PAZ FORES vs.

IRENEO MIRANDA

G.R. No. L-12163 March 4, 1959

FUCKS: wrong spelling ba? hahaha

While the jeepney was descending the Sta. Mesa bridge at an excessive rate of speed, the driver
lost control thereof, causing it to swerve and to his the bridge wall. Five of the passengers were
injured, including the respondent who suffered a fracture of the upper right humerus. The driver
was charged with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and upon interposing a
plea of guilty was sentenced accordingly.

The contention that the evidence did not sufficiently establish the identity of the vehicle as the
belonging to the petitioner was rejected by the appellate court which found, among other things,
that is carried plate No. TPU-1163, SERIES OF 1952, Quezon City, registered in the name of
Paz Fores, and that the vehicle even had the name of "Doña Paz" painted below its wind shield.

A point to be further remarked is petitioner's contention that on March 21, 1953, or one day
before the accident happened, she allegedly sold the passenger jeep that was involved therein to a
certain Carmen Sackerman.

ISSUE: Is the approval of the Public Service Commission necessary for the sale of a public
service vehicle even without conveying therewith the authority to operate the same?

Held: YES.

Section 20 of the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 146) provides that a transfer
contemplated by the law, if made without the requisite approval of the Public Service
Commission, is not effective and binding in so far as the responsibility of the grantee under the
franchise in relation to the public is concerned.

The provisions of the statute are clear and prohibit the sale, alienation, lease, or encumbrance of
the property, franchise, certificate, privileges or rights, or any part thereof of the owner or
operator of the public service Commission. The law was designed primarily for the protection of
the public interest; and until the approval of the public Service Commission is obtained the
vehicle is, in contemplation of law, still under the service of the owner or operator standing in
the records of the Commission which the public has a right to rely upon.
PRISCILLA L. TAN vs. NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC.,

G.R. No. 135802 March 3, 2000

FACTS:

On May 31, 1994, Priscilla L. Tan and Connie Tan boarded Northwest Airlines Flight 29 in
Chicago, U. S. A. bound for the Philippines, with a stop-over at Detroit, U. S. A. They arrived at
NAIA on June 1, 1994 at about 10:40 in the evening. Upon their arrival, found that their
baggages were missing. They returned to the airport in the evening of the following day and they
were informed that their baggages might still be in another plane in Tokyo, Japan. On June 3,
1994, they recovered their baggages and discovered that some of its contents were destroyed and
soiled. Claiming that they "suffered mental anguish, sleepless nights and great damage" because
of Northwest's failure to inform them in advance that their baggages would not be loaded on the
same flight they boarded and because of their delayed arrival, they demanded from Northwest
Airlines compensation for the damages they suffered. On June 15, 1994 and June 22, 1994,
petitioner sent demand letters to Northwest Airlines, but the latter did not respond.

ISSUE: Whether respondent is liable for moral and exemplary damages for willful misconduct
and breach of the contract of air carriage.

HELD: NO.

Respondent airline was not guilty of willful misconduct. "For willful misconduct to exist there
must be a showing that the acts complained of were impelled by an intention to violate the law,
or were in persistent disregard of one's rights. It must be evidenced by a flagrantly or shamefully
wrong or improper conduct."

Contrary to petitioner's contention, there was nothing in the conduct of respondent which showed
that they were motivated by malice or bad faith in loading her baggages on another plane. Due to
weight and balance restrictions, as a safety measure, respondent airline had to transport the
baggages on a different flight, but with the same expected date and time of arrival in the
Philippines. As aptly explained by respondent, to ensure the safety of each flight, Northwest's
personnel determine every flight's compliance with "weight and balance restrictions." They
check the factors like weight of the aircraft used for the flight gas input, passenger and crew
load, baggage weight, all in relation to the wind factor anticipated on the flight. If there is an
overload, i.e., a perceived safety risk, the aircraft's load will be reduced by off-loading cargo,
which will then be placed on the next available flight.

It is admitted that respondent failed to deliver petitioner's luggages on time. However, there was
no showing of malice in such failure. By its concern for safety, respondent had to ship the
baggages in another flight with the same date of arrival.
ALITALIA vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELIPA E. PABLO

[G.R. No. 71929: December 4, 1990.]

