Government VS Springer

50 Phil 259 G.R. No. L-26979 April 1 1927 [Appointing Power of the Chief Executive]

FACTS:

Spinger, Costas and Hilario were elected to be the directors of the Nat'l Coal Company by the legislative
members (Senate President and Speaker of the HoR) of the committee created by Acts. No. 2705(Sec 4)
and 2822 (Sec 2). The GPI instituted an original action of quo warranto against the newly appointed
directors, assailing the validity of the said acts which provide: "The voting power of all such stock (in the
National Coal Company) owned by the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be vested exclusively
in a committee consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives."

Reference was made therein that the provisions of the statutes passed by the Phil. Legislature creating a
voting committee or board of control, and enumerating the duties and powers thereof with respect to
certain corporation in which the Philippine Gov is the owner of stock, are nullities.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Phil Legislature has the power to appoint officials.

RULING:

Sec. 22 of the Organic Act, "That all executive functions of the government must be directly under the
Governor-General or within one of the executive departments under the supervision and control of the
Governor-General." At the very least, the performance of duties appurtenant to membership in the
voting committee is an executive function on the Government, which the Organic Act requires must be
subject to the unhampered control of the Government-General. The administrative domination of a
governmentally organized and controlled corporation is clearly not a duty germane to the law-making
power.

G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989

Marcos, petitioner VS. Manglapus, respondent

Facts:

Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent “people
power” revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to
the Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of
his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the
economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return
of Marcos and his family.

Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening events:
failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders

channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists

plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms dealer. This is
to prove that they can stir trouble from afar

Honasan’s failed coup

Communist insurgency movements

secessionist movements in Mindanao

devastated economy because of

accumulated foreign debt

plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies

Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their
travel documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from
returning in the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country. He
also questioned the claim of the President that the decision was made in the interest of national
security, public safety and health. Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside her
jurisdiction.

According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without due
process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to travel
which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.

Issue:

Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit
the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a
serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.

Decision:

No to both issues. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:

Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article
VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines.” However, it does not define what is meant by “executive power” although in the same
article it touches on exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power to
grant reprieves, commutations and pardons… (art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution outlines
tasks of the president, this list is not defined & exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not
stated in the Constitution which include the power to protect the general welfare of the people. She is
obliged to protect the people, promote their welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the
Constitution). Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do
anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest
discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and that the president has to
maintain peace during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State.

The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible depending on the circumstances. The
request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light
solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to
certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to
the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual
unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in
that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should
submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must
be granted or denied.

For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist factual basis
for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in the
Philippines. It is proven that there are factual bases in her decision. The supervening events that
happened before her decision are factual. The President must take preemptive measures for the self-
preservation of the country & protection of the people. She has to uphold the Constitution.

IN RE CUNANAN 94 PHIL. 534

FACTS:

Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the law
was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.”

Section 1 provided the following passing marks:

1946-1951………………70%

1952 …………………….71%

1953……………………..72%

1954……………………..73%

1955……………………..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.

Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be
deemed to have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the computation
of the general average in subsequent bar examinations.”

ISSUE:

Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.

RULING:

Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the title of the
Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations.
Section2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing
partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.

As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955
was declared in force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under the following
reasons:

The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had
inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;

The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said
candidates;

The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to determine who may be admitted to
practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of
Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power are only minimum norms, not designed to
substitute the judgment of the court on who can practice law; and

The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.

As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to declare it
void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing
Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally
fall within the power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of admission to the practice of
law.

IN RE CUNANAN [94 Phil 534; Resolution; 18 Mar 1954]

Facts: Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.”
In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the bar those
candidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar
invoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision of their examination papers were still
pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who
have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question.
To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration,
irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.

Issue: Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.

Held: RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who
suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been
indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from which
ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in
the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.

On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative
departments of the government.

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as
other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.

Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.

Angara vs. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936.

SEPTEMBER 18, 2018

FACTS:

The case was an original action filed by Jose Angara for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and
prohibit the Electoral Commission (EC) from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro
Ynsua against the election of the former.

Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, et.al., were candidates for the position of National Assembly member for
1st district of Tayabas Province.

On October 7, 1935, Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed Angara as the winner. Angara then took
his oath of office. National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8 (Confirming the election of members of
the National Assembly against whom no protest had been filed)
Subsequently, Respondent Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion of Protest” against
the election of Angara. Electoral Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of which provides: “The
commission will not consider any protest that is not submitted on or before this day (Dec. 9)”

Angara filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion to dismiss the protest” on the ground that it
must uphold Resolution No. 8 of National Assembly. Ynsua countered that there is no constitutional
prohibition barring the filing of protest.

The Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution denying the “Motion to dismiss the Protest” filed by
Angara.

ISSUES:
1. WoN the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission as well as the subject matter
of the controversy (Resolution of National Assembly or Resolution of EC) – YES.

2. WoN the Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction when: (1)it assumed
cognizance of the protest

despite the previous confirmation by the National Assembly; (2) it adopted its resolution in Dec. 9 – NO.
3. WoN Resolution No. 8 can “nullify” filing of protest or toll the time of filing protest effectively
rendering the resolution of the Electoral Commission moot – NO.

RATIO:

1. On judicial review

“In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between several departments and among the integral or
constituent units thereof.”

Sec. 4 of Art VI provides EC the sole power of deciding such matters. Also, from the transcript of the
Framers’ discussion, it is clearly the intention of the Framers to give EC “sole” jurisdiction over election
protests.

Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of powers within its jurisdiction and is
supreme within its own sphere but it does not follow that the Constitution intended them to be
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other.

Constitution institutes the system of checks and balances. Moderating power of the court is granted by
clear implication from section 2 article VIII of the Constitution.

The judiciary does not intend to assert superiority over other departments or deliberately nullify of
invalidate acts of the legislature. It merely asserts the obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims for authority under the Constitution and establish rights for the parties.

“Power of judicial review is limited only to actual cases and controversies…and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented.”

2. On the legality of the Electoral Commission’s acts

Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative. It acted
within its jurisdiction. The EC’s resolution will stand. National Assembly’s Resolution No. 8 should
neither prevent the filing of protest within the time prescribed in EC’s resolution nor “toll the time” in
filing protests.