Professional Documents
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Civil Case Digests (Art. 35 Onwards)
Civil Case Digests (Art. 35 Onwards)
or void. Thus all elements of bigamy were alleged in the Information. WON judicial declaration is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
1. MONTANEZ vs. CIPRIANO Based on the Information, the annulment of the 1st marriage was only marriage. NO
G.R No. 181089 declared in 2003.
October 22, 2012 HELD:
In several cases, it was held that the subsequent judicial declaration of The Court held that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view
DOCTRINE: The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage nullity of the 1st marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration, of the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a
would not change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the the bigamy had already been consummated. Even if the accused marriage license. That there was no judicial declaration that the first marriage
subsistence of the first marriage. eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab was void ab initio before the second marriage was contracted is immaterial as
initio, the point is, the first and second marriage were subsisting. The this is not a requirement under the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the subsequent
FACTS: moment the accused contracted a 2nd marriage without the previous one Decision of the RTC declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only serves to
Cipriano married Socrates on 1976 in Aklan. On 1983, Cipriano married being judicially declared null and void, bigamy was already strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.
Silverio Cipriano during the subsistence of the first marriage. Respondent then consummated. Here, at the time of the 2nd marriage, the first was still
filed a Petition for Annulment of her first marriage with Socrates on the grounds subsisting. Thus bigamy was properly charge to her. The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in
of psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code. Such marriage accordance with the law in effect at the time of its celebration. In this case,
was then declared null and void. Respondent claims that the legal basis is not applicable since the the law in force at the time Lea contracted both marriages was the Civil Code.
declaration of nullity came before the filing of information. But what The children of the parties were also born while the Civil Code was in effect i.e.
Montanez, Silverio’s daughter from a previous marriage, filed a case for makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a 2 nd in 1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must resolve this case using the
Bigamy against Cipriano. This was with an affidavit stating that respondent marriage during the subsistence of the first. provisions under the Civil Code on void marriages, in particular, Articles 80, 81,
failed to reveal to Silverio that she was still married to Socrates. Cipriano then 82, and 83 (first paragraph); and those on voidable marriages are Articles 83
alleged that her marriage with Socrates had already been declared void and 2. In this case, respondent wants to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of (second paragraph), 85 and 86.
thus there was no more marriage to speak of. the first marriage and invoke it to prevent prosecution for bigamy. Such
is not possible. A party may enter into a marriage license and thereafter Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in
ISSUES: contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity the following ways:
1. WON – the declaration of nullity of respondent’s first marriage justifies of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void.
the dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against respondent. NO a) a void marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage from
the beginning - while in a voidable marriage, the marriage is valid
2. WON – the RTC erred in stating that the jurisprudence prior to the Family until annulled by a competent court;
Code and in Wiegel regarding the necessity of a declaration of nullity is 2. CASTILLO v. CASTILLO
ambivalent such that a person was allowed to enter a subsequent G.R No. 189607 b) a void marriage cannot be ratified, while a voidable marriage can
marriage without annulment of the first, without incurring criminal April18, 2016 be ratified by cohabitation;
liability. NO
DOCTRINE: The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined c) being nonexistent, a void marriage can be collaterally attacked,
HELD: in accordance with the law in effect at the time of its celebration while a voidable marriage cannot be collaterally attacked;
1. Respondent is liable for bigamy.
Note: The marriages in this case BOTH took place prior to the effectivity of the d) in a void marriage, there is no conjugal partnership and the
The elements of bigamy are that: Family Code. offspring are natural children by legal fiction, while in voidable
a) offender has been legally married marriage there is conjugal partnership and the children conceived
b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or in case FACTS: before the decree of annulment are considered legitimate; and
his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin
not yet be presumed dead Bautista (Bautista). On 6 January 1979, respondent married herein petitioner e) "In a void marriage no judicial decree to establish the
c) he contracts a subsequent marriage, and Renato A. Castillo (Renato). invalidity is necessary," while in a voidable marriage there
d) the subsequent marriage has all the requisites for must be a judicial decree.
validity. On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage, praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases of People v.
It is consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage. What her subsisting marriage to Bautista. Respondent opposed the Petition, and Mendoza, People v. Aragon, and Odayat v. Amante, that the Civil Code
is essential for the prosecution of bigamy is that the alleged second contended that her marriage to Bautista was null and void as they had not contains no express provision on the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity
marriage, having all the requirements, would be valid were it not for the secured any license therefor, and neither of them was a member of the of a void marriage.
subsistence of the first marriage. denomination to which the solemnizing officer belonged.
It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code rendered
In this case, when respondent contracted the 2nd marriage with Silverio, ISSUE: the rulings in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon inapplicable to marriages
her 1st marriage was still subsisting and had not been declared annulled celebrated after 3 August 1988. A judicial declaration of absolute nullity
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage Sec. 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a decision
against respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the
Family Code. decree of absolute nullity or decree
of annulment shall be issued by the court only
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag) submitted a psychological report establishing after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family
that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation,
Partition and Distribution of Properties.
30. SSS vs. CANDELARIA D. DAVAC It may be true that the purpose of the coverage under the Social Security
29. EMILIE T. SUMBAD vs. CA G.R. No. L-21642 System is protection of the employee as well as of his family, but this purpose
G.R. No. 106060 July 30, 1966 or intention of the law cannot be enforced to the extent of contradicting the very
June 21, 1999 provisions of said law as contained in Section 13, thereof. When the provisions
DOCTRINE: of a law are clear and explicit, the courts can do nothing but apply its clear and
DOCTRINE: If there is a named beneficiary and the designation is not invalid (as it is not so explicit provisions.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue for the in this case), it is not the heirs of the employee who are entitled to receive the
first time on appeal as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and benefits (unless they are the designated beneficiaries themselves). It is only
justice. when there is no designated beneficiary or when the designation is void, that 31. CIRILA ARCABA vs. ERLINDA TABANCURA vda. DE
Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either DOCTRINE: Thus, Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn
spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring
community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property public or private lands in the Philippines, save only in constitutionally private and public lands in the Philippines. In any event, he had and has no
of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of recognized exceptions. capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay
conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising
make advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse. FACTS: the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such
On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A. Taylor (Benjamin), a British a theory would countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional
subject, married Joselyn C. Taylor (Joselyn), a 17-year old Filipina. On June 9, prohibition.
39. SPS. DAR vs. HON. ROSE MARIE ALONZO-LEGASTO 1989, while their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought from Diosa M. Martin
G.R. No. 143016 a 1,294 square-meter lot (Boracay property) situated at Manoc-Manoc, 41. HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. vs. ESTER SERVACIO
August 30, 2000 Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, for and in consideration of ₱129,000.00. The G.R. No. 157537
sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin. Joselyn and Benjamin, also using September 7, 2011
DOCTRINE: the latter’s funds, constructed improvements thereon and eventually converted
Circular No. 28-91 was designed to serve as an instrument to promote and the property to a vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow FACTS:
facilitate the orderly administration of justice and should not be interpreted with Inn. In 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land to Protacio B. Go, Jr.
such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective (Protacio, Jr.). Twenty three years later, or on March 29, 1999, Protacio, Jr.
or the goal of all rules of procedure - which is to achieve substantial justice as However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver, whereby he affirmed under
expeditiously as possible. Kim Philippsen. On June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed an SPA in favor of oath that it was his father, Protacio Go, Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he, who had
Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and purchased the two parcels of land.
FACTS: otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect to their Boracay
Nenita Co Bautista filed a case for unlawful detainer against herein petitioners. property. On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews In 1987, Marta Barola Go died. She was the wife of Protacio, Sr. and mother
They were sued as Mr. and Mrs. in the said case. Petitioners now contend that as lessee, entered into an Agreement of Lease involving the Boracay property of the petitioners. On December 28, 1999, Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. Go
since what is involved in the instant case is their common rights and interest to for a period of 25 years, with an annual rental of ₱12,000.00. The agreement sold a portion of the property to Ester L. Servacio. In 2001, the petitioners
abode under the system of absolute community of property, either of the was signed by the parties and executed before a Notary Public. Petitioner demanded the return of the property, but Servacio refused to heed their
spouses can sign the petition. thereafter took possession of the property and renamed the resort as Music demand. The petitioners averred that following Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation, the
Garden Resort. property became conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to
ISSUE: Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community property between
Whether or not the petition is dismissible when the spouses of petitioners failed Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void.
to sign the Certificate of Non-forum Shopping. NO Joselyn without his (Benjamin’s) consent, Benjamin instituted an action for
Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages against Joselyn Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had exclusively owned the
RULING: and the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the acquisition property because he had purchased it with his own money.
Revised Circular No. 28-91, dated February 8, 1994 applies to and governs the and improvement of the Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he
filing of petitions in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and is intended was Joselyn’s husband, any transaction involving said property required his Servacio and Rito both argue that Article 130 of the Family Code was
to prevent the multiple filing of petitions or complaints involving the same issues consent. inapplicable; that the want of the liquidation prior to the sale did not render the
in other tribunals or agencies as a form of forum shopping. sale invalid, because the sale was valid to the extent of the portion that was
ISSUE: finally allotted to the vendors as his share; and that the sale did not also
With respect to the contents of the certification which the pleader may prepare, Whether or not the consent of the foreign spouse is indispensable for the prejudice any rights of the petitioners as heirs, considering that what the sale
the rule of substantial compliance may be availed of. While this section requires validity of the agreement. NO disposed of was within the aliquot portion of the property that the vendors were
that it be strictly complied with, it merely underscores its mandatory nature in entitled to as heirs.
that it cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely RULING:
disregarded but it does not thereby prevent substantial compliance on this The trial and appellate courts both focused on the property relations of ISSUE:
aspect of its provisions under justifiable circumstances. petitioner and respondent in light of the Civil Code and Family Code provisions. W/N the sale of the property to Servacio is void? NO
They, however, failed to observe the applicable constitutional principles, which, HELD:
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals should have taken into consideration in fact, are the more decisive. Article 130 of the Family Code reads:
the fact that the petitioners were sued jointly, or as Mr. and Mrs. over a property
Aside from the assertions of Elenita that the sale of the property by her father HELD: Several properties are the subject of dispute between the parties. Petitioner is
and her aunt was in the nature of a donation because of the alleged gross Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the marriage is contending that the subject properties are not part of the conjugal partnership
disparity between the actual value of the property and the monetary presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it of Nicolas and his legal wife, Eusebia, but under the regime of co-ownership
consideration for the sale, there is no other evidence that would convince this pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." However, the party who between Nicolas and petitioner’s mother, Pacita.
Court of the paraphernal character of the property. Elenita proffered no invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was
evidence of the market value or assessed value of the subject property in 1975. acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a The RTC ruled that the properties are conjugal properties of Nicolas and
Thus, we agree with the CA that Elenita has not sufficiently proven that the condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the Eusebia in accordance with Article 116 of the FC. That the documents and
prices involved in the sales in question were so inadequate for the Court to conjugal partnership. The party who asserts this presumption must first prove other evidence Eusebia presented constitute "solid evidence" which proved
reach a conclusion that the transfers were in the nature of a donation rather said time element. Needless to say, the presumption refers only to the property that the subject properties were acquired during her marriage with Nicolas. On
than a sale. Hence, the property belongs to the conjugal partnership. acquired during the marriage and does not operate when there is no showing the other hand, the trial court found that petitioners failed to meet the standard
as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, this of proof required to maintain their claim that the subject properties are
presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and paraphernal properties of Nicolas. The trial court added that Pacita presented
51. ANTONIA R. DELA PEÑA and ALVIN JOHN B. DELA PEÑA vs. convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof of exclusive ownership of one no "factual solidity" to support her claim that she bought Lot No. 152 exclusively
GEMMA REMILYN C. AVILA and FAR EAST BANK & TRUST of the spouses. with her own money. On appeal, the CA affirmed.
CO.
G.R. No. 187490 As the parties invoking the presumption of conjugality under Article 160 of the ISSUE:
February 8, 2012 Civil Code, the Dela Peñas did not even come close to proving that the subject WON the subject properties are conjugal properties of Nicolas and Eusebia.
property was acquired during the marriage between Antonia and Antegono. YES
FACTS: Beyond Antonia’s bare and uncorroborated assertion that the property was
Petitioner Antonia Dela Pena obtained from A.C.Aguila & Sons, Co. a loan. purchased when she was already married, the record is bereft of any evidence HELD:
She executed a promissory note and a notarized Deed of Real Estate from which the actual date of acquisition of the realty can be ascertained. When The tax declarations covering the subject properties, along with the unrebutted
Mortgage over a 277 square meter parcel of residential land, registered in the queried about the matter during his cross-examination, even Alvin (son of testimony of Eusebia’s witnesses, establish the fact that the properties are
name of petitioner “Antonia R. Dela Peña, married to Antegono A. Dela Peña. spouses) admitted that his sole basis for saying that the property was owned conjugal. Moreover, on whether Lot No. 152 is conjugal or not, the answer
Antonia thereafter executed a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale over the same by his parents was Antonia’s unilateral pronouncement to the effect. came from petitioners themselves. Nicolas and Eusebia were married on 7
property in favor of respondent Gemma Avila. Utilizing the document, Gemma Considering that the presumption of conjugality does not operate if there is no October 1926. Nicolas and Pacita started cohabiting in 1936. Eusebia died on
caused the issuance of a new naming her as the owner of the subject realty. showing of when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired, the realty 23 November 1996. Pacita and Nicolas were married on 16 December 1996.
After which, Gemma also constituted a real estate mortgage over said parcel in litigation was Antonia’s exclusive property. Petitioners themselves admit that Lot No. 152 was purchased on 4 October
in favor of respondent FEBTC-BPI, to secure a loan facility. 1957. The date of acquisition of Lot No. 152 is clearly during the marriage of
The Dela Peñas insist that the registration thereof in the name of "Antonia R. Nicolas and Eusebia.
Petitioner Antonia filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina an Affidavit of Dela Peña, of legal age, Filipino, married to Antegono A. Dela Peña" should
Adverse Claim that she was the true and lawful owner of the property and that have already sufficiently established its conjugal nature. Confronted with the Since the subject properties, including Lot No. 152, were acquired during the
the Deed of Absolute Sale Gemma utilized in procuring her title was simulated. same issue in the case Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled, however, marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia, the presumption under Article 116 of the
On May 1998, Antonia and her son, Alvin John B. Dela Peña, filed against that the phrase "married to" is merely descriptive of the civil status of the wife Family Code is that all these are conjugal properties of Nicolas and Eusebia.
Gemma the complaint for annulment of deed of sale. Claiming that the subject and cannot be interpreted to mean that the husband is also a registered owner. The burden is on petitioners to prove that the subject properties are not
realty was conjugal property, the Dela Peñas alleged, among other matters, Because it is likewise possible that the property was acquired by the wife while conjugal. Petitioners failed to meet this standard.
that the 7 May 1996 Deed of Real Estate Mortgage Antonia executed in favor she was still single and registered only after her marriage, neither would
of Aguila was not consented to by Antegono who had, by then, already died. registration thereof in said manner constitute proof that the same was acquired Petitioner’s argument that since Nicolas and Pacita were already cohabiting
On the other hand, Gemma maintained that the realty was the exclusive during the marriage and, for said reason, to be presumed conjugal in nature. when Lot No. 152 was acquired, the lot cannot be deemed conjugal property
property of Antonia who misrepresented that her husband was still alive. "Since there is no showing as to when the property in question was acquired, of Nicolas and Eusebia, is flawed.
the fact that the title is in the name of the wife alone is determinative of its
On December 2007, the RTC went on to render a Decision finding that the nature as paraphernal, i.e., belonging exclusively to said spouse." The cohabitation of a spouse with another person, even for a long period, does
subject property was conjugal in nature and that the Deed of Absolute Sale not sever the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. The marriage of Nicolas
Antonia executed in favor of Gemma was void as a disposition without the and Eusebia continued to exist regardless of the fact that Nicolas was already
On 18 May 1998, Antonia and her son filed against Gemma the complaint for
annulment of deed, claiming that the subject realty was conjugal property.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Antonia to
Gemma is null and void.
RULING:
NO, Pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, all property of
the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Although it is
not necessary to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the
partnership, proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition
for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.
As the parties invoking the presumption of conjugality under Article 160 of the
Civil Code, the Dela Peñas did not even come close to proving that the subject
property was acquired during the marriage between Antonia and Antegono.
Beyond Antonia’s bare and uncorroborated assertion that the property was
purchased when she was already married, the record is bereft of any evidence
from which the actual date of acquisition of the realty can be ascertained. When
queried about the matter during his cross-examination, even Alvin admitted
that his sole basis for saying that the property was owned by his parents was
Antonia’s unilateral pronouncement to the effect. Considering that the
presumption of conjugality does not operate if there is no showing of when the
property alleged to be conjugal was acquired, we find that the CA cannot be
faulted for ruling that the realty in litigation was Antonia’s exclusive property.
56.
57.
58.
59.
On the same date, 24 September 1958, "Amalia Plata of legal age, Filipino,
married to Gaudencio Begosa," in consideration of a loan of P3,000,
mortgaged to Cesarea Villanueva married to Gregorio Leaño, the same
property and its improvements" of which the mortgagor declares to be hers as
the absolute owner thereof." The mortgage was also signed by Gaudencio
Begosa, as co-mortgagor.
For failure to pay the mortgage, the same was extrajudicially foreclosed and
sold on 12 April 1960 to the mortgagee as the highest bidder. On May 12,
1961, the Sheriff issued a final deed of sale on the strength of which the
Register of Deeds issued the buyer a new TCT. Subsequently, the respondent,
Villanueva, sued Gaudencio Begosa alone for illegal detainer and obtained
judgment against him in the court of first instance, which became final. A writ
of execution was duly issued, but Amalia Plata resisted all efforts to eject her
from the property, and she filed a third party claim, averring ownership of the
property. Upon motion of the judgment creditors, the court below cited both
Begosa and Plata for contempt, and, finding her explanation unsatisfactory,
found her guilty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property is the exclusive property of Amalia Plata.
YES
RULING:
Granting that the evidence before us against the marriage of petitioner Amalia
Plata to Gaudencio Begosa is weak, considering the admissions of married
status in public documents; the well-known presumption that persons openly
living together as husband and wife are legally married to each other, and that
the prior marriage of Begosa to someone else does not necessarily exclude
the possibility of a valid subsequent marriage to herein petitioner; still the
respondents Villanueva could not ignore the paraphernal character of the
property in question, which had been unquestionably acquired by Plata while
still single, as shown by the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25855 of Rizal. The
subsequent conveyance thereof to Celso Saldaña, and the reconveyance to
her several months afterward of the same property, did not transform it from
paraphernal to conjugal property, there being no proof that the money paid to
FACTS: Essentially, property already owned by a spouse prior to the marriage, and
Petitioner is the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio Francisco by his brought to the marriage, is considered his or her separate property.
second marriage. Private respondents Conchita Evangelista, Araceli F. Marilla Acquisitions by lucrative title refers to properties acquired gratuitously and
and Antonio Francisco are children of Eusebio by his first marriage. Petitioner include those acquired by either spouse during the marriage by inheritance,
alleges that since their marriage on February 10, 1962, she and Eusebio have devise, legacy, or donation. Hence, even if it be assumed that Eusebio’s
acquired the following: (1) a sari sari store, a residential house and lot, and an acquisition by succession of the land took place during his second marriage,
apartment house, all situated at Col. S. Cruz St., Barangay Balite, Rodriguez the land would still be his “exclusive property” because it was acquired by him,
(formerly Montalban), Rizal, and; (2) a house and lot at Barrio San Isidro, “during the marriage, by lucrative title.”
Rodriguez, Rizal. Petitioner further avers that these properties were
administered by Eusebio until he was invalidated on account of tuberculosis, As regards the house, apartment and sari-sari store, private respondents aver
heart disease and cancer, thereby, rendering him unfit to administer them. that these properties were either constructed or established by their father
during his first marriage. On the other hand, petitioner insists that the said
Petitioner also claims that private respondents succeeded in convincing their assets belong to conjugal partnership. In support of her claim, petitioner relied
father to sign a general power of attorney which authorized Conchita on the building permits for the house and the apartment, with her as the
Evangelista to administer the house and lot together with the apartments applicant although in the name of Eusebio. She also invoked the business
situated in Rodriguez, Rizal. license for the sari-sari store issued in her name alone.