FACTS:

Dr. Felipa Pablo — an associate professor in the UP, and a research grantee of the Philippine
Atomic Energy Agency — was invited to take part at a meeting of the Department of Research
and Isotopes of the Joint FAO-IAEA Division of Atomic Energy in Food and Agriculture of the
United Nations in Ispra, Italy. To fulfill this engagement, Dr. Pablo booked passage on petitioner
airline, ALITALIA.

She arrived in Milan on the day before the meeting in accordance with the itinerary and time
table set for her by ALITALIA. She was however told by the ALITALIA personnel there at
Milan that her luggage was "delayed inasmuch as the same . . . (was) in one of the succeeding
flights from Rome to Milan." Her luggage consisted of two (2) suitcases: one contained her
clothing and other personal items; the other, her scientific papers, slides and other research
material. But the other flights arriving from Rome did not have her baggage on board.

By then feeling desperate, she went to Rome to try to locate her bags herself. There, she inquired
about her suitcases in the domestic and international airports, and filled out the forms prescribed
by ALITALIA for people in her predicament. However, her baggage could not be found.
Completely distraught and discouraged, she returned to Manila without attending the meeting in
Ispra, Italy. As it turned out, Prof. Pablo's suitcases were in fact located and forwarded to Ispra, 7
Italy, but only on the day after her scheduled appearance and participation at the U.N. meeting
there. Of course Dr. Pablo was no longer there to accept delivery; she was already on her way
home to Manila. And for some reason or other, the suitcases were not actually restored to Prof.
Pablo by ALITALIA until eleven (11) months later, and four (4) months after institution of her
action.

ALITALIA contends that the Warsaw Convention should have been applied to limit
ALITALIA'S liability; and that there is no warrant in fact or in law for the award to Dr. Pablo of
nominal damages and attorney's fees. 14

ISSUE: Whether or not ALITALIA should be held liable.

HELD: YES.

Warsaw Convention purports to limit the liability of the carriers. The Warsaw Convention
however denies to the carrier availment "of the provisions which exclude or limit his liability, if
the damage is caused by his wilful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance
with the law of the court seized of the case, is considered to be equivalent to wilful misconduct,"
or "if the damage is (similarly) caused . . by any agent of the carrier acting within the scope of
his employment."
The Convention does not thus operate as an exclusive enumeration of the instances of an airline's
liability, or as an absolute limit of the extent of that liability. Such a proposition is not borne out
by the language of the Convention, as this Court has now, and at an earlier time, pointed out. The
Convention cannot be invoked to justify the disregard of some extraordinary sort of damage
resulting to a passenger and preclude recovery therefor beyond the limits set by said Convention.
It is in this sense that the Convention has been applied, or ignored, depending on the peculiar
facts presented by each case.

In the case at bar, no bad faith or otherwise improper conduct may be ascribed to the employees
of petitioner airline; and Dr. Pablo's luggage was eventually returned to her, belatedly, it is true,
but without appreciable damage. The fact is, nevertheless, that some special species of injury
was caused to Dr. Pablo because petitioner ALITALIA misplaced her baggage and failed to
deliver it to her at the time appointed — a breach of its contract of carriage, to be sure —The
opportunity to claim international honor or distinction was irretrievably lost to her because of
Alitalia's breach of its contract.

Certainly, the compensation for the injury suffered by Dr. Pablo cannot under the circumstances
be restricted to that prescribed by the Warsaw Convention for delay in the transport of baggage.

She is not, of course, entitled to be compensated for loss or damage to her luggage. As already
mentioned, her baggage was ultimately delivered to her in Manila, tardily but safely. She is
however entitled to nominal damages — which, as the law says, is adjudicated in order that a
right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated and
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered.
Attorney’s fee was likewise granted.
Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr., Maria Salvacion Saludo, Leopoldo G. Saludo And Saturnino G. Saludo
vs. CA, Trans World Airlines, Inc., And Philippine Airlines, Inc.

