People vs.

Jabinal
55 SCRA 607 27 February 1974

Antonio J.

Facts:

The instant case was an appeal form the judgment of the Municipal
Court of Batangas finding the accused guilty of the crime of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition. The validity of the conviction
was based upon a retroactive application of the Supreme Court’s ruling
in People vs. Mapa.

As to the facts, a determined by the trial court, the accused admitted that
on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the
ammunition described in the complaint was without the requisite license
a permit. He however, contended that he was a SECRET AGENT
appointed by the governor, and was likewise subsequently appended as
Confidential Agent, which granted him the authority to possess fire arm
in the performance of his official duties as peace officer. Relying on the
Supreme Court’s decision in People vs. Macarandang and People vs.
Lucero, the accused sought for his aquittal.

Noting and agreeing to the evidence presented by the accused, the trial
court nonetheless decided otherwise, citing that People vs. Macarandang
and People vs. Lucero were reversed and subsequently abandoned in
people vs. mapa.

Issue:

Should appellant be acquitted on the bases of Supreme Court rulings in

Ruling:

The judgment appealed was reversed, and the appellant was acquitted.

Reason:
The doctrine laid down in lucero and Macarandang was part of the
jurisprudence, hence, of the law, at the time appellant was found in
possession of fire arm in question and he was arraigned by the trial
court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967, but
when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a new one is
adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should
not apply to partres who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the
faith thereof.

GR No. L-30061 (February 27, 1974)

People vs. Jabinal

FACTS:

Jabinal was found guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition.

The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition
described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to
exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the
Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander,
and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question.

The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as Secret Agent
and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled
to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court’s decision in People vs. Macarandang(1959) and People vs.
Lucero(1958) and not on the basis of the latest reversal and abandonment in People vs. Mapa (1967).

ISSUE:

Whether or not appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the court’s rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or
should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa.

RULING:

Decisions of this Court, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code states that “Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system … .” The settled rule supported by
numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim “legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet” — the interpretation
placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.

Appellant was appointed as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant
to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero under which no criminal liability would attach
to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be
absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be
punishable.
The appellant was acquitted.
People of the Philippines vs. M. Mapa
G.R. No. L-22301
August 30, 1967
En Banc

Facts:

The accused was convicted in violation of Sec. 878 in connection to Sec. 2692 of the Revised
Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and further amended by R.A. 4.
On August 13, 1962, the accused was discovered to have in its possession and control a home-
made revolver cal. 22 with no license permit. In the court proceeding, the accused admitted that
he owns the gun and affirmed that it has no license. The accused further stated that he is a secret
agent appointed by Gov. Leviste of Batangas and showed evidences of appointment. In his
defense, the accused presented the case of People vs. Macarandang, stating that he must
acquitted because he is a secret agent and which may qualify into peace officers equivalent to
municipal police which is covered by Art. 879.

Issue:

Whether or not holding a position of secret agent of the Governor is a proper defense to illegal
possession of firearms.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court in its decision affirmed the lower court’s decision. It stated that the law is
explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . . .
possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or
implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or
ammunition." The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully
issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the
Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police,
provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal
mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in
possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties.
The Court construed that there is no provision for the secret agent; including it in the list therefore
the accused is not exempted.

Cayetano vs. Monsod

201 SCRA 210

September 1991

Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
posses required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The
1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines
and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and
must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However,
a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.

Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited
to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action
taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of
a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment,
and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law
means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience.

The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the
position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years does In the view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.