Pub - War at Sea 1914 1945 PDF
Pub - War at Sea 1914 1945 PDF
Pub - War at Sea 1914 1945 PDF
19 1 4-45
WAR AT SEA
Bernard Ireland
General Editor: John Keegan
CASSELL
To Daisy
my very first granddaughter
Cassell
Wellington House, 125 Strand
London WC2R OBB
For their unstinting help in the production of this book, I would like to thank
both the staff at Cassell and their associates. Firstly, Ian Drury, for inviting me to
participate in the series, and Penny Gardiner, as fair an editor as ever wielded a
blue pencil. Then Elaine Willis, who cheerfully scoured the world for pictures
with unpronounceable captions, and Malcolm Swanston, whose excellent maps
and diagrams materialized from my not over-informative wish-lists.
Lastly, of course, my wife who, as ever, patiently converted my stubborn
insistence on hand-written manuscript to one of those magic disks.
BERNARD IRELAND
Fareham, December 2001
The German fast battleship Gneisenau with new 'Atlantic bow'.
CONTENTS
. .- - -
- - -••---.;::..:;.=:-==::::::;;;;;;.. ..~.~:==~i+-I
BIOGRAPHIES 21 4
2 THE FIRST WORLD WAR
FURTHER READING
1 9 1 4- 1.8
218
INDEX 220
Cruiser warfare; Grand Fleet versus High Seas Fleet; PICTURE CREDITS 224
The battle of Jutland; The U-boat war; The British
blockade; Enter naval aviation; Naval operations in
the Dardanelles; The Royal Navy in Mesopotamia;
The Baltic 39
KEY TO MAPS
Symbols on map
X battle
ffi airfield
~ sunken ship
xxxxx
~ army group
xxxx
~ army
xxx
~ corps
xx
~ division
x
~ brigade
III
~ regiment
II
~ battalion
Name style
Thrace province
Geographical symbols
.. urban area
road
river
seasonal river
canal
border
Military movements
attack
-y retreat or conjectural
movement
MAP LIST
9· MESOPOTAMIA 1915-18 99
10. COMMERCIAL LOSSES TO U-BOATS JANUARy-MAY 1942 13 8 -9
CHRONOLOGY
10
CHRONOLOGY
II
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
8 May British establish Iceland 28/29 Mar Battle of Matapan. Prince of Wales sunk by
garnson. April Coastal Command Japanese aircraft.
23 May Faeroes occupied by aircraft put under 11 Dec Germany and Italy
British. operational control of the declare war on us.
26 May Dunkirk evacuation. Admiralt~ 17 Dec First battle of Sirte.
-4 June 4 April Arrangements made to 19 Dec Italian special forces raid
3-8 June Allies evacuate N orwa~ repair British ships in on Alexandria.
9 June HMS Glorious and escort us yards. HMS Queen Elizabeth
sunk. 21 April Mediterranean Fleet and HMS Valiant
11 June Italy declares war on bombards Tripoli. disabled.
Britain and France. 24-25 Apr British evacuation of 25 Dec British surrender Hong
22 June France agrees armistice Greece. Kong.
with German~ 5-12 May Tiger through- 1942
Force H formed at Mediterranean convoy to Jan Start of U-boat offensive
Gibraltar. Egypt. on US eastern seaboard.
July President Roosevelt's 20 May German airborne assault 12 Feb Scharnhorst and
'short of war' declaration. on Crete begins. Gneisenau escape
U-boats begin operating 24 May HMS Hood sunk. up-Channel.
from French Atlantic 27 May Bismarck sunk. 15 Feb British surrender
coast. June Naval support to Singapore.
3 July Force H neutralizes campaign against Vichy 27-28 Feb Battle of Java Sea.
French squadron at French in Syria. 19 Mar Japanese carrier attack on
Mers-el-Kebir. 1 June British complete Darwin.
7 July British begin operation evacuation of Crete. 22 Mar Second battle of Sirte.
against Dakar. 22 June Germany invades Soviet 28 Mar British raid on St N azaire.
9 July Battle off Calabria. Union. 5-9 April Japanese carrier offensive
Sept British and Free French July 'Hedgehog' AS weapon in Bay of Bengal.
operation agains Dakar introduced. 18 April Doolittle's raid on Tokyo.
ends unsuccessfull~ 21-25 July Substance convoy to 4 May British landings in
28 Oct Italy invades Greece from Malta. Madagascar.
Albania. 9-12 Aug Churchill-Roosevelt 7-8 May Battle of Coral Sea.
Nov British establish base in conference at Argentia. 4-7 June Battle of Midwa~
Crete. Sept First convoys sailed to 12-16 June Harpoon and Vigorous
11/22 Nov British carrier attack on North Russia. convoys to Malta.
Taranto. Sept HMS Audacity proves July End of U-boat offensive
27 Nov Action off Spartivento. value of CVE in convoy off US eastern seaboard
1941 protection. and Caribbean.
6-13 Jan Excess convoy to Malta. Sept-Oct First incidents between 2-13 July PQ17 convoy disaster.
HMS Illustrious heavily US escorts and U-boats. 8/9 Aug Battle of Savo Island.
bomb-damaged. 1 Sept US Navy free to escort 10/14 Aug Pedestal convoy to
Jan-Mar First US-British strategy convoys anywhere in Malta.
discussions. Atlantic. 19 Aug British raid on Dieppe.
1 Feb US Atlantic Fleet formed. 26-28 Sept Halberd convoy to 22-25 Aug Battle of Eastern
9 Feb Force H bombards Genoa Malta. Solomons.
and Leghorn. 13 Nov HMS Ark Royal sunk by 7 Sept Americans land on
14 Feb Deutsche Afrika Korps U-boat. Guadalcanal.
begins to land in Libya. 25 Nov HMS Barham sunk by 11/12 Oct Battle of Cape
7 Mar British army begins to U-boat. Esperance.
land in Greece. 7Dec Japanese carrier attack on 26/27 Oct Battle of Santa Cruz.
11 Mar US Lend-Lease Bill Pearl Harbor. 2 Nov Final British breakthrough
approved. 10 Dec HMS Repulse and HMS at Alamein.
12
CHRONOLOGY
INTRODUCTION
.....- - -
- - -••--:::..;;;:-==::::::::;:;;;;;,. ..I@:.~:==~i+-I
THE NATURE
OF SEA POWER
N HIS 'THE SONG OF THE ENGLISH', Kipling reflected the then-confident national
I assertion that the seas, 'their' seas, were a natural highwa~ Beyond this lies the
implication that centuries of hard-contested superiority had conferred some
God-given destin~ What had ever been, ever would be.
Whether a nation looks upon the oceans as a highway or a barrier, facility or
impedance, has little to do with geography and everything to do with the national
temperament.
Two centuries ago, when Cornwallis maintained his weary watch on Brest
and Nelson kept station off Toulon, both were exercising sea power in its purest
form: that of controlling the seas for their nation's own purposes, while denying
them to its enem~ Even with the then-considerable resources of the Royal Navy,
however, 'command of the sea' was a condition that could be established and
guaranteed only in limited areas and for specific purposes. The alternative lay in
the expensive and time-consuming destruction of an opponent's maritime
capabilit~ As this was implicitly the weaker, it would not sensibly expose itself to
confrontation except on the most favourable terms. Its strategy would be likely to
be that of a 'fleet in being'.
When 'in being' a fleet is, strictly speaking, assuming a defensive posture until
such time as a growing capability will allow it to take the offensive. More loosely,
the term refers to a weaker power concentrating its naval assets sufficiently to be
able to exercise local superiority, under favourable circumstances, thus obliging
the superior fleet to modify its otherwise unchallenged activities by taking due
and necessary account. Used sufficiently aggressively, the weaker force may
persuade the stronger that a certain strategy may really not be worth the risk.
This is one aspect of 'sea denial'.
A long-established and effective strategy for the weaker force is the so-called
guerre de course, or war on commerce. Trade is extraordinarily vulnerable to
interference by predators. The privateers and letters of marque of earlier days
have given way to cruising ships and submarines, but the problem remains.
Convoy, as a principle, has been exercised back to the dawn of seaborne
commerce, but it is a principle that had to be relearned in the twentieth century
through hard experience.
'The army', it has been said, 'is a projectile to be fired by the navy.' In the
situation of a general war, as opposed to what might be termed a confrontation,
the issue will probably be settled finally only through military occupation of
territor~ To achieve this, an expeditionary capability is required.
r6
INTRODUCTIO
The establishment of local, and temporary, sea superiority might be sufficient As in the French wars of
to conduct raids with limited objectives. More permanent superiority by a hostile more than a century earlier,
the British fleet was
fleet, however, raises the spectre of invasion. Thus, even when the shades of
constantly at sea. It wore
Cornwallis and Nelson are enforcing local control, the main battlefleet is held out ships, it wore out men,
poised to defend home waters against the 'bolt from the blue', for the defence of but kept morale and
the realm is its ultimate priorit~ fighting efficiency higher
than that of the enemy.
The inherent flexibility of sea power facilitates military intervention in areas
Here, W L. Wyllie
inaccessible by other means. The naval role does not end at delivery, for a force, beautifully depicts
once ashore, requires support and supply and, in the event of an unsatisfactory armoured cruisers in the
outcome, evacuation. When the going is a little rough it is important to the wastes of the North Sea.
military to know that this support exists, that the outfield is being held. In 1941,
during the bitter days of the evacuation of Crete, Admiral Cunningham was
asked if he could go on sustaining the grievous level of loss and damage to his
fleet. For Cunningham, the abandonment of the army was an unthinkable option:
'Replacing a warship,' he observed, 'will take three years. Rebuilding a tradition
would take three hundred.' The evacuation went on.
His remark underlines the fact that the general principles briefly touched
upon here were perfectly understood and exercised in the days of fierce
I7
CHAPTER ONE
. . .- - -
---".--::~:-==:~".~-."'!!!!!:==~:"""I
ANGLo-GERMAN
NAVAL RIVALRY
'naval race' was not the cause of the First World War,
W
HILE THE SO-CALLED
22
ANGLO-GERMAN NAVAL RIVALRY
The result was the passing of the Naval Defence Act in 1889. No less than Typical of a large force of
seventy warships, fifty-two of them major, would be built over five years. Britain British pre-dreadnoughts,
HMS Ocean was a
would also adopt the Two-Power Standard for naval strength, maintaining a
12,950-tonner, completed
Royal Navy capable of meeting the next two largest fleets acting together. This in 1900 as one of the six
massive plan had nothing to do with Germany but to the young Kaiser, just a year Canopus-class ships. She
after his accession, it created resentment at his nation's own inadequacies. was mined and sunk during
the Dardanelles operation
Bismarck, creator of modern Germany, had remarked that the state should
but, prior to this, had
remain 'a seapower of the second rank', linked to the fact that 'as long as he were supported the landings in
Chancellor there would be no colonial policy', and in 1882 had concluded a the Persian Gulf
Triple Alliance with Austria and Ital):
Britain failed really to comprehend that France viewed her as less of a threat
than the Alliance. When, in 1890, she embarked on her own ten-year fleet
reconstruction, its extent matched almost exactly that of the British, who
expressed concern.
In 1891, as a further hedge, France formed an alliance with Russia. Naval
exchanges were followed by rumours that a Russian squadron would be allowed
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
the use of a new French base at Bizerta in Tunisia. Alarm in London was now
considerable, while in Germany, too, there was unease because France and Russia,
both considerable military powers, bracketed her geographicall~
Despite Bismarck's misgivings, Germany still acquired a fledgeling empire in
Africa, New Guinea and the Pacific. He was proved correct, for the colonies were
expensive to administer, generated little trade and demanded resources for their
defence; and he was well satisfied when, in 1890, he recovered Heligoland from
the British in exchange for Zanzibar. Bismarck's diplomatic skills only made
Wilhelm's lapses the more obvious and the latter excluded him increasingly from
decision-making. Eventually, as Wilhelm intended, the septuagenarian statesman
tendered his resignation, which was accepted. The pilot had been dropped.
Wilhelm's ego was further inflated during 1890 by his grandmother's
unfortunate decision to create a sinecure post for him as honorary Admiral of the
Fleet in the Royal Nav~ It was at about the time that he read Alfred Thayer
Mahan's newly published book The Influence of Sea Power upon History.
Hugely influential, it argued the connection between colonial success and an
Pre-dreadnoughts of the
Wittelsbach and
Braunschweig-class
exercising on a typical
blustery North Sea day, well
captured by artist Carl
Saltzmann. Ships such as
these were built to conform
to Tirpitz's 'risk theory' and
were designed with
comparatively short
endurance.
ANGLO-GERMAN NAVAL RIVALRY
efficient battle fleet, and effectively debunked Aube's ]eune Ecole theories (that
emphasized the vulnerability of a battleship navy to emerging technologies like
the 'automobile torpedo', torpedo boat, and submarine). For the moment,
however, any Wilhelmian dreams would need to remain just that, for all parties in
the Reichstag were, for their various reasons, opposed to naval expenditure
beyond the modest programme triggered by the Franco-Russian alliance. It was
already funding the construction of the Kiel canal, commenced in 1887. This
waterway would be strategically important in permitting naval forces to be
switched rapidly between the North Sea and the Baltic.
The canal was opened officially in June 1895 in the presence of an impressive
Admiral Tirpitz viewed the international gathering of warships. These included the first four of the British
submarine as an irritating
Royal Sovereign-class battleships. Setting new standards, this class of seven was
distraction from his task
of creating a battle fleet. to be followed by nine improved Majesties, funded by the so-called Spencer
The first German U-boat, programme of 1893, the objective of which was to guarantee equality with any
in consequence, did Franco-Russian combination.
not commission until
Also present were several large cruisers, the Russian Rurik, French Dupuy de
December 1906. She was
armed with one tube and Lome and American New York. These represented national interpretations of
three torpedoes. Aube's ideas on/commerce destruction; for Wilhelm their potential paled beside
ANGLO-GERMAN NAVAL RIVALRY
that of the capital ships. Aware of his nation's own modest representation, he felt
patronized, particularly by the British.
Large numbers of Germans had settled in South Africa and British attempts
to destabilize Kruger's Boer republic created hostility: The spectacular failure in
1895 of the so-called Jameson Raid resulted in the notorious Kruger Telegram,
pledging German support for the creation of an Afrikaner heartland. Probably
less guilty than his Foreign Office, Wilhelm attracted British fury, fanned by a
popular press in full voice. A British naval 'flying squadron' was put on standby
and measures were taken to prevent the landing of German 'volunteers' on the
South African coast.
For Wilhelm, any difference with Britain was a family affair attracting
disapproval from both Victoria and the heir apparent, the future Edward VII. A
fleet would lend him authority and gain their respect. Britain, however, was
enduring a period not only of German popular resentment but also of diplomatic
isolation, with a triple Franco-Russo-German axis felt to be a distinct possibility:
Inevitably, demands were made for further naval expansion.
In June 1897 Britain exploded into an orgy of patriotism for the queen's
diamond jubilee. At the fleet review a line of twenty-one British battleships lay
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
adjacent to the foreign representatives, of which the German was the elderly
cruiser Konig Wilhelm. Widely interpreted in Britain as a snub, the choice caused
Wilhelm further embarrassment.
Rear Admiral Friedrich Hollmann, Secretary of State for the German
Navy Office, had announced in the previous March that his increase in naval
estimates had been severely trimmed by an unsympathetic Reichstag. His
A German postcard
commemorating Cvictory~ at
Jutland. Seen flanking the
Kaiser are Tirpitz~ the
creator of the High Seas
Fleet~ and Capelle~ who
would shortly succeed him
at the Navy Office. Below~
Scheer would also soon be
succeeded by the
battlecruiser admiral~
Hipper.
Germany, therefore, required a force large enough to face that element based in A coloured photograph of
home waters. If not large enough to defeat it, then at least it must be strong about 1910 showing a
German battleship in a
enough to inflict unacceptable damage. The strategy, therefore, was one of
floating dock in Kiel. Fisher's
deterrence, leaving Germany free to pursue a foreign policy without interference. dreadnought initiative
Using the size of the British ~ha~nel Fleet as a basis and estimating British resulted in a sudden increase
building capacity, Tirpitz calculated that he would need to build sixty capital in the dimensions of capital
ships, necessitating expensive
ships over twenty years. He set to single-mindedly, sidelining any champions of
enlargement of locks and dry
cruiser warfare and submarine develop·ment. Well aware that he would have to docks, and widening and
advance by easy stages, both to placate opponents in the Reichstag and to avoid deepening the Kiel canal.
fatally antagonizing the British, Tirpitz exercised great powers of diplomac): On
10 April 1898 the assembly approved a naval bill to expand the fleet to a total
of 19 battleships, 8 armoured and 42 smaller cruisers, to be constructed over six
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
years. Justified to offset the naval power of France and Russia, the force in no
way threatened British supremac~
During 1898 the French provocatively dispatched a military force into the'
Sudan. Confronted by British military forces at Fashoda, they refused to
withdraw. The use of force by either meant war, and stalemate developed. British
fleets were exercised off the French coasts and an expeditionary force overtly
prepared. Aware of their own fleet's inadequacy and general state of
unpreparedness, the French backed down. It was the last occasion upon which the
two nations contemplated hostilities and its resolution gave the British a further
Ships of the High Seas Fleet boost to naval pride.
lying off Kiel in about 1914. Britain's continuing assertion of authority over Afrikaner-dominated
At the near end of the
provinces in South Africa led to a de facto state of war. Mobile Boer columns
line, two Helgoland-class
dreadnoughts flank an earlier used ambush and skirmish against British military forces ill-trained for the
Nassau, all with hexagonally purpose. The latter responded with harsh repressive measures which fanned
disposed main batteries. German Anglophobia to white heat, not helped by the indignity of German
Beyond are light cruisers,
shipping being stopped and checked by the Royal Nav~
the near four-funnelers
being of the Magdeburg or As Bulow observed that 'in the coming century the German people must be
Karlsruhe classes. either the hammer or the anvil' and the Kaiser announced that the navy would be
ANGLO-GERMAN NAVAL RIVALRY
the equal of the nation's army, Tirpitz had little difficulty in steering through a
revised naval bill. On 14 June 1900 approval was given to increase the fleet to 38
battleships, 20 large and 38 smaller cruisers.
British resentment at German opportunism in South Africa turned to anger
at what was now seen as nothing less than a direct challenge to her naval
supremac)T. The death of Victoria in January 1901 did not improve the situation
as the new king made no secret of his dislike of his nephew.
German plans were still largely just that, while the Royal Navy had added
Admiral of the Fleet John
twenty-eight first-class and four second-class battleships to the fleet between the Arbuthnot Fisher, First Baron
Naval Defence Act and 1902. More major units were brought to home waters Fisher of Kilverstone and
through reductions in the China and Mediterranean fleets, achieved through Tirpitz's nemesis. Twice
First Sea Lord" he brought
diplomac)T. The signing of the 1902 Anglo-Japanese alliance provided for co-
about the cdreadnought
operation with a first-class naval power which, in 1905, eased the situation revolution "" championed
further by virtually annihilating a Russian fleet at Tsushima. the steam turbine" the
France, coming at last to the realization that she and Britain faced a common submarine" torpedoes and
oil-firing" and transformed
threat, ceased to seek naval equality and in 1904 agreed the Entente Cordiale. A
fleet gunnery. He resigned
concerted effort to resolve all minor causes of friction allowed British naval over the Dardanelles fiasco
presence in the Mediterranean to be reduced. Meanwhile, whereas existing naval in 1915.
bases in Britain were sited for possible war with
the Dutch or the French, a start was made in
1903 on a new fleet base at Rosyth, located for
control of the northern North Sea.
For the Royal Navy, this era was dominated
by the restless genius of Admiral Sir John Fisher.
A natural reformer, he swept aside outmoded
practices and, as its commander-in-chief, put the
Mediterranean Fleet on a war footing, which
he regarded as its standard condition. His
recognition of the abilities of Captain Percy
Scott resulted in a dramatic improvement In
gunnery both in accuracy and range of
engagement.
Appointed First Sea Lord in October 1904,
Fisher applied his 'three R' principles - Ruthless,
Relentless, Remorseless - in refashioning the
Royal Navy to meet the new challenge. Having
brought home a maximum number of ships from
foreign stations, he identified 154 others as
having little or no fighting power. These were
scrapped without sentiment to release resources
for reallocation. Ships not required in the active
fleet were classed as 'fleet reserve', and
maintained in a state of reduced commission by
31
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
The Duncans were the fifth class with virtually identical armament, but the
influence of the Virginia and Brin resulted in the up gunned King Edward VIIs,
from which the more logical Lord Nelsons developed. The South Carolinas then
ANGLO-GERMAN NAVAL RIVALRY
broke the mould with a battery that was not only homogeneous but arranged to
give an unprecedented broadside of eight 12-inch guns.
Fisher had no option but to respond, and the leisurely American building rate
allowed him to rush the Dreadnought to completion first. Although equipped
with two more big guns than the Americans, her inferior layout permitted only a
similar eight-gun broadside. Her great innovation was to adopt the yet unproven
steam turbine and partial oil-firing for a speed of 21 knots.
Fisher's personal ideal, however, was what came to be termed the battle-
cruiser, of which the three Invincibles were pressed to completion in 1908. A
sustained speed of 25 knots demanded huge hulls with only sparse protection and
a reduced six-gun broadside. Like the Dreadnought, they could theoretically
bring six guns to bear in chase fire; in practice, blast damage precluded this. They
proved excellent in their intended role of neutralizing the large armoured cruisers
then common, but proved vulnerable to the heavy gunfire of their peers.
In building the Dreadnought, Fisher was often unfairly accused of offsetting
the Royal Navy's great numerical superiority, which was made obsolete. Tirpitz,
33
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
6"forwardbelt
3"slopeddecks
11h" deck plating Lower Deck
..,....-+-r-....,..-r-r-n"T"T"T"T'"'Ir-f------,-- - ----------------.---..------r-r--+--r-....--r-.,....,--,--,-,r-r-r-r-r;r-r-r......,......--.
llh"splinterbulkhead
IMMUNITY ZONE
34
ANGLO-GERMAN NAVAL RIVALRY
however, was put into a quandar~ Not to build similarly would be to abandon the Resplendent in a Far East
master plan by leaving the qualitative advantage with the British. To follow suit colour scheme prior to
heading for the China
would be to make German intentions clear. Like Fisher, he had no choice. Backed
station, the Furst Bismarck
by a threat of resignation, he forced a supplementary naval bill through the transits the Kiel canal. An
Reichstag in May 1906. It approved a one-third increase in funding, not just for armoured cruiser of 10,690
six 'large cruisers' but also for necessary increase in dimensions to infrastructure, tons, completed in 1900, she
had a light armoured deck
particularly the Kiel canal. Fisher later claimed that this alone prevented the
and a shallow side belt.
