of the existence or timing
152
U.S. Department of Justice
//
Analysis
In analyzing the President's conduct related to Cohen, the following evidence is relevant
to the elements of obstruction of justice.
a. Obs t ructive act. We gathered evidence of the President's conduct related to Cohen
on two issues: (i) whether the Pr'esident or others aided or participated in Cohen's false statements
to Congress, and (ii) whether the President took actions that would have the natural tendency to
preverrt Cohen fr'om providing truthful information to the government.
Cohen said that his statements to Congress followed a "party line" that developed within
the campaign to align with the President's public statements distancing the President from Russia.
Cohen also recalled that, in speaking with the President in advance of testifying, he made it clear
that he would stay on message —which Cohen believed they both understood would require false
testimony. But Cohen said that he and the P'resident did not explicitly discuss whether Cohen's
testimony about the Trump Tower Moscow project would be or was false, and the President did
not direct him to provide false testimony. Cohen also said he did not tell the President about the
specifics of his planned testimony. During the time when his statement to Congress was being
drafted and circulated to members of the JDA, Cohen did not speak directly to the Pr'esident about
the statement, but rather communicated with the President's personal counsel — as corroborated by
phone records showing extensive communications between Cohen and the President's personal
counsel before Cohen submitted his statement and when he testified before Congress.
Cohen recalled that in his disrussions with the President's personal counsel on August 27,
2017 — the day befor'e Cohen's statement was submitted to Congress —Cohen said that there were
more communications with Russia and more rommunications with candidate Trump than the
statement reflected. Cohen recalled expressing some concern at that time. According to Cohen,
the President*s personal counsel — who did not have first-hand knowledge of the project-
responded by saying that there was no need to muddy the water, that it was unnecessary to include
those details because the project did not take place, and that Cohen should keep his statement short
and tight, not elaborate, stay on message, and not contradict the President. Cohen's recollection
of the content of those conversations is consistent with direction about the substance of Cohen's
draft statement that appeared to come Irom members of the JDA. For example, Cohen omitted
any rclbrence to his outreach to Russian government officials to set up a meeting between Trump
and Putin during the United Nations General Assembly, and Cohen believed it was a decision of
of conversations beyond that contained in the President's [written responses to the Special Counsel's
Office]." 2/6/19 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office.
153
U.S. Department of Justice
//
the JDA to delete the sentence, "The building project led me to make limited contacts with Russian
government officials."
ii. Sec ond, we considered whether the President took actions that would have
the natural tendency to prevent Cohen from providing truthful information to criminal
investigators or to Congress.
Before Cohen began to cooperate with the government, the President publicly and privately
urged Cohen t'o stay o'n message and not "flip." Cohen recalled the President's personal counsel
telling him that he would be protected so long as he did not go "'rogue." In the days and weeks
that followed the April 2018 searches of Cohen's home and office, the President told reporters that
Cohen was a "'good man" and said he was "a fine person with a wonderful family . . . who I have
always liked lit respected.'* Privately, the President 'told Cohen to ' *hang in there" and "'stay
strong." People who were close to both Cohen and the President passed messages to Cohen that
*'the President loves you," '*the boss loves you,'" and "everyone knows the boss has your back."
Through the President's personal counsel, the President also had previously told Cohen thanks
for what you do" after Cohen provided information to the media about payments to women that,
according to Cohen, both Cohen and the President knew was false, At that time, the Trump
Organization continued to pay Cohen*s legal fees, which was important to Cohen. Cohen also
recalled discussing the possibility of a pardon with the' President's personal counsel, who told him
to stay on message and everything would be fine. The President indicated in his public statements
that a pardon had not been ruled out, and also stated pubflcly that "[m]ost people will flip if the
Government lets them out of trouble" but that he "d[idn't] see Michael doing that."
After it was reported that Cohen intended to cooperate with the government, however, the
President accused Cohen of "mak[ing] up stories in order to get himself out of an unrelated jam
(Taxi cabs maybe' ?)," called Cohen a "rat," and on multiple occasions publicly suggested that
Cohen's family members had committed crimes. The evidence concerning this sequence of events
could suppoit an inference that the President used inducements in the form of positive messages
in an effort to get Cohen not to cooperate, and then turned to attacks and intimidation to deter the
provision of information or undermine Cohen's credibility once Cohen began rooperating.
i. Coh e n's false congressional testimony about the Trump Tower Moscow
project was designed to minimize connections between the President and Russia and to help limit
the congressional and DOJ Russia investigations — a goal that was in the President's interest, as
reflected by the President's own statements. During and atter the campaign, the President made
repeated statements that he had "no business" in Russia and said that there were "no deals that
could happen in Russia, because we' ve stayed away." A s Cohen knew, and as he recalled
communicating to the President during the campaign, Cohen's pursuit of the Trump Tower
Moscow proj ect cast doubt on the accuracy or completeness of these statements.
In connection with his guilty plea, Cohen admitted that he had multiple conversations with
candidate Trump to give him status updates about the Trump Tower Moscow pmject, that the
conversations continued through at least June 2016, and that he discussed with Trump possible
travel to Russia to pursue the project. The conversations were not off-hand, according to Cohen,
because the project had the potential to be so lucrative. In addition, text messages to and from
Cohen and other records further establish that Cohen's efforts to advance the project did not end
in January 2016 and that in May and June 2016, Cohen was considering the timing for possible
trips to Russia by him and Trump in connection with the project.
The evidence could support an inference that the President was aware of these facts at the
time of Cohen's false statetnents to Congress. Cohen discussed the project with the President in
early 2017 following media inquiries. Cohen recalled that on September 20, 2017, the day after
he released to the public his opening remarks to Congress —which said the project "was terminated
in January of 2016" — the President's personal counsel told him the President was pleased with
what Cohen had said about Trump Tower Moscow. And atter Cohen's guilty plea, the President
told reporters that he had ultimately decided not to do the project, which supports the inference
that he remained aware of his own involvement in the project and the period duting the Campaign
in which the project was being pursued.
ii . The President's public remarks following Cohen's guilty plea also suggest
that the President may have been concemcd about what Cohen told investigators about the Trump
Tower Moscow project. At the time the President submitted written answets to questions from
roject
this OIIIce about the p and other subjects, the media had reported that Cohen was cooperating
with the government but Cohen had not yet pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress.
Accordingly, it was not publicly known what information about the project Cohen had provided
to the government. In his written answers, the President did not provide details about the timing
and substance of his discussions with Cohen about the projert and gave no indication that he had
decided to no longer pursue the project. Yet after Cohen pleaded guilty, the President publicly
stated that he had personally made the decision to abandon the project. The President then declined
to clarify the seeming discrepancy to our Offtce or answet' additional questions. The content and
timing of the President's pmvision of information about his knowledge and actions regarding the
Trump Tower Moscow project is evidence that the President may have been concerned about the
information that Cohen could provide as a witness.
155
U,S. Department of Justice
IJ
iii. The President's concern about Cohen cooperating may have been directed
at the Southern District of New York investigation into other aspects of the President's dealings
w'ith Cohen rather than an investigation of Trump Tower Moscow. There also is some evidence
that the President's concern about Cohen cooperating was based on the President's stated belief
that Cohen would provide false testimony against the President in an attempt to obtain a lesser
sentence for his unrelated criminal conduct. Thc President tweeted that Manafort, unlike Cohen,
refused to "break" and "make up stories in order to get a 'deal."*' And after Cohen pleaded guilty
to making false statements to Congress, the President said, "what [Cohen]'s trying to do is get a
reduced sentence. So he's lying about a project that everybody knew about." But the President
also appeared to defend the underlying conduct, saymg, "Even if [Cohen] was right, it doesn*t
matter because I was allowed to do whatever I wanted during the campaign." As described above,
there is evidence that the President knevv that Cohen had made false statements about the Trump
Tower Moscow project and that Cohen did so to protect the President and minimize the President's
connections to Russia during the campaign,
iv. Fin ally, the President's statements insinuating that members of Cohen's
family committed crimes after Cohen began cooperating with the government could be viewed as
an effort to retaliate against Cohen and chill further testimony adverse to the President by Cohen
or others. It is possible that the President believes, as reflected in his tweets, that Cohen "ma[d]e[]
up stories" in order to get a deal for himself and "get his wife and father-in-Iaw... off Scott Free."
It also is possible that the President's mention of Cohen's wife and father-in-Iaw were not intended
to. affect Cohen as a witness but rather were part of a public-relations strategy aimed at discrediting
Cohen and deflecting attention away from thc President on Cohen-related matters. But the
President's suggestion that Cohen's family members committed crimes happened more than once,
including just before Cohen was sentenced '(at the same time as the President stated that Cohen
"should, in my opinion, serve a full and complete sentence") and again just before Cohen was
scheduled to testify before Congress. The timing of the statements supports an inference that they
were intended at least in part to discourage Cohen from finther cooperation.
Although this report does not contain a traditional prosecution decision or declination
decision, the evidence supports several general conclusions relevant to analysis of thc facts
conce
rningt he President's coutse of conduct.
1. Three features of this case render it atypical compared to the heartland obstruction-of-
justice prosecutions brought by the Depattment of Justice.
First, the conduct involved actions by the President. Some of the conduct did not implicate
the president's constitutional authority and raises garde-variety obsnuction-of justice issues.
Other events wc Investigated, however, drew upon the President's Article II authority, which
raised constitutional issues that we address in Volume II, Section III.B, inPa. A f actual analysis
of that conduct would have to take into account both that the President's acts were facially lawful
and that his position as head of the Executive Brartch provides him with unique and powerful
means of influencing official pmceedings, subordinate officers, and potential witnesses.
IJ.S. Department of Justice
Second, many obstruction cases involve the attempted or actual cover-up of an underlying
crime. Personal criminal conduct can furnish strong evidence that the individual had an improper
obstructive purpose, see, e.g., United States v. W7/oxg/thy, 860 F.2d 15, 24 (2d Cir. 1988), or that
he contemplated an effect on an oflicial proceeding, see, e.g., United States v. /Jinday, 804 F.3d
558, 591 (2d Cir. 2015). But proof of such a crime is not an element of an obstruction offense.
See United Statesv.Greer,872 F.3d 790, 798 (6th Cir. 2017) (stating, in applying the obstruction
sentencing guideline„ that "obstruction of a criminal investigation is punishable even if the
prosecution is ultimately unsuccessful or even if the investigation ultimately reveals no underlying
crime" ). Obsoletion of justice can be motivated by a desire to protect non-criminal personal
interests, to protect against investigations where underlying criminal liability fafls into a gray area,
or to avoid personal embarrassment. The injury to the integrity of the justice system is the same
regardless of whether a person committed an underlying wrong.
In this investigation, the evidence does not establish that the President was involved in an
underlying crime related to Russian election interference. But the evidence does point to a range
of other possible personal motives animating the President's conduct. These include concerns that
continued investigation would call into question the legitimacy of his election and potential
unceitainty ab'out whether certain events — such as advance notice of WikiLeaks's release of
hacked information or the June 9, 2016 meeting between senior campaign officials and Russians-
could be seen as criminal activity bythe President, his campaign, or his family.
2. A l though the events we investigated involved discrete acts —e.g., the President's
statement to Comey about the Flynn investigation, his termination of Comey, and his efforts to
remove the Special Counsel — it is important to view the President' s pattern of conduct as a whoIe,
That pattern sheds light on the nature of the President's acts and the inferences that can be drawn
about his intent.
a. Our investigation found multiple acts by the President that were capable of exerting
undue infl uence over law enforcement investigations, including the Russian-interference and
obstruction investigations. The incidents were often carried out through one-on-one meetings in
which the President sought to use his official power outside of usual channels. These actions
ranged from efforts to remove the Special Counsel and to reverse the effect of the Attorney
General's recusal; to the attempted use of official power to limit the scope of the investigation; to
direct and indirect contacts with witnesses with the potential to influence their testimony. Uiewing
the acts collectively can help to illuminate their significance. For example, the President's
direction to McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed was followed almost immediately by
his direction to Lewandowski to tell the Attorney General to limit the scope of the Russia
investigation to prospective election-interference only — a temporal connection that suggests that
both acts were taken with a related purpose with respect to the investigation.
157
U,S, Department of Justice
The President's efforts to infiuence the investigation werc mostly unsuccessful, but that is
laigcly because thc persons who surrounded the President declined to carry out orders or accede
to his requests. Comey did not end the investigation of Flynn, which ultimately resulted in Flynn's
prosecution and conviction for lying to the FBI. McGahn did not tell the Acting Attn'rney General
that the Special Counsel must be removed, but was instead prepared to resign over the President's
order, Lewandowski and Dearborn did not deliver the President's message to Sessions that he
should confine the Russia investigation to future election meddling only. And McGahn refused to
recede from his recollections about events surrounding the President's direction to have the Special
Counsel removed, despite the President's multiple demands that he do so. Consistent with that
pattern„ the evidence we obtained would not support potential obstruction charges against the
President's aides and associates beyond those already filed.
b. In considering the full scope of the, conduct wc investigated, the President's actions ran
be divided into two distinct phases reflecting a possible shift in the President's motives. In the
first phase, before the President fired Comey, the President had been assured that the FBI had not
opened an investigation of him personally. The President deemed it critically important to make
public that he was not under investigation, and he included that information in his termination
letter to Comey after other efforts to have that information disclosed were unsuccessful.
Soon atter he fired Comey, however, the President became aware that investigators were
conducting an obstruction-of justice inquiry into his own conduct. That awareness marked a
significant change in the President's conduct and the start of a second phase of action. The
President launched public attacks on the investigation and individuals involved in it who could
possess evidence adverse to the President, while in private, the President engaged in a series of
targeted efforts to control the investigation. For instance, the President attempted to remove the
Special Counsel; he sought to have Attorney General Sessions unrecuse himself' and limit the
investigation; he sought to prevent public disclosure of information about the June 9, 2016 meeting
between Russians and campaign officials; and he used public forums to attack potential witnesses
who might offer adverse information aud to praise witnesses who declined to cooperate with the
government. Judgmen'ts about the nature of the President's motives during each phase would be
informed by the totality of the evidence.
U.S, Department of Justice
The President's personal counsel has written to this Office to advance statutory arid
constitutional defenses to the potential application of the obstruction-of- 'justice statutes to the
President's conduct.'"' A s a statutory matter, the President's counsel has argued that a core
obstruction-of justice statute, 18 U.S.C. Ij 1512(c)(2), does not cover the President's actions.' rs
As a constitutional matter, the President's counsel argued that the President cannot obstruct justice
by exercising his constitutional authority to close Department of Justice investigations or terminate
the FBI Dii'ector.' i U nder that view, any statute that restricts the President's exercise of those
powers would impermissibly intrude on the President's constitutional role. The President's
counsel has conceded that the Pi esident may be subject to criminal laws that do not directly involve
exercises of his Article II authority, such as laws prohibiting bribing witnesses or suborning
perjury.' ' But counsel has made a categorical argument that "the President's exercise of his
constitutional authority here to terminate an FBI Director and to close investigations cannot
constitutionally constitute obstruction of justice."' '
As foi the constitutional arguments, we recognized that the Department of Justice and the
courts have not definitively resolved these constitutional issues. We therefore analyzed the
President's position through the framework of Supreme Court precedent addressing the separation
of pow'ers. Under that framework, we concluded, Article II of the Constitution does not
categorically and permanently immunize the President from potential liability for the conduct that
we investigated. Rather, our analysis led us to conclude that the obstruction-of justice statutes can
'"' 6/23/17 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office; sea also I/29/1 8
Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office; 2/6/18 Letter, President's Personal
Counsel to Special Counsel's Office; 8/8/18 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's
Office, at 4.
'"' 2/6/18 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 2-9. Counsel has
also noted that othei potentially applicable obstruction statutes, such as 18 U.S.C. g 1505, protect only
pending proceedings. 6/23/17 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 7-8.
Section 1512(c)(2) is not limited to pending proceedings, but also applies to future proceedings that the
person contemplated. Sec Volume II, Section III.A, supra.
'" 6 /23/1 7 Letter, president's personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at I ("[Tjhe president
cannot obstruct.. . by simply exercising these inherent Constitutional powers.").
""' 6/23/17 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 2 n, I,
'~ ' 6/23/17 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 2 n.l (dashes
omitted)1 sea a/so 8/8/18 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 4 (" [T]he
obstmction-of justice statutes cannot be read so expansively as to create potential liability based on facially
lawful acts undertaken by the President in fiutherance of his core Article II discretionary authority to
remove principal officers or carry out the prosecution function.").
U.S. Department of Justice
validly prohibit a President's corrupt efforts to usc his official powers to curtail, end, or interfere
with an investigation.
The obstruction-of justice statute most readily applicable to our investigation is 18 U,S,C.
]i 1512(c)(2). Section 1512(c) provides:
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
The Department of Justice has taken the position that Section 1512(c)(2) states a broad,
independent, and unqualified prohibition on obstruction of justice.' Whi l e defendants have
argued that subsection (c)(2) should be read to cover only acts that would impair the availability
or integrity of evidence because that is subsection (c)(1)'s focus, suong arguments weigh against
that proposed limitation. The text of Section 1512(c)(2) confirms that its sweep is not tethered to
Section 1512(c)(l); courts have so interpreted it; its history does not counsel otherwise; and no
principle of statutory construction dictates a contrmy view. O n its face, therefore, Section
1512(c)(2) applies to all corrupt means of obstructing a proceeding, pending or contcmplated-
including by improper exercises of official power. In addition, other statutory 'provisions that are
potentially applicable to certain conduct we investigated broadly prohibit obstruction of
proceedings that are pending before courts, grand juries, and Congress. See 18 U.S.C. ][tj 1503,
1505. Congress has also specifically prohibited witness tampering. See 18 U.S.C. t) 1512(b).
Several textual features of Section 1512(c)(2) support the conclusion that the provision
broadly prohibits corrupt means of obstructing justice and is not limited by the more specific
prohibitions in Section 1512(c)(1), which focus on evidence impairment.
