Civil Aviation Safety Authority - Australian Government - RELIABILITY PROGRAMS
Civil Aviation Safety Authority - Australian Government - RELIABILITY PROGRAMS
RELIABILITY PROGRAMS
CONTENTS 1. REFERENCES
1. References 1 The Civil Aviation Act 1988
2. Purpose 2 For compliance under the CASR 1998
3. Status of this Advisory Circular 2 Part 42 of the Civil Aviation Safety
4. Acronyms 2 Regulations 1998
5. Background 3 Subpart 42L of the of the Civil Aviation
6. Who is required to have a reliability Safety Regulations 1998
program? 3 Part 42 Manual of Standards
7. Personnel Qualification 4 Part 145 of the Civil Aviation Safety
8. Reliability program document 4 Regulations 1998
9. Reports to CASA 5 For compliance under the CAR 1988
Appendix 1 – Relevant Portions of Annex Regulation 42L of CAR 1988, System of
6 to the Convention on International Civil maintenance: matters to be included
Aviation -International Civil Aviation
Organization International Standards and Regulation 42M of CAR 1988, System of
Recommended Practices - Part I - maintenance: approval
International Commercial Air Transport Regulation 42M of CAR 1988, Statistical
— Aeroplanes 6 returns
Appendix 2 – Copy of Chapter 3 of the Regulations 174B and 175A of the Civil
Part 42 MOS Requirements for approved Aviation Regulations 1988
reliability program 10 Civil Aviation Order 82.0
Chapter 11 of ATA Spec 2000
Annex 6 to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation
Advisory Circulars are intended to provide advice and guidance to illustrate a means, but not necessarily the
only means, of complying with the Regulations, or to explain certain regulatory requirements by providing
informative, interpretative and explanatory material.
Where an AC is referred to in a ‘Note’ below the regulation, the AC remains as guidance material.
ACs should always be read in conjunction with the referenced regulations.
This AC has been approved for release by the Executive Manager Standards Division.
September 2012
AC 42-3(0): Reliability Programs 2
2. PURPOSE
2.1 This Advisory Circular (AC) provides guidance on the practical application of the
regulations pertaining to reliability programs and provides examples of processes suitable for
organisations operating under subpart 42.L of the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998
(CASR 1998).
2.2 This AC is intended to be read in conjunction with Part 42 of CASR 1998 and its Manual
of Standards (MOS) and the associated Acceptable Means of Compliance/Guidance Material
document.
2.3 Compliance under the CAR 1988
2.3.1 In addition to providing a way to comply with subpart 42.L of CASR 1998 reliability
program requirements, this AC describes the way in which the requirements for a
reliability program required by or under regulations 42L, 42M and 132 of the Civil
Aviation Regulations 1988 (CAR 1988) can be achieved.
2.3.2 If reading this document with compliance under the CAR 1988 in mind then read the
following CASR 1998 terms as follows:
CAMO – operator;
CAME – maintenance control manual; and
AMP – system of maintenance.
4. ACRONYMS
AC Advisory Circular
AMO Approved Maintenance Organisation
AMP Aircraft Maintenance Program
ASETPA Approved Single Engine Turbine Powered Aeroplanes
A4A Airlines for America (A4A)
ATA Alphanumeric Specification numbering designator; issued by A4A which was
formerly known as the Air Transport Association of America (ATA)
CAR Civil Aviation Regulations 1988
CASA Civil Aviation Safety Authority
CAME Continuing Airworthiness Management Exposition
CAMO Continuing Airworthiness Management Organisation
CASR Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IFSD In-Flight Shut Down
MEL Minimum Equipment List
MOS Manual of Standards
MPD Maintenance Planning Document
MSG Maintenance Steering Group
SB Service Bulletin
SDR Service Difficulty Reporting
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5. BACKGROUND
5.1 This AC provides information and guidance material that can be used to design,
develop and manage reliability programs. The practices described are acceptable to CASA in
regard to AMP management that incorporate reliability methods.
5.2 The overall AMP development process has two distinct processes within it. The initial
AMP development (baseline) is the actual preparation of the aircraft maintenance specifications.
5.3 The reliability analysis collects data associated with the aircraft operating on the
maintenance program. The results of the analysis can measure the effectiveness of those
maintenance tasks by providing alerts about the systems, components and structures whose
performance measures deviates from their expected levels.
