CASE DOCTRINES IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Necessarily the original record on appeal must remain in the trial

(Rules 72-73) court where other claims may still be pending.

The Union's contention is untenable. In liquidation proceedings,
1. Pacific Banking Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 109373, March the function of the trial court is not limited to assisting in the
20, 1995 (242 SCRA 492) implementation of the orders of the Monetary Board. Under the
same section (§29) of the law invoked by the Union, the court
Elucidating the crucial distinction between an ordinary action and has authority to set aside the decision of the Monetary Board "if
a special proceeding, Chief Justice Moran states:" there is a convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and
Action is the act by which one sues another in a court of justice made in bad faith."
for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong while special proceeding is the act by which 2. Republic v. CA, G.R. No. 163604, May 6, 2005(458
one seeks to establish the status or right of a party, or a SCRA 200)
particular fact. Hence, action is distinguished from special Since Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY JUDICIAL
proceeding in that the former is a formal demand of a right by PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY LAW, contains the following
one against another, while the latter is but a petition for a provision, inter alia:
declaration of a status, right or fact. Where a party litigant seeks Art. 238. Unless modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural
to recover property from another, his remedy is to file an action. rules in this Title shall apply in all casesprovided for in this
Where his purpose is to seek the appointment of a guardian for Codes requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be
an insane, his remedy is a special proceeding to establish the decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical
fact or status of insanity calling for an appointment of rules. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
guardianship. there is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required,
Considering this distinction, a petition for liquidation of an and is, therefore, a summary proceeding under the Family Code,
insolvent corporation should be classified a special proceeding not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court appeal
and not an ordinary action. Such petition does not seek the for which calls for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a
enforcement or protection of a right nor the prevention or summary ordinary proceeding, the filing of a Notice of Appeal
redress of a wrong against a party. It does not pray for from the trial court’s order sufficed.
affirmative relief for injury arising from a party's wrongful act or On the alleged procedural flaw in petitioner’s petition before the
omission nor state a cause of action that can be enforced against appellate court. Petitioner’s failure to attach to his petition
any person. before the appellate court a copy of the trial court’s order
What it seeks is merely a declaration by the trial court of the denying its motion for reconsideration of the disapproval of its
corporation's insolvency so that its creditors may be able to file Notice of Appeal is not necessarily fatal, for the rules of
their claims in the settlement of the corporation's debts and procedure are not to be applied in a technical sense. Given the
obligations. Put in another way, the petition only seeks a issue raised before it by petitioner, what the appellate court
declaration of the corporation's debts and obligations. Put in should have done was to direct petitioner to comply with the
another way, the petition only seeks a declaration of the rule.
corporation's state of insolvency and the concomitant right of
creditors and the order of payment of their claims in the 3. Vda. de Reyes v. CA, G.R. No. L-47027, January 27,
disposition of the corporation's assets. 1989 (169 SCRA 524)
Contrary to the rulings of the Fourteenth Division, liquidation It is well settled that even if a decision has become final, clerical
proceedings do not resemble petitions for interpleader. For one, errors or mistakes or omission plainly due to inadvertence or
an action for interpleader involves claims on a subject matter negligence may be corrected or supplied even after the
against a person who has no interest therein. This is not the judgment has been entered. The correction of a clerical error is
case in a liquidation proceeding where the Liquidator, as an exception to the general rule that no amendment or
representative of the corporation, takes charge of its assets and correction may be made by the court in its judgment once the
liabilities for the benefit of the creditors. He is thus charged with latter had become final. 11 The court may make this
insuring that the assets of the corporation are paid only to amendment ex parte and, for this purpose, it may resort to the
rightful claimants and in the order of payment provided by law. pleadings filed by the parties, the court's findings of facts and its
Rather, a liquidation proceeding resembles the proceeding for conclusions of law as expressed in the body of the decision.
the settlement of state of deceased persons under Rules 73 to That a special proceeding for the settlement of an estate is filed
91 of the Rules of Court. The two have a common purpose: the and intended to settle the entire estate of the deceased is
determination of all the assets and the payment of all the debts obvious and elementary. It would be absurd for the heirs to
and liabilities of the insolvent corporation or the estate. The intentionally excluded or leave a parcel of land or a portion
Liquidator and the administrator or executor, are both charged thereof undistributed or undivided because the proceeding is
with the assets for the benefit of the claimants. In both precisely designed to end the community of interests in
instances, the liability of the corporation and the estate is not properties held by co-partners pro indiviso without designation
disputed. The court's concern is with the declaration of creditors or segregation of shares.
and their rights and the determination of their order of payment.
Furthermore, as in the settlement of estates, multiple appeals 4. Uriarte v. CFI, G.R. Nos. L-21938-39, October 29, 1970
are allowed in proceedings for liquidation of an insolvent (33 SCRA 252)
corporation.
In G.R. No. 112991 (the case of the Stockholders/Investors), Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 [Section 44, paragraph (e)],
the Liquidator's notice of appeal was filed on time, having been Courts of First Instance have original exclusive jurisdiction over
filed on the 23rd day of receipt of the order granting the claims "all matters of probate," that is, over special proceedings for the
of the Stockholders/Investors. However, the Liquidator did not settlement of the estate of deceased persons — whether they
file a record on appeal with the result that he failed to perfect died testate or intestate.
his appeal. As already stated a record on appeal is required
under the Interim Rules and Guidelines in special proceedings The matter of venue, or the particular Court of First Instance
and for cases where multiple appeals are allowed. The reason for where the special proceeding should be commenced, is
this is that the several claims are actually separate ones and a regulated by former Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court,
decision or final order with respect to any claim can be appealed. now Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, which

