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Petitioners Vs VS: First Division
Petitioners Vs VS: First Division
DECISION
VELASCO, JR. , J : p
The Case
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to reverse
and set aside the October 28, 2004 Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its
September 13, 2005 Resolution 2 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
The spouses Gregorio Nanaman (Gregorio) and Hilaria Tabuclin (Hilaria) were the
owners of a parcel of agricultural land located in Tambo, Iligan City, consisting of 34.7
hectares (subject property). Said spouses were childless, but Gregorio had a son
named Virgilio Nanaman (Virgilio) by another woman. Virgilio had been raised by the
couple since he was two years old. Gregorio also had two daughters, Esperanza and
Caridad, by still another woman. 3
When Gregorio died in 1945, Hilaria and Virgilio administered the subject
property. 4 On February 16, 1954, Hilaria and Virgilio sold the subject property to Dr.
Jose Deleste (Deleste) for PhP16,000. 5 The deed of sale was notarized on February 17,
1954 and registered on March 2, 1954. Also, the tax declaration in the name of Virgilio
was canceled and a new tax declaration was issued in the name of Deleste. The arrears
in the payment of taxes from 1952 had been updated by Deleste and from then on, he
paid the taxes on the property. 6
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On May 15, 1954, Hilaria died. 7 Gregorio's brother, Juan Nanaman, was
appointed as special administrator of the estate of the deceased spouses.
Subsequently, Edilberto Noel (Noel) was appointed as the regular administrator of the
joint estate. 8 cDTACE
On April 30, 1963, Noel, as the administrator of the intestate estate of the
deceased spouses, led before the Court of First Instance, Branch II, Lanao del Norte
an action against Deleste for the reversion of title over the subject property, docketed
as Civil Case No. 698. 9 Said case went up to this Court in Noel v. CA , where We
rendered a Decision 1 0 on January 11, 1995, a rming the ruling of the CA that the
subject property was the conjugal property of the late spouses Gregorio and Hilaria
and that the latter could only sell her one-half (1/2) share of the subject property to
Deleste. As a result, Deleste, who died in 1992, and the intestate estate of Gregorio
were held to be the co-owners of the subject property, each with a one-half (1/2)
interest in it. 1 1
Notably, while Civil Case No. 698 was still pending before the CFI, particularly on
October 21, 1972, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 was issued. This law mandates that
tenanted rice and corn lands be brought under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT)
Program and awarded to farmer-bene ciaries. Thus, the subject property was placed
under the said program. 1 2 However, only the heirs of Gregorio were identi ed by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) as the landowners. Concomitantly, the notices
and processes relative to the coverage were sent to these heirs. 1 3
In 1975, the City of Iligan passed City Ordinance No. 1313, known as the "Zoning
Regulation of Iligan City," reclassifying the subject property as commercial/residential.
14
Eventually, on February 12, 1984, DAR issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs)
in favor of private respondents who were tenants and actual cultivators of the subject
property. 1 5 The CLTs were registered on July 15, 1986. 1 6
In 1991, the subject property was surveyed. 1 7 The survey of a portion of the land
consisting of 20.2611 hectares, designated as Lot No. 1407, was approved on January
8, 1999. 1 8 The claim folder for Lot No. 1407 was submitted to the LBP which issued a
Memorandum of Valuation and a Certi cate of Cash Deposit on May 21, 2001 and
September 12, 2001, respectively. Thereafter, Emancipation Patents (EPs) and Original
Certi cates of Title (OCTs) were issued on August 1, 2001 and October 1, 2001,
respectively, in favor of private respondents over their respective portions of Lot No.
1407. 1 9
Meanwhile, on November 22, 1999, the City of Iligan led a complaint with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4 in Iligan City for the expropriation of a 5.4686-
hectare portion of Lot No. 1407, docketed as Special Civil Action No. 4979. On
December 11, 2000, the RTC issued a Decision granting the expropriation. Considering
that the real owner of the expropriated portion could not be determined, as the subject
property had not yet been partitioned and distributed to any of the heirs of Gregorio
and Deleste, the just compensation for the expropriated portion of the subject property
in the amount of PhP27,343,000 was deposited with the Development Bank of the
Philippines in Iligan City, in trust for the RTC in Iligan City. 2 0
IcESDA
On February 28, 2002, the heirs of Deleste, petitioners herein, led with the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a petition seeking to
nullify private respondents' EPs. 2 1 This was docketed as Reg. Case No. X-471-LN-
2002.
