Political Communication

ISSN: 1058-4609 (Print) 1091-7675 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upcp20

Social Media Social Capital, Offline Social Capital,

and Citizenship: Exploring Asymmetrical Social
Capital Effects

Homero Gil de Zúñiga, Matthew Barnidge & Andrés Scherman

To cite this article: Homero Gil de Zúñiga, Matthew Barnidge & Andrés Scherman (2016): Social
Media Social Capital, Offline Social Capital, and Citizenship: Exploring Asymmetrical Social
Capital Effects, Political Communication, DOI: 10.1080/10584609.2016.1227000

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Political Communication, 00:1–25, 2016
© 2016 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1058-4609 print / 1091-7675 online
DOI: 10.1080/10584609.2016.1227000

Social Media Social Capital, Offline Social Capital,

and Citizenship: Exploring Asymmetrical Social
Capital Effects

HOMERO GIL DE ZÚÑIGA, MATTHEW BARNIDGE, and ANDRÉS

SCHERMAN

In pursuit of a healthier and participatory democracy, scholars have long established the
positive effects of social capital, values derived from resources embedded in social ties with
others which characterize the structure of opportunity and action in communities. Today,
social media afford members of digital communities the ability to relate in new ways. In these
contexts, the question that arises is whether new forms of social capital associated with the
use of social media are a mere extension of traditional social capital or if they are in fact a
different construct with a unique and distinct palette of attributes and effects. This study
introduces social media social capital as a new conceptual and empirical construct to
complement face-to-face social capital. Based on a two-wave panel data set collected in
the United States, this study tests whether social capital in social media and offline settings are
indeed two distinct empirical constructs. Then, the article examines how these two modes of
social capital may relate to different types of citizenship online and offline. Results show that
social media social capital is empirically distinct from face-to-face social capital. In addition,
the two constructs exhibit different patterns of effects over online and offline political
participatory behaviors. Results are discussed in light of theoretical developments in the
area of social capital and pro-democratic political engagement.

Keywords offline political participation, online political participation, social capital,

social media, social media social capital, survey panel data

The emergence of social media platforms has reinvigorated scholarly interest in social capital
(Skoric & Zhu, 2015; Valenzuela, Park, & Kee, 2009; Williams, 2006; Zhong, 2014). These
media afford members of digital communities the ability to relate in new ways, in which the
co-presence of others is not necessary to develop social capital (Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, &
Valenzuela, 2012). In this context, the question that arises is whether new forms of social
capital associated with the use of social media are a mere extension of traditional social capital
or if they are in fact a different construct with a unique and distinct palette of attributes and

Homero Gil de Zúñiga is the Medienwandel Professor, and Director of the Media Innovation Lab
(MiLab) at the Department of Communication, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Vienna, and a
Research Fellow at the Facultad de Comunicacíon y Letras, Universidad Diego Portales, Chile. Matthew
Barnidge is post-doctoral researcher in the Media Innovation Lab (MiLab) at the Department of
Communication, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Vienna. Andrés Scherman is Professor at
the Facultad de Comunicacíon y Letras, Universidad Diego Portales, Chile.
Address correspondence to Homero Gil de Zúñiga, Medienwandel Professor, Department of
Communication, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Vienna, Währinger Straße 29, Vienna 1090,
Austria. E-mail: [email protected]

1
2 Homero Gil de Zúñiga et al.

effects (see, e.g., Molyneux, Vasudevan, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2015; Williams, 2006). That is, in
addition to face-to-face means of generating social capital, it is possible that social media users
now develop distinctive ways to remain close to other users, fostering community values in
novel-yet-genuine ways. Because of the close relationship between social capital and political
engagement (Bourdieu, 1985; Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Coleman, 1988; Lake & Huckfeldt,
1998; Lin, 2001), questions also arise about whether differences in the ways social capital is
produced translate into different patterns of political action.
Based on a two-wave panel data set collected in the United States, this study tests
whether social capital in social media and offline settings form two distinct empirical
constructs. Then, the study clarifies the symbiotic, although asymmetrical, relationship
between the two social capital constructs. Finally, the article examines how these two
modes of social capital may relate to political engagement online and offline.

Literature Review

Offline Social Capital Versus Social Media Social Capital

Social capital can be broadly defined as the value derived from resources embedded in social
ties with others (Lin, 2008). The concept was originally used to characterize the structure of
opportunity and action in communities or collectives (Coleman, 1988, 1990), but the idea
was later adapted to the study of individual behavior and orientations toward politics and the
public sphere (Bourdieu, 1985; Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Lin, 2001). This adaptation tracked
closely with the shift in conceptualization of community as an entity defined by geo-spatial
structure to one defined by the structure of interpersonal relationships (Fischer, 1982; Rainie
& Wellmann, 2012). Thus, as scholars came to see community as diffused networks of
personal relationships, they came to view social capital as the value those relationships add
to individuals’ lives (Burt, 2005; Shah & Gil de Zúñiga, 2008).
Social media, including sites such as Facebook and Twitter, allow users to construct
public or semi-public profiles, articulate their social connections with other profiles, and
navigate these connections over virtual space (Boyd & Ellison, 2007). Research has demon-
strated their ability to provide social support to users who lack self-esteem (Ellison,
Steinfield, & Lampe, 2007; Steinfeld, Ellison, & Lampe, 2008). Other work has shown how
they provide new ways for people to connect with politics through engagement with news
(Bakshy, Messing, & Adamic, 2015; Barthel, Shearer, Gottfried, & Mitchell, 2015), expres-
sion or involvement with political discussion (Bachmann, Correa, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2012;
Barnidge, 2015; Gil de Zúñiga, Molyneux, & Zheng, 2014; Kim, 2011; Valenzuela, 2013), or
participation in online or offline mobilization efforts (Bode, 2012; Bode, Vraga, Borah, &
Shah, 2014; Valenzuela et al., 2009).
This empirical evidence implies that social media change the structure and nature of
social connection, and therefore that they may alter the distribution and nature of social
capital embedded in those social relationships. For example, research has shown that social
media enable users to seek broader bases of social support and affiliation (Ellison,
Steinfeld, & Lampe, 2011). In addition, research has shown a direct relationship between
social media use or social media news use and social capital (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012),
while others have found that social media contribute to offline behavior that contributes to
social capital (Hampton, Lee, & Her, 2011).
Not only does this research show that social media promote the development of social
capital, it also points toward several reasons that social capital created in social media
settings is conceptually and empirically different from social capital created in offline
 Asymmetrical Social Capital 3

settings. First, social media alter the structure of social communication through the
articulation of latent or weak-tie relationships (Gil de Zúñiga & Valenzuela, 2011). This
articulation function means that social media provide users with new and different kinds of
social information about relationships (e.g., Kwon, Stefanone, & Barnett, 2014; Walther,
Van der Heide, Kim, Westerman, & Tong, 2008), from which new and different kinds of
value can be derived (e.g., Ellison et al., 2011). Second, social media promote engagement
with a broader range of media content related to politics and public affairs (Bakshy et al.,
2015; Barbera, 2014; Barnidge, 2015; Kim, 2011; Kim, Hsu, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2013), and
they afford new ways to engage with semi-public conversations occurring in egocentric
social networks (Rojas, 2015; Yamamoto, Kushin, & Dalisay, 2013; Zhang, Johnson,
Seltzer, & Bichard, 2010). These behaviors represent different avenues for users to
recognize and develop value in social relationships. Finally, social media provide new
ways for users to convert latent social value into social or political action (Bode et al.,
2014; Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012). Taken together, these three points suggest that social
capital on social media differs from social capital in offline settings in terms of the latent
distribution of social value and resources, the process of recognition and development of
these very characteristics, as well as the conversion of these values and resources into
more tangible individual or collective benefit. Therefore, it is hypothesized that this
conceptual distinction will manifest empirically.

H1: Offline social capital and social media social capital will form two different factors.

Some scholars have asserted that social connection on social media tends to move
from the offline realm to the online environment (Boyd & Ellison, 2007). That is, social
media translate social connections formed offline to online platforms. However, theoreti-
cally, the causal relationship between social connectedness in the two environments could
run the other way—from online to offline. Research shows that social media tend to
expand social networks (Hampton, Sessions, & Her, 2011; Tahkteyev, Gruzd, & Wellman,
2012), and that relationship maintenance on social media typically strengthens offline
social connection (Ramirez, Sumner, & Spinda, 2015; Toma & Choi, 2016). Given these
multiple possibilities regarding the directionality of the causal relationship between social
capital offline and on social media, we pose a research question (RQ) asking which
construct more strongly predicts the other over time.

RQ1: Does offline social capital lead to social media social capital more strongly over time
than the other way around?

Offline Versus Online Political Participation

Traditional political participation is a multidimensional construct characterized by four
kinds of political behavior: voting, campaign activity, contacting officials, and collective
action (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). But the rise of the Internet witnessed the
emergence of new forms of political participation that are not included in this typology
(Gil de Zúñiga, Veenstra, Vraga, & Shah, 2010). These new kinds of participation online
are arguably more personal and driven by individuals’ social and political identities
(Bennett, 1998), which may also be detached from institutionalized politics in some
cases (Bimber, Stohl, & Flanagin, 2009). In fact, many are more ephemeral kinds of
behavior—activities in which individuals can engage with relatively low levels of long-
4 Homero Gil de Zúñiga et al.

term commitment (Norris, 2002). Even still, these new forms of participation, albeit
distinct from offline political activities, appear to coincide with other forms that require
more individual involvement (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2010), meaning there is now a wider
range of behaviors that draw people into politics, more broadly (Bakker & de Vreese,
2011).

Social Capital and Offline Political Participation

Social capital is closely related to political participation (Bourdieu, 1985; Brehm & Rahn,
1997; Coleman, 1988; Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998; Lin, 2001). From its origins, the social
capital concept was used to explain political action (Rojas & Barnidge, 2013), although
later work treated participation as an indicator of social capital, as well (e.g., Brehm &
Rahn, 1997; Putnam, 2000; Shah, Kwak, & Holbert, 2001; Shah, McLeod, & Yoon,
2001). Others have subsequently argued, however, that political behavior is an outcome
of social capital, rather than its indicator (e.g., Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012; Molyneux et al.,
2015), because the value inherent in social relationships must be tapped through commu-
nication in order to produce action (Rojas, Shah, & Friedland, 2011). In support of this
conceptual clarification, recent research shows robust evidence of a relationship between
social connectedness and political participation not only in the United States, but also in
Europe, Asia, and South America (Campus, Pasquino, & Vaccari, 2008; Gibson &
Cantijoch, 2013; Giugni, Michel, & Gianni, 2014; Gustafsson, 2012; Skoric & Zhu,
2015; Zhang & Chia, 2006). In short, how people are connected to one another matters
for political participation.
Because the idea that offline social capital is linked to offline political participation is
well-established in the literature (e.g., Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998), we hypothesize a positive
relationship with both voting and other forms of offline participation.

H2: Offline social capital will be positively related to (a) offline political participation and
(b) voting.

Online and offline political activities tend to be closely interrelated (Bakker & de
Vreese, 2011), in part because people draw on their online social contacts for offline action
(Bennett & Segerberg, 2012; Rojas & Puig-i-Abril, 2009). Increasingly, people use social
media to mobilize their networks for on-the-ground political action, with recent examples
of this online-to-offline phenomenon including the Arab Spring (Eltantawy & Weist, 2011;
Howard & Parks, 2012; Lim, 2012, 2013) and the Occupy movements (Bennett &
Segerberg, 2012; Bennett, Segerberg, & Walker, 2014; Gleason, 2013; Theocharis,
Lowe, Van Deth, & Garcia-Albacete, 2015). Therefore, it is hypothesized that the
resources embedded in social connections formed on social media will also be associated
with offline political participation.

H3: Social media social capital will be positively related to (a) offline political participa-
tion and (b) voting.

Social Capital and Online Political Participation

Prior research shows a positive relationship between social capital on social media and
online political participation (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012; Valenzuela, 2013; Yamamoto
 Asymmetrical Social Capital 5

et al., 2013). Theoretically, social media exposes users to more mobilizing political
information and it affords the possibility of engaging in a range of online participatory
behaviors (Valenzuela, 2013). As a result, the social connections formed through social
media are particularly effective at drawing social media users into online participation.

H4: Social media social capital will be positively related to online political participation.

While there is little prior evidence of a relationship between offline social capital
and online political participation (see Gil de Zúñiga and colleagues [2012] for an
example of a null finding), there are theoretical reasons to expect that a relationship
exists. The Internet and social media have arguably facilitated the rise of new kinds of
political organizations that rely more heavily on diffused social networks of affiliation
and support than do traditional political organizations (Bimber et al., 2009; Gil de
Zúñiga, Copeland, & Bimber, 2014). Therefore, while social networks have always
been important for the mobilizing capacity of political organizations, today there are
more opportunities for these organizations to tap into offline social networks using
online tools (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012; Gibson & Cantijoch, 2013; Lim, 2013;
Theocharis, 2013). By extension, this implies that resources derived from offline social
networks increasingly provide opportunities for people to engage with politics online—
for example, signing online petitions or making online donations at the recommenda-
tion of offline social ties.

H5: Offline social capital will be positively related to online political participation.

Methods

Sample
This study relies on a two-wave panel survey collected by a research team at a major
research university in the United States. The survey was designed to be representa-
tive of the U.S. population over the age of 18. Respondents were selected from a
previously existing online panel of more than 200,000 citizens, curated by an
international polling company, AC Nielsen. Nielsen panels establish quotas to
match U.S. Census statistics for age and gender pursuing national representation
and generalizability. Using the online Qualtrics software, the first survey wave was
collected between December 2013 and January 2014. The second wave was collected
in February and March 2014. The first wave was initially distributed to 5,000
respondents. A total of 2,060 participants completed the survey, and 247 cases
ended up being discarded due to high levels of incomplete data or missing informa-
tion, for a final count of 1,813 cases. The final response rate according to the
American Association of Public Opinion Research’s response rate calculator (RR3)
was 34.6% (American Association of Public Opinion Research, 2011, p. 45). The
second wave retained 1,024 valid cases (57%), which falls within similar parameters
of valid data seeking to respect representation integrity (see Watson & Wooden,
2006, for a discussion of retention rates for Web panels). In general, the survey
respondents were slightly older, more educated, and included fewer Hispanics than
the U.S. population at large. Still, the overall sample demographics are comparable to
other surveys employing random collection methods (Pew Research Center, n.d.) and
6 Homero Gil de Zúñiga et al.

are also comparable to the national population as whole (see full demographic
breakdowns for this data set in Saldaña, McGregor, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2015;
Weeks, Ardèvol-Abreu, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2015).

Measures
Offline Political Participation. In both waves of the survey, five questionnaire items
measured on 10-point (1 = never, 10 = all the time) scales asked respondents how often,
in the past 12 months, they engaged in various offline political activities, including getting
involved in political groups or campaigns, participating with social movement groups,
donating money to a campaign or cause, attending a protest, or attending a political rally
(Wave 1: Cronbach’s α = .82, M = 3.47, SD = 1.57; Wave 2: Cronbach’s α = .83, M = 3.49,
SD = 1.64). A change score (Wave 2—Wave 1) was also computed for use in the change-
score models (M = –.01, SD = 1.25).

Voting. In both waves of the survey, two questionnaire items, measured on 10-point scales
(1 = never, 10 = all the time) asked respondents how often they vote in (a) local or
statewide elections and (b) federal or presidential elections (Wave 1: Spearman-Brown
coefficient = .94, M = 8.11, SD = 2.97; Wave 2: Spearman-Brown coefficient = .93,
M = 8.16, SD = 2.92).

Online Political Participation. Also in both waves of the survey, six questionnaire items
measured on identical scales as offline participation asked respondents how often, in the past
12 months, they engaged in various online political activities, including signing or sharing an
online petition, participating in an online question-and-answer session with a politician or
public official, creating an online petition, and signing up online to volunteer to help with a
political cause, using a mobile phone to donate money to a campaign or political cause via text
message or app, and starting a political or cause-related group on a social media site (Wave 1:
Cronbach’s α = .81, M = 1.83, SD = 1.38; Wave 2: Cronbach’s α = .84, M = 1.83, SD = 1.42). A
change-score variable was also computed (M = .00, SD = 1.00).

Offline Social Capital. The two social capital variables (offline and social media) focus on
the social connectedness aspect of social capital (Williams, 2006; Zhang & Chia, 2006)
using previously validated measurement scales. The variable for social capital in offline
settings was created using six survey items measured on 10-point scales (1 = strongly
disagree, 10 = strongly agree) asking respondents about people in their communities (see
Table 1 for question wording).These items were asked in both survey waves (Wave 1:
Cronbach’s α = .92, M = 1.95, SD = 1.76; Wave 2: Cronbach’s α = .94, M = 1.93,
SD = 1.85). At Wave 1, the offline social capital variable is correlated with frequency of
social media use (measured on a 10-point scale asking respondents, “On a typical day, how
much do you use social media”) at r = .13, p < .001.

Social Media Social Capital. Meanwhile, the variable for social capital in social media
settings was created with four survey items for each survey wave measured on similar
scales and asking respondents about their social media communities (see Table 1 for
question wording; Wave 1: Cronbach’s α = .97, M = 2.10, SD = 1.94; Wave 2:
Cronbach’s α = .97, M = 2.10, SD = 1.97). These items were adapted from previous
measures focusing on social capital in other online or networked media (Molyneux
 Asymmetrical Social Capital 7

Table 1
Factor analysis of offline social capital and social media social capital

Social
Offline Social MediaSocial
Questionnaire Item CapitalW1 CapitalW1
I think people in my community feel connected to .909 .129
each other.
In my community, people help each other when there .894 .054
is a problem.
People in my community watch out for each other. .887 .058
In my community, we talk to each other about .852 .157
community problems.
I think people in my community share values. .819 .100
People in my community feel like family to me. .805 .164
I frequently use social media to encourage .124 .961
conversations about solving community problems.
I frequently use social media to find people to solve .132 .924
problems in my community.
I frequently use social media to foster community .091 .912
values.
I frequently use social media to connect community .039 .913
members to each other.
Eigenvalues 5.71 3.39
Variance explained (%) 47.57 35.99
Cumulative variance explained (%) 81.57
Cronbach’s α .95 .97
Notes. Bolded values indicate items loading on the same factor. W1 = Wave 1.

et al., 2015; Williams, 2006). At Wave 1, the social media social capital item is
correlated with frequency of social media use at r = .44, p < .001.

Social Media Interaction. The use of social media for social interaction is an important driver
of persuasion and action on social media (Diehl, Weeks, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2015). It is therefore
important to include it as a control variable because it could explain both social capital and
participation. Three Wave 1 survey items were used to create the social media interaction
variable. Measured on 10-point scales (1 = never, 10 = all the time), these items asked
respondents how frequently they use social media to stay in touch with friends and family,
meet new people who share interests, and contact people they wouldn’t meet otherwise
(Cronbach’s α = .78, M = 3.56, SD = 2.33).

Discussion Frequency. Likewise, political discussion contributes to social capital (Lake &
Huckfeldt, 1998) and affects political participation (McClurg, 2006; Mutz, 2006), and
therefore it is necessary to control for two dimensions of the political talk concept:
discussion frequency and discussion network size. The discussion frequency variable
was created from nine Wave 1 items measured on 10-point scales (1 = never, 10 = all
8 Homero Gil de Zúñiga et al.

the time) that asked respondents how often they talk politics online or offline with their
spouse/partner, family members, friends, acquaintances, strangers, neighbors they know
well, neighbors they do not know well, coworkers they know well, and coworkers they do
not know well. These items were averaged to create the final variable (Cronbach’s α = .87;
M = 3.27, SD = 1.74).

Discussion Network Size. As with discussion frequency, the size of respondents’ discus-
sion networks accounts for its influence on both social capital and political participation
(Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998). Two Wave 1 items asked respondents how many people they
talk about politics with in face-to-face and online settings. These items were added
together (M = 4.36, SD = 16.88). This variable was highly skewed (skewness = 10.85),
so a natural logarithmic transformation was performed (M = .33, SD = .37,
skewness = 1.3).

News Use. News use also affects social capital and political participation (McLeod et al.,
1996; Shah, Kwak, et al., 2001; Shah, McLeod, et al., 2001). The news use variable was
created by taking the average of 21 Wave 1 survey items measured on 10-point scales
(1 = never, 10 = all the time). These items asked respondents about their habitual use of
various news media, including local, network, and cable television news and/or fake news,
newspapers, radio, online-only news and/or hyperlocal news sites, online news aggrega-
tors, mobile news apps, and social media outlets such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, etc.
These items form a reliable scale (Cronbach’s α = .82, M = 2.92, SD = 1.16).

Media Trust. Media trust has been shown to amplify the effects of news use on political
participation (Kaufhold, Valenzuela, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2010). The media trust variable
took the average of four Wave 1 items measured on 10-point Likert-type scale (1 = not at
all, 10 = a great deal) asking respondents how much they trust news from mainstream
media, alternative news media, social media news, and news from online aggregators.
These items also formed a reliable scale (Cronbach’s α = .72, M = 4.28, SD = 1.72).

Political Interest. Several political orientations were controlled because they are related to
political participation. First, political interest is a relatively consistent predictor of political
participation (Kenski & Stroud, 2006; Verba et al., 1995), and was therefore controlled. It
was measured with two Wave 1 items using 10-point scales (1 = not at all, 10 = a great
deal) asking respondents how interested they are in politics and public affairs and how
closely they pay attention to information about politics and public affairs. A split-half test
shows these items form a reliable measure (Spearman-Brown ρ = .96, M = 6.67,
SD = 2.70).

Strength of Partisanship. Likewise, strength of partisanship is positively related to poli-

tical participation (Chadha, Avila, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2012; Kenski & Stroud, 2006) and
was therefore controlled. Three Wave 1 survey items were used to create the strength of
partisanship variable. These items were measured on 11-point scales (0 = strong conser-
vative, 11 = strong liberal) and asked respondents to place themselves on the partisan
spectrum in terms of party identification, social ideology, and economic ideology
(Cronbach’s α = .90; M = 5.96, SD = 2.60). These three items were averaged and then
folded such that scores farther away from the midpoint (5) took higher values and those
closer to the midpoint took smaller values (M = 5.95, SD = 2.59).
 Asymmetrical Social Capital 9

Internal Political Efficacy. A third important concept related to political participation is

internal political efficacy (Niemi, Craig, & Mattei, 1991). Two survey items measured on
10-point scales were used to create the variable for internal political efficacy. These items,
which were included only in Wave 1, asked respondents whether they consider themselves
well-qualified to participate in politics and whether they have a good understanding of the
important political issues facing the country (Spearman-Brown ρ = .87, M = 5.30,
SD = 2.50).

Demographics. Several important demographic characteristics are related to political

behavior (McLeod et al., 1996; Rojas & Gil de Zuñiga, 2010), and these were controlled
in the analysis. These variables include age (M = 52.9, SD = 14.65), gender (49% female),
education (measured on an 8-point scale ranging from some high school to doctoral
degree; median response category = some college), annual household income (median
response range = between $50,000 and $99,000 USD), and race (78% = White).

Results
The first hypothesis sought to determine to what extent offline social capital and social
media social capital are empirically distinct. The study contended that, although they are
related constructs, social media in the social media sphere is a different construct that
embodies theoretical differences with respect to the offline sphere. Results from principal
axes factoring with varimax rotation support this expectation. Offline social capital
(Cronbach’s α = .95; eigenvalue = 5.71) included six items evaluating the degree to
which people feel connected to one another in the community, the perception of the
community helping, talking to and watching out for one another, as well as a sense of
shared values and feeling like family. Drawing from the same items but uniquely related to
social capital in the social media realm, results also suggest a different, valid, and reliable
factor (Cronbach’s α = .97; eigenvalue = 3.39). The two constructs combined to explain a
total of 81.57% of the variance (see Table 1 for complete results). These results support
H1.
In addition, RQ1 asks whether offline social capital leads to social media capital more
strongly than the other way around. Relying on further causal inference analysis drawing
on cross-lagged correlation tests (Locascio, 1982), results indicate that social media social
capital in Wave 1 predicts offline social capital in Wave 2 (rcross-lagged = .17) more strongly
than the relationship that goes from offline social capital (Wave 1) to the proliferation of
social media social capital (Wave 2; rcross-lagged = .06). That is, developing social capital in
social media today will more strongly predict the development of offline social capital in
the future than the other way around. This finding lends support to the notion of a
virtuous, although asymmetrically related, circle of social capital (see Table 2).
H2 through H5 all pertain to the different ways in which social capital and political
participatory behaviors may be related. Given that the study relied on two-wave panel
data, different analyses were pursued to better address these hypotheses and research
questions. First, the study tested the effects in a cross-sectional regression model showing
the static relationships between social capital and online/offline political participation.
Then, first-differences regression models are estimated, which isolate the impact of social
media social capital and offline social capital on online and offline participation at the
individual level drawing on intrapersonal score changes over time (see Allison, 2009).
Next, the study performed an autoregressive model, which represents a much more
constrained approach, as research shows that prior behavior is the strongest predictor of
10 Homero Gil de Zúñiga et al.

Table 2
Cross-lagged Pearson’s correlation of offline social capital and social media social capital

Pearson Coefficient Effects rcross-lagged p-value

Offline Social Capital (W1) → Social Media Social Capital (W2) .06 .001
Social Media Social Capital (W1) → Offline Social Capital (W2) .17 .001
Notes. Path estimates are unstandardized coefficients. Indirect effects based on bootstrapping to
5,000 samples with biased corrected confidence intervals. The effects of demographic variables (age,
gender, education, race, and income), sociopolitical antecedents (political efficacy, strength of
partisanship, discussion network size, political knowledge), and both general news consumption
and social media for news (or social interaction) were included as control variables. Sample Wave 1
(W1) = 1,814; Sample Wave 2 (W2) & Fixed effect model = 1,017. The cross-lagged correlations
were calculated using the following formula:
ρyt x2  ρx1 yt ρx1 x2
ρyt x2
x1 ¼ rffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
  
1  ρx1 yt 2 1  ρx1 x2 2

future behavior (Aarts, Verplanken, & Van Knippenberg, 1998). In this case, the model
controlled for prior political participatory behavior in Wave 1 when predicting future
participation in Wave 2. Relationships with voting were estimated separately using
cross-sectional models in Wave 1 and Wave 2, as well as with a lagged panel model.
Finally, Huber-White robust standard errors were estimated for all models.
The cross-sectional models explain 47.3% of the variance for online political partici-
pation and 42.6% for offline participation (see Table 3).Both offline social capital
(β = .056, p < .05) and social media social capital (β = .337, p < .001) are related to
online political participation, but only social media social capital is related to offline
political participation (β = .327, p < .001). These models were re-estimated using
Huber-White robust standard errors, and results are substantively similar. For both out-
comes, offline social capital (for online participation: B = .033, SEHW = .015, p < .05; for
offline participation: B = .070, SEHW = .021, p < .001) and social media social capital (for
online participation: B = .239, SEHW = .032, p < .001; for offline participation: B = .301,
SEHW = .043, p < .001) are significantly and positively related.
The first-differences model explained 24.9% of the variance for online political
participation and 18.2% of offline political participation (see Table 4). Offline social
capital is positively related to online participation (β = .113, B = .064, SEHW = .016,
p < .001), but not offline political participation. Meanwhile, social media social capital
positively predicts online participation (β = .188, B = .185, SEHW = .034, p < .001) and
offline participation (β = .212, B = .173, SEHW = .042, p < .001). As can be expected,
prior levels of political participation were the strongest predictors of the outcome variables
in the autoregressive framework (online, β = .494, p < .001; offline, β = .652, p < .001). In
addition, offline participation also positively predicted online participation (β = .159,
p < .001). Among social capital variables, only social media social capital positively
predicted online participation (β = .117, B = .086, SEHW = .033, p < .001) and offline
participation (β = .097, B = .094, SEHW = .041, p < .001), whereas offline social capital
didn’t exhibit any relationships with participation (online, β = –.028, B = –.021,
SEHW = .014, n.s.; offline, β = .003, B = –.005, SEHW = .019, n.s.). The autoregressive
 Table 3
Cross-sectional (W1) regression models testing offline social capital and social media social capital on political participation