1
provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the 6. Advincula v. Teodoro, G.R. No. L-9282, May 31, 1956,
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an (99 Phil 413)
alien, shall be in the court of first instance in the province in
which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an The provision of Section 4 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court which
inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first instance of any provides that “when a will has been proved and allowed, the
province in which he had estate. Court shall issue letters testamentary thereon to the person
named as executor therein, if he is competent, accepts the
In accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, trusts, and gives bond as required by these rules”, cannot be
testate proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a enforced, until after said document has been allowed to probate.
deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for The discovery of a document purporting to be the last will and
the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in testament of a deceased, after the appointment of an
the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of administrator of the estate of the latter, upon the assumption
first instance it is found it hat the decedent had left a last will, that he or she had died intestate, does not ipso facto nullify the
proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the letters of administration already issued or even authorize the
intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had revocation thereof, until the alleged will has been “proved and
already been appointed, the latter being required to render final allowed by the court.” (Rule 83, section 1, of the Rules of Court)
account and turn over the estate in his possession to the It is untenable from the viewpoint of logic and experience,
executor subsequently appointed. This, however, is understood because a stranger to deceased may be competent, capable and
to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be fit to administer her estate, in much the same as a member of
rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an her immediate family could be incompetent, incapable and unfit
intestacy. to do so. At any rate, Advincula is not a stranger, either to her
or to her estate, he bring her surviving spouse and, as such, one
Where intestate proceedings before a court of first instance had of her forced heirs (Arts. 887, 888, 892, 893, 894, 897 to 900,
already been commenced, the probate of the will should be filed and 995 to 1001, Civil Code of the Philippines), whether she died
in the same court, either in a separate special proceeding or in testate or intestate. What is more, he is prima facie entitled to
an appropriate motion for said purpose filed in the already one-half of all property subject to the authority of the
pending intestate proceeding. This is especially true where the administrator of said estate, apart from his share of the other
party seeking the probate of the will had been informed or had half thereof, as heir of the deceased, for “all property of the
knowledge of the pendency of the intestate proceedings. It is marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership” —
not in accord with public policy and the orderly and inexpensive of which he is its administrator (Article 165, Civil Code of the
administration of justice to unnecessarily multiply litigation, Philippines) — “unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to
especially if several courts would be involved, which would be the husband or to the wife” (See Articles 160 and 185, Civil
the result if the probate of will were filed in another court. Code of the Philippines).

It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a 7. Lim vs. CA, G.R. No. 124715, January 24, 2000 (323
waiveable procedural defect, and such waiver may occur by SCRA 102)
laches where, a party had been served notice of the filing of the
probate petition for about a year and allowed the proceedings to The determination of which court exercises jurisdiction over
continue for such time before filing a motion to dismiss the matters of probate depends upon the gross value of the estate
same. of the decedent.
Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of the
A party claiming to be an acknowledged natural child of testator estate of the Late Pastor Y. Lim are in the possession of and are
is entitled to intervene in proceedings for the probate of will of registered in the name of private respondent corporations, which
testator if it is still open, or to ask for its reopening if it has under the law possess a personality separate and distinct from
already been closed, so as to be able to submit for their stockholders, and in the absence of any cogency to shred
determination the question of his acknowledgment as a natural the veil of corporate fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness
child of the deceased testator, said court having, in its capacity of said titles in favor of private respondents should stand
as a probate court, jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of undisturbed.
the deceased testator and whether or not a particular party is or It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality
should be declared his acknowledged natural child. separate and distinct from that of the persons composing it. It
may not generally be held liable for that of the persons
5. Roberts v. Leonidas, G.R. No. L-55509, April 27, 1984 composing it. It may not be held liable for the personal
(129 SCRA 33) indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the entities
connected with it.28
A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died Rudimentary is the rule that a corporation is invested by law
with two wills and "no will shall pass either real or personal with a personality distinct and separate from its stockholders or
property unless it is proved and allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; members. In the same vein, a corporation by legal fiction and
sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court). convenience is an entity shielded by a protective mantle and
The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 imbued by law with a character alien to the persons comprising
Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Baluyot vs. Panio, L-42088, May 7, it.
1976, 71 SCRA 86). It is anomalous that the estate of a person Nonetheless, the shield is not at all times invincible. Thus, in
who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. FIRST PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL BANK vs.COURT OF
Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the APPEALS, We enunciated:
testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate . . . When the fiction is urged as a means of perpetrating a fraud
proceeding should continue hearing the two cases. or an illegal act or as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing
obligation, the circumvention of statutes, the achievement or
perfection of a monopoly or generally the perpetration of
knavery or crime, the veil with which the law covers and isolates
the corporation from the members or stockholders who compose

