Character Assassination
Character Assassination
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Character assassination.
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Sergei A Samoilenko
George Mason University
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image both of the West and of the Russian opposition (Gatov 2015:
12–4; Yakovlev 2015).
It is not easy to analyse chernukha merely by tracing the sources
of negative campaigning. Since its production usually breaches some
legislative norms and violates others, the producers of chernukha will
in most instances either deny their authorship of it or claim that they
were framed. Even so, it is possible to research chernukha by means of
in-depth interviews with experts and political technologists. In addi-
tion, opinion polls held before and after a defamation campaign make it
possible to assess what impact chernukha has had on the general public.
Opinion polls with specifically tailored questions may help to identify the
key stereotypes used in the production of chernukha and how they have
changed over time.
Chernukha is closely intertwined with a number of informal prac-
tices such as krugovaia poruka (joint responsibility, see 3.10 Volume 1)
and the use of kompromat, both of which are integral to the workings
of informal networks in contemporary Russia. In competitive elections,
negative campaigning has the potential to affect the balance between
parties and candidates. In societies with the rule of law and independent
media, it may be helpful for voters to learn in detail about the political
agenda of a vilified candidate (Fernandes 2013: 286). In the context of
the abuse of law and media manipulation, however, chernukha practices
are more likely to create popular distrust in the media, public institutions
and the electoral process and to lead to a state of cynicism that will make
it increasingly hard for public figures to win the trust of the electorate or
to persuade voters to take an active interest in politics (Ansolabehere and
Iyenger 1996).
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Western politics, ‘black PR’ is best known for using compromising materi-
als (see kompromat, 8.4 in this volume) about politicians and other pub-
lic figures. These ‘black PR’ techniques were used in 2014 during regional
elections in Russia. Examples included compromising material about the
alleged criminal connections or past conviction of candidates, as well as
information about their wealth, property and income. Such materials
were used for a variety of purposes, including creating negative publicity,
blackmailing and ensuring loyalty. The wave of kompromat was gener-
ated not only by the demands of the media owners, but also by the jour-
nalists themselves. Credible falsehoods, transcripts of taped telephone
conversations and pseudo-events were thrown to the press in the guise
of ‘news’. This questionable practice was able to flourish under Russian
law, as journalists were not obliged to reveal their sources, except when
ordered to do so by a court. Russian news reports showed compromising
materials in a biased or incomplete way. The aim was not only to report
negative news about an individual or an organisation, but the intent was
also to obfuscate and confuse the viewer.
Fundamentally, an attack on one’s image, reputation or brand is
dependent on audience perception. Studies in the field of motivated rea-
soning (Icks and Shiraev 2014) show that consumers are highly selective
regarding what they deem is ‘credible’ information, preferring to accept
what is most congruent with existing attitudes, expectations or actions.
Five strategies of ‘image restoration’ for victims have been identified.
Suggested responses include ‘denial’, ‘evading responsibility’, ‘reducing
offensiveness’, ‘corrective action’, and ‘mortification’ (Benoit 1995). This
image restoration theory is used to mitigate image damage following a
threat to a reputation. As well as the strategies mentioned above, other
tactics might also include attacks on the accuser.
Situational crisis communication theory (Coombs 2007) suggests
that the level of reputation threat is determined by whether the public
believes the organisation caused the crisis, is dependent on the organi-
sation’s crisis history and the organisation’s prior relational reputation
with the public. Unfortunately for the victim, crises serve as an excel-
lent source of news material. Dramatic events often draw the attention
of the media industry whose sole purpose is to shock their audience and
to sensationalise events by showing them in a tragic or politicised con-
text. It is evident that character assassination techniques are increasingly
employed in the news media along with ‘hate speech’ and other methods
of psychological warfare. The surge of hype, hysteria and sensationalism
in the media is particularly evident when events are positioned as major
threats to national security, political stability or foreign policy. The rise of
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