Online PoliticalParticipation Offline PoliticalParticipation

(Huber-White Huber-White
Variable β B (SE) SE) β B (SE) SE
Intercept – .046 (.215) (.236) – −1.039 (.327)** (.305)***
Block 1: Demographics
Age –.029 –.003 (.002) (.003) .043 .005 (.003) (.003)
Gender (1 = female) –.052 –.143 (.066) (.066)* –.060* –.211 (.088)* (.084)*
Education –.008 –.008 (.023) (.023) .045 .055 (.030) (.034)
Income –.058** –.056 (.024)* (.023)* –.003 –.003 (.032) (.029)
Race (1 = White) –.024 –.079 (.078) (.085) –.008 –.034 (.105) (.118)
ΔR2 .021 .027
Block 2: Media
Antecedents
Discussion Network –.034 –.133 (.107) (.120) .077** .379 (.145)** (.182)*
Size
Discussion Frequency .232*** .188 (.026)*** (.032)*** .165*** .171 (.034)*** (.041)***
Media Trust –.063* –.051 (.023)* (.026)* –.058 –.060 (.031) (.033)
News Use .223*** .280 (.038)*** (.055)*** .212*** .341 (.051)*** (.064)***
Social Media Use .016 .010 (.018) (.018) –.039 –.030 (.024) (.024)
Interaction
ΔR2 .377 .335
Block 3: Political
Antecedent
Political Interest –.012 –.006 (.017) (.017) –.044 –.029 (.023) (.021)
Strength of Partisanship .046 .024 (.013) (.014) .078** .054 (.017)** (.019)**
(Continued )
 Table 3
(Continued)

Online PoliticalParticipation Offline PoliticalParticipation

(Huber-White Huber-White
Variable β B (SE) SE) β B (SE) SE
Internal Political .131*** .070 (.017)*** (.016)*** .132*** .091 (.023)*** (.023)***
Efficacy
ΔR2 .015 .018
Block 4: Social Capital
Offline Social Capital .054* .032 (.015)* (.015)* .092*** .070 (.021)*** (.021)***
Social Media Social .354*** .255 (.023)*** (.033)*** .327*** .301 (.031)*** (.043)***
Capital
ΔR2 .069 .126
Total R2 .482 .426
Notes. Sample size = 1,017. W1 = Wave 1. Cell entries are final-entry ordinary least squares (OLS) standardized beta coefficients (β), unstandardized beta
coefficients (B), standard errors (SE), and robust standard errors (Huber-White SE).
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.
 Table 4
First differences (W2—W1) regression models testing offline social capital and social media social capital on political participation

Online PoliticalParticipationW2-W1 Offline PoliticalParticipationW2-W1

(Huber- (Huber-
Variable β B (SE) White SE) β B (SE) White SE)
Intercept – .020 (.030) (.033) – –.029 (.043) (.048)
Block 1: Media
Antecedents W2-W1
Discussion Network Size –.011 –.044 (.117) (.131) .040 .211 (.151) (.188)
Discussion Frequency .191*** .146 (.022)*** (.029)*** .177*** .170 (.029)*** (.035)***
Media Trust .016 .013 (.024) (.024) .050 .051 (.030) (.036)
News Use .238*** .336 (.042)*** (.072)*** .142*** .251 (.054)*** (.081)**
Social Media Use .012 .008 (.021) (.026) .000 .000 (.027) (.033)
Interaction
ΔR2 .189 .132
Block 2: Political
Antecedent W2-W1
Political Interest –.004 –.002 (.013) (.013) –.001 .000 (.017) (.017)
Strength of Partisanship .015 .016 (.029) (.032) –.002 –.002 (.037) (.039)
Internal Political Efficacy .102*** .061 (.017)*** (.018)*** .095*** .071 (.022)** (.023)**
ΔR2 .015 .011
Block 3: Social Capital
W2-W1

Offline Social Capital .106*** .061 (.016)*** (.021)*** .057 .041 (.021) (.025)
Social Media Social .193*** .128 (.021)*** (.034)*** .209*** .173 (.027)*** (.042)***
Capital
ΔR2 .043 .039
Total R2 .247 .182
Notes. Sample size = 1,017. W1 = Wave 1. W2 = Wave 2. Cell entries are final-entry ordinary least squares (OLS) standardized beta coefficients (β),
unstandardized beta coefficients (B), standard errors (SE), and robust standard errors (Huber-White SE).
** p < .01. *** p < .001.
 Table 5
Autoregressive models testing offline social capital and social media social capital on political participation

Online Political ParticipationW2 Offline Political ParticipationW2

(Huber-White (Huber-White
Variable β B (SE) SE) β B (SE) SE)
Intercept – .6532 (.206)** (.236)* – –.210 (.260) (.297)
Block 1: Demographics
Age .005 .001 (.002) (.002) .056 .007 (.003)* (.003)*
Gender (1 = female) –.001 –.004 (.062) (.063) –.010 –.039 (.079) (.080)
Education –.011 –.011 (.021) (.021) .005 .007 (.027) (.029)
Income –.024 –.024 (.022) (.022) .006 .008 (.028) (.027)
Race (1 = White) –.020 –.069 (.074) (.086) –.023 –.100 (.094) (.107)
ΔR2 .019 .021
Block 2: Media
Antecedents W1
Discussion Network .027 .106 (.103) (.111) .054* .279 (.130)* (.156)
SizeW1
Discussion FrequencyW1 .047 .039 (.025) (.028) .020 .021 (.031) (.035)
Media TrustW1 .033 .028 (.022) (.020) .013 .014 (.028) (.025)
News UseW1 .008 .010 (.037) (.047) –.010 –.017 (.046) (.059)
Social Media Use –.017 –.010 (.017) (.016) –.005 –.004 (.022) (.021)
Interaction W1
ΔR2 .262 .233
Block 3: Political
Antecedent W1
Political InterestW1 –.017 –.009 (.017) (.016) –.003 –.002 (.021) (.020)
Strength of .006 .004 (.012) (.013) .040 .028 (.015) (.017)
PartisanshipW1
Internal Political .026 .014 (.017) (.015) –.018 –.013 (.021) (.020)
EfficacyW1
ΔR2 .009 .012
Block 4: ParticipationW1
Offline ParticipationW1 .128*** .103 (.029)*** (.034)*** .647*** .676 (.037)*** (.056)***
VotingW1 –.034 –.016 (.012) (.013) –.002 –.001 (.015) (.014)
Online ParticipationW1 .548*** .564 (.039)*** (.062)*** .047 .063 (.049) (.079)
ΔR2 .272 .318
Block 4: Social CapitalW1
Offline Social CapitalW1 –.036 –.022 (.015) (.014) –.006 –.004 (.019) (.019)
Social Media Social .099*** .074 (.023)*** (.032)* .095*** .092 (.029)** (.041)*
Capital W1
ΔR2 .005 .004
Total R2 .567 .588
Notes. Sample size = 1,017. W1 = Wave 1. W2 = Wave 2. Cell entries are final-entry ordinary least squares (OLS) standardized beta coefficients (β),
unstandardized beta coefficients (B), standard errors (SE), and robust standard errors (Huber-White SE).
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.
 Table 6
Cross-sectional (W1 and W2) and lagged regression models testing offline and social media social capital on voting