Germans contemplating a naval war before 1914.
35
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
Although the German economy went into significant deficit during this
period, the naval budget exceeded that of the army in only one year (1911). The
ANGLO-GERMAN NAVAL RIVALRY
table shows that, despite their naval vote increasing by 250 per cent, the Germans
were spending less at the end of the period than Britain spent at the start. Having
begun as the smallest spender, Germany finished in much the same situation,
having overtaken only France. Thus did Tirpitz's 'risk strategy' fail, and by a
factor that was actually increasing with time.
At the outbreak of war, in August 1914, the capital ship strength of the major
fleets was as follows:
37
CHAPTER TWO
....
---~.~:,;:-:-==:--=- :@:.~:===';:P+I-.""'----
CRUISER WARFARE
Earlier wars, particularly those fought against the French and Americans, had
exposed the vulnerability of British commercial shipping to both enemy cruisers
and licensed irregulars. The economy was damaged not only by lost ships and
crews but also by huge hikes in insurance and high costs caused by shortages.
Captured cargoes also helped the enemy.
The Treaty of Paris of 1856 thus greatly assisted the British by, inter alia,
making privateering illegal under international law. Henceforth, only government
cruisers and auxiliaries could prosecute a trade war.
I
I
PACIFIC
I
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O<CEAN
:. I
~ .-Yil~-r,.-----+
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,,
,
Fiji 6.
CJ
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__- + - - - - - + - - - - - + - - - - - t - - - - - + - - - - - + - - - - - + - - - - + - - - - + - - - - - + - - - - + - - - - -~
~"" "" ""
o 'lOOkm
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100 miles
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80° 90° l~O° 170
I
FIRST WORLD WAR 1914-18
Unlike the French and Americans, the Germans had not been sidetracked into CRUISE OF THE EAST
building large cruisers as commerce destroyers. Nevertheless, by 1914 they did ASIATIC SQUADRON
have twenty-five modern light cruisers, with ten more under construction. Except for detaching the
Emden, to work in the Bay
Soundly designed, most were at home, attached to the High Seas Fleet. Some,
of Bengal, von Spee ignored
however, were on foreign deployment with orders to operate against trade in the his orders to pursue cruiser
event of war. warfare. After his long trek
In common with the British Admiralty, the Germans offered a modest subsidy across the Pacific he
defeated Cradock's scratch
to owners willing to incorporate good quality tonnage features, such as local
squadron at Coronel before
strengthening, which would facilitate their conversion to auxiliary cruisers. In doubling the Horn and
August 1914, when German shipping disappeared from the oceans, the British being ambushed by Sturdee's
needed to take account of an estimated forty-two such ships, lying in ports both battlecruisers off the
Falklands.
at home and abroad. From the outset the Royal Navy's cruisers were thus charged
~ sMsEmden
~ SMS Leipzig
~ SMS Dresden
o areas of occupation
around islands
'o~ ~farquesas
SOU T H'
I
----t------+------+--------+-------+-------I------1f------~-
____f__~~-__"'__r__r__+_---__+_---___+__-40°
PACIFIC
OCEAN
I
1500 140 0
I
WAR AT SEA'1914-45
with safeguarding the trade routes against both regular and auxiliary raiders.
Germany's Chinese enclave was Tsingtao, where Vice Admiral Graf von
','
Spee's East Asiatic Squadron was based. Its major units, all modern, were the
armoured cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau~ and the light cruisers Emden~
Leipzig and Nurnberg. Tsingtao's base facilities were minimal and should Japan,
allied to Britain, declare war, the port would be indefensible. Von Spee's war
orders were to operate against commerce in the Far East but, lacking proper
maintenance, he knew that his ships would be rapidly wasting assets. Highly
trained and efficient, their proper place was with the High Seas Fleet in the North
Sea. Having detached the Emden to act as a raider in the Indian Ocean, he thus
effectively ignored his instructions by heading
eastward across the Pacific, concentrating and
adding the light cruiser Dresden as he went.
Except for appropriating a handful of ships for
their coal cargoes, von Spee's subsequent brief
FIRST WORLD WAR 1914-18
career had nothing to do with raider warfare, his victory over a scratch British
squadron at Coronel on 1 November 1914 being followed by virtual annihilation
at the Falklands on 8 December.
The lone Emden, however, had been most successful. Appearing suddenly off
the Coromandel coast early in September 1914, she quickly took
eight prizes. Two she retained for their coal; a third she
released with captured crews, who arrived safely in port
full of praise for the courteous manner of the Emden ~s SMS Scharnhorst~ Graf von
Spee~s flagship~ pictured in
captain, von Muller.
East Asiatic colours during
Hunted by British, French, Japanese and Russian 1914. Completed seven years
warships, von Muller visited the Burmese coast, after the Furst Bismarck
found nothing and crossed back to India. After a (see pages 34-5) her Cfamily
likeness ~ is very obvious.
cheeky bombardment of oil tanks at Madras,
N ate how the large patch of
he doubled Dondra Head and spent a 150mm armour amidships
month working the Indian end of the cannot be pierced for scuttles.
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
A contemporary popular
postcard of the Emden as
raider. The victim depicted is
somewhat fanciful as all of
von Muller~s twenty-three
captures were cargo vessels.
N a lives were lost through
any of the sinkings and von
Muller acquired a grudging
respect from the British.
British blockaded the fugitive for nine long months while an expedition was
assembled and then sent out. Arriving in July 1915 this included two shallow-
draught river monitors with high-trajectory howitzers. Although performing
poorly in the heat, aircraft were used to locate the quarry, which was surrounded
by jungle, and then to correct the monitors' fall of shot. Pounded to a wreck, the
Konigsberg was blown up and abandoned by her crew.
44
FIRST WORLD WAR 1914-18
In August 1914 the Karlsruhe was in the West Indies. Quickly arming the liner
Kronprinz \\lilhelm for independent raiding, she eluded searching cruisers and
disappeared. Her operating area soon turned out to be the busy shipping lanes off
Brazil, where she secured 'sixteen prizes. Retaining some for their coal, the
Karlsruhe's captain, Kohler, steamed them in a line of search to facilitate sighting
further victims. One he dispatched to the Canaries with numerous captured
crews and, reasoning that their arrival would compromise his activities, Kohler
headed northward. On 4 November 1914, when some 300 miles off Barbados, the
cruiser's forward end was demolished by a sudden and unexplained explosion.
The survivors, who did not include the captain, were rescued by a store ship and
eventually reached Germany safel~
Including von Spee's squadron, the Imperial German Navy thus expended
two armoured cruisers and six light cruisers in 'cruiser warfare'. On 1 July 1914
Wrecked by the Sydney-'s
British shipping comprised 8,587 steamers and 653 sailing vessels, grossing some
heavier fire, with two-thirds
19.25 million tons, or nearly 40 per cent of the world's merchant fleet. In support of her crew dead or
were over one hundred shipbuilding yards. Bearing in mind the relative sizes of wounded, the Emden
the British fleet and the German Navy, the latter's sacrifice of a significant force ended her career on the reef
off North Keeling Island.
of modern ships and trained crews in exchange for a few score merchantmen
It had been the first major
appears uneconomic. With certain exceptions, the auxiliary cruisers would fare action fought by an
Iittle better. Australian warship.
45
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
First, and least likely, was the 1897-built Norddeutscher Lloyd (NDL) ex-Blue
Riband holder Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse. Built for prestige rather than economy,
she had an impressively conspicuous profile with four funnels spaced in distinct
pairs. Quietly taking aboard six 10.5cm (4.1-linch) guns and a naval crew, she
sailed on the first day of the war and, with the British Northern Patrol not yet
established, broke out into the Atlantic via the Denmark Strait.
Farcically, the first victim of this 14,350-ton raider was a 235-ton fishing
trawler which, with no radio, neither knew of the outbreak of war nor was able
to transmit a raider warning. Moving to the shipping focal point south of the
Canaries, the Kaiser Wilhelm then seized four British ships on 15-16 August 1914.
Scrupulously observing International Law, her captain, Rymann, allowed the two
that carried passengers to proceed; the others were sunk. They were to be the
raider's last successes. Scouring the area, British cruisers picked up two of her
colliers. Information from these and diplomatic sources pointed to the Kaiser
Wilhelm, short of coal, having gone to ground on the West African coast. She was
found on 26 August by the cruiser Highflyer and, in disregard for Spanish
neutrality, was sunk where she lay:
Slipping out of Montevideo in August 1914, the new Hamburg-Sud liner
Cap Trafalgar made for a prearranged rendezvous at the isolated Brazilian
island of Trinidade. Coaling there, she also took the armament and captain
of the old gunboat Eber. Radio traffic from searching Allied cruisers greatly
affected her activities and she spent her time in evasion rather than in actively
taking prizes. Returning to Trinidade empty-handed, she was surprised by the
arrival of the British armed merchant cruiser (AMC) Carmania. To conceal her
identity Cap Trafalgar had removed one of her funnels and painted the other two
in Cunard colours. The Carmania, a genuine Cunarder, allowed her to close
before opening fire. She destroyed the Cap Trafalgar but only at the cost of severe
damage to herself.
At Tsingtao the NDL liner Prinz Eitel Friedrich was similarly armed from the
FIRST WORLD WAR 1914-18
gunboats Luchs and Tiger. Spending three weeks crossing the Pacific, she took Safely returned to Kiel in
three ships before rounding the Horn early in January 1915. Her captain, March 1917 following a
successful four-month cruise,
Thierichsens, evaded interception by, unusually, following the sailing-ship track
Korvettenkapitan Graf zu
up the Atlantic. Only four of his eleven prizes were thus steamers and, with a Dohna-Schlodien and the
mounting defect list and short of coal, he was obliged to make for Newport crew of the auxiliary cruiser
News where, on 11 March 1915, the ship was interned. Mowe pose with their
numerous rescued mascots.
Originally armed by the Karlsruhe, the Kronprinz Wilhelm was more
The raider sank twenty-two
successful. She operated in the central Atlantic narrows and found adequate coal independently routed
and provisions in her prizes. Of these she took fifteen before she, too, needed to steamers, all of which would
seek internment. By this time, having steamed for eight months, the ship was in have survived if convoyed.
poor material condition and the crew sick from lack of fresh food.
Learning from experience, the Germans began to employ smaller ships with
heavier armament. Thus the Mowe, which sailed at the end of 1915, had a
concealed battery of four 15cm (5.9-inch) guns and two torpedo tubes. Some of
her old reefer spaces were utilized as stowage for several hundred mines.
Disguised under Swedish colours, she laid minefields in the Pentland Firth and off
the Charente, the former claiming the British pre-dreadnought King Edward VII.
Taking several ships around the Canaries, the Mowe then moved on to Brazilian
waters. As usual, these proved productive, but the raider was damaged by the
47
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
defensive fire of one of her victims. Abandoning her cruise she returned safely to
Kiel following a four-month absence.
Early in 1916 the Germans sailed the Wolf but her foray had to be abandoned
after her grounding. She was followed on 27 February by the heavily armed Greif.
Disguised as a Norwegian, she was intercepted by the AMCs Alcantara and
Andes of the Northern Patrol. As the forlner closed to send over a boarding party,
the Greiflet fly with guns and torpedoes. Fatally damaged, the British ship herself
opened fire, engaging the raider until the Andes moved in to assist. The issue was
settled by the arrival of the light cruiser Comus.
The Mowe sailed again in November 1916, shortly before a second raider
named Wolf. The latter carried no less than seven 15cm guns, four'torpedo tubes
and, an innovation, a small reconnaissance seaplane. Under another resourceful
commander, Nerger, she first laid clutches of mines off South Africa, Colombo
and Bomba~ Her first capture was in February 1917, employing it as an auxiliary
to lay further mines near Aden. Taking the odd ship here, laying a few mines
there, the Wolf crossed the Indian Ocean, worked her way around Australia and
New Zealand, then moved on to the East Indies. Over fifty Allied warships
wasted time in vain searches but, supplied from his prizes, the wily Nerger
remained successfully at sea for fifteen months, arriving home in February 1918.
His fourteen captures were matched by thirteen more sunk on his mines.
In May 1917 the British finally adopted a convoy system, which removed most
of the 'independents' upon which the raiders preyed. As the following summary
shows, the results achieved by the enemy's surface raiders were small compared
with submarine sinkings. Their activities, however, were successful in the
extensive disruption that they caused.
49
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
... ...
5°
FIRST WORLD WAR 1914-18
defended English Channel or by the northern gap, flanked by the Grand Fleet's
base at Scapa. Here, Jellicoe was yet beyond the effective range of German
submarine but could support the distant blockading forces while being
able to block any enemy attempt to break out.
Although Tirpitz urged an offensive strategy, emphasizing the
fleet's material superiority, the Kaiser cautioned its commander-in-chief,
Admiral von Ingenohl, against risking it, seeing it as an important bargaining
chip in the eventual conclusion of a satisfactory peace.
In July 1914, even before his appointment, Jellicoe had concluded in a
lengthy memorandum to the First Lord that 'it is highly dangerous to
consider that our ships are superior or even equal [to those
of the enemy]'. Had he known that British projectiles
would be liable to break up harmlessly on striking
German armour, he would have been even more
circumspect.
On 28 August 1914 Commodore Tyrwhitt's
Harwich Force forayed against German light
forces active in the Heligoland Bight. In
uncertain visibility and in the face of rapid
German reinforcement, the British were ABOVE: Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Reginald Yorke Tyrwhitt.
soon hard-pressed and Tyrwhitt called
He served throughout the
for assistance from the two battle- First World War as
cruisers that comprised his deep cover. commodore in command
Jellicoe had not been able to inform of the Harwich Force.
A natural leader, his
him that he had reinforced them with
squadron was always in
three more battlecruisers under Vice the thick of things although
Admiral Sir David Beatt~ The impetuous conflicting orders saw it
Beatty did not hesitate to sweep in with all five uninvolved at Jutland.
capital ships. He sank three enemy cruisers
but risked his big ships to mines and to
uninformed friendly submarines. While the
victory was due to overwhelming force rather
LEFT: Admiral of the Fleet
Sir John Rushworth Jellicoe.
THE NORTH SEA 1914-18 Intellectually gifted and
Often termed the German well-respected, he
Ocean by the Victorians, the commanded the Grand Fleet
North Sea became for the from the outset of the war
High Seas Fleet a German until December 1916. He
prison. The importance of the fought Jutland as he had
Shetlands-Norway gap is predicted but his reputation
apparent as is the location of was damaged by the intense
Scapa Flow at its western end. national disappointment
over the action and his
subsequent pessimism over
the U-boat war.
51
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
HELIGOLAND BIGHT than good planning, it boosted British morale and caused the Kaiser to think even
28 AUGUST 1914 more defensivel):
The battle of the Heligoland U1?suspected by the Germans, the British had obtained several of their naval
Bight had degenerated into a
codebooks. Used in conjunction with a chain of radio intercept and direction-
confused melee in which
British light forces were finding stations, these proved a valuable indicator of German activity and
being worsted, when Beatty intentions. The hub of this service was the Admiralty's later-famous 'Room 40',
took a bold gamble by loosely controlled by Captain William R. ('Blinker') Hall, the Director of Naval
intervening with
Intelligence.
battlecruisers in heavily
mined waters. The resulting To popular disappointment, the Grand Fleet did not seek a second Trafalgar
rout was greatly damaging but adopted a policy of containment. The Germans responded by endeavouring
to German morale. to erode its superiorit): By using Vice Admiral Franz von Hipper's battlecruisers
to bombard English east coast towns it was hoped that Royal Navy squadrons
would be goaded into pursuit, to be led into minefields or submarine traps, or
into ambush by superior German forces.
He1igoland Bight
28 August 1914 Still lacking experience, Room 40 failed to warn of Hipper's first such foray
.. German ships when, on 3 November 1914, he shelled Great Yarmouth for twenty minutes while
'-' sunken German ships
a cruiser mined the coastal shipping lane. In accordance with his Kaiser's
British ships
Strassburg in mist
FIRST WORLD WAR 1914-18
instructions, von Ingenohl brought his two supporting battle squadrons no Returning from a sweep
further than the Bight. with the Harwich Force on
11 February 1916 the light
Admiral Fisher, the First Sea Lord, predicted further such provocations and
cruiser Arethusa, in which
was proved correct when Room 40 discovered one due for 16 December. Tyrwhitt wore his broad
As Hipper's force alone was specifically identified, only Beatty's battlecruisers pennant J struck a mine
and one battle squadron were directed to intercept, with the Harwich Force outside the port. Six men
were killed and the shipJ
also at sea. Von Ingenohl, too, was out in support with the battle fleet and his
steaming at 20 knots J broke
scouting forces clashed with those of the British in the pre-dawn darkness. in two.
Fearing that he was risking an action with the whole Grand Fleet, he broke
awa~ Beatty, unwittingly let off the hook, and still assuming the enemy to be
Hipper alone, actually pursued this enormous quarry until, at 8.54 a.m., he
received word that Scarborough was being bombarded. Within half an hour,
unaware of Beatty's approach or von Ingenohl's retreat, Hipper withdrew. He
was contacted by British light cruisers but these lost the scent due to an
ambiguous signal from Beatt~
Although the raids held no military significance, the Admiralty was stung by
vehement press opinion and its own inability to guarantee intervention.
53
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
54
FIRST WORLD WAR 1914-18
Dogger Bank
24 January 1915
German ships
exchange of fire
British ships
Heartened, the Germans planned a sweep against British light forces in the area DOGGER BANK
of the Dogger Bank. Following a timely alert by Room 40, Beatty rendezvoused 24 JANUARY 19 1 5
with Tyrwhitt on the superbly clear morning of 24 January 1915. Hipper was At the battle of the Dogger
Bank, Hipper's
sighted almost immediately and, although outnumbered by five battlecruisers to
battlecruisers escaped
four, was slow in attempting to escape. With the squadrons in two battle lines, because a misread signal
Beatty's slowly overhauled Hipper's, firing commencing at extreme range. from Beatty's stricken
Inevitably the German tail-ender, Blucher and the British leader, Lion, took the flagship caused the
remainder of his force to
heaviest punishment. The latter, losing all power, fell out of line. Beatty was able
abandon pursuit in order to
to make only flag signals and these were badly misread. With an amazing lack of finish off the already
initiative, the remaining four British ships fell on the hapless Blucher, allowing mortally injured Blucher.
Hipper's remaining force to escape.
Hailed by the popular press as a victory, the battle of the Dogger Bank was a
fiasco. British gunnery was outclassed, signal procedures deficient. Beatty's
second-in-command was relieved. One hit on the German Seydlitz had burned
out two turrets when fragments set off waiting charges. Only prompt magazine
flooding saved the ship. The Germans learned a valuable lesson and fitted flash- Vice Admiral Franz Ritter
proof doors to all capital ships, a measure not taken by the British. Depressed by von Hipper and his staff at
the .loss of the Blucher, however, the Kaiser replaced the unfortunate von the time of Jutland. Hipper
commanded the High Seas
Ingenohl with the more aggressive Admiral Hugo von Pohl. Yet, as the strictures
Fleet's Scouting Forces,
remained, little changed. A gloomy Tirpitz began to support an alternative policy which included the
of unrestricted submarine warfare; and the expensive Zeppelin force, feared by battlecruiser squadron.
the Royal Navy for its scouting potential, was largely wasted in bombing raids. Second from left appears
Korvettenkapitan Erich
The colossal egos of Churchill, as First Lord, and Fisher made for an uneasy
Raeder, Hipper's Chief of
relationship. In May 1915 the former's incessant demands brought about Fisher's Staff and destined in 1928 to
resignation. A stagnant war situation also saw the formation of a coalition head the German Navy.
55
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
government. Churchill had made too many enemies and was sidelined. The 'fiery
energy' that had driven the Admiralty was replaced by a 'sound, but lethargic,
administration' headed by Arthur Balfour and Admiral of the Fleet Sir
Henry Jackson. At the point of Churchill's departure the Grand Fleet's
numerical advantage was 25 dreadnoughts to 17, and 9 battlecruisers to
5. The lead was increasing, with 7 more dreadnoughts due to complete
by the end of 1915.
Following the Dogger Bank action little happened at sea. Jellicoe
chafed at the Admiralty's direction but, having failed to sting the
Germans into action, he agreed with Beatty in April 1916 that the High
Seas Fleet would fight only on its own terms.
During 1915 the German fleet had made five half-hearted forays
and, in January 1916, the mortally sick von Pohl was replaced by
Admiral Reinhard Scheer who, on 25 April, waited near Terschelling with
the High Seas Fleet as Hipper shelled Lowestoft and Yarmouth. Although
the Harwich Force made contact, heavy seas prevented Beatty or Jellicoe from
intervention. This led directly to the Admiralty accelerating the Grand Fleet's
southward move to the Firth of Forth.
Admiral Reinhard Scheer At the end of May 1916 Scheer abandoned a planned bombardment of
assumed command of the Sunderland, instead sweeping up the west coast of Jutland. The British, alerted
German High Seas Fleet
by Room 40, were already at sea. On 31 May, as the fleets converged, each was
only in January 1916 and
because of the mortal illness following about 50 miles astern of its scouting battlecruisers. At about
of his predecessor von Pohle 2 p.m. these clashed, with Hipper reversing course to lure Beatty's force on to
H is more aggressive policy Scheer. A fierce running battle developed, with the British six-to-five advantage
led directly to the battle of
offset by poor fire distribution and ship design. Two battlecruisers blew up from
Jutland and near catastrophe
due to Jellicoes superior fleet magazine explosions.
handling. He was succeeded Beatty's light cruisers sighted Scheer's main body at about 4.45 p.m. and it
by Hipper in 1918. was the British turn to go about to entice the unsuspecting Germans on to the
Grand Fleet. Knowing of the pressure on Beatty, Jellicoe had detached Hood's
three battlecruisers to assist. Their intervention forced Hipper back so that he
failed to sight and report Jellicoe's presence. Poorly informed by Beatty, Jellicoe
deployed the Grand Fleet from cruising formation to battle line at the very last
minute. Confined between the closing battle fleets, the scouting forces were
heavily engaged. Several ships, including a third British battlecruiser, were
A contemporary impression destroyed. By 6.30 p.m. Jellicoe was firing on a surprised Scheer who, in a poor
of Jutland by German artist position to respond, reversed course, covered by a destroyer torpedo attack.