On August 31, 1988, petitioner filed a suit for damages and for annulment of It must be emphasized that the aforementioned documents in no way prove
said general power of attorney, and thereby enjoining its enforcement. that the improvements were acquired during the second marriage. And the fact
Petitioner also sought to be declared as the administratrix of the properties in that one is the applicant or licensee is not determinative of the issue as to
dispute. In due course, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of private whether or not the property is conjugal or not.
respondents. It held that the petitioner failed to adduce proof that said
properties were acquired during the existence of the second conjugal Neither is it plausible to argue that the sari-sari store constructed on the land
partnership, or that they pertained exclusively to the petitioner. Hence, the of Eusebio Francisco has thereby become conjugal for want of evidence to
court ruled that those properties belong exclusively to Eusebio, and that he has sustain the proposition that it was constructed at the expense of their
the capacity to administer them. partnership. Normally, this absence of evidence on the source of funding will
call for the application of the presumption under Article 160 of the New Civil
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Code that the store is really conjugal but it cannot be so in this particular case
Hence, this petition. again, by reason of the dearth in proof that it was erected during the alleged
second marriage.
ISSUE:
WON the properties, subject matter of controversy, are not conjugal but the Regarding the property at San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal, private respondents
capital properties of Eusebio exclusively. YES assert that their father purchased it during the lifetime of their mother. In
contrast, petitioner claims ownership over said property inasmuch as the title
RULING: thereto is registered in the name of “Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that “all property of the marriage is Francisco.”
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” However, the party who It must be stressed that the certificate of title upon which petitioner anchors her
invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was claim is inadequate. The fact that the land was registered in the name of
FACTS:
On the 1st day of July, 1911, the plaintiff commenced an action in the Court of
First Instance of the Province of Cebu to recover from the defendant the
possession of a certain parcel of land together with the sum of P125 per month,
from the 1st day of June, 1911. The defendant presented a demurrer to said
complaint, which was overruled. Later the defendant answered, setting up a
general denial and a special defense of a counterclaim in the sum of P18,500
and for the recovery of certain jewelry, of the value of P6,000, alleged to be in
the possession of the plaintiff.
During the trial, plaintiff attempted to show that the jewels in question were
pawned to him by Domingo Franco, with the full knowledge and consent of the
defendant and that after the death of Domingo Franco, the defendant promised
to pay the amount for which, the said jewels were pawned. The defendant
positively denies all allegations. The CFI rendered a decision in favor of the
plaintiff, as to the recovery of the parcel of land. However, the court finds that
the defendant was entitled to the possession of said jewelry, and ordered the
plaintiff to return the same to her because it was established that after the death
of Domingo Franco, it appears that said jewelry was found in the same "caja"
(box) and that the key was in the possession of the defendant. It is very
doubtful, indeed, under the facts, whether the plaintiff ever obtained the actual
possession of the jewelry. Aggrieved, Plaintiff appealed such decision.
ISSUE:
Who is entitled with the ownership and right of possession of said jewelry?
LUCIA MARTINEZ
RULING:
In this case, it was admitted that the jewels in question, before the possession
of the same was given to the plaintiff, belonged to the defendant personally
and that she had inherited the same from her mother. The defendant is the
widow of Domingo Franco and was appointed as administratrix of his estate.
The record further shows that a short time before the death of Domingo Franco
he borrowed from the plaintiff the sum of P4,500 and gave as security for the
payment of said sum the jewelry described in the complaint. It is not clear
whether or not the jewelry, at the time of the execution of said document, was
in fact delivered to the plaintiff.
In view of the fact, however, that the record shows that the jewels were the
sole and separate property of the wife, acquired from her mother, and in the
absence of further proof, we must presume that they constituted a part of her
paraphernal property. As such paraphernal property she exercised dominion
over the same. (Article 1382, Civil Code.) She had the exclusive control and
management of the same, until and unless she had delivered it to her husband,
before a notary public, with the intent that the husband might administer it
properly. (Article 1384, Civil Code.) There is no proof in the record that she had
ever delivered the same to her husband, in any manner, or for any purpose.
That being true, she could not be deprived of the same by any act of her
On September 18, 1972, Katrina issued in favor of Anita Chan a check for
P55,000 which, however, was dishonored for lack of funds. Hence, Katrina was
charged with estafa before the then CFI of Pampanga but the action was
dismissed on the ground that Katrina's liability was not criminal but civil in
nature, as no estafa was committed by the issuance of the check in payment
of a pre-existing obligation. Eventually, Anita Chan and her husband Ricky
Wong filed against Katrina and her husband Romarico Henson, an action for
collection of a sum of money also in the same court. After trial, the court
promulgated a decision in favor of the Wongs. A writ of execution was
thereafter issued. Levied upon were four lots in Angeles City, including the lots
bought by Romarico. Thereafter, a public auction sale ensued and later in the
property covered by said title was extrajudicially foreclosed.
ISSUE:
WON the execution of a decision in an action for collection of sum of money
may be nullified on the ground that the real properties levied upon and sold at
public auction are the alleged exclusive properties of a husband, who did not
participate in his wife's business transactions. YES
RULING:
On the matter of ownership of the properties involved, however, the Court
disagrees with the appellate court that the said properties are exclusively
owned by Romarico. Having been acquired during the marriage, they are still
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership even though Romarico and
Katrina had been living separately. The presumption of the conjugal nature of
the properties subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing
evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the properties are
exclusively owned by Romarico.
FACTS:
On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio De Leon, then single, and the People’s Homesite
and Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell
for the purchase on installment of a lot situated in Quezon City. On April 24,
1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon. They had two children, Danilo and
Vilma. On June 22, 1970, PHHC executed a Final Deed of Sale in favor of
Bonifacio upon full payment of the price of the lot. TCT was issued on February
24, 1972 in the name of Bonifacio, “single.” On January 12, 1974, Bonifacio
sold the lot to his sister, Lita, and her husband, Felix Tarrosa. The Deed of Sale
did not bear the written consent and signature of Anita. On February 29, 1996,
Bonifacio died.
Three months later, Tarrosa spouses registered the Deed of Sale. Anita,
Danilo, and Vilma filed a reconveyance suit allegeing that Bonifacio was still
the owner of the lands. Tarrosa spouses averred that the lot Bonifacio sold to
them was his exclusive property because he was still single when he acquired
it from PHHC. They further alleged that they were not aware of the marriage
between Bonifacio and Anita at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale.
ISSUE:
WON the property that Bonifacio has purchased on installment before the
marriage although some installments were paid during the marriage would be
considered conjugal property. YES
HELD:
The subject lot which was once owned by PHHC and covered by the
Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred during the marriage of
Bonifacio and Anita. The title to the property was only passed to Bonifacio after
he had fully paid the purchase price on June 22, 1970. This full payment was
made more than 2 years after his marriage to Anita on April 24, 1968. In effect,
the property was acquired during the existence of the marriage. Hence,
ownership to the property is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership.
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner
Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo
Ching, EVP of PBM, executed security agreements on December 1980 and
March 1981 making him jointly and severally answerable with PBM’s
indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan hence filing of complaint
against PBM and Ching. The RTC rendered judgment ordering PBM and
Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount with interests.
Pending the appeal of the judgment, RTC issued writ of execution. Thereafter,
Magsajo, appointed deputy sheriff, caused the issuance and service upon
respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on 3 of their conjugal properties
on May 1982. Respondent spouses filed injunction against petitioners on the
ground that subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal
partnership. CA issued a TRP enjoining lower court from enforcing its order
paving way for the scheduled auction sale of respondent spouses conjugal
properties. A certificate of sale was issued to AIDC, being the only bidder and
was registered on July 1982.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is
considered “for the benefit of the conjugal partnership” and is it chargeable.
NO
HELD:
The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of PBM
and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching. Furthermore, AIDC
failed to prove that Ching contracted the debt for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains. PBM has a personality distinct and separate from the
family of Ching despite the fact that they happened to be stockholders of said
corporate entity. Clearly, the debt was a corporate debt and right of recourse
to Ching as surety is only to the extent of his corporate stockholdings.
Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court, “if the money or
services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as
a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as
falling within the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership”. The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the
principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. Ching only signed as a
surety for the loan contracted with AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing as a surety
is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession, it is not embarking in
a business. Hence, the conjugal partnership should not be made liable for the
surety agreement which was clearly for the benefit of PBM.
The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a benefit for the
family may have resulted when the guarantee was in favor of Ching’s
employment (prolonged tenure, appreciation of shares of stocks, prestige
enhanced) since the benefits contemplated in Art. 161 of the Civil Code must
be one directly resulting from the loan. It must not be a mere by product or a
spin off of the loan itself.
PBM has a personality which is distinct from that of Ching’s family despite their
being stockholders of the said company. The debt incurred by Ching is a
corporate debt and the right of recourse to respondent as surety is only to the
extent of his corporate stocks.
If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly
received the money and services to be used in or for his own business or his
own profession, that contract falls within the term “obligations for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership.” It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent
at the time of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract
of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services
to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if
in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated,
where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the
law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of
the conjugal partnership.
On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or
entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract
cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of
“obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” The contract of loan or
services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety
or his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a husband enters into
a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is “for the benefit of the
In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died. In one of her visits to the subject Unlike the absolute community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership
property, Miguela learned that petitioner had already employed a certain Brion apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal partnership shall be governed by
to clean its premises and that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed because Brion the rules on contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is
allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises. expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by
the spouses in their marriage settlements. Thus, the property relations of
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4
property, which was conjugal in nature, she instituted with the RTC a case on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the
for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Reconveyance against petitioner. rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply only when the
property in question was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. Family Code is silent on the matter.
ISSUE: The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge
1. WON the mortgage constituted by Marcelino Dailo on the subject and consent of his wife, Marcelino constituted a real estate mortgage on the
property as co-owner thereof is valid as to his undivided share. NO subject property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express
2. WON the conjugal partnership is liable for the payment of the loan provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority
obtained by Marcelino Dailo, the same having redounded to the benefit or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the
of the family. NO conjugal property shall be void.
HELD: The provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse who
1. Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part: makes the disposition or encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co-
ownership under Article 493 of the Civil Code does. Where the law does not
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus, the real estate mortgage on
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both the subject property for lack of respondent’s consent is null and void in its
spouses jointly. . . . entirety.
FACTS:
Paquito Ando was the president of Premier Allied and Contracting Services,
Inc. (PACSI), an independent labor contractor. Andresito Campo and the other
respondents were hired by PACSI as pilers or haulers. Respondents were
dismissed from employment, consequently filing a case for illegal dismissal and
some money claims with the NLRC.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in respondents’ favor. PACSI and Ando were directed
to pay a total of P422,702.28 (for separation pay and award of attorney’s fees).
To answer for the reward, the NLRC acting sheriff issued a Notice of Sale on
Execution of Personal Property over a property in the name of “Paquito V. Ando
xxx married to Erlinda S. Ando,” prompting Ando to file an action for prohibition
before the RTC. Ando claims that the property belonged to him and his wife in
their personal capacity, and not the corporation, and hence, could not be the
subject of the execution sale. Since he was sued in a representative capacity,
and not in his personal capacity, the property could not be made to answer for
the judgment obligation of the corporation.
ISSUE:
WON the property owned by Ando and his wife could be levied for reason of a
debt incurred by him, in his representative capacity and his company, PACSI.
NO
HELD:
The TCT of the property bears out that, indeed, it belongs to petitioner and his
wife. Thus, even if we consider petitioner as an agent of the corporation and,
therefore, not a stranger to the case such that the provision on third-party
claims will not apply to him, the property was registered not only in the name
of petitioner but also of his wife. She stands to lose the property subject of
execution without ever being a party to the case. This will be tantamount to
deprivation of property without due process.
The power of the NLRC to execute its judgment extends only to properties
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. Thus, a sheriff has
no authority to attach the property of any person except that of the judgment
debtor. The property in question belongs not only to Ando, but his wife as well.
FACTS:
Respondent Mar Tierra Corporation (MTC), through its president, Wilfrido C.
Martinez, applied for a P12,000,000 credit accommodation with petitioner
Security Bank and Trust Company (SBTC). SBTC approved the application
and entered into a credit line agreement with MTC. It was secured by an
indemnity agreement executed by individual respondents Wilfrido C. Martinez,
Miguel J. Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa who bound themselves jointly and
severally with MTC for the payment of the loan.
MTC was not able to pay all its debt balance as it suffered business reversals,
eventually ceasing operations. Petitioner filed a complaint against MTC and
the individual respondents.
RTC issued a writ of attachment on all real and personal properties of MTC
and respondent Martinez including the conjugal house and lot of the spouses
but it found that it did not redound to the benefit of his family, hence, it ordered
the lifting of the attachment on the conjugal house and lot of the spouses
Martinez.
ISSUE:
WON the conjugal partnership may be held liable for an indemnity agreement
entered into by the husband to accommodate a third party. NO
HELD:
Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for “all
debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.”
The court ruled in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. de Garcia that, in acting as a
guarantor or surety for another, the husband does not act for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership as the benefit is clearly intended for a third party.
On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or
entity and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, the transaction
cannot by itself be deemed an obligation for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. It is for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or
his family.
In the case at bar, the principal contract, the credit line agreement between
petitioner and MTC, was solely for the benefit of the latter. The accessory
contract (the indemnity agreement) under which individual respondent
Martinez assumed the obligation of a surety for MTC was similarly for the
FACTS:
The subject matter of the action is a parcel of land with an area of 520.50
square meters situated in Diliman, Quezon City registered in the name of
Domingo B. Hernandez, Sr. married to Sergia V. Hernandez. Later, the TCT
issued to the spouses was cancelled and a new one was issued in favor of
Melanie Mingoa.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale of the property was valid despite the falsity of the wife’s
signature in the SPA. YES
RULING:
Sergia’s lack of consent to the sale did not render the transfer of her share
invalid.
The husband’s first act of disposition of the subject property occurred in 1963
when he executed the SPA and the Deed of Transfer of Rights in favor of
Dolores Camisura. Thus, the right of action of the petitioners accrued in 1963,
as Article 173 of the Civil Code provides that the wife may file for annulment of
a contract entered into by the husband without her consent within ten (10)
years from the transaction questioned.
The failure of Sergia Hernandez to file with the courts an action for annulment
of the contract during the marriage and within ten (10) years from the
transaction necessarily barred her from questioning the sale of the subject
property to third persons.
As time passed, Tarciano and Rosario died while the Fuentes spouses and 2. The answer is no. As stated above, that sale was void from the
possession and control over the lot. Eight years later in 1997, the children of beginning. Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano
Tarciano and Rosario filed a case to annul the sale and reconvey the property and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on the
on the ground that the sale was void since the consent of Rosario was not ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas. As lawful
attained and that Rosarios’ signature was a mere forgery. The Fuentes owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to
spouses claim that the action has prescribed since an action to annul a sale on exclude any person from its enjoyment and disposal.
the ground of fraud is 4 years from discovery. The RTC ruled in favor of the
Fuentes spouses. CA reversed this ruling stating that the action has not In fairness to the Fuentes spouses, however, they should be entitled,
prescribed since the applicable law is the 1950 Civil Code which provided that among other things, to recover from Tarcianos heirs, the Rocas, the
the sale of Conjugal Property without the consent of the other spouse is P200,000.00 that they paid him, with legal interest until fully paid,
voidable and the action must be brought within 10 years. Given that the chargeable against his estate.
transaction was in 1989 and the action was brought in 1997 hence it was well
within the prescriptive period.
ISSUES:
1. WON the action by the Rocas to declare the nullity of the sale to the
spouses has already prescribed. NO
2. Whether only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring
the action to annul the sale. NO
HELD:
(*Side issue on the wife’s signature being forged, the SC ruled that Rosario’s
signature on the affidavit appears heavy, deliberate and forced. This according
to the SC makes the signatures of Rosario on the affidavit a forgery.)
1. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies to this
case is the Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and
Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the
Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family
Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code
does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent
may assail her husband’s sale of the real property. It simply provides that
without the other spouses written consent or a court order allowing the
sale, the same would be void. Under the provisions of the Civil Code
governing contracts, a void or inexistent contract has no force and effect
from the very beginning. And this rule applies to contracts that are
declared void by positive provision of law, as in the case of a sale of
conjugal property without the other spouses written consent. A void
Jose Ros previously obtained a loan in the amount of P115,000.00 from PNB
and as security, a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land with TCT. No. T-
9646 was executed. Upon maturity, the loan remained unpaid and an
extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding on the mortgaged property was instituted
by PNB. After the lapse of a year, the property was consolidated and registered
in the name of PNB.
Estrella Aguete, claiming she had no knowledge of the said loan nor the
mortgage constituted on the land which is part of their conjugal property,
contested the transactions and filed for an annulment of the proceedings. She
interposed in her defense that the signatures affixed on the documents were
forged and that the proceeds of the loan did not redound to the benefit of the
family.
RTC ruled for the spouses, stating that Aguete may during their marriage and
within ten years from the transaction mentioned, may ask the court for an
annulment of the case. On notice of appeal by PNB, Court of Appeals reversed
this ruling and found for PNB, stating that forgery was concluded without
adequate proof. It also found that the loan was used in the expansion of the
family business.
ISSUE:
WON the loan contracted redounded to the benefit of the family making it
binding upon the conjugal property. YES
HELD:
The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without
the consent, express or implied, of the wife.
Should the husband do so, then the contract is voidable. Article 173 of the Civil
Code allows Aguete to question Ros’ encumbrance of the subject property.
However, the same article does not guarantee that the courts will declare the
annulment of the contract. Annulment will be declared only upon a finding that
the wife did not give her consent. Even as Aguete disavows the documents
supposedly acknowledged before the notary public, the document carries the
evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution.
Moreover, petitioners did not present any corroborating witness, such as a
handwriting expert, who could authoritatively declare that Aguete’s signatures
were really forged.
It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the signing of the
contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family
stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the
business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his
business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the
husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law
presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.
FACTS:
Petitioner Efren Pana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others were accused of
murder. Efren was acquitted but Melecia and another person was found guilty
and was sentenced to the penalty of death and to pay each of the heirs of the
victims, jointly and severally for civil indemnity and damages.
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the
issuance of the writ, resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the
names of Efren and Melecia. Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of
sale on execution were issued.
Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution,
claiming that the levied properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal
assets of Melecia.
ISSUE:
WON conjugal properties of Sps. Efren and Melecia can be levied and
executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecia’s civil liability in the murder case.
YES
HELD:
Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted
by the husband or the wife before or during the
marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
properties partnership except insofar as they
redounded to the benefit of the family.
Since Efren does not dispute the RTC’s finding that Melecia has no exclusive
property of her own, the above applies. The civil indemnity that the decision in
the murder case imposed on her may be enforced against their conjugal assets
after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have
been covered.
2. WON the conjugal partnership is liable for the payment of the loan
obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. The same having redounded to
the benefit of the family. NO
HELD:
1. Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. . . .
FACTS:
Spouses Onesiforo and Rosario Alinas (petitioners) separated sometime in
1982. They left behind two lots identified, one with a bodega standing on it and
the other with petitioners' house. Respondent Victor Alinas is the brother of
petitioner. Petitioners alleged that they entrusted their properties to
respondents. Sometime in 1993, petitioners discovered that their two lots were
already titled in the name of the respondent spouses. Onesiforo’s signature
appeared in an Absolute Deed of Sale selling one of the lots to respondent
spouses. Records also show a notarized document whereby petitioner
acknowledged that his brother used his own money to redeem one of the lots
mortgaged and foreclosed and thus his brother became the owner. Petitioners
filed with the RTC a complaint for the recovery of possession and ownership
of their conjugal properties with damages against respondent spouses.