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On July 21, 2003, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) rendered a
Decision 2 2 declaring that the EPs were null and void in view of the pending issues of
ownership, the subsequent reclassi cation of the subject property into a
residential/commercial land, and the violation of petitioners' constitutional right to due
process of law.
Dissatis ed, private respondents immediately led their Notice of Appeal on July
22, 2003. Notwithstanding it, on July 24, 2003, petitioners led a Motion for a Writ of
Execution pursuant to Section 2, Rule XII of the Revised Rules of Procedure, which was
granted in an Order dated August 4, 2003 despite strong opposition from private
respondents. 2 3 On January 28, 2004, the DARAB nulli ed the Order dated August 4,
2003 granting the writ of execution. 2 4
Subsequently, the DARAB, in DARAB Case No. 12486, reversed the ruling of the
PARAD in its Decision 2 5 dated March 15, 2004. It held, among others, that the EPs
were valid as it was the heirs of Deleste who should have informed the DAR of the
pendency of Civil Case No. 698 at the time the subject property was placed under the
coverage of the OLT Program considering that DAR was not a party to the said case.
Further, it stated that the record is bereft of any evidence that the city ordinance has
been approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), as mandated
by DAR Administrative Order No. 01, Series of 1990, and held that whether the subject
property is indeed exempt from the OLT Program is an administrative determination,
the jurisdiction of which lies exclusively with the DAR Secretary or the latter's authorized
representative. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the
DARAB in its Resolution 2 6 dated July 8, 2004.
Undaunted, petitioners led a petition for review with the CA, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 85471, challenging the Decision and Resolution in DARAB Case No. 12486.
This was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated October 28, 2004 for petitioners'
failure to attach the writ of execution, the order nullifying the writ of execution, and such
material portions of the record referred to in the petition and other supporting papers,
as required under Sec. 6 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners' motion for
reconsideration was also denied by the appellate court in a Resolution dated
September 13, 2005 for being pro forma.
On November 18, 2005, petitioners led a petition for review with this Court. In
Our Resolution 2 7 dated February 4, 2008, We resolved to deny the said petition for
failure to show su ciently any reversible error in the assailed judgment to warrant the
exercise by the Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case.
On March 19, 2008, petitioners led a Motion for Reconsideration. 2 8 On April 11,
2008, they also filed a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration. 2 9
In Our Resolution 3 0 dated August 20, 2008, this Court resolved to grant
petitioners' motion for reconsideration and give due course to the petition, requiring the
parties to submit their respective memoranda. IaSCTE
The Issues
I. [WHETHER THE CA WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING] OUTRIGHT THE
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF PETITIONERS . . . .
IV. [WHETHER THE LAND] THAT HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY AND PARTIALLY
EXPROPRIATED BY A CITY GOVERNMENT [MAY] STILL BE SUBJECT[ED]
TO AGRARIAN REFORM.
Our Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Effect of non-compliance with the requirements
under Sec. 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
In ling a petition for review as an appeal from awards, judgments, nal orders,
or resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions,
it is required under Sec. 6 (c), Rule 43 of the Rules of Court that it be accompanied by a
clearly legible duplicate original or a certi ed true copy of the award, judgment, nal
order, or resolution appealed from, with certi ed true copies of such material portions
of the record referred to in the petition and other supporting papers. As stated: cDHAES
Sec. 6. Contents of the petition. — The petition for review shall (a) state
the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the court or agencies
either as petitioners or respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the facts
and issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the review; (c) be
accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certi ed true
copy of the award, judgment, nal order or resolution appealed from,
together with certi ed true copies of such material portions of the
record referred to therein and other supporting papers ; and (d) contain a
sworn certi cation against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of
section 2, Rule 42. The petition shall state the speci c material dates showing
that it was filed within the period fixed herein. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the instant case, the CA dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 85471 for
petitioners' failure to attach the writ of execution, the order nullifying the writ of
execution, and such material portions of the record referred to in the petition and other
supporting papers. 3 2
A perusal of the issues raised before the CA would, however, show that the
foregoing documents required by the appellate court are not necessary for the proper
disposition of the case. Specifically: STaIHc
Is [Lot No. 1407] within the ambit of the [Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program]?