Claus Bergen., capturing the
J ellicoe had long made it clear in writing that, fearing a trap, he would not
ferocity of the encounters.
On the day~ over eight pursue in these circumstances. He steered instead to interpose the fleet between
thousand heavy-calibre Scheer and his bases.
rounds were fired. Gunnery With the pressure thus relieved, however, Scheer again turned about at
efficiency was roughly equal
6.55 p.m. Coming under murderous fire from the Grand Fleet, the German
but that of the British was
offset by poor-quality admiral threw Hipper's battered force at Jellicoe as the latter once more turned
projectiles. away. It was 7.20 p.m., the light was deteriorating and, in accordance with his
FIRST WORLD WAR 1914-18
57
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
recorded intentions, J ellicoe again did not pursue. Through the night he
maintained line, hoping to resume the battle at first light. In a series of violent
encounters, however, Scheer broke through the British tail. This fact, together
with other signals of critical value, were not communicated to Jellicoe who, at
dawn on 1 June, looked upon an empty sea.
The battle of Jutland was over. On the day the Grand Fleet had a clear
advantage of 28 dreadnoughts to 16, a1!d 9 battlecruisers to 5 yet, as the table
shows, the Germans scored a materiel victory:
Scheer's tactical handling should have been more heavily punished. Poorly
Admiral Sir David Beatty~ supported with signalling and individual initiative, Jellicoe erred on the
who had succeeded ]ellicoe side of caution. British gunnery was the equal of German, but projectiles were
as C-in-C~ Grand Fleet~ inferior.
greets Rear Admiral Hugh
Both German admirals were lauded as victors of the Skagerrak but Jellicoe
Rodman~ US Navy. In a
politically important was judged, by ~ disappointed public and service alike, to have wasted an
gesture~ the latter had opportunity. Despite shortcomings, Beatty emerged as the hero, which affected
brought over an American the previously harmonious relationship with his superior. It must be repeated,
battleship division in
however, that Jellicoe had fought as he had said he would. His losses were far
November 1917~ serving in
the Grand Fleet as the Sixth more sustainable than those of the enemy, and the enemy remained fully
Battle Squadron. contained. Nothing had changed.
Convinced that the Grand Fleet would always be too powerful to
defeat, Scheer firmly advocated a shift to unrestricted submarine
warfare. Contrary to popular mythology, Scheer made a further foray
as early as 19 August 1916. Room 40 had the Grand Fleet to sea in
. good time but the enemy diverted fruitlessly after the Harwich
Force and no action ensued.
More caution was now evident on both sides. The Grand
Fleet began to divert many of its minor warships to act as escorts
for the new ~onvoy system. The German High Seas Fleet
committed submarines, previously employed in patrol lines, to the
newall-out offensive. In addition it lost destroyers to assist the
Flanders flotilla.
The British coalition government resigned and David Lloyd
George emerged as Prime Minister. He appointed Sir Edward Carson
as the navy's political head in place of Balfour, and J ellicoe for
Jackson, who was worn out and without ideas on how to counter the
now-critical submarine menace. Beatty succeeded to command of the
Grand Fleet but, despite his legendary reputation, recognized that
Jellicoe's containment policy was correct.
58
------
5th BS
(Evan Thomas)
3rd Battlecruiser
Squadron
• 5.35 pm
6.20 pm
• 6.55 pm
7.21 pm
• 8.00 pm
8.15 pm
Reverse turns of
the High Seas Fleet
Begin End
CD 6.30 pm
o 6.55 pm
® 7.15pm
6.20 pm Are opened by British Grand Fleet
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
Again the North Sea fell quiet until, late in 1917, the Germans made a
destructive raid on a Scandinavian convoy. A British riposte into the Bight was
powerfully supported by six battlecruisers, now under the flag of Vice Admiral
Sir William Pakenham. He operated so cautiously that all chance of an action
was lost and dissatisfaction with the direction of the navy reached new heights. In
December 1917 ]ellicoe was summarily dismissed. In the same month, however,
morale was boosted by the arrival of a squadron of American battleships to
operate with the Grand Fleet.
Following the Russian revolution of October 1917 German ships were
War-weariness and
shortages at home,
combined with insufficient
sea-time and corrosive
inactivity, defeated the High
Seas Fleet from within.
H ippers appointment as
C-in-C failed to halt the
growing wave of
disillusionment and sedition
that was sweeping the
service. Here, in Kiel, a
week prior to the armistice,
a throng of seamen listen to
the governments
representative, the SPD
Defence Minister Gustav
Noske.
FIRST WORLD WAR 1914-18
released from Baltic duties. They brought with them the contagion of revolt and
the murmurings of rebellion, which, combined with war-weariness and evident
disillusionment, produced growing disaffection in the fleet. Scheer dealt with it
firmly, but the fleet was still under-employed. In August 1918 Hipper took over as
its commander-in-chief.
October saw Germany begin peace negotiations with President Wilson. The
naval leadership, none the less, saw capitulation without defeat as dishonourable.
A planned final showdown, however, was scotched by the rank and file, who
opted for open mutiny.
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
66
FIRST WORLD WAR 1914-18
Kaiser. Once in favour of the theories of the so-called ]eune Ecole, he was now
actively opposed to any proposal, such as that of a guerre de course, which
diverted resources from the true path.
Nevertheless, although the German Navy had managed to accumulate
eighteen U-boats by 1910, it was only after this date that boats became truly
effective with the introduction of a satisfactory diesel engine. Their major
deficiency was t.he small capacity of eleven torpedoes (and these of only
50cm/19.7-inch diameter), making them reliant upon sinkings by gun. Together
with deep-sea boats, there were built coastal (UB) and small minelaying
(UC) boats.
Germany's claim to have had no pre-war plans to wage war on commerce was
true in that the means simply did not exist. The early series of setbacks in the war
at sea, however, enabled the arguments of such as Admiral von Pohl to carry more
weight. By January 1915 U-boats had sunk several major British warships with
impunity and Tirpitz, keen to divert attention from the battle fleet's lack of
achievement, agreed to a submarine offensive against trade, to commence in
February. The measure was justified on the legal grounds that British blockade
16
15 f - - ,----.--
-- Number commissioned per month
-- Number destroyed per month
14 ......••.•.•.....•...
13
12 ~ I
! I
!
!
j I I I I I
11 I !
10
I I
I
.i-
i
I
I II
I II
! I !
!
I I ! I
68
FIRST WORLD WAR 1914-18
that studies indicated were needed, only twenty-nine of all types could be U -boat construction
mustered. A lack of skilled labour precluded any rapid expansion, and numbers required specialist
techniques that limited it to
increased, mainly because inadequate Allied countermeasures resulted in few
comparatively few yards.
sinkings. Prior to the war, the British Admiralty had discounted the practicality Continuous ordering and
of a submarine campaign and only in December 1914 was the nucleus of the strict standardization
Submarine Committee established to consider it. Work commenced on allowed for series
production, with dedicated
hydrophone detection early in 1915, but practical depth charges did not enter
work teams moving from
service until January 1916. Until then, destroyers relied mainly on towing hull to hull. With all steel
explosive sweeps. erection being done on site,
Germany's declaration of a war zone was meant to deter neutral ships, which however, construction was
relatively slow.
comprised one in four movements in British ports. The United States, however,
immediately warned of German accountability in the event of 'incidents'. This
extracted an assurance from the German government that properly marked
neutrals would be treated correct!): Because this would require submarines having
to surface, it created problems for the navy, as British ships were now being
defensively armed and ordered to attempt to ram any submarine seeking to
attack. On the other hand, submarines carried few torpedoes and could expect to
hit with less than 50 per cent of them. To accumulate a worthwhile score,
therefore, a commander needed to rely on surfacing to effect destruction by
gunfire or the placement of explosive charges.
As may be seen from the data chart on page 71, British shipping losses were
variable but within bounds. In March 1915 the liner Fa/aha was torpedoed with
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
7°
FIRST WORLD WAR 1914-18
I
I I
I-
I
I I
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I ! i
I ...t.......
800
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700
-
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0 600
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a5 400 LJ.-L-+-LJ-L.lU-L_-1-LJl.~_--+._.J--U-L-L¥~!W~lln$!!WY~'~1:,!!.u'L, . f·········· .....•........•..........•.........•.......•.......,,...-, ···i-··-···'---t·--t--+--t--+-+--+--+-··I
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-...... l-
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t---r'""'I-......;--+---i---+--;-----1-t--I---I--..··.--....
- ~i
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AS 0 N 0 J F M A M J J AS 0 N 0 J F M A M J J AS 0 N Oi J F M A M J J AS 0 N 0 J F M A M J J A SON 0
1914 1915 1916 1917 1918
diversion of tonnage in support of lengthy military campaigns. The supply of This chart shows the
captured and requisitioned shipping had all but dried up and the total available to catastrophic impact made
by the second phase of
support the population was reduced.
unrestricted U-boat warfare,
German theorists calculated that, with restrictions removed, each U-boat was starting in February 1917,
capable of sinking an average of 4,000 gross registered tons (grt) daily. Seventy and, from that October, the
submarines should thus be able to make Britain sue for peace within six months. steady decline in sinkings
due to the introduction of
The United States would almost certainly declare war at such a campaign but it
convoys. The difference on
was felt worth gambling that Britain would be knocked out of the war before the chart between British
American intervention could be effective. and World losses comprises
An embittered Tirpitz was finally squeezed out of office in March 1916 but mainly neutral tonnage.
71
AR AT SEA 1914-45
74
FIRST WORLD WAR 1914-18
Regular and essential short-sea trades were maintained between Great Britain
and Scandinavia, the Netherlands and France. Following German targeting and a
rising loss rate, escorted convoys were tried as a local policy from February 1917.
The reduction in sinkings was dramatic and, although it was argued that
experience in home waters could not be extrapolated deep-sea, the awful losses of
April caused the Admiralty to recommend adopting the system on the North
Atlantic. The prime minister, Lloyd George, later falsely credited himself with
forcing this decision upon a reluctant high command. Between June and October
1917 regular convoy cycles commenced from Canada, the United States, Gibraltar
and the Mediterranean. Practical problems proved to be few and the size of
convoys quickly grew to economize on escorts. 'Fast' and 'slow' convoys were
also introduced. From June 1917 the trend of losses was steadily downward,
assisted by a drive to employ tonnage more efficiently. Three out of four sinkings
had been by submarine gunfire but convoy made this impossible. The enemy
therefore probed new areas where convoys did not operate. Thus 'Independents'
still accounted for 40 per cent of losses, although defensive arming doubled their
chances of survival.
The loss rate had been reduced to less than one-third required for a decision
and, in December 1917, the Germans belatedly created a U-boat Office to co-
ordinate the campaign and to direct the efforts of up to 69,000 skilled personnel,
released from the army to mass-produce submarines. It was too late.
Equally late was the Allies' so-called Great Northern Barrage. The Royal
Navy had finally succeeded in almost closing the narrow and shallow Dover Strait
to U-boats. Enthused, the Americans initiated a scheme to bar the deep, stormy,
2S0-mile wide Scotland-Norway gap by deep mining. Unconvinced of the
project's practicality, the British contributed only about 20 per cent of the 70,000
mines that were laid.
75
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
privateers to seize hostile vessels and their cargo, and bring them to port for
condemnation by an admiralty court. The ease of enrichment, however, resulted
in privateering degenerating into little better than piracy, and the practice was
abolished by the 1856 Declaration of Paris.
This declaration also stated that, with the exception of contraband of war, a
neutral flag protected an enemy's merchandise. Further, neutral merchandise,
contraband excepted, could not be taken while under an enemy flag. British
acquiescence to these clauses flew in the face of experience, for the powers of stop
and search had been widely and successfully exploited during the wars with
America and France. The coming American Civil War would also show the
clauses to be unenforceable.
Although the searching of neutrals on the high seas had been essential to the
conduct of a successful c~mpaign, it had caused much friction, particularly with
Americans, ever mindful of their freedoms. The 1856 declaration extended no
protection to a belligerent's ships and cargoes, and when British war plans against
Germany emphasized the need for economic blockade, it was apparent that there
would be extensive scope for misunderstanding. In truth, the international law of
the sea was little more than an imprecise set of rules based on centuries of
experience, most of it British. The situation remained that the Americans held
that private property at sea was immune to interference while the British
maintained the doctrine of Right of Capture.
Further complications arose from the arbitrary classification of cargoes
themselves. The Declaration of London in 1909 recognized three categories. The
first, 'absolute contraband', comprised purely military goods and were liable
to seizure anywhere. The next, 'conditional contraband', could be taken only if
it could be shown that the goods were specifically intended f~r military use~
Finally, the 'free list' included all commodities, particularly raw materials,
inseparable from those intended for civil use. Great Britain, however, had never
ratified the declaration, leaving the category of all commodities open to
upgrading.
The principle of blockade had never been measured against a modern and
fully industrialized society but, back in 1793, Britain had deliberately targeted
French grain. An indifferent harvest made import vital, and the enforced safe
passage of the resulting convoy gave Lord Howe the opportunity to inflict on the
Brest fleet the sharp reverse known as the Glorious First of June. The Admiralty's
war plan against Germany envisaged a blockade injuring the latter's 'interests,
credit and prestige' sufficiently to provoke a response in force. History, it was
hoped, would repeat itself.
With war, the control of commercial shipping in the English Channel was
relatively simple. The entire width of the Dover Strait was mined except for a
small-ship inshore route on the French side and a patrolled gate on the English.
Eastbound deep-sea traffic was obliged to pass by this gate, thence to be escorted
by the Dover Patrol into the anchorage of the Downs, where it was boarded and
FIRST WORLD WAR 1914-18
examined. With no prospect of evaSIon, any master with ship or cargo of Declared and undeclared
doubtful provenance would be attracted to using the northabout route on which, minefields were an
important passive element
sure enough, traffic rapidly increased.
in the economic blockade of
Notorious for foul weather and poor visibility, the northern approaches to Germany. The ex-Canadian
the North Sea comprised primarily the 40-mile gap between the Orkneys and the Pacific ferry Princess
Shetlands and the hundred-plus miles between the Shetlands and the Norwegian Margaret is seen here loading
mines at Grangemouth. She
coast. The latter was fringed with islands which offered an inshore route, and it
had a converted capacity for
was necessary to patrol to a latitude of 62 degrees North to reach a point where four hundred mines and her
traffic had to emerge into international waters. cruiser stern, unusual at the
Responsible for this considerable stretch of ocean was Rear Admiral Dudley time, facilitated the addition
of mining doors.
de Chair's Tenth Cruiser Squadron (10th CS), comprising eight protected cruisers
of the Edgar and Crescent classes. Until hostilities, the group had been a training
squadron but was now manned mainly by reservists. All ships were at least
twenty years of age and were obsolescent. Base facilities at Scapa Flow were
found to be too far to the south and new arrangements were established at
Lerwick and Busta Voe in the Shetlands. Diverted shipping was also sent to the
Orkneys port of Kirkwall.
Still attached to Admiral ]ellicoe's Grand Fleet, de Chair found his ships
often diverted on Grand Fleet business, a situation eased by the early attachment
of several armed merchant cruisers (AMC). Early in the blockade the navy was
endlessly frustrated by apprehending neutrals with cargoes obviously bound for
Germany yet being ordered to allow them to proceed. Severe criticism preceded
77
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
79
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
influenced the Allied camp in using winged aircraft (HTA). It was largely to give
aircraft the means to tackle airships that brought about the rapid evolution of the
aircraft carrier.
In 1914, aero-engines were still low-powered for their weight, and unreliable.
The enormous wing areas of contemporary aircraft were necessary to create
sufficient lift, but conferred the concomitant advantage of low take-off and
landing speeds. The gas containments within the great envelopes of airships
generated sufficient buoyancy to support little more than the machine's own
weight. Neither LTA nor HTA had thus yet produced aircraft geared to an
The commercial aspect of attacking role. Their greatest c~ntribution at sea was still expected to be in
German airship reconnaissance and in spotting for the fleet's gunfire.
development guaranteed a
While wheeled aircraft could be launched from a modified ship, albeit with
high profile and provided a
valuable base for wartime some difficulty, their recovery was as yet virtually impossible. Not surprisingly,
expansion. Much feared by therefore, the Royal Navy's interest in 1914 centred on the floatplane. Carried
the Grand Fleet for its aboard a variety of warships, these could be set afloat and recoyered by crane or
reconnaissance capability,
boom. In practice, even a minor chop threatened their fragile construction while a
the enemy's airship force
was, however, largely flat calm would see them unable to 'unstick' from the surface, even under full
wasted in bombing sorties throttle.
over England. The naval wing of the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) had recently gained
independence as the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS), and the Director of
Admiralty's Air Department, Captain Murray Sueter, was greatly interested in
the aircraft's potential in attack. His efforts were rewarded in July 1914 when the
Royal Navy followed the Italians in successfully air-dropping a torpedo. Sueter
80
FIRST WORLD WAR 1914-18
immediately specified a suitable aircraft from the firm of Short Brothers, which Fast and handy, several
resulted in the Short 184 seaplane. Progressively upgraded, over 650 were built, short-sea passenger vessels
were converted by the Royal
serving throughout the war as the navy's standard workhorse. To deploy the
Navy to operate a flight of
184s, Sueter began the acquisition of cross-Channel packets. -Fast and nimble, seaplanes. The 1,676-ton
these were fitted with a hangar and cranage aft and, in some cases, a flying-off Engadine had a very active
platform forward. To use the latter, the aircraft's floats were located on a wartime career with the
Harwich Force, with the
wheeled trolley:
distinction at Jutland of
With the German battle fleet obviously prepared to give battle only on its own flying the first-ever
favourable terms, thought turned to the prospects of employing torpedo aircraft reconnaissance in battle.
to attack it in its own bases and anchorages. Although more carriers were
requested for the North Sea, the opening of the Dardanelles campaign early in
1915 meant a net loss of such ships through transfer to the Mediterranean.
During August, three enemy merchantmen were hit with 14-inch aerial torpedoes,
two being sunk despite the poor explosive power of small warheads. In order to
81
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
Le Peli
5 CEl\"T.
26- Annie
SUPPLEMENT ILLUSTRE
Dl'BI
5 CENT.
Numiro 1.279
ABClNNDIENTS..
weight from 810 to 1,400 pounds pointed to
the development of an entirely new type of
aircraft. Attempts to use aircraft to spot for
bombarding warships at the Dardanelles were
bedevilled by the bulk and weight of
contemporary radio equipment. For the
moment kite balloons, lofted from modified
merchantmen, were more satisfactory:
The Short 184 could carry 500 pounds of
bombs and a Lewis gun, and attacking
Turkish positions was part of every naval
pilot's routine. Naval aircraft also repeatedly
bombed the Turkish battlecruiser Yavuz,
recently transferred from the German Navy
h
o
[I] 6 am
o 9.30am
and grounded in the Dardanelles. Their small bombs, however, were defeated by CUXHAVE RAID 1914
turrets of capital ships. A stranger expedient, which successfully claimed a One of the RNAS's twenty-
Zeppelin in August 1918, was to loft a Camel from a specially configured lighter seven 'C', or Coastal,
airshipsJ C26 watches over a
towed at high speed by a destroyer.
convoy. The type served
While the neutral US Navy put much effort into catapaults, the Royal Navy from the end of 1915 the
J
found them to be an unnecessary complication for early aircraft, although crew in the open gondola
independent development and sea trials were continuously progressed. being on duty for up to an
eye-watering twenty-four
A major contribution to the war at sea was made by flying boats which, using
hours.
their hulls for flotation, were more robust than floatplanes. Credit for their early
development is due to the American Glenn Curtiss, but the refinement of his H.4
and H.12 ('Small and Large Americas') into the ubiquitous Felixstowe F.2A was
the work of his British collaborator, Squadron Commander John Porte. Well,
armed for their day, long-legged and surprisingly manoeuvrable, they operated
from a string of east coast stations to cover the southern North Sea in a 'spider's
web' patrol pattern. Surfaced U-boats were their primary quarry, against which
they carried 230-pound bombs. On several occasions they managed to surprise
unwary Zeppelins, and scraps with enemy aircraft were not uncommon.
From 1916 the RNAS took delivery of small, non-rigid airships ('blimps')
which began to fly convoy escort in the following year, together with the flying
boats. Like the Zeppelins, blimps had long endurance and could hover or fly at
85
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
low speeds. Although never credited with the outright sinking of a submarine,
their presence overhead worried attacking U-boat commanders, contributing
greatly to the reduction in sinkings.
With the conversion of the aged Campania the Grand Fleet possessed from
April 1916 a ship that could maintain fleet speed and carry seven Short 184s for
reconnaissance, and up to four interceptors. Her lack of subdivision, however,
made her vulnerable and a better solution was sought. The war was expected to
be over too quickly to warrant the design and procurement of a new building but,
in September 1916 (shortly after the Campania's disappointing non-attendance at
Jutland and the Engadine's consequent flying of the first reconnaissance mission
in battle), the Admiralty approved the reworking of an incomplete liner hull by
Beardmore and promised for the end of 1917.
A conversion was performed in parallel on the large, 31-knot cruiser Furious.
At 228 feet, her new forward flying-off deck was about 17 feet shorter than
that of the Campania but below it was situated accommodation for six
reconnaissance and four fighter aircraft. She commissioned in this guise in July
1917. It was daringly demonstrated in August that a Pup could be sideslipped
around the superstructure to land on the foredeck, although a later attempt
proved fatal. The feat influenced a decision to add a 184-foot flying-on deck aft,
connected by elevator to an aircraft hangar below. In this second state, the
Furious recommissioned in March 1918.
In June 1917 deliveries were begun of the Sopwith Cuckoo. Designed to carry
of an 18-inch torpedo, the aircraft was to be built in hundreds for mass attack on
the enemy fleet.
The after-deck concept aboard the Furious proved to be totally unworkable
due to the violent eddying downstream of her superstructure. For this reason, the
fleet impatiently awaited the Beardmore conversion. To be named Argus, this
featured a near full-length flush flight deck, unencumbered by top-hamper. Her
delivery was badly delayed but the Admiralty approved a second full flight deck
conversion, using an incomplete battleship hull for what would eventually
86
FIRST WORLD WAR 1914-18
become HMS Eagle. Embodying the same principles but designed to task, HMS HMS Furious in her second
Hermes was laid down in January 1918 as the first true carrier. configuration, with separate
forward (flying off) and after
Despite her deficiencies, the Furious gave a promise of things to come when,
(flying-on) decks. The latter
in July 1918, she dispatched a specially trained force of Camels against the has a barrier to prevent
Zeppelin base at Tondern. Carrying two 50-pound bombs apiece, seven aircraft aircraft from flying into the
carried out history's first successful carrier air strike, destroying two enemy superstructure. A small SSZ
blimp of the RNAS is secured.
airships in their shed. To the huge disappointment of the service, the Argus was
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
not delivered until September 1918. As she was still working up when the
armistice was agreed two months later, the planned aerial torpedo attack on the
High Seas Fleet never materialized.