ISSUE:
WON the sale of conjugal property by the husband petitioner to respondent
spouses is valid despite the lack of consent on the part of the wife. NO
HELD:
Pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code and jurisprudence, the sale of
petitioners' conjugal property made by petitioner Onesiforo alone is void in its
entirety. It should be noted that respondent spouses were well aware that the
property is a conjugal property of petitioners. They also knew that the
disposition being made by Onesiforo is without the consent of his wife, as they
knew that petitioners had separated, and, the sale documents do not bear the
signature of petitioner Rosario. The fact that Onesiforo had to execute the
Absolute Deed of Sale and a notarized Agreement reveals that they had full
knowledge of the severe infirmities of the sale. Such being the case, no
injustice is being foisted on respondent spouses as they risked transacting with
Onesiforo alone despite their knowledge that the subject property is a conjugal
property.
A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed by the petitioners with the
Court of Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court
judge in issuing the Orders, the same was dismissed as the petition was filed
beyond the 60-day period provided under Section 4 of Rule 65 of ROC and
that the petition filed along with the mandatory Certificate of Non Forum
Shopping was filed without the consent of Antonio’s wife. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
WON Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition. YES
RULING:
It has been our previous ruling that the certificate of non-forum shopping should
be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case, and that the signing by
only one of them is insufficient. In the case of Efren Loquias vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, we held that the signing of the Verification and the Certification
on Non-Forum Shopping by only one of the petitioners constitutes a defect in
RULING:
The sale was not valid. Consequently, the TCT cannot be cancelled in favor of
the Petitioners as they were not buyers in Good Faith.
To start with, the sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988,
the effectivity of the Family Code. The proper law to apply is, therefore, Article
124 of the Family Code, for it is settled that any alienation or encumbrance of
conjugal property made during the effectivity of the Family Code is governed
by Article 124 of the Family Code.
FACTS:
Thomas Cheesman and Criselda P. Cheesman were married on December 4,
1970 but have been separated since February 15, 1981. On June 4, 1974, a
"Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights" was executed by Armando
Altares conveying a parcel of unregistered land and a house in Olongapo City
in favor of Criselda. On July 1, 1981, Criselda sold the same property to Estelita
M. Padilla, without the knowledge and consent of Thomas. Thereafter, he filed
a suit in the CFI at Olongapo City against his wife, Criselda, and Padilla,
praying for the annulment of the sale on the ground that the transaction had
been executed without his knowledge and consent.
The CFI declared that the sale was void ab initio as the subject property was a
conjugal partnership property, and the consent of Thomas was not duly
obtained. Estelita Padilla filed a petition for relief as she was deceived by
Criselda as to her authority to sell the said the conjugal property. The IAC
granted it thus, aggrieved, Thomas appealed the decision.
ISSUE:
WON the sale of the subject property was valid. PARTLY YES
RULING:
The sale was valid in relation to Criselda but null and void in relation to Thomas.
The fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Section 14,
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution ordains that, "Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain." Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged with
knowledge of this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the
lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right whatever
over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right
or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the
Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void. In any event, he had and
has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the same
property by his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the
prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a
theory would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If
the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien
husband a not insubstantial interest and right over land, as he would then have
a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the
Constitution does not permit him to have.
ISSUE:
In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Furthermore, In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the
Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no
may assail her husband’s sale of the real property. It simply provides that consent may assail her husband’s sale of the real property. It simply provides
without the other spouses written consent or a court order allowing the sale, that without the other spouses written consent or a court order allowing the
the same would be void. sale, the same would be void. Article 124 thus provides:
RULING:
The Court agrees with the CA’s observation that Rosario’s signature strokes
on the affidavit appear heavy, deliberate, and forced. Her specimen signatures,
on the other hand, are consistently of a lighter stroke and more fluid. The way
the letters R and s were written is also remarkably different. The variance is
obvious even to the untrained eye.
Significantly, Rosario’s specimen signatures were made at about the time that
she signed the supposed affidavit of consent. They were, therefore, reliable
standards for comparison. The Fuentes spouses presented no evidence that
Rosario suffered from any illness or disease that accounted for the variance in
her signature when she signed the affidavit of consent. Notably, Rosario had
Under Article 128 of the Family Code, the aggrieved spouse may petition for
judicial separation on either of these grounds:
1) Abandonment by a spouse of the other without just cause;
and
2) Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations
to the family without just cause, even if she said spouse
does not leave the other spouse.
Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent never
to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and without in the
meantime providing in the least for one’s family although able to do so. There
Amparo filed a motion to hold in abeyance the writ of possession and notice to RULING:
vacate arguing that FC Article 129 (9) states that the conjugal dwelling shall be In summary, the three cases including herein petition, are the following:
adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the children choose to G.R. No. 162745, Amparo R. Cabreza v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
remain. She asserted that the family home should be given to her. This was questioning the May 26, 2003 RTC Order granting respondent’s
dismissed because the decision had long become final and executory. RTC motion to sell the family home. Said petition was denied by this
said that FC Article 129(9) presupposes a situation where there are properties Court and an Entry of Judgment was issued on July 23, 2004.
aside from the conjugal dwelling.
G.R. No. 171260, Amparo R. Cabreza v. Ceferino Cabreza et al.,
To salvage her case, she filed new ones questioning the validity of sale. When herein petition, questioning the writ of execution/possession and
this case was filed with the Supreme Court, there were 3 more filed with the notice to vacate because they allegedly varied the terms of the
Court of Appeals questioning the validity of the deed of sale between Ceferino dispositive portion of the January 3, 2001 judgment of the RTC.
and BJD Holdings Corporation because she did not give consent. The CA
granted these and remanded them to RTC. But the RTC had already rendered CA-GR. CV No. 86511, Amparo R. Cabreza v. Ceferino S.
judgment as final and executory (to sell the family dwelling). Cabreza, et al., questioning the Deed of Sale between respondent
and BJD Holdings Corporation, allegedly because of petitioners
The CA considered the contention of the respondent husband, that Art. 129 lack of consent thereto. The petition was granted by the CA, which
(9), Family Code, supra, is applicable only when the spouses had other assets ordered for the remand of the case to the RTC for further
to be divided between them, to be correct. Indeed Art. 129(9), Family Code proceedings.
obviously refers to "partition of the properties". Hence, the respondent Judge
was not guilty of any arbitrariness, whimsicality or capriciousness in issuing the Based on the foregoing, herein petition must fail.
assailed orders and writ. It is not disputed that the conjugal dwelling in question
(TCT No. 17460) was the only asset of the conjugal partnership that was the Petitioner cannot hide from the fact that the May 26, 2003 Order of the RTC is
subject of partition between the spouses. already final and executory as a necessary consequence of the Entry of
Judgment dated July 23, 2004. Said Order categorically authorized the sale of
The more decisive fact, according to the CA, is the finality of the RTC judgment the family home. Although the CA may have mistakenly denominated the May
dated May 26, 2003. The petitioner insisted that the conjugal dwelling should 26, 2003 Order as a "judgment", the same does not detract from the fact that
be awarded exclusively to her because the common children of the spouses,
The RTC ruled affirming the validity of the sale. However, it declared that the The CPG established before and after the effectivity of the Family Code are
property was the conjugal property and not the exclusive property of Protacio, governed by the Family Code. Hence, any disposition of the conjugal property
Sr., because there were three vendors in the sale to Servacio, namely, after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be made only after the
Protacio, Sr., Rito, and Dina. liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void.
It held that the participation of Rito and Dina as vendors had been by virtue of However, the CPG must be subsisting at the time of the effectivity of the Family
their being heirs of the late Marta. Code. Upon Marta’s death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was
dissolved, pursuant to Article 175(1) of the Civil Code, and an implied
Under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the law in effect when the property was ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of
acquired, all property acquired by either spouse during the marriage was Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership
conjugal unless there was proof that the property thus acquired pertained pending a liquidation following its liquidation.
exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share. Hence, Protacio, Sr.
ISSUE: had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the
Whether or not the sale by Protacio, Sr. to Servacio was void for being made interest of his co-owners. The sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners
without prior liquidation. NO without the consent of the other co-owners was not necessarily void, for the
The Trial Court ruled that there was no conjugal partnership of gains and that
since they entered into an amicable settlement which was later on approved,
the petitioner may no longer repudiate it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the Trial Court's Decision which
dismissed the action for dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains? NO
RULING:
Petitioner and respondent were married on 15 February 1951. Thus, the
applicable law is the Civil Code (RA 386).
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due
period 270 days later or after more than nine months from the promulgation of process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in her
the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her. In fact, in
asking the RTC to define the term “Net Profits Earned.” his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide
the community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as
RTC held that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED” denotes “the remainder of circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory
the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of of all the community properties of the parties. Second, when the
the] spouse and the debts.” It further held that after determining the remainder decision for legal separation was promulgated, the petitioner never
of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because questioned the trial court’s ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as
the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits “net profits,” pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the
earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code. petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process.
The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 3. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the
of the Family Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article husband and the wife become joint owners of all the properties of the
102 applies because there is no other provision under the Family Code which marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and
defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation. those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article
92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple’s
ISSUES: properties. And when the couple’s marriage or community is dissolved,
1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129 on that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective
dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains is applicable in this case. heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have established,
ART 129. WILL GOVERN irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned.
2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights over ½ of the In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has
properties in the conjugal partnership. NO been established that the spouses have no separate properties, what
will be divided equally between them is simply the “net profits.” And since
3. Is the computation of “net profits” earned in the conjugal partnership of the legal separation½share decision of Brigido states that the in the net
gains the same with the computation of “net profits” earned in profits shall be awarded to the children, Brigido will still be left with
the absolute community? NO nothing.
ISSUES:
1. WON the CA erred in affirming the Trial Court's Decision which
dismissed the action for dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains? NO
HELD:
1. Petitioner and respondent were married on 15 February 1951. Thus, the
applicable law is the Civil Code (RA 386).
Under Article 175 of the Civil Code, the judicial separation of property
results in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains:
Art. 175. The conjugal partnership of
gains terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
FACTS: When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971. They begot 5 when they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only
children. In 1992, Valdez filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their the property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. The trial court granted the money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to
petition, thereby declaring their marriage null and void. It also directed the their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares,
parties to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is
defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions married to another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal
of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code. partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the
party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision. She asserted that share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed.
the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation
of common property in "unions without marriage. In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the
parties' common property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor
In an Order, the trial court made the following clarification: "Consequently, precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity
considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the must be deemed likewise clothed in authority to resolve incidental and
property acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that
the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common
the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and
will own their 'family home' and all their other properties for that matter in equal partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-
shares. In the liquidation and partition of the properties owned in common by ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles
the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil 102 and 129, 12 of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to
Code shall apply." govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable
Valdes moved for reconsideration of the Order which was denied. Valdes marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the
appealed, arguing that: (1) Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses.
cases where the parties are psychological incapacitated; (2) Articles 50, 51 and
52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2),
of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, (3), (4) and 95) of Article 43, 13 relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable
including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 14 of the
of the spouses; (3) Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a
declared void ab initio on the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void.
spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129.
ISSUE:
Whether Art. 147 FC is the correct law governing the disposition of property in
the case at bar. YES
HELD:
In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of
the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of
Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code.
Article 147 applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment
to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a
void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. Under this property regime,
property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be
ISSUE:
WON the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to settle claims to death
benefits.
HELD:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. However, for purposes other
than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the
court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties
thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said
marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such
instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove
the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute
nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court
declaring such previous marriage void.
FACTS:
After two years of living together, Francisco and Erminda got married in 1979.
Four children were born from this union. During the time they lived together,
they acquired properties, and Erlinda managed their pizza business.
In 1992, she prays for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage based on
Mario's alleged psychological incapacity, and for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains. During the time they lived together, they acquired
properties. She managed their pizza business and worked hard for its
development. Mario denied she was the one who managed the pizza business
and claimed that he exclusively owns the properties "existing during their
marriage."
In 1997 the trial court rendered its judgment and ordered the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains and divided the conjugal properties between
Francisco and Erminda. Not satisfied with the manner their properties were
divided, Francisco appealed to the CA, which in turn affirmed the trial court
decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Fransisco exclusively own the properties existing during their
marriage. NO
RULING:
SC held that the Francisco and Erminda are co-owners of the properties in
question. The marriage of Fransisco and Erminda is declared void ab initio by
the trial court which was later affirmed by the CA. Consequently, their
properties shall be governed by the provisions of Article 147 of the Family
Code.
These provisions enumerate the two instances when the property relations
between spouses shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. These are:
(1) when a man and woman capacitated to marry each other live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage; and (2)
when a man and woman live together under a void marriage.
The trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by
at the time of the celebration of the marriage and declared their marriage void final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50
ab initio. It ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab
issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code. initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void
without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Trial court, upon motion for partial reconsideration of petitioner, modified its
decision holding that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either
after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains unless the
147 of the Family Code. parties agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage settlement
entered into before the marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is
ISSUE: governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains,
Whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a
of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of
the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. YES marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is
governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
HELD:
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC that in a void marriage, regardless of its In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under
cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what
governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and
the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the
barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period
nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the case before of cohabitation are governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
the Court. Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses
should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, “[p]artition may be made by
present: agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x.” It is not
(1) The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding
other; for declaration of nullity of marriage.
On March 31, 1999, the trial court directed the parties to submit a project of We note that the former spouses both substantially agree that they acquired
partition of their inventoried properties, and if they failed to do so, a hearing will the subject properties during the subsistence of their marriage. The certificates
be held on the factual issues with regard to said properties. Having failed to of titles and tax declarations are not sufficient proof to overcome the
agree on a project of partition of their conjugal properties, hearing ensued presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code. All properties acquired by
where the parties adduced evidence in support of their respective stand. the spouses during the marriage, regardless in whose name the properties are
registered, are presumed conjugal unless proved otherwise. The presumption
On January 13, 2004, the trial court rendered the assailed order stating that is not rebutted by the mere fact that the certificate of title of the property or the
the properties declared by the parties belong to them on a 50-50 sharing. tax declaration is in the name of one of the spouses only. Article 116 expressly
provides that the presumption remains even if the property is "registered in the
ISSUE: name of one or both of the spouses." Thus, the failure of Virginia to rebut this
Whether respondent should be deprived of his share in the conjugal presumption, said properties were obtained by the spouses' joint efforts, work
partnership of gains by reason of bad faith and psychological capacity. NO or industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares. Accordingly,
the partition of the former spouses' properties on the basis of co-ownership, as
RULING: ordered by the RTC and the appellate court, should be affirmed, and not on the
The Court held that in a void marriage, as in those declared void under Article regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
3610 of the Family Code, the property relations of the parties during the period
of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code.11 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are
legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in this case. Article 147 of the Family
Code provides:
xxx In the absence of proof to the contrary,
properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts,
work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal
shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did
not participate in the acquisition by the other party of
any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
and of the household. xxx
Alayo purchased parcel of land on installment basis in 1949 and his deed he
named Josefina Bosing as his wife and transferred lot in her name. Final deed
executed in 1959.
Alayo died March 1967. In 1970 Josefa and Josephine executed a document
of extra-judicial partition and sale of the lot, which was described as conjugal
property. Josefa‘s share went to Josephine for P10,000, so Josephine
Belcodero had full ownership. Notice was published.
In October 1980 Juliana (real widow) and 3 children filed for reconveyance of
property. Trial Curt and Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Juliana.
ISSUES:
1. The husband acquired ownership while living with a paramour, after
deserting his wife. Property bought prior to effectivity of 1950 Civil Code
but the final deed was ensued after and the Family Code took effect
1988.
2. Whether the property was acquired in 1949 when he first started paying
installment or in1959 when the deed was finalized, result is the same.
Property belongs to conjugal partnership of Alayo and legal wife Juliana.
HELD:
1. Under old and new Civil Code ―all property is presumed to belong to
conjugal partnership unless it is provided that it is exclusive to either
spouse
Art 147 and 148 of Family Code did not deviate from old rules. Art 148
says that: when one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her
share of the co-ownership shall accrue to the conjugal property of the
DOCTRINE: 2. Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the
Art. 148: only properties acquired by both through actual joint contribution of business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to show that
money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common, in proportion she actually contributed money to buy the riceland. On the date of
to their respective contributions. If a party’s contribution isn’t proven, there will conveyance, she was only around 20 years old and Miguel was already
be no co- ownership and no presumption of equal shares. 64 and a pensioner of the U.S. Government. It is unrealistic to conclude
that she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of
FACTS: property. She now claims that the riceland was bought 2 months. before
Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage in 1949 with Carlina/Cornelia they actually cohabited. She intended to exclude their case from the
Vallesterol. A few months later, Miguel left to work in Hawaii. In 1954, Miguel operation of Article 148. No proof that the riceland was purchased even
returned for a vacation but never stayed with his wife and child. In 1957, Miguel before they started living together. Even assuming that the property was
had attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned to the bought before cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership would still apply
Philippines in 1972 for good, he refused to live with Carlina and his son. and proof of actual contribution would still be essential.
In 1973, Miguel (63 years old) contracted a second marriage with Erlinda 3. Erlinda allegedly bought it for PhP20,000, but the notary public testified
Agapay (19 years old). Two months before said marriage, Miguel and Erlinda that Miguel provided the money and simply asked that Erlinda alone be
jointly purchased a piece of agricultural land. In September 1975, a house and placed as vendee. This makes it a donation, which is void under Art. 739
lot was purchased by Erlinda allegedly as sole vendee. of the Civil Code since it was made by persons guilty of concubinage.
Art. 87 also expressly provides that donations between spouses now
In October 1975, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form also applies to donations between those who cohabitate as spouses.
of compromise agreement to settle case previously filed by Carlina. In said
document, the parties agreed to donate their conjugal property to their only
child, Herminia. Miguel and Erlinda had a son, Kristopher, born 1977. Erlinda
and Miguel were convicted of concubinage in 1979.
In 1981, Miguel died, and Carlina and Herminia filed an action for recovery of
ownership and possession of riceland and house and lot that were allegedly
purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with Erlinda. Erlinda alleged that
she had already donated her half of the riceland property to Kristopher, and
that the house and lot is her sole property having bought it with her own money.
RTC ruled in favor of 2nd wife Erlinda. CA ruled in favor of 1st wife Carlina.
ISSUE:
WON the properties in dispute (“piece of agricultural land” and house and lot)
belong to the conjugal property of Miguel and Carlina (1st wife) and is therefore
subject to reconveyance? YES
RULING:
The properties in dispute belong to the conjugal property.
DOCTRINE:
Art. 148: only properties acquired by both through actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common, in proportion
to their respective contributions. If a party’s contribution isn’t proven, there will
be no co- ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
FACTS:
Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were plaintiffs in an action for ejectment filed
against Guillerma, Gina and Toto Tumlos. In the complaint, spouses
Fernandez alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment building
that through their tolerance they allowed the Tumlos’ to occupy the apartment
for the last 7 years without payment of any rent. It was agreed that Guillerma
will pay 1,600 a month while the other defendants promised to pay 1,000 a
month which was not complied with. Demand was made several times for the
defendants to vacate the premises as they are in need of the property for the
construction of a new building.
ISSUE:
WON Guillerma is a co-owner of the said apartment under Article 148.
RULING:
SC rejected the claim that Guillerma and Mario were co-owners of the subject
property. The claim was not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma since there were
no other evidence presented to validate it except for the said affidavit. Even if
the allegations of having cohabited with Mario and that she bore him two
children were true, the claim of co-ownership still cannot be accepted. Mario
is validly married with Lourdes hence Guillerma and Mario are not capacitated
to marry each other. The property relation governing their supposed
cohabitation is under Article 148 of the Family Code. Actual contribution is
required by the said provision in contrast to Art 147 which states that efforts in
the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as
contributions to the acquisitions of common property by one who has no salary,
income, work or industry. Such is not included in Art 148. If actual contribution
is not proven then there can be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal
shares.