First, the text of Section 1512(c)(2) is unqualified: it reaches acts that "obstruct[],
influence[], or impede[] any official proceeding'*when committed "corruptly.' * Nothing in Section
1512(c)(2)'s text limits the provision to acts that would impair the integrity or availability of
evidence for use in an official proceeding. In contrast, Section 1512(c)(l) explicitly includes the
requirement that the defendant aet "with the intent to impair the object's r'ntegrity or availability
160
U.S. Department of Justice
for use in an official proceeding," a requirement that Congress also included in two other sections
of Section 1512, See 18 U.S.C. )f 1512(a)(2)(B)(ii) (use of physical force with intent to cause a
person to destroy an object "with intent, to impair the integrity or availability of thc object for use
in an official proceeding"); 1512(b)(2)(B) (use of intimidation, threats, corrupt persuasion, ar
misleading conduct with intent to cause a person to destroy an object "with intent to impair the
integrity or availability of the object for use in an official proceeding'). But no comparable intent
or conduct element focused on evidence impairinent appears in Section 1512(c)(2), The intent
element in Section 1512(c)(2) romes fram the word "rorruptly.** See, e.g., Untted States v.
IrfeEibhins, 656 F.3d 707, 711 (7th Cir. 2011) (" The intent element is important because the word
'corruptly' is what serves to separate criminal and innocent acts of obstruction.*') (i'nternal
quotation marks omitted). And the conduct element in Section 1512(c)(2) is "obstruct[ing],
infiuenc[ing], or imped[ing]" a proceeding. Congress is presumed to have acted intentionally in
the disparate inclusion and exclusion 'of evidence-impairment language. SeeLoughrin v. United
States, 573 U.S. 351, 358 (2014) ("[%]heri 'Congress includes particular language in one section
of a statute, but omits it in another' — let alone in the very next provision — this Court 'presume[s]'
that Congress intended a difference in meaning'') (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U,S. 16,
23 (1983)); ttceord Digital Realty Trust, Ine. v. Soiner, 138 S. Ct. 767, 777 (2018).
Second, the structure of Section 1512 supports the conclusion that Section 1512(c)(2)
defines an independent offense. Section 1512(c)(2) dehneates a complete crime with different
elements from Seotion 1512(c)(1) — and each subsection of Section 1512(c) contains its own
"attempt" prohibition, underscoring that they are independent prohibitions. The twa subsections
of Section 1512(c) are connected by the conjunction ' *or," indicating that each piovides an
alternative basis for criminal liab'ility. See Loughrln, 573 U,S. at 357 (" ordinary use [of 'or'] is
almost always disjunctive, that is, the words it connectsare to be given separate meanings")
(internal quotation marks omitted). In Loughrln, for example, the Supreine Court relied on the use
af the word "or" to hold that adjacent and overlapping subsections of the bank fraud statute, 18
U.S.C. 8 1344, state distinct offenses and that subsection 1344(2).therefore should not be
interpreted to contain an additional element specified only in subsection 1344(1). Id.; see olsa
Show v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 462, 465-469 (2016) (recognizing that the subsections of the
bank fraud statute "overlap substantially" but identifying distinct circumstances covered by
each).'"' A nd here, as in Loughrln„Section 1512(c)'s "two clauses have separate numbers, line
breaks before, between, and afier them, and equivalent indentatian — thus placing the clauses
visually on an equal footing and indicating that they have separate meanings;" 573 U.S. at 359.
Third, the introductory word "otherwise" in Section 1512(c)(2) signals that the provision
covers obstructive acts that are different from those listed in Section 1512(c)(1). See Black's Law
Dictionary 1101 (6th ed. 1990) '("otherwise" means "in a different manner; in another way, or in
other ways"); see also, e.g., American Heritage College Dictionary Online ("l. I n another way;
" ' The Office of Legal Counsel recently relied on several of the same interprefive principles in
concluding that language that appeared ia the first clause of the Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. ) 1084, restricting its
prohibition against certain betting or wagering activities to "any sporting event or contest„" did not apply
to the second clause of the same statute, which reaches other betting or wagering activities. See
Reeonstdenng Whether the Wire Aet Applies to Non-Sports Gambling (Nav. 2, 2018), slip op. 7 (relying
on plain language); id. at 11 (finding it not "tenable to read into the second clause the qualifier 'on any
sporting event or contest* that appears in the first clause" );id. at 12 (relying on Digit al Realty).
161
U,S. Depaitment of Justice
differently; 2. Under other circumstances"); see also Gooclt v, United States,297 U.S. 124, 128
(1936) (characterizing "otherwise" as a "broad term" and holdi'ng that a statutory prohibition on
kidnapping "for ransom or reward or otherwise" is not limited by the words "ransom" and
"reward" to kidnappings for pecuniary benefits); Callazas v. United States, 368 F.3d 190, 200 (2d
Cir. 2004) (construing otherwise" in 28 U.S.C. ) 2466(1)(C) to reach beyond the "specific
examples" listed in prior subsections, thereby covering the "myriad means that human ingenuity
might devise to permit a person to avoid the jurisdiction of a court" ); cf, Begay v. United States,
553 U.S. 137, 144 (2006) (recognizing that "otherwise" is defined to mean "in a different way or
manner," and holding that the word otherwise" introducing the residual clause in the Armed
Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. $ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), can, but need not necessarily, "refer to a crime
that is similar to the listed examples in some respects but different in others").' Th e purpose of
the word "otherwise" in Section 1512(c)(2) is therefore to clarify that the provision covers
obstructive acts other than the destruction of physical evidence with the intent to impair its
integrity or availability, which is the conduct addressed in Section 1512(c)(1). The word
'"otherwise*' does not signal that Section 1512(c)(2) has less breadth in covering obstructive
condurt than the language of the provision implies.
Courts have not limited Section 1512(c)(2) to conduct that impairs evidence, but instead
have read it to cover obstructive acts in any form.
In Sykesv, United States, 564 U,S. 1, 15 (2011), the Supreme Court substantially abandoned
Begay's reading of the residual clause, and in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), the Court
invalidated the residual clause as unconstitutionally vague. Begay's analysis of the word "otherwise" is
thus of limited value.
162
U,S. Department of Justice
commencement ar conduct of a proceeding, and not just to acts that make, evidence unavailable or
impair its integrity.
Section 1512(c)(2)'s breadth is reinforced by the similarity of its language to the omnibus
clause of 18 U.S.C. $ 1503, which covers anyone who "corruptly . . . obstructs, or impedes, or
endeavors to influence, obsMct, or impede, the due administration of justice." That clause of
Section 1503 follows two mare specific clauses that protect jurors, judges, and court officers. The
omnibus clause has nevertheless been construed to be "far more general in scope than the earlier
clauses of the statute." United Statesv. Agut7or, 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995). "The omnibus clause
is essentially a catch-all provision which generally prohibits conduct that interferes with the due
administratian ofjustice." United Statesv. /Jrenson, 104 F3d 1267, 1275 (11th Cir. 1991). Courts
have accordingly given it a "'non-restricflve reading." United Statesv. Jfunior, 617 F.3d 612, 620
(2d Cir. 2010); id, at 620 n.7 (calleeting cases fram the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh
Circuits). As one court has explained, the omnibus clause "prohibits acts that are siinilar in result,
rather than manner, to the conduct desrribed in the first part of the statute." Un ited Ratesv.
Howard, 569 F.2d 1331, 1333 (5th Cir. 1978). While the specific clauses forbid certain means
of obstructing justice... the omnibus clause aims at obstruction of justice itself, regardless of the
means used to reach that result." /d. (collecting cases). Given the similarity of Section 1512(c)(2)
ta Section 1503's omnibus clause, Congress would have expected Section 1512(c)(2) to cover acts
that produced a similar result to the evidence-impairment provisions —
i e., the result of obstructing
justice — rather than covering only acts that were similar in manner. Read this way, Section
1512(c)(2) serves a distinct function in the federal obstructian-of justice statutes: it captures
corrupt conduct, other than document destruction, that has the natural tendency to obstruct
contemplated as well as pending proceedings.
Section 1512(c)(2) overlaps with other obstruction statutes, but it does not render thein
superfluous. S ection 1503, for example, which covers pending grand jury and judicial
proceedings, and Section 1505, which covers pending administrative and congressional
proceedings, reach "endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede" the proceedings — a broader test
for inchoate violations than Section 1512(c)(2)'s "attempt" standard, which requires a substantial
step towards a completed offense. See United States v. Sontpson, 898 F.3d 287, 302 (2d Cir, 2018)
("[E]ffarts to witness tamper that rise to the level of an 'endeavor' yet fall short af an 'attempt'
cannat be prosecuted under $ 1512."); United Statesv. Leisure, 844 F.2d 1341, 1366-1367 (8th
*
Clr. 1988) (collecting cases recognizing the difference between the "endeavor" and "attempt'
standards). A n d 18 U.S.C. g 1519, which prohibits destruction of documents or records in
contemplation of an investigation or proceeding, does not require the "nexus" showing under
Aguilar, which Section 1512(e)(2) demands. See, e.g,, United Ratesv. Yielding, 657 F.3d 688,
712 (8th Cir. 2011) (" The requisite knowledge and intent [under Section 15 19] can be present even
if the accused lacks knowledge that he is likely ta succeed in obstructing the matter."); United
States v. Gray, 642 F.3d 371, 376-377 (2d Cir. 2011) ("[1]n enacting $ 1519, Congress rejected
any requirement that the government prove a link between a defendant's conduct and an imminent
or pending official proceeding."). The existence of even "substantial" ovei'lap is nat "uncommon"
in criminal statutes. Lougltnn, 573 U.S. at 359 n.4; seeS/itnv, 137 S. Ct. at 458-469; beguiler, 515
U.S. at 616 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (" The fact that there is now some overlap between f 1503 and
g 1512 is no more intolerable than the fact that there is some overlap between the onmibus clause
*
of $ 1503 and the other provisions of $ 1503 itself.' ). But given that Sections 1503, 1505, and
163
U.S. Department of Justice
1519 each reach conduct that Section 1512(c)(2) does not, the overlap provides no reason to give
Section 1512(c)(2) an artificially limited consnuction. See Shaw, 137 S. Ct. at 469.' "
Congress enacted Section 1512(c)(2) as part the Sarbanes-Dxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-204, Tit. Xl, $ 1102, 116 'Stat. 807. T h e relevant section of the statute was entitled
"Tatnpering with a Record or Otherwise Impeding an 0+ ciai Proceeding. *' 116 Stat. 807
(bmphasis added}. That title indicates that Congress intended the two clauses to have independent
effect. Section 1512(c) was added as a floor amendment in the Senate and explained as closing a
certain "loophole" with respect to "document shredding." See 148 Cong. Rec. S6545 (July 10,
2002) (Sen. Lett); id. at S6549-S6550 (Sen. Hatch), But those explanations do not limit the enacted
*
text. See pills/on Coal Groupv. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 115 (1988) (' [l]t is not the law that a
statute can have no effects which are not explicitly mentioned in its legislative history."); see also
Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 1'38 S. Ct. 1134, 1143 (2018} (" Even if Congress did not
foresee all of the applications of the statute, that is no reason not to give the statutory text a fair
reading."). The flout statements thus cannot detract Irom the meaning of the enacted text. See
Barnh~ v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438„457 (2002) (" Floor statements from two Senators
cannot amend the clear and unambiguous language of a statute. We see no reason to give greater
weight to the views of two Senators than to the collective votes of both Houses, which are
memorialized in the unambiguous statutory text.''}. That principle has particular force where one
of the proponents of the amendment to Section 1512 introduced his remarks as only "briefly
elaborat[ing] on some of the specific provisions contained in this bill.*' 148 Cong. Rec. S6550
(Sen. Hatch).
' ' The Supreme Court's decision in Mari nello v, United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101 (2018), does not
support imposing a non-textual limitation on Section 1512(c)(2). Mari nello interpreted the tax obstruction
statute, 26 U.S.C. g 7212(a), to require "a 'nexus' between the defendant's conduct and a particular
administraflve proceeding." Id at 1 109. T he Court adopted that construction in light of the similar
interpretation given to "other obstruction provisions," id. (citing Aguilar and Arthur Andersen), as well as
considerations of context, legislative histoty, structure of the criminal tax laws, fair warning, and lenity. Id
at 1106-1108. The type of "nexus" element the Court adopted in Marinello already applies under Section
1512(c')(2}, and the remaining considerations the Court cited do not justify reading into Section 1512(b)(2}
language that is not there. See Batesv. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29 (1997) (the Court "ordinarily resist[a]
reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face.").
164
U.S. Department of Justice
earlier provision is instructive. Recognizing that "die proper administration of justice may be
impeded or thwarted" by a "variety of corrupt methods... limited only by the imagination of the
criminally inclined,*' S. Rep. No. 532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1982), Congress considered a
bill that would have amended Section 1512 by making it a crime„ inter alia, when a person
"corruptly. . . influences, obstructs, or impedes... [t]hc enforcement and prosecution of federal
*'
law," "administration of a law under which an official proceeding is being or may be conducted,
or the "exercise of a Federal legislative 'power of inquiry."' ld. at 17-19 (quoting S. 2420).
Id. at 18. The report gave examples of conduct "actually prosecuted under the current residual
clause [in 18 U.S.C. g 1503], which would probably not be covered in this series [of provisions]
without a residual clause." Id . On e prominent example was "[a] conspir'acy to cover up the
Watergate burglary and its aftermath by having the Central Intelligence Agency seek to interfere
with an ongoing FBI investigation of the burglary.*' Id. (citing United States v. IIaldentan, 559
F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). The report therefore indicates a congressional awareness not only that
residual-clause Ianguag» resembling Section 1512(c)(2) broadly covers a wide variety of
obstructive conduct, but also that such language reaches the improper use of governmental
processes to obstruct justice — specifically, the Watergate cover-up orchestrated by White House
officials including the President himself. See Haldeman,559 F.3d at 51, 86-87, 120-129, 162.'
The requirement of fair warning in criminal law, the interest in avoiding due process
»oncems in potentially vague statutes, and the rule of lenity do not justify narrowing the reach of
Section 1512(c)(2)*s text.' tz
a. As with other criminal laws, the Supreme Court has '*exercised restraint" in interpreting
obstruction-of justice provisions, both out ofrespect for Congress's role in defining crimes and in
the intemst of providing individuals with "fair warning" of what a criminal statute prohibits.
Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101, 1106 (2018); Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 703;
" ' The Senate ultimately accepted the House version of the bill, which excluded an omnibus
clause. See United Statesv. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 382-383 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (tracing history of the
proposed omnibus provision in the witness-protection legislation). During the floor debate on the bill,
Senator Heinz, one of the initiators and primary backers of the legislation, explained that the omnibus clause
was beyond the scope of the witness-protection measure at issue and likely "duplicative" of other
obstruction laws, 128 Cong. Rec. 26,810 (1982) (Sen. Heinz), presumably referring to Sections 1503 and
1505.
"' I n a separate section addressing considerations unique to the presidency, we consider principles
of statutoiy construction relevant in that context. SeeYolume II, Section 1113 k I, inpa.
165
U.S. Department of Justice
Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599-602. In several obstruction cases, the Court has imposed a nexus test that
tequires that thc wrongful conduct targeted by the provision be sufficiently connected to an official
proceeding to ensure the requisite culpability. Marinello, 138 S, Ct. at 1109; Arthur Andersen,
544 U.S. at 707-708; Aggdlar, 515 U,S. at 600-602. Section 1512(c)(2) has been interpreted to
require a similar nexus. See, e.g., United Statesv. young, 916 F.3d 368, 386 (4th Cir. 2019);
United States v. Petrak, 781 F.3d 438, 445 (8th Cir 2015); United Statesv. Phiiiilts, 583 F.3d
1261, 1264 (10th Cir. 2009); United Statesv. Iteich, 479 F.3d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 2007). To satisfy
the nexus requirement, the government must show as an objective matter that a defendant acted
"in a manner that is likely to obstruct justice,," such that the statute "excludes defendants who have
an evil purpose but use means that would only unnaturally and improbably be successful."
Agttilar, 515 U.S. at 601-602 (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. at 599 ("the endeavor
must have the natural and probable effect of interfering with the due administration of justice" )
(interiml quotation marks omitted). The government must also show as a subjective matter that
the actor "contemplated a particular, foreseeable proceeding." Petruk,781 F.3d at 445. Those
requirements alleviate fair-warning concerns by ensuring that obstructive conduct has a close
enough connection to existing or future proceedings to implicate the dangers targeted by the
obstruction laws and that the individual actually has the obstructive result in mind.
b. Courtsalso seek to construe statutesto avoid due process vagueness concerns. See,e.g.,
McDonnell v, United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2373 (2016); Skilhng v. United States, 561 U.S. 358,
368, 402-404 (2010), Vagueness doctrine requires that a statute define a cr'ime "with sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited" and "in a manner that
docs not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Id. at 402-403 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The obsnuction statutes' requirement of acting "corruptly" satisfies that test.