2
it will be lifted to allow for its consideration merely as an Regrettably, therefore, whale We agree with the petitioner that
aggregation of individuals. . . . venue in this case should have been laid in Quezon City,
Piercing the veil of corporate entity requires the court to see petitioner's inaction has worked against it:
through the protective shroud which exempts its stockholders It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a
from liabilities that ordinarily, they could be subject to, or waiveable procedural defect, and such waiver may occur by
distinguishes one corporation from a seemingly separate one, laches . . . (Uriarte v. CFI of Negros Occ., G.R. Nos. L-21938-39,
were it not for the existing corporate fiction. October 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 252 at p. 261)
The corporate mask may be lifted and the corporate veil may be Foregoing considered, We agree with the Court of Appeals that
pierced when a corporation is just but the alter ego of a person indeed, petitioner has waived its right to contest the question of
or of another corporation. Where badges of fraud exist, where venue.
public convenience is defeated; where a wrong is sought to be
justified thereby, the corporate fiction or the notion of legal 9. Jao v. CA, G.R. No. 128314, May 29, 2002 (382 SCRA
entity should come to naught. 407)
Further, the test in determining the applicability of the doctrine
of piercing the veil of corporate fiction is as follows: 1) Control, The main issue before us is: where should the settlement
not mere majority or complete stock control, but complete proceedings be had --- in Pampanga, where the decedents had
domination, not only of finances but of policy and business their permanent residence, or in Quezon City, where they
practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the actually stayed before their demise?
corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
separate mind, will or existence of its own; (2) Such control Where estate of deceased persons be settled. – If the decedent
must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
wrong, to perpetuate the violation of a statutory or other whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters
positive legal duty, or dishonest and unjust act in contravention of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of
of plaintiffs legal right; and (3) The aforesaid control and breach First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of
of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
complained of. The absence of any of these elements prevent Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate.
"piercing the corporate veil". The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate
Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it
corporation is not of itself a sufficient reason for disregarding the depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
fiction of separate corporate personalities. location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
Moreover, to disregard the separate juridical personality of a proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original
corporation, the wrong-doing must be clearly and convincingly case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
established. It cannot be presumed. (underscoring ours)
Granting arguendo that the Regional Trial Court in this case was Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be
not merely acting in a limited capacity as a probate court, settled or letters of administration granted in the proper court
petitioner nonetheless failed to adduce competent evidence that located in the province where the decedent resides at the time
would have justified the court to impale the veil of corporate of his death.
fiction. Truly, the reliance reposed by petitioner on the affidavits Petitioner Rodolfo invokes our ruling in the case of Eusebio v.
executed by Teresa Lim and Lani Wenceslao is unavailing Eusebio, et al.,14 where we held that the situs of settlement
considering that the aforementioned documents possess no proceedings shall be the place where the decedent had his
weighty probative value pursuant to the hearsay rule. Besides it permanent residence or domicile at the time of death. In
is imperative for us to stress that such affidavits are inadmissible determining residence at the time of death, the following factors
in evidence inasmuch as the affiants were not at all presented must be considered, namely, the decedent had: (a) capacity to
during the course of the proceedings in the lower court. To put it choose and freedom of choice; (b) physical presence at the
differently, for this Court to uphold the admissibility of said place chosen; and (c) intention to stay therein permanently.15
documents would be to relegate from Our duty to apply such While it appears that the decedents in this case chose to be
basic rule of evidence in a manner consistent with the law and physically present in Quezon City for medical convenience,
jurisprudence. petitioner avers that they never adopted Quezon City as their
permanent residence.
8. Consolidated Bank v. IAC, G.R. No. 75017, June 3, The recitals in the death certificates, which are admissible in
1991 (198 SCRA 34) evidence, were thus properly considered and presumed to be
correct by the court a quo. We agree with the appellate court’s
Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are basically observation that since the death certificates were accomplished
governed by Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. It is said that even before petitioner and respondent quarreled over their
the laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive. It inheritance, they may be relied upon to reflect the true situation
relates to the jurisdiction of the court over the person rather at the time of their parents’ death.
than the subject matter. Provisions relating to venue establish a The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the decedents’
relation between the plaintiff and the defendant and not between residence at the time of death, over the numerous documentary
the court and the subject matter. Venue relates to trial not to evidence presented by petitioner. To be sure, the documents
jurisdiction, touches more of the convenience of the parties presented by petitioner pertained not to residence at the time of
rather than the substance of the case. death, as required by the Rules of Court, but to permanent
The action in the present case pertains to the probate of the residence or domicile. In Garcia-Fule v. Court of Appeals,16 we
intestate estate of the late Don Vicente Madrigal, in which case a held:
regional trial court properly has jurisdiction over the case, both xxx xxx xxx the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual
under the Judiciary Act of 1948, Sec. 44 (e) and under BP 129, residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile."
Sec. 19(4). This term "resides", like the terms "residing" and "residence", is
Objection to improper venue should be made in a motion to elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or
dismiss. Until this is done, venue cannot truly be said to have purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
been improperly laid. application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of