DOCTRINE:
Art. 148: only properties acquired by both through actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common, in proportion
to their respective contributions. If a party’s contribution isn’t proven, there will
be no co- ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
FACTS:
Lupo Atienza hired Yolanda De Castro as accountant for his two corporations
(Enrico Shipping Corporation and Eurasian Maritime Corporation) in 1983.
Then their relationship became intimate despite Lupo being a married man!
They lived together in the later part of 1983. They had 2 children, after the
second child they parted ways. Then Lupo filed a complaint against Yolanda
for a judicial partition of a land between them in the Bel-Air subdivision.
Lupo alleged that Yolanda bought the said property with his own funds.
Yolanda on the other hand said she bought it with her own funds.
Trial Court said that the contested property is owned common by him and
Yolanda and ordered the partition into two equal parts.
CA reversed the TC! Saying that it was the exclusive property of Yolanda.
ISSUE:
WON the disputed property is the exclusive property of Yolanda. YES
RULING:
Since they are not capacitated to marry each other in their cohabitation, FC
148 applies. Under this regime only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution shall be owned by them in
proportion to their contributions. Absent of proof of contribution, it shall be
presumed to be equal. He did not show any evidence that he contributed in the
parcel of land while the accountant showed bank accounts which apparently
shows that she was capacitated to buy the said land.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition with the SSC in which she attached a
waiver of rights executed by Editha whereby the latter waived any/all claims
from Social Security System (SSS), among others due to the deceased
Rodolfo Signey Sr. SSC affirmed the decision of the SSS. The SSC gave more
weight to the SSS field investigation and the confirmed certification of marriage
showing that the deceased was married to Editha, than to the aforestated
declarations of Editha in her waiver of rights.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has a superior legal right over the SSS benefits as
against the illegitimate minor children of the deceased?
RULING:
As to the issue of who has the better right over the SSS death benefits, Section
8(e) and (k) of R. A. No. 8282 is very clear. Hence, we need only apply the law.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Jambrich has no title to the properties in question and
may not transfer and assign any rights and interest in favor of the
petitioner?
RULING:
1. The evidence clearly shows that as between respondent and Jambrich,
it was Jambrich who possesses the financial capacity to acquire the
properties in dispute. At the time of the acquisition of the properties,
Jamrich was the source of funds used to purchase the three parcels of
land, and to construct the house. Jambrich was the owner of the
properties in question, but his name was deleted in the Deed of Absolute
Sale because of legal constraints. Nevertheless, his signature remained
in the deed of sale where he signed as a buyer. Thus, Jambrich has all
authority to transfer all his rights, interest and participation over the
subject properties to petitioner by virtue of Deed of Assignment.
Furthermore, the fact that the disputed properties were acquired during
the couple’s cohabitation does not help the respondent. The rule of co-
ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but otherwise
capacitated to marry each other does not apply. At the case at bar,
respondent was still legally married to another when she and Jambrich
lived together. In such an adulterous relationship and no co-ownership
The trial court held that the petitioners cannot invoke the law on donations or
the rules on testamentary succession in order to defeat the right of herein
defendants to collect the insurance indemnity. The beneficiary in a contract of
insurance is not the donee spoken in the law of donation. The rules on
testamentary succession cannot apply here, for the insurance indemnity does
not partake of a donation.
DOCTRINE:
While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is
premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the
parties.
FACTS:
During Betty Lacbayan and Bayani Samoy’s illicit relationship, they, together
with three more incorporators, were able to establish a manpower services
company, by which they acquired 5 parcels of land, registered in their names,
ostensibly as husband and wife.
Having parted ways eventually, both of them agreed to divide the said
properties and terminate their business partnership by executing a Partition
Agreement. Initially, Samoy agreed to Lacbayan's proposal that the properties
in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter, while the
ownership over the three other properties will go to Samoy. However, when
Lacbayan wanted additional demands, Samoy refused.
Thus, Lacbayan filed a complaint for judicial partition of the said properties
before the Quezon City RTC. In his Answer, however, Samoy denied
Lacbayan's claim of cohabitation and said that the properties were acquired
out of his own personal funds without any contribution from her.
ISSUE:
Does an action for partition preclude a settlement on the issue of ownership?
NO
RULING:
While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is
premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the
parties. Petitioner insists she is a co-owner pro indiviso of the five real estate
properties based on the TCTs covering the subject properties. Respondent
maintains otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of co-
ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a
partition of the disputed properties. More importantly, the complaint will not
even lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not even have any
rightful interest over the subject properties.
In 1997, Esteban sold the Vitas and Delpan properties to Evangeline and her
husband, Paulino Abuda. According to Edilberto, when Esteban was
diagnosed with colon cancer sometime in 1993, he decided to sell the Delpan
and Vitas properties to Evangeline. Evangeline continued paying the
amortizations on the two (2) properties situated in Delpan Street.
Edilberto alleged that the sale of the properties was fraudulent because
Esteban’s signature on the deeds of sale was forged. Respondents, on the
other hand, argued that because of Socorro’s prior marriage to Crispin, her
subsequent marriage to Esteban was null and void. Thus, neither Socorro nor
her heirs can claim any right or interest over the properties purchased by
Esteban and respondents.
ISSUE:
WON there was actual contribution from Esteban in the Delpan property.
RULING:
Edilberto claims that Esteban’s actual contribution to the purchase of the
Delpan property was not sufficiently proven since Evangeline shouldered some
of the amortizations. Thus, the law presumes that Esteban and Socorro jointly
contributed to the acquisition of the Delpan property. We cannot sustain
Edilberto’s claim. Both the RTC-Manila and the CA found that the Delpan
property was acquired prior to the marriage of Esteban and Socorro.
Furthermore, even if payment of the purchase price of the Delpan property was
made by Evangeline, such payment was made on behalf of her father. Article
1238 of the Civil Code provides:
DOCTRINE:
Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it
should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward
a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown
that no such efforts were in fact made, the same case must be dismissed.
This rules shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise
under the Civil Code.
FACTS:
Edwin and Lourdes are husband and wife who have lived together since 1996,
but formalized their union on October 28, 1997. On April 30, 1998, Lourdes
filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC, claiming Edwin left their
conjugal home with their daughter, Khriza Mae Tribiana. Edwin deprived
Lourdes of lawful custody of Khriza, who was 1 year and 4 months old. Later,
it was found that Khriza was with Rosalina Tribiana, Edwin’s mother.
Edwin moved to dismiss Lourdes’ petition on the ground that it did not allege
that earnest efforts at a compromise were made before its filing, following FC
151. On May 20, 1998, Lourdes filed her opposition to Edwin’s motion by
stating that there were prior failed efforts at a compromise. Attached to
Lourdes’ opposition was a copy of the Certification to File Action from their
barangay, dated May 1, 1998. On May 18, 1998, the RTC denied Edwin’s
motion to dismiss and reiterated a previous order requiring Edwin and Rosalina
to bring Khriza to the RTC. Upon denial of his motion for reconsideration, Edwin
filed with the CA a petition for prohibition and certiorari, which was denied on
July 2, 1998. Edwin’s motion for reconsideration was also denied by the CA.
ISSUE:
WON the trial and appellate courts should have dismissed the petition for
habeas corpus on the ground of failure to comply with the condition precedent
under FC 151.
RULING:
The trial and appellate courts’ resolutions were affirmed. The petition for
habeas corpus filed by Lourdes indeed failed to allege that she resorted to
compromise proceedings before filing the petition. However, in her opposition
to Edwin’s motion to dismiss, she attached a Barangay Certification to File
Action. As Edwin did not dispute the authenticity of the Barangay Certification
and its contents, this established that the parties tried to compromise, but were
unsuccessful.
Lourdes has complied with the condition precedent under FC 151. A dismissal
under Rule 16, Section 1 (j) is warranted only if there is a failure to comply with
a condition precedent. Given that the alleged defect is a mere failure to allege
compliance with a condition precedent, the proper solution is not an outright
dismissal of the action, but an amendment under Rule 10, Section 1 of the
1997 Rules of Procedure.
DOCTRINE:
Art. 150. Family relations include those:
1. Between husband and wife;
2. Between parents and children;
3. Among other ascendants and descendants; and
4. Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood.
Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it
should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward
a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown
that no such efforts were in fact made, the same case must be dismissed.
This rules shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise
under the Civil Code.
FACTS:
On November 24, 2000, Alberto Moreno (private respondent) filed with the
RTC of Caloocan City a complaint against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc.
(petitioner), his wife Remedios, the spouses Felipe and Maria Owe and the
Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for cancellation of mortgage contending
that he did not secure any loan from petitioner, nor did he sign or execute any
contract of mortgage in its favor; that his wife, acting in conspiracy with Hiyas
and the spouses Owe, who were the ones that benefited from the loan, made
it appear that he signed the contract of mortgage; that he could not have
executed the said contract because he was then working abroad.
ISSUE:
WON HIYAS SAVINGS and LOAN BANK, INC. can invoke Article 151 of the
Family Code. NO
RULING:
The Court has ruled that the requirement under Article 151 of the Family Code
is applicable only in cases which are exclusively between or among members
of the same family, it necessarily follows that the same may be invoked only by
a party who is a member of that same family, as provided for by Article 150 of
the Family Code.
DOCTRINE:
Article 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are:
The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family;
and Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the
relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and
who depend upon the head of the family for legal support.
Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both
spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for
as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same
unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply
regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.
FACTS:
On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife,
petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and
private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he left was a
parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school building.
Private respondent claims that the subject property which is the family home
duly constituted by spouses Marcelino and Perla Dario cannot be partitioned
while a minor beneficiary is still living therein namely, his 12-year-old son, who
is the grandson of the decedent.
ISSUE:
WON the family home cannot be partitioned on the grounds that a minor-
beneficiary is still residing therein. NO
RULING:
Three requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is entitled to the
benefits of Art. 159: (1) the relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family
Code; (2) they live in the family home, and (3) they are dependent for legal
support upon the head of the family.
Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from
the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution
and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home
continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both
spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for
as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same
unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply
regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.
FACTS:
Fidel Arriola who married twice died and is survived by his legal heirs: John
Nabor Arriola (respondent), his son with his first wife, and Vilma G. Arriola, his
second wife and his other son, Anthony Ronald Arriola (petitioners). On
February 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision ordering the partition of the
parcel of land left by the decedent Fidel S. Arriola by and among his heir John,
Vilma and Anthony in equal shares of one-third each without prejudice to the
rights of creditors or mortgagees thereon, if any. However, the parties failed to
agree on how to divide the property and so the respondent proposed to sell it
through public auction. The petitioners initially agreed but refused to include in
the auction the house standing on the subject land because it is a family home.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject house is a family home. YES
RULING:
The subject house is a family home that it cannot be sold through public
auction.
Based on Article 152, the Family Home, constituted jointly by the husband and
wife or any an unmarried head of the family is the dwelling house where they
and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated.
Article 153, the Family Home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from
the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution
and so long as any beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home
continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
Article 159, the Family Home shall continue despite the death of one or both
spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for
as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same
unless the court finds compelling reason.
DOCTRINE:
Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife
or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their
family reside, and the land on which it is situated.
Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from
the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution
and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home
continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
FACTS:
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag,
Davao del Sur on July 1988, registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and
a parcel of agricultural land located at Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao de
Sur also registered in the latter’s name. A motion to quash was filed by the
petitioner alleging that the residential land is where the family home is built
since 1969 prior the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for
liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment sought to be
enforced against the family home is not one of those enumerated. With regard
to the agricultural land, it is alleged that it is still part of the public land and the
transfer in his favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a member
of a cultural minority. The residential house in the present case became a
family home by operation of law under Article 153.
ISSUE:
WON the subject property is deemed to be a family home.
RULING:
The petitioner’s contention that it should be considered a family home from the
time it was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-taken.
Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it provides that the provisions of this
Chapter shall govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are
applicable. It does not mean that Article 152 and 153 shall have a retroactive
effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been
constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code and are exempt from the execution for payment of
obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Code. The said article simply
means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the
Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to
the benefits accorded to a family home under the FC. The debt and liability
which was the basis of the judgment was incurred prior the effectivity of the
Family Code. This does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided
in the FC.
As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made
shall be on whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land. Petition was
dismissed.
DOCTRINE:
A family home cannot be established on property held in co-ownership with
third persons. The family home must be established on the properties of (a) the
absolute community, or (b) the conjugal partnership, or (c) the exclusive
property of either spouse with the consent of the other.
FACTS:
In this case, Cabang has been occupying the Lot 7777owned by Basay.
Cabang believed that the said property is Lot 7778 that they rightfully owned.
SC ruled in favor Basay filed a complaint for recovery of the said lot. RTC ruled
in favor of Cabang. CA ruled in favor of Basay. Case was elevated to the SC.
Cabang argued that the said lot cannot be subject of Motion for Execution as
it is a family home. However, the SC held that it is not a family home but a
residential house because a family home cannot be established on property
held in co-ownership with third persons. It must be established on the
properties of ACP, CPG, or exclusive property of either spouse.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellate tribunal erred in reversing the judgment of the trial
court. NO
RULING:
The CA did not err in reversing RTC’s dismissal of the Motion for Execution.
Under Article 153 of the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on
a house and a lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is
no need to constitute the same judicially or extra-judicially. There can be no
question that a family home is generally exempt from execution, provided it
was duly constituted as such.
DOCTRINE:
For family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August
3, 1988, there is no need to constitute extra judicially or judicially, and
the exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as
any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually resides therein.
FACTS:
Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos
Electric, Inc., a company owned by Ernesto M. Ramos. The decision ruled in
favor of the respondents and became final and executory so a writ of execution
was issued which the Deputy Sheriff of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) implemented by levying a property in Ramos’ name
situated in Pandacan.
Alleging that the property situated at Pandacan was the family home, hence,
exempt from execution to satisfy the judgment award. Respondents argued
that it is not the family home there being another one in Antipolo and that the
Pandacan address is actually the business address.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the levy upon the property situated in Pandacan was valid. YES
RULING:
If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or
before August 3, 1988, then it must have been constituted either judicially or
extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil
Code. Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is governed by Articles 240 to 242.
On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is no need to constitute extra judicially
or judicially, and the exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and
lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually resides therein.
Moreover, the family home should belong to the absolute community
or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, its constitution must
have been with consent of the other, and its value must not exceed certain
amounts depending upon the area where it is located.
The family home was constituted prior to August 3, 1988, or as early as 1944,
they must comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil Code. There being
absolutely no proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or extra judicially
constituted as the Ramos’ family home, the law protecting the family home
cannot apply thereby making the levy upon the Pandacan property valid.
Consequently, the Bank initiated the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate
Mortgage. The Spouses filed a civil action for “Temporary Restraining Order
(‘TRO’), Injunction and Annulment of Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale” in the RTC
of Pasig City, which the RTC granted by issuing a TRO for 20 days.
DOCTRINE: Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family
For family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August Codeon August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be family homes and thus
3, 1988, there is no need to constitute extra judicially or judicially, and exempt from execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as
the exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein;
any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually resides therein.
Third, family residences which were not judicially or extra judicially constituted
FACTS: as a family home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing
The petitioners jointly purchased a parcel of land situated at No. 3 Forbes thereafter, are considered as family homes by operation of law and are
Street, Mount Carmel Homes Subdivision, Iba, Meycauayan, Bulacan, which prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the
was formerly covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-76.725 (M) Family Code. Also, Section 30 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that
issued by the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan and registered under “A redemptioner must produce to the officer, or person from whom he seeks to
Araceli’s name, on April 17, 1984 while they were still merely cohabiting before redeem, and serve with his notice to the officer a copy of the judgment or final
their marriage. order under which he claims the right to redeem, certified by the clerk of the
court wherein the judgment or final order is entered, or, if he redeems upon a
A house was later constructed on the subject property, which the petitioners mortgage or other lien, a memorandum of the record thereof, certified by the
thereafter occupied as their family home after they got married sometime in registrar of deeds, or an original or certified copy of any assignment necessary
January 1987.Sometime in September 1988, De Mesa obtained a loan from to establish his claim; and an affidavit executed by him or his agent, showing
Claudio D. Acero, Jr. worth P100,000.00, which was secured by a mortgage the amount then actually due on the lien.”
over the subject property.
Due to failure of payment, Acero filed a complaint and was granted. On March
15, 1993, a writ of execution was issued and Sheriff Samonte levied upon the
property by selling it on public auction. The certificate of sale was issued to
Claudio, and was leased on the petitioners and a certain Juanito Oliva.
They then defaulted on the payment again so Acero filed a complaint for
ejectment. On July 1999, MTC rendered a decision favoring the Acero’s and
ordering the petitioners to vacate the property. On October 29, 1999, the
petitioners filed against the respondents a complaint to nullify TCT No. T-
221755 (M) and other documents with damages with the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan. Therein, the petitioners asserted that the subject property is a family
home, which is exempt from execution under the Family Code and, thus, could
not have been validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying the March 15, 1993
writ of execution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower courts erred in refusing to cancel Claudio’s Torrens
title TCT No. T-221755 (M) over the subject property. NO
RULING:
The court finds that the CA did not err in dismissing the petitioners’ complaint
for nullification of TCT No. T-221755 (M). The subject property is a family
home, however the family home’s exemption from execution must be set up
and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. It is
evident that appellants did not assert their claim of exemption within a
reasonable time.
Sps. Fortaleza’s MR: Subject property is their family home and is exempt from
foreclosure sale. MR denied. CA: Dismissed the appeal and affirmed RTC
Ruling.
ISSUE:
W/N the subject property is a family home exempt from forced sale. NO
RULING:
As a rule, the family home is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment.
However, Article 155(3) of the Family Code explicitly allows the forced sale of
a family home “for debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after
such constitution.” In this case, there is no doubt that spouses Fortaleza
ISSUES:
(1) Whether petitioners are guilty of forum-shopping. NO
RULING:
DOCTRINE:
Article 163
The filiation of children may be by nature or by adoption. Natural filiation may
be legitimate or illegitimate. (n)
Article 992
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives
inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
FACTS:
The petitioners claim that they are the legitimate half-brothers and half-sisters
of the deceased, hence they are qualified to inherit from the latter. However,
the birth dates of the petitioner were earlier than the death of the original wife
of their father.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners are legitimate half-brothers and half-sisters of
the deceased. NO
RULING:
The petitioners were born before 1951. Therefore, in the absence of any fact
that would show that conjugal union of Juan Arbolario and Catalina Baloyo had
been judicially annulled before 1951, or before Juan Arbolario cohabited with
Francisca Malvas, it would only be reasonable to conclude that the foregoing
union which resulted in the birth of the [Arbolarios] was extra-marital. And
consequently, Voltaire Arbolario, et al., are illegitimate children of Juan
Arbolario.
As held by the appellate court, without proof that Catalina died in 1903, her
marriage to Juan is presumed to have continued. Even where there is actual
severance of the filial companionship between spouses, their marriage
subsists, and either spouse’s cohabitation with any third party cannot be
presumed to be between “husband and wife.”
DOCTRINE:
It is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima face
evidence of the facts contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of the
truthfulness of the statements made there by the interested parties.
FACTS:
Petitioners are allegedly the half-brothers, the half-sister-in-law, and the
children of a half-brother of the deceased Pacita Gonzales. Respondents are
heirs of Villanueva and are represented by Melchor. The remaining
respondents, Angelina Villanueva and husband Victoriano de Luna, are
allegedly the daughter and the son-in-law, respectively, of the late Villanueva.
From 1927 until her death in 1980, Gonzales cohabited with Villanueva without
the benefit of marriage because the latter was married to one Amanda Musngi
who died on April 20, 1963. In the course of their cohabitation, they acquired
several properties including the properties contested in this case. Gonzales
died on July 3, 1980 without leaving a will. On August 8, 1980, Villanueva
and respondent Angelina executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with sale,
that is, an extrajudicial settlement of Gonzales’ estate comprising a number of
the aforementioned properties. In this document, Villanueva, for the amount of
P30,000, conveyed his interests in the estate to Angelina. Petitioners filed a
case for partition of Gonzales’ estate and annulment of titles and damages,
with the RTC.