5.4 A reliability program can be expected to enhance safety of flight operation and optimise
maintenance costs. The basic functions of a reliability program are to provide:
a summary of aircraft fleet reliability and thus reflect the effectiveness of the way in
which maintenance is being done (by means of the statistical reliability element);
significant and timely technical information by which improvement of reliability may be
achieved through changes to the program or to the practices for implementing it; and
variations to the AMP where standards and reliability data justify the change.
5.5 AMP variations actions resulting from a reliability program may be to escalate or de-
escalate, delete, vary or add maintenance tasks, as necessary. The aims of those actions include
elimination of redundant and ineffective maintenance practices, reduce no-fault found
occurrences, reduce fleet maintenance costs, reduce maintenance and down time, increase aircraft
availability and reduce the time from problem identification to corrective action.
5.6 A CAMO may make changes to an AMP as provided by the CAME. All other amendment
to the reliability program will require approval by CASA.
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6.3 The ASETPA reliability program requirements are as recommended by ICAO in Annex 6
to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. A copy of the relevant portions of that
document can be seen at Appendix 1.
7. PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION
7.1 In approving the operators maintenance and reliability program, CASA expects that the
organisation which runs the program (it may be the operator, operators continuing airworthiness
management organisation (CAMO), or an approved maintenance organisation (AMO) under
contract) employs or contracts the services of sufficiently qualified personnel with appropriate
engineering experience and understanding of reliability concepts. Trained and experienced
personnel enable the interpretation of the data analysis to be made correctly.
7.2 An approved reliability program can include full or partial utilisation of the services of
aircraft manufacturers. Such utilisation needs to be described with the reliability program
document.
7.3 Failure to provide appropriately qualified personnel for the reliability program may lead
CASA to reject the approval of the reliability program and therefore the aircraft maintenance
program.
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9. REPORTS TO CASA
9.1 When approving a reliability program CASA will require that the program includes
procedures for providing reliability reports to CASA (to the CASA field office responsible for the
relevant CAMO).
9.2 The periodicity for report submission would normally be on a quarterly basis but other
arrangements may be agreed. For a low use aircraft (eg some corporate aircraft) the report may be
submitted on a yearly basis or as agreed with the CASA field office responsible for the aircraft
operator.
9.3 The report is required to be indicative of the fleet’s reliability and overall effectiveness of
the aircraft’s maintenance program. Reporting content detail can be seen within Appendix 2.
Executive Manager
Standards Division
September 2012
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AC 42-3(0): Reliability Programs 6
APPENDIX 1 –
RELEVANT PORTIONS OF ANNEX 6 TO THE CONVENTION ON
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION -INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
AVIATION ORGANIZATION INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND
RECOMMENDED PRACTICES - PART I - INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT — AEROPLANES
CHAPTER 5. Aeroplane performance operating limitations. 5.4 Additional requirements for operations of single-
engine turbine-powered aeroplanes at night and/or in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC)
5.4.1 In approving operations by single-engine turbine-powered aeroplanes at night and/or in IMC, the State of the
Operator shall ensure that the airworthiness certification of the aeroplane is appropriate and that the overall level of
safety intended by the provisions of Annexes 6 and 8 is provided by:
a) the reliability of the turbine engine;
b) the operator’s maintenance procedures, operating practices, flight dispatch procedures and crew training
programmes; and
c) equipment and other requirements provided in accordance with Appendix 3.
5.4.2 All single-engine turbine-powered aeroplanes operated at night and/or in IMC shall have an engine trend
monitoring system, and those aeroplanes for which the individual certificate of airworthiness is first issued on or
after 1 January 2005 shall have an automatic trend monitoring system.
Appendix 3. Additional Requirements for approved operations by single-engine turbine powered aeroplanes at
night and/or in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) (See Chapter 5, 5.4.1)
Airworthiness and operational requirements provided in accordance with Chapter 5, 5.4.1, shall satisfy the following:
1. Turbine engine reliability
1.1 Turbine engine reliability shall be shown to have a power loss rate of less than 1 per 100 000 engine hours.
Note.— Power loss in this context is defined as any loss of power, the cause of which may be traced to faulty engine
or engine component design or installation, including design or installation of the fuel ancillary or engine control
systems. (See Attachment H.)
