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Carlton Reeves' Order
Carlton Reeves' Order
____________________
No. 3:18-cv-171-CWR-FKB
v.
THOMAS E. DOBBS,
In his official capacity as State Health Officer of the
Mississippi Department of Health, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________
1The common measure of fetal gestational age is from the first day of the
woman’s last menstrual period (“lmp”). See Docket No. 101-2 at 2 n.1.
2Jackson Women's Health Org. v. Currier, 349 F. Supp. 3d 536 (S.D. Miss.
2018).
3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d).
2
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4 Alabama Women's Ctr. v. Miller, 318 F.R.D. 143, 148 (M.D. Ala. 2016) (cit-
ing Rowe v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 421 F.2d 937, 943 (4th Cir. 1970)); see also
Smith v. Hebert, 533 F. App’x 479, 483 (5th Cir. 2013).
5 Chemetron Corp. v. Bus. Funds, Inc., 682 F.2d 1149, 1194 (5th Cir. 1982),
rev’d on other grounds, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983); see also U.S. ex rel. Gadbois v.
PharMerica Corp., 809 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2015).
6 Docket No. 108 at 3 n.1.
7 Id. at 4.
8 At oral argument, the Court asked what prejudice the State would face
if supplementation was allowed. The State did not articulate any sort of
prejudice and expressed only that it “doesn’t make any sense” to have the
3
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4
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12Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2014)
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
13 SeeWhole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2320 (2016) (“we
now use ‘viability’ as the relevant point at which a State may begin limit-
ing women’s access to abortion for reasons unrelated to maternal
health.”).
5
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14 See Docket No. 107 at 6 (“Defendants here necessarily concede that they
have been unable to identify any medical research or data that show a fe-
tus has reached the ‘point of viability’ during the 6-12 week LMP time pe-
riod in which S.B. 2116 would operate.”).
15 See Docket No. 117 at 39.
16 See Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2320; Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146
(2007); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 837
(1992) (“regardless of whether exceptions are made for particular circum-
stances, a State may not prohibit any woman from making the ultimate
decision to terminate her pregnancy before viability.”); see also Beck v. Ed-
wards, 136 S. Ct. 895 (2016) (denying certiorari on Eighth Circuit’s ruling
that Arkansas’ 12-week abortion ban was unconstitutional); Stenehjem v.
MKB Mgmt. Corp., 136 S. Ct. 981 (2016) (denying certiorari on Eighth Cir-
cuit’s ruling that North Dakota’s fetal heartbeat bill was unconstitutional);
EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Beshear, No. 3:19-CV-178-DJH, 2019
WL 1233575, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 15, 2019) (district court temporarily en-
joining similar heartbeat bill).
6
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20See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (“These matters, involving the most intimate
and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.”).
21 See id. at 860 (“viability marks the earliest point at which the State’s in-
terest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on
nontherapeutic abortions.”).
22 Currier, 760 F.3d at 458 n.9.
23 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d).
7
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