"Acting 'corruptly' within the meaning of ( 1512(c)(2) means acting with an improper
purpose and to engage in conduct knowingly and dishonestly with the specific intent to subvert,
impede or obstruct *' the relevant proceeding. United Statesv. Gordon, 710 F.3d 1124, 1151 (10th
Cir. 2013) (some quotation marks omitted). The majority opinion in Aguilar did not address the
defendant's vagueness challenge to the word "corruptly," 515 U.S, at 600 n. I, but Justice Scalia's
separate opinion did reach that issue and would have rejected the challenge,id. at 616-617 (Scalia,
J., joined by Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "Statutory
language need not be colloquial," Justice Scalia explained, and "the term 'corruptly' in criminal
laws has a longstanding and well-accepted meaning. It denotes an act done. with an intent to give
some advantage inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others." Id . at 616 (internal
quotation marks omitted; citing lower court authority and legal dictionaries). Justice Scalia added
that '*in the context of obstructing jury proceedings, any claim of ignorance of wrongdoing is
incredible." Id , at 617, L o wer courts have also rejected vagueness challenges to the word
"corruptly." See, e.g., Umted Statesv. Edwards, 869 F.3d 490, 501-502 (7th Cir, 2017); United
States v. IJrenson, 104 F.3d 1267, 1280-1281 (11th Cir. 1997); Umted Statesv. Howard, 569 F.2d
1331, 1336 n.9 (5th Cir. 1978). This well-established intent standard precludes the need to limit
the obstruction statutes to only certain kinds of inherently wrongful conduct.' "
'" ' In United Statesv. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991), the court of appeals found the
term "corruptly" in 18 U.S.C. 11 1505 vague as applied to a person who provided false information to
Congress. After suggesting that the word "corruptly" was vague on its face, 951 F,2d at 378, the court
U.S. Department. of Justice
c. Finally, the rule of lenity daes nat justify treating Section 1512(c)(2) as a prohibition on
evidence impairment, as opposed to an omnibus clause. The rule of lenity is an interpretive
principle that resolves ambiguity in criminal laws in favor af the less-severe ronstruction.
**
Clevefond v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 25 (2000). "[A]s [the Court has] repeatedly emphasized,
however, the rule of lenity applies only if, "after considering text, structure, history and purpose,
there temains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute such that the Court must simply
guess as to what Congress intended." Abroms/dv. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 188 n.10 (2014)
(internal quatation marks omitted),. The rule has been cited,, for example, in adopting a natrow
meaning of "tangible object" in an obstruction statute when the prohibition's title, history, and list
of prohibited acts indicated a focus on desttuction of records. See Yates v. United.States, 135 S.
Ct. 1074, 1088 (2015) (plurality opinion) (interpreting "tangible object" in the phrase "record,
document, or tangible object" in 18 U.S.C. tj 1519 to mean an item capable of recording or
preserving informs'tion). Here, as discussed above, the text, structure, and history of Secflon
1512(c)(2) leaves no "grievous ambiguity" about the statute's meaning. Section 1512(c)(2)
defines a structurally independent general prohibition on obstruction of official proceedings.
Regardless whether Section 1512(c)(2) rovers all corrupt acts that obstruct, influence, or
impede pending or cantemplated proceedings, other statutes would apply to such conduct in
pending proceedings, provided that the remaimng statutory elements are satisfied. As discussed
above, the omnibus clause in 18 U.S.C. $ 1503(a) applies generally to obstrucflion of p'ending
judicial and grand proceedings.' st See Agoi7ttr, 515 U.S. at 598 (noting that the clause is "far
more general in scope" than preceding provisions). Section 1503(a)'s protections extend to
witness tampering and to other obstructive conduct that has a nexus to pending proceedings. See
Saintison, 898 F.3d at 298-303 tk n,6 (collecting cases from eight circuits holding that Section
1 503 covers witness-related obstructive conduct, and cabining prior circuit authority). A n d
Section 1505 broadly criminalizes abstructive conduct aimed at pending agency and congressional
proceedings.' See , o.g., UnitedStates v. Ra/ney, 757 F.3d 234, 241-247 (5th Cir. 2014).
concluded that the statute did not clearly apply to corrupt conduct by the person himself and the "core"
conduct to which Section 1505 could constitutionally be applied was one person influencing another persan
?o violate a legal duty. Id . at 379-386. Congress later enacted a provision overturning that result by
providing that "[a]s used in [S]ection 1505, the term 'corruptly' means acting with an improper purpase,
personally or by influencing another, including by making a false or misleading statement, or withholding,
concealing, altering„or destroying a document or other information." 18 U.S.C. ) 1515(b). Other courts
have declined to follow E'oindextsr either by limiting it to Section 1505 and the specific conduct at issue in
that case, seeitrsnson, 104 F.3d at 1280-1281; reading it as narrowly limited ta certain types of conduct,
see United States v. Ivforrison, 98 F.3d 619, 629-630 (D.C. Cir. 1996); or by noting that it predated Artttor
Anderson's interpretation af the term "carruptly," see Edwards, 869 F.3d at 501-502.
'" Section 1503(a) priivides for criminal pumshment of:
In sum, in light of the breadth of Section 1512(c)(2) and the other obstruction statutes, an
argument that the conduct at issue in this investigation falls outside the scope of the obstruction
laws lacks merit,
The President has broad discretian ta direct criminal investigations, The Constitution vesta
the "executive Power" in the President and enjoins him to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed." U . S. CGNsT. ART II, 4) I , 3 . T hose powers and duties form the foundation of
prosecutorial discretion. See United Sroresv. Armstrong, 517 U.S, 456, 464 (1996) (Attorney
General and United States Attorneys "have this latitude because they are designated by statute as
the President's delegates to help him dischaige his constitutianal responsibility to 'take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed.'"). The President also has authority to appoint officers of the
United States and to remove those whom he has appointed. U.S. Cows T.AIN'T II, II 2, cl, 2 (granting
authority to the President to appoint all officers with the advice and consent rrf the Senate, but
providing that Congress may vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, the,
heads af departments, or the courts of law); see also Free Enierpnse Fund v. Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 477, 492-493, 509 (2010) (describing removal authority as
flowing tram the President's "responsibility to take care that the laws be faithfully executed").
Although the President has broad autharity under Article II, that authority coexists with
Congress's Article I power to enact laws that pratect congressional proceedings, federal
investigations, the courts, and grand juries against conupt efforts to undermine their functions.
Usually, those constitutional powers function in harmony, with the President enforcing the
criminal laws under Article II to protect against corrupt obstructive acts. But when the President's
official actions come into conflict with the prohibitions in the obstruction statutes, any
constitutional tension is reconciled through separation-of-powers analysis,
168
U.S. Department of Justice
The President's counsel has argued that "the President's exercise of his constitutional
authority. . . to terminate an FBI Director and to close investigations.. . cannot constitutionally
constitute obstruction of justice."' As n o ted above, no Department of Justice position or
Supreme Court precedent directly resolved this issue. %e did not fmd counsel's contention,
however, to accord with our reading of the Supreme Court authority addressing separation-of-
powers issues. Applying the Court's framework for analysis, we concluded that Congress can
validly regulate the President's exercise of official duties to prohibit, actions motivated by a corrupt
intent to obstruct justice. The fimited effec on presidential power that results from that restriction
would not impermissibly undermine the President's ability to perform his Article II functions.
The Supreme Court has applied that clear-statement rule in several cases. In one leading
case, the Court construed the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S,C. f 701 et seq., not to apply
to judicial review of presidential action. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-801 (1992).
The Court explained that it "would require an express statement by Congress before assuming it
intended the President's performance of his statutory duties to be reviewed for abuse of discretion."
Id. at 801. In another case, the Court interpreted the word "utilized'* in the Federal Advisory
Committee Act (FACA), 5 U.S.C. App., to apply only to the use of advisory committees
established directly or indirectly by the government, thereby excluding the American Bar
Association's advice to the Department of Justice about federal judicial candidates. Public Citizen
v. United States Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 455, 462-467 (1989). The Court explained
that a broader interpretation of the term "utilized" in FACA would raise serious questions whether
the statute Infringed unduly on the President's Article II power to nominate federal judges and
violated the doctrine of separation of powers." Id . at 466-467. Another case found that an
established canon of statutory construction applied with "special force" to provisions that would
impinge on the President's foreign-affairs powet's if consnued broadly. Sale v. Haitian Centers
Council, 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993) (applying the presumption against extraterritorial application
to construe the Refugee Act of 1980 as not governing in an overseas context where it could affect
"foreign and military affairs for which the Ptcsident has unique responsibility" ). SeeApplication
The Department of Justice has relied on this clear-statement principle to interpret certain
statutes as not applying to the President at all, similar to the approach taken in Franklin. Ses, e.g.,
Memorandum for Richard T. Burress, Office of the President, from Laurence IL Silberman,
Deputy Attorney General, ltet C onflict of Interest Problems Arising out of the President's
Nomination of Nelson A. Itockefeller to be Vice President under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution, at 2, 5 (Aug. 28„1974) (criminal conflict-of-interest statum, 18 U.S.C. $ 208,
does not apply to the President). Other OLC opinions interpret statutory text not to apply to certain
presidential or executive actions because of constitutional concerns. SeeApplication, of 28 U S.C.
g 458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 350-357 (consanguinity
limitations on court appointments, 28 U.S.C. $ 458, found inapplicable to "presidential
appointments of judges to the federal judiciary"); Constraints Imposed by I8 US.C. g 1913 on
Lobbying Efforts, 13 Op. O.L.C. 300, 304-306 (1989) (limitation on the use of appropriated funds
for certain lobbying programs found inapplicable to certain communications by the President and
executive officials).
But OLC has also recognized that this clear-statement rule "does not apply with respect to
a statute that raises no separation of powers questions were it to be applied to the President," such
as the federal bribery statute, 18 U,S.C. $ 201. Application of 28 US.C. $ 458 to Prestdentlal
Appointments of Federal Judges, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 357 n.l l. OLC explained that "[a]pplication
of $ 201 raises no separation of powers question, let alone a serious one," because [t]he
Constitution confers no power in the President to receive bribes.*' Id. In support of that conclusion,
OLC noted constitutional provisions that forbid increases in the President's compensation while
in office, "which is what a bribe would function to do," id,. (citing U.S. Co@sr, ART. II, tj 1, cl. 7),
and the exp'ress constitutional power of "Congress to impeach [and convict] a President for, infer
alia, bribery," id. (citing U.S. CoNsT. ART II, ti 4).
Under OLC's analysis, Congress can permissibly criminalize certain obstructive conduct
by the President, such as subo
rning p erjury, intimidating witnesses, or fabricating evidence,
because those prohibitions raise no separation-of-powers questions. SeeApplication of 28 US.C.
$458 to Presidential Appointments af Federal Judges, 1 9 Op. O.L.C. at 357 n.ll . The
Constitution does not authorize the President to engage in such conduct„and those actions would
transgress the President's duty to "take Cate that the Laws be faithfully executed." U.S. CoNs7'.
Atn II, g 3 . I n view of those clearly permissible applications of the obstruction statutes to the
President, Franklin's holding that the President is entirely excluded from a statute absent a clear
statement would not apply in this context.
A more limited application of a clear-statement rule to exclude from the obstruction statutes
only certain acts by the President — for example, removing prosecutors or ending investigations
for corrupt reasons —would be difficult to implement as a matter of statutory interpretation. It is
not obvious how a clear-statement rule would apply to an omnibus provision like Section
1512(c)(2) to exclude corruptly motivated obstructive acts only when carried out in the President's
conduct of office. Iqo statutory term could easily bear that specialized meaning. Por example, the
word 'Mortuptly" has a well-established meaning that does not exclude exercises of offlcial power
for corrupt ends. Indeed, an established definition states that "corruptly" means action with an
170
U,S. Department of Justice
intent to secure an improper advantage "inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others,"
BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONAILV 276 (3d ed. 1969) (emphasis added). And it would be contrary
to ordinary rules of statutory consuuction to adopt an unconventional meaning of a statutory term
only when applied to the President. See United Statesv. Santos, 553 U.S. 501, 522 (2008)
(plurality opinion of Scalia, J.) (rejecting proposal to *'giv[e] the same word„ in the same statutory
provision, different meanings in different factual contexts"); cf. Public Citisen, 491 U.S. at 462-
467 (giving the term "utilized" in the FACA a uniform meaning to avoid constitutional questions') .
Nor could such an exclusion draw on a separate and established background interpretive
presumption, such as the presumption against extraterritoriality applied in Sate. The principle that
courts will construe a statute to avoid serious cons'titutional questions "is not a license for the
judiciary to rewrite language enacted by the legislature." Saltnasv. United States, 522 U.S. 52,
59-60 (1997). "It is one thing to acknowledge and accept. . . w ell defined (or even newly
enunciated), generally applicable, background principles of assumed legislative intent. It is quite
another to espouse the broad proposition that criminal statutes do not have to be read as broadly
as they are written, but are subject to case-by-case exceptions." Broganv. United States, 522 U.S.
398, 406 (1998).
When Congiess imposes a limitation on the exercise of Article II powers, the limitation's
validity depends on whether the measure "disrupts the balance between the coordinate branches."
¹s on v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977). "Even when a branch does
not arrogate power to itself,... the separation-of-powers doctrine requires that a branch not impair
another in the performance of its constitutional duties.'* lo ving v. United States,517 U.S. 748,
757 (1996). The "separation of powers, does not mean," however, "that the branches "ought to
have no partial agency in, or no controul over the acts of each other.'" Clintonv. Jones„520 U.S.
681, 703 (1997) (quoting James Madison, The Federalist No. 47, pp. 325 — 326 (J. Cooke ed. 1961)
(emphasis omitted)). In this context, a balancing test applies to assess separation-of-powers issues.
Applying that test here, we concluded that Congress can validly make obstruction-of justice
statutes applicable to corruptly motivated official acts of the President without impermissibly
undermining his Article II functions.
171
U.S. Department of Justice
When an Article II power has not been "explicitly assigned by the text of the Constitution
to be within the sole province of the President, but rather was thought to be encompassed within
the general grant to the President of the 'executive Power,'" the Court has balanced competing
constitutional considerations. Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 484 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O' Connor, J.). As Justice Kennedy noted in Pubh'c
Cttizett, the Court has applied a balancing test to restrictions on "the President's powei. to remove
Executive officers, a power [that].. . is not conferred by any explicit provision in the text of the
Constitution (as is the appointment power), but rather is inferred to be a necessary part of the grant
of the 'executive Power."' Id. (citing Morrison v. Nson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988), and Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 115 — 116 (1926)). Consistent with that statement, Morrison sustained
a good-cause limitation on the removal of an i nferior officer with defined prosecutorial
responsibilities atter determining that the limitation did not impermissibly undermine the
President's ability to perform his Article II functions. 487 U.S. at 691-693, 695-696. The Court
has also evaluated other general executive-power claims through a balancing test. For example,
thc Court evaluated the President's claim of an absolute privilege for presidential communications
about his official acts by balancing that interest against the Judicial Branch's need for evidence in
a criminal case. United Statesv. Nixon, supra (recognizing a qualified constitutional privilege for
presidential communicanons on official matters). The Court has also upheld a law that provided
for archival access to presidential records despite a claim of absolute presidential privilege over
the records. Administrator of General Services,433 U.S. at 443-445, 451-455. The analysis in
those cases supports applying a balancing test to assess the constitutionality of applying the
obstruction-of justice statutes to presidential exercises of executive power.
Only in a few instances has the Court applied a different framework. When the President's
power is "both 'exclusive* and 'conclusive' on the issue," Congress is precluded from regulating
its exercise. Zivotofsky v. Eerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084 (2015). In Zivotafsky, for example, the
Court followed '" Justice Jackson's familiar tripartite framework" in I'oungstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-638 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring), and held that the President's
'"r OLC applied such a balancing test in concluding that the president is not subject to criminal
pi'osecution while in office, retying on many af the same precedents discussed in this section. See A'Sitting
President 's Amenability ui Indtctment and Cri mina Prosecution„24 Op. O.L.C. 222, 237-238, '244-245
(2000) (relying on, inter alia, Uiii ted States v. Nrxcn, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, and Clinton v. Jones, and quoting
the legal standard from Admitdstratar of General Services v. Nixon that is applied in the text), O LC
recognized that "[t]he balancing analysis" it had iiiitiagy relied on in finding that a sitting President is
immune from pi osecution had "been adopted as the appropriate mode of analysis by the Court.*' Id. at 244.
172
U.S. Department af Justice
authority to recognize foreign nations is exclusive. Id. at 2083„2094. See also Public Citizen 491
U.S. at 485-486 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing the power to grant pardons under
U.S. CoNsT., AsT. II, $ 2, cl. I, and the Presentment Clauses for legislation, U.S. CowsT., AIN'T. I,
5 7, Cls. 2, 3, as cxamplcs of exclusive presidential powers by virtue af constitutional text).
But even when a. power is exclusive„"Congress' powers, and its central role in making
laws, give it substantial authority regarding many of the policy determinations that precede and
follow" the President's act. Zivotofshy,135 S. Ct. at 2087. For example, although the President *s
power ta grant pardons is exclusive and not subject to congressional regulation,.see United States
v. Jfletn, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147-148 (1872), Congress has the authority to prohibit the corrupt
use of"anything of value" to influence the testimony of another person in a judicial, congressional,
or agency proceeding, 18 V.S.C. tj 201(b)(3) — which would include the offer or promise of a
pardon to induce'a person to testify falsely or not to testify at all. The offer of a pardon would
precede the act af pardoning and thus be within Congress's power to regulate even if the pardon
itself is not. Just as the Speech or Debate Clause, U.S. CoNsT. AttT. I, $ 6, cL I, absolutely protects
legislative acts, but nat a legislator's "taking or agreeing to take inaney for a promise to act in a
certain way.. . for it is taking the bribe, not performance of the illicit compact, that is a criminal
act," United Statesv. Breivster, 408 U.S. 501, 526 (1972') (emphasis omitted), the promise of a
pardon ta corruptly influence testimony would not be a constitutionally immunized act. The
application of obstruction statutes to such promises therefore would raise na serious separation-
of-powers issue.