Can the OLT by DAR over the subject land validly proceed without notice to
the landowner?
Can the OLT be validly completed without a certi cation of deposit by
Land Bank?
[I]s the landowner barred from exercising his right of retention . . .
[considering that EPs were already issued on the basis of CLTs]?
Are the EPs over the subject land . . . valid . . .? 3 3
Petitioners complied with the requirement under Sec. 6 (c), Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court when they appended to the petition led before the CA certi ed true copies of
the following documents: (1) the challenged resolution dated July 8, 2004 issued by the
DARAB denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration; (2) the duplicate original copy
of petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration dated April 6, 2005; (3) the assailed decision
dated March 15, 2004 issued by the DARAB reversing on appeal the decision of the
PARAD and nullifying with nality the order of execution pending appeal; (4) the Order
dated December 8, 2003 issued by the PARAD reinstating the writ of execution earlier
issued; and (5) the Decision dated July 21, 2003 issued by the PARAD in the original
proceedings for the cancellation of the EPs. 3 4 The CA, therefore, erred when it
dismissed the petition based on such technical ground. SIaHTD
Even assuming that the omitted documents were material to the appeal, the
appellate court, instead of dismissing outright the petition, could have just required
petitioners to submit the necessary documents. In Spouses Espejo v. Ito , 3 5 the Court
held that "under Section 3 (d), Rule 3 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of
Appeals, 3 6 the Court of Appeals is with authority to require the parties to submit
additional documents as may be necessary to promote the interests of substantial
justice."
Moreover, petitioners' subsequent submission of the documents required by the
CA with the motion for reconsideration constitutes substantial compliance with Section
6 (c), Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. 3 7 In Jaro v. CA , this Court held that subsequent and
substantial compliance may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure.
Particularly:
The amended petition no longer contained the fatal defects that the
original petition had but the Court of Appeals still saw it t to dismiss the
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amended petition. The Court of Appeals reasoned that "non-compliance in the
original petition is admittedly attributable to the petitioner and that no highly
justi able and compelling reason has been advanced" to the court for it to depart
from the mandatory requirements of Administrative Circular No. 3-96. The hard
stance taken by the Court of Appeals in this case is unjusti ed under the
circumstances.
Time and again, this Court has held that a strict and rigid application of
technicalities must be avoided if it tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice. 3 9 As held in Sta. Ana v. Spouses Carpo: 4 0
Rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. If the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than
to promote justice, it is always within our power to suspend the rules or
except a particular case from their operation. Law and jurisprudence
grant to courts the prerogative to relax compliance with the procedural
ru l es, even the most mandatory in character , mindful of the duty to
reconcile the need to put an end to litigation speedily and the parties'
right to an opportunity to be heard.
Our recent ruling in Tanenglian v. Lorenzo is instructive:
Pertinently, after an assiduous study of the records of the case, We agree with
petitioners that the subject property, particularly Lot No. 1407, is outside the coverage
of the agrarian reform program in view of the enactment by the City of Iligan of its local
zoning ordinance, City Ordinance No. 1313. aSAHCE
It is undeniable that the local government has the power to reclassify agricultural
into non-agricultural lands. In Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v. CA , 4 5 this
Court held that pursuant to Sec. 3 of Republic Act No. (RA) 2264, amending the Local
Government Code, municipal and/or city councils are empowered to "adopt zoning and
subdivision ordinances or regulations in consultation with the National Planning
Commission." It was also emphasized therein that "[t]he power of the local government
to convert or reclassify lands [from agricultural to non-agricultural lands prior to the
passage of RA 6657] is not subject to the approval of the [DAR]." 4 6
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Likewise, it is not controverted that City Ordinance No. 1313, which was enacted
by the City of Iligan in 1975, reclassi ed the subject property into a
commercial/residential area. DARAB, however, believes that the approval of HLURB is
necessary in order for the reclassification to be valid.
