THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 182805, April 22, 2015 ]

HEIRS OF SERAPIO MABBORANG: LAURIANO
MABBORANG, DOMINGO MABBORANG, ENCARNACION
MABBORANG, FELIX MABBORANG, FAUSTINA
MABBORANG, ELIAS MABBORANG, ALBERTA
MABBORANG; HEIRS OF REGINO MABBORANG: JOSE
MABBORANG, DIONICIA MABBORANG, SOTERA
MABBORANG, MARIANO MABBORANG; HEIRS OF
SUSANA MABBORANG: CECILIA UBINA-OCAB AND
CANDIDA U. TAGUIGA; SEGUNDA MABBORANG; HEIRS
OF VICTORINO MABBORANG: JUAN MABBORANG, JR.,
SERVANDO MABBORANG; AND HEIRS OF VICENTE
MABBORANG: MARIANO MABBORANG, MARTIN
MABBORANG, LUZ MABBORANG-CARILLO,
PETITIONERS, VS. HERMOGENES MABBORANG AND
BENJAMIN MABBORANG, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision[1] and
Resolution[2] dated November 12, 2007 and March 18, 2008, respectively, of
the Court Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86656 which affirmed the
Judgment[3] dated December 14, 2005, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Civil Case No. 4051.

The antecedents are as follows:

Sometime in August 1989, respondents Hermogenes Mabborang and

Benjamin Mabborang filed an action for Judicial Partition of Realty with
Damages before the RTC of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, against petitioners, heirs
and children of the late spouses Severino Mabborang and Maria Magabung.[4]
Respondents alleged that since they are the surviving heirs of their deceased
father, Rufino Mabborang, one (1) of the nine (9) children of said spouses,
they are entitled to a share in several parcels of land left behind by the
latter, which were already being possessed and cultivated by petitioners.
Petitioners, however, countered that Rufino was not among the children of
the spouses, who only had eight (8) and not nine (9) children as claimed by
respondents. According to petitioners, Rufino was actually a grandson of the
spouses, as the son of the spouses' daughter, Sofronia Mabborang.
Petitioners further alleged that respondents can no longer claim from the
estate of the late spouses for Sofronia had already received her share thereof
and, subsequently, sold the same to some of the petitioners and other third
parties.[5]

After trial, on August 20, 1991, the RTC dismissed the case finding that since
Rufino is not a child of the spouses Severino Mabborang and Maria
Magabung, respondents are not entitled to judicial partition because their
shares could have been inherited by their father, Rufino or their
grandmother, Sofronia, to wit:
The issues as embodied in [the] pre-trial order is whether Rufino Mabborang
is the child of the spouses Severino Mabborang and Maria Magabung and
whether the plaintiffs already obtained their shares from the estate of said
spouses.

The Court is inclined to believe the version of the defendants that indeed
Rufmo Mabborang is the son of Sofronia Mabborang by her common-law
husband Marciano Escobar and not her brother, neither of the son of [the]
spouses Severino Mabborang and Maria Megabong who begot eight (8)
children, among them is Sofronia Mabborang. Exhibit "A," the birth certificate
cannot be relied upon citing by analogy the case of Macadangdang vs. Court
of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73 where it was ruled that "baptismal and marriage
certificate prove only the administration of the sacraments to the subjects
thereof, not the veracity of the statements made therein with respect to
relationship."

The Court takes judicial notice of the belief, superstitious it [may be] of
Filipinos that in order to save the child from dying sice [sic] all its brothers
and sisters had died as in this case, said child shall be registered as having
been begotten by another couple. This happened in the case at bar when
Rufmo was registered as the son of [the] spouses Severino Mabborang and
Maria Megabong, when in truth and in fact the [sic] was the illegitimate son
of Sofronia and Marciano, and therefore [grandson] of the former spouses.

Considering further the date of birth of Rufmo (1931) and the date of birth of
Maria Megabong (1880) it is unlikely that she could have given birth to
Rufmo.