Under the Supreme Court's balancing test for analyzing separation-of-powers issues, the
first task is to assess the degree to which applying obstruction-af justice statutes to presidential
actions affect the President's ability to carry out his Article II responsibilities. Administrator af
General Services, 433 U.S. at 443. As discussed above, applying obstruction-of justice statutes
to presidential conduct that does not invalve the President's conduct of office — such as influencing
the testimony of witnesses — is canstitutionally unproblematic. The President has no more right
than other citizens to impede official proceedings by corruptly influencing witness testimony. The
conduct would be equally imprapei' whether effectuated through direct efforts to produce false
testimony or suppress the truth, or through the actual, threatened, or promised use of official
powers to achieve the same result.
173
U.S. Department of Justice
only when it is taken with the "corrupt" intent to obstruct jugtice. The obstruction statutes thus
would restrict presidential action only by prohibiting the President from acting to obstruct afficial
proceedings for the impraper purpose of protecting his own interests. See Volume II, Section
III.A.3, supra.
The, direct effect on the President's freedom of action would correspondingly be a limited
one. A preclusion of "corrupt official action is nat a major intrusion on Article II powers, For
example, the proper supervision of criminal law does not demand Ireedam for the President to act
with the, intention of shielding himself fram criminal punishment, avoiding financial liability, or
preventing personal embanassment. To the contrary, a statute that prohibits official sation
undertakenforsuch personal purposes furthers,rather than binders,the impartialand evenhanded
administratian of the law. A n d the Constitution does not mandate that the President have
unfettered authority to direct investigations or prosecutions, with no limits whatsoever, in order to
carry aut his Article II functions. See Heckler v. Chancy, 470 V.S. 821, 833 (1985) ("Congress
may limit an agency's exercise of enforcement power if it wishes, either by setting substantive
priorities, or by otherwise rircumscribing an agency's power to discrimi'nate among issues or cases
it will pursue."); United Statesv. /ttixon, 418 U.S. at 707 ("[t]o read the Art. II powers of the
President as providing an absolute privilege [to withhold confidential communications fiom a
criminal trial]... would upset the constitutional balance of 'a workable government' and gravely
impair the role of the courts under Art. III").
Nor must the President have unfettered authority to remove all Executive Branch officials
involved in the execution of the laws. The Constitution establishes that Congress has legislative
authority to structure the Executive Branch by authorizing Congress to create executive
departments and officer positions and to specify haw inferior afficers are appointed. E g., V.S.
CoNsT., ART. I, tj g„cl. 18 (Necessary and Proper Clause); ART. II, g 2, cl. 1 (Opinions Clause);
ART, II, $ 2, cl. 2 (Appointments Clause); seeFree Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 499. While the
President's removal power is an important means of ensuring that officers faithfully execute the
law, Congress has a recognized authority to place certain limits on removaL Id. at 493-495.
The President's removal powers are at their zenith with respect to principal officers — that
is, officers who must be appointed by the President and who report to him directly. See Free
Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 493, 500, The President's "exclusive and illimitable power of
removal' * of those principal officers furthers "the President's ability to ensure that the laws me
faithfully executed." Id. at 493„498 (internal quotation marks omitted);Myers, 272 U.S. at 627.
Thus, "there are some 'purely executive' officials who must be removable bythe President at will
if he is able to accomplish his constitutional role." Morrison,487 U.S. at 690; Myers, 272 U.S. at
134 (the President's "cabinet officers must do his will," and "[t]he moment that he loses confidence
in the intellitp:nce, ability, judgment, or loyalty of any one of them, he must have the p<nver to
remove him without delay" ); cf. Huinphrsy's Executor v. United States„295 U.S. 602 (1935)
(Congress has the power to create independent agencies headed by principal officers removable
only for good cause). In light of thase constitutional precedents, it may'be that the obstructian
statutes could nat be constitutionally applied to limit the removal of a cabinet officer such as the
Attorney General. Sos 5 U.S.C. 11 101; 28 U.S.C. 5 503. I n that context, at least absent
circumstances showing that the President was clearly attempting to thwart accountability for
personal conduct while evading ordinary political checks and balances, even the highly limited
174
U.S. Department of Justice
regulation imposed by the obstruction statutes could possibly intrude too deeply an the President's
I'rcedam to select and supervise the members of his cabinet.
The removal of inferior officers, in contrast, need not necessarily be at will for the President
to fulfill his constitutionally assigned role in managing the Executive Branch, "[I]nferiar officers
are officers whose work is directed and supervised at some level by other officers appointed by
the President with the Senate's consent." Free Enterprise Fund,561 U.S. at 510 (quoting Ednt and
v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997}) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme
Court has long recognized Congress's authority ta place for-cause limitations on the President's
removal of inferior Officers" whose appointment may be vested in the head of a department. U.S.
Criwsv. Axr. Ii„ tj 2„ cl , 2. Se e United States v. Perkins,116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886) (" The
constitutional authority in Congress to thus vest the appointment [of inferior officers in the heads
af departments] implies authority to limit, restrict, and regulate the removal by such laws as
Cangress may enact in relation to the officers so appointed*') (quoting lower court decision);
Morrison, 487 U S. at 689 n. 27 (citing Perkins); oecordid at723-724 kk n 4 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(recagnizing that Perkins is "established*' law); see also Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S; at 493-
495 (citing Perkins and Morrison). The category of inferiar officers includes both the FBI Director
and the Special Counsel, each of whom reports ta the Attorney General. See 28 U.S.C. t)t) 509,
515(a), 531; 28 C.F.R, Part 600. Their work is thus "directed and supervised" by a presidentially-
appainted, Senate-confirmed officer. See In re: Grand Jury Investigation, F.3 d 2019 WL
921692, at s 3-*4 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 26, 2019) (holding that the Special Counsel is an "inferior officer"
for constitutional purposes).
Where the Constitution permits Congress ta impose a good-cause limitation on the removal
of an Executive Branch officer, the Constitution should equally permit Congress to bar removal
for the corrupt purpose of obstructing justice. L i m iting the. range of permissible reasons for
removal to exclude a "corrupt" purposeimposes a lesser restraint on the President than requiring
an affirmative showing of good cause. It follows that for such inferior officers, Cangress may
constitutionally restrict the President's removal authority if that authority was exercised for the
corrupt purpose af obstiucting justice. And even if a particular inferior officer's pasifion might be
of such importance to the execution of' the laws that the President must have at-will removal
authority, the obstruction-cd-justice statutes could still be constitutionally applied to forbid
removal for a corrupt reason.' 's A narrow and discrete limitation an removal that precluded
corrupt action would leave ample room for all other considerations, including disagreement over
policy or loss of confidence in the officer's judgment or commitment. A c orrupt-purpose
prohibition therefore would not undermine the President's ability ta perform his Article II
functions. A ccordingly, because the separation-of-powers question is "whether the removal
restrictions are of such a nature that they impede tbe President's ability to perform his
constitutional duty," Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691, a restriction on removing an htferior officer for a
' Although the FBI director is an inferior officer, hc is appointed by the President and removable
by him at will, see 28 U.S.C, li 532 note, and it is not clear that Congress could constitutionally provide the
FBI director with goad-cause tenure protection. See OLC, Constitutionality of Legislation Extending the
Terat of the FBI Dl rector, 2011 WL 2566125, at *3 (O.L.C. Junc 20, 2011) ("tenure protection for an officer
with the FBI Director's broad investigative, administrative, and policymaking responsibfiiries would raise
a serious constitu'tianal question whether Congress bad 'impede[d] the President's ability to perform his
constitutional duty' to take care that the laws be faithfully executed") (quoting Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691).
U.S. Department of Justice
cortupt reason — a reason grounded in achieving personal rather than offlcial ends — does not
seriously hinder the President's performance of his duties. The President retains broad latitude to
supervise investigations and remove officials, circumscribed in this context only by t he
requirement that he not act for corrupt personal purposes.'c s
i. Congress has Article I authority to define generally applicable criminal law and apply it
to all persons — including the President. Congress clearly has authority to protect its own
legislative functions against corrupt efforts designed to impede legitimate fact-gathering and
lawmaking efforts. See yVatta'ns v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187, 206-207 (1957); Chapman
v. UnitedStatas, 5 App. D.C. '122, 130 (1895). Congress also has authority to establish a system
of federal courts, which includes the power to protect the judiciary against obstructive acts. See
U.S. CONsT, AaT. I, tj 8, cls. 9, 18 (" The Congress shall have Power.. . To constitute Tribunals
inferior to thc supreme Court" and "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing powers''). The long lineage of the obstruction-of justice
statutes, which can be traced to at least 1831, attests to the necessity for that protertion. SosAn
Act Declaratory of the Law Concerning Contempts of Court, 4 Stat. 487-488 II 2 (1831) (making
it a crime if "any person or persons shall corruptly... endeavor to influence, intimidate, or impede
any juror„witness, or offlccr, in any court of the United States, in the discharge of his duty, or
shall, corruptly.. . obstruct, or impede, or endeavor to obstruct or impede, the due administration
of justice therein").
ii. T he Article III courts have an equally strong interest in being protected against
obstructive acts, whatever their source. As the Supreme Court explained in United States v. Nixon,
a "primary constitutional duty of thc Judicial Branch*' is "to do justice in criminal prosecutionsp
418 U.S. at 707; accord Cheney v. Uruted States District Court for the District of Columbia, 542
U.S. 367, 384 (2004). In ¹x o n,thc Court rejected the President's claim of absolute executive
privilege because "the allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably
The obstruction statutes do not disquaflfy the President from acting in a ease simply because
he has a personal interest in it or because his own conduct may be at issue. As the Department of Justice
has made clear, a claim of a conflict of interest, standing alone, cannot deprive the President of the ability
to fulfill his constitutional function. See,ag.„OLC, Application of 28 US C $ 4 58 to Presidential
Appointments of psdsraltudgss, 19 O.L.C. Op. at 356 (citing Memorandum for Richard T. Burress, Office
of the President, from Lauience H. Silberman, Deputy Attorney General, Rsi Conflict oflntersst Problems
Arising out of the President 's ¹mi nation of Nelson A. Rockefeller to hs Vice President under the Twsnty-
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, at 2, 5 (Aug. 28, 1974)).
U.S. Department of Justice
relevant in a criminal trial would eut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely
impair the basic function of the courts.*' 407 U.S. at 712. As Nixon illustrates, the need to
safeguard judicial integrity is a compelling constitutional interest. See id. at 709 (noting that the
denial of full disclosure of the facts sunounding relevant presidential communications threatens
"[t]he very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system").
iii. Finally, the grand jury cannot achieve its constitutional purpose absent protection from
corrupt acts. Serious federal criminal charges generally reach the Article III courts based on an
indictment issued by a grand jury. Cobhledictrv. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 327 (1940) (" The
Constitution itself makes the grand jury a part of the judicial pracess."). And the grand jury's
function is enshrined in the Filth Amendment. U.S. Coitsv. AMENo, V. ("[n]o person shall be held
to answer" for a seiious crime "unless an a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury" ). "[T]he
whole theory of [the grand jury's] function is that it belangs to no branch of the institufional
government,serving as a kind of buffer or referee between the Government and the people,"
United States v. Wlliams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992), "pledged to indict no one because of prejudice
and to fic no one because of special favor." Costellov. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362. (1956).
If the grand jury were not protected against corrupt interference from all persons, its function as
an independent charging body would be thwarted. And an impartial grand jury investigation to
determine whether probable cause exists to indict is vital to the criminal justice process.
The final step in the constitutional balancing process is ta assess whether the, separation-
of-powers doctrine permits Congress ta t a ke a ction w ithin i ts c onstitutional authority
notwithstanding the potential impact on Article II functions. See Administrator of General
Services, 433 US. at 443; see also Iidorrison, 487 US. at 691-693, 695-696; United Statesv. Nhon,
418 U.S. at 711-712. In the case of the obstruction-of justice statutes, our assessment of the
weighing of interests leads us to conclude that Congress has the authority to impose the limited
restrictions contained in those statutes on the President's official conduct to protect the integrity
of important functions of other branches af government.
A general ban on corrupt action docs not unduly innude on the President's responsibility
to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." U S. CowsT.ARTII, i]f 3.' To the contrary,
the concept of "faithful executian"' connotes the use of power in the interest of the public, not in
the office holder's personal interests. See I S amuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English
Language 763 (1755) (" faithfully" def. 3: "[w]ith strict adherence to duty and allegiance''). And
immunizing the President trom the generally applicable criminal prohibition against corrupt
obstruction of official proceedings would seriously impair Congress's power to enact laws "'to
promote objectives within [its] constitutional authority," Administrator of Genera( Services,433
U.S. at 425 —i,e., protecting the integrity of its own proceedings and the proceedings of Article III
courts and grand juries.
'"' As noted above, the President's selection and removal of principal executive officers may have
a unique constitutional status.
U.S. Department of Justice
Accordingly, based on the analysis above, we were not persuaded by the argument that the
President has blanket constitutional immunity to engage in acts that would corruptly obstruct
justice through the exercise of otherwise-valid Article II powers. '
Applying the obstruction statutes to the President's official conduct would involve
determining as a factual tnatter whether he engaged in an ob'structive act, whether the act had a
nexus ta official proceedings> and whether he was motivated by corrupt intent. But applying those
standards to the President's official conduct should not hinder his ability to perform his Article II
duties. Cf. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 752-753 Jk n.32 (taking into account chilling effect an
the President in adopting a constitutional rule of presidential immunity from private civil damages
action based on official duties). Several safeguards would prevent a chilling effect: the existence
of settled legal standards„ the presumption of regularity in prosecutorial actions, and the existence
of evidentiary limitations on probing the President's motives. And historical experience confirms
that no impermissible chill should exist.
That point is illustrated by examples of conduct that would and would not satisfy the
stringent corrupt-motive standard. Direct or indirect action by the President to end a criminal
mvestigation into his own a r hi s family members' conduct to protect against personal
embarrassment or legal liability would constitute a core example of corruptly motivated conduct.
So too would action to halt an enforcement proceeding that directly and adversely affected the
Piesident's financial interests for the purpose of protecting those interests. In those examples,
'w' A possible remedy through impeachment for abuses of power would nat substitute for potential
criminal liability atter a President leaves office. Impeachment would remove a President frere ofHce, but
would nat address the underlying culpability of the conduct or serve the usual purposes af the criminal law.
Indeed, the Impeachment Judgment Clause recognizes that criminal law plays an independent role in
addressing an official's conduct„distinct fmm the political remedy of impeachment. See U.S. CottST, AR n
I, ti 3, cl. 7. Impeachment is also a drastic. and rarely invoiced remedy, and Congress is not restricted to
relying only on impeachment, rather than making criminal law applicable to a former President, as OLC
has recognized. A Sitting President's Amenability to indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. O,L.C.
at 255 ("Recognizing an immunity fiam prasecuuon for a sitting President would not preclude such
prosecution ance the President's term is aver or he is otherwise removed fi'am office by resignation or
impeachment.").
178
U.S. Department of Justice
official power is being used for the purpose of protecting thc President's personal interests. In
oontrast, the President's actions to serve political or policy interests would not qualify as corrupt,
The President's role as head of the government necessarily requires him to take into account
political factors in making policy decisions that affect law-enforcement actions and proceedings.
For instance, th'e Piesident's decision to curtail a law-enforcement investigation to avoid
international friction would not implicate the obstruction-of-justice statutes, The criminal law
does not seek ta regulate the consideration of such polifical or policy factors in the canduct of
government. And when legitimate interests animate the President's conduct, those interests will
almost invariably be readily identifiable based on objective factors. Because the president's
conduot in those instances will obviously fall outside the zone ot' obstruction law, no chilling
concern should arise.
b. There is also no reason to believe that investigations, let alone prosecutions, would
occur except in highly unusual circumstances when a credible factual basis exists to believe that
obstruction occurred. Prosecutorial action enjoys a presumption of regularity: absent "clear
evidence to the rontrary, courts presume that [prosecutors] have properly discharged their afficial
duties." Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 (quoting United States v. Chemical Foundation, Ine., 272
U.S. 1, 14 —15 (1926)). The presumption of prosecutorial regularity would provide even greater
protection to the President than exists in routine cases given theprominence and sensitivity of any
matter involving the president and the likelihood that surh matters will be subject to thorough and
careful review at the most senior levels of the Department of Justice. Under OLC's opinion that a
sitting President is entitled to immunity fram indictment, only a successor Administration would
be able to piosecute a former President. But that consideration does not suggest that a President
would have any basis far fearing abusive investigations or prosecutions after leaving office. Thcrc
are "obvious political checks" against initiating a baseless investigation or prosecution of a former
President. See Administrator af General Services,433 U.S. at 448 (considering political checks
in separation-af-powers analysis). And the Attorney General holds "the power to conduct the
criminal litigation of the United States Government," United States v. Nixon,418 U.S. at 694
(citing 28 U.S.C. f' 516), which provides a strong institutional safeguard against politicized
investigations oi prosecutions. ' m
'"i Similar institutianal safeguards protect Department of Justice officers and line prasecutars
against unfounded investigations into prosecutorial acts., P rosecutors are generally barred from
participating in matters implicating then personal interests, see 28 C.F,R. $ 45,2, and are instructed not to
be influenced by their "own prafessianal or personal circumstances," Justice Manual 4 9-27.260, so
prosecutors would not frequently be in a pasitian to take action that could be perceived as corrupt and
persanally motivated. And if such cases arise, criminal investigation would be conducted by responsible
officials at the Department of Justice, who can be presumed to refrain from pursuing an investigation absent
a credible factual basis. Those facts distinguish the criminal context from the cotnmon-law rule of
prosecutorial immunity, which protects against the threat of suit by "a defendant [who] often will transform
his resentment at being prosecuted into the ascription of improper and malicious actions." Im bler v.