We differ. As previously mentioned, City Ordinance No. 1313 was enacted by the
City of Iligan in 1975. Signi cantly, there was still no HLURB to speak of during that
time. It was the Task Force on Human Settlements, the earliest predecessor of HLURB,
which was already in existence at that time, having been created on September 19,
1973 pursuant to Executive Order No. 419. It should be noted, however, that the Task
Force was not empowered to review and approve zoning ordinances and regulations.
As a matter of fact, it was only on August 9, 1978, with the issuance of Letter of
Instructions No. 729, that local governments were required to submit their existing land
use plans, zoning ordinances, enforcement systems and procedures to the Ministry of
Human Settlements for review and rati cation. The Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission (HSRC) was the regulatory arm of the Ministry of Human Settlements. 4 7
Signi cantly, accompanying the Certi cation 4 8 dated October 8, 1999 issued by
Gil R. Balondo, Deputy Zoning Administrator of the City Planning and Development
O ce, Iligan City, and the letter 4 9 dated October 8, 1999 issued by Ayunan B. Rajah,
Regional O cer of the HLURB, is the Certi cate of Approval issued by Imelda
Romualdez Marcos, then Minister of Human Settlements and Chairperson of the HSRC,
showing that the local zoning ordinance was, indeed, approved on September 21, 1978.
This leads to no other conclusion than that City Ordinance No. 1313 enacted by the City
of Iligan was approved by the HSRC, the predecessor of HLURB. The validity of said
local zoning ordinance is, therefore, beyond question.
Since the subject property had been reclassi ed as residential/commercial land
with the enactment of City Ordinance No. 1313 in 1975, it can no longer be considered
as an "agricultural land" within the ambit of RA 6657. As this Court held in Buklod nang
Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. v. E.M. Ramos and Sons, Inc. , 5 0 "To be exempt
from CARP, all that is needed is one valid reclassi cation of the land from agricultural
to non-agricultural by a duly authorized government agency before June 15, 1988, when
the CARL took effect."
Despite the foregoing ruling, respondents allege that the subsequent
reclassification by the local zoning ordinance cannot free the land from the legal effects
of PD 27 which deems the land to be already taken as of October 21, 1972, when said
law took effect. Concomitantly, they assert that the rights which accrued from said
date must be respected. They also maintain that the reclassi cation of the subject
property did not alter its agricultural nature, much less its actual use. 5 1 CTSDAI
Verily, vested rights which have already accrued cannot just be taken away by the
expedience of issuing a local zoning ordinance reclassifying an agricultural land into a
residential/commercial area. As this Court extensively discussed in Remman
Enterprises, Inc. v. CA: 5 2
In the main, REMMAN hinges its application for exemption on the ground
that the subject lands had ceased to be agricultural lands by virtue of the zoning
classi cation by the Sangguniang Bayan of Dasmariñas, Cavite, and approved by
the HSRC, specifying them as residential.
Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988, respondent
DAR is bound by such conversion. . . . .
This, however, raises the issue of whether vested rights have actually accrued in
the instant case. In this respect, We reckon that under PD 27, tenant-farmers of rice and
corn lands were "deemed owners" of the land they till as of October 21, 1972. This
policy, intended to emancipate the tenant-farmers from the bondage of the soil, is given
effect by the following provision of the law:
The tenant farmer, whether in land classi ed as landed estate or not, shall
be deemed owner of a portion constituting a family size farm of ve (5)
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hectares if not irrigated and three (3) hectares if irrigated. (Emphasis supplied.)
HcTDSA
By analogy, Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals applies to the case at bar
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since there was likewise a violation of due process in the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law when the petitioner was not noti ed of any
ocular inspection and investigation to be conducted by the DAR before
acquisition of the property was to be undertaken. Neither was there proof that
petitioner was given the opportunity to at least choose and identify its retention
area in those portions to be acquired. Both in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law and Presidential Decree No. 27, the right of retention and how this right is
exercised, is guaranteed by law.