One reason for the success Although the British were responsible for most of the essential HTA
of the German auxiliary developments during the period under consideration, others also operated
cruiser Wolf was her use
aircraft at sea and in maritime support. The German Navy converted merchant-
of a small Friedrichshafen
FF.33e floatplane. Careful men to carriers of floatplanes but made no significant use of them. One
maintenance allowed it exception was the little aircraft carried by the auxiliary cruiser Wolf, which made
to make over fifty flights, over fifty flights in support of the ship's commerce-raiding activities during 1917.
which widened the ship's
Shore-based German floatplanes nevertheless proved a nuisance on occasion. A
horizon and threatened
its merchantmen into surfaced submarine off Harwich was surprised by a flight and peppered by
submission. machine-gun fire almost to destruction. The same medium accounted for a whole
flotilla of six British coastal motor boats (CMB) in August 1918. Several aerial
torpedoings of merchantmen occurred off the Thames Estuary during 1917.
While a Turkish torpedo boat was the largest warship to be destroyed by
bombing during the war, a few submarines were sunk. These included the British
Bl0, sunk by Austro-Hungarian aircraft at Venice Arsenal in 1916, and the British
D3, sunk in error by a French airship in 1918. 'During 1916 the French Foucault
was detected submerged in clear water and sunk by Austrian aircraft.
88
FIRST WORLD WAR 1914-18
Liman von Sanders. The German Vice Admiral Wilhelm Souchon, effectively
The Mediterranean
1914-18 head of the Turkish fleet, echoed much senior opinion in the Royal Navy by
Central powers
doubting that an Allied squadron could operate beyond the Dardanelles due to
states later joining
problems of supply. The French also had reservations but participated because
D Central powers
they regarded the Levant as a French sphere of interest. Their objections to the
Entente powers
choice of Senior Naval Officer (SNO) were also overridden. Rear Admiral
states later joining
D Entente powers Sir Sackville Carden was due for retirement, had little command experience and
D neutral state even less initiative. In Rear Admiral Sir John de Robeck, however, he had an
• naval base able deputy.
~ British Together with the Sea of Marmara and the Bosphorus, the 40-mile
r French
Dardanelles waterway provides the only link between the Black Sea and the
Mediterranean. Generally 2 to 4 miles in width, it closes to only three-quarters of
Russian
a mile at the Chanak Narrows, some 13 miles from the Mediterranean entrance.
F Austrian
Studding both shores, fortifications both ancient and modern housed over 200
r Italian
f Japanese
r- Ottoman
• Russian minefield
Patrol zones
D British
D French
D Italian
guns. Ten rows of mInes, some 375 In all, were quickly established over the THE MEDITERRANEAN
Battleships could not force the strait until the mines were swept, but the A glance at a map of the
Mediterranean is sufficient
minefields were commanded at close range by many fixed and mobile gun
to show the strategic
batteries, supported by searchlights. Minesweepers could operate only if the importance of the British
batteries were suppressed. Many officials, including the First Sea Lord, Admiral bases at Gibraltar and
Sir John Fisher, believed it essential that military forces would need to clear either Malta and in Italy, which
permitted the Allies to
shore as the fleet advanced. For the moment, it suited Fisher's purposes to go
patrol the Strait of Otranto,
along with the plan. and the Aegean, which
At Mudros, on the Greek island of Lemnos, a substantial fleet was soon reduced the options to
assembled, headed by the British battlecruiser Inflexible and sixteen pre- enemy naval forces.
dreadnoughts, four of which were French. Much to Fisher's unease, the new
battleship Queen Elizabeth was also under orders to join.
. Carden planned to overcome the defences in three stages. First to be targeted
sea
L
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
division. Carden had already moved against the intermediate defences but used
his ships piecemeal. Restricted in manoeuvre, they were harassed by mobile
batteries; unable to anchor, their fire was inaccurate. Spotting by aircraft was
ineffective due to still-primitive equipment.
Under pressure, but with the intermediate defences virtually unscathed,
Carden ordered an attempt to reduce the first mine barriers. On the night of
10/11 March 1915, seven civilian-manned minesweeping trawlers moved up,
supported by warships. The latter proved wholly unable to suppress either
searchlights or guns and the attempt was quickly abandoned. Two further
attempts, one British, one French, also failed, even with the use of naval crews.
On 16 March Carden resigned and was replaced by de Robeck.
Two days later de Robeck launched a major attack. As the four modern
British capital ships advanced slowly in line abreast, laying long-range fire on the
Narrows defences, flanking squadrons of older British and French ships engaged
the attentions of the intermediate defences. As the force neared the mine barriers,
the sweepers again went forward, and again attracted unendurable fire.
Withdrawing, the heavy ships then ran into a new line of just twenty mines, laid
93
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
Suvla Bay
..
xxx
.....
ANZAC
The Dardanelles
March 1915 - January 1916
Ottoman deployment
Ottoman fort
~ Nagara
~ Triumph Burnu
mobile battery
25 May 1915
~ static battery
~~• • Erveden
Aegean •• • Halar
Sea
AchiA .~
•
Baba ~ •• _ •• -.
~~~~
\ e
e
\
.........
-
...... ... ,
--~,
~
"" ... '"
...... '"
...... '"
...... '"
...... '"
~~
~, N
~ 1 ...... '" ...... '" ...... '" ......... "
Majestic 0' ... ... ... ... ~
27 May ... ... '" ... ... ... ... ...'" ... ... ... .-A..... I ... Irres,st,°ble
°
94
FIRST WORLD WAR 1914-18
at night by a Turkish auxiliar~ The French Bouvet was lost with nearly all hands. THE DARDANELLES
The Inflexible and Irresistible both struck mines, the latter slowly foundering. In MARCH 1915-
JANUARY 1916
attempting to assist, the Ocean suffered a similar fate. For the loss of three
The Dardanelles were
battleships and three more heavily damaged, de Robeck's big effort had reduced
impregnable to orthodox
neither minefield nor defences. Viewing old capital ships as expendable, Churchill naval attack. Minefields
dispatched four more, while the French sent one. Destroyers were modified for barred capital ships from
high-speed minesweeping. breaking through. Fixed and
mobile batteries prevented
De Robeck now suddenly echoed the opinion of General Ian Hamilton, the
clearance by minesweepers.
senior military officer on Lemnos, that a combined operation was necessary to A military campaign was
protect the navy's line of communication. Churchill disagreed furiously, but had thus essential, but was
to bow to the unanimity of Fisher and the Sea Lords, together with the appallingly misdirected.
commanders on the spot. None the less, an offensive was necessary to encourage
the reluctant alliance of Italy, to offset the growing stalemate of the Western
Front, and to relieve continuing Turkish pressure on the Russians. On 25 April
1915 Anzac and British troops were landed on the Gallipoli peninsula, with
French forces on the Asiatic shore. From this point, naval operations assumed a
supporting role.
Germany, unsure of Turkish ability to withstand further naval assault,
decided to dispatch U-boats to the scene, although these would take time to
arrive. On the night of 12/13 Maya single enemy destroyer slipped down the
strait and torpedoed the anchored battleship Goliath, sinking her with great loss
of life. Knowing U-boats were also en route, Fisher was fearful for the Queen
Elizabeth and successfully demanded her return. Churchill's response was a
95
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
No organized pre-landing
bombardment, no close air
support, no spearhead
assault with amphibious
armoured vehicles. To
modern eyes the landings on
Gallipoli appear hopelessly
amateur. The courage of
the individual squaddie
was squandered by
incompetence at high level.
FIRST WORLD WAR 1914-18
97
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
MESOPOTAMIA Constantinople and the peninsula was disrupted by Australian, British and
Commitment by the Royal French submarines. Braving roaring currents, mines and nets they sank eight
Navy to oil-firing meant warships, sank or wrote-off thirty-five transports and destroyed countless cargo-
that sources of oil had to be
carrying sailing craft for the loss of eight of their own number.
safeguarded. War with
Turkey thus led to the Considerable military reinforcement failed to break the Gallipoli stalemate
Mesopotamian campaign, and, when Bulgaria joined the Central Powers, a new Allied intervention was
whose initial objectives were required to aid Serbia. In October 1915 General Hamilton was replaced and his
simply those necessary to
successor recommended evacuation. Considerable casualties had attended the
cover the Ahwaz-Basra-
Abadan region. Military initial landings but, as a result of careful planning that had been absent through
necessities, however, added much of the campaign, the force was evacuated by the navy at the end of the year
further complication in virtually without loss.
diflFicult terrain.
Having decided in 1912 that the Royal Navy would move to oil-firing in all
ships, the British government acquired a controlling interest in the Anglo-Persian
Oil Compan~ Its refinery stood at Abadan, where the Shatt-al-Arab waterway
entered the head of the Persian Gulf. The Shatt emptied the combined flow of the
Mesopotamian (now Iraqi) Tigris and Euphrates, and the Persian (now Iranian)
Karun. Long and vulnerable, the pipeline roughly followed the course of the
Karun, north-eastward to Ahwaz. The vast expanse across which these rivers
flowed was devoid of major feature and seasonally inundated to form a waist-
deep wilderness of mud and reed. Small islands then abounded but the only
continuous communication was by way of the rivers and their embankments,
thickly fringed with groves of date palms.
This hostile land, where the Ottoman Empire met Persia, was peopled by
nomadic Arab tribes with scant allegiance to any authority. The British had
50°
British river-borne
~
operations
~
other British
operations
40°
-~ British retreat
~ Turkish advance
-~ Turkish retreat
e
A oil field
oil pipeline
eMardJn
I '- \ /
/ I
'- - /
~) f
\
\
\
I
}
I
/
bi
99
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
commercial interests on the waterways, where all the major centres of habitation
la~ Their relaxed earlier relations with the Turkish authorities had deteriorated
since the rise to power of the German-influenced 'Young Turks'. There was
British concern that, in the event of war, Turkey would be encouraged into calling
a general jihad, the effect of which would cross all frontiers and unite disaffected
tribes in Afghanistan and north-west India.
With Turkey on the verge of declaring hostilities, and with warnings that
crews of stranded German merchant ships were planning to scuttle them in the
vital Shatt, Britain unobtrusively moved an Indian army brigade to Bahrain. Its
transports were escorted by the old battleship Ocean, which rendezvoused in the
Gulf with the sloops Espiegle and Odin, and the Indian Marine armed transport
Dalhousie. On 6 November 1914, the day after Turkey's declaration, the Espiegle
silenced the enemy battery at Fao, allowing the force to enter the Shatt and to
disembark a little above the refiner~ A second brigade arrived on the 14th.
The deep-draught Ocean was unable to cross the bar but her captain, Arthur
Hayes-Sadler, armed tugs and launches for upriver service and embarked in the
Espiegle as Senior Naval Officer (SNO). Thus began a strange, one-dimensional
naval operation, where there was rarely water under the keel and ships were piled
with sandbags and steel plate to soak up rifle bullets that spat randomly from
thick cover on the river banks. The sloops' lofty masts offered the highest vantage
point for miles. Violent sandstorms would suddenly halt operations with nil
visibility and winds strong enough to swamp requisitioned native craft.
A brisk military action at Sahil began a Turkish withdrawal, allowing the
navy to enter the Karun and retrieve a group of shallow-draught river steamers. It
was the time of seasonal low water and any attempt at a defensive stand could be
outflanked across the desert. The abandoned town of Basra was thus quickly
occupied and the navy reconnoitred up to Qurna (Kurnah), about 110 river miles
from the sea and the point at which the Tigris and Euphrates unite to form the
Shatt-al-Arab.
The Odin, with her 12-foot draught, damaged her rudder on a submerged
obstruction and an ad hoc flotilla went forward to land a military force some
10 miles below the town. A maze of thicketed side creeks had to be cleared by
infantry before Qurna could be attacked. On 9 December, as the navy occupied
the attention of the Turks from the front, the town was taken by an encircling
movement from the rear. With athe length of the Shatt-al-Arab secure, Hayes-
Sadler returned to the Ocean, leaving Commander Wilfred Nunn of the Espiegle
as SNO.
As the British consolidated their exposed situation at Qurna, the Turks made
two thrusts across countr~ One probed the British front towards Ahwaz, at the
head of the pipeline. The other headed south-eastward to Basra, threatening the
rear of the Qurna force. Seasonal inundation had by now converted the wastes
into a vast shallow lake, and troops by now of corps strength and commanded by
General Sir John Nixon, employed large numbers of native bellums in turning
100
FIRST WORLD WAR 1914-18
back these thrusts. Also very effective as mobile artillery were four naval 4.7s Here seen at Basra, the
mounted on Suez canal horseboats. ubiquitous Short 184 was
the RNAS's workhorse.
The threats had emanated from Nasiriya on the Euphrates and Amara on the
Note the huge wing area to
Tigris. Assisted in reconnaissance and mapping by a new agency - aircraft - and compensate for the limited,
reinforced by the newly arrived sloop Clio, a column under Major General 275 hp of the engine.
Charles Townshend took Amara on 3 June, the surrender being effected to two Taking-off could be difficult
in conditions of great heat
armed tugs, an armed paddle yacht and two horseboats, all precariously far
and the radiator, set in the
ahead of the main body. A second column then moved against Nasiriya but due centre of the upper wing,
to heat, sickness and the barrier of the huge, shallow Lake of Hammar, the town could be given to boiling.
did not fall until 25 July.
Commanders on the spot had overcome immense difficulties, Nunn
describing the land as having 'too much water for the army, not enough for the
navy'. From the London perspective, however, objectives had been achieved
comfortably and the decision was made to press on for the politically desirable
prize of Baghdad itself. Still on poor defensive ground, the Turks fell back to Kut-
aI-Amara. Due to seasonal low water only the smaller naval craft could now
navigate but these again occupied the front as the army entered from the side,
taking the town at bayonet point. Baghdad lay just 110 miles distant overland,
perhaps double that on the meandering river. Twenty miles short of the capital
the ancient city of Ctesiphon was situated on good defensive ground, and here the
Turks made their stand in depth.
The navy now began to receive what it had always needed: Fly-class gunboats,
shipped to Abadan in sections for local reassembly. Drawing less than 3 feet of
101
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
water, they carried three medium calibre and five automatic weapons. During the
battle for Ctesiphon the gunboats attacked a heavy redoubt on the enemy's flank.
The river's deep embankment protected the hulls of craft to an extent but also
hindered their fire. Townshend's attempt to roll up the Turkish line failed on
fierce resistance and, having suffered 30 per cent casualties, he had insufficient
strength to renew the attack. It was now the British turn to retreat, covered by the
navy as rearguard. Hit by artillery and disabled, the new gunboat Firefly had to
be abandoned. By early December 1915 the British had withdrawn to a point well
south of Kut, where Townshend and a full division had been left to annoy the
enemy's rear pending relief, anticipated in a few weeks. Determined Turkish
resistance made that relief impossible and, by April 1916, conditions in Kut were
Shipped out in sections for critical. Two Victoria Crosses were won in a desperate and unsuccessful attempt
assembly at Abadan~ the to resupply the garrison with a river steamer and, on 29 April, Townshend was
'small China gunboats~ of
obliged to surrender.
the Fly class proved
indispensable on the rivers~ Even before this disaster the campaign, well beyond the capacity of the Royal
drawing less than 3 feet of Indian Marine to administer, had become the responsibility of the War Office.
water. They packed a 4-inch A naval yard was established at Basra, and a logistic build-up included specialist
gun~ one 12- and one 6-
river steamers and cargo lighters. There were even some stretches of railway: The
poundeG a pam-pam and
four Maxims. Note the large little Fly-class gunboats were supplemented with the larger Insect type.
areas of protective screen. In July 1916, after preparations of Roman thoroughness, the Mesopotamia
102
FIRST WORLD WAR 1914-18
Expeditionary Force was placed under the command of Lieutenant General Sir
Stanley Maude, who moved forward in greatly superior force in December 1916.
Resistance was dogged but, on the night of 24 February 1917, Nunn's flottila,
again well ahead, had the satisfaction of raising the flag over the ruins of Kut. As
retreat assumed disorder, the Turks found the navy moving up as cavalry,
overtaking their rearguard. The fleeing enemy armed flotilla was overhauled and
routed, the Firefly again assuming the White Ensign. This naval action, fought
nearly 600 river miles from the sea and some twenty-eight months since the
original flotilla had entered the Shatt-al-Arab, marked the end of the navy's
armed involvement, for Baghdad fell on 11 March 1917.
THE BALTIC
Shallow, constricted and largely ice-bound in winter, the Baltic imposes its own
complications on naval warfare. Admiral Sir John Fisher favoured a plan to seize
its exits and pass in a fleet that would oversee the landing of a Russian army on
the Pomeranian coast, less than 100 miles from Berlin. Such high-risk strategy
found support neither with the Admiralty nor with the service, and the proposal
died with his resignation in 1915.
The sea thus remained a backwater, bounded to the west by neutral
Scandinavian states and to the east by Germany and Russia, mutually at war. For
Germany the North Sea carried priority, with its ever-present threat from the
British Grand Fleet. In emergency the Kiel canal enabled powerful forces to be
transferred quickly to the Baltic, which was normally secured by older squadrons
and much used for training and working-up.
Germany, in any case, had little reason to fear the Tsar's battle fleet. Its main
function was the protection of the Russian capital, St Petersburg, shortly to be
renamed Petrograd. This lay at the eastern end of the Gulf of Finland, a 250-
mile-long cul-de-sac. The fleet was based at Kronstadt, on Kotlin island, close to
the capital. The bulk of its strength remained behind the two patrolled mine
barriers that blocked the gulf at its mid point and western end.
The eastern shore of the Baltic bounded the Russian-dominated Baltic States
and, from the military point of view, formed Germany's far left flank. The area
was of low strategic importance and offensives were useful mainly in tying down
Russian divisions. Because of the reluctance to commit major fighting ships and
the shallowness of the waters, the naval war centred mainly on skirmishing
between cruiser-destroyer groups, and widespread mine-laying.
An early German initiative led to a disaster that was the greater for going
apparently unremarked. On 26 August 1914 the cruiser Magdeburg grounded at
Odensholm, her wreck being taken by the Russians before it could be thoroughly
destroyed. Naval codebooks retrieved from her were copied to the British. These,
together with a couple of more invaluable sources, formed the basis upon which
the Admiralty's highly effective intelligence branch was established in Room 40
just two months later.
1°3
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
The British Admiralty refused Russian requests for assistance with surface
ships but in October 1914 sent three E-class submarines. Although all under
competent commanders, they could achieve little before the onset of winter
except to make the Germans excessively cautious. More E-boats joined during
1915 but shallow water and variable salinity made operations very difficult. None
the less, useful targets were to be found on the iron-ore route between Sweden
and Germany. Also during 1915 the Germans made several powerful incursions in
the Gulf of Riga. Although their immediate purpose was that of large-scale
1°4
FIRST WORLD WAR 1914-18
mine-laying, the operations were covered by front-line units from the High Seas
Fleet. Any hopes of enticing the Tsar's capital ships into action, however, were
stillborn.
By the 1916 season German manpower shortages were already requiring the
decommissioning of labour-intensive pre-dreadnoughts in order to crew more
important escorts as merchant shipping began to be organized in convoys. In
June one such convoy of about ten ships, escorted by only three armed
auxiliaries, was the subject of an attack by a Russian cruiser-destroyer force.
1°5
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
Although beginning their attack efficiently enough, the latter disengaged in the
face of a resolute defence.
As British submarine commanders chafed at the restrictive orders placed on
them by the Russians, the Germans probed the Gulf of Finland with a flotilla of
modern destroyers. This ran into one of the infestation of minefields, with a
disastrous loss of seven ships. From March 1917 both the Russian Army and
Navy became infected with the nation's deepening revolutionary fervour. In
October, Germany took advantage of this situation by moving eleven capital
ships from the North Sea and landing 25,000 troops to take the islands of Osel,
Moon and Dago. Occupation of these would bottle up Russian naval forces in the
Anchored in company with Gulf of Riga and free the German army's flank from their attentions. In the
an Invincible-class heaviest naval exchanges of the war the Russians lost the battleship Slava, while
battlecruiser, HMS the Germans suffered a dozen minor warships sunk and, lacking sufficient
Vindictive shows off her
minesweepers, mine damage to three capital ships.
new conversion from the
cruiser Cavendish. Taking By December, the Bolsheviks had seized Petrograd and agreed an armistice
her name from the old with the Germans, the latter forcing a full peace agreement in March 1918. Under
cruiser famous for the certain conditions, the Russians were permitted to withdraw their fighting ships
Zeebrugge raid, she usefully
to Kronstadt where the British, still at war with Germany, needed to prevent the
reinforced Cowan's Baltic
force with fighters and latter from appropriating them. Seven British submarines, based in the port, had
seaplanes. to be destroyed.
106
FIRST WORLD WAR 1914-18
Riga, the capital, fell to the Reds on 3 ] anuary 1919 and British ships Libya and the Adriatic.
1°7
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
Finnish coast only 30 miles from Kronstadt. From here he deployed torpedo-
armed coastal motor boats (CMB) against the bombarding Red warships, sinking
the cruiser Oleg on the night of 16/17 June 1919. Reinforcements to Cowan
included the cruiser-carrier Vindictive and, on the night of 17/18 August 1919,
her aircraft made a diversionary attack on Kronstadt to cover a penetration by
A Royal Navy 55-foot CMBs. Their torpedoes put two battleships and a depot ship on the bottom in
Coastal Motor Boat (CMB), shallow water.
forerunner of the Motor
In September, although the new Soviet government offered to end the
Torpedo Boat (MTB).
Based in Finnish waters hostilities and to recognize the independence of the Baltic states, von der Goltz
and using the Vindictive as had other ideas and, through his loyal Russian subordinates, he made a strong bid
depot ship, CMBs sank the to take Riga. In mid October - in one of their final actions, therefore - Cowan's
Russian cruiser 0 leg and
ships blasted the rebels from fortifications commanding the port. Following
successfully penetrated the
Russian fortified fleet base similarly direct action at Libau, the Germans departed. By the end of November,
of Kronstadt. all was quiet.