Eeehtman, 424 U.S. 409, 425 (1976). As the Supreme Court has noted, the existence of civil immunity
does not justify criminal immunity. See O' Shea v. Littletan,414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974) (" Whatever may be
the case with respect to civil liability generally,.. . we have never held that the performance of the duties
of judicial, legislative, or executive officers, requires ar contemplates the immunization of otherwise
criminal deprivatian of constitutional rights.") (citations omitted).
179
U,S, Department of Justice
These considerations distinguish thc Supreme Court's holding in Nixon v. Fitzgerald that,
in part because inquiries into the President*s motives would be "highly intrusive," the President is
absolutely immune from private civil damages actions based on his official conduct. 457 U.S. at
756-757. As Fitzgerald recognized, '*there is a lesser public interest in actions for civil damages
than, for example, in criminal prosecutions." Fitzgerald,457 U.S. at 754 n.37; see C/teney, 542
U.S. at 384. And private actions are not subject to the institutional protections of an action under
the supervision of the Attorney General and subject to a presumption of regularity. Armstrong„
517 U.S. at 464.
c. I n the mre cases in which a substantial and credible basis justifies conducting an
investigation of the President, the process of examining his motivations to determine whether he
acted for a corrupt purpose need not have a chilling effect. A sceitaining the President" s
motivations would turn on any explanation he provided to justify his actions, the advice he
received, thc circumstances surrounding the actions, and the regularity or irregularity of the
process he employed to make decisions. But grand juries and courts would not have automatic
access to confidential presidential communications on those matters; rather, they could be
presented in official proceedings only on a showing of sufficient need, Nixon, 418 U.S. at 712; In
re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 754, 756-757 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also Admi nistrator of General
Services,433 U.S. at 448-449 (former President can invoke presidential communications privilege,
although successor 's failure to support the claim ",detracts from [lts] weight").
d. Finally, history provides no reason to believe that any asserted chilling effect justifies
exempting the President from thc obstruction laws. As a historical matter, Presidents have very
seldom been the subjects of grand jury investigations. And it is rarer still for circumstances to
raise even the possibility of a corrupt personal motive for arguably obsnuctive action through the
President's use of official power. Accordingly, the President's conduct of office should not be
chilled based on hypothetical concerns about the possible application of a corrupt-motive standard
in this context.
In sum, contrary to the position taken by the President's counsel, we concluded that, in
light of the Supreme Court precedent governing separation-of-powers issues, we had a valid basis
for investigating the conduct at issue in this report. In Qlll' view, the application of the obstruction
statutes would not impermissibly burden the President's performance of his Article II function to
supervise prosecutorial conduct or to remove inferior law-enforcement officers. A n d the
protection of the criminal justice system from corrupt acts by any person — including the
President — accords with the fundamental principle of our government that "[n]o [person] in this
180
U,S, Department of Justice
country is so high that he is above the lave," United Statesv. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882) see
also Clinton v. Jones, 520 U,S. at 697; United Statesv. Nixon, supra.
181
U.S Department of Justice
IV. CGNcLUsIDN
Because we determined not to make a traditional prosecutorial judgment, we did not draw
ultimate conclusions about the President's conduct. T h e evidence we obtained about the
President's actions and intent presents difficult issues that would need to be resolved if we were
making a traditional prosecutorial judgment, At the same time, if we had confidence after a
thorough investigation of the facts that the president clearly did not commit obstruction of jusnce,
we would so state. Based on the facts and the applicable legal standards, we are unable to reach
that judgment. Accordingly, while this report does not conclude that the president committed a
crime, it also does not exonerate him.
182
U.S. Department of Justice
Appendix A
U.S. Department of Justice
U.S. Department of Justice
ORDEit.NO, 3915-2017
APPOINTMENT Ol' SPECIAL COUNSEL
TO INVESTIGATE RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE %ITH THE
2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTI()N AND RELATED MATTERS
By virtue of the authority vested it> mc as Acting Attorney Genemi, including 28 U,S,C.
I'It) 509, 510„atrd 5 I 5, in order to discharge my responsibility to provide supervision and
managetnent of the Department of Justice, and td ensure a lull and thorough investigation of the
'Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 20 I 6 presidential election, I hereby order as
follows:
(a) Ro bert S, Mueller I I I is appointed to serve as Special Counsel for the United States
Department of Justice.
(i) an y links and/or coordination between the Russian government and individuals
associated with the campaign of President Donald Trutup'I and
(ii) an y matters that arose or may arise directly fmm the investigation; and
(c) If t he Special Counsel believes it is necessary and appropriate, the Special Counsel is
authorized to prosecute federal crimes arising &om the investigation of these matters,
(d) Se ctions 600A thmugh 600.IO of Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations are
applicable to the Special Counsek
R o J. Ros a i n
Acting Au tcy General
U.S, Department of Justice
U.S. Department of Justice
II
U.S, Department of Justice
//
U.S, Department of Jusffce
APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY
The following glossary contains names and brief descriptions of individuals and entities
referenced in the two volumes of this report, It is not intended to be comprehensive and is intended
only to assist a reader in the reading the rest of the report.
Referenced Persons
Agalarov, Aras Russian real-estate developer (owner of the Crocus Group)1 met Donald
Trump in connection with the Miss Universe pageant snd helped arrange
the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Natalia Veselnitskaya
and Trump Campaign officials.
Agalarov, Emin Performer, executive vice president uf Crocus Group, and son of Aras
Agalarov; helped arrange the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower
between Natalia Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign officials.
Akhmetov, Rinat Former member in the Ulcrainian parliament who hired Paul Manafort to
conduct work for Ukrainian political party, the Party of Regions.
Akhmetshin, Rinat U.S. lobbyist and associate of Natalia Veselnitskaya who attended the
June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Veselnitskaya and Trump
Campaign officials,
Aslanov, Head of U.S. depar'tment of the Internet Research Agency, which
Dzheykhun (Jay) engaged in an "active measures" social media campaign to interfere in
the 2016 U,S, presidential election,
Assange, Julian Founder of WikiLeaks, which in 2016 posted on the internet documents
stolen from entities and individuals affiliated with the Democratic Party.
Aven, Petr Chaiirnan of the board of Alfa-Bank who attempted outreach to the
Presidential Transition Team in connection w'ith anticipated post-election
sanctions.
Bannon, Stephen White House chief strategist and semor counselor to President Trump
(Steve) (Jan, 2017 —Aug. 2017); chief executive of the Trump Campaign,
Baranov, Audrey Director of investor relations at Russian state-owned oil company,
Rosneit, and associate of Carter Page.
Berkowitz, Avi Assistant to Jared Kushner.
Boente, Dana Acting Attorney General (Jan. 2017 — Feb. 2017); Acting Deputy
Attorney General (Feb. 2017 —Apr, 2017).
Bogacheva, Anna Internet Research Agency employee who worked on "active measures"
social media campaign to interfere in in the 2016 U.S. presidential
election, traveled to the Umted States umier false pretenses in 2014.
Bossert, Thomas Former homeland security advisor to the. President who also. served as a
(Tom) senior official on the Presidential Transition Team.
U.S. Department of Justice
JI
Boyko, Yuriy Member of the Ukrainian political party Opposition Bloc and member of
the Ukrainian parliament.
Brand, Rachel Associate AttorneyGeneral(M ay 2017— Feb.2018).
Browder, William Founder of Hermitage Capital Management who lobbied in favor of the
(Bill) Magnitsky Act, which imposed financial and travel sanctions on Russian
off1clals.
Bulatov, Alexander Russian intelligence oAicial who associated with Carter Page in 200g.
Burchik, Mikhail Executive director of the Internet Research Agency, which engaged in an
"active measures" social media campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S.
presidential election,
Burck, William Personal attorney to Don McGahn, White House Counsel.
Burnham, James Attorney in the White House Counsel's OQice who attended January
2017 meetings between Sally Yates and Donald McGahn.
Burt, Richard Former U.S. ambassador who had done work Alfa-Bank and was a board
member of the Center for the National Interest.
General director of the Internet Research Agency, which engaged in an
"active measur's"" social media campaign to interfere in the 2016 U,S.
presidential election.
Calamari, Matt Chief operating offtcer for the Trump Organization.
Caputo, Michael Trump Campaign advisor.
Chaika„Yuri Prosecutor general of the Russian Federation who also maintained a
relationship with Aras Agalarov.
Christie, Chris Former Governor of New Jersey.
Clapper, James Director of National Intelligence (Aug. 2010 —Jan. 2017).
Clovis, Samuel Jr, Chief policy advisor and national co-chair of the Trump Campaign.
Coats, Dan Director of National Intelligence.
Costello, Robert Attorney who represented he had a close relationship with Rudolph
Giuliani, the President's personal counseh
Credico, Randolph Radio talk show host who interviewed Julian Assange in 2016,
(Randy) • •
Davis, Richard Partner with Pegasus Sustainable Century Merchant Bank, business
(Rick) Jr. partner of Paul Manafort, and co-founder of the Davis Manafort lobbying
finn,
Dearborn, Rick Former White House deputy chief of staff for policy who previously
served as chief of staff to Senator Jeff Sessions.
Dempsey, Michael Office of D irector of N ational Intelligence official who recalled
discussions with Dan Coats after Coats's meeting with President Trump
on March 22, 2017.
Denman, Diana Delegate to 2016 Republican National Convention who proposed a
platform plank amendment that included armed support for Ukraine.
Deripaska, Oleg Russian businessman with ties to Vladimir P'utin who hired Paul
Manafort for consulting work between 2005 and 2009,
Dhillon, Uttam Attorney in the White House Counsel's Office (Jan. 2017 —June 2018).
Dmitriev, Kirill Head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF); met with Erik
Prince in the Seychelles in January 2017 and, separately, dialled a U.S.-
Russia reconcilidtion plan with Rick Gerson,
Donaldson, Annie Chief of staff to White House Counsel Donald McGahn (Jmi, 2017- Dec.
2018).
Dvorkovich, Arkady Deputy prime minister of the Russian Federation and chairman of the
hoard of directors of the New Economic School in Moscow. He met with
Carter Page twice in 2016.
Dvoskin, Kvgeney Executive of Genbank in Crimea and associate of Felix Sater.
Kisenberg, John Attorney in the White House Counsel's Office and legal counsel for the
National Secudity Council.
Krehova, Lana Ex-wife of Dmitry Klokov who emailed Ivanka Trump to introduce
(a/Ir/a Lans Klokov to the Trump Campaign in the fall of 2015.
Alexander)
U,S. Department of Justice
Fabrizio, Anthony Partner at the research and consulting firm Fabrizio, Lee Jt Associates.
(Tony) He was a pollster for the Trump Campaign and worked with Paul
Manafort on Ukraine-related polling after the election.
Fishbein, Jason Attorney who performed worked for Julian Assange and also sent
WilciLeaks a password for an unlaunched website PutinTrump.org on
September 20, 2016,
Flynn, Michael G. Son of Michael T, Flynn, National Security Advisor (Jan. 20, 2017 —Feb.
(a/k/a Michael 13, 2017).
Flynn Jr.)
Flynn, Michael T. National Security Advisor (Jan. 20, 2017 — Feb, 13, 2017), Director of
the Defense Intelligence Agency (July 2012 — Aug. 7, 2014), and Trump
Campaign advisor, H e p leaded guilty to lying to the FBI about
communications with Ambassador Sergey Kislyak in December 2016.
Foresman, Robert Investment banker who sought meetings with the Trump Campaign in
(Bob) spring 2016 to discuss Russian foreign policy, and after the election met
with Michael Flynn.
Futei fas, Alan Outside counsel for the Trump Organization and subsequently personal
counsel for Donald Trump Jr.
Carten, Alan General counsel of the Trump Organization.
Gates, Richard Deputy campaign manager for Trump Campaign, Trump Inaugural
(Rick) III Committee deputy chairman, and longtime employee of Paul Manafort,
He pleaded guilty to conspiring to defraud the United States and violate
U.S, laws, as well as making false statements to the FBI,
Gerson, Richard New York hedge fund manager and associate of Jared Kushner, During
(Rick) the transition period, he worked with Kirill Dmitriev on a proposal for
reconciliation between the United States and Russia.
Gistaro, Edward Deputy Director o'f National Intelligence for Intelligence Integration.
Glassner, Michael Political director of the Trump Campaign who helped introduce George
Papadopoulos to others in the Trump Campaign.
Goldstone, Robert Publicist for Emin Agalarov who contacted Donald Trump Jr. to arrange
the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Natalia Veselnitskaya
and Trump Campaign ofFicials.
Gordon, Jeffrey National security advisor to the Trump Campaign involved in changes to
(J.II,) the Republican party platform and who communicated with Russian
Ambassador Sergey Kislyalc at the Republican National Convention,
Gorkov, Sergey Chairman of Vnesheconombank (VEB), a Russian state-owned bank,
who met with Jared Kushner during the transition period.
Graff, Rhona Senior vice-president and executive assistant to Donald J. Trump at the
Trump Organization.
U.S. Department of Justice
II
• • • • •
Hawker, Jonathan Public relations consultant at FTI Consulting; worked with Davis
Manafort International LLC on public relations campaign in Ukraine.
Heilbrunn, Jacob Editor of the National Interest, the periodical that officially hosted
candidate Trump's April 2016 foreign policy speech.
Hicks, Hope Volte House communications director (Aug. 2017 — Mar. 2018) and
press secretary for the Trump Campaign.
Holt, Laster NBC News anchor who interviewed President Trump on May 11, 2QI'7.
Hunt, J'ody Chief of staff to Attorney General Jeff Sessions (Feb. 2017 —Oct. 2Q17).
Ivanov, Igor President of the Russian International Affairs Council and former
Russian foreign minister, Ivan Timofeev told George Papadopoulos that
Ivanov, advised on arranging a "Moscow visit" for the Trump Campaign.
Ivanov, Sergei Special representative of Vladimir Putin, former Russian deputy prime
minister, and former FSB deputy director, In January 2016, Michael
Cohen emailed the Kremlin requesting to speak to Ivanov,
Kasowitz, Mare President Trump's personal counsel (May 2017 —July 2017).
Katsyv, Iyenis Son of Peter Katsyv; owner of Russian company Prevezon Holdings Ltd.
and associate of Natalia Veselnitskaya.
Katsyv, Peter Russian businessman and father of Denis Katsyv.
• • • •
Kaveladze, Irakli Vice president at Crocus Group and Ares Agalarov's deputy in the United
(Ike) States. He participated in the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower
between Natalia Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign officials.
Kaverzina, Ir'ina Employee of the Iriternet Research Agency, which engaged in an "active
measures" social media campaign to i nterfere in th e 2016 U.S.
presidential election.
Kelly, John %hite House chief of staff (July 2017 —Jan. 2019).
Khalilzad, Zalmay U.S, special representative to Afghanistan and former U.S, ambassador,
He met with Senator Jeff Sessions during foreign policy dinners put
together through the Center for the National Interest.
Ktlimnik, Russian-Ukrainian political consultant and long-time employee of Paul
Koustantin Manafort assessed by the FBI to have ties to Russian intelligence.
Kislyak, Sergey Former Russian ambassador to the United States and ourrent Russian
senator from Mordovia.
Klimentov, Denis Employee of the New Economic School who informed high-ranking
Russian goveriunent officials of Carter Page.'s July 2016 visit to Moscow.
U,S. Department of Justice
//
Klimentov, Dmitri Brother of Denis Klimentov who contacted IQemlin press secretary
Dmitri Peskov about Carter Page's July 2016 visit to Moscow.
Klokov, Dmitry Executive for PJSC Federal Grid Company of Unified Energy System
and former aide to Russia's minister of energy. He communicated with
Michael Cohen about a possible meeting between Vladimir Putin and
candidate Trump.
Kobyakov, Anton Advisor to Vladimir Putin and member of the Roscongress Foundation
who invited candidate Trump to the St. Petersburg International
Economic Forum.
Krickovic, Andrej Professor at the Higher School of Economics who recommended that
CarterPage give a July 2016 commencement address in Moscow.
Kushner, Jared President Trump's son-in-law and senior advisor to the President.
Kuxnetsov, Sergey Russian government official at the Russian Embassy to the United States,
who transmitted Vladimir Putin's congratulations to President-Elect
Trump for his electoral victory on November 9, 2016.
Landrum, Pete Advisor to Senator Jeff Sessions who attended the September 2016
meeting between Sessions and Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak.
Lavrov, Sergey Russian minister of foreign affairs and former permanent representative
of Russia to the United Nations,
Ledeen, Barbara Senate staffer and associate of Michael Flynn who sought to obtam
Hillary Clinton emails during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign
period.
Ledeen, Michael Member of the Presidential Transition Team who advised on foreign
policy and national security matters.
Led get t, Richard Deputy director of the National Security Agency (Jan. 2014 —Apr. 2017);
present when President Trump called Michael Rogers on Maivh 26, 2017.
Lewandowski, Campaign manager for the Trump Campaign (Jan. 2015 —June 2016).
Corey
Luff, Sandra Legislative director for Senator Jeff Sessions; attended a September 2016
meeting between Sessions and Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak.
8-6
U.S. Department of Justice
Manafort, Paul Jr. Trump campaign member (March 2016 — Aug. 2016) and chairman and
chief strategist (May 2016 —Aug. 2016).
Mashburn, John Trump administration official and former policy director to the Trump
Campaign.