In fine, Rufino not being a child of the spouses Severino Mabborang

and Megabong his children the plaintiffs herein, are not entitled to
judicial partition as it is evident that their supposed shares could
have been inherited by their father Rufino or [grandmother]
Sofronia.[6]
On May 31, 1996, the CA reversed the RTC's decision insofar as it denied
respondents' claim for judicial partition in view of the absence of any kind of
documentary or testimonial evidence supporting petitioners' allegations that
the estate of the spouses had already been partitioned and that their
daughter, Sofronia, had received her share, which she sold to petitioners and
third parties. In the words of the appellate court:
We see no cogent or compelling reason to reverse or disturb the court a
quo's finding that Rufino Mabborang was not a son of the deceased spouses
Severino Mabborang and Maria [Megabong.] The evidence is preponderant
and overwhelming that Rufino was the son of Sofronia Mabborang by her
common-law husband, Marciano Escobar.

xxxx

Nonetheless, We are constrained to reverse and set aside the

decision insofar as it declared that plaintiffs-appellants "are not
entitled to judicial partition."
It is undisputed that Severino Mabborang and Maria [Megabong] died in 1938
and 1963, respectively. Upon their death, their property, or their inheritance
as defined in Article 776 of the Civil Code, was transmitted by operation of
law to their surviving children (Articles 774, 777, Civil Code), among them,
Sofronia Mabborang who died in 1978 (TSN, August 23, 1999, p. 41). Rufino
Mabborang who died in 1962 (TSN, August 23, 1990, pp. 33 and 46), having
predeceased Sofronia, his two (2) sons, herein plaintiffs-appellants inherited
the share of Sofronia in accordance with Articles 902 and 990 of the Civil
Code.

As stated by the Supreme Court in Diaz vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,

182 SCRA 427: Articles 902, 989, and 990 clearly speak of successional
rights of illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to their
descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate
children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be
legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the
fact that the persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate (at pp.
431-432). The determining factor is the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the
person to be represented. If the person to be represented is an illegitimate
child, then his descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, may represent
him; however, if the person to be represented is legitimate, his illegitimate
descendants cannot represent him because the law provides that only his
legitimate descendants may exercise the right of representation by reason of
the barrier imposed in Article 992 (Diaz vs. IAC, supra, at page 433).

While it was alleged as a defense that the properties left by the

couple Severino and Maria had already been partitioned among the
heirs, that each one of them had taken possession of his or her
individual share, that Sofronia during her lifetime had sold part of
her share, and that whatever remained was sold by plaintiffs-
appellants (pars. 8 and 9, Answer), the records show no
documentary or testimonial evidence whatsoever presented to
support the allegations. We note that plaintiffs' documentary
evidence, particularly Exhibits 3, 3-A, 3-B, 3-B-1, 3-B-2, 4, 4-A, 4-A-
1, 4-A-2, 4-A-3, 4-A-4, 4-A-5, 4-B, 4-B-1, 5, 5-A, 5-A-1, and 5-E, the
sketches allegedly showing the division of the properties of the
spouses Severino Mabborang and Maria Megabung among the
children, were submitted and offered as part of formal evidence, only
on August 27, 1991 after rendition of the decision on August 20,
1991.

Except for the parcel of land designated as cadastral lot No. 397, described in
paragraph 3(c) of the complaint, all the parcels of land involved are covered
by original certificates of title. The first parcel x x x in the name of Heirs of
Severino Mabborang represented by Maria Megabung. The second parcel x x
x in the name of Heirs of Severino Mabborang represented by Maria
Megabung. x x x The fourth, fifth, and sixth parcels x x x in the name of
Maria Megabung (sic). No deed of partition was presented to show that
the subject parcels of land have been partitioned and subdivided. No
certificate of title in the names of the heirs was produced to show
that the mentioned certificates of title, Exhibits D, E, and G, have
been superseded and cancelled. While it is claimed that Sofronia
during her lifetime had sold part of her share to some of the
defendants-appellees and third persons and that whatever remained
was sold by plaintiffs-appellants, no deeds of sale or instruments of
conveyance evidencing such alleged sale or conveyances had been
presented.