FIRST WORLD WAR 1914-18
The apparent end of 'the war that was not a war', together with the onset of
another Baltic winter, now exacerbated grievances in the force. 'Hostilities only'
personnel were being retained when those at home had been demobilized. Leave
was haphazard and inadequate, gratuities unfairly apportioned. Pay and
allowances, needless to say, remained abysmal. Following widespread disaffection
both in regular warships and auxiliaries, Cowan returned to London in January
1920 to argue a drastic reduction of British naval presence in the Baltic. Despite
the obviously improving stability of the theatre, the withdrawal was phased over
a year.
Of the Allied navies, the British was the only one to be engaged on a war
footing. It supplied 238 of the 280 ships involved. Of these, 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers,
2 minesweepers, 1 submarine, 8 CMBs and 3 auxiliaries were lost, together with
37 aircraft. The Royal Navy suffered 123 personnel killed, the nascent Royal Air
Force,S. Many wondered for what purpose.
CHAPTER THREE
A TIME OF TREATIES
A TIME OF TREATIES
112
A TIME OF TREATIES 1918-39
113
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
German warships. Armoured ships would not exceed 10,000 tons, cruisers 6,000
tons, destroyers and torpedo boats 800 and 200 tons respectivel~ Submarines and
aircraft were excluded and manpower limited to 15,000 volunteers. A British
proposal to ban the submarine internationally as a weapon of war failed in the
face of American reluctance and French hostilit~
At the Peace Conference Britain accepted all of President Wilson's 'Fourteen
Points' except that of absolute freedom of the seas in peace and war. Wilson's
necessary acknowledgement earned an American observation that British naval
supremacy was no better than 'Prussian militarism'. The President reaffirmed the
'1916 programme' but hinted that it might again be deferred if his ambition of a
Designed before Jutland J the League of Nations be realized. An unsympathetic American press accused him of
battlecruiser HMS Hood 'spreadeaglism' and the British of 'diehard commitment to supremacy for no
had a further 5J OOO tons of
good strategic reason'.
protection worked in as a
result of lessons learned at None the less, Britain had already scrapped nearly four hundred warships,
the action. Although including forty capital ships. In August 1919 the government adopted the
reducing her designed speed notorious Ten-Year Rule, whereby the continuing assumption that Britain would
by two knots J it was still
not be involved in a major war during the ensuing decade enabled the Treasury to
deficient in the horizontal
plane. Constantly in service eviscerate defence budgets.
as a flagshipJ she never Diminished by war, Britain certainly did not seek a further naval race,
received a planned further particularly one that she could not win. Much American antagonism was, in
upgrade.
reality, directed at Japan, with whom Britain was in alliance. Japan's newly
acquired mandate over Germany's western Pacific island groups threatened
American interests. She was in an expansionist mood and building up her fleet
which, in conjunction with British support, would outnumber any planned
American Pacific fleet.
Britain's only post-Jutland capital ship was the battlecruiser Hood. Launched
in August 1918, and the only one of a planned quartet to be complete4, she
attracted approbation in a confidential report to Admiral Benson, the American
CNG. Her 'perfect balance' of hitting power, speed and protection combined, it
114
A TIME OF TREATIES 1918-39
115
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
faced no opposition worthy of the name, that the British historically went to war
eventually with every serious commercial rival, and that they had always come
out on top.
The Anglophobe eNO, Benson, thus drove the 1916 programme hard. Six
43,200-ton South Dakota-class battleships and six 43,500-ton Lexington-class
battlecruisers were commenced during 1920-21. Simultaneously, Japan began her
'Eight/Eight' programme of 38,500-ton battleships and 40,000-ton battlecruisers.
Between the wars the British By 1925 the British knew that their battle fleet would be totally outclassed. With
Mediterranean Fleet was an the now-One Power Standard and national prestige at stake, four 46,OOO-ton
important stabilizing
battlecruisers were ordered. A lack of finance held up the go-ahead for four
influence in the region.
Lying in Malta's Grand 48,500-ton battleships with 18-inch guns.
Harbour are, at the head of During 1921 the new Harding administration in the United States rallied
the line, two Queen opposition against the hawks, whose policies were damaging international
Elizabeth class battleships,
relationships and proving ruinously expensive. The five major naval powers were
with an R-class beyond.
Two County-class heavy invited to a 'conference on the limitation of armament', to be convened in
cruisers complete the line. Washington in November 1921. Throughout the proceedings the Americans were
The unconverted QE in the always one step ahead by virtue of their secret service monitoring every
floating dock suggests a date
communication between delegations and their governments. By offering to
of about 1930.
abandon their building programmes both they and the Japanese were able to
make large paper sacrifices. Britain, as yet with no real programme, could match
these only by further cutting the existing fleet. Already worn and outdated, this
would become more so during the construction 'holiday' now proposed.
The Washington Treaty, signed in February 1922, was to influence major
116
A TIME OF TREATIES 1918-39
warship parameters until 1936. Britain, the United States and, reluctantly, japan The extraordinary size and
agreed a 5:5:3 ratio in capital ships, with aggregate tonnages of 525,000: 525,000: speed of the US Navy's first-
generation fleet carriers
315,000 respectivel~ France and Italy accepted limitation to 175,000 tons each.
(Lexington and Saratoga)
Individual replacements would be limited to 35,000 tons and 16-inch guns. taught it very early the
Aircraft carriers would be subject to the same ratio as capital ships, with the two advantages of large air
largest fleets being allowed 135,000 tons. Existing carriers would be classed groups and smooth flight-
deck organization. The
'experimental' and could be replaced at any time. New carriers would be limited
precise role of the carrier
to 27,000 tons each, except where specifically allowed by treat~ Other warships was still being defined, as
should not exceed 10,000 tons nor carry guns of greater than 8-inch calibre. This evidenced by the armament
clause was to have the unintended result of encouraging signatories to build up to of 8-inch guns.
a new and powerful type, generally termed a 'treaty cruiser'. Signatories were also
prohibited from further fortifying Pacific territories and insular possessions.
Dating from 1902, the Anglo-japanese alliance was due for a second renewal.
Militarily, it obliged each to aid the other if attacked by more than one aggressor.
japan's increasingly strident attitude worried British and Americans alike and the
latter judged it a major diplomatic coup to render the alliance almost worthless
117
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
their aviation, the early British lead being eroded and lost. Aircraft were specified
by the navy but supplied by the air force. Because of space restrictions aboard
carriers, multi-purpose types proliferated, with consequent lower performances.
Although the RAF in 1923 created the Fleet Air Arm (FAA) as part of its
Coastal Area, it was more concerned with developing its own operational
strategies and the Navy's particular requirements were not well addressed. The
insidious damage sustained by British naval aviation between the wars severely
affected its performance in the Second World War.
In the United States, the War and Navy Departments retained separate
control over their aviation elements, although this did not prevent the ambitious
rr8
A TIME OF TREATIES 1918-39
119
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
Japanese ten of the new 8-inch 'heavy' cruisers complete or under construction.
What Britain really needed, however, was a good number of 'light' cruisers for
trade protection. The United States sought to extend the Washington limitations
to smaller classes and called a conference for 1927 in Geneva. Italy and France
declined to attend and the conference collapsed when Britain and the United
States refused to compromise on their cruiser requirements. Versailles left
Germany with a small, primarily pre-1914 fleet fit only for training. Rapacious
demands by France and Belgium for war reparations left the German economy in
ruins, and fleet renewal was necessarily slow. In 1925 the training cruiser Emden
marked a new start. She was followed by a short series of light cruisers which,
being severely displacement limited, incorporated much of the new technique of
welding to save weight.
Versailles allowed German designers 10,000-ton 'armoured ships' with no
A red Letter day for the new
Kriegsmarine, 19 May 1931 limit on gun calibre. As ever, the governing parameters were protection, speed
saw the Launch of the first and armament, leading to three favoured options for a new ship:
heavy unit, the pocket 1. 30.Scm (12-inch) guns; 200mm belt armour; 21 knots
battLeship Deutschland. Her
2. 30.Scm guns; 280mm belt armour; 18 knots, or
name was, however, so
prestigious that, on 3. 28cm (11-inch) guns, iOOmm belt armour; 26 knots.
outbreak of war, she was The third option was selected and commenced in 1928. With six 28cm and
renamed Liitzow. Following eight 1Scm (S.9-inch) guns she could outfight any treaty cruiser. Her speed
an undistinguished active
enabled her to decline action with any ship that could outgun her, with the
career, she was destroyed by
the RAF with 12,OOO-pound exception of the three remaining British battlecruisers. Diesel propulsion
bombs in April 1945. provided an endurance of 21,000 sea miles at 19 knots and the potential for
.~
A TIME OF TREATIES 1918-39
commerce raiding was obvious. Three of these armoured ships, popularly dubbed
'pocket battleships', were built by 1934.
Trying once more to regulate smaller classes of warship, the five Washington
signatories met in 1930 in London. Japan said that she would not be bound by the
Washington 5:5:3 ratio. She already had twelve heavy cruisers built or building,
their actual displacements being up to 15 per cent greater than that declared.
Settling to about the same aggregate figure of 335,000 tons, the Americans and
British finally agreed on cruisers. The former would build eighteen heavies and an
unspecified number of lights, the latter fifteen and thirty-five respectivel): General
agreement was reached on destroyers not exceeding 1,850 tons nor mounting
guns of greater than 13cm (5.1-inch) calibre. Only 16 per cent of each destroyer
fleet should, however, exceed 1,500 tons. Submarines should not exceed 2,000
tons surfaced nor have guns larger than 130mm. In this class Japan was allowed
full parit):
With France and Italy locked in impasse, the conference agreed the following
totals, expressed in imperial tons:
The capital ship building holiday was confirmed until 1936 while Britain, the
United States and Japan agreed to scrap four, three and one respectively of their
122
A TIME OF TREATIES 1918-39
older capital ships. Japan continued to cheat. One of each of the above could be
retained in a demilitarized state but Japan's (the Hiei) was maintained in a
condition whereby she was later modernized and rearmed. By adopting common
barbette diameters for triple 6-inch and twin 8-inch turrets, Japan was able
simply to upgrade cruisers from 'light' to 'heavy'. Various types of warship and
auxiliary were designed with hulls that could later be converted to aircraft carriers.
Although Britain was not happy at having to accept a figure of fifty cruisers,
rather than the seventy required, the conference marked a thawing in Anglo-
American naval relations. Between 1922 and 1930, as both argued about
superiority, they were outbuilt by the remainder. In crude terms of numbers of
warships, built or building: United States 11; Britain 74; Italy 82; France 119;
Japan 125.
As Japan expanded and her armies laid China waste, the US Hoover
administration responded to deepening financial crisis by slowing naval
construction, reducing specifications and discharging half the Naval Academy's
graduates.
A further General Disarmament Conference, held at Geneva in 1932, failed
through each delegation pursuing its nation's interests. Britain sought to reinstate
her claim for seventy cruisers, but impose global tonnage limits. The United
States wished to limit numbers of hulls; the British wanted to abolish
submarines; the French demanded larger ones. The conference was notable, too,
for the return of Germany. Still in a state of political turmoil, her delegation
insisted on an 'equality of rights'.
In Italy, Muss~lini had removed the last powers from the monarchy. Germany
was intent on rearming. The League of Nations was an ineffective deterrent and
Geneva a dead letter. Both Britain and the United States
began to look at the state of their forces. Of 6 million cubic feet
The British government's search for ,economies had capacity, the US Navy's
dirigible Akron was
resulted in service pay cuts, the inequality of which
commissioned in October
resulted in the Invergordon Mutiny. The 1931 building 1931. She was wrecked
programme had been abandoned. Although the during a storm in April
iniquitous Ten-Year Rule was quietly dropped, Britain 1933, when seventy-three
were killed, including the
began a building programme of cruisers with six or
Chief of the Bureau of
eight 6-inch guns where foreign equivalents were Aeronautics, Rear Admiral
mounting up to fifteen. Franklin D. Roosevelt, on taking W A. Moffett, a pioneer of
over in 1932, actually sought to reduce the size of the American naval aviation.
The tender is the modified
active American fleet, until Congress approved the
oiler Patoka (AV6).
National Industrial Recovery Act. This allowed funds to
be devoted to new construction in the guise of aid to
the industry.
Adolf Hitler was democratically appointed
Chancellor of Germany in January 1933. With the
death of Hindenburg in August 1934, he assumed the
12 3
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
124
A TIME OF TREATIES 1918-39
Spanish Civil War erupted, with both Germany and Italy supporting the N a fleet, including the Royal
fascist insurrection. Navy, ever had enough
destroyers which,
Seeing Europe squandering the peace that they felt that they had gifted, the
consequently, frequently
Americans began to move into isolationism. Although Congress passed the first worked in mixed groups.
Neutrality Act in August 1935, it still sent a delegation to the scheduled London Here, the older-style
Disarmament Conference in December. Portents were not good, with the Italians destroyer Fury leads three of
the new and more heavily-
refusing to accept any new strictures. The Japanese walked out, their government
gunned vessels, two Tribals
already making preparation in unprecedented secrecy for constructing the and a J-type. The 20mm
monster Yamato-class battleships, 65,000-tonners with guns exceeding 18-inch Oerlikons in the Fury's
calibre. bridge wings, and lack of
mainmasts, show this to be
In such an atmosphere it appears in retrospect strange that the remaining
a wartime picture.
powers should seek to limit themselves further. Britain's proposal for future
capital ships of only 25,000 tons and 12-inch guns was totally unrealistic, and
35,000 with 14-inch was adopted. This carried the important proviso that Italy
12 5
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
126
A TIME OF TREATIES 1918-39
BISMARCK 1941
Short-circuited by Hitler's chaotic policies, Raeder's so-called 'Z-plan' would SHIPS OF THE Z-PLAN
have created a formidable fleet, but the procedure would certainly have elicited Admiral Raeder's ambitious
massive response abroad. As it was, Germany annexed Bohemia and Moravia in Z-plan included the two
46,OOO-ton Bismarcks
March 1939 and, in the following month, renounced the London agreement.
(upper profile) as 'smaller
Hostilities were now only a matter of time. battleships'. They were to be
In September 1939, the effective strength of the combatant fleets were as followed by six 56,OOO-ton
follows: H -class battleships (lower
profile) with diesel propulsion
and 40.6cm (16-inch) guns.
British Empire France Germany Italy Two were actually laid down
Capital ships 15 7 2 4 late in 1939 but were
Aircraft carriers 6 1 subsequently discontinued
and dismantled on the ways.
Pocket battleships 3
Heavy cruisers 15 7 2 7
Light cruisers 49 12 6 15
Destroyers/TBs 183 72 34 133
Submarines 57 78 57 102
For comparison, the effective strengths of the fleets of the United States and
Japan in December 1941 were:
12 7
CHAPTER FOUR
.....- - -
---".""""'::-:-:~~".:@:.~:==~:"""'I
September 1940. Londons cent respectivel~ Yards that had produced over 2 million grt annually before 1914
East End and docks blaze now built less than half that total.
following the Luftwaffes
During hostilities, shipping needs not only to fulfil its conventional role in
opening daylight raid.
Sustained bombing of ports supportin.g the population but also to transport huge quantities of materials
was an element in the necessary to prosecute a major war, while sppplying tonnage for military needs.
enemys overall strategy to Particularly in the last role ships could 'disappear' for months as they waited for
destroy Britain "s economy.
discharge or acted as floating warehouses. Hire of neutral tonnage was expensive
Levelling the adjacent areas,
where the associated and could not be relied upon.
workforce lived, was of The enemy's ability to bomb ports had added a new uncertaint~ Ports tended
questionable legality but to specialize and could not necessarily assume sudden responsibility for unusual
practised by both sides.
quantities of unfamiliar,cargo. Although there was an obvious requirement for a
powerful central body to control shipping, ports and associated areas, it was not
13°
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-45
until May 1941 that the Ministry of War Transport was created. Admiralty
planning assumed that commerce would be assaulted by four main elements,
namely surface raiders, submarines, aircraft and mines. In this it was correct, but
was fortunate in that Germany herself was ill-prepared.
In November 1936 Germany had also been a signatory to the London
Protocol, denouncing submarine attack on merchant shipping and when Hitler's
chaotic policies precipitated war in 1939, the navy was deficient in all classes
of warship. None the less, Operational Order No.1 of the High Command of
the Wehrmacht, dated 31 August 1939, defined the navy's primary task as 'the
waging of war on enemy commerce, concentrating largely against Britain'. For
this, Commodore Karl Donitz, Head of U-boats, had only fifty-seven of the
three hundred boats that he had stipulated. Many were too small for ocean
13 1
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
work and initially only nine could be expected in their operational areas at any
one time. D6nitz argued successfully that he could not produce decisive
results unless submarine construction enjoyed priority at the expense of other
warships.
Until the U-boat arm was up to strength, surface raiders would have a greater
significance. In the previous war, regular warship raiders had tended to be light
cruisers, which enjoyed a brief existence living on their wits. The new generation
would be heavy cruisers, the so-called 'pocket battleships' and capital ships.
Inherently more robust and reliable, these would be supported by pre-positioned
supply ships.
The adoption of convoys had proved Britain's salvation twenty years before
but, in the new era of air attack, the principle was again hotly debated. The
Naval Staff held it to be still valid and argued that properly armed escorts would
reduce both the air and submarine threat to 'manageable proportions'. They
A situation dreaded by the thought also, in light of his earlier experience, that the enemy would not risk
anti-convoy lobby. The
alienating neutral opinion by unrestricted warfare. The Air Staff considered that
route to northern Russia
was flanked by Luftwaffe to group ships in convoy would 'positively invite' mass air attack. This theory
bases in Norway and, in \paralleled earlier arguments but in practice convoys remained difficult to find
September 1942, convoy while the Germans, at least initially, possessed few specialist maritime strike
PQ.18 was attacked by
aircraft. Moreover, all too few of the Admiralty's 'properly armed' escorts were
about forty torpedo aircraft
which approached in line available. With respect to neutral opinion and international law the enemy, while
abreast 'like a huge flight of observing some initial niceties, stated that 'it ... goes without saying that effective
nightmare locusts'. Only ... fighting methods will never fail to be employed merely because some
one ship survived from the
international regulations ... are opposed to them'.
two starboard wing columns
- eight ships in exchange for The defensive arming of m r hantme had earl·er gee y. creased .r
five aircraft. chance of survival hen rfa
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-45
therefore, made to arm some three thousand British deep-sea ships and about
fifteen hundred coasters, and to train personnel in gunner~
The English south and east coasts defined inshore routes that teemed with
shipping, not only the vital coasters and colliers but also deep-sea vessels in
transit between convoy assembly and dispersal points and their ports of
destination. Frequent and regular convoys ran between the Thames Estuary and
the Firth of Forth. The east coast channels, constricted by offshore shoals, caused
convoys to become dangerously attenuated and difficult for the escorts to protect
adequatel~ Although Fighter Command airfields in their sector could provide
cover, it was very difficult to prevent hit-and-run attacks by single or small groups
of aircraft. Torpedo attacks by enemy S-boats became a major nuisance with the
enemy's occupation of Dutch and Channel ports in 1940.
134
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-45
Selling her life dearly, the armed liner gained sufficient time for her convoy ,to
scatter, limiting losses to six ships.
The Admiralty's response to these formidable raiders was to a~company
ocean convoys where possible with old battleships or cruisers. Far from repair
facilities, a raider dare not incur damage and almost invariably refrained from
attack. An aggressive light escort could also be a deterrent, as instanced by that
of convoy JW.51B. Fourteen ships bound for North Russia were intercepted off
North Cape on 31 December 1942 by the pocket battleship Liitzow, heavy cruiser
Admiral Hipper and six destroyers. The fighting escort comprising six smaller
destroyers held off the enemy in appalling weather until the arrival of two light
cruisers caused the attackers to withdraw. No merchant ships were lost.
In distant waters beyond the regular convoy network, there were still many
independently routed ships. It was on these that the powerfully armed, but
innocently disguised, auxiliary cruisers preyed. Nine of these made successful
and highly disruptive cruises, one of their tactics 'being to lay small clutches of
mines at shipping focal points. Surface raiders are credited with the destruction
of 237 merchantmen, aggregating 1.33 million grt,or about 6.1 per cent of total
tonnage lost.
Aircraft accounted for as many losses as raiders and mine warfare combined.
Many ships were safely convoyed only to be destroyed in ports, the bombing of
which was integral to the disruption of the British commerical network.
Warehouses could contain huge quantities of high-value merchandise, and the
likes of London and Leith, Hull and Swansea were regularly and profitably
targeted.
Bigger ships were usually fast and tended to be independently routed and the
135
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
largest casualty was the 42,350-ton Canadian Pacific liner Empress of Britain,
bombed in the Western Approaches in October 1942. Another particularly
grievous loss was that of the 16,250-ton Cunarder Lancastria~ bombed and sunk
off St Nazaire in June 1940. Evacuating troops from France, she went down with
., over three thousand personnel.
Long-range maritime aircraft, particularly the FW200 Kondor, were an
important element in Donitz's campaign although, fortunately for Britain, the
Luftwaffe was not very co-operative in their availabilit~ Covering large areas of
ocean, their task was to find and orbit convoys, homing-in attacking submarines
and disposing of stragglers on opportunit)T.
Krupps Germaniawerft Submarines accounted for about 68 per cent of all tonnage destroyed. Donitz,
facility at Kiel had a total himself an ex-submariner, fully comprehended that Britain could be defeated
of eight slips for V-boat
through the destruction of her merchant fleet and he pursued this objective
construction. As with other
facilities, it suffered little remorselessl~ During the 1930s he developed the theory of 'wolf-pack' tactics to
direct damage by bombing defeat the convoy system. Operating in groups, V-boats would proceed on a line
before April 1945, of search. When one of these, or perhaps an aircraft, sighted a convoy its duty
disruption to production
was to maintain contact at all costs, homing-in the remainder. Only when the
being caused indirectly by
damage to railways and whole group was in contact would a simultaneous attack be launched,
inland waterways. overwhelming the efforts of the escort. It was to dispose of the 'snooping' Kondor
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-45
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THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-45
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zores Peas from a pod. A line of submarine campaign lay in
Liberty ships fitting out at building ships faster than
o
• o
one of the specialist
American facilities.
they could be sunk. Of
Liberties alone, over 2,700
N I n crude terms the key to were built, representing
"": Madeira defeating Donitzs nearly 19.5 million grt.