MeCabe, Andrew Acting director of the FBI (May 2017 — Aug. 2017); deputy director of
the FBI (Feb. 2016 —Jan, 2018).
McCord, Mary Acting Assistant Attorney General (Qct, 2016 —
May 2017).
McFarland, Deputy White House National Security Advisor (Jan. 2017 —May 2017),
Kathleen (K,T.)
McGahn, IJonald White House Counsel (Jan, 2017 —Qct. 2018),
(Don)
Medvedev, Dmitry Prim e Minister of Russia
Melnik, Yurly Spokesperson for the Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C., who
connected with George Papadopoulos on social media.
Mifsud, Joseph Maltese national and former London-based professor who, immediately
after returning from Moscow in April 2016, told George Papadopoulos
that the Russians had "dirt" in the form of thousands of Clinton emails.
Miller, Matt Trump Campaign staff member who was present at the meeting of the
National Security and Defense Platform Subcommittee in July 2016.
Miller, Stephen Senior advisor to the President.
Millian, Sergei Founder of the Russian American Chambei of Commerce who met with
George Papadopoulos during the campaign,
Mnuchin, Steven Secretary of the Treasury.
• • • • •
B-7
U.S, Department of Justice
Oganov, Georgiy Advisor to Qleg Deripaska and a board member of investment company
Basic Element. He met with Paul Manafort in Spain in early 2017.
Oknyansky, Henry Florida-based Russian individual who claimed to have derogatory
(a/k/a Henry information pertaining to Hillary Clinton. He met with Roger Stone in
Greenberg) May 2016.
Page, Carter Foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign who advocated pro-
Russian views and made July 2016 and December 2016 visits to Moscow,
Papadopoulos, Foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign who received information
George from Joseph Mifsud that Russians had "dirt" in the form of thousands of
Clinton emails. He pleaded guilty to lying to the FBI about his contact
with Mifsud.
Parscale, Bradley Digital media director for the 2016 Trump Campaign,
Patten, William Lobbyist and business partner of Konstantin I<ilimnik.
(Sam) Jr.
Peskov, Dmitry Deputy chief of staff of and press secretary for the Russian presidential
administration.
Pbares, Walid Foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign and co-secretary general
of the Transatlantic Parliamentary Group on Counterterrorism (TAG).
Pinedo, Richard U,S. person who pleaded guilty to a single-count information of identity
fraud.
Podesta, John Jr. Clinton campaign chairman whose email account was hacked by the
GRU. WikiLeaks released his stolen emails during the 2016 campaign.
Podobnyy, Victor Russian intelligence officer who interacted with Carter Page while
operating inside the United States; later charged in 2015 with conspiring
to act as an unregistered agent of Russia.
Poliakova, Elena Personal assistant to Dmitry Peskov who responded to Michael Cohen's
ouueach about the Trump Tower Moscow project. in January 2016,
Polonskaya, Olga Russian national introduced to George Papadopoulos by Joseph Mifsud
as an individual with connections to Vladimir Putin.
Pompeo, Michael U.S. Secretary of State; director of the Central Intelligence Agency (Jan.
2017 — Apr. 201g).
Porter, Robert White House staff secretary (Jan, 2017 —Feb. 201g),
Priebus, Reince White House chief of staff (Jan. 2017 — July 2017); chair of the
Republican National Committee (Jan. 2011 —Jan. 2017),
Pr igoxhin, Yevgeniy Head of Russian companies Concord Catering and Concord Management
and Consulting; supported and financed the Internet Research Agency,
which engaged in an "active measures" social med'ia campmgn to
interfere in the 2016 U.S, presidential election,
U.S, Department of Justice
Prikhodko, Sergei First deputy head of the Russian Government Office and former Russian
deputy prime minister. In January 2016, he invited candidate Trump to
the St. Petersburg International Economic Fonnn.
Prince, Erik Businessman and Trump Campaign supporter who met with Presidential
Transition Team officials after the election and traveled to the Seychelles
to me'et with Kirill Dmitriev in January 2017.
Raffel, Josh White House communications advisor (Apr. 2017 — Feb. 2018).
Rasin, Alexei Ukrainian associate of Henry Oknyansky who claimed to possess
derogatory information regarding Hillary Clinton,
Rogers, Michael Director of the National Security Agency (Apr. 2014 — May 2018).
Rosenstein, Rod Deputy Attorney General (Apr. 2017 —present); Acting Attorney General
for the Russian election interference investigation (May 2017 — Nov,
2018).
Roxov, Audrel Chairman of I.C. Expert Investment Company, a Russian real-estate
development corporation that signed a letter of intent 'for the Trump
Tower Moscow project in 2015.
Ruddy, Christopher Chief executive of Newsmax Media and associate of President Trump,
Rybicki, James FBI chief of staff (May 2015 —Feb. 2018).
Sam ochornov, Translator who worked with Natalia Veselnitskaya and attended a June
Anatoli 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Veselnitskaya and Trump
Campaign officials,
Sanders, Sarah White House press secretary (July 2017 —present).
Huckabee
Sater, Felix Real-estate advisor who worked with Mirhael Cohen to pursue a Trump
Tower Moscowproject.
Saunders, Paul J. Executive with the Center for the National Interest who worked on
outlines and logistics of candidate Trump's April 2016 foreign policy
speecli.
Sechin, Igor Executive chairman of Rosneil, a Russian-stated owned oil company,
Sessions, Jefferson Attorney General (Feb. 2017 — Nov. 2018); U.S. Senator (Jan. 1997-
III (Jeff) Feb. 2017); head of the Trump Campaign's foreign policy advisoryteam.
Shoygu, Ser gey Russian Minister of Defense,
Simes, IIimitri President and chief executive officer of the Center for the National
Interest,
B-9
U.S. Department of Justice
//
Smith, Peter Investment banker active in Republican politics who sought to obtain
Hillary Clinton emails during the 2016 U.S. Presidential campaign
period,
Spicer, Sean White House press secretary and comm
unications director (Jan. 2017-
July 2017).
• r a ••
Stone, Roger Advisor to the Tiump Campaign
Trump, Donald Jr, President Trump's son; trustee and executive vice president of the Trump
Organization; helped arrange and attended the June 9, 2016 meeting at
Trump Tower between Natalia Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign
officials,
Trump, Eric President Trump's son; trustee and executive vice president of the Trump
Organization,
Trump, Ivanka President Trump's daughter; advisor to the President and former
executive vice president of the Trump Organization.
Ushakov, Yuri Aide to Vladimir Putin and former Russian ambassador to the United
Viktorovich 'States; identified to the Presidential Transition Team as the proposed
channel to the Russian government,
Yates, Sally Acting Attorney General (Jan. 20, 2017 — Jan, 30, 2017)i Deputy
Attorney General (Jan. 10, 2015 —Jan. 30, 2017).
Yatsenko, Sergey Deputychieffinancialofficer ofG azprom, a Russian state-owned energy
company,and associate of CarterPage.
Xakharova, Maria Dire'ctor of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affair's Information and
Press Depai'tment who received notification of Carter Page's speech in
July 2016 from Denis Klimentov.
Zayed al Nahyan, Crown Prince ef Abu Dhabi and deputy supreme commander of the
Mohammed bin United Arab Emirates (UAE) armed foices,
Guccifer 2,0 Fictitious online persona operated by the GRU that released stolen
documents during the 2016 U.S, presidential campaign period.
I.C. Kxpert, Investment Russian real-estate and development corporation that signed a letter of
Company intent with a Trump Organization subsidiary to develop a Trump
Moscow property.
Internet Research Russian entity based in Saint Petersburg and funded by Concord that
Agency (IRA) engaged in an "active measures" social media campaign to inter fere in
the 2016 U.S. presidential election,
KLS Research LLC Business established by an associate of and at the direction of Petei
Smith to further Smith's search for Hillary Clinton emails,
Kremlin Official residence of the president of the Russian Federation; it is used
colloquially to refer to the office of the president or the Russian
government,
LetterOne Companythat includes Petr Aven and Richard Burt as board inembers.
During a board meeting in December 2016, Aven asked for Burt's help
to make contact with the Presidential Transition Team.
Link Campus University i n R ome, Italy, where George Papadopoulos was
University introduced to Joseph Mifsud.
London Centre of International law advisory organization in London that employed
International Law Joseph Mifsud and George Papadopoulos.
Practice (LCILP)
Main Intelligence Russian Federation's military intelligence agency.
Directorate of the
General Staff (GRU)
New Economic School Moscow-based school that invited Carter Page to speak at its July 2016
in Moscow (NKS) commencement ceremony.
Opposition Bloc Ukrainian political party that incorporated members of the defunct
Party of Regions.
Party of Regions Ukrainian political party of former President Yanukovych, It was
generally understood to align with Russian policies,
Pericles Emerging Company registered in the Cayman Islands by Paul Manafort and his
Market Partners LLP business partner Rick Davis. Oleg Deripaska invested in the fund,
Prevezon Holdings Ltd. Russian company that was a defendant in a U.S. civil action alleging
the laundering of proceeds from fraud exposed by Sergei Magnitsky.
Roscong ress Russian entity that organized the St, Petersburg International
Foundation Economic Forum.
Roan eft Russian state-owned oil and energy company.
Russian Direct Sovereign wealth fund established by the Russian Government in 2011
Investment Fund and headed by Kiril l Dmitricv.
8-12
U.S. Deparlment of Justice
IndexofAcron ms
B-14
U.S. Department of Justice
Appendix t"
U.S. Department of Justice
//
U.S. Department of Justice
APPENDIX C
I NTROBU C T ORY NO T E
The President provided written responses through his personal counsel to questions
submitted to him by thc Special Counsel*s Office. We first explain the process that led to the
submission of written questions and then attach the President's responses,
Beginning in December 2017, this Offmr sought for more than a year to interview the
President on topics relevant to both Russian-election interference and obstruction-of justice. We
advised counsel that the President was a "subject" of the investigation under the definition of the
Justice Manual — "a person whose conduct is within the scope of the grand jury's investigation."
Justice Manual tj 9-11.151 (2018). We also advised counsel that "[a]n interview with the President
is vital to our investigation" and that this Office had vcarefully ronsidered the constitutional and
other arguments raised by.. . counsel, and they d[id] not provide us with reason to forgo seeking
an interview."' We additionally stated that "it is in the interest of the Presidency and the public
for an interview to take place" and. offered "numerous accommodations to aid the President's
preparation and avoid surprise." After extensive discussions with the Department of Justice about
the Special Counsel's objective of securing the President*'s testimony, these accommodations
included the submissions of written questions to the President on certain Russia-related topics.'
We received the President's written responses in late November 2018.~ In December 2018,
we informed counsel of the insufficiency of those responses in several respects.' We noted, among
other things, that the President stated on more than 30 occasions that he "does not 'recall' or
'remember' or have an 'independent recollection'" of information called for by the questkins.s
Other answers were "incomplete or imprecise."7 The written responses„we informed counsel,
"demonstrate the inadequacy of the written format, as we have had no opportunity to ask follow-
up questions that would ensure complete answers and potentially refresh your client's recollection
or clarify the extent or nature of his lack of recollection." W e again requested an in-person
interview, limited to certain topics, advising the President's counsel that "[t]his is the President's
opportunity to voluntarfiy provide us with information for us to evaluate in the context of all of
the evidence we have gathered/" s The President declined. is
a, When did you first learn that Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner
was considering participating in a meeting in June 2016 concerning potentially
negative information about Hillary Clinton? Describe who you learned the
information from and the substance of the discussion.
c. On June 9, 2016, Donald Trump, Jr., Paul IVlanafort, and )ared Kushner attended a
meeting at Trump Tower with several individuals, inciuding a Russian lawyer,
Natalia Veselnitskaya (the "June 9 meeting").
i, Other than as set forth in your answers to l.a and I.b, what, if anything,
were you told about the possibility of this meeting taking place, or the
scheduling of such a meeting? Describe who you discussed this with,
when, and what you were informed about the meeting.
When did you learn that some of the individuals attending the June 9
meeting were Russian or had any affiliation with any part of the Russian
government? Describe who you learned this information from and the
substanceofthe discussion(s).
iii. What were you told about what was discussed at the June 9 meeting' ?
Describe each conversation in which you were told about what was
discussed at the meeting, who the conversation was with, when it
occurred, and the substance of the statements they made about the
meeting.
U.S. Department of Justice
lI
iv. Were you told that the June 9 meeting was about, in whole or in part,
adoption and/or the Magnitsky Act7 If yes, describe who you had that
discussion with, when, and the substance of the discussion.
d. For the period June 6, 2016 through June 9, 2016, for what portion of each day
were you in Trump Tower7
Did you speak or meet with Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared
Kushner on June 9, 2016? I f yes, did any portion of any of t hose
conversations or meetings include any reference to any aspect of the June
9 meeting'? If yes, describe who you spoke with and the substance of the
conversation.
f. Did you learn of any communications. between Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort,
or Jared Kushner and any member or representative of the Agalarov family,
Natalia Veselnitskaya, Rob Goldstone, or any Russian official or contact that took
place after June 9, 2016 and concerned the June 9 meeting or efforts by Russia to
assist the campaign? If yes, describe who you learned this information from,
when,and the substance of what you l earned.
g. On June7, 2016, you gave a speech in which you said,in part,"Iam going to give
a ma)or speech on probably Monday ofnextweek and we' re going to be discussing
all of the things that have taken place with the Clintons."
i. Why did you make that statement'?
ii. What information did you plan to share with respect to the Clintons?
iii. What did you believe the source(s) of that information would be' ?
iv. Did you expect any of the information to have come from the June 9
meeting?
v. Did anyone help draft the speech that you were referring to7 If so, who'?
vi. Why did you ultimately not give the speech you referenced on June 7,
2016?
h. Did any person or entity inform you during the campaign that Vladimir Putin or
the Russian government supported your candidacy or opposed the candidacy of
Hillary Clinton? If yes, describe the source(s) of the information, when you were
informed,and the content of such discussion(s).
i. Did any person or entity inform you during the campaign that any foreign
government or foreign leader, other than Russia or Vladimir Putin, had provided,
wished to provide, or offered to provide tangible support to your campaign,
including by way of offering to provide negative information on Hillary Clinton'? If
U.S. Department of Justice
yes, describe the source(s) of the information, when you were informed, and the
content of such discussion(s).
a. On June 14, 2016, it was publicly reported that computer hackers had penetrated
the computer network of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and that
Russian intelligence was behind the unauthorized access, or hack. Prior to June
14, 2016, were you provided any information about any potential or actual
hacking of the computer systems or email accounts of the DNC, the Democratic
Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), the Clinton Campaign, Hillary Clinton,
or individuals assodated with the Clinton campaign'? If yes, describe who provided
this information, when, and the substance of the information.
b. On July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks released nearly 20,000 emails sent or received by
Democratic party officials.
i. Prior to the July 22, 2016 release, were you aware from any source that
WikiLeaks, Guccifer 2.0, DCLeaks, or Russians had oi potentially had
possession of or planned to release emails or information that cauld help
your campaign or hurt the Clinton campaign'? If yes, describe who you
discussedthis issue with,when, and the substance of the discussion(s).
After the release of emails by WikiLeaks on July 22, 2016, were you told
that WikiLeakspossessed or might possess additional information that
could be released during the campaign? If yes, describe who provided this
informatian, when, and what you were told.
c. Are you aware of any communications during the campaign, directly or indirectly,
between Roger Stone, Donald Trump, Jr.„Paul Manafort, or Rick Gates and (a)
WikiLeaks, (b) Julian Assange, (c) other representatives of WikiLeaks, (d) Guccifer
2.0, (e) representatives of Guccifer 2.0, or (f) representatives of DCLeaks? If yes,
describe who provided you with this information, when you learned of the
communications, and what you know about those communications,
d. On July 27, 2016, you stated at a press conference: "Russia, if you' re listening, I
hope yau're able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing. I think you will
probably be rewarded mightily by our press."
Why did you make that request of Russia, as opposed ta any other country,
entity, or individual' ?
ii. In advance of making that statement„what discussions, if any, did you have
with anyone else about the substance of the statement'?
iii. Were you told at any time before or after you made that statement that
Russia was attempting to infiltrate or hack computer systems or email
accounts of Hillary Clinton or her campaign'? If yes, describe who provided
this information, when, and what you were told.
U,S. J3epartmcnt of Justice
II
e. On October 7, 2016, emails hacked from the account of John Podesta were
released by WikiLeaks.
i. Where were you on October 7, 2016?
ii. Were you told at any time in advance of, or on the day of, the October 7
release that WikiLeaks possessed or might possess ernails related to John
Podesta? If yes, describe who told you this, when, and what you were
told.
iii. Are you aware of anyone associated with you or your campaign, including
Roger Stone, reaching out to WikiLeaks, either directly or through an
intermediary, on or about October?, 2016? If yes, identify the person and
describethe substance of the conversations or contacts.
f. W ere you told of anyone associated with you or your campaign, including Roger
Stone, having any discussions, directly or indirectly, with WikiLeaks, Guccifer 2.0,
or DCLeaks regarding the content or timing of release of hacked emails? If yes,
describewho had such contacts,how you became aware of the contacts,when
you became aware of the contacts,and the substance ofthe contacts.
g. From June 1, 2016 through the end of the campaign, how frequently did you
communicate with Roger Stone7 Describe the nature of your communication(s)
with Mr. Stone.
i. During that time period, what efforts did Mr. Stone tell you he was making
to assist your campaign, and what requests, if any, did you make of Mr.
