113894-2002-Choa v. Choa PDF
113894-2002-Choa v. Choa PDF
113894-2002-Choa v. Choa PDF
SYNOPSIS
In this petition, petitioner argued that the trial court denied her demurrer to evidence
despite the patent weakness and gross insu ciency of respondent's evidence. Thus, she
was entitled to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.
In granting the petition, the Supreme Court held that Rules 41 and 65 of the Rules of
Court expressly recognize the exception when interlocutory orders may be subject to
certiorari proceedings — when the lower court acts with grave abuse of discretion, as in
this case. It was totally erroneous but also grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court to rule that the ling by petitioner of a series of cases against the respondent
established the latter's psychological incapacity. The evidence presented, even if taken as
true, merely established the prosecution of the cases against the respondent. Other
complaints of respondent, namely, about petitioner's alleged lack of attention to their
children's needs, immaturity and lack of an "intention of procreative sexuality" do not
constitute psychological incapacity. Finally, the testimony of the supposed expert witness
presented by the respondent was based on hearsay evidence.
SYLLABUS
DECISION
Simply stated, the issues are: (1) is certiorari available to correct an order denying a
demurrer to evidence? and (2) in its denial, did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion
by violating or ignoring the applicable law and jurisprudence? SDAaTC
"In all the above instances where the judgment or nal order is not
appealable, the aggrieved party may le an appropriate special civil action under
Rule 65." 2 2
Thus, a denial of a demurrer that is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction may be assailed through a petition for certiorari. 2 4 In Cruz
v. People, this exception was stressed by the Court in this wise:
"Admittedly, the general rule that the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not
available to challenge interlocutory orders of the trial court may be subject to
exceptions. When the assailed interlocutory orders are patently erroneous or
issued with grave abuse of discretion, the remedy of certiorari lies." 2 5
Second Issue:
Denial of Demurrer to Evidence
Having established that a writ of certiorari may be issued in exceptional
circumstances, this Court is now tasked to determine whether the present case falls under
the exception; that is, whether the RTC indeed committed a "patent error" or grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner's Demurrer to Evidence.
A demurrer to evidence is de ned as "an objection or exception by one of the parties
in an action at law, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is
insu cient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out his case or sustain the issue."
2 6 The demurrer challenges the su ciency of the plaintiff's evidence to sustain a verdict.
2 7 In passing upon the su ciency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely
required to ascertain whether there is competent or su cient proof to sustain the
indictment or to support a verdict of guilt. 2 8
We have thoroughly reviewed the records of the present case, and we are convinced
that the evidence against respondent (herein petitioner) is grossly insu cient to support
any nding of psychological incapacity that would warrant a declaration of nullity of the
parties' marriage.
First. Respondent claims that the ling by petitioner of a series of charges against
him are proof of the latter's psychological incapacity to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. These charges included Complaints for perjury, 2 9 false testimony,
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
30 concubinage 3 1 and deportation. 3 2 According to him, the ling and the prosecution of
these cases clearly showed that his wife (herein petitioner) wanted not only to put him
behind bars, but also to banish him from the country. He contends that this "is very
abnormal for a wife who, instead of protecting the name and integrity of her husband as
the father of her children, had acted to the contrary." 3 3
We do not agree. The documents presented by respondent during the trial do not in
any way show the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife. It is the height of absurdity
and inequity to condemn her as psychologically incapacitated to ful ll her marital
obligations, simply because she led cases against him. The evidence presented, even if
taken as true, merely establishes the prosecution of the cases against him. To rule that the
lings are su cient to establish her psychological incapacity is not only totally erroneous,
but also grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity.
Second. Neither is the testimony of respondent, taken by itself or in conjunction with
his documentary offerings, su cient to prove petitioner's alleged psychological
incapacity. He testified in these words:
"Q. Will you please tell us or explain to the Court what do you mean by
'psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage.' What do you mean by that?
A. Because before our marriage she was already on the family way, so at that
time she even want it aborted by taking pills. She was even immature,
carefree, and she lacked the intention of procreative sexuality. 3 4
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. CHUA:
And you consider her that she was carefree, she is psychologically
incapacitated? Will you please elaborate on this what you mean by
'carefree' approximating psychologically incapacitated?
ATTY. MIRANO:
I think we better ask the witness what he means by 'carefree.'
ATTY. CHUA:
Okay.
COURT:
Witness may answer.
WITNESS:
She does not help in the household chores, she does not take care of the
child, she wants me to hire an attendant in order to take care of the child.
Even when the children were sick she does not bother to let the children see
a doctor. 3 5
xxx xxx xxx
"STENOGRAPHER (reads back the question of Atty. Chua):
'ATTY. CHUA:
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
Now. From the time of courtship up to the time of your marriage to
the defendant, did you notice any characteristic or traits which you
consider as psychological incapacity?'
WITNESS:
Sometimes when I cannot visit at her house she gets mad at me, and she
won't talk to me when I call her up by telephone. So, all she wanted for me
to visit her everytime and even at the time when I am busy with some other
things. So, I think that is all." 3 6
Even if taken as true, the testimony of respondent basically complains about three
aspects of petitioner's personality; namely, her alleged (1) lack of attention to their
children, (2) immaturity and (3) lack of an "intention of procreative sexuality." None of these
three, singly or collectively, constitutes "psychological incapacity." Far from it.
