Academic freedon

Miriam College Foundation, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

Academic Freedom; Schools and Colleges; Academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to
decide for itself its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference
save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint.—Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the
Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic
freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to
attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for
some restraint. The essential freedoms subsumed in the term “academic freedom” encompasses the freedom to
determine for itself on academic grounds: (1) Who may teach, (2) What may be taught, (3) How it shall be
taught, and (4) Who may be admitted to study. The right of the school to discipline its students is at once
apparent in the third freedom, i.e., “how it shall be taught.” A school certainly cannot function in an atmosphere
of anarchy.

Valmores vs. Achacoso 2017

Same; Same; The Constitution guarantees the freedom to believe absolutely, while the freedom to act
based on belief is subject to regulation by the State when necessary to protect the rights of others and in the
interest of public welfare.—In a nutshell, the Constitution guarantees the freedom to believe absolutely, while
the freedom to act based on belief is subject to regulation by the State when necessary to protect the rights of
others and in the interest of public welfare. Today, religion has transcended mere rubric and has permeated into
every sphere of human undertaking. As a result, religious freedom, to a limited extent, has come under the
regulatory power of the State. In 2010, the CHED institutionalized the framework for operationalizing Section
5, Article III of the 1987 Constitution vis-à-vis the academic freedom of higher education institutions (HEIs),
pursuant to its statutory power to formulate policies, priorities, and programs on higher education in both
public and private HEIs.

Same; Same; Academic Freedom; Freedom of Religion; The Commission on Higher Education (CHED)
imposed a positive duty on all Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) to exempt students, as well as faculty
members, from academic activities in case such activities interfere with their religious obligations.—At once, a
plain reading of the memorandum reveals the ministerial nature of the duty imposed upon HEIs. Its policy is
crystal clear: a student’s religious obligations takes precedence over his academic responsibilities, consonant
with the constitutional guarantee of free exercise and enjoyment of religious worship. Accordingly, the CHED
imposed a positive duty on all HEIs to exempt students, as well as faculty members, from academic activities in
case such activities interfere with their religious obligations.

Cudia vs. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) 2015
Same; Same; Academic Freedom; Philippine Military Academy; As the premiere military educational
institution of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in accordance with Section 30, Article III of
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 1 and Sections 58 and 59, Chapter 9, Subtitle II, Title VIII, Book IV of Executive
Order (EO) No. 292 (“Administrative Code of 1987”), the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) is an institution
that enjoys academic freedom guaranteed by Section 5(2), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.—As the
premiere military educational institution of the AFP in accordance with Section 30, Article III of C.A. No. 1 and
Sections 58 and 59, Chapter 9, Subtitle II, Title VIII, Book IV of E.O. No. 292 (“Administrative Code of 1987”),
the PMA is an institution that enjoys academic freedom guaranteed by Section 5(2), Article XIV of the 1987
Constitution. In Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 348 SCRA 265 (2000), it was held that
concomitant with such freedom is the right and duty to instill and impose discipline upon its students. Also,
consistent with Isabelo, Jr. v. Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc., 227 SCRA 591 (1993), and Ateneo de Manila
University v. Capulong, 222 SCRA 644 (1993), the PMA has the freedom on who to admit (and, conversely, to
expel) given the high degree of discipline and honor expected from its students who are to form part of the AFP.
For respondents, Cadet 1CL Cudia cannot, therefore, belatedly assail the Honor Code as basis of the HC’s
decision to recommend his dismissal from the PMA. When he enlisted for enrolment and studied in the PMA for
four years, he knew or should have been fully aware of the standards of discipline imposed on all cadets and the
corresponding penalty for failing to abide by these standards.
Same; Academic Freedom; School-Student Relationship; The Supreme Court (SC) has ruled that the
school-student relationship is contractual in nature; Such contract is imbued with public interest because of the
Academic freedon

high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory
powers over all educational institutions.—We have ruled that the school-student relationship is contractual in
nature. Once admitted, a student’s enrolment is not only semestral in duration but for the entire period he or
she is expected to complete it. An institution of learning has an obligation to afford its students a fair
opportunity to complete the course they seek to pursue. Such contract is imbued with public interest because of
the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory
powers over all educational institutions.
Same; Same; Same; The school undertakes to provide students with education sufficient to enable them to
pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the students agree to abide by the academic
requirements of the school and to observe its rules and regulations.—The school-student relationship has also
been held as reciprocal. “[It] has consequences appurtenant to and inherent in all contracts of such kind — it
gives rise to bilateral or reciprocal rights and obligations. The school undertakes to provide students with
education sufficient to enable them to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the students
agree to abide by the academic requirements of the school and to observe its rules and regulations.”
Same; Same; Same; An educational institution has the power to adopt and enforce such rules as may be
deemed expedient for its government, this being incident to the very object of incorporation, and indispensable
to the successful management of the college.—Academic freedom or, to be precise, the institutional autonomy of
universities and institutions of higher learning, has been enshrined in our Constitutions of 1935, 1973, and
1987. In Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, 68 SCRA 277 (1975), this
Court espoused the concurring opinion of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter in Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957), which enumerated “the four essential freedoms” of a university: To determine
for itself on academic grounds (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall be taught, and (4)
who may be admitted to study. An educational institution has the power to adopt and enforce such rules as may
be deemed expedient for its government, this being incident to the very object of incorporation, and
indispensable to the successful management of the college. It can decide for itself its aims and objectives and
how best to attain them, free from outside coercion or interference except when there is an overriding public
welfare which would call for some restraint. Indeed, “academic freedom has never been meant to be an
unabridged license. It is a privilege that assumes a correlative duty to exercise it responsibly. An equally telling
precept is a long recognized mandate, so well expressed in Article 19 of the Civil Code, that every ‘person must,
in the exercise of his rights and in the perform-