We, therefore, rule that the court a quo erred in dismissing plaintiffs-
appellants' complaint. Plaintiffs-appellants are entitled to a partition
as heirs of Sofronia Mabborang.[7]
However, since the records did not contain the necessary details to
determine the exact shares of the respondents, such as whether there exists
an heir who has died without issue, the appellate court remanded the case to
the RTC for purposes of said determination. Thereafter, on June 27, 1996,
the aforequoted decision became final and executory.[8]

On January 28, 1998, however, petitioners, through the Public Attorney's

Office, submitted a Report and Motion reiterating their position that Sofronia
had already disposed of a portion of her share as shown by machine copies
of a Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Registered Land, dated November
14, 1976, executed by Sofronia in favor of Erlinda Ubina, married to
petitioner Mariano Mabborang, and that the rest of her share had passed to
respondents, who had already sold the same as shown by machine copies of
an Extrajudicial Settlement/Partition with Sale of Portion of Estate, dated
August 6, 1984, in favor of petitioner Jose Mabborang, as well as an
Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Rufino Mabborang with Adjudication
and Sale of Unregistered Land, dated February 12, 1978, in favor of
petitioner Jose Mabborang.[9]

Initially, the RTC granted respondents' motions for the subdivision of the six
(6) parcels of land and for the marking of the same. However, in its
subsequent Orders,[10] the trial court set aside its previous rulings granting
the subdivision of the properties, re-opened the pre-trial of the case, and
directed petitioners to present the aforestated Deeds of Sale and
Extrajudicial Settlement. In view of respondents' contention that the subject
documents are spurious, the RTC, in an Order dated August 31, 2001, further
directed respondents to have the subject documents examined by an expert
in order to determine the authenticity of the thumbprints appearing
thereon.[11] Should the thumbprints be found to be genuine, respondents
bound themselves to have the case dismissed.[12] Due to respondents' failure
to subject the documents to expert examination, the trial court, in an Order
dated May 30, 2003, declared that respondents are deemed to have waived
the presentation of their evidence to prove that the transfer made by
Sofronia were forgeries.[13]

On December 14, 2005, the RTC rendered its Judgment,[14] the pertinent
portions of which state:
The only objective of this Court is to determine the share of plaintiffs-
appellants in the estate of the late Severino Mabborang and Maria Magabung,
consisting of six (6) parcels of land.

The properties in question are the intestate estate of the late Severino
Mabborang and Maria Magabung, who died on April 6, 1938 and March 5,
1963, respectively, and is survived by their eight (8) children, namely:
Serapio Mabborang, Victoriano Mabborang, who is already deceased and
survived by his children Basilio, Baldomero, Juan and Servando, all surnamed
Mabborang, Vicente Mabborang, who is already deceased and is survived by
his children Mariano, Martin and Luz Mabborang Carillo, Sofronia Mabborang
who is already deceased and survived by his grandchildren, Hermogenes and
Benjamin Mabborang, Isabel Mabborang, who is already deceased without
having any issue, Susana Mabborang Ubina, Regino Mabborang and Segunda
Taquiga.

Of the issues children, one (1) died without any issue, namely Isabel
Mabborang.

Pursuant to Art. 980 of the Civil Code, the children of the deceased shall
always inherit in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.

As Isabel Mabborang died without any issue, her share in the estate of
Severino Mabborang and Maria Magabung shall accrue to the surviving
brothers and sisters (Article 968 of the Civil Code).

The estate should then be divided and partitioned into seven (7) shares, one
share for each child of the late Severino Mabborang and Maria Magabung,
namely Serapio Mabborang, Susana Mabborang Ubina, Regino Mabborang,
Segunda Mabborang Taquiga while the share of Victorino Mabborang shall be
divided among his heirs Basilio, Baldomero, Juan and Servando, all surnamed
Mabborang, the share of Vicente Mabborang shall be divided among his heirs
Mariano, Martin both surnamed Mabborang and Luz Mabborang Carillo, and
the share of Sofronia Mabborang shall be divided among her heirs
Germogenes and Benjamin Mabborang.