3
the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather . We hold that Section 8 of Rule 89 allows this action to proceed.
than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute The factual differences alleged by petitioners have no bearing on
uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning the intestate court's jurisdiction over the approval of the subject
residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases conditional sale. Probate jurisdiction covers all matters relating
make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" to the settlement of estates (Rules 74 & 86-91) and the probate
but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are of wills (Rules 75-77) of deceased persons, including the
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term appointment and the removal of administrators and executors
"inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or (Rules 78-85). It also extends to matters incidental and
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual collateral to the exercise of a probate court's recognized powers
or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of such as selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay belonging to the estate. Indeed, the rules on this point are
thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely intended to settle the estate in a speedy manner, so that the
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or benefits that may flow from such settlement may be
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an immediately enjoyed by the heirs and the beneficiaries.16
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily Petitioners contend that under said Rule 89, only the executor or
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s administrator is authorized to apply for the approval of a sale of
domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required realty under administration. Hence, the settlement court
though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. allegedly erred in entertaining and granting respondent's Motion
It does not necessarily follow that the records of a person’s for Approval.
properties are kept in the place where he permanently resides. We read no such limitation. Section 8, Rule 89 of the Rules of
Neither can it be presumed that a person’s properties can be Court, provides:
found mostly in the place where he establishes his domicile. It "SEC. 8. When court may authorize conveyance of realty which
may be that he has his domicile in a place different from that deceased contracted to convey. Notice. Effect of deed. -- Where
where he keeps his records, or where he maintains extensive the deceased was in his lifetime under contract, binding in law,
personal and business interests. No generalizations can thus be to deed real property, or an interest therein, the court having
formulated on the matter, as the question of where to keep jurisdiction of the estate may, on application for that purpose,
records or retain properties is entirely dependent upon an authorize the executor or administrator to convey such property
individual’s choice and peculiarities. according to such contract, or with such modifications as are
At any rate, petitioner is obviously splitting straws when he agreed upon by the parties and approved by the court; and if
differentiates between venue in ordinary civil actions and venue the contract is to convey real property to the executor or
in special proceedings. In Raymond v. Court of Appeals and administrator, the clerk of the court shall execute the deed. x x
Bejer v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that venue for ordinary civil x."
actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same This provision should be differentiated from Sections 2 and 4 of
meaning. As thus defined, "residence", in the context of venue the same Rule, specifically requiring only the executor or
provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence administrator to file the application for authority to sell,
or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity mortgage or otherwise encumber real estate for the purpose of
and consistency. All told, the lower court and the Court of paying debts, expenses and legacies (Section 2);19 or for
Appeals correctly held that venue for the settlement of the authority to sell real or personal estate beneficial to the heirs,
decedents’ intestate estate was properly laid in the Quezon City devisees or legatees and other interested persons, although
court. such authority is not necessary to pay debts, legacies or
expenses of administration (Section 4).20 Section 8 mentions
10. Heirs of Sandejas v. Lina, G.R. No. 141634, February only an application to authorize the conveyance of realty under a
5, 2001 (351 SCRA 183) contract that the deceased entered into while still alive. While
this Rule does not specify who should file the application, it
When a contract is subject to a suspensive condition, its birth or stands to reason that the proper party must be one .who is to be
effectivity can take place only if and when the condition happens benefited or injured by the judgment, or one who is to be
or is fulfilled.11 Thus, the intestate court's grant of the Motion entitled to the avails of the suit.21
for Approval of the sale filed by respondent resulted in Petitioners aver that the CA's computation of Eliodoro Sr.'s share
petitioners' obligation to execute the Deed of Sale of the in the disputed parcels of land was erroneous because, as the
disputed lots in his favor. The condition having been satisfied, conjugal partner of Remedios, he owned one half of these lots
the contract was perfected. Henceforth, the parties were bound plus a further one tenth of the remaining half, in his capacity as
to fulfil what they had expressly agreed upon. a one of her legal heirs. Hence, Eliodoro's share should be 11/20
Court approval is required in any disposition of the decedent's of the entire property. Respondent poses no objection to this
estate per Rule 89 of the Rules of Court. Reference to judicial computation.22
approval, however, cannot adversely affect the substantive On the other hand, the CA held that, at the very least, the
rights of heirs to dispose of their own pro indiviso shares in the conditional sale should cover the one half (1/2) pro indiviso
co-heirship or co-ownership.12 In other words, they can sell conjugal share of Eliodoro plus his one tenth (1/10) hereditary
their rights, interests or participation in the property under share as one of the ten legal heirs of the decedent, or a total of
administration. A stipulation requiring court approval does not three fifths (3/5) of the lots in administration.23
affect the validity and the effectivity of the sale as regards the Petitioners' correct. The CA computed Eliodoro's share as an heir
selling heirs. It merely implies that the property may be taken based on one tenth of the entire disputed property. It should be
out ofcustodia legis, but only with the court's permission.13 It based only on the remaining half, after deducting the conjugal
would seem that the suspensive condition in the present share.24
conditional sale was imposed only for this reason. The proper determination of the seller-heir's shares requires
Because petitioners did not consent to the sale of their ideal further explanation. Succession laws and jurisprudence require
shares in the disputed lots, the CA correctly limited the scope of that when a marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband
the Receipt to the pro-indiviso share of Eliodoro Sr. Thus, it or the wife, the decedent's entire estate - under the concept of
correctly modified the intestate court's ruling by excluding their conjugal properties of gains -- must be divided equally, with one
shares from the ambit of the transaction. half going to the surviving spouse and the other half to the heirs
of the deceased.25 After the settlement of the debts and

