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Cristobal v Labrador | GR No 47941 | December 7, 1940 | En Banc | Laurel, J.

Article VII, Section 11, Paragraph 6 of Constitution then: The President shall have the
power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction, for all offenses, except in cases of impeachment, upon such conditions and with
such restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper to impose. He shall have the power to
grant amnesty with the concurrence of the National Assembly.

Doctrine: Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the President’s pardoning
power cannot be restricted of controlled by legislative action. An absolute pardon not only blots
out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction.

Nature of Case: Petition for Writ of Certiorari to review decision of Court of First Instance of
Rizal in election case sustaining Teofilo C. Santos’s retention in list of eligible voters, in light of
presidential pardon, not withstanding his prior conviction for crime of estafa

Facts:
 March 5, 1930: CFI of Rizal found Teofilo C. Santos guilty of estafa and sentence him
to six months of arresto mayor, and order him to pay to Toribio Alarcon and Emilio
Raymundo P375 and P125 respectively
 December 20, 1930: Confirmed judgment of Conviction
 March 4 to August 18, 1932: Santos confined in Jail of Pasig
 1934 to 1937: Teofilo continued being a registered elector of Malabon, Rizal
 August 22, 1938: Commonwealth Act 357, Election Code, was approved by National
Assembly. Section 94, Paragraph B, thereof: Disqualified from voting anyone “declared
by final judgment guilty of any crime against property
 August 15, 1939: Santos requested absolute pardon from president
 December 24, 1939: With recommendation from Secretary of Justice, President grants
petition, restoring Santos’s "full civil and political rights, except that with respect to the
right to hold public office or employment, he will be eligible for appointment only to
positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or property
responsibility."
 November 16, 1940: Miguel Cristobal filed for exclusion of Santos from list of voters in
precint No. 11 of Malabon Rizal on the ground of latter disqualification under Section 94,
Paragraph B of Election Code
 November 28, 1940: Court below held that the pardon extended by the President in
favor of the respondent excludes him from disqualification created by New Election Code
 Petitioner:
o Pardoning power does not apply to legislative prohibitions
o Pardoning power here is unlawful exercise by executive of legislative functions
o The respondent already served out his sentence and penalties, there was nothing
to pardon.

Issue + Ruling:
 WON Santos should be disqualified as voter through Commonwealth Act 357? (NO)
o Limitations on Presidential Pardon
 Pardon be exercised after conviction
 Does not extend to cases of impeachment
o Absent limitations, power of presidential pardon cannot be restricted or controlled
by legislative action. Sovereign authority awarded to president to pardon
o An absolute pardon blots out the crime, and also all consequences resulting from
conviction (not just imprisonment; but all accessory and resultant disabilities)
o Disqualification, in this case, is based solely on the conviction
o Although pardon is conditional in the sense of appointment only to clerical
responsibilities, it is absolute in so far as restoring civil and political rights
o United States pardoning power does not restore privilege of voting because right
of suffrage is exclusively in hands of State not Federal Governement
o Commonwealth Act 357 is not in purview of presidential pardoning power, not
allowed to impair said power
o Impairment would result to restoring political privilege only through legislative
action, which is not contemplated in Constitution
Disposition:
Petition Not Granted.
Dissent:
 Horilleno, M. (Spanish so I really didn’t understand most parts)
o Presidential pardon should involve forgiveness but not forgetfulness
o Pardon may relieve disability of fines and forfeitures, but not stain of bad
character
o Pardon doesn’t not erase fact of conviction which isn’t reversed or set aside
o Pardon may be granted, but the fact of prior conviction subsists especially in the
context of conviction for habitual criminality
o Common law: once convicted of crime, no longer competent witness
o Common law: legislature may put absolute tests and debar privileges of electors
o Primera Conclusion:
 Que el decreto de indulto a favor del recurrido Santos no tenia objeto.
o Segunda Conclusion:
 Que, si bien el indulto remite el castigo impuesto al reo, no tiene la virtud,
sin embargo, de borrar la comision del delito y la conviccion del acusado.
o Tercera Conclusion
 Que el inciso (b) del articulo 94 del Codigo Electoral no es, propiamente
hablando, una pena ni una incapacidad (disability) resultante de la
conviccion del recurrido.

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