Since land acquisition under either Presidential Decree No. 27
and the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law govern the extraordinary
method of expropriating private property, the law must be strictly
construed. Faithful compliance with legal provisions, especially those
which relate to the procedure for acquisition of expropriated lands
should therefore be observed . In the instant case, no proper notice was given
to Virginia A. Roa by the DAR. Neither did the DAR conduct an ocular inspection
and investigation. Hence, any act committed by the DAR or any of its agencies
that results from its failure to comply with the proper procedure for expropriation
of land is a violation of constitutional due process and should be deemed
arbitrary, capricious, whimsical and tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
(Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
But it was incumbent upon the DAR to notify Deleste, being the landowner of the
subject property. It should be noted that the deed of sale executed by Hilaria in favor of
Deleste was registered on March 2, 1954, and such registration serves as a
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constructive notice to the whole world that the subject property was already owned by
Deleste by virtue of the said deed of sale. In Naval v. CA, this Court held:
Applying the law, we held in Bautista v. Fule that the registration of an
instrument involving unregistered land in the Registry of Deeds creates
constructive notice and binds third person who may subsequently deal with the
same property. 6 3 . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
It bears stressing that the principal purpose of registration is "to notify other
persons not parties to a contract that a transaction involving the property has been
entered into." 6 4 There was, therefore, no reason for DAR to feign ignorance of the
transfer of ownership over the subject property.
Moreover, that DAR should have sent the notice to Deleste, and not to the
Nanamans, is bolstered by the fact that the tax declaration in the name of Virgilio was
already canceled and a new one issued in the name of Deleste. 6 5 Although tax
declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, they are nonetheless "good indicia of possession in the concept of an
owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his
actual or, at least, constructive possession." 6 6 IEHaSc
Petitioners' right to due process of law was, indeed, violated when the DAR failed
to notify them that it is subjecting the subject property under the coverage of the
agrarian reform program.
On this note, We take exception to our ruling in Roxas & Co., Inc. v. CA , 6 7 where,
despite a nding that there was a violation of due process in the implementation of the
comprehensive agrarian reform program when the petitioner was not noti ed of any
ocular inspection and investigation to be conducted by the DAR before acquiring the
property, thereby effectively depriving petitioner the opportunity to at least choose and
identify its retention area in those portions to be acquired, 6 8 this Court nonetheless
ruled that such violation does not give the Court the power to nullify the certi cates of
land ownership award (CLOAs) already issued to the farmer-bene ciaries, since the
DAR must be given the chance to correct its procedural lapses in the acquisition
proceedings.
Manifesting her disagreement that this Court cannot nullify illegally issued
CLOAs and should rst ask the DAR to reverse and correct itself, Justice Ynares-
Santiago, in her Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, 6 9 stated that "[i]f the acts of DAR
are patently illegal and the rights of Roxas & Co. violated, the wrong decisions of DAR
should be reversed and set aside. It follows that the fruits of the wrongful acts, in this
case the illegally issued CLOAs, must be declared null and void." She also noted that "[i]f
CLOAs can under the DAR's own order be cancelled administratively, with more reason
can the courts, especially the Supreme Court, do so when the matter is clearly in issue."
In the same vein, if the illegality in the issuance of the CLTs is patent, the Court
must immediately take action and declare the issuance as null and void. There being no
question that the CLTs in the instant case were "improperly issued, for which reason,
their cancellation is warranted." 7 0 The same holds true with respect to the EPs and
certi cates of title issued by virtue of the void CLTs, as there can be no valid transfer of
title should the CLTs on which they were grounded are void. 7 1 Cancellation of the EPs
and OCTs are clearly warranted in the instant case since, aside from the violation of
petitioners' right to due process of law, the subject property is outside the coverage of
the agrarian reform program.
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Issue of Validity of EPs Not Barred by Res Judicata
The LBP maintains that the issue of the EPs' validity has already been settled by
this Court inHeirs of So a Nanaman Lonoy v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform , 7 2 where
We held that the EPs and OCTs issued in 2001 had already become indefeasible and
incontrovertible by the time the petitioners therein instituted the case in 2005; hence,
their issuance may no longer be reviewed. 7 3
In effect, the LBP raises the defense of res judicata in order to preclude a
"relitigation" of the issue concerning the validity of the EPs issued to private
respondents.
Notably, the doctrine of res judicata has two aspects, namely: (1) "bar by prior
judgment," 7 4 wherein the judgment in a prior case bars the prosecution of a second
action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action; 7 5 and (2) "conclusiveness of
judgment," 7 6 which precludes relitigation of a particular fact or issue in another action
between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action. 7 7 HAICcD
Applying the above statement of the Court to the case at bar, We nd that LBP's
contention that this Court's ruling in Heirs of So a Nanaman Lonoy that the EPs and
OCTs issued in 2001 had already become indefeasible and incontrovertible precludes a
"relitigation" of the issue concerning the validity of the EPs issued to private
respondents does not hold water.
In the rst place, there is no identity of parties in Heirs of So a Nanaman Lonoy
and the instant case. Arguably, the respondents in these two cases are similar.
However, the petitioners are totally different. In Heirs of So a Nanaman Lonoy , the
petitioners are the more than 120 individuals who claim to be descendants of Fulgencio
Nanaman, Gregorio's brother, and who collectively assert their right to a share in
Gregorio's estate, arguing that they were deprived of their inheritance by virtue of the
improper issuance of the EPs to private respondents without notice to them. On the
other hand, in the instant case, petitioners are the heirs of Deleste who seek nulli cation
of the EPs issued to private respondents on grounds of violation of due process of law,
disregard of landowner's right of retention, improvident issuance of EPs and OCTs, and
non-coverage of the agrarian reform program, among others. Evidently, there is even no
privity among the petitioners in these two cases. cDCEHa
And in the second place, the issues are also dissimilar. In Heirs of So a Nanaman
Lonoy, the issue was whether the ling of a petition for prohibition was the proper
remedy for the petitioners therein, considering that the EPs and OCTs had already been
issued in 2001, four (4) years prior to the ling of said petition in 2005. In the instant
case, however, the issue is whether the EPs and OCTs issued in favor of private
respondents are void, thus warranting their cancellation.
In addition, the factual circumstances in these two cases are different such that
the necessity of applying the rule on indefeasibility of title in one is wanting in the other.
In Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy, the petition for prohibition was filed by the petitioners
therein in 2005, notwithstanding the fact that the EPs and OCTs had already been
issued in 2001. For that reason, apart from making a ruling that "[p]rohibition, as a rule,
does not lie to restrain an act that is already a fait accompli," it becomes incumbent
upon this Court to hold that:
. . . Considering that such EPs and OCTs were issued in 2001, they had
become indefeasible and incontrovertible by the time petitioners
instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 00365 in 2005 , and may no longer be judicially
reviewed. 8 2 (Emphasis supplied.)
On the contrary, in the instant case, the petition for nulli cation of private
respondents' EPs and OCTs was led on February 28, 2002. Taking into account that
the EPs and OCTs were issued on August 1, 2001 and October 1, 2001, respectively,
the ling of the petition was well within the prescribed one year period, thus, barring the
defense of indefeasibility and incontrovertibility. Even if the petition was filed before the
DARAB, and not the Regional Trial Court as mandated by Sec. 32 of the Property
Registration Decree, 8 3 this should necessarily have the same effect, considering that
DARAB's jurisdiction extends to cases involving the cancellation of CLOAs, EPs, and
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even of certi cates of title issued by virtue of a void EP. As this Court held in Gabriel v.