4
obligations, the remaining half of the estate is then distributed applicable only to civil actions which are essentially adversarial
to the legal heirs, legatees and devices. We assume, however, and involve members of the same family, thus:
that this preliminary determination of the decedent's estate has It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than
already been taken into account by the parties, since the only a litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary
issue raised in this case is whether Eliodoro's share is 11/20 or that every effort should be made toward a compromise before
3/5 of the disputed lots. litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is
know that lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper
11. Vda. de Manalo v. CA, G.R. No. 129242, January 16, bitterness than stranger.25
2001 (349 SCRA 135) It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners)
are not being sued in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 for any cause of
It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature action as in fact no defendant was imploded therein. The Petition
of an action or proceeding, the averments15 and the character for issuance of letters of Administration, Settlement and
of the relief sought 16 in the complaint, or petition, as in the Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is a special
case at bar, shall be controlling. A careful srutiny of the Petition proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners
for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. 26
Distribution of Estatein SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) merely seek
petitioners' claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary to establish the fat of death of their father and subsequently to
civil action. The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional be duly recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so
facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate of a that they can validly exercise their right to participate in the
deceased person such as the fat of death of the late Troadio settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent
Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction of the probate
City of Manila at the time of his said death. The fact of death of court.
the decedent and of his residence within he country are
foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in 12. In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Ismael Reyes,
the administration of the estate rest.17The petition is SP.PROC G.R. No. 139587, November 22, 2000 (345 SCRA 541)
No. 92-63626 also contains an enumeration of the names of his
legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by the The jurisdiction of the probate court merely relates to matters
deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate having to do with the settlement of the estate and the probate
proceedings. In addition, the relief's prayed for in the said of wills of deceased persons, and the appointment and removal
petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention of the of administrators, executors, guardians and trustees.18 The
petitioners therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicial question of ownership is as a rule, an extraneous matter which
settlement of the estate of their deceased father, Troadio the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality.19 Thus, for the
Manalo. purpose of determining whether a certain property should or
It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to should not be included in the inventory of estate proceeding, the
defeat the purpose of the essentially valid petition for the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such
settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the
matters that as irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. It final decision in a separate action to resolve title.20
must be emphasized that the trial court, siting as a probate Settled is the rule that the Regional Trial Court acting as a
court, has limited and special jurisdiction 20 and cannot hear probate court exercises but limited jurisdiction, thus it has no
and dispose of collateral matters and issues which may be power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to
properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action. In property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent,
addition, the rule has always been to the effect that the unless the claimant and all other parties having legal interest in
jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of an the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission
action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not of the question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the
by the defenses contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced.
would not be too difficult to have a case either thrown out of
court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple strategem.21 13. PCIB v. CA, G.R. No. 103149, November 15, 2000 (344
So it should be in the instant petition for settlement of estate. SCRA 596)
The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly
take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Petitioner claims that it was not given sufficient opportunity to
Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil file an answer in opposition to the application for preliminary
Code of the Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for injunction due to its belated receipt of the complaint-in-
settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo intervention. Such contention is untenable. Since it received a
inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough. To wit: copy of the complaint-in-intervention on November 23, 1990,
Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members there was ample time to prepare an answer for the hearing set
of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts on December 4, 1990. Moreover, petitioner was duly notified of
toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have the hearing on the application for the writ. In fact, the hearing
failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035(underscoring had been reset and appropriate notices given to the parties. The
supplied).22 record further showed that petitioner’s counsel attended the
The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to hearing on December 4, 1990, but decided not to take part in
ordinary civil actions. This is clear from the term 'suit' that it the proceedings when his motion for extension of time to file
refers to an action by one person or persons against another or responsive pleading was denied.
other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the Thus, adequate opportunity was given to petitioner to oppose
remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the application for the writ as well as to file its answer to the
the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. 23 A civil complaint-in-intervention. Petitioner may not presume that its
action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a motion for extension would be granted as a matter of course.
party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the The grant of an extension of time to file a responsive pleading is
prevention or redress of a wrong.24 Besides, an excerpt form discretionary on the part of the court.
the Report of the Code Commission unmistakably reveals the Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the Rules of Court do not
intention of the Code Commission to make that legal provision require that issues be joined before preliminary injunction may

5
issue. Preliminary injunction may be granted at any stage of an 15. Uy v. Capulong, A.M. No. RTJ-91-776, April 7, 1993
action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, (221 SCRA 87)
ordering a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a
particular act or acts.21 For as long as the requisites for its Every judge should be cognizant of the basic principle that when
issuance are present in the case, such issuance is valid. questions arise as to ownership of property alleged to be part of
Petitioner’s contention that the writ of injunction issued by the the estate of a deceased person, but claimed by some other
trial court effectively adjudicated ownership of the mortgaged person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of
property in favor of respondent Blanquita Ang is misplaced. It is inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the
only upon expiration of the redemption period, without the deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be determined
judgment debtor having made use of his right of redemption, in the courts of administration proceedings. The trial court,
that ownership of the land sold in a foreclosure sale becomes acting as probate court, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such
consolidated in the purchaser.22 The probate court issued the contentions, which must be submitted to the trial court in the
writ to enjoin petitioner and other concerned parties from exercise of its general jurisdiction. The failure of respondent
performing any act which would directly or indirectly enforce the judge to apply this basic principle indicates a manifest disregard
effects of the extra-judicial foreclosure of decedent’s property of well-known legal rules.
caused by petitioner bank, in order to preserve the estate of the In cancelling the titles of complainants over their properties on
decedent. Consolidation of title would have the consequence of mere motion of a party and without affording them due process,
transferring ownership since the buyer in a foreclosure sale respondent Judge violated her sworn obligation to uphold the
becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is law and promote the administration of justice. It has been held
not redeemed during the period of one year after the that if the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one
registration of the sale.23 Therefore, at the time the writ was does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
issued there was yet no issue regarding ownership because the The foregoing transgressions of respondent Judge are further
period for redemption had not lapsed. aggravated by her refusal to abide by the Decision of the Court
Nevertheless, the probate court may pass upon and determine of Appeals annulling her Order of 7 June 1989 which directed the
the title or ownership of a property which may or may not be cancellation of the titles of complainants. She was in fact
included in the estate proceedings, but such determination is specifically enjoined from proceeding against them, yet, despite
provisional in character and is subject to final decision in a this Decision, respondent Judge skill authorized the subsequent
separate action to resolve title.24 Thus, the allegations of transfer or alienation to other persons of properties titled in the
Blanquita Ang that her signatures on the real estate mortgage name of complainants to the detriment of the latter. This utter
documents were forged may be ventilated in a separate disrespect for the judgment of a higher court constitutes grave
proceeding, requiring the presentation of clear and convincing misconduct prejudicial to the interest of the public, the bench
evidence. and the bar.

