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I.
Who has not heard it said, when the Hegelian philosophy has
been under discussion, that Hegel has invalidated the so-called
fundamental Law of Contradiction and its associated Law of Ex
cluded Middle, and, in consequence of this capital crime against
logic, has given his system a wholly illogical basis ? The number
of those who declare this is legion. It will be sufficient, however,
as we here enter the lists in behalf of the Hegelian doctrine, to
consider the arguments by which two chief representatives ot
logic attempt to protect it against this outrage, and confute the
sore offender, Hegel. u
I refer to Trendelenburg in his Logische
in his "
Untersuchungen," and Ueberweg System der Logik." The
other antagonists of the category of Contradiction bring forward
nothing further that is pertinent, and can very excusably be left
out of consideration.
It is certainly true that this category is a constituent element
in the Hegelian system; that Hegel conceived it as something
in as
actual, something freely given objective thought and reality,
an immanent characteristic of things themselves. He has a very
diction, on the other hand, is the source of all activity and life ;
only so far as anything has in itself contradiction is it vital, does
it show tendency and activity.
It is likewise true that Hegel has not accepted as a genuine
law of thought the principle of Excluded Middle, as
given in the
"
following formula : Of two opposed predicates, only one can be
to anything ; there can be no third." But in that con
assigned
tradiction, which, according to Hegel, is an element of all
reality,
and in the principle of Excluded Middle which he rejects, are the
contradictorily opposed judgments of the logicians?a la Trendel
enburg and Ueberweg?under consideration? At all events, in the
"
rejected principle, what is spoken of is two opposed predicates,"
not two contradictorily opposed says elsewhere:
" predicates. Hegel
The principle of Excluded Middle is the principle of the definite
understanding, which tries to avoid contradiction, but in so doing
falls into it. A must be either -j- a, or ? a. But in the very
statement itself there is already the third a, which is neither
plus
nor minus, but may be either. If -j- W means six miles to the
? If" six miles to the East, and plus and minus cancel
West, and
one another, the six miles of distance remains the same, with or
without their opposition. Even the mere plus and minus of ab
stract distance, or number, have, if you like, zero for a third."
We see by this, first of all, that Hegel is not considering contra
dictory, but contrary propositions, as the illustrations he gives
plainly indicate. Ueberweg also makes this plain in
referring to
Kant (u System der Logik," p. 214), as, for example, the contra
dictory opposite, the "logical negation"?to use
Trendelenburg's
the mathematical ?
expression?of -j- a is by no means a, but
not -f- a. Indeed, in the very passage quoted?" The principle of
Excluded Middle is the principle of the definite
Understanding,"
etc.,?it is further seen that the contradiction
designated byHegel
would not be simple subjective "
contradiction, pure logical nega
tion," but that he is thinking of contrary propositions and their
relations. The coexistence of
essentially opposite characteristics
in one object, or
conception, is what Hegel calls Contradiction.
He expressly gives this definition in the note to 89 of his " En
?
cyclopaedia."
In ? 119 of the " and in the two notes to the
Encyclopaedia,"
same, cited by Trendelenburg and
Ueberweg, Hegel gives the fol
1The editor allows a profuse use of capitals in this article, most of the words used
as categories being thus indicated.?Ed.
II.
ject, and it can then not be said that everything contains Differ
ence, which the Understanding persistently says. According to
one thing is distinguished from another, and thereby re
Hegel,
lated to that other through its own specific character. It is at
once related to self (self-identity), and related to another (opposi
body, is yet distinguished from it, and rises above the sphere of
its external expression to pure spiritual existence.
From what has been said, it should be clear that it is no "con
"
tradiction in terms when Hegel designates " soul as immediate,
"
natural spirit. The contradiction in terms lies rather with the
abstract understanding itself, meeting everything with "contra
diction in terms!" It brings on its own dead abstractions, and
believes that through them itwill be able to comprehend this
IV.
V.
. . . .An
objector to the Hegelian category' of Contradiction
" "
says, in allusion to Lotze's Geschichte der JEsthetik": The
Notion itself does not change with things, but only its applicability
to a definite sphere of existence. The same Notion continues true
only as it is related to a thing, depends upon it, changes with it."
Certainly such a notion of the understanding as is ready-made,