JP Latex Technology Vs Granger (ENRIQUEZ)
JP Latex Technology Vs Granger (ENRIQUEZ)
Facts: Respondent Ballons Granger Balloons, Inc. (Granger) anchoring on an isolated transaction, filed a
complaint for rescission and damages against petitioner JP Latex Technology, Inc., a domestic corporation
primarily engaged in the manufacture of latex and balloons.
The complaint,[4] docketed as Civil Case No. B-6527, alleged that Ogino, representing himself as the
president of petitioner corporation, and respondent Santorineos entered into a contract for the sale of
respondent Grangers machinery consisting of four dipping lines and all associated equipment for the
amount of US$1,230,000.00 and other non-cash considerations consisting of a 20% shareholding in
petitioners distribution company and the distributorship of its balloons in Canada and Greece.
Although respondent Granger had performed its end of the bargain by re-assembling the subject
machinery in petitioners factory in Bian and transferring its dipping formulations and technology to
petitioner, the latter allegedly paid only a partial sum of US$748,262.87 and reneged on its other non-
cash commitments. According to respondent Granger, it made several written and verbal demands for
the full payment of the purchase price to no avail. The complaint was accompanied by an application for
the issuance of a writ of replevin.[5]
The RTC rendered its decision in favor of respondent Granger. While the case was pending respondent
Granger moved for the execution pending appeal[6] of the RTC decision,[7] which was promulgated on 10
August 2006 or a few days after it filed the motion.
After it received a copy of the RTC decision on 30 August 2006, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration
RTC granted motion for execution pending appeal after finding that the equipment under litigation were
deteriorating and that petitioner might not have sufficient funds to pay for the damages, thereby leaving
respondents with an empty judgment.
On 15 November 2006, the writ of execution pending appeal was issued.[14] Thereupon, Sheriff Arellano
successfully effected the dismantling of the machinery. Thus, petitioner and Ogino filed a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals.
On 22 December 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision, denying the petition for
certiorari mainly on the ground that petitioner failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed
RTC Order dated 10 November 2006.[16] Petitioner sought reconsideration but its motion was denied per
the appellate courts Resolution dated 23 March 2007.
Hence, the instant petition with urgent application for immediate issuance of a temporary restraining
order (TRO) or writ of preliminary injunction.
In a Resolution dated 23 May 2007, the SC issued a TRO to prevent respondents from implementing the
writ of execution pending appeal conditioned upon the filing of a cash or surety bond.[18] Forthwith,
petitioner posted a bond[19] and the TRO was released and served.[20] Upon motion by petitioner,[21] the
Court directed the Office of the Ex-Officio Sheriff to release to petitioner the properties levied under the
restrained order of execution pending appeal.[22]
ISSUE: WHETHER EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL MAY BE ISSUED AND IMPLEMENTED WHEN THE DECISION
SOUGHT TO BE EXECUTED IS NOT YET FINAL BECAUSE OF THE PENDING AND UNRESOLVED MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE DECISION SOUGHT TO BE EXECUTED PENDING APPEAL.
Held: NO! Execution pending appeal or immediate execution, which is now called discretionary execution
under Rule 39, Section 2(a), 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is allowed pending appeal of a
judgment or final order of the trial court, upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due
hearing.[26] Section 2 (a) of Rule 39 expressly states:
After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal
may be filed in the appellate court.
It is clear from the caption of the provision that discretionary execution is allowed only when the period
to appeal has commenced but before the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case. The period to appeal
where a motion for reconsideration has been filed as in the instant case commences only upon the receipt
of a copy of the order disposing of the motion for reconsideration. The pendency of a motion for
reconsideration, therefore, prevents the running of the period to appeal.
In the instant case, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision. The records of the
case show that the motion had not been acted upon by the RTC before it ruled on the motion for
execution pending appeal. That being the case, the pendency of the motion for reconsideration has
prevented the period to appeal from even commencing. The period within which a party may move for
an execution pending appeal of the trial courts decision has not yet also started.
Where there is a pending motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision, an order execution pending
appeal is improper and premature. The pendency of the motion for reconsideration legally precludes
execution of the RTC decision because the motion serves as the movants vehicle to point out the findings
and conclusions of the decision which, in his view, are not supported by law or the evidence[27] and,
therefore, gives the trial judge the occasion to reverse himself. In the event that the trial judge finds the
motion for reconsideration meritorious, he can of course reverse the decision.
In the absence of an appeal from the decision, as the motion for reconsideration is still unresolved, the
execution ordered by the RTC cannot be properly considered as execution pending appeal. All references
to the assailed order as an order of execution pending appeal are mislabeled.
The need to resolve first, or better still deny, petitioners motion for reconsideration before the RTC could
grant the discretionary execution becomes more imperative in the light of the rule that executions
pending appeal are frowned upon. Without preempting the resolution of petitioners motion for
reconsideration one way or the other, a perusal thereof shows that petitioner had raised questions and
issues which were not thoroughly discussed and passed upon in the RTC decision. The RTC should have
resolved these issues first before allowing the discretionary execution of its judgment if only to preclude
any speculation that the order of execution pending appeal was issued in haste. Said failure constitutes
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC judge.
In any event, the Court does not find any good reason to justify the execution of the RTC decision
pending finality. The RTCs finding that the machinery under litigation was deteriorating is not supported
by the evidence on record. Nor is the possibility that petitioner would not be able to pay the judgment
award a good reason to order discretionary execution. The good reasons allowing execution pending
appeal must constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency that will outweigh the injuries or
damages to the adverse party if the decision is reversed.[28]