Literal Rule: A Tool For Statutory Interpretation: Submitted To
Literal Rule: A Tool For Statutory Interpretation: Submitted To
Submitted To
Mr.S.Bala Shanmugam
(Associate professor in Interpretation of Statutes)
By
P.Prashanna Guruparan
III year B.A.LL.B (Honrs)
(Reg no.BA0150032)
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ACKNOWNLEDGMENT
Shanmugam from the bottom of my heart who has been of immense help during
moments of anxiety and torpidity while the project was taking its crucial shape.
and the administrative staff of TNNLS who held the project in high esteem by
precious time is unforgettable and highly solicited. Their valuable advice and
timely supervision paved the way for the successful completion of this project.
Finally, I thank the Almighty who gave me the courage and stamina to
confront all hurdles during the making of this project. Words aren’t sufficient to
project, as I know ‘Words are Poor Comforters’. I once again wholeheartedly and
earnestly thank all the people who were involved directly or indirectly during this
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DECLARATION
Interpretation of Statutes, Tamil Nadu National law school and has not
(P.Prashanna Guruparan)
B.A., LL.B (Hons)
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LITERAL RULE: A TOOL FOR STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
INDEX:
CHAPTER I
Interpretation:
Rules Associated With Rule Of Interpretation:
CHAPTER II
Literal Rule of Interpretation
Appraisal of the Principle
Merits
Present Position in India
CHAPTER III
CRITICISMS OF THE LITERAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION
CHAPTER IV
Golden Rule of Interpretation
Rule of Harmonious Construction
Rule of Beneficial Construction:
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION:
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS:
4. If not what are the other rules of interpreting statutes and how are they better than the
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LITERAL RULE: A TOOL FOR STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
INTERPRETATION:
Interpretation is the method by which the true sense or the meaning of the word is
understood. The meaning of an ordinary word of the English Language is not a question of law.
According to Gray, the process by a judge constructs from the words of a statute book, a
meaning which he either believes to be that of the legislature, or which, he proposes to attribute
to its interpretation. Salmond describes interpretation or construction as the process by which the
court seeks to ascertain the meaning of the legislature through the medium of authoritative forms
in which it is expressed.
CHAPTER I
Ejusdem Generis:-When particular words forming part of the same class or same category are
followed by general words then the general words must be construed in the context of the
particular words1.It means of the same kind or nature. According to this principle, the words of a
statute are to be understood in their context especially when general words are used in a
summarizing or comprehensive manner. If there is some kind of ambiguity the word has to be
interpreted in the light of words used earlier. If a man tells his wife to go to the market to buy
1
A.N SAHA,, MITRAS LEGAL AND COMMERCIAL DICTIONARY 257 (5th ed1994).
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vegetables, fruits, groceries and anything else she needs, the ‘anything else’ would be taken to
mean food and grocery items due to the rule of ejusdem generis and not cosmetics or other
feminine accessories. In Workmen of Dimakuchi v. Dimakuchi Tea Estate2 the problem arose
regarding the interpretation of “any person” whose services is not like worker or employer
So the rule of ejusdem generis was applied. When a particular word is followed by
general words the rule of interpretation is that these common words are limited to the same
species or the same category as the particular word3. In State of Madras v. Shantabai4 the
question arose whether or not university is a ‘State’. The court held that it is not a State. The
expression “all other articles whatsoever”, must be interpreted to mean only article of the same
kind as those expressly dealt with by the statute. The court will not apply ejusdem generis. But it
Casus Omissus: The Casus Omissus rule provides that omissions in a statute cannot be supplied
by judicial constructions6. This rule signifies that omissions in a statute cannot as a general rule
be supplied by interpretation. The courts have the liberty only to remedy the logical defects in
words and phrases used in the statute and the intention of the legislature. The court prefers the
interpretation in accordance with the words used without adding a new word. In Parkinson v
Plunton7 while interpreting catering establishment in Wages Act, 1943 the House of Lords
preferred the interpretation in accordance with the language used therein and did not extend to
2
(1958)1LLJ500S.C
3
Chipman JohnGRAY NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAW, 176(2 nd edn.).
4
AIR 1958 SC 532
5
Ujjambai v State of Uttar Pradesh. AIR 1962 SC 1621
6
N.Mani Tripathi, ,JURISPRUDENCE-LEGAL THEORY 253 (17 th ed Allahabad Law Agency.