Wave 1 Wave 2 Lagged Panel

(W1 → W1) (W2 → W2) (W1 → W2)
(Huber-White (Huber-White (Huber-White
Variable β B (SE) SE) β B (SE) SE) β B (SE) SE)
Intercept – .106 (.594) (.553) – −.343 (.618) (.583) – .160 (.584) (.550)
Block 1:
Demographics
Age .214*** .043 (.006)*** (.006)*** .224*** .044 (.006)*** (.006)*** .213*** .042 (.006)*** (.006)***
Sex (1 = Female) .061* .359 (.160)* (.165)* .053 .309 (.161) (.173) .053 .306 (.158) (.165)
Education .082** .168 (.055)** (.057)** .078** .157 (.055)** (.059)* .080** .160 (.054)** (.056)**
Income .084** .175 (.058)** (.061)** .079** .160 (.058)** (.063)** .095*** .193 (.057)*** (.058)***
Race (1 = White) .091*** .651 (.191)*** (.220)** .137*** .962 (.193)*** (.222)*** .123*** .862 (.188)*** (.219)***
ΔR2 .180 .181 .181
Block 2: Media
Antecedents
Discussion .038 .312 (.263) (.223) .053 .634 (.363) (.372) .016 .130 (.259) (.229)
Network Size
Discussion .019 .033 (.063) (.063) .071* .126 (.062)* (.067) .027 .046 (.062) (.065)
Frequency
Media Trust .037 .065 (.056) (.059) .027 .046 (.057) (.058) .065* .112 (.055)* (.057)*
News Use –.014 –.037 (.092) (.090) .025 .067 (.098) (.096) –.065 –.171 (.091) (.090)
Social Media .037 .048 (.044) (.045) .028 .036 (.046) (.049) .039 .048 (.043) (.044)
Interaction
ΔR2 .054 .052 .053
Block 3: Political
Antecedents
Political Interest .270*** .297 (.043)*** (.051)*** .102*** .156 (.047)*** (.045)*** .266*** .287 (.042)*** (.050)***
Strength of –.021 –.024 (.031) (.028) –.001 –.002 (.032) (.030) –.009 –.010 (.031) (.027)
Partisanship
Internal Political .123*** .142 (.042)*** (.048)** .243*** .287 (.039)*** (.040)*** .116** .132 (.042)** (.047)**
Efficacy
ΔR2 .088 .066 .083
Block 4: Social
Capital
Offline Social .071* .091 (.038)* (.039)* .072* .089 (.038)* (.039)* .080** .101 (.037) (.038)**
Capital
Social Media –.078* –.120 (.056)* (.054)* –.146*** –.218 (.057)*** (.059)*** –.042 –.064 (.055) (.050)
Social Capital
ΔR2 .006 .012 .005
Total R2 .328 .311 .322
Notes. Sample size = 1,017. W1 = Wave 1. W2 = Wave 2. Cell entries are final-entry ordinary least squares (OLS) standardized beta coefficients (β),
unstandardized beta coefficients (B), standard errors (SE), and robust standard errors (Huber-White SE).
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.
18 Homero Gil de Zúñiga et al.

models explained 55.1% of variance for online participation and 58.5% for offline
participation (see Table 5).
Results for voting are presented separately in Table 6. All three models in the table
explain relatively low levels of variance (Wave 1: .6%, Wave 2: 1.2%, lagged: .5%).
Offline social capital is positively related to voting in all three models (Wave 1: β = .071,
B = .091, SEHW = .039, p = .05; Wave 2: β = .072, B = .089, SEHW = .039, p = .05;
Lagged: β = .080, B = .101, SEHW = .038, p = .01). Meanwhile, social media social capital
is negatively related in the cross-sectional models (Wave 1: β = –.078, B = –.120,
SEHW = .054, p < .05; Wave 2: β = –.146, B = –.218, SEHW = .059, p < .05), but
unrelated in the lagged model.
Taken together, results partially support H2. Offline social capital is not significantly
related to voting, but, surprisingly, it is unrelated to offline political participation.
However, offline social capital is positively related to online participation, in support of
H5. As for social media social capital, results support the idea that it is related to both
offline (H3a) and online participation (H4), but not to voting (H3b).