In dismissing the complaint, the RTC made two findings: (1) Gonzales was
never married to Villanueva and (2) respondent Angelina was her illegitimate
child by Villanueva and therefore her sole heir, to the exclusion of petitioners.
The CA ruled that respondent Angelina was the illegitimate daughter of the
decedent, based solely on her birth certificate.
ISSUE:
WON Angelina is an illegitimate child of the deceased Villanueva. NO
RULING:
The mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the
supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the
status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even amounts
to simulation of the child’s birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate,
which is a public document. Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth
is merely a prima face evidence of the facts contained therein. It is not
conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there by the
interested parties.
Following the logic of Benitez case, respondent Angelina and her co-
defendants in SD-857 should have adduced evidence of her adoption, in view
of the contents of her birth certificate. The records, however, are bereft of any
such evidence. Under the circumstances, the Court ruled that it was not
sufficiently established that respondent Angelina was Gonzales’ biological
daughter, nor even her adopted daughter. Thus, she cannot inherit from
Gonzales. Since she could not have validly participated in Gonzales’ estate,
The marriage of Isabel’s parents had previously been declared by the CFI as
“null and void.” Federico anchors his opposition on this fact, alleging based on
Art. 992 of the CC, that Isabel has no right to succeed by right of representation
as she is an illegitimate child. The trial court had denied Federico’s Motion to
Dismiss, hence this petition for certiorari. Federico contends that, inter alia, that
the dispositive portion of the decision declaring the marriage of Isabel’s parents
“null and void” be upheld.
ISSUES:
1. In case of conflict between the body of the decision and the dispositive
portion thereof, which should prevail? Related thereto, was the marriage
of Isabel’s parents a case of a void or voidable marriage?
RULING:
Petition dismissed Art. 10 of the Civil Code states that in case of doubt in the
interpretation and application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail. This is also applicable and binding upon
courts in relation to its judgment. While the dispositive portion of the CFI
decision states that the marriage be “declared null and void,” the body had
shown that the legal basis was par. 3 Art. 85 of the Civil Code, which was in
effect at the time. Art. 85 enumerates the causes for which a marriage may be
annulled.
As such the conflict between the body and the dispositive portion of the
decision may be reconcilable as noted by the Supreme Court. The fundamental
distinction between void and voidable marriages is that void marriage is
deemed never to have taken place at all. The effects of void marriages, with
respect to property relations of the spouses are provided for under Article 144
of the Civil Code. Children born of such marriages who are called natural
children by legal fiction have the same status, rights and obligations as
acknowledged natural children under Article 89 irrespective of whether or not
the parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith. On the other
hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects,
until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for
annulment.
FACTS:
The ratio decidendi points as the legal basis for setting aside the marriage is
paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code, the law in force prior to the
enactment of the Family Code, on voidable marriages.
The conflict lies on the legal connotation and implications of the terms
“voidable” and “null and void”.
ISSUE:
Which should prevail between the ratio decidendi and the fallo in this case?
RATIO DECIDENDI
RULING:
It is an elementary principle of procedure that the resolution of the court in a
given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of a decision or order is the
controlling factor as to settlement of rights of the parties and the questions
presented, notwithstanding statement in the body of the decision or order which
may be somewhat confusing, the same is not without qualification. The
foregoing rule holds true only when the dispositive part of a final decision or
order is definite, clear and unequivocal and can be wholly given effect without
need of interpretation or construction which usually is the case where the order
or decision in question is that of a court not of record which is not
constitutionally required to state the facts and the law on which the judgment
is based.
Thus, a reading of the pertinent portions of the decision xxx shows that the
marriage is voidable.
FACTS:
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married in August 1964. It
was during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de
Jesus, herein petitioners, were born. In a notarized document, dated June 7,
1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being
his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan died intestate in
March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock
in various corporations and some real property. It was on the strength of his
notarized acknowledgement that petitioners filed a complaint for “Partition with
Inventory and Accounting” of the Dizon estate with the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners are illegitimate children of decedent Juan Dizon entitled to
inherit from him. NO
RULING:
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the valid
marriage of their parents Danilo and Carolina. The certificates of birth also
identified Danilo de Jesus as their father. There is a presumption in law that
children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes
conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access
between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of
the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact the husband
and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not
possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents
sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set
forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which
took effect on August 3, 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child
would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption
becomes fixed and unassailable.
FACTS:
The Estate of Rogelio Ong opposed on the CA order directing the Estate and
Joanne Rodgin Diaz for DNA analysis for determining the paternity of the minor
Joanne. Trial court formerly rendered a decision and declared the minor to be
the illegitimate child of Rogelio Ong with Jinky Diaz, and ordering him to
support the child until she reaches the age of majority. Rogelio died during the
pendency of the case with the CA. The Estate filed a motion for reconsideration
with the CA. They contended that a dead person cannot be subject to testing.
CA justified that "DNA paternity testing, as current jurisprudence affirms, would
be the most reliable and effective method of settling the present paternity
dispute."
ISSUE:
Whether DNA analysis can still be done despite the death of Rogelio. YES
RULING:
The death of Rogelio does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing
for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. New Rules
on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing by using biological
samples--organic material originating from the person's body, ie., blood, saliva,
other body fluids, tissues, hair, bones, even inorganic materials- that is
susceptible to DNA testing.
FACTS:
Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) entered the
Philippines in the 1930s as immigrants from China. They had 11 children,
namely, Rita K. Lee, Leoncio K. Lee, Lucia K. Lee-Ong, Julian K. Lee, Martin
K. Lee, Rosa Lee-Vanderlek, Melody Lee-Chin, Henry K. Lee, Natividad Lee-
Miguel, Victoriano K. Lee, and Thomas K. Lee (collectively, the Lee-Keh
children).
In 1948, Lee brought from China a young woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu),
supposedly to serve as housemaid. The respondent Lee-Keh children believe
that Tiu left the Lee-Keh household, moved into another property of Lee
nearby, and had a relation with him.
Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh children learned that Tiu’s children
with Lee (collectively, the Lee’s other children) claimed that they, too, were
children of Lee and Keh. This prompted the Lee-Keh children to request the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate the matter.
ISSUE:
Whether the stepmother can properly invoke Section 25 Rule 30 of the Rules
of Court. NO
RULING:
No, the stepmother cannot invoke Section 25 Rule 30 of the Rules of Court
which reads:
The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to “direct”
ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry.
A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother.
It was found that the murderer, a Caucasian male, was able to trespass into
the hotel room of the victim and was then able to murder and rob the victim.
The heirs of the victim blame the hotel's gross negligence in providing the most
basic security system of its guests.
ISSUE:
Whether the plaintiffs were able to prove that they are the widow and son of
Mr. Christian Harper. YES
RULING:
The Revised Rules of Court provides that public documents may be evidenced
by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record. The
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be
under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the
clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
If the record is not kept in the Philippines, the attested copy must be
accompanied with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in
which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by
a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated
by the seal of his office.
The documents involved in this case are all kept in Norway. These documents
have been authenticated by the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
they bear the official seal of the Ministry and signature of one, Tanja Sorlie.
The documents are accompanied by an Authentication by the Consul,
Embassy of the Republic of the Philippines in Stockholm, Sweden to the effect
that, Tanja Sorlie is duly authorized to legalize official documents for the
Ministry.
However, when respondent refused the offer of petitioner’s family to take the
child from her, petitioner abandoned respondent and her child and left them to
the mercy of relatives and friends. Respondent further alleged that she
attempted suicide due to depression but still petitioner refused to support her
and their child.
Respondent thus prayed for support pendente lite and monthly support in the
amount of ₱20,000.00, as well as actual, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees.
ISSUE:
Whether the filiation of Christian Paulo was duly established entitling him for
support from petitioner. YES
RULING:
Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate filiation may
be established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.
ISSUE:
Whether the deletion of the entry on the date and place of marriage of
respondent’s parents from his birth certificate has the effect of changing his
civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, hence, any change in civil status of a
person must be effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding.
RULING:
A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME)
using valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change
results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change will
avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a
sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in
good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was
for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public
interest.17 Respondent’s reason for changing his name cannot be considered
as one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds, however.
Since respondent’s desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to
illegitimate, Rule 108 applies. It reads:
FACTS:
Mariano Andal, assisted by his mother Maria Dueñas, as guardian ad litem,
brought an action in the CIF of Camarines Sur for the recovery of the ownership
and possession of a parcel of land situated in Camarines Sur. The complaint
alleges that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of Emiliano Andal and Maria
Dueñas and that Emiliano was the owner of the parcel of land in question
having acquired it from his mother Eduvigis Macaraig by virtue of a donation
propter nuptias executed by the latter in favor of the former.
The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (a) declaring
Mariano Andal the legitimate son of Emiliano Andal and such entitled to inherit
the land in question; (b) declaring Mariano Andal owner of said land; and (c)
ordering the defendant to pay the costs of suit. Defendant took the case to this
Court upon the plea that only question of law are involved.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the child is considered as the legitimate son of Emiliano.
RULING:
Considering that Mariano was born on June 17, 1943 and Emiliano died
on January 1, 1943, the former is presumed to be a legitimate son of the latter
because he was born within 300 days following the dissolution of
the marriage. The fact that the husband was seriously sick is not sufficient to
overcome the presumption of legitimacy. This presumption can only be
rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had
access to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300 days next preceding the
birth of the child. Impossibility of access by husband to wife includes absence
during the initial period of conception, impotence which is patent, and
incurable; and imprisonment unless it can be shown that cohabitation took
place through corrupt violation of prison regulations. Maria’s illicit
intercourse with a man other than the husband during the initial period does
not preclude cohabitation between husband and wife. Hence, Mariano Andal
was considered a legitimate son of the deceased making him the owner of the
parcel land.
ISSUE:
Whether the child is the legitimate child of Ma. Theresa and Gopiao or the
illegitimate child of Ma. Theresa and Gerardo.
RULING:
The child, Jose Gerardo, is the legitimate child of Ma. Theresa and Mario
Gopiao.
The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised as per Art. 164 of the
Family Code which states, “A child who is conceived or born during the
marriage of his parents is legitimate.” It is fully supported by Art. 167 of the
Family Code which states, “The child shall be considered legitimate although
the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress.” The law requires that every reasonable
presumption be made in favor of the legitimacy. It is grounded on the policy to
protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very
beginning, he never became her husband and thus never acquired any right to
impugn the legitimacy of her child. The minor cannot be deprived of his/her
legitimate status on the bare declaration of the mother and/or even much less,
the supposed father. In fine, the law and only the law determines who are the
legitimate or illegitimate children for one’s legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever
be compromised. It should be what the law says and not what a parent says it
is. Additionally, public policy demands that there be no compromise on the
There had been divergent and incongruent statements and assertions bandied
about by the parties to the present petition. But with the advancement in the
field of genetics, and the availability of new technology, it can now be
determined with reasonable certainty whether Rogelio is the biological father
of the minor, through DNA testing.
A party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing
the parties have presented their respective evidence. They are matters of order remains discretionary upon the court. The court may, for example,
evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is
when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. already preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test
FACTS:
Private complainant Edna P. Pergis testified that in the evening of December
24, 1992, she was raped by Quitoriano while she was in the kitchen located at
the back of their house in Barangay Pakaskasan, Torrijos, Marinduque.
Quitoriano alleged that since private complainant gave birth more than ten
months after the alleged rape; therefore, the child could not have been his.
ISSUE:
WON the child could have been the accused’s child? YES
HELD:
The fact that private complainant gave birth more than ten months after the
alleged rape does not discredit her testimony.
Hence, it is not impossible that the child was conceived in December, 1992,
the date of the alleged rape.
Respondent financially supported petitioner and Allan. Respondent had It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a child
consistently and regularly given petitioner allowances before she got married. cannot be compromised. Public policy demands that there be no compromise
He also provided her with employment. on the status and filiation of a child. Paternity and filiation or the lack of the
same, is a relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the Court
When petitioner was still in high school, respondent required her to work at the to declare its existence or absence. stablished, and it is for the Court to declare
Cebu Liberty Lumber, a firm owned by his family. She was later on able to work its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.
at the Gaisano- Borromeo Branch through respondent’s efforts.
Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement dated 18
Petitioner and Allan were introduced to each other and became known in the February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and vests
Chinese community as respondent’s illegitimate children. During petitioner’s no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The void
wedding, respondent sent his brother Catalino Chua (Catalino) as his agreement cannot be rendered operative even by the parties' alleged
representative, and it was the latter who acted as father of the bride. performance (partial or full) of their respective prestations.
Respondent’s relatives even attended the baptism of petitioner’s daughter
ISSUE:
WON Respondent can make use of the compromise agreement dated Feb. 21,
2000 to prove that there is no filiation between him and the Petitioner? NO
HELD:
ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:
FACTS:
Vasquez allegedly also refused to give him regular school allowance despite
repeated demands. Petitioner Dolores added that she and Vasquez are not
legally married, and that Vasquez has his own family.
Vasquez was declared in default for failure to answer the service of summons
(substituted). The court ordered Vasquez to acknowledge Laurence and to pay
P 5000 monthly.
The appeal was granted by the court. Before the appellate court, he argued
that the trial court erred in trying and deciding the case as it “never” acquired
jurisdiction over his person, as well as in awarding P5,000-per-month support,
which was allegedly “excessive and exorbitant.” The appellate court granted
Vasquez’s contention
ISSUE:
Whether he is obliged to give support to co-petitioner Laurence. YES
HELD:
Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines mandates that illegitimate
filiation may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children.
Under Article 172, appearing in the civil register or a final order; or (2) by
admission of filiation in a public document or private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned; or in default of these two, by open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child or by any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Vasquez did not deny that Laurence is his child with Dolores. He signed as
father in Laurence’s certificate of live birth, a public document. He supplied the
data entered in it. Thus, it is a competent evidence of filiation as he had a hand
in its preparation.
In fact, if the child had been recognized by any of the modes in the first
paragraph of Article 172, there is no further need to file any action for
acknowledgment because any of said modes is by itself a consummated act.
As filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation.
Petitioners were able to prove that.
Insular admitted that Loreto misrepresented Eva as his legitimate wife and The revocation of Eva as a beneficiary in one policy and her disqualification as
Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie as his legitimate children, and that they such in another are of no moment considering that the designation of the
filed their claims for the insurance proceeds of the insurance policies; that when illegitimate children as beneficiaries in Loreto’s insurance policies remains
it ascertained that Eva was not the legal wife of Loreto, it disqualified her as a valid.
beneficiary and divided the proceeds among Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha
Angelie, as the remaining designated beneficiaries; and that it released Because no legal proscription exists in naming as beneficiaries the children of
Odessa’s share as she was of age, but withheld the release of the shares of illicit relationships by the insured, the shares of Eva in the insurance proceeds,
minors Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie pending submission of letters of whether forfeited by the court in view of the prohibition on donations under
guardianship. Article 739 of the Civil Code or by the insurers themselves for reasons based
on the insurance contracts, must be awarded to the said illegitimate children,
Insular alleged that the complaint or petition failed to state a cause of action the designated beneficiaries, to the exclusion of petitioners.
insofar as it sought to declare as void the designation of Eva as beneficiary,
because Loreto revoked her designation as such in Policy No. A001544070 It is only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary,
and it disqualified her in Policy No. A001693029; and insofar as it sought to or when the designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the
declare as inofficious the shares of Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie, proceeds, that the insurance policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit
considering that no settlement of Loreto’s estate had been filed nor had the of the estate of the insured.
respective shares of the heirs been determined.
Insular further claimed that it was bound to honor the insurance policies
designating the children of Loreto with Eva as beneficiaries pursuant to Section
53 of the Insurance Code.
AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE NAMED JENIE DELA 1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of
CRUZ. WE MET EACH OTHER IN OUR evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict
HOMETOWN, TEREZA RIZAL. AT FIRST WE compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by
BECAME GOOD FRIENDS, THEN WE FELL IN the acknowledging parent; and
LOVE WITH EACH OTHER, THEN WE BECAME
GOOD COUPLES. AND AS OF NOW SHE IS 2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other
PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of
IN OUR HOUSE NOW. THAT’S ALL. filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by
the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such
The City registrar denied the application for registration of the child’s name on other evidence.
the ground that the father failed to acknowledge his paternity.
ISSUE:
WON an unsigned autobiography is sufficient to prove that the father
acknowledged the paternity of the illegitimate child?
FACTS:
In 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the RTC for
compulsory recognition and support pendente lite, claiming that the petitioner
is the father of her child Gliffze, whose imputed paternity the petitioner denied.
Trial ensued. She met the petitioner in 1992 in a bank where they both worked.
They became sweethearts in the last week of January 1993. Sometime in
September 1993, the petitioner started intimate sexual relations with the
respondent in the former’s rented room in the boarding house managed by
Rodulfo, the respondent’s uncle.
The sexual encounters occurred twice a month and became more frequent in
June 1994; eventually, on August 8, 1994, the respondent found out that she
was pregnant. When told, the petitioner was happy and made plans to marry
the respondent but eventually backed out. The respondent gave birth to their
son Gliffze on March 9, 1995. When the petitioner did not show up and failed
to provide support to Gliffze, the respondent sent him a letter on demanding
recognition of and support for their child. When the petitioner did not answer
the demand, the respondent filed her complaint for compulsory recognition and
support pendente lite. The petitioner took the witness stand and testified for
himself. He denied the imputed paternity, claiming that he first had sexual
contact with the respondent in the first week of August 1994 and she could not
have been pregnant for 3 months when he was informed of the pregnancy on
September 1994. During the pendency of the case, the RTC, on the
respondent’s motion, granted a P2,000.00 monthly child support, retroactive
from March 1995. RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
The CA consequently set aside the RTC decision and ordered the petitioner to
recognize his minor son Gliffze. It also reinstated the RTC order for monthly
child support. The petitioner argues that the CA committed a reversible error in
rejecting the RTC’s ruling, and that the evidence on record is insufficient to
prove paternity.
ISSUE:
WON the CA committed a reversible error when it set aside the RTC’s findings
and ordered the petitioner to recognize and provide legal support to his minor
son?
HELD:
The Court DENIED the petition and AFFIRMED the ruling of the CA, sustaining
the award of P2,000.00 monthly child support, not finding any reversible error
in the CA’s ruling. In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case
that the petitioner is the putative father of Gliffze through testimony that she
had been sexually involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of her
conception. Rodulfo corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and the
respondent had intimate relationship. However, the petitioner failed to
substantiate his allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His
allegations, therefore, cannot be given credence for lack of evidentiary support.
FACTS:
This is a case filed by one Monina Jison for recognition as an illegitimate child
of Francisco Jison who is married to Lilia Lopez Jison. MONINA alleged that
she is the daughter of FRANCISCO who impregnated her mother Esperanza
F. Amolar, who was then employed as the nanny of FRANCISCO's daughter.
She claims that she has openly and continuously possessed the status of an
illegitimate child of Francisco and that Francisco had also openly and
continuously recognized her as such. The trial court categorized Monina’s
many evidences as hearsay evidence, incredulous evidence, or self-serving
evidence and ruled against Monina while the Court of Appeals decided in favor
of Monina and declared her to be the illegitimate daughter of Francisco. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the testimonies of Monina’s witnesses were
sufficient to establish MONINA's filiation.
ISSUE:
WON Monina successfully established her filiation. YES
HELD:
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation, such as MONINA's,
may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as that of
legitimate children. The Supreme Court sustained the findings of the CA that
Monina was able to prove her illegitimate filiation. For the success of an action
to establish illegitimate filiation under Article 172 par. 2, a "high standard of
proof" is required. To prove open and continuous possession of the status of
an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the
permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by
continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which
cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that
they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to
have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not
accidentally, but continuously. By "continuous" is meant uninterrupted and
consistent, but does not require any particular length of time.