1.2 The operator shall be responsible for engine trend monitoring.
1.3 To minimize the probability of in-flight engine failure, the engine shall be equipped with:
a) an ignition system that activates automatically, or is capable of being operated manually, for take-off and landing,
and during flight, in visible moisture;
b) a magnetic particle detection or equivalent system that monitors the engine, accessories gearbox, and reduction
gearbox, and which includes a flight deck caution indication; and
c) an emergency engine power control device that permits continuing operation of the engine through a sufficient
power range to safely complete the flight in the event of any reasonably probable failure of the fuel control unit.
2. Systems and equipment
Single-engine turbine-powered aeroplanes approved to operate at night and/or in IMC shall be equipped with the
following systems and equipment intended to ensure continued safe flight and to assist in achieving a safe forced
landing after an engine failure, under all allowable operating conditions:
a) two separate electrical generating systems, each one capable of supplying all probable combinations of continuous
in-flight electrical loads for instruments, equipment and systems required at night and/or in IMC;
b) a radio altimeter;
c) an emergency electrical supply system of sufficient capacity and endurance, following loss of all generated power,
to as a minimum:
1) maintain the operation of all essential flight instruments, communication and navigation systems during a
descent from the maximum certificated altitude in a glide configuration to the completion of a landing;
2) lower the flaps and landing gear, if applicable;
3) provide power to one pitot heater, which must serve an air speed indicator clearly visible to the pilot;
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6. Operator planning
6.1 Operator route planning shall take account of all relevant information in the assessment of intended routes or
areas of operations, including the following:
a) the nature of the terrain to be overflown, including the potential for carrying out a safe forced landing in the event
of an engine failure or major malfunction;
b) weather information, including seasonal and other adverse meteorological influences that may affect the flight;
and
c) other criteria and limitations as specified by the State of the Operator.
6.2 An operator shall identify aerodromes or safe forced landing areas available for use in the event of engine failure,
and the position of these shall be programmed into the area navigation system.
Note 1.— A ‘safe’ forced landing in this context means a landing in an area at which it can reasonably be expected
that it will not lead to serious injury or loss of life, even though the aeroplane may incur extensive damage.
Note 2.— Operation over routes and in weather conditions that permit a safe forced landing in the event of an engine
failure, as specified in Chapter 5, 5.1.2, is not required by Appendix 3, 6.1 and 6.2 for aeroplanes approved in
accordance with Chapter 5, 5.4. The availability of forced landing areas at all points along a route is not specified
for these aeroplanes because of the very high engine reliability, additional systems and operational equipment,
procedures and training requirements specified in this Appendix.
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2.2.2 A reliability programme should be established covering the engine and associated systems. The engine
programme should include engine hours flown in the period and the in-flight shutdown rate for all causes and the
unscheduled engine removal rate, both on a 12-month moving average basis. The event reporting process should
cover all items relevant to the ability to operate safely at night and/or in IMC. The data should be available for use by
the operator, the Type Certificate Holder and the State so as to establish that the intended reliability levels are being
achieved. Any sustained adverse trend should result in an immediate evaluation by the operator in consultation with
the State and manufacturer with a view to determining actions to restore the intended safety level. The operator
should develop a parts control programme with support from the manufacturer that ensures that the proper parts and
configuration are maintained for single-engine turbine-powered aeroplanes approved to conduct these operations.
The programme includes verification that parts placed on an approved single-engine turbine-powered aeroplane
during parts borrowing or pooling arrangements, as well as those parts used after repair or overhaul, maintain the
necessary configuration of that aeroplane for operations approved in accordance with Chapter 5, 5.4.
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2.3 Power loss rate should be determined as a moving average over a specified period (e.g. a 12-month moving
average if the sample is large). Power loss rate, rather than in-flight shut-down rate, has been used as it is considered
to be more appropriate for a single-engine aeroplane. If a failure occurs on a multi-engine aeroplane that causes a
major, but not total, loss of power on one engine, it is likely that the engine will be shut down as positive engine-out
performance is still available, whereas on a single-engine aeroplane it may well be decided to make use of the
residual power to stretch the glide distance.
2.4 The actual period selected should reflect the global utilization and the relevance of the experience included (e.g.
early data may not be relevant due to subsequent mandatory modifications which affected the power loss rate). After
the introduction of a new engine variant and whilst global utilization is relatively low, the total available experience
may have to be used to try to achieve a statistically meaningful average.
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APPENDIX 2 –
COPY OF CHAPTER 3 OF THE PART 42 MOS REQUIREMENTS FOR
APPROVED RELIABILITY PROGRAM
This appendix contains a copy of Chapter 3 of the Part 42 MOS Requirements for an approved
reliability program and is accompanied by guidance material. The copy is the unshaded text
below whilst the guidance material is the shaded portions of text.