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby adjudges

that plaintiffs, as heirs of the late Sofronia Mabborang, are entitled to
a share in the estate of the late Severino Mabborang and Maria
Magabung, to the extent of 1/7 of the same.

Further, the Court also adjudges that the six (6) parcels of land forming part
of the estate of said spouses, shall be partitioned to seven (7) shares, one
share each to the heirs of Serapio Mabborang, Susana Mabborang, Regino
Mabborang, and Segunda Taquiga. The share of the heir Victorino
Mabborang, shall be divided into 4 parts, with Basilio Mabborang, Baldomero
Mabborang, Juan Mabborang and Servando Mabborang entitled to a share.
The share of the heir Vicente Mabborang shall be entitled into three (3)
parts, with Mariano Mabborang, Martin Mabborang and Luz Mabborang Carillo
entitled to a share. The share of the heir Sofronia Mabborang shall be divided
into two (2) parts, with Hermogenes Mabborang and Benjamin Mabborang
entitled to a share.

As to the issue that Sofronia Mabborang disposed of her shares to

some of the defendants and third persons during her lifetime, the
Court finds no evidence to support such allegation, so the same could
not be considered.[15]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration maintaining that since
respondents failed to prove that the subject documents were forgeries, the
same must be considered valid, and on this score alone, the RTC should have
dismissed the case. However, in its Resolution dated February 6, 2006, the
trial court held that while respondents were indeed ordered to have the
documents examined, and upon their failure are deemed to have waived the
presentation of evidence to show that the documents are spurious,
petitioners' allegations were never proven in court, the subject documents
not having been marked nor presented formally in court, to wit:
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the defendants, the Court
finds that the plaintiffs had already presented their evidence before this
Court and before the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals.

In the decision of the Court of Appeals, the said Court found that plaintiffs
are the children of Regino [sic] Rufino Mabborang who is an illegitimate child
of Sofronia Mabborang. Said Court remanded the case back to this Court to
determine the share of Sofronia Mabborang.

The defendants claimed that Sofronia Mabborang had already received her
share in the estate of her parents Severino Mabborang and Magabung and
had disposed of the same.

Going over the records of the case, the Court finds that this
allegation of the defendants had never been proven. In fact said
alleged transfer made by Sofronia Mabborang was not even marked
or presented formally by the defendants. While it maybe so, that the
Order dated April 4, 2003 ordered the plaintiffs to examine the
documents which are in their possession and which were submitted
to the NBI for purposes of evaluation to determine whether the
thumbmark appearing in the alleged document are the genuine
thumbmark of Sofronia Mabborang and in the Order dated May 30,
2003, the Court declared that the plaintiffs are deemed to have
waived the presentation of evidence to prove the transfer made by
Sofronia Mabborang were forgeries as previously stated, the
existence of the document however, has not been proven by the
defendants.

According to American jurisprudence, 'the test for determining which part has
the affirmative, and therefore the burden of establishing a case, is found in
the result of an inquiry as to which party would be successful if no evidence
at all were given, the burden being of course on the party would be
unsuccessful in that situation. In other words, one alleging a fact which is
denied has the burden of establishing it. Unless the party asserting the
affirmative of an issue sustains the burden of proving it by the required
degree of proof, he must fail.' (29 American Jurisprudence, 2d. 160-163 cited
in Francisco's Revised Rules of Court of the Phils. Vol. 7, part 2, 1997 Edition
page 6).[16]
On November 12, 2007, the CA affirmed the lower court's findings in the
following manner:
However, insofar as the issue of a subsisting co-ownership over the subject
properties among the heirs of Severino Mabborang and Maria Magabung, the
same was categorically resolved by this Court in its Decision dated May 31,
1996 finding that Sofronia Mabborang had not yet received her share and
neither had she sold it during her lifetime. No deeds of sale or
instruments of the alleged conveyances were presented in evidence.
Upon remand to the trial court for further proceedings, appellant reiterated
their position that Sofronia Mabborang had already been given her share in
the estate of Severino Mabborang and Maria Magabung and that she already
sold it to various parties. The trial court nevertheless ruled, for the second
time, on the basis of the entire records, that appellants failed to substantiate
their allegations. In denying appellants' motion for reconsideration, the trial
court stressed that even if the purported documents of transfer or
sale bearing the thumbmarks of Sofronia Mabborang were
supposedly received by appellees for the purpose of having them
examined by the NBI documents examiners for their authenticity, the
existence of said documents, which were not even marked during the
initial presentation of evidence by the parties, have not been proven
by the appellants.