FACTS:
In behalf of her minor child, Benedick Arevalo, her mother filed a complaint
against defendants for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate child of their
deceased father. During trial, Mary Jane Dy-Chiao De Guzman, one of the
sisters entered a compromised agreement with plaintiff whereby she is
acknowledging the petitioner as the illegitimate son of her father and pay
petitioner P6M as a share in the estate of their deceased father.
In her reply, she questioned assailed decision of RTC since the illegitimate
filiation of Benedick could not be the subject of a compromise agreement. She
further alleged that the parties thereunder did not recognize the validity of the
compromise agreement, as in fact she and the petitioners were exploring the
possibility of modifying their extrajudicial settlement.CA ruled in favor of the
defendants, hence a petition.
ISSUE:
W/N the compromise regarding filiation is valid? NO
HELD:
The ruling of RTC based on the compromise agreement executed by Mary
Jane is null and void. Article 2035(1) of the New Civil Code provides that no
compromise upon the civil status of persons shall be valid. As such, paternity
and filiation, or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially
established, and it is for the court to determine its existence or absence. It
cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Such recognition by Mary
Jane, however, is ineffectual, because under the law, the recognition must be
made personally by the putative parent and not by any brother, sister or
relative.
HELD: Respondent relied on the testimony of her witnesses, Frisco Lawan, Felicisima
Evidence presented: Certificate of Live Birth of plaintiff herein, Lourdes Evero Nagac Pacana and Cecilia Nagac Villareal who testified that they personally
Pacana, which are Exhibit A for the plaintiff and Exhibit 1 for the defendants. knew Hermogena (respondent’s mother) and/or Juan Gabatan, that they knew
Juan Gabatan was married to Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena was the
To begin with, Exhibit A, as the trial court noted, was an original typewritten child of Juan and Laureana. However, none of these witnesses had personal
document, not a mere photocopy or facsimile. It uses a form of 1950s vintage, knowledge of the fact of marriage of Juan to Laureana or the fact of birth of
but this Court is unable to concur in the trial courts finding that Exhibit 1 was of Hermogena to Juan and Laureana. They were not yet born or were very young
a later vintage than Exhibit A which was one of the trial courts bases for when Juan supposedly married Laureana or when Hermogena was born and
doubting the authenticity of Exhibit 1. On the contrary, the printed notation on they all admitted that none of them were present at Juan and Laureanas
the upper left hand corner of Exhibit 1 states Municipal Form No. 102 which wedding or Hermogenas birth. These witnesses based their testimony on what
makes it an older form than Exhibit A. Thus, the trial courts finding regarding they had been told by, or heard from, others as young children. Their
which form was of more recent vintage was manifestly contradicted by the testimonies were, in a word, hearsay.
evidence on record. No actual signature appears on Exhibit A except that of a
certain Maximo P. Noriga, Deputy Local Civil Registrar of the Office of the Local All in all, this Court finds that respondent dismally failed to substantiate, with
Civil Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City, who purportedly certified on July 6, convincing, credible and independently verifiable proof, her assertion that she
1977 that Exhibit A was a true copy of respondent’s birth certificate. The names is the sole heir of Juan Gabatan and thus, entitled to the property under
of the attendant at birth (Petra Sambaan) and the local civil registrar (J.L. litigation. Aggravating the weakness of her evidence were the circumstances
Rivera) in 1950 were typewritten with the notation (Sgd.) also merely that (a) she did not come to court with clean hands for she presented a
typewritten beside their names. The words A certified true copy: July 6, 1977 tampered/altered, if not outright spurious, copy of her certificate of live birth
above the signature of Maximo P. Noriga on Exhibit A appear to be inscribed and (b) she unreasonably delayed the prosecution of her own cause of action.
by the same typewriter as the very entries in Exhibit A. It would seem that If the Court cannot now affirm her claim, respondent has her own self to blame.
Exhibit A and the information stated therein were prepared and entered only in
1977. Significantly, Maximo P. Noriga was never presented as a witness to
identify Exhibit A. Said document and the signature of Maximo P. Noriga
therein were identified by respondent herself whose self-serving testimony
cannot be deemed sufficient authentication of her birth certificate.
Even assuming purely for the sake of argument that the birth certificate
presented by respondent (Exhibit A) is a reliable document, the same on its
face is insufficient to prove respondents filiation to her alleged grandfather,
Juan Gabatan. All that Exhibit A, if it had been credible and authentic, would
have proven was that respondent’s mother was a certain Hermogena Clarito
Gabatan. It does not prove that same Hermogena Clarito Gabatan is the
2.2 Private handwritten instrument an instrument In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears the stigma of
executed in the handwriting of the father and duly dishonor. It is to petitioner minor child’s best interests to allow him to bear the
surname of the now deceased Dominique and enter it in his birth certificate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA committed a reversible error in rejecting the RTC
appreciation of the respondent’s testimony, and that the evidence on record is
insufficient to prove paternity? NO
RULING:
The burden of proof in paternity cases is on the person alleging. Divina
established prima facie case against Charles through her testimony,
corroborated by Charles uncle (dorm owner), that she’s only been involved with
one man at the time of conception. Charles did not deny his sexual relations
with her, only that it occurred at a later date.
One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of filiation
in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws. We have held that such other proof of one’s filiation
The rules for establishing filiation are found in Articles 172 and 175 of the Here, the single instance that Antonio allegedly hugged Randy and promised
Family Code which provide as follows: to support him cannot be considered as proof of continuous possession of the
status of a child. To emphasize, "[t]he father’s conduct towards his son must
Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is be spontaneous and uninterrupted for this ground to exist." Here, except for
established by any of the following: that singular occasion in which they met, there are no other acts of Antonio
(1) The record of birth appearing in the treating Randy as his son. Neither can Antonio’s paternity be deduced from
civil register or a final judgment; or how his sister Lelita treated Randy. To this Court, Lelita’s actuations could have
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in been done due to charity or some other reasons.
a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by
the parent concerned. All told, it is clear that respondents failed to establish Randy’s illegitimate
filiation to Antonio. Hence, the order for Antonio to support Randy has no basis.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession
of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the 161. (Same as #158)
Rules of Court and special laws.
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an
illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception
provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by
the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by
the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the
father.
FACTS:
That on or about the 15th day of September, 1997, at 8:00 o’clock in the
evening, more or less, in Barangay Sagana, Municipality of Bongabong,
province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd and unchaste design,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
of one RACHELLE RECTO y Rafal, by means of force and threats to kill, to the
irreparable damage of the said Offended Party.
Rachelle’s mother, Gaudiosa Recto, testified that she only came to know about
the rape incident after Dr. Fetalberto required Rachelle to have an x-ray
examination at Bongabong Hospital. The results showed that Rachelle was
pregnant. She also testified that Rachelle refused to tell her about it because
accused-appellant threatened to kill her several times whenever he saw her.
ISSUE:
Can the accused in the crime of rape claim parental authority over the child
who is the result of committing such crime? NO
RULE:
With respect to the acknowledgment and support of the child born out of rape
our recent ruling in People v. Justiniano Glabo states:
FACTS:
Sometime on December 1999, in the afternoon, at Barangay San Vicente,
Municipality of Pamplona, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused MARLON BARSAGA
ABELLA, while armed with "Balisong" and under the influence of liquor, by
means of force and intimidation and with lewd design, did then and there
willfully and feloniously enter the house of herein complainant and then and
there have sexual intercourse with AAA, a woman of feeble mind, against her
will to her damage and prejudice. AAA was later on found out to be pregnant
due to the rape incident that happened.
ISSUE:
WON the accused can be compelled to acknowledge the child who is the result
from committing the crime of rape? YES
RULE:
In the case before us, the prosecution has established beyond reasonable
doubt that the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA, a demented
person, through force, threat or intimidation. AAA was psychiatrically evaluated
as an adult woman with the mental age of a 7 to 8-year old child and that she
gave birth to a child despite her mental inability to give her consent to a sexual
relationship. These facts support the allegation of sexual abuse. AAA also
identified without uncertainty the accused-appellant as her attacker and related
distinctly that he forcibly laid her down, held her at knifepoint, and sexually
abused her.
We also accord high respect to the ruling of the trial court, as well as to the
appellate court’s deference thereto, that the accused-appellant was the
biological father of the two-year old daughter of AAA as a result of the rape
incident and in view of their "striking facial similarities and features." The order
to acknowledge and support accused-appellant’s offspring is in accordance
with Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code.
Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three kinds of civil
liability that may be imposed on the offender:
a) indemnification,
b) acknowledgment of the offspring, unless the law
should prevent him from so doing, and
c) in every case to support the offspring.
FACTS:
Ma. Blyth Abadilla, a Clerk of Court, filed a complaint against Judge Tabiliran
on the grounds of gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption
unbecoming of a judge. With respect to the charge on gross immorality, she
contended that the judge scandalously and publicly cohabited with Priscilla
Baybayan during subsistence of his marriage with Teresita Banzuela. Tabiliran
and Priscilla got married in May 1986. On the other hand, with respect to the
charge on deceitful conduct, petitioner claims that the judge caused his three
illegitimate children with Priscilla be registered as “legitimate” by falsely
executing separate affidavits stating the delayed registration was due to
inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight when in fact, he knew these
children cannot be legally registered as legitimate. The judge averred that 25
years had already elapsed since the disappearance of her wife in 1966 when
he married Priscilla hence the cohabitation was neither bigamous nor immoral.
However, as early as 1970, based on the record, Priscilla had begotten her
three children (1970, 1971 and 1975).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the three children can be considered legitimate? NO
HELD:
The three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered
legitimate since the time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage
between Tabiliran and Teresita. Only natural children can be legitimated.
Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception
of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are
natural.
Under Article 177 of the Family Code, only children conceived and born outside
of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were
not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated.
Reasons for this limitation:
1) The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed;
2) It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of
successional rights;
3) There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social
mores change;
4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to
adulterous children as it will destroy the sanctity of marriage;
5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry
many years after the birth of the child.
Respondents offered the child for adoption to Gina Carreon's sister and xxx
brother-in-law, petitioners Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes, 168. IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the
who took care and custody of the child when she was barely two weeks old. following cases:
FACTS: 1) if one spouse seeks to adopt the
An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child by petitioners was also The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
executed by respondent Gina Carreon on 29 April 1987. The petition for On 23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor 2) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own
adoption was filed by petitioners over the child before the RTC of Rizal on 20 children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
August 1987, which granted the petition. Lucia Ayuban. Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim however, That the other spouse has
registered the children to make it appear that they were the children’s parents. signified his/her consent thereto; or
The court ordered that the child be "freed from parental authority of her natural The children were named Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim. Michelle 3) if the spouses are legally separated from
parents as well as from legal obligation and maintenance to them and that from was barely eleven days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was each other.
now on shall be, for all legal intents and purposes, known as Angelie Anne born on 15 March 1977. Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse
Cervantes, a child of herein petitioners and capable of inheriting their estate." to petitioner’s clinic. His date of birth is 1 August 1983. adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint
parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
Petitioners received a letter from the respondents demanding to be paid the The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They xxx
amount of P150, 000.00; otherwise, they would get back their child. sent the children to exclusive schools. They used the surname Lim in all their
school records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim The use of the word shall in the above-quoted provision means that joint
While petitioners were out at work, the respondent Gina Carreon took the child died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario, an American adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with
from her "yaya" at the petitioner's residence and brought the child to her house. citizen. the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation.
As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but
Petitioners demanded the return of the child, but Gina Carreon refused, saying Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony
that she had no desire to give up her child for adoption and that the affidavit of given under RA 8552 to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. between the spouses.
consent to the adoption she had executed was not fully explained to her. She Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of
will, however, return the child to the petitioners if she were paid the amount. Michelle and Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried
1258 and 1259, respectively. At the time of the filing of the petitions for at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the
Felisa Tansingco, the social worker who had conducted the case study on the adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her
adoption and submitted a report thereon to the RTC of Rizal in the adoption 18 years and seven months old. husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption
case, testified before the Executive Judge, RTC Pasig declaring that she had on this ground.
interviewed respondent Gina Carreon and that respondent manifested to the Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by
social worker her desire to have the child adopted by the petitioners. their Affidavits of Consent. Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in
shown in his Affidavit of Consent. Petitioners husband Olario likewise executed Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of
ISSUE: an Affidavit of Consent for the adoption of Michelle and Michael. petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate
W/N the custody and care of minor Angelie Anne Cervantes should be granted children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated
to the petitioners. YES In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and from each other.
Development (DSWD), Michelle was considered as an abandoned child
HELD/RATIO: and the whereabouts of her natural parents were unknown. The DSWD issued The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit
The Court affirmed the decision of RTC granting petitioners of custody and a similar Certification for Michael. of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must
care of minor Angelie Anne Cervantes and ruled that the petition for writ of comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in
Habeas Corpus be granted. In all controversies regarding custody of minors, The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The trial court ruled Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic
the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in
concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as social jointly with her new husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the
standing of the contending parents. Provision that no mother shall be husband and the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption
separated from a child under 5 years of age will not apply where the court finds and Article 185 of the Family Code. decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and
compelling reasons to rule otherwise. Petitioners who are legally married (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopters country as the latter’s adopted
appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting ISSUE: child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.
the minor and giving her a future better than what the natural mother, who is WON petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt. NO
Alvin A. Clouse is a natural born citizen of the United States of America. He Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify
married Evelyn, a Filipino on June 4, 1981 at Olongapo City. On August 19, pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino
1988, Evelyn became a naturalized citizen of the United States of America in citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition for
Guam. They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable of adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185
adopting Solomon, a 12 year old minor. which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife.
Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 up to the present, Solomon It reads:
Joseph Alcala was and has been under the care and custody of private Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt,
respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery except in the following cases:
Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his
to support and educate her son. own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the
Trial Court ruled in favor of the spouses and granted the petition for adoption. legitimate child of the other.
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General appealed to us for relief, Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that
contending that the lower court erred in granting the petition for adoption of must be read along together with Article 184.
Alvin and Evelyn Clouse, because they are not qualified to adopt under
Philippine law.
ISSUE:
WON spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse who are aliens can adopt
under Philippine Law. NO
HELD:
Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise
known as "The Family Code of the Philippines", private respondents spouses
Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.
Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates
the persons who are not qualified to adopt, viz.:
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in
accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.
(2) WON the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part
may be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since
indispensable parties in a damage case filed against their adopted child, Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was
for acts committed by the latter, when actual custody was yet lodged with committed.
the biological parents.
RULING:
(1) The shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occurred when
parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the
natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that the
natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are
the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
While petitioners were out at work, the respondent Gina Carreon took the child
from her "yaya" at the petitioners' residence in Angono, Rizal, on the pretext
that she was instructed to do so by her mother. Respondent Gina Carreon
brought the child to her house in Parañaque. Petitioners thereupon demanded
the return of the child, but Gina Carreon refused, saying that she had no desire
to give up her child for adoption and that the affidavit of consent to the adoption
she had executed was not fully explained to her. She sent word to the
petitioners that she will, however, return the child to the petitioners if she were
paid the amount of P150,000.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus should be granted. YES
RULING:
In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the
latter's welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated
from a child under five (5) years of age, will not apply where the Court finds
compelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all controversies regarding the
custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social
welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as
well as social standing of the contending parents. Never has this Court
deviated from this criterion.
FACTS:
Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor
illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among
others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that her mother is Gemma
Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and
surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent.
He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her
mother’s surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig,"
his surname.
The trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding that there
is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his
biological mother as his middle name.
ISSUE:
WON an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle
name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father. YES
RULING:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her
natural mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to
be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless
hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that relationship with her
natural mother should be maintained.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily
the surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code
and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that "the initial
or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the
father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the
mother.
A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, Mrs. Lahom Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending principally (a)
commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the Regional that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case and (b) that the petitioner
Trial Court of Naga City on the following grounds: had no cause of action in view of the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 8552.
Petitioner asseverated, by way of opposition, that the proscription in R.A. No.
1. That x x x despite the proddings and pleadings of said spouses, 8552 should not retroactively apply, i.e., to cases where the ground for
respondent refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom, rescission of the adoption vested under the regime of then Article 3482 of the
to the frustrations of petitioner particularly her husband until the Civil Code and Article 1923 of the Family Code.
latter died, and even before his death he had made known his
desire to revoke respondent's adoption, but was prevented by The trial court rendered a decision dismissing the petition. Hence, this instant
petitioner's supplication, however with his further request upon petition for review on certiorari.
petitioner to give to charity whatever properties or interest may
pertain to respondent in the future. ISSUE:
1. WON an adoption decreed on 05 May 1972, may still be revoked or
2. That respondent continued using his surname Sibulo to the utter rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552? NO
disregard of the feelings of herein petitioner, and his records with
the Professional Regulation Commission showed his name as 2. WON the adopter's action has already prescribed? YES
Jose Melvin M. Sibulo originally issued in 1978 until the present,
and in all his dealings and activities in connection with his practice RULING:
of his profession, he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo. (1) It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner
filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then,
3. That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in this city the new law, had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter
with only her household helps to attend to her, has yearned for the under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of
care and show of concern from a son, but respondent remained adoption. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the Court should
indifferent and would only come to Naga to see her once a year. now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having
been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no
4. That for the last three or four years, the medical check-up of longer could be pursued.
petitioner in Manila became more frequent in view of a leg ailment,
and those were the times when petitioner would need most the (2) An action to set aside the adoption is subject to the five-year bar rule
care and support from a love one, but respondent all the more under the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to
remained callous and utterly indifferent towards petitioner which is revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise
not expected of a son. of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill
the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. It must also be
5. That herein respondent has recently been jealous of petitioner's acknowledged that a person has no vested right in statutory privileges.
nephews and nieces whenever they would find time to visit her, While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a "right," the
respondent alleging that they were only motivated by their desire privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather
for some material benefits from petitioner. a right merely created by statute. It is a privilege that is governed by the
state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and
6. That in view of respondent's insensible attitude resulting in a welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal
strained and uncomfortable relationship between him and of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to
petitioner, the latter has suffered wounded feelings, knowing that regulation by the State. Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute
after all respondent's only motive to his adoption is his expectancy may be taken away at anytime before it has been exercised.
of his alleged rights over the properties of herein petitioner and her
As to the P250,000.00 granted by the trial court as monthly support pendente While there is evidence to the effect that defendant is giving some forms of
lite, as well as the P1,750,000.00 retroactive support, respondent found it financial assistance to his two (2) children via their credit cards and paying for
unconscionable and beyond the intendment of the law for not having their school expenses, the same is, however, devoid of any form of spousal
considered the needs of the respondent. support to the plaintiff, for, at this point in time, while the action for nullity of
marriage is still to be heard, it is incumbent upon the defendant, considering
His second motion for reconsideration having been denied, respondent filed a the physical and financial condition of the plaintiff and the overwhelming
petition for certiorari in the CA. capacity of defendant, to extend support unto the latter.
Accordingly, only the following expenses of respondent may be allowed as
On April 12, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision nullified and set aside and deductions from the accrued support pendente lite for petitioner and her
instead a new one is entered to pay private respondent a monthly support children:
pendente lite of P115,000.00.
Medical expenses of Susan Lim-Lua Php 42,450.71
ORDERING the deduction of the amount of PhP2,482,348.16 plus 946,465.64, Dental Expenses of Daniel Ryan 11,500.00
or a total of PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total support in arrears of Danilo Credit card purchases of Angelli 365,282.20
Y. Lua to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two (2) children; (Groceries and Dry Goods)
Credit Card purchases of Daniel Ryan 228,869.38
The appellate court said that the trial court should not have completely TOTAL Php 648,102.29
disregarded the expenses incurred by respondent consisting of the purchase
and maintenance of the two cars, payment of tuition fees, travel expenses, and
FACTS:
Vircel Andres, as legal guardian of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, filed an action
in 1988 for maintenance and support against the alleged father Manuel De Asis
who failed to provide support and maintenance despite repeated demands.
Vircel later on withdrew the complaint in 1989 with the condition that Manuel
will not pursue his counter-claim.