7
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The approach of the court is not to apply certain words which are not found in the statute.
However if the intention of the legislature is faulty, either too broad or too narrow, the courts are
bound to accept them as they are given and they cannot either add, alter, modify, deduct or
amend from the given statute, as such an action would amount to legislation rather than
construction or interpretation. It is not duty of the Court to stretch the words used by the
Expressio unius est excusio alterius-The express mention of one person or thing is the
exclusion of another. Where the statutory language is plain and the meaning clear, there is no
scope for applying the rule8. If a given word or phrase is competent of two interpretations, the
express mention of one of the possibilities on a similar context excludes the other possibility.
This rule may be used to denote the aim or intention of the Legislature, although it would not be
safe to regard it as an obligatory rule of law. In the words of Lopes, L.J this maxim means “a
valuable servant but a dangerous master9”. Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
defines “transfer of property”, which means, “an act by which living persons conveys property,
in present or future, to one or more other living persons or to himself in and one or more
The next paragraph provides that in this section “living person” includes a company or
association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not .This clearly provides that “living
person” not only means an individual or human being but can also refers to a company or
association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not .However this rule may not
always provide the answer to problems of construction. It is often the result of inadvertence or
8
N.MANI TRIPATHI, ,JURISPRUDENCE-LEGAL THEORY 253 (17 th ed Allahabad Law
Agency,Faridabad,2006).
9
70Coluhoun v. Brooks (1886)21 Q.B.D 52
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accident that this principle is applied and the maxim ought not to be applied when its application,
injustice. This maxim is also not used to extend the operation of a statute beyond the operation of
a statute beyond the provision that it actually makes, e.g. a law enacted by Parliament for A,
what is already a law for A and others, the new law will not change the law for others.
CHAPTER II
is also known as plain rule of Interpretation. In this form of interpretation the “words” used in the
statute are construed according to their “literal” meaning or according to the popular and
dictionary meaning of the term, in other words its plain sense. Chief Justice Jervis in Abley v
Gale10 has explained the expression ‘literal meaning’. He points out that “if the precise words
used are plain and unambiguous, in our judgment we are bound to construe them in their
ordinary sense even though it too leads in our view of the case to an absurdity or manifest
injustice. This is given in the Latin term verbis legis non est recelendum, which means from the
The words of a statute are to be first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense
and phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that
leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context, or in the object of the statute
to suggest the contrary. Interpretation of a statute would be to give its plain meaning language of
the statute is clear and unambiguous it is not necessary to look into the legislative.
10
20 L.J.C.P (N.S) 233 (1851).
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It is not necessary to take legislative’s intention is to be taken into consideration. There is
no room for construction if there isn’t any ambiguity. If the language of a statute is clear and
unambiguous the court must give effect to it and it has no right to extend its operation in order to
In the case of Deepak Aggarwal v Keshav Kaushik & Ors11 the interpretation of the
word has been was the issue. Art of the Constitution of India held that
‘A person shall only be eligible to be appointed as a District Judge if he has been, for not less
than seven years, an advocate or pleader, and is recommended by the High Court for appointment’
The three judges Bench of Supreme Court held that it is clear from the expression “has
been” that the present continuous tense is used for a position which began sometime in the past
and is still continuing, and therefore such person must, with the requisite period, still be
In the case of Healthways Dairy Products Co. Regd., Gauhati Vs. Union of India the
issue whether condensed skimmed milk will be included under condensed milk for tax
exemption where the SC held that unless other specified in the statute separately, the condensed
skimmed milk is included within the definition of condensed milk and it can be exempted from
levying tax.
APPRAISAL OF PRINCIPLE
It may be paradoxical that plain meaning rule is not plain and requires no construction, starts
with a premise that the words are plain, which is itself a conclusion reaches after construing the
11
(2013) 5 SCC 277 p.331
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words12. The rule, that plain words require no construction, starts with the premise that the words
are plain, which is itself a conclusion reached after construing the words. It is not possible to
decide whether certain words are plain or ambiguous unless they are studied in their context and
construed13. The rule therefore, in reality means that after you have construed the words and
have come to the conclusion that they can bear only one meaning, your duty is to give effect to
that meaning. For a proper application of the rule to a given statute, it is necessary, therefore, to
determine first whether the language used is plain or ambiguous. As pointed out by Lord
Buckmaster, “by any ‘ambiguity’ is meant a phrase fairly and equally open to diverse meanings”.