G.R. No. 95536 March 23, 1992

FACTS:

After the death of plaintiffs' mother, Pomierski and Son Funeral Home of Chicago, made the
necessary preparations and arrangements for the shipment, of the remains from Chicago to the
Philippines. The funeral home had the remains embalmed and secured a permit for the
disposition of dead human body. The casket that is airtight and waterproof wherein was
contained the remains of Crispina Saludo Galdo . On the same date, October 26, 1976, Pomierski
brought the remains to C.M.A.S. at the airport (Chicago) which made the necessary
arrangements such as flights, transfers, etc.; C.M.A.S. is a national service used by undertakers
to throughout the nation (U.S.A.), they furnish the air pouch which the casket is enclosed in, and
they see that the remains are taken to the proper air freight terminal. C.M.A.S. booked the
shipment with PAL thru the carrier's agent Air Care International, with Pomierski F.H. as the
shipper and Mario (Maria) Saludo as the consignee.

PLaintiffs went to the funeral director of Pomierski Funeral Home who had her mother's remains
and she told the director that they were booked with United Airlines. But the director told her
that the remains were booked with TWA flight to California. This upset her, and she and her
brother had to change reservations from UA to the TWA flight after she confirmed by phone that
her mother's remains should be on that TWA flight. They went to the airport and watched from
the look-out area. She saw no body being brought. So, she went to the TWA counter again, and
she was told there was no body on that flight.

Upon arrival at San Francisco, plaintiff went to the TWA counter there to inquire about her
mother's remains. She was told they did not know anything about it. She then called Pomierski
that her mother's remains were not at the West Coast terminal, and Pomierski immediately called
C.M.A.S., which in a matter of 10 minutes informed him that the remains were on a plane to
Mexico City, that there were two bodies at the terminal, and somehow they were switched; he
relayed this information to Miss Saludo in California; later C.M.A.S. called and told him they
were sending the remains back to California via Texas.

ISSUE: Whether Trans World Airlines (TWA) and PAL are liable for the misshipment and
eventual delay in the delivery of the cargo containing the remains of the late Crispin Saludo, and
of the discourtesy of its employees to petitioners.

HELD:

Petitioner allege that private respondents received the casketed remains of petitioners' mother on
October 26, 1976, as evidenced by the issuance of PAL Air Waybill No. 079-01180454 18 by
Air Care International as carrier's agent; and from said date, private respondents were charged
with the responsibility to exercise extraordinary diligence so much so that for the alleged
switching of the caskets on October 27, 1976, or one day after private respondents received the
cargo, the latter must necessarily be liable. Petitioners rely on the jurisprudential dictum hat
"(t)he issuance of a bill of lading carries the presumption that the goods were delivered to the
carrier issuing the bill, for immediate shipment, and it is nowhere questioned that a bill of lading
is prima facie evidence of the receipt of the goods by the carrier. A bill of lading is a written
acknowledgment of the receipt of the goods and an agreement to transport and deliver them at a
specified place to a person named or on his order. The two-fold character of a bill of lading is all
too familiar; it is a receipt as to the quantity and description of the goods shipped and a contract
to transport the goods to the consignee or other person therein designated, on the terms specified
in such instrument.

As already demonstrated, the facts in the case at bar belie the averment that there was delivery of
the cargo to the carrier on October 26, 1976. Rather, as earlier explained, the body intended to be
shipped as agreed upon was really placed in the possession and control of PAL on October 28,
1976 and it was from that date that private respondents became responsible for the agreed cargo
under their undertakings in PAL Airway Bill No. 079-01180454. Consequently, for the
switching of caskets prior thereto which was not caused by them, and subsequent events caused
thereby, private respondents cannot be held liable. It can correctly and logically be concluded,
therefore, that the switching occurred or, more accurately, was discovered on October 27, 1976,
it happened while the cargo was still with CMAS, well before the same was place in the custody
of private respondents. It was not (to) TWA, but to C.M.A.S. that the Pomierski & Son Funeral
Home delivered the casket containing the remains of Crispina Saludo. TWA would have no
knowledge therefore that the remains of Crispina Saludo were not the ones inside the casket that
was being presented to it for shipment. TWA would have to rely on there presentations of
C.M.A.S. The foregoing points at C.M.A.S., not defendant TWA much less defendant PAL, as
the ONE responsible for the switching or mix-up of the two bodies at the Chicago Airport
terminal, and started a chain reaction of the misshipment of the body of Crispina Saludo and a
one-day delay in the delivery thereof to its destination.