A geria
Canary Islands
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139
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
Oil was one of the most that the escort carrIer evolved. Overrating (as indeed did the British) the
valuable of war materials efficiency of Asdic (later termed Sonar), Donitz ordered his boats to attack on the
and loaded tankers were
surface by night. This tactic was very successful until the escorts were fitted with
prized targets. Gutted and
broken, this tanker is typical radar. The occupation of France and Norway gave an enormous boost to
in being still very resistant Donitz's efforts, enabling him to base U-boats much closer to their areas of
to sinking, due to her many operation.
tanks forming an efficient
U-boats had no opportunity to economize on torpedoes by using deck guns
system of subdivision.
against ships in convoy: As the average boat carried only fourteen torpedoes,
which often needed to be expended in salvoes, they could be kept on patrol only
through resupply by the specially designed Mark XIV submarines. These, too,
were especially targeted by Allied forces.
Damaged merchantmen awaiting repair soon began to choke yards that could
otherwise have produced new tonnage. With losses exceeding replacements it was
vital to acquire more ships. Considerable numbers of over-age American vessels
had been laid up and were available for purchase but the British were slow to bid.
Most were snapped up by neutral owners for later charter at high rates.
During the First World War, British and American yards had built standard
ships, simplified for speedy construction. In September 1940 a British mission
went to the United States to arrange a new programme. The specification that
they took was that of a workhorse capable of transporting 10,000 deadweight
tons at a modest 11 knots. A prototype, the Empire Liberty, was already being
built in the United Kingdom. Although they considered the design too basic, the
Americans took it on, modified ·it to suit their building methods and, as the
Liberty ship, it went to 2,710 units. Specialist yards, some In
Canada, produced other standards - Victory, T2 tankers,
Oceans, Forts, Parks and others. There came the point in
1943 where this avalanche of new construction exceeded Bi //- ,(
that being destroyed. From that moment, Donitz's
attritional campaign was defeated.
This, however, is to anticipate for, early in 1942, the
United States, catapulted into the conflict, suddenly faced
a U-boat onslaught of her own. Donitz, equally surprised by At _-//'1'
the Japanese action, could divert only a few boats across the
Atlantic, but these unleashed veritable slaughter. The 20-ShipConvoy
CONVOY FORMATIONS
The original arguments cover. Extending this length of the perimeter of escorts again, while tripling
governing the number of argument to the diagrams it the circle is directly it will still require fewer
escorts necessary were based can be shown by proportional to its diameter, than twice as many. In
on the false premise that it measurement that~ if the it follows that doubling the practice, convoys were wider
was directly proportional to diameter of the circle size of a convoy will require and shallower in plan, but
the number of ships in enclosing the 20-ship convoy less than half as many the same principle holds.
convoy. Operational analysis is called unity, then that
showed that it should be around the 40-ship convoy
based on that proportion of will be of diameter 1.45 and
the convoy~s perimeter that a that around the 60-ship
single escort could efficiently convoy 1.85. As the
B't t ('
6O-Ship Convoy
A' J
40-Ship Convoy
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
time. Powerful images of blazing tankers and pitiful groups of frozen, oil-
soaked survivors tend to conceal the fact, however, that the huge majority of
convoyed ships arrived safely. As the early U-boat 'ace' commanders were
eliminated they were replaced by others less skilful. Facing larger and better
defences, their sinkings per patrol decreased, offset by the greater number of
operational boats.
The climax came suddenly. In March 1943 the adjacent Atlantic convoys
SC.122 and HX.229 were faced by up to 40 U-boats in several groups. For sixteen
days the escorts countered the attacks but succeeded in sinking only one U-boat
in exchange for 21 merchantmen of 141,000 grt. Then, during May, no fewer than
41 submarines were sunk. Five were lost for no result when the 38-ship SC.130
was assaulted by four hunting groups.
Compared with the Figures so vast inevitably vary, but reliable statistics indicate that 5,150 Allied
equivalent chart for the merchant ships were lost to enemy action during the Second World War, a total
First World War (see of over 21.5 million grt. This wanton destruction claimed the lives of nearly
page 71) this shows that
27,000 British seamen alone.
mercantile sinkings were
more severe and from an The experience was not repeated in the Pacific. From the western seaboard
earlier point in the war. the lines of communication to the areas of Nimitz's and MacArthur's campaigns
One reason for the higher were very long, and vulnerable to submarine attack. Rigid Japanese doctrine,
tonnages was that
however, prescribed that laurels were to be won only in sinking warships.
individual ships had on
avemge about doubkd Destroying merchantmen was virtually an unworthy action. It was fortunate that
in size. the Japanese lacked a Donitz.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-45
143
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
one-sixth of the crew, a Flower was small enough to be built in scores of little-
known yards around the United Kingdom and Canada. Magnificently seaworthy,
yet desperately uncomfortable in the open ocean, Flowers were also far too slow.
They were, however, what could most quickly be made available. Design of a
larger type of escort, for which the generic term 'frigate' was revived, was soon
put in hand, but it would be the spring of 1942 before the first of the new 'Rivers',
was commissioned.
Most escorts had been fitted with Asdic, for which unrealistically high
expectations can only have resulted from insufficient pre-war trials testing. It was
indispensable, though swamped by water noise at high speed or in a seaway, and
almost useless in the vicinity of a convoy with its high levels of radiated noise.
Early Asdics had a fixed angle of declination so that, when running in for an
attack, an escort lost contact with a submerged target at about one thousand
Small ship in a large ocean. yards. As depth charges were released aft from rails and from the quarters by
The Flower-class corvettes throwers, and at a point over the target, there was significant 'dead time' from the
were distantly related to
moment contact had been lost. This was not helped by the time that a drum-
pre-war whale catchers.
Designed originally to escort shaped depth charge took to sink to even the 600-foot limit of earlier U-boats.
coastal convoys, they spent Patterns of four charges were quickly increased to ten or fourteen, but an astute
their lives in the deep ocean. submarine commander had time to get beyond their lethal range.
Although superb sea boats,
What was required was an ahead-throwing weapon that could reach a target
their motion was such as to
reduce crew effectiveness while its position was still firmly defined by the Asdic. The answer was the spigot
through sheer fatigue. mortar, known as 'Hedgehog', which went operational at the end of 1941.
The Coastal Command of the RAF existed to service the particular
144
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-45
HEDGEHOG THROWER
requirements of the navy yet, and not entirely the fault of the RAF, pilots had
received no specific training in AS operations. Nor for the most part did they fly
appropriate aircraft. In September 1939 there were just two squadrons equipped
with the new and robust Sunderland flying boat, with a third working-up with
the American-designed Hudson.
Standard AS bombs were found to explode on contact, endangering the
dropping aircraft, so 450-pound naval depth charges were fitted with discarding
aerodynamic fairings. As most contacts were on the surface, new ultra-shallow
hydrostatic fuses had to be developed.
Admiral Donitz's control over his widely scattered U-boats depended upon
145
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
tactical level. French, American and British research led to the production of a
shipboard unit, whose birdcage antenna at the masthead became a familiar sight
from 1942. It enabled escorts to pinpoint and suppress any U-boat transmitting in
the vicinity of a convo~
With its poor submerged performance, a U-boat operated on the surface
whenever possible. The sudden appearance of any aircraft would necessitate an
urgent dive. By early 1940 crude prototype radars had been sufficiently refined to
allow to be put into production the first airborne set, known as the ASV Mark II
(i.e. Air to Surface Vessel, as opposed to Air to Air). Hard on its heels came the
important development of the cavity magnetron, permitting the transmission of
high powers at high frequencies. Small rotating antennae were now possible.
As U-boats surfaced at night to refresh and recharge, radar was particularly
valuable. Like Asdic, however, it unavoidably blanked-out at close range, with the
aircraft at the point of attack. The solution to this was the Leigh Light, a
standard naval searchlight in a trainable mounting that fitted into an aircraft's
ventral turret ring.
147
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
A huge effort by the British and Canadian navies saw escort coverage
gradually extended to the whole Atlantic crossing, corvettes taking fuel and
replacement depth charges from tankers. V-boat commanders, accustomed to
attacking on the surface by night, were now frustrated by escorts fitted with
radar, powerful illuminants and reliable inter-ship communications.
Air cover was essential to keeping submarines submerged, where they could
do limited harm. Twin-engined Wellingtons and Whitleys had been transferred
from Bomber Command but could not operate beyond 500 miles. Early
American-built Catalinas could work out to about 800, the Sunderlands
somewhat less. Even the commissioning of airfields in occupied Iceland left a
mid-Atlantic gap where the V-boats concentrated, untroubled by air patrols.
The large, four-engined B-24 Liberator proved to be the ideal but, needed for
high-priority strategic bombing, these were available in very limited numbers. To
operate against both submarines and the marauding enemy Kondors, on-the-spot
carrier-borne aircraft were required.
As fleet carriers were too few and too valuable, stopgaps were introduced in
the shape of catapult-armed merchantmen (CAM) and merchant aircraft carriers
(MAC). The latter were working tankers and bulk carriers with a flight deck
topside. These lacked all facilities but pointed the way to the first auxiliary, or
escort, carrier HMS Audacity, completed in June 1941. Her career was short and
hectic but her half-dozen fighters had proved invaluable. A mainl American
programme was initiated, ultimately producing over one hundred escort carriers HMS Audacity was the first
based on standard mercantile hulls. Among their many applications some were British escort carrier, being
converted from a German
used in roving escort groups, which·could quickly reinforce threatened convoys or
prize and commissioned in
exploit good intelligence to target independently the enemy's supply submarines. July 1941. As there was no
Along the Biscay coast, from Brest to· Bordeaux, five major U-boat facilities hangar her six aircraft (six
had been established, based on monolithic, multi-cell pens covered in thicknesses Martlet fighters or four
fighters and two Swordfish
of reinforced concrete that made them all but impervious to the bombing that
AS aircraft) had to remain
progressively levelled the towns around them. But en route to their operational on deck. As a prototype, she
areas U-boats had to transit the Bay of Biscay, where the pressing attentions of the was invaluable.
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
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THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-45
RAF triggered a leap-frog technological contest between attackers and attacked. THE BAY OFFENSIVE
In July 1942, after Leigh Light Wellingtons had inflicted some unpleasant The five large U-boat
surprises out of total darkness, Donitz ordered boats to surface by da~ This was facilities established on the
French Atlantic coast greatly
very risky but, by courtesy of an ASV set from a crashed aircraft, his scientists
decreased transit times to
were able to produce a radar detector ('Metox') of the correct wavelength. Thus, and from the submarine's
from September 1942, boats so fitted could again surface by night. The Luftwaffe operational areas. Their
also mounted patrols over the Bay but the RAF countered by escorting their AS passage across the Bay of
Biscay was, however, long
aircraft with Beaufighters and Mosquitoes.
and successfully disputed by
As the British worked to neutralize Metox with a centimetric ASV Mark III, aircraft operating from
the Americans followed a different path. A low-flying aircraft could detect a southern England.
submerged submarine fhrough its ferrous mass distorting the natural terrestrial
magnetic field. The effect was only transient and, to isolate its position, the
disposable 'S'Onobuoy' was developed. Dropped in a pattern, these transmitted
machinery and propeller noise to the aircraft. As the origin could be only
approximately deduced, depth charge attack was impractical, and an air-dropped Captain Frederick ?ohnny'
acoustically homed torpedo was substituted. The combination was coming into Walker comes ashore from a
ship of hi~ Second Escort
service by early 1943 and scored some kills, but was not made really effective until
Group. The Royal Navy's
after' the war, with later improvements in electronics. By 1943, too, experts such most consistently successful
as Captain Frederick Walker were perfecting AS tactics. Larger frigates were U-boat hunter, he was
entering service, with early problems on Hedgehog being resolved. directly involved in the
sinking of at least fourteen.
As escorts could no longer be simply evaded the Germans, likewise,
On 9 July 1944, aged 48, he
employed electric acoustic torpedoes, tuned to home on to a frigate's propellers. died ~f a stroke, probably
Escorts countered by towing the unloved 'Foxer' noise generator. Sonars gained a from overwork.
'Q-attachment', essentially a second set configured to
measure target depth. The U-boats tried to baffle Sonar
operators by launching fixed or mobile decoys, and
having hulls clad with rubber-based, sound-absorbing
(anechoic) coatings.
Metox-equipped U-boats then suddenly began to be
attacked at night without warning. Convinced that radar
could not operate on wavelengths sufficiently short,
Donitz's scientists persuaded him that Metox must itself
be radiating detectable energ~ The equipment was
banned pending a replacement ('Tunis') which did not go
operational until May 1944.
The U-boat's temporarily reduced protection was
doubly serious for, as well as having to admit defeat in
the Atlantic in mid 1943, they had suffered a depressing
number of losses in the Ba~ Here Allied aircraft had
mounted a major effort against U-boats, many fitted
with extra anti-aircraft weapons and armour plate, and
mOVIng In groups.
By late 1944, Hedgehog was proving a greater killer
15 1
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
than the depth charge. However, its twenty-four-bomb pattern required a direct
hit to detonate a single 30-pound charge. It was recognized that the conventional
depth-charge's 'big bang' was at once psychologically uplifting for the attackers
and powerfully depressing for the attacked. Hedgehog's successor, 'Squid',
therefore hefted three 200-pound bombs some 300 yards ahead of the ship.
Depth-measuring Sonar automatically fused the bombs to detonate at the correct
depth. New Castle-class corvettes shipped a single Squid, while Loch-class
frigates carried a double Squid, which laid a three-dimensional pattern. Over the
last two years of the war, analysis indicated that depth charges were lethal on one
attack in sixteen, Hedgehog one in five, and Squid a devastating one in two.
In November 1942 Allied mercantile losses had hit a record 862,000 grt yet,
just seven months later, U-boats had to be temporarily withdrawn from the
Atlantic with unacceptable losses, exceeding forty in two months out of three.
Almost one thousand Allied ships were now dedicated to AS operation, and new
aircraft-deployed weapons included armour-piercing rockets and even 57mm
anti-tank guns.
Long before the odds had thus deteriorated, the enemy had decided that
The Bristol Beaufighter, submarines needed to remain submerged far longer, yet be able to operate at
fitted with a variety of higher underwater speed to avoid a crippling loss of performance. The first
engines, served with both the
requirement was met by reintroducing what was termed the Schnorkel, or
Royal Air Force and the Fleet
Air Arm as heavy fighter Snort, a device first patented in Italy in the 1920s and actually installed in
and cship buster'. This 1944 Dutch submarines captured by the Germans in 1940. When raised, the Snort
picture shows ground crew provided an intake/exhaust tube which allowed a boat's diesel engines to be run
fusing rockets prior to
while submerged. Battery charging no longer necessitated surfacing and an
take-off. These projectiles
easily punched holes in emergency programme was initiated to provide equipment for retro-fitting to
U -boat pressure hulls. existing boats.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-45
optimized for smooth and quiet flow, and without the conventional multitude of SUBMARINE
protrusions. The hull needed to be large to float three times the usual battery Scourge of Allied shipping,
the VIle had sleek looks
capacit~ With the Snort fitted as standard, the Type XXI, as it was termed, had a
that belied her deficiences
formidable performance. of poor submerged speed
Prepared in good time, the design was ready for production by mid 1943. and endurance. The XXI
Allied attempts to destroy U-boats by bombing shipyards had enjoyed little Elektroboot, in contrast,
was optimized around
success, but bombing was increasing in intensit~ To realize a 290-boat
hydrodynamic efficiency in
programme, therefore, it was decided to prefabricate hulls in eight major sections the submerged condition.
at separate facilities. These would be transported by inland waterway to three Speed, however, required
bomb-proof assembly facilities. Although meticulously detailed, the plan large and heavy batteries
and, in reality, she was
suffered interminable delays through shortage of essential materials, and from
12 per cent longer than
the Allies targeting key points on the canal system and manufacturers of vital the VIle.
components.
In the event, the Type XXI and its near-water diminutive, the Type XXIII,
began to work-up early in the final phase of the war, and even this was disrupted
by aerial mining of their Baltic trials areas.
153
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
154
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-45
and regularly updated. It assumed the indefensibility of territories in the western Early R- and S-class boats,
Pacific, their loss and eventual recover~ It assessed the issues involved and, in dating from 1918-22, served
throughout the Second
direct contrast to its Japanese equivalent, accepted that a war would be a long
World War, first as
one. Japan would be 1efeated by a combination of blockade and bombardment. operational boats then, with
It would require time- to create the means for bombardment; in the distant and new construction, being
enemy-dominated waters of the western Pacific, the submarine was the only retired as training or target
craft. Without air
practical instrument of blockade.
conditioning, conditions
Signatory to the various inter-war conventions, the United States officially aboard were unpleasant
repudiated unrestricted submarine warfare. Adherence to the prize rules, when operating in tropical
however, effectively ruled out the subm.arine in the enforcement of blockade. In waters.
Europe, Germany had abandoned constraint virtually from the outset while
Britain had done much the same, although less publicized. American policy,
however, remained equivocal, referring possibly to unrestricted operations in
specified areas, or universally 'if justified by events'. The opening 'event' as it
happened, was on so brutal a scale that, just six hours after Nagumo's aircraft
headed back from Pearl Harbor, the navy was ordered to 'execute unrestricted air
and submarine war against Japan'.
The US Navy already had 111 submarines in commission and had seventy-
three more under construction. Command areas were as follows:
a) Waters to the west of the Malayan peninsula and the island of Sumatra were
the purlieu of British and Dutch submarines of the British Eastern Fleet, later
based on Trincomalee.
155
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
Allied naval forces were unable to affect seriously the course of the opening
Japanese campaign. With the overrunning of the Philippines American
submarines first fell back on Dutch facilities at Surabaya then, with the loss of the
Malay Barrier, on Australia. By March 1942 they were based at Fremantle and
Albany in the subcontinent's far south-west. There was criticism that this placed
them some 3,000 miles distant from their most productive patrol areas but Port
Darwin, the only practical alternative, was being heavily bombed by enemy
formations based on Timor and a tender could not be risked there. An advanced
refuelling base was eventually established on the inhospitable Exmouth Gulf.
Lacking facilities for extended tropical patrols, the surviving S-boats were sent
around to Brisbane. Operating as Task Force 42, they were conveniently situated
here to support MacArthur's campaign in New Guinea and the Solomons. They
played a negligible role in blockade but, when deficiencies obliged their
withdrawal late in 1942, the flotilla had to be made good from Fremantle.
Early operations were hampered not only by inexperience but also by the loss
of most of the Fremantle force's stock of torpedoes, destroyed at Cavite. The boats
were, therefore, much involved in minelaying. As the Japanese had not yet begun
to exploit their gains, traffic was still sparse but American submarine availability
was further eroded by an incessant call for fleet-related 'special missions'.
157
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
Compared with the standard German Types VII and IX, American
submarines were large (1,570-2,415 tons against 769-871 and 1,051-1,178) as the
duration of unresupplied patrols was a function of capacity. Operating more
often in shallow water, their size increased vulnerability to counter-attack. They
carried up to twenty-eight torpedoes, which did not compare favourably with the
twenty-two of the far smaller Type IX. Deck guns were essential, increasing from
a single 3-inch to two 5-inch weapons.
About eighty strong, American crews were nearly double those of the
Germans but did not have to endure much of the cheerful squalor that was the lot A fine, modern Japanese
of the U-boat men (S-boats excepted). Electronics were far superior, with air-and freighter slips to a lonely
sea-search radars and even high-frequency Sonars capable of guidance through a grave. Destroying '¥qr!!,~~,. .•
as the Americans termed
moored minefield.
them, was a mission equally
Submarine design was strictly standardized for series production. Three important as that of 9~!!it~,. ~
classes (Gato, Balao and Tench) represented phased improvements and, of a total as Japan depended - . ~ . -..
159
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
had failed, much through being over-centralized. 'Section attack', using small
groups of boats, had been practised by the Americans between the wars, but it
was abandoned because of the need for better communications. This problem
being resolved, the tactic was again introduced, as the enemy was beginning to
run convoys.
Sections, usually comprising three boats, rejoiced in labels such as 'Roy's
Rangers' or 'Shelby's Shellackers'. Having received his orders, the senior skipper
was free to make his own tactical decisions, although Pearl kept him fully
updated. Groups formed a search line and any boat making contact informed the
others by radio phone. Each in turn would then act as 'flanker', attacking before
falling back to be the 'trailer'. The usual lack of enemy aerial escort allowed the
boats to use their 20-plus knot surface speed to make 'end runs' to repeat
the process.
As Nimitz's forces began their amphibious leap-frog across the western
Pacific, SubPac boats performed invaluable service in targeting the transports
carrying troop reinforcements and materiel. Carrier aircraft joined American and
Commonwealth land-based airpower to distress enemy shipping further. In all,
aircraft accounted for nearly 30 per cent, and submarines about 57 per cent, of all
losses. Submarines, however, had been committed from the outset, when air
supremacy was but a distant dream.
In August 1943, faced with unacceptable casualty rates, the Japanese High
Command ordered that all merchantmen be escorted. In November a dedicated
Escort Command was established comprising two, later four, Surface Escort
Divisions. A few light carriers were intermittently available and a building
programme for frigates initiated. By July 1944 some fifty were in service; they
looked austere to a degree but carried plenty of depth charges and were often
handled effectively and aggressivel~ No less than six hundred aircraft were also
allocated, organized in four air groups, but, with the navy's front-line carriers
desperately short of qualified pilots, escort squadrons always received poor
material and were always under strength.
Starting with the Singapore route, the Japanese had a general convoy system
running by early 1944. It tended to small groups of five or eight ships, very
uneconomical in terms of escort numbers. Of the original fifty routes, there was
gradual enforced abandonment due both to Allied territorial gains and the
unbearable pressure exerted by submarine and air attack. Abandoned garrisons
at least did not require resuppl~
Military success also enabled submarines to be forward-based, cutting transit
times and increasing utilization. Having penetrated the difficult Sea of Japan and
been disappointed at a relative paucity of targets there, the submarine force
specifically targeted Japan's tanker traffic, routed between Sumatra or Borneo
and the home islands. Even despite shipping oil back in drums, supplies became
so short that the bulk of the battle fleet had to be based on Singapore to be near
sources, albeit poorly refined.
r60
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-45
170° 1800
t
maximum extent of
Japanese occupation
1 January 1944
1 May 1944
1January 1945
1 May 1945
15 August 1945
Still in operation at
the end of the war 30~
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March 1945 saw the South China Sea so thoroughly covered by submarines JAPANESE MERCHANT
and air power that convoys had to be discontinued. So few ships sailed that SHIPPING ROUTES
sinkings were confined to a few coast-huggers. From June, movements were If it is remembered that the
distance from Tokyo to
almost all of coaster-sized ships and small wooden craft. Mines now accounted
Singapore is 2,,900 nautical
for the majority of casualties. Japan was now living on its own resources. No miles" equivalent to an
longer able to sustain the war nor the population, the High Command faced Atlantic crossing" the scale
unconditional surrender even without the awful warning of two nuclear weapons. of the Pacific theatre may be
realized. Long-haul cargoes"
Convoy failed the Japanese because of a lack of commitment. Availability of
such as oil from Borneo or
escorts failed to synchronize with the sailings of the convoy that required them rubber from Malaya"
while air support either did not materialize or was ineffective. When well required much Japanese
organized, however, the opposition could be stiff, victory costing the Americans tonnage" all vulnerable to
submarine and air attack.
a total of fifty-two submarines. In August 1945 the Japanese had just 1.6 million
grt left to them; of this, nearly 42 per cent was laid up awaiting repair.