The rule is that a document, or any article for that matter, is not evidence
when it is simply marked for identification; it must be formally offered and
the opposing counsel given an opportunity to object to it or cross-examine
the witness called upon to prove or identify it. The alleged documents of
sale or transfer (Exhibits "3" and "5") have not been identified by
any witness nor its existence duly proved, the original of which was
not even presented as only photocopies were attached to the "Report
and Motion" submitted by the Public Attorney's Office. The
subsequent delivery of the copies to the appellees for the intended
examination by the NBT experts is not equivalent to formal offer.
Much less, have the appellees admitted the due execution and authenticity of
the said documents, which as manifested in the Public Attorney's Office
report to the court, were being questioned by appellees as "spurious."

On the other hand, the formal offer of documentary evidence of

appellants appearing in pages 86 to 93 of the original records
actually makes reference not to any deed of sale or extrajudicial
settlement with sale but to "Diagrams showing the divisions of
properties of spouses Severino Mabborang and Maria Magabung
among and between their children including their child Sofronia who
is the mother of Rufino Mabborang" and which are the only evidence
marked and offered for the purpose of proving that "Sofronia sold all
her portions in the property to various persons." Significantly, the CA
Decision dated May 31, 1996 has already noted the absence of documentary
or testimonial evidence to support the allegation of appellants that Sofronia
was already given her share which she had disposed of. It also noted that
Exhibits "3" to "5-E" being mentioned by appellants allegedly showing the
division of the properties of the spouses Severino Mabborang and Maria
Magabung among the children were "submitted and offered as the formal
offer of evidence, only on August 27, 1991 after rendition of the decision on
August 20, 1991.

At any rate, records clearly bear out that the documents of sale or
transfer allegedly thumbmarked by Sofronia were never identified,
marked as exhibits or formally offered by the appellants during the
proceedings before the trial court. It was held that during the trial on the
merits, evidence must formally be offered by the parties, otherwise the trial
court will not consider it. Any evidence a party desires to submit for the
consideration of the court must formally be offered by him. Evidence not
formally offered cannot be taken into consideration in disposing of the issues
of the case.[17]
Upon further denial of their Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution[18]
dated March 18, 2008, petitioners filed the present petition invoking the
following arguments:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED THE MATTER NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH
LAW FOR THE REASON THAT SAID COURT HAS AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SUBMITTING THE CASE FOR DECISION
DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT WAS ONLY THE PLAINTIFFS WHO WERE DEEMED
TO HAVE WAIVED THEIR PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL

COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS BY AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF THE
LOWER COURT WHICH MERELY DETERMINED THE PROPORTIONAL SHARE OF
THE PARTIES IN THE ESTATE WHEN THE ORIGINAL ACTION AND THE
REASON FOR THE REMAND OF THE CASE WAS FOR THE PARTITION OF THE
ESTATE AMONG THE HEIRS, SAID ACTION CALLS FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE
POWER OF SUPERVISION BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.[19]
Petitioners reiterate their contention that the failure of respondents to prove
that the documents presented by the Public Attorney's Office, in its Report
and Motion, are forgeries means that the same are genuine, and is
tantamount to an acceptance by respondents of the due execution thereof.
Consequently, the trial court should have dismissed the case. Moreover,
according to petitioners, they have, from the very beginning, already alleged
that Sofronia Mabborang had been properly given her share in the estate of
the spouses Severino Mabborang and Maria Megabung and have
subsequently disposed of the same during her lifetime. Since respondents
were deemed to have waived their presentation of evidence, petitioners
should have been ordered to present theirs.