14. De Leon v. CA, G.R. No. 128781, August 6, 2002 (386 16. Enderes v. CA, G.R. No. 128525, December 17, 1999
SCRA 216) (321 SCRA 178)

A probate court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding,22 Injunction may issue pendente lite only in cases of extreme
can only pass upon questions of title provisionally.23 The urgency, where the right to the possession, during the pendency
rationale therefor and the proper recourse of the aggrieved party of the main case, of the property involved is very clear; where
are expounded in Jimenez v. Court of Appeals: considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in favor of
"The patent reason is the probate court’s limited jurisdiction and the complainant seeking the possession of the property
the principle that questions of title or ownership, which result in pendente lite; where there was willful and unlawful invasion on
inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can plaintiff's right, over his protest and remonstrance, the injury
only be settled in a separate action. being a continuing one. 9
"All that the said court could do as regards said properties is Before an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the
determine whether they should or should not be included in the following requisites be present: (1) there must be a right in esse
inventory or list of properties to be administered by the or the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act
administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the against which injunction is to be directed is a violation of such
opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to an right. 10
ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims We agree with the findings of the SEC as affirmed by the Court
of title because the probate court cannot do so."24 of Appeals that petitioners failed not only to establish a
The Court held in Valero Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of threatened violation of a right but they also failed to discharge
Appeals26 that the order of exclusion (or inclusion) is not a final the burden of clearly showing the right to be protected. 11 On
order; that it is interlocutory in the sense that it did not settle the mere contention that the shareholdings of private
once and for all the title to the subject lots; that the prevailing respondents belong to the estate of the late Dr. Ortañez which is
rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain still the subject of settlement before the Regional Trial Court of
property should or should not be included in the inventory, the Quezon City, petitioners had not established their clear legal
probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such rights to obtain injunctive relief against private respondents.
determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final Injunction, whether preliminary or final, is not designed to
decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be protect contingent or future rights.
instituted by the parties. In support of their position, petitioners cited in their reply the
The elevation of the records of Special Proceedings No. C-1679 issuance of an Order by the intestate court declaring that the
to the Court of Appeals for the purpose of petitioners’ appeal shares of stock of Philinterlife belong to the estate. It is admitted
from the order removing the administratrix is unnecessary that the special proceedings are still pending before the court
where a record on appeal is allowed under the Rules of Court. and the estate had not been partitioned and distributed.
The court a quo loses jurisdiction over the subject of the appeal Notwithstanding the proceedings being conducted by the
upon the approval of the record on appeal and the expiration of intestate court, the petitioners' rights or interests over the
the time to appeal of the other parties; but retains jurisdiction estate or over the assailed shareholdings in the name of private
over the remaining subject matter not covered by the appeal.32 respondents are still future and unsettled rights which cannot be
protected by the writ of injunction. The rule is well settled that

6
the jurisdiction of the regional trial court as a probate or 18. Solivio v. CA, G.R. No. 83484, February 12, 1990 (182
intestate court relates only to matters having to do with the SCRA 119)
settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons
but does not extend to the determination of questions of After a careful review of the records, we find merit in the
ownership that arise during the proceedings. 15 petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26,
The intestate court may pass upon the title to a certain property lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia Villanueva's action for
for the purpose of determining whether the same should or partition and recovery of her share of the estate of Esteban
should not be included in the inventory but such determination is Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings (Spl, Proc. No.
not conclusive and is subject to final decision in a separate 2540) for the settlement of said estate are still pending in
action regarding ownership which may be constituted by the Branch 23 of the same court, there being as yet no orders for
parties. 16 The court in charge of the intestate proceedings the submission and approval of the administratix's inventory and
cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and
a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to terminating the proceedings (p. 31, Record).
outside parties. 17 Therefore, the possibility of irreparable In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and
damage without proof of violation of an actually existing right of conflicting dispositions of a decedent's estate, a court should not
petitioners over the shareholdings presently in the possession of interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-equal court.
private respondents is no ground for an injunction being a mere Thus, did we rule in Guilas v. Judge of the Court of First Instance
damnum absque injuria. 18 of Pampanga, L-26695, January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 111, 117,
Contrary to the contentions of petitioners, the SEC found that where a daughter filed a separate action to annul a project of
private respondents are bona fide owners of shares of stock in partition executed between her and her father in the
Philinterlife constituting the majority thereof or 94% of the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of her mother:
outstanding capital stock of the company. Records show that The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under
they have been stockholders of Philinterlife since 1983 up to the administration only after the payment of all the debts and the
present. It was only in 1994 that petitioners sought the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the
annulment of the shareholdings of private respondents before same. The finality of the approval of the project of partition by
the SEC. The grant of the writ of injunction against private itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding (Timbol
respondents by restraining them from exercising their rights as v. Cano, 1 SCRA 1271, 1276, L-15445, April 29, 1961; Siguiong
stockholders would in effect dispose of the main case without a v. Tecson, 89 Phil. pp. 28, 30). As long as the order of the
trial. The SEC acted correctly in denying the issuance of the writ distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the
until the merits of the case can be heard. Further, it is a basic probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated
procedural postulate that a preliminary injunction is not proper Siguiong v. Tecson, supra); because a judicial partition is not
where its purpose is to take the property out of control or final and conclusive and does not prevent the heirs from
possession of one party and transfer the same to the hands of bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive
another who did not have such control at the inception of the period therefore has not elapsed (Mari v. Bonilia, 83 Phil. 137).
case 20 and whose title has not been clearly established by law. The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received
21 his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the
same probate or administration proceedings, or for reopening of
17. Cortes v. CA, G.R. No. 117417, September 21, 2000 the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been
(340 SCRA 715) closed, and not through an independent action, which would be
tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a
The long standing rule is that probate courts, or those in charge decision or order of the probate or intestate court already final
of proceedings whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and
determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate and disposed of. (Ramos v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol
which are claimed to belong to outside parties.6 Stated v. Cano, supra; Jingco v. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil.
otherwise, "claims for title to, or right of possession of, personal 1082; Roman Catholic v. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960,
or real property, made by the heirs themselves, by title adverse 107 Phil. 455, 460-461; Emphasis supplied)
to that of the deceased, or made by third persons, cannot be The probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Notice of the
entertained by the (probate) court."7 time and place of hearing of the petition is required to be
In the present case, however, private respondent Menandro A. published (Sec. 3, Rule 76 in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 79, Rules of
Reselva, who refused to vacate the house and lot being eyed as Court). Notice of the hearing of Celedonia's original petition was
part of the estate of the late Teodoro T. Reselva, cannot be published in the "Visayan Tribune" on April 25, May 2 and 9,
considered an "outside party" for he is one of the three 1977 (Exh 4, p. 197, Record). Similarly, notice of the hearing of
compulsory heirs of the former. As such, he is very much her amended petition of May 26, 1977 for the settlement of the
involved in the settlement of Teodoro's estate.8 By way of estate was, by order of the court, published in "Bagong
exception to the above-mentioned rule, "when the parties are all Kasanag" (New Light) issues of May 27, June 3 and 10, 1977
heirs of the decedent, it is optional upon them to submit to the (pp. 182-305, Record). The publication of the notice of the
probate court the question of title to property."9 Here, the proceedings was constructive notice to the whole world.
probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership. Concordia was not deprived of her right to intervene in the
More so, when the opposing parties belong to the poor stratum proceedings for she had actual, as well as constructive notice of
of society and a separate action would be most expensive and the same.
inexpedient. Celedonia's allegation in her petition that she was the sole heir
In the same way, when the controversy is whether the property of Esteban within the third degree on his mother's side was not
in issue belongs to the conjugal partnership or exclusively to the false. Moreover, it was made in good faith and in the honest
decedent, the same is properly within the jurisdiction of the belief that because the properties of Esteban had come from his
probate court, which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal mother, not his father, she, as Esteban's nearest surviving
partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent relative on his mother's side, is the rightful heir to them. It
which is to be distributed among the heirs.12 would have been self-defeating and inconsistent with her claim
of sole heirship if she stated in her petition that Concordia was
her co-heir. Her omission to so state did not constitute extrinsic
fraud.