Jamias: 8 4
It is well-settled that the DAR, through its adjudication arm, i.e., the DARAB
and its regional and provincial adjudication boards, exercises quasi-judicial
functions and jurisdiction on all matters pertaining to an agrarian dispute or
controversy and the implementation of agrarian reform laws. Pertinently, it is
provided in the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure that the DARAB has primary
and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and
adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and related agrarian reform
laws. Such jurisdiction shall extend to cases involving the issuance,
correction and cancellation of Certi cates of Land Ownership Award
(CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents which are registered with the Land
Registration Authority . IECcAT
This Court has had the occasion to rule that the mere issuance of an
emancipation patent does not put the ownership of the agrarian reform
bene ciary beyond attack and scrutiny. Emancipation patents may be cancelled
for violations of agrarian laws, rules and regulations. Section 12 (g) of P.D. No.
946 (issued on June 17, 1976) vested the then Court of Agrarian Relations with
jurisdiction over cases involving the cancellation of emancipation patents issued
under P.D. No. 266. Exclusive jurisdiction over such cases was later lodged with
the DARAB under Section 1 of Rule II of the DARAB Rules of Procedure.
For sure, the jurisdiction of the DARAB cannot be deemed to
disappear the moment a certi cate of title is issued, for, such
certi cates are not modes of transfer of property but merely evidence
of such transfer, and there can be no valid transfer of title should the
CLOA, on which it was grounded, be void. The same holds true in the
case of a certi cate of title issued by virtue of a void emancipation
patent.
From the foregoing, it is therefore undeniable that it is the DARAB and not
the regular courts which has jurisdiction herein, this notwithstanding the issuance
of Torrens titles in the names of the petitioners. For, it is a fact that the petitioners'
Torrens titles emanated from the emancipation patents previously issued to them
by virtue of being the farmer-bene ciaries identi ed by the DAR under the OLT of
the government. The DAR ruling that the said emancipation patents were
erroneously issued for failing to consider the valid retention rights of respondents
had already attained nality. Considering that the action led by respondents
with the DARAB was precisely to annul the emancipation patents issued to the
petitioners, the case squarely, therefore, falls within the jurisdiction of the DARAB.
. . . (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Inevitably, this leads to no other conclusion than that Our ruling in Heirs of So a
Nanaman Lonoy concerning the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of the EPs and
OCTs issued in 2001 does not bar Us from making a nding in the instant case that the
EPs and OCTs issued to private respondents are, indeed, void.
With the foregoing disquisition, it becomes unnecessary to dwell on the other
issues raised by the parties.
WHEREFORE , the Court GRANTS the petition and REVERSES and SETS ASIDE
the CA's October 28, 2004 and September 13, 2005 Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No.
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85471. The Emancipation Patents and Original Certi cates of Title covering the subject
property, particularly Lot No. 1407, issued in favor of private respondents are hereby
declared NULL and VOID .
The DAR is ordered to CANCEL the aforementioned Emancipation Patents and
Original Certificates of Title erroneously issued in favor of private respondents.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED .
Corona, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Del Castillo and Perez, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 72-73. Penned by Associate Justice Mari or P. Punzalan Castillo and concurred in
by Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr.
2.Id. at 75-78. Penned by Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro and concurred in by Associate
Justices Arturo G. Tayag and Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr.
3.Id. at 126-127.
4.Heirs of So a Nanaman Lonoy v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform , G.R. No. 175049, November 27,
2008, 572 SCRA 185, 192.
5.Rollo, p. 127.
6.Id. at 153-154.
7.Id. at 127.
8.Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, supra note 4, at 193.
9.Rollo, p. 127.
10.Noel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 59550 and 60636, January 11, 1995, 240 SCRA 78.
11.Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, supra note 4, at 193.
12.Rollo, pp. 154-155; Heirs of So a Nanaman Lonoy v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, supra note 4,
at 193-194.
13.Id. at 155.
14.Id. at 127.
15.Id.
16.Id. at 155.
17.Id.
18.Id. at 156.
19.Id. at 990, 263-292.
21.Id. at 128.
23.Id. at 133.
24.Id. at 634-635.
25.Id. at 126-141.
26.Id. at 102-103.
27.Id. at 822-823.
28.Id. at 824-861.
29.Id. at 862-881.
30.Id. at 959-960.
31.Id. at 991-992. Original in lowercase.
32.Id. at 72.
33.Id. at 87.
34.Id. at 99-163.