Stone7
ii. Did Mr. Stone ever discuss WikiLeaks with you or, as far as you were aware,
with anyone else associated with the campaign? If yes, describe what you
were told, from whom, and when,
iii. Did Mr. Stone at any time inform you about contacts he had with WikiLeaks
or any intermediary of WikiLeaks, or about forthcoming releases of
information? If yes, describe what Stone told you and when.
h. Did you have any discussions prior to January 20, 2017, regarding a potential
pardon or other action to benefit Julian Assange? If yes, describe who you had
the discussion(s) with„when, and the content of the discussion(s).
i. W ere you aware of any efforts by foreign individuals or companies, including those
in Russia,to assistyour campaign through the use of socialmedia postings or the
organization of rallies7 If yes, identify who you discussed such assistance with,
when, and the content of the discussion(s).
U.S. Department af Justice
,//
c. Did you learn of any communications between Michael Cohen or Felix Sater and
any Russian government officials, including officials in the office of Dmitry Peskov,
regarding the Trump Moscow project? If so, identify who provided this
information to you, when, and the substance of what you learned.
d, Did you have any discussions between June 2015 and June 2016 regarding a
potential trip to Russia by you and/or Michael Cohen for reasons related to the
Trump Moscow project? If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, and the
substanceof the discussion(s).
e. Did you at any time direct or suggest that discussions about the Trump Moscow
project should cease„or were you informed at any time that the project had been
abandoned'? If yes, describe who you spoke with,when, the substance of the
discussion(s)
,and why that decision was made.
g. Aside from the Trump Moscow project, did you or the Trump Organization have
any other prospective or actual business interests, investments, or arrangements
with Russia or any Russian interest or Russian individual during the campaign? If
yes,describe the business interests,investments, orarrangements.
U.S. Department of Justice
Prior to mid-August 2016, did you become aware that Paul Manafort had ties to
the Ukrainian government? If yes, describe who you learned this information
from, when, and the substance of what you were told. Did Mr. Manafort's
connections to the Ukrainian or Russian governments play any role in your
decision to have him join your campaign? If yes, describe that role.
Were you aware that Paul Manafort offered briefings on the progress of your
campaign to Oleg Deripaska'? If yes, describe who you learned this information
from, when, the substance of what you were told, what you understood the
purpose was of sharing such information with Mr. Deripaska, and how you
responded to learning this information.
C. Were you aware of whether Paul Manafort or anyone else associated with your
campaign sent or directed others to send inte'mal Trump campaign information to
any person located in Ukraine or Russia or associated with the Ukrainian or
Russian governments'? If yes, identify who provided you with this information,
when, the substance of the discussion(s), what you understood the purpose was
of sharing the internal campaign information, and how you responded to learning
this information.
During the campaign, were you told about efforts by Russian officials to meet with
you or senior members of your campaign? I f yes, describe who you had
conversations with on this topic, when, and what you were told.
What role, if any, did you have in changing the Republican Party platform
regarding arming Ukraine during the Republican National Convention? Prior to
the convention, what information did you have about this platform provision?
After the platform provision was changed, who told you about the change, when
did they tell you, what were you told about why it was changed, and who was
involved?
On July 27, 2016, in response to a question about whether you would recognize
Crimea as Russian territory and lift sanctions on Russia, you said: "We' ll be looking
atthat. Yeah, we' ll be looking." Did you intend tocommunicate by thatstatement
or at any other time during the campaign a willingness to lift sanctions and?'or
recognize Russia's annexation of Crimea if you were elected?
U.S. Department of Justice
a. Were you asked to attend the World Chess Championship gala on November 10,
2016'?Ifyes,who asked you to attend, when were you asked, and what were you
toldabout about why your presence was requested?
Did you attend any part of the event7 lf yes, describe any interactions you
had with any Russians or representatives of the Russian government at the
event.
c. Qn December 29 and December 31, 2016, LTG Flynn had conversations with
Russian Ambassador Sergey Kisl yak about the Russia sanctions and Russia's
responseto the Russia sanctions.
i. Did you direct or suggest that LTG Flynn have discussions with anyone from
the Russiangovernment about the Russia sanctions?
ii. Were you told in advance of LTG Flynn"s December 29, 2016 conversation
that he was going to be speaking with Ambassador Kislyak? If yes, describe
who told you this information, when, and what you were told. If no, when
and from whom did you learn of LTG Flynn's December 29, 2016
conversation with Ambassador Kislyak?
iii. When did you leam of LTG Flynn and Ambassador Kislyak's call on
December 31, 2016? Who told you and what were you told?
iv. When did you learn that sanctions were discussed in the December 29 and
December 31,2016 calls between LTG Flynn and Ambassador Kislyak?
Who told you and what were you told' ?
d. Atany time between December 31,2016, and January 20, 2017, did anyone tell
you or suggest to you that Russia's decision not to impose reciprocal sanctions
was attributable in any way to LTG Flynn's communications with Ambassador
Kislyak'? If yes, identify who provided you with this information, when, and the
substance of what you were told,
C-9
U.S.
Department ofJustice
e. On January 12, 2017, the Washington Post published a column that stated that
LTG Flynn phoned Ambassador Kislyak several times on December 29, 2016. After
learning of the column, did you direct or suggest to anyone that LTG Flynn should
deny that he discussed sanctions with Ambassador Kislyak7 If yes, who did you
make this suggestion or direction to, when, what did you say, and why did you
take this step?
i. After learning of the column, did you have any conversations with LTG
Flynn about his conversations with Ambassador Kislya k in December 2016'?
If yes, describe when those discussions occurred and the content of the
discussions.
f. W ere you told about a meeting between Jared Kushner and Sergei Gorkov that
took place in December 20167
i. If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, the substance of t he
discussion(s), and what you understood was the purpose of the meeting.
g. Were you told about a meeting or meetings between Erik Prince and Kirill Dmitriev
or any other representative from the Russian government that took place in
January 2017?
i. If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, the substance of t he
discussion(s), and what you understood was the purpose of the meeting(s).
h. Prior to January 20, 2017, did you talk to Steve gannon, Jared Kushner, or any
other individual associated with the transition regarding establishing an unofficial
line of communication with Russia7 If yes, describe who you spoke with, when,
the substance of the discussion(s),and what you understood was the purpose of
such an unofficialline of communication.
U.S. Department of Justice
When did you first learn that Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner was
considering participating in a meeting in June 2016 concerning potentially negative
information about Hillary Clinton7 Describe who you learned the information from and the
substanceof the discussion,
Attached to this document as Exhibit A is a series of emails fl'om June 2016 between,
among others, Donald Trump, Jr. and Rob Goldstone. In addition to the emails reflected in
Exhibit A, Donald Trump, Jr. had other communications with Rob Goldstone and Emin
Agaiarov between June 3, 2016, and June 9, 2016.
i, Did M r , Trump, Jr. or anyone else tell you about or show you any of these
communications7 If yes, describe who discussed the communications with you,
when, and the substance of the discussion(s).
ii. Whe n did you flrst see or learn about all or any part of the emails reflected in
Exhibit A'?
iii. Wh e n did you first learn that the proposed meeting involved or was described as
being part of Russia and its government's support for your' candidacy7
iv. Did you suggest to or direct anyone not to discuss or release publicly all or any
portion of the emails reflected in Exhibit A7 I f y es, describe who you
communicated with, when, the substance of the communication(s), and why you
took that action.
On June 9„2016, Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, and Jared Kushner attended a meeting
at Tnunp Tower with several individuals, including a Russian lawyer, Natalia
Veselnitskaya (the "June 9 meeting").
Other than as set forth in your answers to La and I.b, what, if anything, were you
told about the possibility of this meeting taking place, or the scheduling of such a
meeting'? Describe who you discussed this with, when, and what you were informed
about the meeting.
ii. Whe n did you learn that some of the individuals attending the June 9 meeting were
Russian or had any afliliation with any part of the Russian government7 Describe
who you learned this information Irom and the substance of the discussion(s).
U.S, Department of Justice
ili. Wh at were you told about what was discussed at the June 9 meeting'! Describe each
conversation in which you were told about what was discussed at the meeting, who
the conversation was with, when it occurred, and the substance of the statements
they made about the meeting.
iv. We r e you told that the June 9 meeting was about, in whole or in part, adoption
and/or the Magnitsky Act? If yes, describe who you had that discussion with, when,
and the substance of the discussion.
d. For the period June 6, 2016 through June 9, 20I6, for what portion of each day were you
in Trump Tower?
Did you speak or meet with Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner
on June 9,2016? If yes, did any portion of any of those conversations or meetings
include any reference to any aspect of the June 9 meeting'Y If yes, describe who you
spoke with and the substance of the conversation.
Did you communicate directly or indirectly with any member or representative of the
Agalarov family after June 3, 2016? If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, and the
substance of the communication.
Did you learn of any communications between Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared
Kushner and any member or representative of the Agalarov family, Natal is Veselnitskaya,
Rob Goldstone, or any Russian official or contact that took place after June 9, 2016 and
concerned the June 9 meeting or efforts by Russia to assist the campaign? If yes, describe
who you learned this information from, when, and the substance of what you learned.
g. On June 7, 2016, you gave a speech in which you said, in part, "I am going to give a major
speech on probably Monday of next week and we' re going to be discussing all of the things
that have taken place with the Clintons."
ii. Wha t information did you plan to share with respect to the Clintons?
iil. Wha t did you believe the source(s) of that information would be?
iv. Did you expect any of the information to have come from the June 9 meeting?
v. Did anyone help draft the speech that you were referring to'? If so, who?
vi. Why did you ultimately not give the speech you referenced on June 7,2016?
Did any person or entity inform you during the campaign that Vladimir Putin or the Russian
C-12
U.S. Department of Justice
government supported your candidacy or opposed the candidacy of Hillary Clinton? If yes,
describe the source(s) of the information, when you were informed, and the content of such
discussion(s).
Did any person or entity inform you during the campaign that any foreign government or
foreign leader, other than Russia or Vladimir Putin, had provided, wished to provide, or
offered to provide tangible support to your campaign, including by way of offering to
provide negative information on Hillary Clinton? If yes, describe the source(s) of the
information, when you were informed, and the content of such discussion(s).
I have no recollection of learning at the time that Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort„or Jared
Kushner was considering participating in a meeting in June 2016 concerning potentially negative
information about Hillary Clinton. Nor do I recall learning during the campaign that the June 9,
2016 meeting had taken place, that the referenced emails existed, or that Dondd J. Trump, Jr., had
other communications with Emin Agalarov or Robert Goldstone between June 3, 2016 and June
9, 2016.
I have no independent recollection of what portion of these four days in June of 2016 I spent in
Trump Tower. This was one of many busy months during a fast-paced campaign, as the primary
season was ending and we were preparing for the general election campaign,
I am now aware that my Campaign's calendar indicates that I was in New York City from June 6
— 9, 2016. Calendars kept in my Trump Tower offlce reflect that I had various calls and meetings
scheduled for each of these days. While those calls and meetings may or may not actually have
taken place, they do indicate that I was in Trump Tower during a portion of each of these working
days, and I have no reason to doubt that I was. When I was in New York City, I stayed at my
Trump Tower apattment.
My Trump Organization desk calendar also reflects that I was outside Trump Tower during
portions of these days. The June 7, 2016 calendar indicates I was scheduled to leave Trump Tower
in the early evening for Westchester where I gave remarks af'ter winning the California, New
Jersey, New Mexico, Montana, and South Dakota Republican primaries held that day. The June g,
2016 calendar indicates a scheduled departure in late afternoon to attend a ceremony at my son' s
school. The June 9, 2016 calendar indicates I was scheduled to attend midday meetings and a
fundraising luncheon at the Four Seasons Hotel. At this point, I do not remember on what dates
these events occurred, but I do not currently have a reason to doubt that they took place as
scheduled on my calendar.
Widely available media reports, including television footage, also shed light on my activities
during these days. For example, I am aware that my June 7, 2016 victory remarks at the Trump
C-13
U.S Department of Justice
National Golf CluB in Brinrcliff Manor, New York, were recorded and published by the media. I
remember winning those primaries and generally recall delivering remarks that evening.
At this point in time, I do not remember whether I spoke or met with Donald Trump, Jr„Paul
Manafort, oi' Jared Kushner on June 9, 2016. My desk calendar indicates I was scheduled to meet
with Paul Msnnfort on the morn ing of June 9, but I do not recall if that meeting took place, It was
more than two years ago, at a time when I had many calls and interactions daily.
I have no independent recollection of any communications I hsd with the Agslarov family or
anyone I understood to be s representative of the Agalarov family after June 3, 2016 and before
the end of the campaign. While preparing to respond to these questions, I have become aware of
written communications with the Agslarovs during the campaign that were sent, received, nnd
largely authored by my staff and which I understand have already been produced to you.
In general, the documents include congratulatory letters on my campaign victories, emsils about a
painting Emin and Aras Agalsrov arranged to have delivered to Trump Tower as a birthday
present, and emaila regarding delivery of a book written by Aras Agalarov. The documents reflect
that the deliveries were screened by the Secret Service.
I do not recall being aware during the campaign of communications between Donald Trump, Jr.,
Paul Mnnafort, or Jared Kushner and any member or representative of the Agslnrov family, Robert
Goldstone, Natalia Veselnitsknyn (whose name I was not familiar with), or anyone I understood
to be a Russian official.
In remarks I delivered the night I won the California, New Jersey, New Mexico, Montana, and
South Dakota Republican primaries, I said, "I sm going to give a major speech on probably
Monday of next week and we' re going to be discussing all of the things that have taken place with
the Clintons.** In general, I expected to give s speech referencing the publicly available, negative
information about the Clintons, including, for example, Mrs. Clinton's failed policies, the
Clintons' use of the State Department to further their interests and the interests of the Clinton
Foundation, Mrs. Clinton's improper use of a private server for State Department business, the
destruction of 33,000 emails on that server, and Mrs. Clinton's temperamental unsuitability for the
office of President,
In the course of preparing to respond to your questions, I have become aware that the Campaign
documents already produced to you reflect the drafting, evolution, and sources of information for
the speech I expected to give "probably" on the Monday following my June 7, 2016 comments.
These documents generally show that the text of the speech was initially drafted by Campaign staff
U.S. Department of Justice
with input from various outside advisors and was based on publicly available material, including,
in particular, information from the book Clinion Cosh by Peter Schweizer.
The Pulse Nightclub terrorist attack took place in the early morning hours of Sunday, June 12,
2016. In light of that tragedy, I gave a speech directed tnore specifically to national security and
terrorism than to the Clintons. That speech was delivered at the Saint Anselm College Institute of
Politics in Manchester, New Hampshire, and, as reported, opened with the fallowing:
This wns going to be a speech on Hillary Clinton and how bnd a President,
especially in these times of Radical Islamic Terrorism, she would be. Even her
former Secret Service Agent, who hns seen her under pressure and in times of stress,
has stated that she lacks the temperament nnd integrity to be president. There will
be plenty of opportunity to discuss these important issues nt a later time, and I will
deliver that speech soon. But today there is only one thing to discuss: the growing
threat of terrorism inside of our borders.
I continued to speak about Mrs. Clinton's failings throughout the campaign, using the informatian
prepared for inclusion in the speech to which I referred an June Z, 2016.
I have no recollection of being told during the campaign that Vladimir Putin or the Russian
government "supported" my candidacy or "opposed" the candidacy of Hillary Clinton. However,
I was aware of some reports indicating that President Putin had made complimentary statements
about me.
I have no recollection of being told during the campaign that any foreign government or fareign
leader had provided, wished to pmvide, or offered to provide tangible support to my campaign.
On June 14, 2016, it was publicly reported that computer hackers had penetrated the
computer network of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and that Russian
intelligence was behind the unauthorized access, or hack. Prior to June 14, 2016, were you
provided any information about any potential or actual hacking of the computer systems or
email accounts of the DNC, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC),
the Clinton Campaign, Hillary Clinton, or individuals associated with the Clinton
campaign? If yes, describe wha provided this information, when, and the substance of the
information.
10
C.-15
U.S. Department of Justice
b, On July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks released nearly 20,000 emails sent or received by Democratic
party officials.
Prior to the July 22, 2016 release, were you aware from any source that WikiLeaks,
Guccifer 2,0, DCLeaks, or Russians had or potentially had possession of or planned
to release emails or information that could help your campaign or hurt the Clinton
campaign? If yes, describe who you discussed this issue with, when, and the
substance of the discussion(s).
ii. Aft e r the release of emails by WikiLeaks on July 22, 2016, were you told that
WikiLeaks possessed or might possess additional information that could be
released during the campaign? If yes, describe who provided this information,
when, and what you were told.
Are you aware of any communications during the campaign, directly or indirectly, between
Roger Stone, Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Rick Gates and (a) WikiLeaks, (b)
Julian Assange, (c) other representatives of WikiLeaks, (d) Guccifer 2.0, (e) representatives
of Guccifer 2.0, or (f) representatives of DCLeai<s? If yes, describe who provided you with
this information, when you learned of the communications, and what you know about those
communications.
On July 27, 2016, you stated at a press conference: "Russia, if you' re listening, I hope
you' re able to find the 30„000 emalla that are missing, I think you will probably be rewarded
mightily by our press."
i. Why did you make that request of Russia, as opposed to any other country, entity„
or individual?
ii. In a dvance of making that statement, what discussions, if any, did you have with
anyone else about the substance of the statement?
iii. We r e you told at any time before or alter you made that statement that Russia was
attempting to infiltrate or hack computer systems or email accounts of Hillary
Clinton or her campaign? If yes, desci'ibe who provided this information, when, and
what you were told.
On October7, 2016, emails hacked from the account of John Podesta were released by
WikiLeaks.
i. W h ere were
you on October 7,2016?
ii, Wer e you told atany time m advance of, or on the day of, the October 7 release that
WikiLeaks possessed or might possess emails related to John Podesta? If yes,
describe who told you this, when, and what you were told.