Petitioners' arguments are misplaced.

Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that "the court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally offered." This is to enable
the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is
presenting the evidence. Also, it allows opposing parties to examine the
evidence and object to its admissibility. A formal offer is necessary because
judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and judgment strictly and
only upon the evidence offered by the parties at trial. Consequently, review
by the appellate court is facilitated for it will not be required to review
documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court.[20] Hence, strict
adherence to this basic procedural rule is required, lest evidence cannot be
assigned any evidentiary weight or value:
Thus, the trial court is bound to consider only the testimonial
evidence presented and exclude the documents not offered.
Documents which may have been identified and marked as exhibits
during pre-trial or trial but which were not formally offered in
evidence cannot in any manner be treated as evidence. Neither can
such unrecognized proof be assigned any evidentiary weight and
value. It must be stressed that there is a significant distinction between
identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer. The former is
done in the course of the pre-trial, and trial is accompanied by the marking
of the evidence as an exhibit; while the latter is done only when the party
rests its case. The mere fact that a particular document is identified and
marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has already been offered as part
of the evidence. It must be emphasized that any evidence which a
party desires to submit for the consideration of the court must
formally be offered by the party; otherwise, it is excluded and
rejected.[21]
In certain instances, however, this Court has relaxed the procedural rule and
allowed the trial court to consider evidence not formally offered on the
condition that the following requisites are present: (1) the evidence must
have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded; and (2) the same
must have been incorporated in the records of the case.[22]

None of the conditions are present in this case.

As noted by the courts, the records of the case show no documentary or

testimonial evidence whatsoever to support petitioners' allegations. While
petitioners persistently claimed that Sofronia had already received her share
in the subject properties and subsequently disposed of the same during her
lifetime, they never presented any evidence during the proceedings before
the RTC and even during the appeal before the CA to substantiate the same.
As aptly observed by the CA, there was no deed of partition presented
showing that the subject parcels of land have been partitioned and divided,
deed of sale or instrument of conveyance evidencing any transfer of
Sofronia's share, nor certificate of title indicating that the titles to the
properties have been superseded and cancelled. On this basis, the appellate
court justifiably ruled that respondents are entitled to their share in the
subject properties in the absence of proof that Sofronia had indeed received
and disposed of her share therein.

It bears stressing that only after almost two (2) years from the finality of the
CA's decision and on remand to the RTC for the determination of
respondents' specific share was it mentioned that there exists documents
which may substantiate petitioners' allegations. Specifically, the Public
Attorney's Office manifested that Deeds of Sale and Extrajudicial Settlements
were executed in the past transferring Sofronia's share to various persons.
Yet, as the trial court ruled, even if the purported documents of transfer or
sale were supposedly received by respondents to have their authenticity
examined, petitioners were not able to prove the existence of the same,
which were not even marked during the initial presentation of evidence by
the parties. Neither were they identified by any witness. In fact, the original
of said documents were not even presented as mere photocopies were
attached to the Report and Motion submitted by the Public Attorney's Office.

Indeed, procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of

cases. Courts and litigants alike are enjoined to abide strictly by the rules.
While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true
that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. Unless
substantial justice dictates that procedural rules be relaxed to arrive at a just
disposition of a case, there shall be no liberality in the interpretation and
application of the rules.[23]

Here, not only did petitioners fail to formally offer the subject documents in
evidence during the trial on the merits, they also failed to provide any
explanation as to the reason behind such failure. While rules of procedure
may be relaxed in the interest of justice and fair play, this Court shall refrain
from doing so if there is not even the slightest effort to provide the courts
with a reason to justify the non-observance of the same.

