Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 194390 August 13, 2014

VENANCIO M. SEVILLA, Petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

REYES, J.:

FACTS:

The prosecution alleged that on July 2, 2001, the

first day of his term as councilor of the City of
Malabon, Sevilla made a false narration in his Personal
Data Sheet (PDS).6 That in answer to the question of
whether there is a pending criminalcase against him,
Sevilla marked the box corresponding to the "no"
answer despite the pendency of a criminal case against
him for assault upon an agent ofa person in authority
before the Metropolitan Trial Court ofMalabon City,
Branch 55.

OMB Ruling: OMB found Sevilla administratively liable

for dishonesty and falsification of official document
and dismissed him from the service. In Sevilla v.
Gervacio, the Court, in the Resolution dated June 23,
2003, affirmed the findings of the Office of the
Ombudsman as regards Sevilla’s administrative
liability.

According to Sevilla, he instructed his staf

Mendoza to copy the entries in the previous copy of
his PDS which he filed with the personnel office. After
the PDS was filled up and delivered to him by
Mendoza, Sevilla claims that he just signed the same
without checking the veracity of the entries therein.
That he failed to notice that, in answer to the question
of whether he has any pending criminal case, Mendoza
checked the box corresponding to the "no" answer.
 The defense likewise presented the testimony of
Edilberto G. Torres (Torres), a former City Councilor.
Torres testified that Sevilla was not yet given an office
space in the Malabon City Hall on July 2, 2001; that
when the members of Sevilla’s staf would then need
to use the typewriter, they would just use the
typewriter inside Torres’ office. Torres further claimed
that he saw Mendoza preparing the PDS of Sevilla, the
latter having used the typewriter in his office.

SB Ruling: The Sandiganbayan opined that Sevilla

cannot be convicted of falsification of public document
under Article 171(4)10 of the RPC since he did not act
with maliciousintent to falsify the aforementioned
entry in his PDS. However, considering that Sevilla’s
PDS was haphazardly and recklessly done, which
resulted in the false entry therein, the Sandiganbayan
convicted Sevilla of falsification of public document
through reckless imprudence under Article 36511 of
the RPC. Thus:

Moreover, the marking of the "no" box to the

question on whether there was a pending criminal
case against him was not the only defect in his PDS. As
found by the Office of the Honorable Ombudsman in
its Resolution, in answer to question 29 inthe PDS,
accused answered that he had not been a candidate in
any localelection (except barangay election), when in
fact he ran and served ascouncilor of Malabon from
1992 to 1998. Notwithstanding the negative answer in
question 29, in the same PDS, in answer to question
21, he revealed that he was a councilor from 1992 to
1998. Not to give premium to a negligent act, this
nonetheless shows that the preparation of the PDS
was haphazardly and recklessly done.

Taking together these circumstances, this Court is

persuaded that accused did not act with malicious
intent to falsify the document in question but merely
failed to ascertain for himself the veracity of narrations
in his PDS before affixing his signature thereon. The
reckless signing of the PDS without verifying the data
therein makes him criminally liable for his act. Accused
is a government officer, who prior to his election as
councilor in 2001, had already served as a councilor of
the same city. Thus, he should have been more
mindful of the importance of the PDS and should have
treated the said public document with due respect.
SB ruling: accused is convictedof Falsification of Public
Document through Reckless Imprudence, as defined
and penalized in Article 171, paragraph 4, in relation to
Article 365, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. x x
x.12

MR Denied.

SB erred in finding him guilty of the felony of

falsification of public documents through reckless
imprudence. He claims that the Information that was
filed against him specifically charged him with the
commission of an intentional felony, i.e.falsification of
public documents under Article 171(4) of the RPC.
Thus, he could not be convicted of falsification of
public document through reckless imprudence under
Article 365 of the RPC, which is a culpable felony, lest
his constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him be violated.

This petition.

ISSUE:
Whether Sevilla can be convicted of the felony of
falsification of public document through reckless
imprudence notwithstanding that the charge against
him in the Information was for the intentional felony
of falsification of public document under Article 171(4)
of the RPC.