In 1995, Vircel filed a similar complaint against Manuel, this time as the minor’s
legal guardian/mother. Manuel interposed res judicata for the dismissal of the
case. He maintained that since the obligation to give support is based on
existence of paternity between the child and putative parent, lack thereof
negates the right to claim support.
ISSUE:
WON the minor is barred from action for support. NO
HELD:
The right to give support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a
third person. The original agreement between the parties to dismiss the initial
complaint was in the nature of a compromise regarding future support which is
prohibited by law.
The existence of lack thereof of any filial relationship between parties was not
a matter which the parties must decide but should be decided by the Court
itself. While it is true that in order to claim support, filiation or paternity must be
first shown between the parties, but the presence or lack thereof must be
judicially established and declaration is vested in the Court. It cannot be left to
the will or agreement of the parties. Hence, the first dismissal cannot bar the
filing of another action asking for the same relief since, it being contrary to law,
had no force and effect. Furthermore, the defense of res judicata claimed by
Manuel was untenable since future support cannot be the subject of any
compromise or waiver.
FACTS:
Victor Rondina was accused of raping AAA, a 16-year old lass. (Details of
criminal case not discussed since topic is about support). As a result of such,
AAA gave birth to CCC. Victor pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Pre-trial
and trial thereafter ensued. Victor interposed the defense of denial and alibi.
The RTC did not believe Victors alibi. Hence, the dispositive portion of its
Judgment “After considering all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused
Victor Rondina GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape as
charged in the information and, accordingly, without any finding as to mitigating
and aggravating circumstances, hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment
of Forty (40) years reclusion perpetua, to pay the offended party the sum of
P75,000.00 as indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and costs; also to
acknowledge the offspring [CCC] and to give her support.”
ISSUE:
WON the RTC was correct in a ordering the accused to support offspring CCC.
YES
HELD:
Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three different kinds of civil
liability that may be imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b)
acknowledgement of the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so
doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring.
FACTS:
In 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the RTC for
compulsory recognition and support pendente lite, claiming that Charles
Gotardo, petitioner, is the father of her child Gliffze. They met in 1992 in a bank
where they both worked. They became sweethearts in the last week of January
1993. Sometime in September 1993, they started to have intimate sexual
relations. The sexual encounters occurred twice a month and became more
frequent in June 1994; eventually, on August 8, 1994, the respondent found
out that she was pregnant. When told, the petitioner was happy and made
plans to marry the respondent but eventually backed out.
Divina gave birth to their son Gliffze on March 9, 1995. She sent Charles a
letter on demanding recognition of and support for their child. When the latter
did not answer the demand, Divina filed her complaint for compulsory
recognition and support pendente lite. Charles claimed that he first had sexual
contact with the Divina in the first week of August 1994 and she could not have
been pregnant for 3 months when he was informed of the pregnancy on
September 1994.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred when it set aside the RTC’s findings and ordered Charles
to recognize and provide legal support to his minor son Gliffze. NO
HELD:
Divina established a prima facie case that the petitioner is the putative father
of Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually involved only with one
man, the petitioner, at the time of her conception. Rodulfo, owner of the hotel,
corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and the respondent had intimate
relationship. Charles on the other hand failed to substantiate his allegations of
infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His allegations, therefore, cannot be
given credence for lack of evidentiary support.
The petitioner’s denial cannot overcome the respondent’s clear and categorical
assertions. Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of
obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate. Support consists of everything indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
FACTS:
Respondent Mirasol Baring and petitioner Antonio Perla were allegedly
neighbors and became sweethearts. When Mirasol became pregnant, Antonio
allegedly assured her that he would support her. However, Antonio started to
evade her.
Mirasol and her then minor son, Randy Perla (Randy), filed before the RTC a
Complaint for support against Antonio. Mirasol and Randy thus prayed that
Antonio be ordered to support Randy. During the trial, Mirasol presented
Randy’s Certificate of Live Birth and Baptismal Certificate indicating her and
Antonio as parents of the child. Mirasol testified that she and Antonio supplied
the information in the said certificates. However, these evidence were not
signed by Antonio. The RTC rendered a decision ordering Antonio to support
Randy, which was affirmed by CA.
ISSUE:
WON respondents successfully proved Antonio’s filiation to Randy. NO
HELD:
For Randy to be entitled for support, his filiation must be established with
sufficient certainty. The Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required
to establish paternity and filiation. An order for support may create an
unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the
parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by
clear and convincing evidence.
On May 19, 1998, the trial court issued an Order granting petitioner’s
application for support pendente lite. On motion of petitioner’s counsel, the trial
court issued an Order dated October 11, 2002 directing private respondent to
give support in the amount of P42,292.50 per month starting April 1, 1999
pursuant to the May 19, 1998 Order. On February 11, 2003, private respondent
filed a Motion to Reduce Support citing, among other grounds, that the
P42,292.50 monthly support for the children as fixed by the court was even
higher than his then P20,800.00 monthly salary as city councilor.
After hearing, the trial court issued an Order dated March 7, 2005 granting the
motion to reduce support and denying petitioner’s motion for spousal support,
increase of the children’s monthly support pendente lite and support-in-arrears.
On June 14, 2005, petitioner through counsel filed a Notice of Appeal from the
Orders dated March 7, 2005 and May 4, 2005. Petitioner pointed out that her
appeal is "from the RTC Order dated March 7, 2005, issued prior to the
rendition of the decision in the main case".
ISSUE:
WON orders on the matter of support pendente lite are interlocutory or final.
HELD:
In this case, since the order was but an incident to the main action, it is
INTERLOCUTORY.
The assailed orders relative to the incident of support pendente lite and support
in arrears, as the term suggests, were issued pending the rendition of the
decision on the main action for declaration of nullity of marriage, and are
therefore interlocutory. They did not finally dispose of the case nor did they
consist of a final adjudication of the merits of petitioner’s claims as to the
ground of psychological incapacity and other incidents as child custody,
support and conjugal assets.
Provisional remedies are writs and processes available during the pendency
of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect
certain rights and interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the
ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case. They are provisional because
they constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the
DOCTRINE: The right to separate support or maintenance, even from the conjugal
The loss of the substantive right to support in such a situation is incompatible partnership property, presupposes the existence of a justifiable cause for the
with any claim for support pendente lite. spouse claiming such right to live separately. This is implicit in Article 104 of
the Civil Code, which states that after the filing of the petition for legal
FACTS: separation the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other. A
Teodoro E. Lerma and Concepcion Diaz were married on May 19, 1951. On petition in bad faith, such as that filed by one who is himself or herself guilty of
August 22, 1969 the petitioner filed a complaint for adultery against the an act which constitutes a ground for legal separation at the instance of the
respondent and a certain Teodoro Ramirez and on September 26, 1972 the other spouse, cannot be considered as within the intendment of the law
court of First Instance of Rizal decided the adultery case of the respondent and granting separate support. In fact under Article 303 of the same Code the
found her and her co-accused, Teodoro Ramirez, guilty of the charge, obligation to give support shall cease "when the recipient, be he a forced heir
sentencing them to a term of imprisonment. During the pendency of the or not, has committed some act which gives rise to disinheritance;" and under
adultery case against the respondent, wife On November 18, 1969 the Article 921 one of the causes for disinheriting a spouse is "when the spouse
respondent filed with the lower court, a complaint against the petitioner for legal has given cause for legal separation." The loss of the substantive right to
separation and/or separation of properties, custody of their children and support in such a situation is incompatible with any claim for support pendente
support, with an urgent petition for support pendente lite for her and their lite.
youngest son, Gregory, who was then and until now is in her custody. The
respondent's complaint for legal separation is based on two grounds:
concubinage and attempt against her life. The application for support pendente
lite was granted in an order dated December 24, 1969, which was amended in
an order dated February 15, 1970. The petitioner filed his opposition to the
respondent's application for support pendente lite, setting up as defense the
adultery charge he had filed against the respondent.
On March 12, 1970 the petitioner filed with respondent Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul the
aforementioned orders on the ground that they were issued with grave abuse
of discretion. The next day the respondent court gave due course to the petition
and issued a writ of preliminary injunction to stop Judge Luciano from enforcing
said orders.
The respondent court, in its decision of October 8, 1970, set aside the assailed
orders and granted the petitioner an opportunity to present evidence before the
lower court in support of his defense against the application for support
pendente lite.
The respondent moved to reconsider the decision on the ground that the
petitioner had not asked that he be allowed to present evidence in the lower
court. The respondent court, in its resolution of January 20, 1971, set aside the
decision of October 8 and rendered another, dismissing the petition. This is
now the subject of the instant proceeding for review.
ISSUE:
W/N the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the
respondent’s application for support pendente lite without giving the petitioner
an opportunity to present evidence in support of his defense against the said
application.
HELD:
Court of Appeals January 20, 1971 resolution and the orders of respondent
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court herein complained of, dated December
24, 1969 and February 15, 1970, all are set aside and their enforcement
DOCTRINE:
Art. 61, FC. After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall
be entitled to live separately from each other. The Court, in absence of a written
agreement between the spouses, shall designate either of them or a third
person to administer the absolute community or conjugal partnership property.
The administrator appointed by the court shall have the same powers and
duties as those of a guardian under the Rules of Court.
Art. 62, FC. During the pendency of the action for legal separation, the
provisions of Article 49 shall likewise apply to the support of the spouses and
the custody and support of the common children.
The Court shall provide for the support of the spouses, the support and custody
of the common children. Paramount considerations = moral and material
welfare of the children, their choice of parent
FACTS:
Celia Ilustre-Reyes filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Quezon City a complaint against her husband Manuel J.C. Reyes for legal
separation on the ground that he had attempted to kill her: he punched her,
held her head, and bumped it several times against the cement floor. He also
pushed her at the stairway of 13 flights, and swung at her abdomen which got
her half-unconscious. It was her father who saved her; He doused her with
grape juice, kicked her several times, and was saved this time by her driver.
She filed for support pendente lite for her and her 3 children. Manuel
opposed this by saying that his wife committed adultery with her physician.
The RTC granted the support pendent lite of P5000 per month while the CA
dismissed Manuel’s petition for the annulment of the RTC order alleging that
Manuel appears to be financially capable of giving the support.
ISSUE:
(1) WON adultery can be used as a defense in an action for support. YES,
but not in this case
(2) WON in determining the amount of support it is enough that the Court
ascertain via affidavits or other documentary evidence. YES
HELD:
(1) The alleged adultery must be established by competent evidence.
Adultery is a good defense if properly proved. In the case at bar Manuel
did not present any evidence to prove his allegation. He still has the
opportunity to adduce evidence on this alleged adultery when the action
for legal separation is heard on the merits before the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of QC. However, it is doubtful whether adultery
will affect her right to alimony pendente lite – she is asking for support to
be taken from their conjugal property, not Manuel’s personal funds.
(2) Mere affidavits may satisfy the court to pass upon the application for
support pendent lite; it is enough that the facts be established by
affidavits/other documentary evidence. Celia submitted documents that
FACTS:
In 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the RTC for
compulsory recognition and support pendente lite, claiming that the petitioner
is the father of her child Gliffze, whose imputed paternity the petitioner denied.
Trial ensued. She met the petitioner in 1992 in a bank where they both worked.
They became sweethearts in the last week of January 1993. Sometime in
September 1993, the petitioner started intimate sexual relations with the
respondent in the former’s rented room in the boarding house managed by
Rodulfo, the respondent’s uncle. The sexual encounters occurred twice a
month and became more frequent in June 1994; eventually, on August 8, 1994,
the respondent found out that she was pregnant. When told, the petitioner was
happy and made plans to marry the respondent but eventually backed out. The
respondent gave birth to their son Gliffze on March 9, 1995. When the
petitioner did not show up and failed to provide support to Gliffze, the
respondent sent him a letter on demanding recognition of and support for their
child. When the petitioner did not answer the demand, the respondent filed her
complaint for compulsory recognition and support pendente lite.
The petitioner took the witness stand and testified for himself. He denied the
imputed paternity, claiming that he first had sexual contact with the respondent
in the first week of August 1994 and she could not have been pregnant for 3
months when he was informed of the pregnancy on September 1994. During
the pendency of the case, the RTC, on the respondent’s motion, granted a
P2,000.00 monthly child support, retroactive from March 1995. RTC dismissed
the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. The CA consequently set aside the
RTC decision and ordered the petitioner to recognize his minor son Gliffze. It
also reinstated the RTC order for monthly child support. The petitioner argues
that the CA committed a reversible error in rejecting the RTC’s ruling, and that
the evidence on record is insufficient to prove paternity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error when it set aside the RTC’s
findings and ordered the petitioner to recognize and provide legal support to
his minor son Gliffze.
HELD:
The Court DENIED the petition and AFFIRMED the ruling of the CA, sustaining
the award of P2,000.00 monthly child support, not finding any reversible error
in the CA’s ruling. In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case
that the petitioner is the putative father of Gliffze through testimony that she
had been sexually involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of her
conception. Rodulfo corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and the
respondent had intimate relationship. However, the petitioner failed to
FACTS:
In 1961, petitioner Zenaida gave birth to a baby boy named Joseph Casero in
the Makabali Clinic in San Fernando, Pampanga, owned and operated by
respondent Dra. Makabali, an unmarried woman. Zenaida left the child with
Dra. Makabali from his birth, and the latter reared Joseph as her own son. She
had him treated for her expense for polio in Manila, nursed him until his
recovery, and sent him to school. From birth, Zenaida neither visited the child
nor paid for his expenses, until she filed a petition for habeas corpus before the
Pampanga CFI. At trial, it was found that Zenaida lived with a married man,
Feliciano Casero, and their two other children. This arrangement was
apparently at the tolerance of Casero’s lawful wife, who lived elsewhere.
Casero was a mechanic making P400/month, while Zenaida earns P4 to P5 a
day.
When Joseph was called to the witness stand in the presence of both parties,
the CFI found that he never knew his biological mother, Zenaida; the CFI had
to inform him. He repeatedly referred to Dra. Makabali as his “Mommy,” and
when asked with whom he would like to stay, Joseph pointed to the respondent
and said, “Mommy.” When further questioned why, Joseph said, “She is the
one rearing me.” Dra. Makabali promised the CFI that she would allow the
minor a free choice with whom to live upon reaching the age of 14. The CFI
then ruled that it was in the child’s best interest to be left with the respondent.
Zenaida then appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether Zenaida is entitled to custody of the child. — NO. The right to
custody entails the proper discharge of parental duties.
HELD:
Art. 363 of the Civil Code provides that “in all questions on the care, custody,
education, and property of children, the latter’s welfare shall be paramount.”
Further, for compelling reasons, even a child under seven years old may be
ordered separated from his mother. The law has thus created what the civilist
Peña calls “a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor.” Hence, the right of
parents to the company and custody of their children is but ancillary to
the proper discharge of parental duties to provide the children with
adequate support, education, moral intellectual, and civic training and
development, as provided by Art. 356.
As found by the Court, Zenaida was remiss in these duties. She not only failed
to provide the child with love and care: she actually deserted him, not even
visiting him in his tenderest years. No advantage could be derived from
coercing Joseph to leave Dra. Makabali’s care, in order to stay with Zenaida
FACTS: From 1972 to September, 1979, affiant and petitioner have always
Petition for certiorari to have the order of respondent judge of December 28, had a cordial and amicable relationship. Even from 1973 when
1979 ordering petitioner to produce the child, Maria Teresa Unson, his affiant started living with her brother-in-law, Agustin F. Reyes at
daughter barely eight years of age, with private respondent Edita N. Araneta San Lorenzo, Makati, affiant and petitioner retained a cordial
and return her to the custody of the later, further obliging petitioner to "continue relationship. Petitioner, since 1973, always knew about affiant's
his support of said daughter by providing for her education and medical needs," relationship with Agustin F. Reyes. In fact, petitioner would visit
allegedly issued without a "hearing" and the reception of testimony in violation Maria Teresa at affiant's home. Petitioner was always welcome to
of Section 6 of Rule 99. Petitioner and private respondent were married on April pick up Maria Teresa at any time.
19, 1971 and out of that marriage the child in question, Teresa, was born.
However, they executed an agreement for the separation of their properties Petitioner, his family, affiants family (Mr. and Mrs. Teodoro
and to live separately, as they have in fact been living separately since June Araneta), affiant's relatives and friends, since 1973, have long
1972. The agreement was approved by the Court. The parties are agreed that known of and accepted the circumstances involving private
no specific provision was contained in said agreement about the custody of the respondent and Agustin F. Reyes;
child because the husband and wife would have their own private arrangement
in that respect. Affiant admits that her present circumstances at first impression
might seem socially if not morally unacceptable; but in reality this
Thus petitioner affirms, among others, that: is not so. Maria Teresa has been reared and brought up in an
atmosphere of Christian love, affection and honesty to the import
That during the early part of 1978 petitioner personally acquired of the situation. Further, the quality and capacity of affiant of being
knowledge that his wife Edita Araneta has been living with her a good mother has always remained.
brother-in-law Agustin F. Reyes, in an apartment at C. Palma St.,
Makati, Metro Manila. and so petitioner tightened his custody over The respondent judge ordered the petitioner to produce the child, Maria Teresa
his daughter, especially after: Unson, his daughter barely eight years of age, with private respondent Edita
a) he found out that Agustin F. Reyes was confined at N. Araneta and return her to the custody of the later.
the Makati Medical Center from October 13 up to
December 3, 1977 for "Manic Depressive" disorder, ISSUE:
under the care of Dr. Baltazar Reyes; Whether or not minor Maria Teresa should be under the custody of her mother.
b) he found out that his wife Edita Araneta delivered a NO
child fathered by Agustin F. Reyes on September 24,
1978. HELD:
c) he found out that Agustin F. Reyes had been confined It is axiomatic in our jurisprudence that in controversies regarding the custody
again for the same ailment at the Makati Medical of minors the sole and foremost consideration is the physical, education, social
Center from June 27 up to August 29, 1978 under the and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective
care of the same doctor. resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents. Never
has this Court diverted from that criterion.
That on May 21, 1980 Edita Araneta delivered another child
fathered by Agustin F. Reyes. With this premise in view, the Court finds no difficulty in this case in seeing that
it is in the best interest of the child Teresa to be freed from the obviously
That aside from the foregoing circumstances, the following militate unwholesome, not to say immoral influence, that the situation in which private
against custody of Maria Teresa in favor of Edita Araneta: respondent has placed herself, as admitted by her, might create in the moral
a) Agustin F. Reyes is the child's and social outlook of Teresa who is now in her formative and most
godfather/baptismal sponsor; impressionable stage in her life. The fact, that petitioner might have been
b) Agustin F. Reyes and Edita Araneta have left tolerant about her stay with her mother in the past when she was still too young
the Roman Catholic Church and have to distinguish between right and wrong and have her own correct impressions
embraced a protestant sect. or notions about the unusual and peculiar relationship of her mother with her
DOCTRINE:
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred
or renounced except in cases authorized by law.
FACTS:
Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married. After their
marriage, the couple stayed with Teresita Eslao, mother of Reynaldo. The
couple had two children namely Leslie and Angelica. Leslie was entrusted to
the care and custody of Maria's mother while Angelica was entrusted with her
parents at Teresita's house. Reynaldo died 4 years later. Maria
intended to bring Angelica to her mother's place but Teresita prevailed and
entrusted to the custody of Angelica. Maria returned to her mother's house and
stayed with Leslie. Years later, Maria married James Manabu-Ouye, a
Japanese-American orthodontist, and she migrated to US with him. A year after
the marriage, Maria returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her children
and bring them to US. Teresita, however, resisted by way of explaining that the
child was entrusted to her when she was 10 days old and accused Maria of
having abandoned Angelica. The trial court rendered a decision where Teresita
was directed to cause the immediate transfer of custody of the child to Maria.
CA affirmed with the lower court's decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Teresita has the right to the custody of the child?
HELD:
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred
or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental
authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority
only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or
an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another,
such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely
temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental
authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the
same.
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children,
are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and company. In this
case, when Maria entrusted the custody of her minor child to Teresita, what
she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute
abandonment or renunciation of parental authority.