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 This chapter specifies for paragraph 42.020 (2) (k) of CASR 1998, the requirements for a
reliability program for an aircraft that requires a reliability program under regulation 42.155 of
CASR 1998.
3.2 General requirements
3.2.1 The reliability program must:
(a) be in writing; and
(b) define the meaning of any unique terms or acronyms used in the program; and
(c) contain the records of approval of:
(i) the program; and
(ii) any subsequent variations to the program.
Note Common terms used throughout the industry need not be defined as long as the same meaning is intended.
A reliability program, in practical terms, should ensure the continuous monitoring, recording and
analysing of the functioning and condition of aircraft components and systems. The results are
then measured or compared against established normal behaviour levels so that the need for
corrective action may be assessed and, where necessary, taken.
A reliability program should contain means for ensuring that the reliability which is forecast can
actually be achieved. A program, which is only general, may lack the details necessary to satisfy
the reliability requirement. It is not intended to imply that all of the following information should
be contained in one program. It is realised that operating philosophy and program management
practices, etc., for each operator are different; however, the requirements described in this
Appendix could be applied to the specific needs of either a simple or a complex program. All
associated procedures should be clearly defined.
The significant terms and definitions applicable to the program should be clearly identified.
Terms are already defined in MSG-3, CASR 1998, CAR 1988, Part 42 MOS and Civil Aviation
Orders. Other terms may be found in the ATA CSDD: 2010 – Common Support Data Dictionary
or in mathematical statistics literature and Chapter 11 of ATA Spec 2000. An operator’s
reliability program requires approval from CASA and its approval status is indicated by the
reliability program’s revision control.
3.3 Identification and applicability of the program
3.3.1 The reliability program must contain the following information:
(a) the type, model, serial number and registration mark of the aircraft controlled by
the program;
(b) the name and address of the registered operator of the aircraft controlled by the
program;
(c) the name and approval certificate reference number of the CAMO responsible for
the program.
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The organisational structure and the departmental responsibilities for the administration of the
program should be stated. The responsibilities for individuals and departments (Engineering,
Production, Quality, Operations etc.) in respect of the program, together with the information and
functions of any program control committees (Reliability Group), should be defined.
Participation of CASA at periodic reliability meetings should be considered. This information
should be contained in the operator’s CAME.
3.4 Objective of the program
3.4.1 The objective of the reliability program must be described in the program.
3.4.2 The applicable instructions for continuing airworthiness must be followed to establish the
objective of the program.
3.4.3 As a minimum, the reliability program must provide a means of ensuring maintenance
program tasks are effective and their periodicity is adequate for continuing airworthiness
of the aircraft.
A statement should be included summarising as precisely as possible the scope and prime
objectives of the program. As a minimum it should include the following:
a recognition of the need for corrective action;
establishment of the corrective actions needed; and
a determination of the effectiveness of those actions.
The extent of the objectives should be directly related to the scope of the program. The
manufacturers Maintenance Planning Data (MPD) may give guidance on the objectives and
should be consulted in every case. Where some items such as aircraft structure, engines, APU,
etc. are controlled by separate programs, the associated procedures (e.g. individual sampling or
life development programs and manufacturers structure sampling programs) should be cross-
referenced in the program.
In case of a MSG-3 based maintenance program, the reliability program should provide a monitor
that all MSG-3 related tasks from the AMP are effective and their periodicity is adequate.
3.5 Identification of items controlled by the program
3.5.1 The aircraft parts, systems and structural elements controlled by the reliability program
must be clearly defined and identified in the program.
3.5.1 The maintenance program tasks controlled by the program must be clearly identified in
the program.
3.5.1 Where some items, such as aircraft structure, engines, and auxiliary power units, are
controlled by a separate program, such as a manufacturer structural sampling or life
development program, this must be referenced in the program.
3.6 Administration of the program
3.6.1 The individuals responsible for the administration of the reliability program must be
identified and their responsibility must be described in the program.
3.7 Data collection
3.7.1 A description of the data collection system for the items controlled by the reliability
program must be included in the program. Such a description must include the following:
(a) identification of sources of data;
(b) procedures for transmission and receiving of data from each source;
(c) steps of data development from source to analysis;
(d) organisational responsibilities for each step of data development.