Let’s take the case of Kanai Lal v.Paramnidh.14 This case basically dealt with the ejection
of thika tenants under provisions of Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949. The court said “It must
always be kept in mind that the first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the
Legislature must be found in the words used by the legislature.” It also added “When the
material words are capable of two constructions, one of which is likely to defeat or impair the
policy the Act whilst the other construction is likely to assist the achievement of the said policy,
In S.A.Venkataraman v. The State16, the court said. This case dealt with Section 6 of the
Prevention of Corruption Act. It was to do with taking a sanction from an appropriate authority.
12
SINGH, supra note 3
13
D. Saibaba v. Bar Council of India and Anr AIR 2003 SC 2502
14
A.I.R 1957 SC 907.
15
4Justice G.P SINGH, PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 53(11th ed 2008)
16
A.I.R 1958 SC 107
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It considers only the present working employees as employees; those who have retired are not
considered as employees. The court said, “In construing the provisions of a statute it is essential
for a court, in the first instance, to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used therein if
those words are clear enough”. Apparently clear and simple language at times in its analysis is so
Constitution which provides that ‘no member of the Parliament shall be liable to any proceeding
The Supreme Court in Tej Kiran Jain v. N.Sanjeeva Reddy17 held that the Article means
what it says in language which could not be plainer. In the case of P.V Narshima Rao v.
State(Central Bureau of Investigation)18 when Mr.P.V.Narshima Rao was the Prime Minister, the
government faced a no-confidence movement, which was defeated later on. However they were
few members who were accused of the offence of giving and taking bribes and the President of
Rashtriya Mukti Morcha filed a complaint, against the P.V.Narishma Rao, alleging charges of
corruption, with the Central Bureau of Investigation. However Article 105 of the Indian
Constitution which gives provisions for the powers and privileges of the members of the House
of Parliament. It was held by a majority of three judges that a member who voted in Parliament
after receipt of bribe cannot be prosecuted as his prosecution would be a proceeding in respect of
In another case Ramavtar Budhaiprasad v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer19, the Supreme
court was faced with a question with the meaning of “vegetable”, as it had occurred in the C.P
and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947 as amended by Act of 1948,whether the word vegetables included
17
(1971) 1 SCR 612.
18
(1998) 4 SCC 626
19
(1961) A.I.R SC 1325
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betel leaves or not. The Supreme Court held that “being a word of everyday use it must be
construed in its popular sense20”. It was therefore held that betel leaves were excluded from its
purview.
In the case of Forest range Officer v. Khushboo Enterprise21 The question in the case was
whether sandal wood oil is “wood oil” as used in the Section 2(f) of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961.
The argument referred to a technical dictionary which defined wood-oil as a natural produce of
the forest. Hence it was held that sandalwood oil was a wood-oil. In the case of Vemma Reddy
Kumarsawmy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh22, The dispute was regarding the excess of land
possessed by the appellant, and this was surrendered by them, however it had cashew-nut
plantation. The trees in the surrendered land were fruit bearing. The court stated that in
construing if it was plain and ambiguous then the primary rule of interpretation was supposed to
be used.
MERITS
The advantages while using literal rule of interpretation. Literal rule of interpretation being a
traditional rule of interpretation is often advocated by jurists of the plain meaning rule who claim
that it prevents courts from taking sides in legislative or political issues. They also point out that
ordinary people and lawyers do not have extensive access to secondary sources23 . It is also
argued, that extrinsic evidence should not be allowed to vary the words used by the testator or
20
TRIPATHI, supra note 40, at 127.