I6I
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
Landing Craft, Tank, or LCT. Effectively an elongated LCM, with the usual
engines aft and ramped bow, it differed from the LST primarily in having an open
vehicle deck, capable of accommodating up to three heavy and six medium tanks.
With home construction facilities already stretched, the British sent a mission
to the United States during 1941 to discuss procurement under Lend-Lease terms.
An unexpected bonus was that, when shortly afterwards the Americans found
themselves at war, amphibious craft production had already been initiated.
In the United States' armed forces, reponsibility for amphibious operations
rested with the Marine Corps. Since 1921 it had been developing its role in
daylight assault landings, identified as a necessary preface to the seizure of
western Pacific islands for forward fleet bases. By 1935 it was able to produce
what became, with successive revisions, the inter-service 'bible'. Entitled the
Tentative Landing Operations Manual, this identified six key areas, namely
command relationships, naval gunfire support, air support, ship-to-shore
movement, securing the beachhead, and logistics.
Active co-operation benefited both Americans and British. The latter's drafts
and requirements kick-started production of what would become a flood of craft
of widely differing characteristics. The Americans' Higgins-type LCM proved to
be inadequate but, farsightedly, they were already testing prototype LVTs
(Landing Vehicles, Tracked). Spotting for naval fire support was not possible as
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-45
specialist forward-based observation parties had not yet been trained. What had Amphibious tracked vehicles
been identified, and had to be learned the hard way by the British, was the were very necessary for the
negotiation of offshore reefs)
requirement for 'combat loading' of transports. Irrespective of its size and
upon which conventional
weight, what was needed ashore most urgently had to come ashore first. craft grounded. They could
The first practitioners of large-scale amphibious landings, however, were the proceed directly from the
Japanese. As their orthodox marine corps had been disbanded, they made the flooded well of an LPD) or
via the ramp of an LST, to a
army the responsible authority for such operations, with the navy's role limited to
point safely beyond the
transportation and protection. Assault battalions were trained for the role, as beach. Here) on Eniwetok)
were assault engineer teams who crewed minor amphibious craft and organized the preliminary barrage has
beach activities. left its mark.
r65
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
be extended to support each operation. From 1940 naval paratroops were trained
for dropping from low altitude in the rear of defences. The overwhelming
impression of the Japanese campaign is one of a bewildering succession of small-
scale landings, possible only because defences were inadequate or non-existent.
From August 1942, when the Americans switched to the offensive, enemy
amphibious operations were confined mainly to reinforcement and resupply of
the many garrisons. For these duties the Japanese built many LSTs and LCTs,
based closely on Allied design, and an original fast frigate type with a sloping
stern, able to transport and launch either minor landing craft or miniature
submarines.
By transporting up to ten In early landings particularly, the attrition rate in Allied minor landing craft
thousand troops at a time proved to be very high, and ships were developed to transport small craft in bulk.
half way across the globe, In 1935 the Japanese had built an ungainly 8,000-tonner named Shinshu Maru,
the giant express liners
which was equipped with heavy gear to support twenty small craft and their
represented the first link in
a sequence that culminated loads. The ship had innovatory side ports and stern doors and her
for most on a bullet-swept successful use in China may have been the inspiration for the British
beach. This is Cunard's converSIon In 1940 of two train ferries. These utilized their
Queen Elizabeth with
existing rails to accommodate thirteen trolley-mounted
what appear to be Clyde
puffers alongside. Note the LCMs, launched and recovered over a stern ramp, assisted
prominent degaussing girdle. by an overhead gantr~ The principle was extended to
JAPANESE EXPANSION
Retrospectively, the
devastatingly successful Japanese OCEAN
overrunning of South-east
Asia in 1942 looks very logical
and straightforward. For the
demoralized and bewildered
ABDA forces at the time, however,
the enemy seemed to appear from
any and every direction.
166
70
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-45
three auxiliary tankers, which functioned in their original role while stowing
Japanese expansion
fifteen loaded LCMs on deck under heavy gantry davits. December 1941 - July 1942
Both of these were stopgaps, available as the concept of a submersible Japanese Empire
early 1941
pontoon was being evaluated. Again, the British approached the Americans, with occupied by Japan
D Dec. 1941 - July 1942
a draught requirement from which was developed the revolutionary Landing
Ship, Dock, or LSD. Effectively a self-propelled floating dock, the LSD simply
D China
British
D (Commonwealth)
Dutch
• French
Portuguese
Coral Sea
i
Cape
r··• J Fiji 0';:
York ,/,~ I
1
I
./ I
___---r/---- -
- ~,
--1-- I
I
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:;J""""'------ New Caledonia" -. I
A U S T R A L A ~ / I
examples weighed 7.5 tons and, with twenty equipped marines aboard, could
negotiate an offshore reef and advance beyond the open beach. Subsequent
variants acquired protection, some 17-tonners even taking a 75mm gun and
acting as light armour.
The major amphibious landings of the Second World War marked the three
major axes of Allied advance. Briefly, these were:
1. Admiral Nimitz: Gilbert Islands (November 1943); Marshall Islands
(January-February 1944); Mariana Islands (June-July 1944); Palau Islands
(September 1944); Iwo Jima (February 1945); Okinawa (April 1945).
2. General MacArthur: Solomon Islands (August 1942 - December 1943); Lae
(September 1943); Hollandia (April 1944); Wakde-Biak (May 1944); Morotai
(September 1944); Leyte (October 1944).
3. General Eisenhower: North Africa (November 1942); Sicily (July 1943);
Salerno (September' 1943); Anzio (January 1944); Normandy (June 1944);
Correctly a Landing Ship, south of France (August 1944).
Medium (Rocket), or LSM Techniques and experience varied for each sequence of operations. Admiral
(R), this is one of a dozen
Nimitz headed the body known as the Fifth Fleet, whose tactical commander
converted to clear a beach
with a close-in salvo prior was Admiral Raymond A. Spruance. Within its structure was included the
to a landing. She carries amphibious element, Task Force 51 (TF51), under the able Vice Admiral
eighty-five rocket launchers, Richmond K. Turner, whose function was to put ashore V Amphibious Corps,
a 5-inch gun, two 40mm
led by Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith. Turner commanded all the major
and three 20mm automatic
weapons. This salvo was assaults, whose scale and ferocity increased as each came closer to the enemy's
laid on Okinawa. home islands.
168
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-45
At Tarawa and Makin in the Gilberts, and at Kwajalein and Eniwetok in the
Marshalls, assaults were directed at reef-fringed islets on the edge of coral atolls.
Defence in depth was not possible and the battle began at the water's edge. From
Saipan on, land masses were larger and, excepting Iwo Jima, mountainous and
with heavy vegetation.
Before June 1944, carrier-based aviation was not generally available for close
air support and the choice of objectives needed to take account of airfields.
Veteran battleships, some reclaimed from the mud of Pearl Harbor, found a
major role in delivering ever-heavier pre-assault bombardments, supported by
aircraft to almost the very moment of first touchdown. Destroyers, working close
inshore, were found to be invaluable in delivering 5-inch and 40mm fire at point-
blank range on demand.
Until LSDs became generally available, LVTs were launched from LST
Naval gunfire is the key to
'tractor flotillas'. On their final approach, amtracks would be subjected to a success in amphibious
lashing fire, and a popular innovation was escort by LCIs (Landing Craft, warfare. Here, the veteran
Infantry or 'Elsie Items') converted to gunboats (LCI(G)). Some of these were battleship Warspite engages
targets in Normandy after
fitted with batteries of nearly three hundred medium-calibre rockets. Firepower
D-Day. Field Marshal
such as this saved many casualties in the initial wave but there was a high attrition Rommel reported that cthe
rate among LVTs returning for the follow-up. As the shallow coral shelf within effects of naval bombardment
the reef was usually sown liberally with mines and obstructions, Underwater are so powerful that an
operation with infantry or
Demolition Teams (UDT), first used in the Marianas, were formed for their
armoured formations is
preliminary disposal. impossible in an area
General MacArthur's Seventh Fleet in the South-west Pacific was commanded by (itt.
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
First assault waves were followed up with LSD-launched LCMs with armour
and heavy equipment, then LCIs, each with about 180 infantrymen. MacArthur's
deliberate westerly progress kept the Japanese unsure as to whether the main
threat came from him or from Nimitz.
In August 1942 a powerful British raid on Dieppe indicated that the seizure of
even a small port would be impossible in the face of a resolute defence. This
conclusion much influenced amphibious operations in the European theatre, for
here an equipped port was necessary to exploit continental invasions.
The reconquest of Europe was presaged by the North African landings of
November 1942. Simultaneous landings were made in the vicinity of Casablanca,
Oran and Algiers. Casablanca was an all-American operation, mounted directly
from the United States. No LSTs were yet available
and the 350 minor landing craft suffered badly in Even as the assault troops
the heavy Atlantic surf. Fortunately, Vichy French consolidate the beach area,
supplies and ammunition
opposition to the landing was negligible, although
pour ashore. The rapid
the US Navy had a brisk task subduing some very delivery of these to the
hostile French naval units in the port. Casablanca points where they are
itself was secured with the assistance of armour immediately needed is of
great importance and is the
landed along the coast at Safi from a converted
responsibility of specially
train ferry. trained units, who
Assaults at Oran and Algiers were staged frequently find themselves
directly from the United Kingdom with joint engaged in the front line.
This is Iwo lima.
Anglo-American participation. Whereas initially
Safi had been rushed successfully by two old
destroyers, a similar British attempt at Oran was
bloodily repulsed. The Maracaibo conversions
were, however, very successful in putting essential
armour ashore, the port being quickly secured.
At Algiers, the landing was marked by
considerable confusion in the darkness and only
the lack of real opposition avoided a costly failure.
About 90 per cent of assault craft were wrecked.
Here, only one of two British destroyers succeeded
in breaking into the port and she received fatal
damage.
Fortunately, it was a further eight months
before the Axis forces could be defeated in North
Africa and Sicily invaded, allowing time for
improvement in procedures and training. Here two
armies, the US Seventh and the British Eighth, were
landed on the coasts flanking Cape Passero. Newly
available LSTs could beach directly on to the sand.
Only light air support was available and, as off
17 1
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
North Africa, the Luftwaffe mounted many damaging nuisance raids. The British
airborne attack preceding the landing went badly awry when 50 per cent of the
gliders involved were blown out to sea by contrary winds.
The ensuing slog up the long peninsula of Italy was deeply unpopular with
the Americans who held that it was an irrelevant delay to an essential cross-
Channel operation. As the terrain overwhelmingly favoured the defence, it is
surprising, in view of Allied superiority in this area, that more use was not made
of tactical amphibious landings to turn enemy defensive lines.
In the event, the landing of the American Fifth Army at Salerno in September
1943, to facilitate the capture of Naples, was so obvious a move that a fully
prepared defence nearly succeeded in sweeping it back into the sea. Again, only
light air cover was available and it was naval gunfire that saved the day by
breaking up enemy attacks, although the ships themselves faced a new hazard in
the enemy's air-launched, radio-controlled glider bombs.
In January 1944 a similar attempt was made at Anzio in order to speed the
path to Rome. Many resources had already been withdrawn, however, for the
coming Normandy invasion, and the operation was on too small a scale. It
was immediately contained by the Germans and was unsuccessful in that it
did not achieve its objectives, while absorbing more Allied resources than
German ones.
The final large-scale Mediterranean operation, in the south of France, was
technically unremarkable, although preceded by a large detachment of
paratroops. Forces ashore were quickly built up to two armies, one of them
French, which moved northward up the Rhone valley.
All experience to date was incorporated in the Normandy invasion of June
17 2
THE SECO D WORLD WAR 1939-45
1944. The build-up in southern England could not be disguised, but an elaborate For success, the Normandy
deception programme kept the enemy guessing as to its objective. Because of invasion depended upon a
rapid and sustained build-up.
these doubts the Germans divided their resources between fixed coastal defences
Equipped French ports,
and a mobile reserve. A sustained Allied air offensive was then mounted to cut however, were heavily
communications to the coast while virtually destroying the Luftwaffe's available defended by the enemy. The
strength. Pre-assault paratroop and glider drops were made to seize crossings solution was the Mulberry
harbour. Prefabricated in
vital to the operation. The landing itself was on a five-division front, preceded by
sections, towed across and
a not entirely effective air and naval bombardment. Initial enemy resistance was sunk in position, it permitted
agreeably light, except on the Americans' Omaha beach, whe~e the wide stretches ocean-going ships to
of sand became a killing ground. discharge 'over the beach'.
The unique answer to the lack of an equipped port was to construct two
temporary harbours. These 'Mulberries' comprised linked concrete caissons,
prefrabricated in England, towed across and sunk in position. They allowed
seagoing ships to discharge directly to complement the efforts of the ubiquitous
LSTs.
Within a month over one million Allied personnel were ashore and there
began the breakout that marked the start of the long road to Berlin.
173
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
Swordfish aircraft ranged Royal Navy would probably have followed the same path as the Pacific fleets. It
on the flight deck of HMS was only later in the struggle that groups of carriers became available to be
Victorious before her strike
deployed offensively as, for instance, against the T irpitz and in the Far East.
against the Bismarck
during the epic pursuit of During the whole inter-war period, Japan and the United States regarded
May 1941. The antiquated each other as potential adversaries, and the vast geography of the Pacific shaped
Swordfish was one of the their thinking. The American war plan envisaged Japan overrunning the western
Second World War's
Pacific and, in order to recover lost territories, a fleet would need to make resisted
success stories, its superb
low-speed performance progress westward for 5,000 miles, self-sufficient in maintenance, supplies and air
making it a deadly torpedo support. To the American strategists each of the mandated Japanese islands was
and AS aircraft. a potential unsinkable airfield, although the same Washington Treaty that
permitted both fleets to introduce large carriers from an early date also
prohibited development of 'fortifications' on the islands. The Japanese had long
174
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-45
observed this and as a result also required their fleet to take along its own air Secure in the Kaa fjord, the
support. Both fleets discovered the value of the largest possible air strike in Tirpitz was a threat to every
convoy bound to or from
overwhelming an enemy defence to achieve an objective.
northern Russia. On 3 April
Limited by treaty to a total of 135,000 tons of aircraft carriers, the US Navy 1944 the Home Fleet's two
had nearly half its allowance invested in the two giant hulls of the Lexington and carriers were joined by four
Saratoga. Until rearmament started in 1936, therefore, ensuing ships were the eVEs, putting up an air strike
of forty-two dive-bombers
smallest that would do the job. Japan, to her intense resentment, had been limited
and eighty fighters. Fourteen
to only 81,000 tons of carriers. One reaction was to delegate the important hits were obtained, but the
reconnaissance function to floatplanes deployed from surface combatants, battleship survived.
maximizing the strike potential of the carriers. Plans were also made, and quickly
implemented, to convert mercantile and selected warship hulls to further,
auxiliary, carriers.
175
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
HAWAII OPERATION: In Chuichi N agumo the Japanese had a carrier admiral who welded the half-
ROUTE OF JAPANESE dozen available fleet carriers into a highly efficient homogeneous force. In
ATTACK FORCES
December 1941 he was able to unleash two overwhelming air strikes, of 183 and
The Japanese Pearl Harbor
167 aircraft against a sleeping Pearl Harbor. In the British attack on the alert port
striking force sailed from the
of Taranto a year before, the strikes had been by twelve and nine aircraft
desolate Kurile islands and
followed a northerly track respectivel)'.
to avoid detection. For the Nagumo did not stop with the attack on the Hawaiian Islands. In the course
same reason:J its return to of the japanese campaign to overrun South-east Asia, his carriers covered
Japan was indirect. The
landings on Wake Island, the Bismarck Archipelago and java, all beyond the
distances involved were such
that eight tankers and supply reach of land-based aircraft. They also grouped for attacks on Darwin, Colombo
ships were in company. and Trincomalee early in 1942.
I
1500 1600
I
I
Departure from Hitokoppu Boy
TokYo time 6.00 am 26 November
Hawaii time 10.30 am 25 November
W~hingtonJime 4.00 pm 25 November
I .
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Sortie begins 26 November i
!
-43-0 -15-90-30-'E---
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i
16 Deter
36°N 17
f
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.<2 TROPIC OF CANCER
-----------
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500 1000 miles
I 0
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-45
"" 1800
" "" \
""
" "" l
~
t
t West longitudinal date:
1 Japanese forces,
I irrespedive of longitude,
I always operated on
I Tokyo time
P A IC F C o E A N
I
~panese carriers Soryu and Hiryu I
~ cruisers and destroyers force ~
r.ook off to support attack o~.. I
rake Island 0 I
------\r---------- 30 0
, 7 December: Two Japanese US carrier Lexington,
Ju destroyers shell Midway with the heavy cruisers
Mi ay Astoria, Chicago and Portland
( I and the destroyers Porter,
• Flusser, Drayton, Lamson, and
the Mahan sailed from Pearl Harbor . .
with aircraft for Midway 8December (7 December east longltudmal date):
Northampton and the I Hopkms, Long and the Johnson, SOIled Washingto time 1.25 pm 7 December
Salt Lake City, and the from Pearl Harbor for an amphibious 7December:
destroyers Balch, Gridley, I exercise at Johnston Island ~ Heavy cruiser Minneapolis and the
Craven, McCall, Maur v, Dunla v, I J destroyer-minesweepers Boggs,
/, /, Johnston Isian \() Chandler, Hovey and the Lamberton
Fanning, Benham and the ,
Ellet, flew aircraft into Wake , were involved in gunnery exercises
I south of Oahu
177
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
,,
y. ,~
,, , ,. .
I ,~ 13
, I ,
Middle Loch
12
® i
@
®
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-45
CD Tender Whitney and destroyers During the latter attacks the small British carrier
Tucker, Conyngham, Reid,
Case and Selfridge Hermes was caught by dive-bombers which reputedly
CD Destroyer Blue
CD Light cruiser Phoenix sank her with forty hits in ten minutes. Coming so
CD Destroyers Aylwin, Farragut,
soon after the destruction of the Prince of Wales and
Dale and Monaghan
CD Destroyers Patterson, Ralph,
Repulse by enemy aircraft based in Thailand, it was
Talbot and Henley
® Tender Dobbin and destroyers realized that the British Eastern Fleet had no answer
Worden, Hull, Dewey, Phelps
and Macdough to Nagumo and it was withdrawn to East Africa,
(j) Hospital Ship Solace
® Destroyer Allen temporarily yielding control of the Indian Ocean.
® Destroyer Chew
Being able to read Japanese naval codes, the
@ Destroyer-minesweepers Gamble and
Montgomery
and light-minelayer Ramsey
Americans had the huge advantage of knowing much
® Destroyer-minesweepers Trever, of their enemy's intentions. Still advancing in May
Breese, Zane, Perry and Wasmuth
® Repair vessel Medusa 1942, the Japanese sailed an invasion convoy against
@ Seaplane tender Curtiss
@ Light cruiser Detroit Port Moresby in New Guinea. Known to be
@ Light cruiser Raleigh
providing distant cover were the enemy's two largest
@ Target battleship Utah
@ Seaplane tender Tangier carriers under Rear Admiral Takagi. Against these,
@ Battleship Nevada
® Battleship Arizona
Admiral Nimitz dispatched his only two available
@ Repair vessel Vestal carriers, Yorktown and Lexington, commanded by
® Battleship Tennessee
@ Battleship West Virginia Rear Admiral Jack Fletcher.
® Battleship Maryland
Advertising his presence for no good reason by a
@ Battleship Oklahoma
@ Oiler Neosho passing raid on Tulagi, Fletcher became Takagi's
@ Battleship California
® Seaplane tender Avocet
quarry: Heavy frontal cloud made the reconnaissance
® Destroyer Shaw sightings of both sides unreliable. Initially the
@ Destroyer Downes
® Destroyer Cassin Japanese expended a strike against an American oiler
® Battleship Pennsylvania
and her escort, then Fletcher launched ninety-three
® Submarine Cachalot
® Minelayer Oglala aircraft at what turned out to be not Takagi but the
® Light cruiser Helena
® Auxiliary vessel Argonne
covering force for the invasion convoy: The strike
@ Gunboat Sacramento sank the light carrier Shoho, but the convoy had
® Destroyer Jarvis
® Destroyer Mugford already been diverted. Early the following morning
® Seaplane tender Swan
Takagi and Fletcher located each other almost
@ Repair vessel Rigel
@ Oiler Ramapo simultaneously: Eighty-two American aircraft struck
@ Heavy cruiser New Orleans
@ Destroyer Cummings and
first, a low-level torpedo attack diverting attention
light-minelayers Preble and Tracy
from the dive-bombers, which caused moderate
@ Heavy cruiser San Francisco
@ Destroyer-minesweeper Grebe, damage to one carrier with three bomb hits.
destroyer Schley and light-minelayers
Pruitt and Sicard The extra experience of the Japanese showed
@ Light cruiser Honolulu
® Light cruiser St. Louis when they pressed home a torpedo attack from two
® Destroyer Bagley
directions, again to cover their dive-bombers. The
@ Submarines Narwhal, Dolphin
and Tautog and tenders American combat air patrol (CAP) was caught off-
Thornton and Hulbert
@ Submarine tender Pelias position, the Yorktown taking one bomb but the
® Auxiliary vessel Sumner
® Auxiliary vessel Castor Lexington two bombs and two torpedoes. A large
ship, she would have survived these structurally, but
ruptured aviation fuel lines allowed pockets of
explosive vapour to collect. A series of devastating
explosions eventually destroyed the ship.
179
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
This, the battle of the Coral Sea, caused the Japanese to abandon their plans
to invade the south coast of New Guinea. It was additionally significant that the
battle was the first naval engagement in which the opposing sides did not sight
each other.
