CASE DIGESTS

IN
EVIDENCE

SUBMITTED BY:
REGEAN U. ELLORIMO

SUBMITTED TO:
JUDGE EDGARDO LEONIDO
 First Assignment

1. HEIRS OF MARGARITA PRODON v. HEIRS OF MAXIMO ALVAREZ

G.R. NO. 170604, September 2, 2013

Facts:

Heirs of Maximo Alvarez, (the respondents herein) in their Complaint for Quieting
of Title and Damages against Margarita Prodon averred the following:
1. that their parents, the late spouses Maximo S. Alvarez, Sr. and Valentina
Clave, were the registered owners of that parcel of land;
2. that their parents had been in possession of the property during their lifetime;
3. that upon their parents’ deaths, they had continued the possession of the
property as heirs, paying the real property taxes due thereon;
4. that they could not locate the owner’s duplicate copy but original copy on
file with the Register of Deeds of Manila was intact;
5. that the original copy contained an entry stating that the property had been
sold to defendant Prodon subject to the right of repurchase; and
6. that the entry had been maliciously done by Prodon because the deed of
sale with right to repurchase covering the property did not exist.

Consequently, they prayed that the entry be cancelled, and that Prodon be
adjudged liable for damages.

Prodon’s Answer claimed that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had executed on
September 9, 1975 the deed of sale with right to repurchase; that the deed had been
registered with the Register of Deeds and duly annotated on the title; that the late
Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been granted six months from September 9, 1975 within which
to repurchase the property; and that she had then become the absolute owner of the
property due to its non-repurchase within the given 6-month period.

During the trial, the custodian of the records of the property attested that the
copy of the deed of sale with right to repurchase could not be found in the files of the
Register of Deeds of Manila.

The RTC rendered judgment, finding untenable the plaintiffs’ contention that the
deed of sale with right to repurchase did not exist, concluded that the original copy of
the deed of sale with right to repurchase had been lost, and that earnest efforts had
been exerted to produce it before the court, and found that the defendant had
established the execution and existence of the deed. It allow the presentation of
secondary evidence.

On appeal, CA reversed the RTC decision and finds that the secondary
evidence should not have been admitted because Margarita Prodon failed to prove
the existence of the original deed of sale and to establish its loss.

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 First Assignment

Issue:

Whether or not best evidence rule is applicable in the case at bar?

Held:

No. Best Evidence Rule was not applicable, because the terms of the Deed of
Sale were not the issue. The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a written
document are the subject of the inquiry. In action for quieting of title based on the
existence of a deed of sale with right to repurchase that purportedly cast a cloud on
the title of a property, the Best Evidence Rule does not apply, and the defendant is not
precluded from presenting evidence other than the original document.

However, in the case at bar, Prodon failed to establish the existence and due
execution of the deed. The Best Evidence Rule stipulates that in proving the terms of a
written document the original of the document must be produced in court. The rule
excludes any evidence other than the original writing to prove the contents thereof,
unless the offeror proves: (a) the existence or due execution of the original; (b) the loss
and destruction of the original, or the reason for its non-production in court; and (c) the
absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror to which the unavailability of the original
can be attributed. A view of the records reveals that Prodon did not adduce proof
sufficient to show the lossor explain the unavailability of the original as to justify the
presentation of secondary, hence, the Supreme Court finds that the respondents (heirs
of Alvarez), preponderantly proved that the deed of sale with right to repurchase
executed by the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. did not exist in fact and rendered a decision
in favor of the respondents.

2. SALUN-AT MARQUEZ & NESTOR DELA CRUZ V. ELOISA ESPEJO, et.al

G.R. 168387, August 25, 2010

Facts:

Respondents Espejos were the original registered owners of the two agricultural
lands of Lantap Property located at Barangay Lantap, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya and
the Murong Property located at Brgy. Murong of the same town which were
subsequently foreclosed and sold to Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc. (RBBI) due to their
failure to pay the loans in the said bank. But a Deed of Sale was made on Feb. 26,
1985covering "TCT No. T-62096" (corresponds to Murong property) without description as
to the location of the subject property whether it is in Brgy. Murong or Brgy. Lantap.

TCT No. T-62096 dated January 14, 1985 was issued for the Murong Property and
TCT No. T-62836 dated June 4, 1985 was issued for the Lantap Property in favor of RBBI.
However, both TCTs did not specifically state its location whether it is in Barangay
Lantap or Barangay Murong.

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 First Assignment

RBBI executed separate Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer (VLTs) in favor of

Marquez and Dela Cruz covered by TCT No. T-62836 (corresponds to Lantap Property)
but described being located in Brgy. Murong. DAR issued Certificate of Land Ownership
Award (CLOA) to Marquez and Dela Cruz upon payment of the purchase price to RBBI.

Nemi Fernandez, husband of Elenita Espejo, was the tenant of Lantap Property
while Salun-at Marquez and Nestor Dela Cruz were the tenants of the Murong Property.
No evidence that Espejos took possession of Murong Property nor demanded lease
rentals from petioners, Marquez and Dela Cruz.

Espejos filed Complaint on Feb. 10, 1997 before the Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (RARAD) of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya based on the Deed of Sale
indicating that TCT No. T-62096 (referring to Murong Property) was the subject of their
buy-back transaction. RARAD gave precedence to the TCT numbers appearing on the
Deed of Sale and VLTs but was reversed by Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB).