21
A.I.R 1994 SC 120
22
(2006) 2 SCC 670
23
SINGH, supra note 3
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JURISTIC ANALYSIS
CASE STUDIES
The court said-“it must always be borne in mind that the first and primary rule of construction is
that the intention of the Legislature must be found in the words used by the legislature.” It also
added-“When the material words are capable of two constructions, one of which is likely to
defeat or impair the policy of which is likely to defeat or impair the policy of the Act whilst the
other construction is likely to assist the achievement of the said policy, then the courts would
prefer to adopt the latter construction.” This case basically dealt with the ejection of ‘theka’
The court said that this case dealt with Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. It was to
do with taking a sanction from an appropriate authority .It considers only the present working
employees as employees, those who have retired are not considered as employees. The court
said, “In construing the provisions of a statute it is essential for a court, in the first instance, to
give effect to the natural meaning of the words used therein, if those words are clear enough.”
c. Ramavtar Budhaiprasad v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer26 The Supreme court was faced
with a question with the meaning of “vegetable”, as it had occurred in the C.P and Berar Sales
Tax Act, 1947 as amended by Act of 1948,whether the word vegetables included betel leaves or
24
AIR 1957 SC 907
25
AIR 1958 SC 107
26
AIR 2002 SC 135
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not. The Supreme Court held that “being a word of everyday use it must be construed in its
popular sense”27. It was therefore held that betel leaves were excluded from its purview.
d. Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India28 Sub- section 7 of section 6 of the Press Coucil
Act, 1978 provides: ‘A retiring member shall be eligible for renomination for not more than one
term.’ The Supreme Court applied the literal and grammatical meaning of these words and held
that the provision applied to a member “just retiring” and not to a retired member and that a
retired member who had held office for two terms sometime in the past is not debarred from
CHAPTER III
There are certain defects of the literal rule of interpretation. The defects may be of two types
Logical defect which constitutes of ambiguity, inconsistency and incompleteness and the second
statute has not one but various meanings, and it is not clear which one particular meaning it
represents at which particular context or place. So here the court will have to go beyond the
statute and yet stick to the same literal words of the statute to ascertain its meaning. Also the
ambiguity sometimes is “syntactic29” which means the vagueness arises from words like “or”,
“and”, “all” and other such words. For example if a punishment for a certain crime is “fine or
27
Ramavtar Budhaiprasad v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer A.I.R 1961 SC 1325; p.1326
28
AIR 2002 SC 1351
29
P J FITZGERALD,,SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE 152 (12 th ed.,Universal Law Publishing
Co.Pvt.Ltd.,2008).
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imprisonment or both”, the court can imprison the accused or impose a fine or impose a fine as
well as imprison him. If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, the Court cannot
discard the plain meaning, even if it leads to an injustice30. The words cannot be understood
properly without the context in which it is used. The strict adherence to this principle may cause
injustice and sometimes it might give results which are quite contrary to general intention of the
In case there is some lacuna or omission in the statute which prevents it from giving a
complete idea, or it makes it logically incomplete, it is the duty of the court to make up the defect
by adding or altering something, but the court is not allowed to do more than that. It is
permissible only in cases where the statutes are inapplicable in their present form, which is
incomplete. For the change, either alteration or addition the court looks into the matters which
will probably help it in ascertaining the intention of the legislature. It is not necessary that judges
would always find some or the other means to help them in cases of defective texts. There will
be some cases where they might find nothing of this kind. They may ascertain the intention of
the legislature which presumably, would have had the defect come to notice.
AMBIGUITY
Ambiguity occurs where a term or an expression used in a statute has not one but various
meanings, and it is not clear which one particular meaning it represents at which particular
context or place
30
CIT vs. T.V. Sundaram Iyyengar [1975] 101 ITR 764 (SC)
31
AIYER,P.RAMNATHAN, LAW LEXICON 1134 (2 nd ed.,Wadhwa and Co., ,2002).
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INJUSTICE
The words cannot be understood properly without the context in which it is used. The strict
adherence to this principle may cause injustice and sometimes it might give results which are
INCOMPLETENESS
It means that there is some lacuna or omission in the statute which prevents it from giving a
complete idea, or it is logically incomplete. In such cases it is the duty of the court to make
up the defect by adding or altering something, but the court is not allowed to do more than
that.
ABSURDITY
Sometimes the court might ascertain a certain meaning to the statute which was never the
intention of the legislature. This is also one of the problems of literal rule.
RESTRICTION ON COURTS
The traditional rule of literal interpretation forbids the court to attach any meaning other than
the ordinary one. It closes the doors for any type of judicial innovation.
With a change in policies and legislation, the statutes cannot still be interpreted in accordance
32
N.S BINDRA, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 4 (9 edn Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 2002).
