EN BANC

[G.R. No. 4795. November 23, 1908. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARIANO BOSTON, Defendant-Appellant.

Ortigas & Fisher, for Appellant.

Solicitor-General Harvey, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. ABORTION; SUFFICIENCY OF PROOF. — Held, That the facts proven by the prosecution and set out in the
decision constitute prima facie proof of the guilt of the defendant, and that, the defendant having failed to
controvert or satisfactorily explain these facts, he was properly convicted of the crime with which he was
charged.

DECISION

CARSON, J. :

The accused in this case was convicted in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Pangasinan of the
crime of abortion as defined and penalized in paragraph 3 of article 410 of the Penal Code.

The guilt of appellant is conclusively established by the evidence of record, the testimony of the witnesses for
the prosecution leaving no room for reasonable doubt, despite the fact that there are some inconsistencies
and discrepancies in their statements. Counsel for appellant insists that the evidence does not conclusively
establish the fact that he intentionally caused the abortion, because there is no evidence in the record
disclosing the character and medicinal qualities of the potion which the accused gave to the mother whose
child was aborted. The evidence clearly discloses that the child was born three months in advance of the full
period of gestation; that the appellant, either believing or pretending to believe that the child in the womb of
the woman was a sort of a fish-demon (which he called a balat), gave to her a potion composed of herbs, for
the purpose of relieving her of this alleged fish-demon; that two hours thereafter she gave premature birth to
a child, having been taken with the pains of child birth almost immediately after drinking the herb potion given
her by the appellant; that after the birth of the child the appellant, still believing or pretending to believe that
the child as a fish-demon which had taken upon itself human form, with the permission and aid of the husband
and the brother of the infant child, destroyed it by fire in order to prevent its doing the mischief which the
appellant believed or affected to believe it was capable o f doing. These facts constitute, in our opinion, prima
facie proof of the intent of the accused in giving the herb potion to the mother of the child, and also of the
further fact that the herb potion so administered to her was the cause of its premature birth. The defense
wholly failed to rebut this testimony of the prosecution and we are of opinion, therefore, that the trial court
properly found the defendant guilty of the crime with which he was charged beyond a reasonable doubt.

The sentence imposed is in strict accord with the penalty provided by the code, and should be and is hereby
affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the Appellant. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Willard and Tracery, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25176 February 27, 1968

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

Rufino J. Abadies and Francis J. Militante for defendant-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:

Appeal on a pure question of law, from the order of the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental directing the amendment of the information in Criminal Case No. 763 of said court.

There is no dispute as to the facts of this case:

Convicted by the Municipal Court of Baliangao (Misamis Occidental) of the crime of simple
seduction, upon complaint of Catalina Babol, and sentenced to imprisonment for two months and one
day of arresto mayor, accused Agapito Yap, Jr. brought the case on appeal to the Court of First
Instance of Misamis Occidental, 1 where the following information was filed:

The undersigned (Provincial Fiscal), accuses Agapito Yap, Jr. of the crime of Simple
Seduction, committed as follows:

That on or about May 15, 1959, and for sometime subsequently thereto, in the town of
Baliangao, province of Misamis Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused by means of deceit and false promise of marriage, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously seduce and have sexual intercourse
several times with Catalina Babol a virgin over 12 but under 18 years of age, resulting in
pregnancy with abortion thereafter.

Contrary to Art. 338 of the Revised Penal Code.

The accused moved to quash the aforequoted information, claiming that it alleged multiple acts
of simple seduction, in addition to the offense of criminal abortion. The motion was duly heard, during
which the prosecuting fiscal signified willingness to eliminate the word abortion from the information.

On August 31, 1965, the court, sustaining the stand of the accused, directed its amendment, as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the information is hereby ordered AMENDED such that there must not
be an opportunity for the prosecution to put the accused in danger more than once, or that
because of lack of objection and because of allegation in the complaint that there is an after
effect, in the form of abortion, which might be a criminal abortion, and for which the same
accused might be held criminally responsible and duly sentenced therefor, the said
information must be amended immediately such that the accused will not be placed in
useless danger of being convicted more than once, or for two crimes in an information;
OTHERWISE, the case is ordered DISMISSED.
 The prosecution interposed the present appeal.

The only issue to be resolved here is, whether or not the above-quoted information violates the
prohibition against duplicity of offenses as provided in Section 12 of Revised Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court.

It is claimed for the defense that under the averment of the information that, "on or about May
15, 1959, and for sometime subsequent thereto . . . said accused by means of deceit and false promise
of marriage, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously seduce and have sexual intercourse
several times with Catalina Babol a virgin over 12 but under 18 years of age," the accused may be
convicted of as many instances of seduction as may be proved during the trial. In short, it is their
theory that there is a complete and consummated offense of seduction for every sexual intercourse
the accused may have had with the offended party, so that under the disputed information the former
runs the risk of being found guilty of as many seduction as the number of sexual contacts between the
parties that the prosecution would be able to establish. In opposing the motion, the prosecution
advances the argument that there is no continuing offense of seduction; that the criminal act is
consumated on the first violation of the chastity of the offended girl and any subsequent coition would
already be beyond the reach of the penal provision on seduction.

These views, both extreme, may be rejected. On contention of the prosecution, it may be pointed
out that in simple seduction, unlike that in a qualified case, the matter of virginity of the offended party,
is not essential; it is only necessary that the complainant be an unmarried woman and of chaste life
and good reputation. 2 Under the law, simple seduction is synonymous with loss of virginity; a widow
can be the victim of seduction. 3 Upon the other hand, the fact that there should be different acts of
intercourse, consented by the woman in reliance upon the same promise of marriage would not mean
separate offenses of seduction, (cf. U.S. vs. Salud, 10 Phil. 208). Nowhere in the information does it
appear that every act of intercourse was the result of a separate act of deceit.

It is, therefore, incorrect to conclude that the information in this case charged the accused of
more than one offense. A reading thereof would show that he was there being charged for the
seduction of Catalina Babol, with the clause "May 15, 1959 and for sometime subsequent thereto"
serving as the point of time against which the allegation that she was over 12 years, but under 18
when the alleged criminal offense was committed, may be checked or reckoned. Such recital of fact,
forming the basis of the statement that the accused had sexual relations with the offended party
"several times", together with the allegations of the subsequent pregnancy of the offended girl and the
expulsion of the foetus, constitute no more than the details of the entire incident upon which the
seduction charge was based. They partake of the nature of particulars, with which the prosecution
intends to inform the accused of the matter it will prove at the trial; and this does not come within the
prohibition of the rules. Thus, in one case, 4 an information that charge the defendant with a specific
crime set forth in various counts, each of which may constitute a distinct offense, was allowed. The
narration in the information of the specific acts was considered a bill of particulars of facts upon which
the inference of the guilt of the accused of the crime charged may be based and, consequently, was
held not objectionable. The same thing may be said of the information in the present case.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case is ordered remanded
to the court below for proceedings on the merits. It appearing that the prosecution had expressed
willingness to delete from the information the averment of abortion, an amendment to this effect would
be in order. No costs.

Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur. 1äw phï1.ñët

Footnotes
1 Docketed as Criminal Case No. 763.

2 People vs. Iman, 62 Phil. 92.

3 Art. 338, Revised Penal Code.

4 U.S vs. Cernia, 10 Phil. 682, 690.