In appeal, the CA annulled and set aside DARAB’s decision because in using the
Best Evidence Rule embodied in Rule 130, Section 3, the Deed of Sale is the best
evidence as to its contents, particularly the description of the land which was the
object of the sale. Since the Deed of Sale expressed that its subject is the land covered
by TCT No. T-62096 – the Murong property – then that is the property that the
respondents repurchased. The additional description in the VLTs that the subject thereof
is located in Barangay Murong was considered to be a mere typographical error.

On June 22, 2004, RBBI filed a separate Petition for Review on Certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 163320 with the Supreme Court but was denied. CA’s decision
becomes final and executory. A petition for review on Certiorari was filed in the SC by
Marquez and Dela Cruz.

Issues:

Whether or not the CA erred in utilizing the Best Evidence Rule to determine the
subject of the contracts.

Held:

Yes, the appellate court erred in its application of the Best Evidence Rule. The
Best Evidence Rule states that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, the best evidence is the original document itself and no other evidence
(such as a reproduction, photocopy or oral evidence) is admissible as a general rule.
The original is preferred because it reduces the chance of undetected tampering with
the document.

There is no room for the application of the Best Evidence Rule in this case
because there is no dispute regarding the contents of the documents for it is admitted

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 First Assignment

by the parties that the Deed of Sale referred to TCT No. T-62096 as its subject; while the
petitioners’ VLTs referred to TCT No.T-62836 as its subject. The real issue is whether the
admitted contents of these documents adequately and correctly express the true
intention of the parties.

There’s an intrinsic ambiguity in the contracts, arising from an apparent failure of

the instruments to adequately express the true intention of the parties. To resolve the
ambiguity, resort must be had to evidence outside of the instruments.

The SC granted the Petition for Review on Certiorari and declared that the Deed
of Sale between respondents and RBBI covers the Lantap property under TCT No. T-
62836, while the VLTs and CLOAs of the petitioners covered the Murong property under
TCT No. T-62096. The Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya is directed to make the
necessary corrections to the titles of the said properties in accordance with this
decision.

3. MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION, V. SSANGYONG CORPORATION

G.R. No. 170633; October 17, 2007

Facts:

On April 13, 2000, Ssangyong Manila Office sent, by fax, a letter, to confirm MCC
Industrial Sales and Sanyo Seiki's order of 220 metric tons (MT) of hot rolled stainless steel
addressed to MCC's manager and President of Sanyo Seiki Stainless Steel Corporation
Gregory Chan. On behalf of the corporations, Chan, assented and affixed his signature
on the conforme portion of the letter.

On April 17, 2000, Ssangyong forwarded to MCC Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-
POSTSO401 containing the terms and conditions of the transaction. MCC sent back by
fax to Ssangyong the invoice bearing the conformity signature of Chan. As stated in the
pro forma invoice, payment for the ordered steel products would be made through an
irrevocable letter of credit (L/C) at sight in favor of Ssangyong. Following their usual
practice, delivery of the goods was to be made after the L/C had been opened. On
the same date, due to the fact that MCC could only open a partial letter of credit, the
order for 220MT of steel was split into two, one for 110MT and another for 110MT
covered by Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 respectively.

On June 20, 2000, Ssangyong, through its Manila Office, informed Sanyo Seiki
and Chan, by way of a fax transmittal, that stainless steel from Korea was ready to ship
to the Philippines. It requested that the opening of the L/C be facilitated. Chan affixed
his signature on the fax transmittal and returned the same, by fax, to Ssangyong. The
first L/C covering payment for 100MT of stainless steel coil under Pro Forma Invoice No.
ST2-POSTS080-2 was opened. The goods covered by the said invoice were then shipped

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 First Assignment

to and received by MCC. But, for the second L/C, MCC refused to open it that resulted
to the filing of civil action by SSangyong for damages due to breach of contract.

After Ssangyong rested its case, MCC filed a Demurrer to Evidence, alleging that
respondent failed to present the original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the
civil action was based. The court denied the demurrer, ruling that the documentary
evidence is admissible pursuant to RA 8792 and that both testimonial and documentary
evidence tended to substantiate the material allegations in the complaint, suffice for
the purposes of prima facie case. On appeal to the CA, the appellate court affirmed
the ruling of the trial court and ruled that the Pro Forma invoices were admissible in
evidence , although they were mere facsimile printouts of the steel orders.

Issue:

Whether or not the print out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are
electronic evidence and admissible as such.

Held:

In an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original paper-based

information or data that is scanned, sent through a phone line, and re-printed at the
receiving end. Further, in a virtual or paperless environment, technically, there is no
original copy to speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual reality are the same, in all
respects, and are considered as originals. Ineluctably, the law's definition of "electronic
data message," which, as aforesaid, is interchangeable with "electronic document,"
could not have included facsimile transmissions, which have an original paper-based
copy as sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as received. These two copies are
distinct from each other, and have different legal effects.

The terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document," as defined

under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission.
Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is
not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not
admissible as electronic evidence.

Since a facsimile transmission is not an "electronic data message" or an

"electronic document," and cannot be considered as electronic evidence by the
Court, with greater reason is a photocopy of such a fax transmission not electronic
evidence. Hence, the Supreme court held that Pro Forma Invoices are mere
photocopies of the original fax transmittals and not electronic evidence, contrary to the
position of both the trial and the appellate courts.

In this case, the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED.

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