11
U.S. Department of Justice
iii. Are you aware of anyone associated with you or your campaign, including Roger
Stone, reaching out to WikiLeaks, either directly or through an intermediary, on or
about October 7, 2016? If yes, identify the person and describe the substance of the
conversations or contacts.
Were you toid of anyone associated with you or your campaign„ including Roger Stone,
having any discussions„directly or indirectly, with WikiLeaks, Guccifer 2.0, or DCLeaks
regarding the content or timing of release of hacked emails? If yes, describe who had such
contacts,how you became aware of the contacts,when you became aware of the contacts,
and the substance of the contacts.
g. Fro m June I, 2016 through the end of the campaiipi, how frequently did you conununicate
with Roger Stone? Describe the nature of your communication(s) with Mr. Stone.
i. Dur i ng that time period, what efforts did Mr. Stone tell you he was making to assist
your campaign, and what requests, if any, did you make of Mr, Stone' !
ii. Did Mr. Stone ever discuss WikiLeaks with you or, as far as you were aware, with
anyone else associated with the campaign? If yes, describe what you were told, I'rom
whom, and when.
iii. Did Mr. Stone at anytime inform you about contacts he had with WikiLeaks or any
intermediary of WikiLeaks, or about forthcoming releases of information? If yes,
describe what Stone told you and when.
h. Did you have any discussions prior to January 20, 2017, regarding a potential pardon or
other action to benefit Julian Assange? If yes, describe who you had the discussion(s) with,
when, and the content of the discussion(s).
Were you aware of any efforts by foreign individuals or companies, including those in
Russia, to assist your campaign through the use of social media postings or the organization
of rallies? If yes, identify who you discussed such assistance with, when, and the content
of the discussion(s).
I do not remember the date on which it was publicly reported that the DNC had been hacked, but
my best recollection is that I learned of the hacking at or shortly after the time it became the subject
of media reporting. I do not recall being provided any information during the campaign about the
hacking of any of the named entities or individuals before it became the subject of media reporting.
C-17
U.S. Department of Justice
I recall that in the months leading up to the election there was considerable media reporting about
the possible hacking and release of campaign-related information and there was a lot of talk aBout
this matter. At the time, I was generally aware of these media reports and may have discussed these
issues with my campaign staff or others, but at this point in time — more than two years later — I
have no recollection of any particular conversation, when it occurred, or who the participants were.
I do not recall being aware during the campaign of any communications between the individuals
named in Question II (c) and anyone I understood to be a representative oF WikiLeaks or any of
the other individuals or entities refeired to in the question.
I made the statement quoted in Question II (d) in jest and sarcastically, as was apparent to any
objective observer. The context of the statement is evident in the full reading or viewing of the
July 27, 2016 press conference, and I refer you to the publicly available transcript and video of
that press conference. I do not recall having any discussion about the substance of the statement in
advance of the press conference. I do not recall being told during the campaign of any efforts by
Russia to infiltrate or hack the computer systems or email accounts of Hillary Clinton or her
campaign prior to them becoming the subject of media reporting and I have no recollection of any
partimilar conversation in that regard.
I was in Trump Tower in New York City on October 7, 2016. I have no recollection of being told
that WikiLeaks possessed or might possess emails related to John podesta before the release of
Mr. Podesta's eniails was reported by the media. Likewise, I have no recollection of being told
that Roger Stone, anyone acting as an intermediary for Roger Stone, or anyone associated with my
campaign had communicated with WikiLeaks on October 7, 2016,
I do not recall being told during the campaign that Roger Stone or anyone associated with my
campaign had discussions with any of the engties named in the question regarding the content or
timing of release of hacked emails,
I spoke by telephone with Roger Stone from time to time during the campaign. I have no
recollection of the specifics of any conversations I had with Mr. Stone between June I, 2016 and
13
V.S, Department of Justice
//
November g, 2016. I do not recall discussing WikiLeaks with him, nor do I recall being aware of
Mr. Stone having discussed Wiki Leaks with individuals associated with my campaign, although I
was aware that WikiLeaks was the subject of media reporting and campaign-related discussion at
the time.
I do not recall having had any discussion during the campaign regarding a pardon or action to
benefit Julian Assange.
I do not recall being aware during the campaign of specific efforts by foreign individuals or
companies to assist my campaign through the use of social media postings or the organization of
rallies,
In October 2015, a "Letter of Intent," a copy of which is attached as Exhibit B, was signed
for a proposed Trump Organization project in Moscow (the "Trump Moscow project").
i. Whe n were you first informed of discussions about the Trump Moscow project?
By whom'? What were you told about the project?
b. In a statement provided to Congress, attached as Exhibit C, Michael Cohen stated: "To the
best of my knowledge, Mr. Trump was never in contact with anyone about this proposal
other than me on three occasions, including signing a non-binding letter of intent in 2015."
Describe all discussions you had with Mr. Cohen, or anyone else associated with the Trump
Organization, about the Trump Moscow project, including who you spoke with, when, and
the substance of the discussion(s).
Did you learn of any communications between Michael Cohen or Felix Sater and any
Russian government officials, including officials in the office of Dmitry Peskov, regarding
the Trump Moscow project? If so, identify who pmvided this infoimation to you, when,
and the substance of what you learned.
Did you have any discussions between June 2015 and June 2016 regarding a potential hdp
to Russia by you and/or Michael Cohen for reasons related to the Trump Moscow pmject?
If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, and the substance of the discussion(s).
Did you at any time direct or suggest that discussions about the Trump Moscow project
C-19
U.S. Department of Justice
//
should cease, or were you informed at any time that the project had been abandoned? If
yes, describe who you spoke with, when, the substance of the discussion(s), and why that
decision was made.
Did you have any discussions regarding what inforination would be provided publicly or
in response to investigative inquiries about potential or actual investments or business deals
the Trump Organization had in Russia, including the Trump Moscow project? If yes,
describe who you spoke with, when, and the substance of the discussion(s).
Aside from the Trump Moscow project, did you or the Trump Organization have any other
prospective or actual business interests, investments, or arrangements with Russia or any
Russian interest or Russian individual during the campaign? If yes, describe the business
interests, investments, or arrangements,
Sometime in 2015, Michael Cohen suggested to me the possibility of a Trump Organization project
in Moscow. As I r'ecall, Mr. Cohen described this as a proposed project of a general type we have
done in the past in a variety of locations. I signed the non-binding Letter of Intent attached to your
questions as Exhibit 8 which required no equity or expenditure on our end and was consistent with
our ongoing efforts to expand into significant markets around the world.
I had few conversations with Mr. Cohen on this subject. As I recall, they were brief, and they were
not memorable. I was not enthused about the proposal, and I do not recall any discussion of travel
to Russia in connection with it. I do not i'emember discussing it with anyone else at the Trump
Organization, although it is possible. I do not recall being aware at the time of any communications
between Mr. Cohen or Felix Sater and any Russian government oBiciai regarding the Letter of
Intent. In the course of preparing to respond to your questIons, I have become aware that Mr.
Cohen sent an email regarding the Letter of Intent to "Mr. Peskov" at a general, public email
account, which should show there was no meaningful relationship with people in power in Russia.
I understand those docuinents already have been pmvided to you.
I vaguely remember press inquiries and media reporting during the campaign about whether the
Trump Organization had business dealings in Russia. I may have spoken with campaign staff or
Trump Organization employees regarding responses to requests for information, but I have no
current recogection of any particular conversation, with whom I may have spoken, when, or the
substance of any conversation, As I recall, neither I nor the Trump Organization had any projects
or proposed projects in Russia during the campaign other than the Letter of Intent.
IV. Con t acts with Russia and Russia-Related Issues Durin the Cam ai n
Prior to mid-August 2016, did you become aware that Paul Manafort had ties to the
Uicrainian government? If yes, describe who you learned this information from, when, and
the substance of what you were told. Did Mr. Manafort's connections to the Ukrainian or
l5
C-20
U.S. Department of Justice
Russian governments play any role ln your decision to have him join your campaign? If
yes, describe that role.
Wet e you aware that Paul Manafort offered briefings on the progress of your campaign to
Oleg Deripaska? If yes, describe who you learned this information from, when, the
substarrce of what you were told, what you understood the purpose vvas of sharing such
information with Mr. Deripaska, and how you responded to learning this information.
Were you aware of whether Paul Manafort or anyone else associated with your campaign
sent or directed others to send internal Trump campaign information to any person located
in Ukraine or Russia or associated with the Ukrainian or Russian governments'? If yes,
identify wbo provided you with this information, when, the substance of the discussion(s),
whatyou understood the purpose was ofsharing the internal campaign information,and
how you responded to learning this information.
d. Did Paul Manafort communicate to you, directly or indirectly, any positions Ukraine or
Russia would want the U.S. to support? If yes, describe wlien he communicated those
positions to you and the substance of those communications.
During the campaign, were you told about efforts by Russian officials to meet with you or
senior members of your campaign'? If yes, describe who you had conversations with on this
topic, when, and what you were told.
What role, if any, did you have in changing the Republican Party platform regarding
arming Ukraine during the Republican National Convention'/ Prior to the convention, what
information did you have about this platform provision"! Alter the platform provision was
changed, who told you about the change, when did they tell you, what were you told about
why it was changed, and who was involved?
On July 27, 2016, in response to a question about whether you would recognize Crimea as
Russian territory and lift sanctions on Russia, you said: "We' ll be looking at that. Yeah, .
we' ll be looking," Did you intend to communicate by that statement or at any other time
during the campaign a willingness to IIII sanctions and/or recognize Russia's annexation
of Crimea if you were elected?
i. Wha t consideration did you give to lifting sanctions and/or recognizing Russia's
annexation of Crimea if you were elected'? Describe who you spoke with about this
topic, when, the substance of the discussion(s).
Mr. Manafort was hired primarily because of his delegate work for prior presidential candidates,
including Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Bob Dole. I knew that Mr,
Manafort had done international consulting work and, at some time before Mr. Manafort left the
16
U.S. Department of Justice
//
campaign, I learned that he was somehow involved with individuals concerning Ukraine, but I do
not remember the specifics of what I knew at the time.
I do not recall being told during the campaign of efforts by Russian officials to meet with me or
with senior members of my campaign, In the process of preparing to respond to these questions, I
became aware that on March 17, 2016, my assistant at the Trump Organization, Rhona Gratf,
received an email from a Sergei Prikhodko, who identified himself as Deputy Prime Minister of
the Russian Federation, Foundation Roscongress, inviting me to participate in the St. Petersburg
International Economic Forum to be held in June 2016, The documents show that Ms. Gruff
prepared for my signature a brief response declining the invitation. I understand these documents
already have been produced to you.
I have no recollection of the details of what, when, or from what source I first learned about the
change to the platform amendment regarding arming Ukraine, but I generally recall learning of the
issue as part of media reporting. I do not recalJ being involved in changing the language to the
amendment.
Were you asked to attend the World Chess Championship gala on November 10, 2016? If
yes, who asked you to attend, when were you asked, and what were you told about about
[sic] why your presence was requested?
i. Did you attend any part of the event? If yes, describe any interactions you had with
any Russians or representatives of the Russian govern ment attheevent,
U.S. Department of Justice
II
I do not remember having been asked to attend the World Chess Championship gala, and I did not
attend the event. During the course of preparing to respond to these questions, I have become
aware of documents indicating that in March of 2016, the president of the World Chess Federation
invited the Tmmp Organization to host, at Trump Tower, the 2016 World Chess Championship
Match to be held in New York in November 2016. I have also become aware that in November
2016, there were press inquiries to my staff regarding whether I had plans to attend the tournament,
which was not being held at Trump Tower. I understand these documents have already been
provided to you.
E N essstgalgP, rois
DON D J . TRUMP
President of the United States
18
U.S. Department of Justice
Appendix 0
V.S. Department af Justice
U.S. Department of Justice
//
AFFKNaix D,
This appendix identifies matters transferred or referred by the Special Counsel's Office, as
well as cases prosecuted by the Office that are now completed.
A. Transfers
The Special Counsel's Office has concluded its investigation into links and coordination
between the Ru'ssian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign. Certain
m atter
sassigned ta the Office by theActing Attorney Generalhave natfully concluded as ofthe
date of this report. After consultation with the Oifice of the Deputy Attorney General, the Office
has transferred responsibility for those matters to other components of the Department af Justice
and the FBI. Those transfers include:
US. Attorney 's Off ice for the Eastern District of Virginia
(Awaiting trial)
The Acting Attorney General authorized the Special Counsel to investigate, among other
things, possible criminal conduct by Michael Flynn in acting as an unregistered agent for the
Government of Turkey. See August 2,2017 Memorandum fmm Rod J.Rosenstein to RobertS.
Mueller, III. The Acting Attorney General later confirmed the Special Counsel's authority to
investigate Rafiekian and Alptekin because they "may have been jointly involved" with Flynn in
FARA-related crimes. See October 20, 2017 Memorandum from Associate Deputy Attorney
General Scott Schools to Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein.
On December I, 2017, Flynn pleaded guilty to an Information charging him with making
false statements to the FBI about his contacts with the Russian ambassador to the United States.
As IMrt of that plea„Flynn agreedto a Statement of the Offense in which he acknowledged that
the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) documents he filed an March 7, 2017 "contained
materially false statements and omissions." Flynn's plea occurred before the Special Counsel had
made a final decision on whether ta charge Rafiekian or Alptekin. On March 27, 2018, after
consultation with the Ofiice of the Deputy Attorney General, the Special Counsel's Ofiice referred,
the investigation of Rafiekian and Alptekin to the National Security Division (NSD) for any action
it deemed appropriate, The Special Counsel's Office determined the referral was appropriate
because the investigation of Flynn had been completed, and that investigation had provided the
rationale for the Office's investigation of Rafiekian and Alptekin. At NSD's request, the Eastern
District of Virginia continued the investigation of Rafiekian and Alptekin.
2. Un ited States v. Michael Fl n
The Acting Attorney Gene'ral authorized the Special Counsel to investigate aspects of
Patten's conduct that related to another matter that was under investigation by the Office, The
investigation uncovered evidence of a crime; the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of
Columbia handled the prosecution of Patten.
9 .
• • • •
(Investigation ongoing)
The Acting Attorney General authorized the Special Counsel to investigate, among other
things„crime or crimes arising out of payments Paul Manafort received Irom the Ukrainian
government before and during the tenure of President Viktor Yanukovych. SeeAugust 2, 2017
Memorandum from Rod J. Rosenstein to Robed S. Mueller, III. The Acting Attorney General
' One defendant, Concord Management tk Consulting LLC, appeared through counsel and is in pre-
trial litigation.
U.S. Department of Justice
//
On October 27, 2017, Paul Manafort and Richard Gates were charged in the District of
Columbia with various crimes (including FARA) in connection with work they performed for
Russia-backed political entities in Ukraine. On February 22, 2018, Manafort and Gates were
charged in the Eastern District of Virginia with various other crimes in connection with the
payments they received for work performed for Russia-backed political entities in Ukraine.
During the course of its , the Special Counsel's Office develo ed substantial
evidence with respect to individuals and entities that wer
On February 23, 2018, Gates pleaded guilty in the District of Columbia to a multi-
object conspiracy and to making false statements; the remaining charges against Gates were
dismissed. Thereafter, in consultation with the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the Special
Counsel's OI5ce' closed the ' e ' ' and referred themg+ for further +g
investigation as it deemed appropriate. The Office based its decision to close those matters on its
mandate, the indictments'of Menafort, Gates's plea, and its determination as to how best to allocate
its resources, among other reasons;
At • • •• • • ,
continued
the investigation of those closed matters.
11, • • • • •
(Investigation ongoing)
B. Referrals
During the course of the investigation, the Office periodically identified evidence of
potential criminal activity that was outside the scope of the Special Cbunsel's jurisdiction
established by the Acting Attorney General. Afier consultation with the Office of the Deputy
Attorney General, the Office referred that evidence to appropriate law enforcement authorities,
prinoipally other components of the Department of Justice and the FBI. Those referrals, listed
• • • • •
' Manafort was ultimately convicted at trial in the Eastern District of Virginia and pleaded guilty
in the District of Columbia. See Vol. I, Section IV.A.8. The trial and plea happened after the transfer
decision described here.
U.S. Department of Justice
II
I. •
o • ••
2. Michael Cohen
During the oourse of the investigation, the Special Counsel's Office uncovered evidence
of potential wire fraud and FECA violations pertaining to Michael Cohen. That evidence was
referred to the U.S. Attorney's OAice for the Southern District of New York and the FBI's New
York Field Office.
• • a
4 RQR
• • a•
During the course of the FARA investigation of Paul Manafort and Rick Gates, the Special
C I' Oft i d id f p t tid F A RAvi I ' m p m i ' g t ~
Gregory Craig, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher dt Flom LLP (Skadden), and their work on behalf
of the government of Ukraine.
• • • a •
D-4
U.S. Department of lustice
Il
• e •• •
• • • •
• • • •
• • • • •
10.
• • • s •
• • •
• • • •
13. •
• • • •
U.S. Department of Justice
• • • •
• a ••
• • • •
C. Completed Prosecutions
In three cases prosecuted by the Special Counsel's Office, the defendants have completed
or are about to complete their terms of imprisonment. Because no further proceedings are likely
in any case, responsibility for them has not been transferred to any other office or component.
1. United States v. Geor e Pa ado oulos
Post-conviction, Completed term of impi isonment (December 7, 2018)
2. United States v. Alex van derZwaan
Post-conviction, Completed term of imprisonment (June 4, 2018)