Thus, Teresita does not have the right to the custody of the child.
DOCTRINE:
Tender Age Presumption; hence, in the case at bar, the children are now both
over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay
is clear from the record.
FACTS:
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met in
Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation
and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local hospital. Teresita left for Los
Angeles, California to work as a nurse. Reynaldo was sent by his employer,
the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its liaison officer
and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship
of husband and wife. On 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born.
While they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita
got married, and upon their return to the United States, their second child, a
son, this time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was born on 1988.
Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and filed the petition
for a writ of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over
the children, thus starting the whole proceedings now reaching this Court. The
trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. It suspended Teresita's
parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have
sole parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon
by the parties and to be approved by the Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to gain custody over the
children be granted.
HELD:
The SC dismissed the writ of habeas corpus petition by the mother and retain
the custody of the children to the father. The illicit or immoral activities of the
mother had already caused emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and
exposure to conflicting moral values against the children.
The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with
whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all indications,
Reynaldo is a fit person. The children understand the unfortunate shortcomings
of their mother and have been affected in their emotional growth by her
behavior.
On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia
household, where three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents
contend that through deceit and false pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy
and clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown in Bacong, Negros
Oriental.
The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor
Ward Leouel Santos Jr.," before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with
Santos, Sr. as respondent. After an ex-parte hearing on October 8, 1990, the
trial court issued an order on the same day awarding custody of the child
Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. Petitioner
appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals. In its decision dated April 30,
1992, respondent appellate court affirmed the trial court's order.
Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court to
award custody of his minor son to his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the
ground that under Art. 214 of the Family Code, substitute parental authority of
the grandparents is proper only when both parents are dead, absent or
unsuitable. Petitioner's unfitness, according to him, has not been successfully
shown by private respondents.
ISSUE:
Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.?
HELD:
The minor should be given to the legitimate father. When a parent entrusts the
custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a
document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute
a renunciation of parental authority. Only in case of the parents' death, absence
or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving
grandparent.
The court held the contentions of the grandparents are insufficient as to remove
petitioner's parental authority and the concomitant right to have custody over
DOCTRINE :
Under Article 213, FC, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise."
Rule 102, Sec. 1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is
separated from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that
of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole parental
authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child.
FACTS:
Daisie David had an intimate relationship with her boss Ramon Villar, who is
married, and a father of 4 children, all grown-up. They first had a son,
Christopher, who was eventually followed by 2 more girls, Christine and Cathy
Mae. The relationship became known to Villar’s wife when Daisie took
Christopher J, to his house and introduced him to Villar's wife. After this,
Daisie’s were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were even accepted
by his legal family.
Then Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then 6 years old, to go with
his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give
Christopher back and had enrolled him at the Holy Family Academy for the
next school year. Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of
Christopher J. which the RTC granted, giving custody to Daisie and ordering
Villar to give temporary support of P3K a month to the 3 kids and to pay the
costs of suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not custody should be given to Daisie. YES
HELD:
CA ruling reversed, custody granted to Daisie and Villar ordered to give
temporary support in the amount of Php 3,000, pending the fixing of the amount
of support in an appropriate action. Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since
at the time of his conception, his father Villar, was married to another woman
other than his mother.
As such, pursuant to Art. 176, FC, he is under the parental authority of his
mother, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody
of him. And because she has been deprived of her rightful custody of her child
by Villar, Daisie is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
Rule 102, Sec. 1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is
separated from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that
of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole parental
authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child. The fact that Villar
has recognized the Christopher may be a ground for ordering him to give
support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Article
213, FC, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise."
DOCTRINE:
Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that
"illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this
Code." This is the rule regardless of whether the father admits paternity.
FACTS:
On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus
to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda. The petitioner
alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with
respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on September 17, 1996
as evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now
married to a Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan. The
petitioner prays that the custody of his son Michael Kevin Pineda be given to
him as his biological father and has demonstrated his capability to support and
educate him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the natural father may be denied the custody and parental care
of his own child in the absence of the mother who is away.
HELD:
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate
child of petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of
the Philippines explicitly provides that "illegitimate children shall use the
surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be
entitled to support in conformity with this Code." This is the rule regardless of
whether the father admits paternity.
Parental authority over recognized natural children who were under the age of
majority was vested in the father or the mother recognizing them. If both
acknowledge the child, authority was to be exercised by the one to whom it
was awarded by the courts; if it was awarded to both, the rule as to legitimate
children applied. In other words, in the latter case, parental authority resided
jointly in the father and the mother.
DOCTRINE:
Article 213 of the Family Code provided: “Art 213. In case of separation of
parents parental authority shall be exercised by the parent des granted by the
court.
FACTS:
Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a petition for declaration
of nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn w/ an ancillary prayer for custody pendente
lite of their almost 4 year old son, Rafaello, whom her wife took away w/ her
from their conjugal home and his school when she left him.
The RTC granted the ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite, since the wife
failed to appear despite notice. A house helper of the spouses testified that the
mother does not care for the child as she very often goes out of the house and
even saw her slapping the child. Another witness testified that after surveillance
he found out that the wife is having lesbian relations.
The judge issued the assailed order reversing her previous order, and this time
awarded the custody of the child to the mother. Finding that the reason stated
by Crisanto not to be a compelling reason as provided in Art 213 of the Family
Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the custody of the minor child should be awarded to the mother.
HELD:
Article 213 of the Family Code provided: “Art 213. In case of separation of
parents parental authority shall be exercised by the parent des granted by the
court. The court shall take into account all relevant consideration, especially
the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is
unfit.” No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise,” This Court has
held that when the parents separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing
provision governs the custody of their child. Article 213 takes its bearing from
Article 363 of the Civil Code, which reads: “Art 363. In all question on the care,
custody, education and property pf children, the latter welfare shall be
paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of
age, unless the court finds compelling reason for such measure.”
DOCTRINE: The CA was correct in holding that the order of the trial court did not
In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely directed
entitled to the custody of their child. Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why they are
deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline for the restraining his liberty. The assailed order was an interlocutory order
proper award of custody by the court. precedent to the trial court’s full inquiry into the issue of custody, which
was still pending before it.
FACTS:
Loran Abanilla and Marie Salientes are the parents of the minor, Lorenzo. They 2. Habeas corpus is available to the father.
loved with Marie's parents. Due to in-law problems, Abanilla suggested to his Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is
wife that they transfer to their own house, but Salientes refused. Abanilla left withheld from a person entitled thereto. Under Article 211 of the Family
the house, and was thereafter prevented from seeing his son. Abanilla, in his Code, respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have joint
personal capacity and as a representative of his son, filed a petition for habeas parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody.
corpus and custody before the RTC of Muntinlupa City. The trial court ordered Further, although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody
the Salienteses to produce and bring before the court the body of Lorenzo, and has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant
to show cause why the child should not be discharged from restraint. of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of
Salienteses filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, but it was dismissed. CA their child. In the present case, private respondent’s cause of action is
stated that the order of the trial court did not award custody but was simply a the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his petition.
standard order issued for the production of restrained persons. The trial court Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him.
was still about to conduct a full inquiry. A subsequent MR was likewise denied.
Salienteses filed the current appeal by certiorari. Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial
adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline for the proper award
ISSUES: of custody by the court. Petitioners can raise it as a counter argument
1. Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari against the for private respondent’s petition for custody. But it is not a basis for
trial court's order. preventing the father to see his own child. Nothing in the said provision
disallows a father from seeing or visiting his child under seven years of
2. Whether the remedy of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is age.
available to the father
HELD:
1. The CA rightfully dismissed the petition for certiorari.
Salientes: the order is contrary to the Family Code which provides that
no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise even
assuming that there were compelling reasons, the proper remedy for
private respondent was simply an action for custody, but not habeas
corpus. Petitioners assert that habeas corpus is unavailable against the
mother who, under the law, has the right of custody of the minor. They
insist there was no illegal or involuntary restraint of the minor by his own
mother. There was no need for the mother to show cause and explain
the custody of her very own child.
Abanilla: the writ of habeas corpus is available against any person who
restrains the minor’s right to see his father and vice versa. He avers that
the instant petition is merely filed for delay, for had petitioners really
intended to bring the child before the court in accordance with the new
rules on custody of minors. Under the law, he and petitioner Marie
Antonette have shared custody and parental authority over their son. He
Beckett further relates that, during the March 1, 2011 conference on the
application for habeas corpus, Geoffrey, Jr., then nine (9) years old, displayed
inside the courtroom hysterical conduct, shouting and crying, not wanting to let
go of Eltesa and acting as though, he, the father, was a total stranger. Despite
Geoffrey Jr.’s outburst, Judge Sarmiento issued an Order5, dated March 1,
2011, directing inter alia the following: (1) Eltesa to return Geoffrey, Jr. to
Beckett; and (2) Beckett to bring the child in the pre-trial conference set for
March 15, 2001.
For some reason, the turnover of Geoffrey, Jr. to Beckett did not materialize.
FACTS:
The RTC appointed Bonifacia Vancil, an American citizen, as legal and judicial
guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie and Vincent, the children of
her deceased son Reeder.
Helen Belmes, the natural mother of the minor children, instituted a motion for
removal of Guardianship and Appointment of Vancil, asserting that she is the
natural mother in custody of and exercising parental authority over the subject
minors.
Since Valerie had reached the age of majority at the time the case reached the
SC, the Court resolves to determine who between the mother and grandmother
of minor Vincent should be his guardian.
ISSUE:
Whether Helen Belmes is the sole guardian of the minor Vincent. YES
HELD:
Belmes, being the natural mother of Vincent, has the preferential right to be his
guardian.
Art. 211 of the FC states: "The father and the mother shall jointly exercise
parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of
disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order
to the contrary. xxx."
Considering that Belmes is still alive and has exercised continuously parental
authority over Vincent, Vancil has to prove Belmes' unsuitability.
As the Court held in Guerrero vs. Teran, the courts should not appoint persons
as guardians who are not within the jurisdiction of the courts as they will find it
difficult to protect the wards.
FACTS: Further, it was Ched the grandson of the vehicle owner Vivencio who allowed
Defendant-appellant St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City conducted an the minor James to drive the jeep at the time of the accident. The school did
enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment not allow James to drive the jeep. So whether the accident was caused by the
campaign was the visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees were reckless driving of James or the mechanical detachment of the steering wheel
studying. As a student of St. Mary’s Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of guide of the jeep, the school could not be held liable since these are events
the campaigning group. which it had no control. If the school may be considered negligent, it was only
the remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury,
Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school students there intervened the negligence of the minor’s parents or the detachment of
were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
their way to Larayan Elementary School, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by
James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same school. Allegedly, At any rate, since it is clear that the accident occurred because of
the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school but
turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the the registered owner of the vehicle who should be held responsible for
accident. The parents of Sherwin filed a case against James Daniel II and his damages for the death of Sherwin. Registered owner of any vehicle, even if not
parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third
Villanueva and St. Mary’s Academy before the RTC of Dipolog City and persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the
claimed for damages. highways or streets.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner St. Mary’s Academy is liable for damages for the
death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
RULING:
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental
authority over a minor child while under their supervision, instruction or
custody: (1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual,
entity or institution engaged in child care.
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor,
those exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable
for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor
while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.
However, for the school to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or
omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the death or
injury sustained. Injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate
consequence of the wrong done. Negligence, no matter in what it consists,
cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury
complained of. And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
In this case, the parents of Sherwin failed to show that the proximate cause of
the accident was the negligence of the school authorities. They admitted that
ISSUE: Petitioners’ argument that CLC exercised the due diligence of a good father of
Whether or not the school was negligent for the boy’s accidental fall. YES a family in the selection and supervision of its employees is not decisive. Due
diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is applicable where the
RULING: employer is being held responsible for the acts or omissions of others under
In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove Article 2180 of the Civil Code. In this case, CLC’s liability is under Article 2176
by a preponderance of evidence: of the Civil Code, premised on the fact of its own negligence in not ensuring
(1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; that all its doors are properly maintained. The Court’s pronouncement that
(2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other Timothy climbed out of the window because he could not get out using the
person for whose act he must respond; door, negates petitioners’ other contention that the proximate cause of the
(3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or accident was Timothy’s own negligence. The injuries he sustained from the fall
negligence and the damages incurred. were the product of a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
intervening cause, which originated from CLC’s own negligence.
In this tort case, respondents contend that CLC failed to provide precautionary
measures to avoid harm and injury to its students in two instances:
(1) failure to fix a defective door knob despite having been
notified of the problem; and
(2) failure to install safety grills on the window where Timothy
fell from. During trial, it was found that the lock was
defective.
The architect witness testified that he did not verify if the doorknob at the
comfort room was actually put in place. Further, the fact that Timothy fell out
through the window shows that the door could not be opened from the inside.
That sufficiently points to the fact that something was wrong with the door, if
not the door knob, under the principle of res ipsa loquitor.
The permit form of student Chiara Mae was unsigned. But because the mother Notably, respondent’s negligence, although gross, was not habitual. In view of
personally brought her to the school with her packed lunch and swimsuit, the considerable resultant damage, however, the SC agreed that the cause is
Taguiam concluded that the mother allowed her to join. Before the activity sufficient to dismiss respondent.
started, respondent warned the pupils who did not know how to swim to avoid
the deeper area. However, while the pupils were swimming, two of them Indeed, the sufficiency of the evidence as well as the resultant damage to the
sneaked out. employer should be considered in the dismissal of the employee. In this case,
the damage went as far as claiming the life of a child.
Respondent went after them to verify where they were going. Unfortunately,
while respondent was away, Chiara Mae drowned. When respondent returned,
the maintenance man was already administering cardiopulmonary
resuscitation on Chiara Mae. She was still alive when respondent rushed her
to the General Malvar Hospital where she was pronounced dead on arrival.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent’s dismissal on the ground of gross negligence
resulting to loss of trust and confidence was valid. YES
RULING:
Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, gross and habitual neglect of duties is a
valid ground for an employer to terminate an employee. Gross negligence
implies a want or absence of or a failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or
the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences
without exerting any effort to avoid them. Habitual neglect implies repeated
failure to perform one’s duties for a period of time, depending upon the
circumstances.
FACTS:
The Sps. Inton filed an action for damages and a criminal case on behalf of
their son Jose Luis where the latter was Sister Yamyamin, his religion teacher,
kicked him on the legs several times and shove his head on his classmate’s
seat for his behavior during class. Yamyamin plead guilty and was sentenced
accordingly.
The Intons sought to recover actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well
as attys fees for the hurt suffered by Jose Luis. Yamyamin was held liable to
him for moral damages of P25k, exemplary damages of P25k, and attys fees
of P10k.
Not satisfied with the award, the Intons elevated the case to the CA and asked
that the award be increased and hold Aquinas School solidarily liable with
Yamyamin. The CA found that the school is solidarily liable with Yamyamin.
Finding that there was an employer-employee relation existed between the
two.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Aquinas School is solidarily liable with Yamyamin. NO
HELD:
The Court has consistently applied the “four-fold test” to determine the
existence of an employer-employee relationship: the employer (a) selects and
engages the employee; (b) pays his wages; (c) has power to dismiss him; and
(d) has control over his work. Of these, the most crucial is the element of
control. Control refers to the right of the employer, whether actually exercised
or reserved, to control the work of the employee as well as the means and
methods by which he accomplishes the same.
In this case, the school directress testified that Aquinas had an agreement
with a congregation of sisters under which, in order to fulfill its ministry,
the congregation would send religion teachers to Aquinas to provide
catechesis to its students. Aquinas insists that it was not the school but
Yamyamin’s religious congregation that chose her for the task of catechizing
the school’s grade three students, much like the way bishops designate the
catechists who would teach religion in public schools. Under the
circumstances, it was quite evident that Aquinas did not have control over
Yamyamin’s teaching methods. The Intons had not refuted the school
directress testimony in this regard. Consequently, it was error for the CA to
hold Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin.
Regarding the Intons plea for an award of greater amounts of damages, the
Court finds no justification for this since they did not appeal from the decision
of the CA. The Intons prayed for the increase only in their comment to the
petition. They thus cannot obtain from this Court any affirmative relief other
than those that the CA already granted them in its decision.
FACTS:
Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates in
Grade Six at the Mabini Elementary School in Bacolod City. On July 9, 1962
their teacher assigned them, together with three other classmates, to weed the
grass in the school premises. While thus engaged, Monfort found a plastic
headband, an ornamental object commonly worn by young girls over their hair.
Jokingly she said aloud that she had found an earthworm and, evidently to
frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her. At that precise moment the
latter turned around to face her friend, and the object hit her right eye. Smarting
from the pain, she rubbed the injured part and treated it with some powder.
The next day, July 10, the eye became swollen and it was then that the girl
related the incident to her parents, who thereupon took her to a doctor for
treatment. She underwent surgical operation twice, first on July 20 and again
on August 4, 1962, and stayed in the hospital for a total of twenty-three days.
Despite the medical efforts, however, Maria Teresa Cuadra completely lost the
sight of her right eye.
ISSUE:
What is the liability of a parent for an act of his minor child which causes
damage to another?
HELD:
In this case, NONE.
What is the exact degree of diligence contemplated, and how does a parent
prove it in connection with a particular act or omission of a minor child,
especially when it takes place in his absence or outside his immediate
company? Obviously there can be no meticulously calibrated measure
applicable; and when the law simply refers to "all the diligence of a good father
of the family to prevent damage," it implies a consideration of the attendant
circumstances in every individual case, to determine whether or not by the
exercise of such diligence the damage could have been prevented.
In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the
defendant could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care,
or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in
failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his
child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as
he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the
teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was
an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent,
however careful, would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard
against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the
child's character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for
which the blame could be attributed to her parents.
The victim, no doubt, deserves no little commiseration and sympathy for the
tragedy that befell her. But if the defendant is at all obligated to compensate
FACTS:
Nora Fe Sagun is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national,
and Marta Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in
Baguio City and did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority. In 2005, Sagun applied for a Philippine passport. Her application was
denied due to the citizenship of her father and there being no annotation on
her birth certificate that she has elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently,
she sought a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship
averring that she was raised as a Filipino and she is a registered voter in
Baguio City and had voted in local and national elections as shown in the Voter
Certification. She asserted that by virtue of her positive acts, she has effectively
elected Philippine citizenship and such fact should be annotated on her record
of birth so as to entitle her to the issuance of a Philippine passport.
After hearing, the trial court granted the petition and declaring Sagun a Filipino
citizen. Petitioner, through the OSG, directly filed a petition for review on
certiorari, pointing out that Sagun failed to comply with the procedural
requirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine citizenship.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent is a Filipino citizen. NO
HELD:
When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the governing charter was the
1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the
citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father
followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority,
the child elected Philippine citizenship.
Records, however, show that Rosa had ratified the extrajudicial settlement of
the estate with absolute deed of sale. In Napoleon and Rosa’s Manifestation
before the RTC dated July 11, 1997, they stated:
"Concerning the sale of our parcel of land executed by our father, Enrique Neri
concurred in and conformed to by us and our other two sisters and brother (the
other plaintiffs), in favor of Hadji Yusop Uy and his spouse Hadja Julpa Uy on
July 7, 1979, we both confirmed that the same was voluntary and freely made
by all of us and therefore the sale was absolutely valid and enforceable as far
as we all plaintiffs in this case are concerned;"
In their June 30, 1997 Joint-Affidavit, Napoleon and Rosa also alleged:
"That we are surprised that our names are included in this case since we do
not have any intention to file a case against Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim
Uy and their family and we respect and acknowledge the validity of the Extra-
Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale dated July 7,
1979;"
Considering, thus, that the extrajudicial settlement with sale is invalid and
therefore, not binding on Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, only the shares of
Enrique, Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda and Rosa in the homestead properties
have effectively been disposed in favor of spouses Uy. "A person can only sell
what he owns, or is authorized to sell and the buyer can as a consequence
acquire no more than what the seller can legally transfer." On this score, Article
493 of the Civil Code is relevant, which provides:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage
it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal
rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect
to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in
the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.