GERALDINE MICHELLE B. FALLARME and ANDREA MARTINEZ-GACOS, petitioners, vs. SAN JUAN DE DIOS
EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION, INC., CHONA M. HERNANDEZ, VALERIANO ALEJANDRO III, SISTER CONCEPTION
GABATINO, D.C., and SISTER JOSEFINA QUIACHON, D.C., respondents. 2016

Same; Same; Same; Academic Freedom; The determination of whether the performance of probationary
teaching personnel has been sufficiently satisfactory as to warrant their regularization lies in the hands of the
schoolpursuant to its administrative prerogative, which is an extension of its academic freedom under Section 5(2),
Article XIV of the Constitution.—Indeed, the determination of whether the performance of probationary teaching
personnel has been sufficiently satisfactory as to warrant their regularization lies in the hands of the school
pursuant to its administrative prerogative, which is an extension of its academic freedom under Section 5(2),
Article XIV of the Constitution. Academic freedom gives the school the discretion and the prerogative to impose
standards on its teachers and to determine whether these have been met upon the conclusion of the probationary
period. It must be pointed out that the school’s exercise of administrative prerogative in this respect is not plenary
as respondents would like us to believe. The exercise of that prerogative is still subject to the limitations imposed
by the Labor Code and jurisprudence on valid probationary employment.

UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN, INC., SISTER CONCEPCION CAJILIG, NENALYN ABIODA, MARY ESPINO,
RHODORA AZUCENA, MA. DULCE SOCORRO POSA and COSETTE MONTEBLANCO, petitioners, vs.COURT OF
APPEALS, ANTONIO H. LARA, EDUARDO MAGANTE, JOSE SANCHO, REYNALDA F. SO and WINNEFRIDA C.
VALENZUELA, as parents/guardians of Antonio Marco Ho, Ma. Elanie Magante, Roy D. Sancho,
Michael Kim So and Bernardina Cainoy, respondents. 1994
Academic freedon

Schools and Colleges; Academic Freedom; Moot and Academic; Even if a case were moot and academic, a
statement of the governing principle is appropriate in the resolution of dismissal for the guidance of the parties
and others similarly situated.—The petition which was filed by private respondents before the trial court sought
the issuance of a writ of mandamus, to command petitioners to admit them for enrolment. Taking into account
the admission of private respondents that they have finished their Nursing course at the Lanting College of
Nursing even before the promulgation of the questioned decision, this case has clearly been overtaken by events
and should therefore be dismissed. However, the case of Eastern Broadcasting Corporation (DYRE) v. Dans,
etc., et al. is the authority for the view that “even if a case were moot and academic, a statement of the
governing principle is appropriate in the resolution of dismissal for the guidance not only of the parties but of
others similarly situated. We shall adhere to this view and proceed to dwell on the merits of this petition.

Tan Vs. CA 1991

Schools and Colleges; Academic Freedom; The academic freedom of the school to choose its students should
not be stretched beyond its constitutional limits.—At any rate, there should be no question that not every
complaint of the parents is per seunreasonable. It should not follow that because their complaints have strained
their relations with the school, their children can on that score alone be denied reenrollment. I am also thinking
of another situation that could perhaps cause us more serious concern unless we define narrow perimeters for
the doctrine. We have said often enough, most recently in Non v. Dames, 185 SCRA 523, that the enrollment of
the student does not connote the forfeiture of his constitutional rights, which he does not leave at the “gateposts
of the school.” My fear is that in exercising such rights, he may offend the sensibilities of the school and
consequently become persona non grata. Shall we, following the said doctrine, sustain the school when it refuses
him re-admission for the sake of peace on the campus? I submit that in this and similar cases—including the
case at bar—the academic freedom of the school to choose its students should not be stretched beyond its
constitutional limits.

Calawag vs. University of the Philippines Visayas 2013

Same; Academic Freedom; The academic freedom accorded to institutions of higher learning gives them the
right to decide for themselves their aims and objectives and how best to attain them.—Verily, the academic
freedom accorded to institutions of higher learning gives them the right to decide for themselves their aims and
objectives and how best to attain them. They are given the exclusive discretion to determine who can and cannot
study in them, as well as to whom they can confer the honor and distinction of being their graduates. This
necessarily includes the prerogative to establish requirements for graduation, such as the completion of a thesis,
and the manner by which this shall be accomplished by their students. The courts may not interfere with their
exercise of discretion unless there is a clear showing that they have arbitrarily and capriciously exercised their
judgment.375