7
Failure to disclose to the adversary, or to the court, matters classified as her paraphernal properties, it being acquired by her
which would defeat one's own claim or defense is not such through lucrative title (Art. 148, Civil Code). On the other hand,
extrinsic fraud as will justify or require vacation of the judgment. plaintiffs testimony that the third parcel of land covered in the
(49 C.J.S. 489, citing Young v. Young, 2 SE 2d 622; First complaint was inherited by Edilberto Vita from Isidra Montanano
National Bank & Trust Co. of King City v. Bowman, 15 SW 2d is an admission that the said property was the paraphernal
842; Price v. Smith, 109 SW 2d 1144, 1149) property of the latter.
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is The defendants and intervenors claim that the above-stated
not reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, three (3) parcels of land and the properties covered in their
but the descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom counterclaim were donated to them by Isidra Montanano by
he inherited the properties in question. Therefore, he did not virtue of two (2) deeds of donation she executed on November
hold his inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of his aunt, 22, 1938 and December 20, 1940. They presented testimonial
Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third degree on and documentary evidence to prove that Isidra Montanano
his mother's side. The reserva troncal applies to properties acquired all these parcels of land, either by inheritance or
inherited by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it donation, from her father Domingo Montanano, her aunt
from another ascendant or 9 brother or sister. It does not apply Francisca Asilo and her uncle Juan Asilo. Aside from this, the tax
to property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the declarations covering the properties involved in the complaint
reverse of the situation covered by Article 891. and counterclaim are mostly in the name of Isidra Montanano,
However, inasmuch as Concordia had agreed to deliver the except one each in the name of her father Domingo Montanano,
estate of the deceased to the foundation in honor of his mother, her aunt Francisca Asilo and her nephew Jose Samonte. The
Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana (from whom the estate came), court is convinced, therefore, that all the properties involved in
an agreement which she ratified and confirmed in her "Motion to this litigation were the paraphernal properties of the deceased
Reopen and/or Reconsider Order dated April 3, 1978" which she Isidra Montanano.
filed in Spl. Proceeding No. 2540: Whatever merit there may be in plaintiff-appellant's claim that
4. That ... prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner upon the death of Isidra Montanano, the ownership of these
Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have agreed parcels of land (except with respect to the parcel of land covered
to make the estate of the decedent a foundation, besides they by Tax Declaration No. 1253 (4, old) which was validly donated
have closely known each other due to their filiation to the to defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants by Isidra
decedent and they have been visiting each other's house which Montanano, as We shall discuss later) are vested upon Edilberto
are not far away for (sic) each other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis Vita by operation of law, subject only to the right of her nephew
supplied) and nieces, liquidation of the conjugal partnership of Isidra
she is bound by that agreement. It is true that by that Montanano and Edilberto Vita must be undertaken prior to the
agreement, she did not waive her inheritance in favor of adjudication of properties to the heirs (Vicente J. Francisco,The
Celedonia, but she did agree to place all of Esteban's estate in Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1970 Edition, p. 619).
the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation" which In this connection, contrary to the trial court's ruling, it is not
Esteban, Jr., during his lifetime, planned to set up to honor his necessary to file a separate proceeding in court for the proper
mother and to finance the education of indigent but deserving disposition of the estate of Isidra Montanano. Under Rule 73,
students as well. Section 2 of the Rules of Court, if both spouses have died, the
Her admission may not be taken lightly as the lower court did. conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or
Being a judicial admission, it is conclusive and no evidence need intestate proceedings of either. In the present case, therefore,
be presented to prove the agreement (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 the conjugal partnership of Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita
Phil. 227; Granada v. Philippine National Bank, L-20745, Sept. should be liquidated in the testate proceedings of the latter.
2, 1966, 18 SCRA 1; Sta. Ana v. Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31, It is explicit in Article 725 * of the Civil Code that acceptance is
1968, 24 SCRA 1018; People v. Encipido, G.R.70091, Dec. 29, necessary in a donation. This applies to all kinds of donation
1986, 146 SCRA 478; and Rodillas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. because the law does not make any distinction. The rationale
58652, May 20, 1988, 161 SCRA 347). behind the requirement of acceptance is that nobody is obliged
19. Vita v. Montano, G.R. No. L-50553 February 19, to receive a benefit against his will (Arturo M. Tolentino,
1991 (194 SCRA 180) Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
We are in conformity with the finding of the trial court that the Philippines, Volume II, 1972 Edition, p. 521). We uphold the trial
three (3) parcels of land mentioned in the complaint were court that (p. 50, Record on Appeal):
paraphernal properties of Isidra Montanano, being supported by . . . notwithstanding the fact that from the secondary evidence
documentary and testimonial evidence (p. 48, Record on presented, the said deed of donation mortis causa of November
Appeal): 22, 1938 seems to have been legally and validly executed, it
. . . plaintiff claims that in accordance with the inventory cannot be given force and effect as the acceptance thereof by
prepared by Edilberto Vita of his properties before his death the donees is void and illegal in as much (sic) as they were
(Exhs. "O", "O-1", "O-1-A", "O-1-B", and "O-1-C"), the parcel of made at the time of the execution of the document, not after the
land covered by Tax Declaration No. 4 (old) was a paraphernal death of the donor Isidra Montanano. A donation mortis causa
property of his wife Isidra Montanano while the parcels of land takes effect only after the death of the donor, consequently it is
covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 72 (old) and 73 were conjugal only after the latter's death that its acceptance maybe made.
properties of the spouses Edilberto Vita and Isidra Montanano as The quoted provision in the second deed of donation should be
they were donated to the latter by Francisca Asilo during their understood in its entirety. Thus, based on the first part of the
marriage. It is the contention of the plaintiff that upon the death paragraph which states " '[n]a bagaman at sa kasulatang ito ay
of Isidra Montanano, her husband Edilberto Vita acquired lubusan ng ibinibigay at ipinagkakaloob sa bawat isa . . . na iyon
ownership of these properties. ay patuluyan nang ngayo'y iginagawad sa kanila ng walang
This contention of the plaintiff in effect corroborates the claim of pasubali, na magagawa na nila ang buong karapatan ngayon
the defendants and intervenors that an the three (3) parcels of bilang tunay na may-ari . . . " (Emphasis supplied), supra, it was
land, subject-matter of the complaint, including all the parcels of obviously the intention of Isidra Montanano to grant a donation
land being claimed by them in the intervenor's counterclaim, inter vivos to defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants.
were all paraphernal properties of Isidra Montanano. The two (2) Although the rest of the paragraph states "'gayon man, ay kami
parcels of land supposedly received as donation by Isidra pa ring mag-asawa ang mananatili sa pag-mamayari,
Montanano during her marriage with Edilberto Vita should be pakikinabang at pamomosision, –– na kani-kaniyang pag-aaring