Discussion
The emergence of social media has arguably changed the nature of social capital and the
ways in which it is generated from social relationships (Williams, 2006). As the nature of
social connectedness evolves, questions arise about whether social media social capital is
empirically distinct from social capital generated in offline venues, and whether it has
different patterns of effects on political participation.
The results of this study provide evidence that social media social capital is empiri-
cally distinct from offline social capital. Using principal axes factory analyses, the study
shows that survey items tapping social capital formed on social media form a distinct
empirical construct than items tapping offline social capital. Thus, while offline social
capital, as previously theorized in the literature (Bourdieu, 1985; Lin, 2008), continues to
be a robust benchmark on how strongly people connect in their communities, share values,
and watch out for one another, the results of this study suggest that the platforms people
use to connect with one another affect the nature of the value derived from those relation-
ships (Molyneux et al., 2015; Williams, 2006).
The study also tested the relationship between offline social capital and social media
social capital as a virtuous circle over time. Although both constructs are, as can be
expected, interrelated, social media social capital tends to predict offline social capital
more strongly than the other way around. In other words, the way people make connec-
tions, foster their community values, and seek to talk about their community problems on
social media predicts whether these citizens will continue to do so in their offline
communities over time. Yet, sharing values, helping one another, or watching out for
one another in one’s offline communities does not as strongly predict that they will
continue to do so in the social media context. Offline social capital and social media
social capital represent a symbiotic, yet asymmetrical, virtuous circle.
This finding—that social media social capital predicts offline social capital over time
more strongly than the reverse—may also help to clarify why social media social capital
influences people’s participatory behaviors online and offline more so than offline social
capital. It may be due to (a) the direct influence social media social capital has over both
online and offline political participation and (b) the impact social media social capital has
on offline social capital over time. Future research should delve deeper into this mediating
mechanism.
 Asymmetrical Social Capital 19

Diverse and extensive tests based on panel data (i.e., first-differences and autoregres-
sive models) also clarify the relationship between these distinct dimensions of social
capital and people’s participatory political behaviors. Consistent with previous literature,
offline social capital is a robust predictor of voting (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012, 2014;
Giugni et al., 2014; Gustafsson, 2012; Skoric & Zhu, 2015; Zhang & Chia, 2006).
However, offline social capital does not predict other forms of political participation
over time once previous levels of participation are accounted for in the models. Social
media social capital,on the other hand, predicts both offline and online political participa-
tion over time even while controlling for prior levels of participation. Thus, interestingly,
social media social capital is not only related to online political participation but also to
political participation that occurs outsidethe digital sphere. This means that community
relationships generated through social media are not only predictors of online political
participation, as previous research has shown (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012; Valenzuela,
2013; Yamamoto et al., 2013), but also are predictors of traditional political participation.
This result lends support to the theoretical assumption that social networks curated and
maintained in social media permeate to the offline world and facilitate face-to-face
political coordination that fuels offline political action (Bakker & de Vreese, 2011;
Bennett & Segerberg, 2012; Bennett, Segerberg, & Walker, 2014; Eltantawy & Weist,
2011; Gleason, 2013; Howard & Parks, 2012; Lim, 2012, 2013; Theocharis et al., 2015).
However, results show that this phenomenon may not extend to the voting booth. In fact,
some tests show a negative relationship between social media social capital and voting,
while others show no relationship. Therefore, while social media social capital may
promote other forms of offline participation such as protesting, it may actually discourage
voting in major elections.
One reason that social media social capital is related to political participation in
multiple communicative realms is that social media reduce barriers to participation—
such as time and economic resources (Verba et al., 1995)—by enabling a series of
interconnected behaviors such as developing political ties with other members of the
community, donating money to a cause, or signing a petition addressed to the authorities.
Another feature that may foster this relationship between social media social capital and
participation has to do with the interactive character of these digital platforms. As has been
studied in the relationship between news and audiences (Holton, Coddington, Lewis, &
Gil de Zúñiga, 2015), online relationships facilitated or maintained by social media enable
higher levels of personal and social reciprocity. In turn, reciprocity would allow for a
smoother exchange of information, common values, and resources among users, contri-
buting to the creation of an environment that fosters actions related to political
participation.
These results are limited in several important ways. First, although the panel data used
in this study establish causal order with regards to the relationship between social media
social capital and political participation, it cannot control for every potential confounding
variable. Further analysis of similar panel data sets is warranted to reinforce these findings.
Second, while the measurement strategy for the two social capital constructs is based on
prior literature (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012; Molyneux et al., 2015; Williams, 2006; Zhang
& Chia, 2006; Zhong, 2014;), future research would ideally include the items validated in
this study and combine those with a more diverse array of questions that reflect the
specific affordances of offline and online environments. Third, this study has focused on
the adult population of the United States, but it is possible that different subsets of the
population could exhibit different patterns of social capital and/or political participation.
More specifically, results are likely colored by the institutional structure of the American
20 Homero Gil de Zúñiga et al.

political system (a two-party presidential system), as well as by cultural norms of inter-

personal connectivity and community-based interactivity. Future research should focus
specifically on subgroups of populations; for example, young people could be especially
likely to form social capital through social media sites because they use them more
frequently, while older people, on the other hand, could be more likely to build social
capital and engage offline. In addition, future research should focus on testing specific
dimensions of changing social connections on social media, including network structure,
the range of media exposure, and the potential to change opinions.
Despite these limitations, this study provides relatively strong evidence that social
media social capital has different patterns of effects on offline and online political
participation than social capital developed in offline venues. Arguably, these different
patterns occur because social media afford new ways for people to connect to one another
and, therefore, they enable the development of new kinds of value in social relationships.
This study provides a useful framework for understanding how social connectedness and
political action have changed in this kind of environment relative to offline settings, and
more generally, for conceptualizing social capital in new media environments as they
continue to emerge.

Acknowledgments
The first author is grateful to the Excellence Chair Program at Universidad Carlos III,
Spain, where he participated in 2016. His visit and participation in the program was
invaluable.

Supplemental Material
Supplemental data for this article can be accessed on the publisher’s website at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2016.1227000.

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