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CHAPTER IV
The Golden rule, or British rule, is a form of statutory interpretation that allows a judge to depart
It is a compromise between the plain meaning (or literal) rule and the mischief rule. Like the
plain meaning rule, it gives the words of a statute their plain, ordinary meaning33. However,
when this may lead to an irrational result that is unlikely to be the legislature's intention, the
The mischief rule is a certain rule that judges can apply in statutory interpretation in order to
discover Parliament's intention. Originating from a 16th century case (Heydon’s case) in the
33
Rao Mn & Dhanda Amita, Bindra N S, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 433(10 th edn Lexis Nexis
Butterworth’s, 2007
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United Kingdom, its main aim is to determine the "mischief and defect" that the statute in
question has set out to remedy, and what ruling would effectively implement this remedy
When there is a conflict between two or more statues or two or more parts of a statute then the
rule of harmonious construction needs to be adopted. The rule follows a very simple premise that
every statute has a purpose and intent as per law and should be read as a whole34. The
interpretation consistent of all the provisions of the statute should be adopted. In the case in
which it shall be impossible to harmonize both the provisions, the court’s decision regarding the
Beneficial Construction is a tendency and not a rule. The reason is that this principle is based on
human tendency to be fair, accommodating, and just. Instead of restricting the people from
getting the benefit of the statute, Court tends to include as many classes as it can while remaining
For example, in the case of Alembic Chemical Works vs. Workmen35, an industrial tribunal
awarded more number of paid leaves to the workers than what Section 79(1) of Factories Act
recommended. This was challenged by the appellant. The Supreme Court held that the enactment
being welfare legislation for the workers had to be beneficially constructed in the favour of
34
https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/tag/harmonious-construction/
35
AIR 1961
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worker and thus, if the words are capable of two meanings, the one that gives benefit to the
The golden rule is a slight modification of the Literal Rule. It is considered a part of the literal
construction.
In this case the court can depart from the ordinary meaning of the words; here it tends to avoid
absurdity. Mischief rule is to remove the mischief in a statute. Literal rule is the most ancient
rule used in interpretation. Where there is an inconsistency, the judiciary will attempt to provide
a harmonious interpretation.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION:
Literal rule of interpretation is the primary rule. Under this rule of interpretation the
Courts interpret the statutes in a literal and ordinary sense. They interpret the words of the statute
in a way that is used commonly by all. It is incumbent on the court to use the grammatical
meaning.
The statutes should be construed in such a manner as though there is no other meaning
except the literal meaning. It is an old and traditional rule of interpretation. It is used not only in
England where it originated but also in India37. The Courts while interpreting statutes have to
keep few things in mind. It must realize that a provision is ambiguous only if it contains a word
or phrase which has more than one meaning. If the interpretation is open to different meanings in
36
Rao Mn & Dhanda Amita, Bindra N S, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 433(10 th edn Lexis Nexis
Butterworth’s, 2007
37
Bindra N.S, Interpretation Of Statutes (9 edn Lexis Nexis Butterworth’s, 2002).
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one context it is ambiguous but if it is susceptible to different meaning in different contexts it is
plain. The art of correct interpretation would depend on the ability to read what is stated in plain
language, read between the lines, read ‘through’ the provision, examining the intent of the
Legislature and call upon case laws and other aids to interpretation.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY:
Books referred:
Chipman John, Gray Nature And Sources Of Law, 176(2 nd Edn.) The Columbia University
Press.
Co.Pvt.Ltd.,2008).
Butterworth’s).
Sites referred:
http://www.caaa.in/Image/Interpretation%20of%20Statutes.pdf
http://hanumant.com/index.php/academics/law-notes/14-interpretation-of-
statutes.html
http://lawtimesjournal.in/interpretation-of-statutes-important-questions
https://definitions.uslegal.com/l/literal-rule/
https://kively2010.wordpress.com/2011/12/20/what-are-the-difference-between-
literal-golden-and-mischief-rule/
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https://www.translegal.com/lesson/statutory-interpretation-2
https://www.stuvia.com/doc/55829/explain-the-literal-rule-of-statutory-
interpretation
https://www.lawctopus.com/academike/mischief-rule-statutory-interpretation/
Articles referred:
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