RULING:

The appeal is dismissed for lack of merit.

The Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of reckless

imprudence, punished under Article 365 of the RPC,
which resulted into the falsification of a public
document. However, the Sandiganbayan designated
the felony committed as "falsification of public
document through reckless imprudence." The
foregoing designation implies that reckless
imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a
modality of committing it. Quasi-ofenses under Article
365 of the RPC are distinct and separatecrimes and not
a mere modality in the commission of a crime.

In Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro,14 the Court

explained that:

Indeed, the notion that quasi-ofenses, whether

reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime,
separately defined and penalized under the framework
of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the
middle of the last century, we already sought to bring
clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of
the Peace of Pampangathe proposition that "reckless
imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of
committing it x x x" on three points of analysis: (1) the
object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to
intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat
quasi crimes as distinct ofenses (as opposed to
subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of
minimal intent) and; (3) the diferent penalty
structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:

The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the

Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not
a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and
merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability
is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are
crimes that by their structure cannot be committed
through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery,
maliciousmischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in
our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi
ofense, and dealt with separately from willful
ofenses. It is not a mere question of classification or
terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is
punished; in negligence or imprudence, what
isprincipally penalized is the mental attitude or
condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness,
lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible.x x x

Were criminal negligence but a modality in the

commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the
penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the
mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack
of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one
actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would
require that the corresponding penalty should befixed
in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime
when committed willfully. For each penalty for the
willful ofense, there would then be a corresponding
penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our
Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for
reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to
prision correccional[medium], if the willful act would
constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the
penalty for the latter could range all the way from
prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be
seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence
bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is
set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.
(Emphasis supplied)

This explains why the technically correct way to

allege quasicrimes is to state that their commission
results in damage, either to person or property.15
(Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

Further, in Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation v.

People,16 the Court clarified that:

Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code,

criminal negligence "is treated as a mere quasi ofense,
and dealt with separately from willful ofenses. It is
not a question ofclassification or terminology. In
intentional crimes, the act itselfis punished; in
negligence or imprudence, what is principally
penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind
the act, the dangerousrecklessness, lack of care or
foresight, the imprudencia punible. Much of the
confusion has arisen from the common use of such
descriptive phrase as ‘homicide through reckless
imprudence’, and the like; when the strict technical
sense is, more accurately, ‘reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide’; or ‘simple imprudence causing
damages to property’."

Thus, the proper designation ofthe felony should be

reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public
documents and not falsification of public
documentsthrough reckless imprudence.

Having threshed out the proper designation of the

felony committed by Sevilla, the Court now weighs the
merit of the instant appeal. Sevilla’s appeal is
anchored mainly on the variance between the ofense
charged in the Information that was filed against him
and that proved by the prosecution. The rules on
variance between allegation and proof are laid down
under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court,
viz:
 Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between
allegation and proof. – When there is variance
between the ofense charged in the complaint or
information and that proved, and the ofense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes the
ofense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the
ofense proved which is included in the ofense
charged, or of the ofense charged which isincluded in
the ofense proved.

Sec. 5. When an ofense includes or is included in

another. – An ofense charged necessarily includes the
ofense proved when some of the essential elements
or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an
ofense charged is necessarily included in the ofense
proved, when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
 DOCTRINAL: in case of variance between
the allegation and proof, a defendant may be
convictedof the ofense proved when the
ofense charged is included in or necessarily
includes the ofense proved.

Start ANALYSIS/ Answer with this: There is no

dispute that a variance exists between the ofense
alleged against Sevilla and that proved by the
prosecution – the Information charged him with
the intentional felony of falsification of public
document under Article 171(4) of the RPC while
the prosecution was able to prove reckless
imprudence resulting to falsification ofpublic
documents. Parenthetically, the question that has to
be resolved then is:

whether reckless imprudence resulting to

falsification of public document is necessarily
included in the intentional felony of falsification
ofpublic document under Article 171(4) of the
RPC.
The Court, in Samson v. Court of Appeals,18 has
answered the foregoing question in the affirmative.
Thus:

It is however contended that appellant Samson

cannot be convicted of the crime of estafathrough
falsification by imprudence for the reason that the
information filed against him charges only a willful act
of falsification and contains no reference to any act of
imprudence on his part. Nor can it be said, counsel
argues, that the alleged imprudent act includes or is
necessarily includedin the ofense charged in the
information because a deliberate intent to do an
unlawful act is inconsistent with the idea of
negligence.

xxxx

While a criminal negligent act is nota simple

modality of a wilful crime, as we held in Quizon v.
Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, x x x, but a distinct
crime in itself, designated asa quasi ofense, in our
Penal Code, it may however be said that a conviction
for the former can be had under an information
exclusively charging the commission of a wilful
ofense, upon the theory that the greater includes the
lesser ofense. This is the situation that obtains in the
present case. Appellant was charged with willful
falsification but from the evidence submitted by the
parties, the Court of Appeals found thatin efecting the
falsification which made possible the cashing of checks
inquestion, appellant did not act with criminal intent
but merely failed to take proper and adequate means
to assure himself of the identity of the real claimants
as an ordinary prudent man would do. In other words,
the information alleges acts which charge willful
falsification but which turned out to be not willful but
negligent. This is a case covered by the rule when
there is a variance between the allegation and proof,
and is similar to some of the cases decided by this
Tribunal.19 (Emphasis ours)
 Thus, Sevilla’s claim that his constitutional right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him was violated when the Sandiganbayan
convicted him of reckless imprudence resulting to
falsification of public documents, when the
Information only charged the intentional felony of
falsification of public documents, is untenable. To
stress, reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of
public documents is an ofense that is necessarily
included in the willful act of falsification of public
documents, the latter being the greater ofense. As
such, he can be convicted of reckless imprudence
resulting to falsification of public documents
notwithstanding that the Information only charged the
willful act of falsification of public documents.

In this regard, the Court’s disposition in Sarep v.

Sandiganbayan20 is instructive.1âwphi1 In Sarep, the
petitioner therein falsified his appointment paper
which he filed with the CSC. An Information was then
filed against him for falsification of public document.
Nevertheless, the Court convicted the accused of
reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public
document upon a finding that the accused therein did
not maliciously pervert the truth with the wrongful
intent of injuring some person. The Court, quoting the
Sandiganbayan’s disposition, held that:

We are inclined, however, to credit the accused

herein with the benefit of the circumstance that he did
not maliciously pervert the truth with the wrongful
intent of injuring some person (People vs. Reyes, 1
Phil. 341). Since he sincerely believed that his CSC
eligibility based on his having passed the Regional
CulturalCommunity Officer (Unassembled)
Examination and educational attainment were
sufficient to qualify him for a permanent position, then
he should only be held liable for falsification through
reckless imprudence.

Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, which

punishes criminal negligence or quasi-ofenses,
furnishes the middle way between a wrongful act
committed with wrongful intent, which gives rise to a
felony, and a wrongful act committed without any
intent which may entirely exempt the doer from
criminal liability. It is the duty of everyone to execute
his own acts with due care and diligence in order that
no prejudicial or injurious results may be sufered by
others from acts that are otherwise ofensive (Aquino,
R.P.C. Vol. III, 1976, Ed., p. 1884). What is penalized is
the mental attitude orcondition behind the acts of
dangerous recklessness and lack of care or foresight
although such mental attitude might have produced
several efects or consequences (People vs. Cano, L
19660, May 24, 1966).21

Anent the imposable penalty, under Article 365 of

the RPC, reckless imprudence resulting in falsification
of public document is punishable by arresto mayor in
its maximum period to prision correccional in its
medium period. In this case, taking into account the
pertinent provisions of Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the Sandiganbayan correctly imposed upon Sevilla the
penalty of four ( 4) months of arresto mayor as
minimum to two (2) years ten ( 10) months and twenty
one (21) days of prision correccional as maximum.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing

disquisitions, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision
dated February 26, 2009 and the Resolution dated
October 22, 2010 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case No. 27925 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN*

Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA**

Associate Justice
 CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the

Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice