De Guzman v. CA - Docx-2
De Guzman v. CA - Docx-2
De Guzman v. CA - Docx-2
AGUILAR, Yna Marei
DE GUZMAN VS. CA
G.R. No. L-47822; December 22, 1988
DOCTRINES:
Common Carriers; Definition of; Art. 1732 of the Civil Code makes no distinctions between a person or
enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and such service on an
occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis.
Same; Same; Same; The concept of common carrier under Art. 1732 coincides with the notion of Public
Service under the Public Service Act (CA No. 1416).
FACTS:
Ernesto Cendana, a junk dealer, was engaged in buying up used bottles and scrap metal in Pangasinan.
Upon gathering sufficient quantities, he would bring them to Manila for resale through two (2)
six-wheeler trucks which he owned. On the return trip to Pangasinan, he would load his vehicles with
cargo which various merchants wanted delivered to different establishments in Pangasinan. For that
service, he charged freight rates which were commonly lower than regular commercial rates.
In 1970, Pedro de Guzman, a merchant and authorized dealer of General Milk Company Phil., Inc. in
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, contracted with Cendana for the hauling of 750 cartons of Liberty filled milk from
a warehouse in Makati, Rizal, to de Guzman's establishment in Urdaneta. Accordingly, Cendana loaded
in Makati the merchandise on to his trucks: 150 cartons were loaded on a truck driven by himself, while
600 cartons were placed on board the other truck which was driven by Manuel Estrada, his driver and
employee.
Only 150 boxes of Liberty filled milk were delivered to de Guzman. The other 600 boxes never reached
him, since the truck which carried these boxes was hijacked somewhere along the MacArthur Highway in
Paniqui, Tarlac, by armed men who took with them the truck, its driver, his helper and the cargo.
In 1971, de Guzman commenced action against Cendana in CFI Pangasinan, alleging that Cendana,
being a common carrier, and having failed to exercise the extraordinary diligence required of him by the
law, should be held liable for the value of the undelivered goods.
Cendana denied that he was a common carrier and argued that he could not be held responsible for the
value of the lost goods, such loss having been due to force majeure.
In 1975, RTC held Cendana to be a common carrier and thus liable. CA reversed the judgment and held
that Cendana had been engaged in transporting return loads of freight "as a casual occupation – a
sideline to his scrap iron business” and not as a common carrier. Hence, this Petition for Review.
ISSUES:
WON Cendana may, under the facts, be properly characterized as a common carrier.
HELD AND RATIO:
YES. The Civil Code defines "common carriers" in the following terms:
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Concept of Common Carrier. Definition.
AGUILAR, Yna Marei
Article 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of
carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation, offering their
services to the public.
The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal b usiness activity is the carrying of
persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local Idiom as "a
sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise
offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis a nd one offering such service on an
occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering
its services to the "general public," i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services
or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population.
So understood, the concept of "common carrier" under Article 1732 may be seen to coincide neatly with
the notion of "public service," under the Public Service Act.
It appears to the Court that Cendana is properly characterized as a common carrier even though he
merely "back-hauled" goods for other merchants from Manila to Pangasinan, although such back-hauling
was done on a periodic or occasional rather than regular or scheduled manner, and even though private
respondent's principal occupation was not the carriage of goods for others. There is no dispute that
private respondent charged his customers a fee for hauling their goods; that fee frequently fell below
commercial freight rates is not relevant here.
CA referred to the fact that Cendana held no certificate of public convenience, and concluded he was not a
common carrier. This is palpable error. A certificate of public convenience is not a requisite for the
incurring of liability under the Civil Code provisions governing common carriers.
Common carriers, "by the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy" are held to a very high
degree of care and diligence ("extraordinary diligence") in the carriage of goods as well as of passengers.
The specific import of extraordinary diligence in the care of goods transported by a common carrier is,
according to Article 1733, "further expressed in Articles 1734, 1735 and 1745, numbers 5, 6 and 7" of the
Civil Code.
Article 1734 establishes the general rule that common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction or
deterioration of the goods which they carry, "unless the same is due to any of the following causes only:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural disaster or calamity;
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or-in the containers;
(5) Order or act of competent public authority.
It is important to point out that the above list of causes of loss, destruction or deterioration which
exempts the common carrier for responsibility is a closed list.
Article 1735, provides as follows: In all cases other than those mentioned in numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the
preceding article, if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
required in Article 1733.
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Concept of Common Carrier. Definition.
AGUILAR, Yna Marei
The hijacking of the carrier's truck does not fall within any of the five (5) categories of exempting causes
listed in Article 1734. It would follow, therefore, that the hijacking of the carrier's vehicle must be dealt
with under the provisions of Article 1735.
The precise issue that we address here relates to the specific requirements of the duty of extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods carried in the specific context of hijacking or armed robbery.
Article 1745 provides in relevant part:
Any of the following or similar stipulations shall be considered unreasonable, unjust and contrary to
public policy:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) that the common carrier shall not be responsible for the acts or omissions of his or its employees;
(6) that the common carrier's liability for acts committed by thieves, or of robbers who do not a
ct with
grave or irresistible t hreat, violence or force, is dispensed with or diminished; and
(7) that the common carrier shall not responsible for the loss, destruction or deterioration of goods on
account of the defective condition of the car vehicle, ship, airplane or other equipment used in the contract
of carriage.
Under Article 1745 (6) above, a common carrier is held responsible — and will not be allowed to divest or
to diminish such responsibility — even for acts of strangers like thieves or robbers, except where such
thieves or robbers in fact acted "with grave or irresistible threat, violence or force." We believe and so hold
that the limits of the duty of extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods carried are reached
where the goods are lost as a result of a robbery which is attended by "grave or irresistible threat, violence
or force."
In the instant case, armed men held up the second truck owned by private respondent which carried
petitioner's cargo. The decision of the trial court shows that the accused acted with grave, if not
irresistible, threat, violence or force. 3 of the 5 hold-uppers were armed with firearms. The robbers not
only took away the truck and its cargo but also kidnapped the driver and his helper, detaining them for
several days.
In these circumstances, the occurrence of the loss must reasonably be regarded as quite beyond the
control of the common carrier and properly regarded as a fortuitous event. It is necessary to recall that
even common carriers are not made absolute insurers against all risks of travel and of transport of goods,
and are not held liable for acts or events which cannot be foreseen or are inevitable, provided that they
shall have complied with the rigorous standard of extraordinary diligence.
Cendana is not liable for the value of the undelivered merchandise which was lost because of an event
entirely beyond private respondent's control.
DISPOSITIVE: ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED and the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 3 August 1977 is AFFIRMED.
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