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3.8.2 Upper and lower limits may be used to express performance standards. This represents a
reliability band or range by which the reliability is interpreted.
3.8.3 The program must describe the methods and data to be used for establishment of the
performance standard.
3.8.4 The performance standard must be responsive and sensitive to the level of reliability
experienced. It must not be so high that even abnormal variations would not cause an
alert, or so low that it is constantly exceeded in spite of corrective action measures.
3.8.5 The performance standards must be based on the operator’s own operating experience
with the exceptions mentioned in subsection 3.8.6. The period of experience will be
dependent on fleet size and utilisation.
3.8.6 If the operator’s operating experience of an aircraft type or model is non-existent or
limited, performance standards may be based on 1 or more of the following as applicable:
(a) the experience of other operators of the same or a similar aircraft type or model;
(b) the operator’s own experience of a similar aircraft type or model;
(c) the performance of a similar product or system on another aircraft type or model;
(d) the expected in-service reliability values used in the design of the aircraft.
Note For paragraph (d), the values are normally quoted in terms of mean time between unscheduled
removals or mean time between failure, for both individual product and complete systems.
3.8.7 The program must contain procedures for monitoring and reviewing performance
standards at regular intervals to reflect the operating experience, product improvement
and changes in procedures.
3.8.8 The program must provide for the review of the performance standards set in accordance
with subsection 3.8.6, after the operator has gained sufficient operating experience.
Performance Standards & Establishing Alert Levels
Performance standards/alerts require engineering judgement for their application and typically
apply to component monitoring, Pilot Reports, etc. A reliability alert level (or equivalent title, e.g.
Performance Standard, Control Level, Reliability Index, Upper Limit) is purely an indicator,
which when exceeded indicates that there has been an apparent deterioration in the normal
behaviour pattern of the item with which it is associated. There are several recognised methods of
calculating alert levels, any one of which may be used provided that the method chosen is fully
defined in the CAME.
Alert levels should, where possible, be based on the number of events, which have occurred
during a representative period of safe operation of the aircraft fleet. They should be up-dated
periodically to reflect operating experience, product improvement and changes in procedures etc.
When establishing alert levels based on operating experience, the normal period of operation
taken is between two and three years dependent on fleet size and utilisation. The alert levels
should usually be so calculated as to be appropriate to events recorded in one- monthly or three-
monthly periods of operation. Large fleets will generate sufficient information much sooner than
small fleets.
Where there is insufficient operating experience, or when a program for a new aircraft type is
being established, the following approach may be used:
For a new aircraft type, during the first two years of operation, alert levels should be
established in conjunction with the aircraft type certificate holder and operators
experience if appropriate and should be closely monitored for effectiveness during the
induction period. Program data should still be accumulated for future use.
For an established aircraft type with a new operator, the experience of other operators may
be utilised until the new operator has accumulated a sufficient period of own experience.
Alternatively, experience gained from operation of a similar aircraft model may be used.
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While setting alert levels for the latest aircraft designs, computed values based on the degree of
system and component in-service expected reliability assumed in the design of the aircraft might
also be used. These computed values are normally quoted in terms of Mean Time Between
Unscheduled Removals or Mean Time Between Failure, for both individual components and
complete systems. These initial predictions should be replaced when sufficient in-service
experience has been accumulated.
When an alert level is exceeded an assessment should be made to determine if corrective action
should be taken. It is important to realise that alert levels are not minimum acceptable
airworthiness levels. When alert levels are based on a representative period of safe operation
(during which failures may well have occurred) they may be considered as a form of protection
against erosion of the design aims of the aircraft in terms of system function availability. In the
case of a system designed to a multiple redundancy philosophy it should not be misunderstood
that, as redundancy exists, an increase in failure rate can always be tolerated without corrective
action being taken.
Alert levels can range from 0.00 failure rate per 1,000 hours both for important components,
where failures in service have been extremely rare, and to perhaps as many as 70 Pilot Reports
per 1,000 hours on a systems basis for ATA 100 Chapter 25 - Equipment/Furnishings, or for 20
removals of passenger entertainment units in a like period.
For structural or significant non-routine findings from major checks, a non-statistical review may
identify an alert condition.
Recalculation of Alert Levels
1.Both the method used for establishing an alert level, and the associated qualifying period, apply
when the level is re-calculated to reflect current operating experience. However if, during the
period between re-calculation of an alert level, a significant change in the reliability of an item is
experienced which may be related to the introduction of a known action (e.g. modification,
changes in maintenance or operating procedures) then the alert level applicable to the item should
be re-assessed and revised on the data subsequent to the change.