8
dito'y ipinagkakaloob, sa buong panahon na ang bawat isa sa
amin mag-asawa'y nabubuhay, at kung kailan bawian kami ng
hiram na buhay, ay saka at saka pa lamang maaring matamo
nila ang ganap na pagmamayari at pakikinabang sa mga pag-
aaring iyan . . . supra," We have adjudged in the case of Heirs of
Juan Bonsato, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 95 Phil. 481,
488:
It is true that the last paragraph in each donation contains the
phrase "that after the death of the donor the aforesaid donation
shall become effective." . . . However, said expression must be
construed together with the rest of the paragraph, and thus
taken, its meaning clearly appears to be that after the donor's
death, the donation will take effect so as to make the donees the
absolute owners of the donated property, free from all liens and
encumbrances; for it must be remembered that the donor
reserved for himself a share of the fruits of the land donated.
Such reservation constituted a charge or encumbrance that
would disappear upon the donor's death, when full title would
become vested in the donees.
As We have ruled in Concepcion, et al. v. Concepcion, 91 Phil.
823, 830:
. . . even if he (donor) says it (the donation) is to take effect
after his death, when from the body of the instrument or
donation it is to be gathered that the main consideration of the
donation is not the death of the donor but rather services
rendered to him by the donee or his affection for the latter, then
the donation should be considered as inter vivos, . . . and the
condition that the donation is to take effect only after the death
of the donor should be interpreted as meaning that the
possession and enjoyment of the its of the property donated
should take place only after donor's death.

20. Eastern Shipping v. Lucero, G.R. No. L-60101, August

31, 1983 (124 SCRA 425)

There is thus enough evidence to show the circumstances

attending the loss and disappearance of the M/V Eastern Minicon
and its crew. The foregoing facts, quite logically. are sufficient to
lead Us to a moral certainty that the vessel had sunk and that
the persons aboard had perished with it. upon this premise, the
rule on presumption of death under Article 391 (1) of the Civil
Code must yield to the rule of preponderance of evidence. As
this Court said in Joaquin vs. Navarro 4 "Where there are facts,
known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be
made, the presumption does not step in, and the rule of
preponderance of evidence controls."
If in the foregoing criminal cases, where the proof required for
conviction must be beyond reasonable doubt, the rule of
presumption was not applied and the fact of death was deemed
established, with more reason is this Court justified in entering a
finding of death. Indeed, We cannot permit Article 391 to
override, or be substituted for, the facts established in this case
which logically indicate to a moral certainty that Capt. Lucero
died shortly after he had sent his last radio message at 9:50
p.m. on February 16, 1980.