35.G.R. No. 176511, August 4, 2009, 595 SCRA 192, 206; citing Spouses Lanaria v. Planta , G.R.
No. 172891, November 22, 2007, 538 SCRA 79.
36.Rule 3, Sec. 3 (d) reads: "When a petition does not have the complete annexes or the required
number of copies, the Chief of the Judicial Records Division shall require the petitioner to
complete the annexes or le the necessary number of copies of the petition before
docketing the case. Pleadings improperly led in court shall be returned to the sender by
the Chief of the Judicial Records Division."
37.Gonzales v. Civil Service Commission , G.R. No. 139131, September 27, 2002, 390 SCRA 124,
130.
38.G.R. No. 127536, February 19, 2002, 377 SCRA 282, 296-297.
39.Id. at 298; citing Cusi-Hernandez v. Diaz, G.R. No. 140436, July 18, 2000, 336 SCRA 113.
40.G.R. No. 164340, November 28, 2008, 572 SCRA 463, 477.
43.Sta. Ana v. Spouses Carpo, supra note 40, at 480; citing DAR v. Abdulwahid, G.R. No.
163285, February 27, 2008, 547 SCRA 30, 40.
44.G.R. Nos. 167401 & 167407, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 185, 207
45.G.R. Nos. 142359 & 142980, May 25, 2004, 429 SCRA 109, 134-135.
46.Id. at 135.
47.Under Sec. 18 of PD 1396, the Human Settlements Commission established pursuant to PD
933 was renamed as the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission and was made the
regulatory arm of the Ministry of Human Settlements. PD 1396 was issued on June 2,
1978.
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48.Rollo, p. 340.
49.Id. at 341.
52.G.R. Nos. 132073 & 132361, September 27, 2006, 503 SCRA 378, 391-393.
53.G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989, 175 SCRA 343, 390-391.
54.Del Castillo v. Orciga, G.R. No. 153850, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 498, 506.
55.Id. at 505-506.
56.Id. at 506.
57.Rollo, p. 976.
58.No. L-28609, January 17, 1974, 55 SCRA 26.
60.Roxas & Co., Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 127876, December 17, 1999, 321 SCRA 106, 134.
61.G.R. No. 170346, March 12, 2007, 518 SCRA 202, 210-213.
62.G.R. No. 164846, June 18, 2008, 555 SCRA 97, 104.
63.G.R. No. 167412, February 22, 2006, 483 SCRA 102, 111.
64.Gutierrez v. Mendoza-Plaza, G.R. No. 185477, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA 807, 817.
65.Rollo, p. 153.
66.Republic v. Spouses Kalaw, G.R. No. 155138, June 8, 2004, 431 SCRA 401, 413.
70.See Justice Melo's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Roxas & Co., Inc. v. CA, supra note
60, at 155-158.
71.Gabriel v. Jamias, G.R. No. 156482, September 17, 2008, 565 SCRA 443, 457; citing Hermoso
v. C.L. Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 140319, May 5, 2006, 489 SCRA 556, 562.
72.Supra note 4.
73.Rollo, pp. 1216-1220.
74.In Re: Petition for Probate of Last Will & Testament of Basilio Santiago , G.R. No. 179859,
August 9, 2010, 627 SCRA 351, 362.
75.Linzag v. CA, G.R. No. 122181, June 26, 1998, 291 SCRA 304, 319.
76.In Re: Petition for Probate of Last Will & Testament of Basilio Santiago, supra note 74, at
362.
79.G.R. No. 149624, September 29, 2010, 631 SCRA 471, 480.
80.Id.
81.Id. at 480-481.
82.Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, supra note 4, at 207-208.
83.Sec. 32 of the Property Registration Decree provides:
Sec. 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. — The decree of
registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other
disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court
for reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the
government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest
therein by such adjudication or con rmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to le in
the proper Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] a petition for reopening and
review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of the
entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by
the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest
therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for
value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an
innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value. Upon the expiration of said
period of one year, the decree of registration and the certi cate of title issued shall
become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any
case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other
persons responsible for the fraud.
84.G.R. No. 156482, September 17, 2008, 565 SCRA 443, 456-458.