In Santos vs. CA, 3 7 this Court clearly explained that "psychological incapacity must
be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability." 3 8 Said the
Court:
"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including,
and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee
itself, that the use of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' under Article 36 of the
Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses
as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low
intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's
'Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon
Law,' quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the
American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's 'Handbook II for Marriage
Nullity Cases'). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law
on marriage. Thus correlated, 'psychological incapacity' should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of
the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and delity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to con ne the meaning of 'psychological
incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
signi cance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated." 3 9
"ATTY. CHUA:
Q. And then finally and ultimately you reached the conclusion that both
parties, meaning the husband and the wife in the present case have a
personality which is normal. That is your conclusion?
WITNESS:
A. They are normal, but they cannot mix together.
A. Yes.
Q. And by normal personality, you mean that neither of them suffer from any
personality disorder, bordering on abnormality?
A. Yes.
Q. But Doctor, is not a fact or a fact of life, that no couple could be or are
perfectly match?
A. Precisely, if there is a problem, marital problem, there should be somebody
who knows how to handle marriage, that should try to intervene.
Q. You mean expert advise or services should be needed by the couple?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, if the couple are mature enough and each of them practises what we
call maximum tolerance and give and take, will that serve the purpose?
A. That would served the purpose of getting well.
Q. Yes?
A. Yes, with personalities different from each other, which I mentioned there
in my last page. That they are like oil and water, immiscible. Like oil and
water, they will not mix.
Q. You also mentioned that the plaintiff. Meaning to say the husband told
you about the frequent quarrels had with the wife. Did he ever tell you that
was a serious or major quarrel?
A. Actually there was no major quarrel. It was all petty quarrels. 4 3
xxx xxx xxx
Q. So the problem of this couple is fundamentally a conflicting personalities?
A. Yes. 4 4
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Now, you mentioned that you may be able to make them reconcile?
A. Yes.
Q. You mean that given the time and opportunity, things could be worked
out?
A. Yes.
Q. You mean reconciliation at this stage with expert services, and the advise
of those who possess the necessary [expertise] could be worked out?
Q. Incompatibility.
A. Yes. 4 6
Obviously, Dr. Gauzon had no personal knowledge of the facts he testi ed to, as
these had merely been relayed to him by respondent. The former was working on pure
suppositions and secondhand information fed to him by one side. Consequently, his
testimony can be dismissed as unscientific and unreliable.
Dr. Gauzon tried to save his credibility by asserting that he was able to assess
petitioner's character, not only through the descriptions given by respondent, but also
through the former's at least fteen hours 5 0 of study of the voluminous transcript of
records of this case. Even if it took the good doctor a whole day or a whole week to
examine the records of this case, we still nd his assessment of petitioner's psychological
state sorely insufficient and methodologically flawed.
As to respondent's argument — that because Dr. Gauzon's testimony had never been
objected to, the objection raised thereafter was deemed waived — the Supreme Court has
already ruled on the matter. It held that although the question of admissibility of evidence
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
could not be raised for the rst time on appeal, hearsay or unreliable evidence should be
disregarded whether objected to or not, because it has no probative value. 5 1
We are, of course, mindful of the ruling that a medical examination is not a conditio
sine qua non to a nding of psychological incapacity, so long as the totality of evidence
presented is enough to establish the incapacity adequately. 5 2 Here, however, the totality
of evidence presented by respondent was completely insu cient to sustain a nding of
psychological incapacity — more so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological
examination.
The trial court should have carefully studied and assessed the evidence presented
by respondent and taken into account the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter. It could
then have easily concluded, as we conclude now, that it was useless to proceed further
with the tedious process of hearing contravening proof. His evidence was obviously,
grossly and clearly insu cient to support a declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity. Withal, it was grave abuse of discretion for the RTC to deny the
Demurrer and to violate or ignore this Court's rulings in point. Indeed, continuing the
process of litigation would have been a total waste of time and money for the parties and
an unwelcome imposition on the trial court's docket.
We have already ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court
or tribunal violates or contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. 5 3
Any decision, order or resolution of a lower court tantamount to overruling a judicial
pronouncement of the highest Court is unmistakably a very grave abuse of discretion. 5 4
There is no reason to believe that an appeal would prove to be a plain, speedy or
adequate remedy in the case at bar. An appeal would not promptly relieve petitioner from
the injurious effects of the patently mistaken Orders maintaining the baseless action of
respondent. It would only compel her to go needlessly through a protracted trial, which
would further clog the court dockets with another futile case. 5 5
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed CA Decision
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent's Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED, and the case
for declaration of nullity of marriage based on the alleged psychological incapacity of
petitioner is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs. TICaEc
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., is abroad on official business.
Footnotes
1. Annex "A" of the Petition; rollo, pp. 25-28; penned by Justice Romeo A. Brawner and
concurred in by Justices Fermin A. Martin Jr. (Division chairman) and Andres B. Reyes
Jr. (member).
15. Ibid.
16. Id., pp. 4 & 27-A.
17. Ibid.
18. The case was deemed, submitted for decision on February 12, 2001, upon this Court's
receipt of the Memorandum for respondent signed by Attys. William N. Mirano and Gina
H. Mirano of Mirano, Mirano & Mirano. Petitioner's Memorandum, received on December
29, 2000, was signed by Atty. Joselito T. Bayatan.
24. Ong v. People, 342 SCRA 372, October 9, 2000; Gutib v. CA, 312 SCRA 365, August 13,
1999.
25. 303 SCRA 533, 538, February 23, 1999, per Pardo, J.
54. Ibid.
55. Emergency Loan Pawnshop, Inc. v. CA, 353 SCRA 89, February 28, 2001; Far East Bank
and Trust Co. v. CA, 341 SCRA 485, September 29, 2000; MB Finance Corp. v. Abesamis,
195 SCRA 592, March 22, 1991.