Besides, the records of the case do not show any indication that petitioners
were denied their right to present evidence. They had every opportunity to
submit the necessary documentary evidence in order to substantiate their
claims, and when they did, the same were not even originals thereof. In fact,
as can be gleaned from the records, it took them nearly a decade from the
filing of the action in August 1989 to even make an attempt at presenting the
subject documents to the courts which they did only on January 28, 1998, at
such time when not only the trial on the merits had concluded, but also when
the May 31, 1996 judgment of the appellate court had already become final
and executory. This undue delay in the presentation of the subject
documents casts doubt as to the authenticity and reliability of the same. If
the documents evidencing the alleged partition and sale of the properties
really existed, no impediment could have prevented its offer as evidence.

We, therefore, find no error in the refusal by the courts below to give any
probative value to the subject documents. To reiterate, petitioners presented
the same only after the decision of the appellate court became final and
executory, without any explanation. In fact, as observed by the CA, the
formal offer of documentary evidence made by petitioners makes reference
not to any deed of sale or extrajudicial partition with sale but to "diagrams
showing the divisions of properties of the spouses Severino Mabborang and
Maria Magabung among and between their children, including their child
Sofronia who is the mother of Rufino Mabborang," which are the only
evidence marked and offered for the purpose of proving that "Sofronia sold
all her portions in the property to various persons." For reasons of their own,
petitioners did not formally offer in evidence the subject documents before
the trial court as required by the Rules of Court. To admit these documents
now deprives respondents of the opportunity to examine and controvert the
same, which runs contrary to the fundamental principles of due process.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The

Decision and Resolution, dated November 12, 2007 and March 18, 2008,
respectively, of the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86656, which affirmed
the Judgment dated December 14, 2005, of the Regional Trial Court in Civil
Case No. 4051, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., Chairperson, Brion,* Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

June 26, 2015

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on April 22, 2015 a Decision, copy attached hereto,
was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original
of which was received by this Office on June 26, 2015 at 10:15 a.m.
 Very truly yours,
(SGD.)
WILFREDO V. LAPITAN
Division Clerk of Court

*
Designated Acting Member, in lieu of Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama,
Jr., per Raffle dated September 24, 2010.

[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court), with Associate Justices Noel G. Tijam, and Sesinando
E. Villon, concurring; rollo, pp. 38-50.

[2]
Id. at 51.

[3]
Penned by Judge Jimmy Henry F. Luczon, Jr.; id. at 35-37.

[4]
Rollo, p. 39.

[5]
Id.

[6]
Id. at 39-40. (Emphasis in the original)

[7]
Id. at 40-42. (Emphasis in the original)

[8]
Id. at 42.

[9]
Id. at 43.

[10]
Id. at 26-29.

[11]
Id. at 30.

[12]
Id. at 32.

[13]
Id. at 34.

[14]
Id. at 35-37.

[15]
Id. at 35-36. (Emphasis ours)

[16]
Id. at 46. (Emphasis ours)

[17]
Id. at 48-49. (Emphasis ours)

[18]
Id. at 51.

[19]
Id. at 16-17.

[20]
Heirs of Pasag, et. al. v. Spouses Lorenzo, et. al., 550 Phil. 571, 579
(2007), citing Parel v. Prudencio, 521 Phil. 533, 545 (2006); Katigbak v.
Sandiganbayan, 453 Phil. 515, 542 (2003); Ong v. Cowl of Appeals, 361 Phil.
338, 350 (1999); People of the Philippines v. Alicante, 388 Phil. 233, 260
(200).

[21]
Id. at 581-582. (Emphasis ours)

[22]
Heirs of Romana Saves, et. al. v. Heirs of Escolastico Saves, 646 Phil.
536, 544 (2010), citing People v. Napat-a, 258-A Phil. 994, 998 (1989),
citing People v. Mate, 15 191 Phil. 72 (1981); Mato Vda. de Onate v. Court of
Appeals, 320 Phil. 344,350 (1995).

[23]
Bergonia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 189151, January 25, 2012, 664
SCRA 322, 331.

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