2.Procedures for changes in alert levels should be outlined in the approved reliability program
and the procedures, periods and conditions for re-calculation should be defined in each program.
3.9 Display of information
3.9.1 The reliability program must provide for a format of display that allows easy
identification of trends, events and when performance standards are exceeded.
3.9.2 The display may be in graphical or in a tabular format or a combination of both.
3.9.3 The rules governing any separation or discarding of information before incorporation into
the display must be stated in the program.
3.9.4 The display of information must include provision for “nil returns” to aid the examination
of the total information.
The displayed information should provide the operator and CASA with an indication of the
aircraft fleet’s reliability. The rules governing any separation or discard of information prior to
incorporation into these displays and reports should be stated.
The format, frequency of preparation and the distribution of displays and reports should be fully
detailed in the program documentation.
Where “standards” or “alert levels” are included in the program, the displayed information should
be oriented accordingly.
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Reliability Reports
Reliability reports typically display the following:
Fleet reliability summary - This summary relates to all aircraft of the same type, and
should contain the following information for the defined reporting period:
number of aircraft in service;
number of operating days (less maintenance checks);
total number of flying hours;
average daily utilisation per aircraft;
average flight duration;
total number of cycles/landings;
total number delays/cancellations; and
technical incidents.
Dispatch reliability (Aircraft technical delays/cancellations)
All technical delays more than 15 minutes and cancellation of flight(s), due to technical
malfunction, are required to be reported. The report should include the delay/cancellation rate for
the defined reporting period, the three-monthly moving average rate and, where appropriate, the
alert level. The CAMO should present the information for a minimum period of 12 consecutive
months, but need not repeat the occurrences in descriptive form. This information should be
presented in such a way as to show the trend over a 2 to 3 year period.
In-flight diversions due to technical malfunction or failures (known or suspected). While all in-
flight diversions due to technical malfunction or failures (known or suspected) should be reported
through normal Service Difficulty Reporting (SDR); a summary of all in-flight technical
diversions also needs to be reported upon. If the summary references the SDRs, then it need not
repeat the occurrences in descriptive form.
Engine unscheduled shut-down or propeller feathering. All In-Flight Shut Down (IFSD) and
IFSD rates or propeller feathering in flight, if applicable, listed by type of engine and aircraft for
the reporting period should be reported and presented in graphical form. If this information
references the SDRs, then it need not repeat the occurrences in descriptive form. When dealing
with small numbers of IFSD, IFSD rate, or propeller feathering in flight, this information should
be presented in such a way as to show the trend over a 2 to 3 year period.
Incidents involving inability to control engine/obtain desired power. All incidents involving
inability to control/obtain engine desired power during the reporting period should be reported
and presented in graphical form. If this information references the SDRs, then it need not repeat
the occurrences in descriptive form. When dealing with small numbers of such incidences, this
information should be presented in such a way as to show the trend over a 2 to 3 year period.
Unscheduled engine removals due to technical failures. All unscheduled engine removals and
rates due to technical failures, listed by type of engine and aircraft for the reporting period should
be reported and presented in graphical form. If this information references the SDRs, then it need
not repeat the occurrences in descriptive form. When dealing with small numbers of unscheduled
engine removals, this information should be presented in such a way as to show the trend over a 2
to 3 year period.
Component unscheduled removal. All unscheduled removal of maintenance significant
components, by ATA chapter, during the defined reporting period should be reported and
presented in graphical form. Some CAMOs may monitor hundreds of components and it may not
be feasible for them to graph all data. The format of component removal information should be
such that:
both unscheduled removals and confirmed failures rates should be compared with the alert
levels; and
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The range and depth of engineering analysis and interpretation should be related to the particular
program and to the facilities available. The following should be taken into account:
flight defects and reductions in operational reliability;
defects occurring at line and main base;
deterioration observed during routine maintenance;
workshop and overhaul facility findings;
modification evaluations;
sampling programs;
the adequacy of maintenance equipment and technical publications;
the effectiveness of maintenance procedures;
staff training; and
Service Bulletins (SB) and technical instructions.
Where the operator relies upon contracted maintenance and/or AMOs as an information input to
the program, the arrangements for availability and continuity of such information should be
established and details should be included.
