In The Matter of The IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION

In re: Edillion, AM No.
1928, August 3, 1978
Facts:
 On November 29, 1975, the IBP Board of Governors, unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65
in Administrative case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty.
Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from
its Roll of Attorneys for 'stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues' to the IBP since the
latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.
 On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said
resolution to the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24,
Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which. reads: “Should the delinquency further continue until
the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the
continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a
recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from
the Roll of Attorneys.”
 Respondent Edillion argued that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional
rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a
lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that
as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is
admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions
of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
 Edillion further questioned the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of
Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the
Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."
Issues:
1. WHETHER THE COURT IS WITHOUT POWER TO COMPEL HIM TO BECOME A MEMBER OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
2. WHETHER THE PROVISION OF THE COURT RULE REQUIRING PAYMENT OF A MEMBERSHIP FEE IS
VOID
3. WHETHER THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE PENALTY PROVISIONS WOULD AMOUNT TO A
DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS
4. WHETHER THE POWER OF SC TO STRIKE THE NAME OF A LAWYER FROM ITS ROLL OF
ATTORNEYS IS VALID.
Ruling:
1. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of Edillon’s

constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate
with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or
vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State’s
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the
cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of
the regulatory program — the lawyers. But, assuming that the questioned provision does in a
sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an
exercise of the police power of the State.
2. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the Court, to promulgate rules concerning the admission
to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973
Constitution) — from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a
reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they
belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to
raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration.
3. It must be emphasized that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege,
and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with
the lawyer’s public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name
of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have
been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the
authorities holding such are legion.
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly
granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power
to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed
undoubtedly vested in the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
Respondent Marcial A. Edillon is disbarred, and his name was ordered to be stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys of the Court.

In The Matter of The IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION

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In The Matter of The IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION

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In re: Edillion, AM No.

1928, August 3, 1978

1. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of Edillon’s

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