No attribution of discourtesy or indifference has been made against PAL by petitioners. It was
from PAL that they received confirmation that their mother's remains would be on the same
flight to Manila with them. The censurable conduct of TWA's employees cannot, however, be
said to have approximated the dimensions of fraud, malice or bad faith. It can be said to be more
of a lethargic reaction produced and engrained in some people by the mechanically routine
nature of their work and a racial or societal culture which stultifies what would have been their
accustomed human response to a human need under a former and different ambience.
Nonetheless, the facts show that petitioners' right to be treated with due courtesy in accordance
with the degree of diligence required by law to be exercised by every common carrier was
violated by TWA and this entitles them, at least, to nominal damages from TWA alone.
DRA. SOFIA L. PRUDENCIADO, vs. ALLIANCE TRANSPORT SYSTEM, INC. and JOSE
LEYSON, et al., G.R. No. L-33836 March 16, 1987

FACTS:

At about 2:05 p.m. of May 11, 1960, Dra. Sofia L. Prudenciado was driving her own Chevrolet
Bel Air car along Arroceros Street with the intention of crossing Taft Avenue in order to turn
left, to go to the Philippine Normal College Compound where she would hold classes. She
claimed that she was driving her car at the rate of 10 kmph; that before crossing Taft Ave. she
stopped her car and looked to the right and to the left and not noticing any on-coming vehicle on
either side she slowly proceeded on first gear to cross the same, but when she was almost at the
center, near the island thereof, Jose Leyson who was driving People's Taxicab owned and
operated by Alliance Transport System, Inc., suddenly bumped and struck Dra. Prudenciado's
car, thereby causing physical injuries in different parts of her body, suffering more particularly
brain concussion which subjected her to several physical examinations and to an encephalograph
test while her car was damaged to the extent of P2,451.27. The Court of Appeals and the trial
court are in accord in the finding that the accident was caused by the negligence of the taxi
driver. (affirmed din negligence nun driver sa SC)

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is justified in modifying or changing the grant of
damages by the trial court.

HELD: The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED.

A careful review of the records makes it readily apparent that the injuries sustained by Dra.
Prudenciado are not as serious or extensive as they were claimed to be, to warrant the damages
awarded by the trial court. On the other hand, it will be observed that the reduction of the
damages made by the Court of Appeals is both too drastic and unrealistic, to pass the test of
reasonableness, which appears to be the underlying basis to justify such reduction.

While the damages sought to be recovered were not satisfactorily established to the extent
desired by the petitioner, it was nonetheless not disputed that an accident occurred due to the
fault and negligence of the respondents; that Dra. Prudenciado suffered a brain concussion which
although mild can admittedly produce the effects complained of by her and that these symptoms
can develop after several years and can lead to some, serious handicaps or predispose the patient
to other sickness. Being a doctor by profession, her fears can be more real and intense than an
ordinary person. Otherwise stated, she is undeniably a proper recipient of moral damages which
are proportionate to her suffering. (diniscuss kung paano mag award ng damges, things to
consider at kinorecct un amount awarded ng CA)
FERNANDO LOPEZ, ET AL., vs. PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS

G.R. No. L-22415 March 30, 1966

FACTS:

Senator Fernando Lopez, and his family booked a flight with PAN-AM. Its San Francisco head
office confirmed the reservations. First class tickets for the abovementioned flight were
subsequently issued. As scheduled Senator Lopez and party left Manila by Northwest Airlines on
May 24, 1960, arriving in Tokyo at 5:30 P.M. of that day. As soon as they arrived Senator Lopez
requested Minister Busuego of the Philippine Embassy to contact PAN-AM's Tokyo office
regarding their first class accommodations for that evening's flight. For the given reason that the
first class seats therein were all booked up, however, PAN-AM's Tokyo office informed Minister
Busuego that PAN-AM could not accommodate Senator Lopez and party in that trip as first class
passengers. Senator Lopez thereupon gave their first class tickets to Minister Busuego for him to
show the same to PAN-AM's Tokyo office, but the latter firmly reiterated that there was no
accommodation for them in the first class, stating that they could not go in that flight unless they
took the tourist class therein. Due to pressing engagements awaiting Senator Lopez and his wife,
in the United States —business conference and medical check-up — Senator Lopez and party
were constrained to take PAN-AM's flight from Tokyo to San Francisco as tourist passengers.
Senator Lopez however made it clear, as indicated in his letter to PAN-AM's Tokyo office on
that date that they did so "under protest" and without prejudice to further action against the
airline.

Suit for damages was thereafter filed by Senator Lopez and party against PAN-AM, alleging
breach of contracts in bad faith by defendant.

According to plaintiffs, defendant acted in bad faith because it deliberately refused to comply
with its contract to provide first class accommodations to plaintiffs, out of racial prejudice
against Orientals. And in support of its contention that what was done to plaintiffs is an
oftrepeated practice of defendant, evidence was adduced relating to two previous instances of
alleged racial discrimination by defendant against Filipinos in favor of "white" passengers. Said
previous occasions are what allegedly happened to others, citing some instances.

Against the foregoing, however, defendant's evidence would seek to establish its theory of honest
mistake, thus:

ISSUE: bakit daming issue ng mga tao? Anyway, this case’s issue is….secret!

Sige na nga: Whether or not PAN-AM should be held liable.

From the foregoing evidence of defendant it is in effect admitted that defendant — through its
agents — first cancelled plaintiffs, reservations by mistake and thereafter deliberately and
intentionally withheld from plaintiffs or their travel agent the fact of said cancellation, letting
them go on believing that their first class reservations stood valid and confirmed. In so
misleading plaintiffs into purchasing first class tickets in the conviction that they had confirmed
reservations for the same, when in fact they had none, defendant wilfully and knowingly placed
itself into the position of having to breach its a foresaid contracts with plaintiffs should there be
no last-minute cancellation by other passengers before flight time, as it turned out in this case.
Such actuation of defendant may indeed have been prompted by nothing more than the
promotion of its self-interest in holding on to Senator Lopez and party as passengers in its flight
and foreclosing on their chances to seek the services of other airlines that may have been able to
afford them first class accommodations. All the time, in legal contemplation such conduct
already amounts to action in bad faith. For bad faith means a breach of a known duty through
some motive of interest or ill-will "Self-enrichment or fraternal interest, and not personal ill-will,
may well have been the motive; but it is malice nevertheless."

Addressing ourselves now to the question of damages, it is well to state at the outset those rules
and principles. First, moral damages are recoverable in breach of contracts where the defendant
acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Second, in addition to moral damages, exemplary or corrective
damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in breach of
contract where the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
manner. And, third, a written contract for an attorney's services shall control the amount to be
paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.

First, then, as to moral damages. As a proximate result of defendant's breach in bad faith of its
contracts with plaintiffs, the latter suffered social humiliation, wounded feelings, serious anxiety
and mental anguish. For plaintiffs were travelling with first class tickets issued by defendant and
yet they were given only the tourist class. At stop-overs, they were expected to be among the
first-class passengers by those awaiting to welcome them, only to be found among the tourist
passengers. It may not be humiliating to travel as tourist passengers; it is humiliating to be
compelled to travel as such, contrary to what is rightfully to be expected from the contractual
undertaking. Mrs. Maria J. Lopez, as wife of Senator Lopez, shared his prestige and therefore his
humiliation. In addition she suffered physical discomfort during the 13-hour trip

In concluding, let it be stressed that the amount of damages awarded in this appeal has been
determined by adequately considering the official, political, social, and financial standing of the
offended parties on one hand, and the business and financial position of the offender on the
other. And further considering the present rate of exchange and the terms at which the amount of
damages awarded would approximately be in U.S. dollars, this Court is all the more of the view
that said award is proper and reasonable.
BABALA: Ang digest ay tanging gabay lang, basahin pa rin ang full text.

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