3.11 Investigation and corrective action
3.11.1 The program must provide for an active investigation and, if applicable, implementation
of corrective action when a performance standard is exceeded.
3.11.2 If upper and lower limits are used to express performance standards, the follow up
requirements for each limit must be fully described in the program.
3.11.3 The procedures for implementing corrective actions and for monitoring the effectiveness
of the corrective actions must be described in the program.
3.11.4 The procedures must include provision of periodic feedback to the individual responsible
for taking the corrective action until such time as performance has reached an acceptable
level.
3.11.5 Corrective actions must correct any reduction in reliability revealed by the program and
may take the form of 1 or more of the following:
(a) changes to maintenance, operational procedures or techniques;
(b) changes to maintenance program tasks, including escalation or de-escalation of
tasks, addition, modification or deletion of tasks;
(c) one-time special maintenance for the fleet;
(d) initiation of modifications to aircraft and aeronautical products;
(e) changes to provisioning of spare parts for maintenance;
(f) changes to manpower and equipment planning for maintenance;
(g) training of maintenance personnel.
3.11.6 Where applicable, each corrective action must include a planned completion date.
The procedures and time scales both for implementing corrective actions and for monitoring the
effects of corrective actions should be fully described. Corrective actions should correct any
reduction in reliability revealed by the program and could take the form of:
maintenance changes involving inspection frequency and content, function checks,
overhaul requirements and time limits, which will require amendment of the scheduled
maintenance periods or tasks in the AMP;
amendments to approved manuals (e.g. Maintenance Manual, Crew Manual);
special inspections or fleet campaigns;
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3.13.3 For the analysis to be valid, the following things for the aircraft from which data is pooled
must be substantially the same:
(a) aircraft configuration;
(b) aircraft age and utilisation rate;
(c) type of operation and operating environment;
(d) AMP and maintenance procedures.
3.13.4 The program must describe the pooling arrangement and the types and extent of data to be
pooled.
In some cases, it may be desirable to “pool” data (i.e. collate data from a number of operators of
the same type of aircraft) for adequate analysis. For the analysis to be valid, the aircraft
concerned, mode of operation, and maintenance procedures applied must be substantially the
same. Variations in utilisation between two operators may fundamentally corrupt the analysis.
Although not exhaustive the following list gives guidance on the primary factors, which need to
be taken into account:
certification factors, such as aircraft type certificate data sheet (TCDS) compliance
(variant)/modification status, including SB compliance;
operational factors, such as operational environment/utilisation,
e.g. low/high/seasonal/respective fleet size operating rules applicable
(e.g. EDTO/RVSM/All Weather operations etc.)/operating procedures/MEL and MEL
utilisation;
maintenance factors, such as aircraft age, maintenance procedures; maintenance
standards, applicable lubrication/servicing procedures, MPD revision or escalation applied
or AMP applicable.
Although it may not be necessary for all of the foregoing to be completely common, it is
necessary for a substantial amount of commonality to prevail. CASA makes its approval
decisions on a case-by-case basis.
In case of a short-term lease agreement (less than 6 month) CASA may grant more flexibility
against the above criteria to allow the operator to operate the aircraft under the same program
during the lease agreement.
Where an operator wishes to pool data in this way, the approval of CASA will need to be sought
prior to any formal agreement being signed between operators. CASA approval of data pooling
will be described within the program.
Whereas this paragraph is intended to address the pooling of data directly between operators, it is
acceptable that the operator participates in a reliability program managed by the aircraft
manufacturer, when CASA is satisfied that the manufacturer manages a reliability program that
complies with the intent of this AC.
While regulations require that the CAMO manage and present the AMP which includes the
associated reliability program to CASA, it is understood that the CAMO may delegate certain
functions to an AMO under contract, provided this organisation proves to have the appropriate
expertise.
The functions that may be delegated to an AMO are:
developing the aircraft maintenance and reliability programs;
performing the collection and analysis of the reliability data;
providing reliability reports; and
proposing corrective actions to the CAMO.
September 2012
AC 42-3(0): Reliability Programs 20
Despite the above, the decision to implement a corrective action (or the decision to request from
CASA the approval to implement a corrective action) remains the CAMO’s prerogative and
responsibility. A decision not to implement a corrective action should be justified and
documented.
The arrangement between the CAMO and the AMO should be specified in the maintenance
contract and the relevant MCM and procedures manual of the AMO.
September 2012