The commander-in-chief of the Japanese combined fleet, Admiral Isoroku
Yamamoto, sought to provoke a decisive action with the American Pacific Fleet
AXES OF JAPANESE
ADVANCE AND ALLIED
RESPONSE
I
The raid on Darwin and the
location of the Coral Sea
action show just how
I
closely the Japanese
threatened Australia. III
180
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-45
-----14
Rendezvous on completion of
8am 5May raid on Tulagi by Yorktown's
~ air group
11.30 am 6May Lexington, Yorktown
: 8cruisers - - + - - - - - - 1 6 "
~ 12.30 pm 7May: 1 destroyerS
Sims (destroyer) sunk
1518 Neosho (oiler) damag~~oby air affacks 162
xxxx
IFIRST AIR FLEET I
AGUMO
~erauke.
Torres Strait
Somerse • o o~~~Is.
Rotuma 0
----~
~ Allied air strikes
/ Japanese units
Coral Sea)
LEFT: ..l::1... Japanese sinking ship
181
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
See
map
above
Akagi c=EC::J
Kaga ~
Soryu Adm. Nogumo
Hiryu ~ 1st Corrier Striking Force
o /
o I o
Marcus Is.
Volcano Is.
o Wake
I
I
o Guam I
I
I 00
I
I 00
Marshall
Is.
I
I
I
I
150 0
r82
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-45
BATTLE OF MIDWAY
Battle of Midway
4-5 June 1942
29Q...
US air strikes
I ring Sea
US fleet movements
I
I
p A c I F I c o c E A N
ldm. Spruance ~~
Task Force 16
Admiral Yamamoto's
~
plans to seize Midway
May-June 1942
Japanese submarine
screenin~ Force Japanese striking forces
~ Japanese carrier
t
US fleet movements
c=-==J US carrier
~ major attack
\
1500
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
ZUIHO 1941 Shokaku, repaired following damage at the Coral Sea. Opposing him, Rear
The Japanese carrier Zuiho Admiral Fletcher had good intelligence and three carriers but with poor timing
and her sister Shoho (sunk detached one to refuel. In attacking the convoy, Fletcher's aircraft sank the light
at the Coral Sea) were
carrier Ryujo, whose own air group was away hitting the island. With his own
launched in 1935/6 as
submarine depot ships. To first strike absent, Fletcher himself was then hit by Nagumo and was lucky to
circumvent Washington escape with a heavily damaged Enterprise. The action, known as the battle of the
Treaty limits on carrier Eastern Solomons, then petered out with both commanders excessively nervous
tonnage, they were designed
of losing another carrier.
for later convertion to
lightcarriers. Zuiho was The gritty, see-saw struggle for Guadalcanal brought about a further clash in
expended at Leyte Gulf in October 1942 when Yamamoto sought to destroy American naval forces
1944 as a unit of Ozawa-'s supporting the island. He steamed in two groups, a van (including the large
diversionary force.
auxiliary carrier junyo) upon which a riposte was expected to fall, followed at a
distance by another force, built around Nagumo's two large carriers and the
smaller, converted Zuiho.
For his part, the pugnacious and impetuous Vice Admiral William F. Halsey
had just two carriers, the scarred Enterprise and the newly arrived Hornet. True
to her name, the Enterprise dispatched early reconnaissance aircraft armed with
SOO-pound bombs. Finding and reporting Nagumo, they also put the Zuiho out
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-45
of the impending action with a single destructive hit. Zuiho, however, had
already launched her share of a sixty-two-plane strike, which was followed within
the hour by a second of seventy-three aircraft. En route these passed Halsey's
response, also of seventy-three aircraft.
The American carriers and their screens manoeuvred independently, but no
defence could withstand blows on this scale. Within ten minutes the Hornet had
taken four bombs and two torpedo hits, together with two crashing aircraft. The
Enterprise suffered two hits and a near miss. The protracted and ultimately
unsuccessful efforts to save the Hornet left the Enterprise as the only serviceable
American carrier in the theatre.
As Yamamoto had hoped, most of the American effort had fallen upon his
surface ships, his big carrier Shokaku surviving four bomb hits. He should have
struck again to finish off the Enterprise (and indeed the still-floating Hornet) but
the newly introduced American proximity-fused AA ammunition had simply
caused him too many losses.
This, the battle of Santa Cruz, had reduced American fortunes to a low ebb.
The Wasp had been lost to submarine torpedoes in the previous month, leaving
the Enterprise as the only carrier capable of flying urgently required replacement
I8S
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
aircraft into Guadalcanal. Tenacity finally paid off, however, with the Japanese
evacuating the island in February 1943. Two months later, the course of the
Pacific war was changed when good intelligence led to the ambushing and
destruction of Admiral Yamamoto's aircraft over Bougainville.
The 1938 supplement to the 1934 Vinson-Trammell Act had provided for an
extra 40,000 tons of carriers. These became the short-lived Hornet and the rather
larger Essex. Although the latter's design was subsequent to the relaxation of
treaty conditions, it was really only a 27,SOO-ton extrapolation of earlier work.
Protection against shellfire had been reworked to meet the greater threat of
bombing, but she was effectively unarmoured. With war came the urgent need to
build rapidl~ As there was no time to develop a new ship, the Essex became the
lead for the protracted class that proved crucial to success in the Pacific.
In repairing heavily bombed British armoured carriers, the Americans had
been impressed by their ability to survive. Their resultant closed design, however,
made them cramped and allowed them much smaller aircraft capacity, which was
counter to US naval doctrine, with its emphasis on large air wings and well-
ordered flight deck operations.
Despite high priority, it took until the end of 1942 to complete the Essex and,
with the navy desperately short of flight-decks, the President himself overrode
professional detractors to insist on the conversion of cruiser hulls to light
carriers. Nine of these useful little ships, the Independence-class CVLs, were
completed during 1943 to complement the first seven Essex-class CVs. At a
Observance of Washington
Treaty limitations left the displacement of 14,200 tons they could accommodate thirty-one aircraft and
major fleets with insufficient maintain fleet speed of 31.5 knots.
carriers. Early losses thus The United States froze standard designs to facilitate rapid series production
left the US Navy very short
but, except for a single (and too late) class of light carriers, the Japanese had a
of decks while the Essex-
class fleet carriers were haphazard approach, producing mainly one-offs and mercantile conversions.
being built. As an interim From the last day of 1942, when the Essex commissioned, the Japanese fleet
measure) therefore) nine was effectively facing annihilation as American production got into its stride. The
Independence-class CVLs
following table, listing completions per quarter, shows by just how much the
were converted from cruiser
hulls. This is the USS Japanese were out-built.
Langley (CVL.27). In parallel with their ambitious carrier construction programme, the
186
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-45
Americans thoroughly trained enormous numbers of aircrew, an issue addressed Simpson Harbour, at
by the Japanese, to their cost, with nothing like the same urgency Rabaul in New Britain J
18 7
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
Admiral Nimitz's naval forces were reorganized as the Fifth Fleet, under the
tactical control of Vice Admiral Spruance. Within its structure, the carrier force
was styled Task Force 50 (TF50), first under Rear Admiral Pownall then, from
January 1944, Rear Admiral Marc A. Mitscher. By November 1943 it could
already deploy eleven carriers, the much-experienced Saratoga and Enterprise,
four Essex-class CVs and five CVLs. These operated in four separate Task
Groups (TG 50.1 to TG50.4), each with its dedicated surface and AA escort. This
included battleships which, so long the yardstick of naval power, had yielded
Loaded with ordnance and place to the new-style capital ship, with her ability to strike hammer blows at a
aviation fuel, carriers distance of 200 miles and more.
proved to be very vulnerable
Combined or separately, task groups were used to mount extended offensives
to dive-bombing. The
US Navy's SB2C Helldiver against the enemy prior to any major amphibious assault. Japanese aerial
replaced an earlier aircraft opposition was virtually extinguished while, consequently lacking cover, their
of the same name and could naval forces kept their distance. American combat sorties might exceed one
carry a 2000-pound bomb
thousand on such an operation but, due to the overwhelming nature of the
load. Two Helldivers here
overfly the Essex-class attacks, losses were relatively light. Replacement aircraft were continuously
Hornet. ferried-in by attached CVEs.
188
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-45
The alternative Japanese major fleet anchorage was at Truk in the eastern
Carolines. Prior to the Eniwetok landings of February 1944, Spruance scourged
Truk for two days with the combined air wings of 6 CVs and 4 CVLs, later
supported by heavy naval firepower. Out of 350 Japanese aircraft, 300 were
destroyed for the loss of just 25 American. Seven warships, several auxiliaries and
about 28 merchantmen were sunk. Like Rabaul, Truk was effectively abandoned
by the enemy as now being too vulnerable.
Relentlessly increasing in severity, similar blows were inflicted on the
Marianas in February 1944, the Palaus in April and, in June, the Bonins and Truk
and the Marianas again. Reacting powerfully to the threat against the Marianas,
the Japanese mustered their whole fleet. This included the still-formidable total of
5 large and 4 small carriers, with a total of about 430 aircraft. Mitscher, however,
now faced these with 7 CVs, 8 CVLs and 890 aircraft.
Covering the June landings on Saipan, Spruance cruised westward,
interposed between the likely approach of the enemy and the islands. His
opponent, Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, remained further to the west, just
beyond the range of the American aircraft. His plan was to fly an outward leg,
attacking Spruance and landing his aircraft on the islands to refuel and rearm, MASSACHUSETTS
prior to a second attack as they returned to their carriers. They would be The American battleship
supported by land-based air power already in the islands, although Ozawa was Massachusetts (BB59) had
an unlikely baptism of fire
never appraised by how much this had already been reduced by Mitscher's fliers.
in duelling with the Vichy
As was customary, the American carriers were organized in four heavily French battleship Jean Bart
escorted groups. Between them and Ozawa was a 'gun-line' of Rear Admiral at Casablanca in November
Willis A. Lee's seven battleships and supporting ships. Mitscher could mount a 1942. She was then present
at all the major Pacific
rotating cover from his 450 fighters but, even before they met these, the Japanese
actions. One of the four
suffered at the hands of Lee. Sinking nothing, four waves of Japanese aircraft South Dakota class, she is
were greatly reduced as they flew on to the islands, only to find intruder now preserved by her home
squadrons awaiting them over their airfields. state at Fall River.
Ozawa, meanwhile, had run into submarine country and lost both the big
Pearl Harbor veteran Shokaku and the new, armoured Taiho, which succumbed
to a devastating Avgas vapour explosion following a hit by a single torpedo. Late
in the afternoon Mitscher located Ozawa's force and, despite the hour, dispatched
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
over 200 aircraft at the very limit of their range. They found and destroyed the
large auxiliary carrier Hiyo but, while the attack cost only 20 aircraft, a further
80 ditched as their fuel ran out. So ended the battle of the Philippine Sea, a body-
blow for the Japanese, who lost 3 carriers, 50 land-based and nearly 400 carrier
aircraft, with most of the latter's crews. Whereas the Americans were organized
to make good their not-inconsiderable losses, the Japanese were not. Their fleet
was now vulnerable, its carriers possessing aircraft but few trained aircrew.
2.00 am
s
g
PT attock a o
Landings at Leyte Gulf in the Philippines were planned for October 1944,
and Mitscher's fliers had three months to scour these islands and the staging
airfields on Formosa. The deteriorating standards of the enemy air force is
evident in that about 1,360 Japanese planes were claimed for the loss of 115
American aircraft.
MacArthur's landings on 20 October triggered the 'decisive battle' that the
Imperial Navy had long sought but was no longer in a condition to fight. Greatly
5 cruisers
4.25 om
Hibuson
Island
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
reduced land-based air could give little support or cover, while Ozawa's remaining
four carriers, with barely one hundred aircraft between them, were fit only to be
used as live bait to successfully lure fleet commander Halsey dangerously out
of position.
In sacrificing itself, Ozawa's force opened the way for a powerful Japanese
surface group to attack the amphibious forces directl~ The only obstacle was
Rear Admiral Thomas Sprague's eighteen eVEs, providing close air support for
forces ashore. Packing thirty-plus aircraft apiece, the little carriers responded like
heroes, with fliers and surface escort fighting desperatel~ Unnerved, the Japanese
admiral, Kurita, retired, less three heavy cruisers.
The battles for Leyte Gulf collectively finished Japanese sea power as a
serious threat but a worrying development emerged as Sprague's carriers were
deliberately crashed by enemy aircraft. The kamikaze had arrived.
February and April 1945 brought the bitter struggle for Iwo Jima and
Okinawa. Mitscher's force, now of 10 evs and 6 eVLs with 1200 aircraft, were
reinforced by the 4 armoured carriers of the reconstituted British Eastern Fleet,
with a further 220 aircraft. This latter was effectively no more than an extra task
group, whose poor endurance meant frequent absences for replenishment from
American sources, while being covered by American eVEs.
British carriers, however, were able to withstand kamikaze impacts that took
American evs out of the line, but this was only at the cost of capacit~ With
roughly the same displacement, an Essex could deploy 95 to 100 aircraft, while
from the British squadron, Formidable accommodated just 43 aircraft, the
Indefatigable 69. To detect the approach of the kamikaze, each carrier now
deployed an Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft which was fitted with
specialist radar.
In August 1945, the detonation of the first nuclear wea ons opened a new
debate regarding the continuing viability of concentr.~te ask groups of high-
value units such as carriers or amphibious ships.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-45
193
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
/
I
8 April:
Denmark and Norway Two British destroyers sunl<
by Cerman destroyets
April-June 1940
X
~ British movements
~ German movements
German paratroop
landings
/
/ major ships sunk
12E _
/
~
\lrCl
00 w
~Faeroe
~ Islands
194
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-45
military response by the enemy would be met by a landing of Allied troops at DENMARK AND NORWAY
Such ambitions were transparently clear to the German High Command, as This map well illustrates the
boldness of the German
the British in Norway could throttle the winter ore traffic and put the Baltic
plan to invade Norway. All
within range of the Royal Air Force (RAF). Beginning in February 1940, the but the smallest group was
Germans therefore planned a pre-emptive invasion, codenamed Weserubung. open to flank attack by the
Norway's mountainous geography makes for sparse communications, with British Home Fleet. Surprise
was relied upon and
most centres of population situated on the deeply indented fjord coastline. Major J
links are maintained by sea and the German plan, like that of the British, was to the Germans the problem of
use surprise to come alongside at selected ports, secure the port area and hold it getting their ships home
pending the rapid arrival of support vessels sailed in advance. again.
For the Germans it was a very high-risk enterprise, requiring the services
of every available warship, working in small groups and remote from
their bases, in a North Sea dominated by the British Home Fleet. Success
depended upon total surprise but subsequent withdrawal of the ships looked
problematical.
Six groups would be sailed at appropriate intervals against Norway:
1. Group I to Narvik. Ten destroyers, carrying two thousand Alpine troops. Fast
battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau to give distant cover.
2. Group II to Trondheim. Heavy cruiser Hipper and four destroyers with seven
hundred troops. Follow-up by one tanker and three supply ships.
3. Group III to Bergen. Light cruisers Koln and Konigsberg, a training ship, two
torpedo boats and an E-boat flotilla with its parent ship, all told carrying
1,900 troops. Follow-up by one tanker and three supply ships.
4. Group IV to Christiansand and Arendal. Light cruiser Karlsruhe, three
torpedo boats and an E-boat flotilla with its parent ship, all told carrying
1100 troops. Follow-up by four supply ships.
5. Group V to Oslo. Pocket battleship Lutzow, heavy cruiser Blucher, light
cruiser Emden, three torpedo boats and ten minor warships, all told carrying
2,000 troops. Follow-up by two tankers and fire supply ships. Twenty-three
supply ships would follow within days.
6. Group VI to Egersund. Four minesweepers with a motor-cycle detachment.
Stavanger airfield would be seized by a Luftwaffe landing force, tactical
minefields would be laid and almost every operational U-boat would be pre-
positioned to intercept anticipated British response. Five Danish ports would be
taken simultaneously, mainly with minor warships acting as transports. The hour
was fixed for 5 a.m. on 9 Apri11940.
Had Wilfred commenced on 5 April, as planned, it would have reduced the
British to total confusion but, unfortunately, it was delayed until the 8th. British
codebreakers were still in the early stages of masteripg Naval Enigma but the so-
called 'traffic analysis' studied the general pattern of transmissions and looked
for any variations that might indicate enemy activity: An upsurge was noted in
early April and the Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre (01 C) notified.
195
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
The prompt, however, was too imprecise to cause the Admiralty to order any
precautionary dispositions.
Having furthest to travel, German Groups I and II and various supply ships
were sailed early, and sightings caused the Home Fleet to sail from Scapa late on the
7th, though it steered north-eastward to guard against a possible Atlantic breakout.
Three British minelaying groups sailed as scheduled, two towards the
Norwegian coast between Bergen and Trondheim, the third towards the Narvik
approach in Vestfjord. To counter expected opposition, the Narvik group was
covered by the battlecruiser Renown and a destroyer group. One of the latter,
Glowworm, lost a man overboard. Searching, she became detached and
blundered into enemy Groups I and II, still in company. Having exchanged fire
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-45
with two of their destroyers, she was heavily hit by the 8-inch main battery of the
Hipper. With no chance of escape, her captain, G. B. Roope, turned and rammed
the cruiser, an action for which he was awarded the Victoria Cross.
British submarines and reconnaissance aircraft were by now reporting so
many enemy groups at sea that the overall picture became one of confusion, not
helped by Group II being sighted marking time off Trondheim as Group I held on
towards N arvik in a full gale.
The British commander-in-chief, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Charles Forbes, sent
the Repulse to reinforce the Renown. Cruisers, ready loaded with combat troops,
disembarked them and proceeded to sea. Group IV overcame resistance easily, but
Group ~ approaching Oslo via the Drobak narrows, was engaged by the
Oskarsborg fort, whose ancient Krupp guns
immobilized the Blucher with two 28cm shells. In gallantly fighting the
Drifting, the ship was then torpedoed twice, capsizing heavy cruiser Admiral
Hipper and her escort the
with heavy loss of life. This, however, did not affect
captain of the British
the outcome at Oslo which, once seized, became the destroyer Glowworm earned
enemy's main port of entry. a Victoria Cross. Rescued
At Trondheim the Hipper bought vital minutes in by the enemy, the survivors
in their oil-soaked
confusing the Norwegians by signalling in English.
wretchedness could be
Her destroyers quickly landed assault troops who survivors of either side,
occupied batteries from the land side. The defences at anywhere.
Bergen were less easily misled and damaged both the
Konigsberg and the returning Bremse. Here, Group III
forces were accessible from the sea and four British
cruisers were ordered to intervene. A fine opportunity
was lost with the countermanding of the instruction.
The situation was redeemed somewhat by sixteen Skua
dive-bombers of the Fleet Air Arm which, flying at
extreme range from their Orkney base, sank the
Konigsberg at her berth. She was the first major
warship to be sunk by dive-bomber in combat.
As Group 1's destroyers steamed into Narvik their
heavy cover remained at sea where, early on 9 April, it
encountered the Renown. The German commander
failed to exploit his two-ship advantage and, in an
indecisive exchange of fire, the Gneisenau received
three IS-inch hits in exchange for two II-inch.
Before entering Narvik the enemy destroyers had
landed detachments to seize key points, and had
torpedoed and sunk two Norwegian coast-defence
ships. They were still much scattered and needing to
refuel when, out of the snowy gloom of the following
dawn, they were surprised by five British destroyers. In
197
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
an exceedingly fierce melee each force lost two ships. The attackers also
intercepted support ships carrying all the invader's ammunition and motor
transport.
The port of Narvik lies at the head of a long cul-de-sac and it was unwise of
the German commander to remain, although refuelling was painfully slow and
action damage needed to be repaired. Early on 13 April the British returned with
the battleship Warspite and nine destroyers. Every last enemy was hounded into
dead ends and destroyed. Although 50 per cent of the German navy's large
destroyers had been thus eliminated, Narvik remained in German hands.
In support of Weseriibung, Admiral Donitz involved no less than twenty of
On 8 June 1940 the British his twenty-three commissioned ocean-going U-boats and all but four of his
aircraft carrier Glorious was twenty-six coastal boats. The Germans were also freely reading British naval
returning from Norway
codes, an advantage offset somewhat by the British having learned their
when she was intercepted by
the German Gneisenau (seen dispositions; they achieved little because of chronic torpedo problems. Like the
here firing on her) and her Americans, the Germans had economized too far on pre-war live firings and now
sister, Scharnhorst. With no suffered from unrectified depth-keeping problems and over-sensitive magnetic
reconnaissance aircraft aloft,
firing pistols.
the Glorious was surprised
and, with no strike at British (and, indeed, one Polish) boats, in contrast, made good practice,
readiness, quickly sunk. sinking twenty-one supply ships totalling 112,000 grt, a German loss rate of
about 9 per cent. The light cruiser Karlsruhe and
training ship Brummer were also sunk by torpedo,
with severe damage inflicted on the Gneisenau and
Liitzow. Three British submarines were lost.
With the seizure of the major port of Oslo, the
Germans were able rapidly to extend their hold over I
199
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
The Mediterranean
Late 1942
Italian territory
Axis occupied
D Neutral countries
Allied airfield
Axis airfield
Casablanca
111I 0 r
o t: t: 0 Alger·, 8
(Fr}
Berresof •
• BeniAbb'
es 0
200
THE SECO D WORLD WAR 1939-45
Despite Mussolini's posturing, Italy was ill-prepared for war: equipment was THE MEDITERRANEAN
poor, inadequate stockpiles of bunker fuel existed for the fleet, few supplies had 194 2
already been shipped to North Africa and, when she declared war in June 1940, Contrasting with the
earlier Mediterranean map
one-third of her merchant fleet (about 218 ships of 1.2 million grt)were caught
(see page 92/3) a hostile
beyond Mediterranean limits and unable to get home. Italy effectively divides the
This momentous month saw the Royal Navy lose the ally of the powerful sea into two basins. With
French fleet and gain an enemy in the Italian. Italy's strength was considerable, most of the North African
coast:J together with
including 2 new and 4 well-modernized battleships by the end of 1940, 7 heavy
Greece:J occupied and
and 12 light cruisers, 60 fleet and 60 light destroyers, and over 100 submarines. France neutralized:J the
The fleet's weakness was the lack of aircraft carriers, its chief of naval staff, difficulties of keeping
Admiral Cavagnari, believing that both reconnaissance and attack could best be Malta functioning are
obvious. The island's
undertaken by land-based air, leaving the naval budget free for the acquisition of
situation with respect to
further heavy-gunned warships. Pilots, however, had little or no training in I talian convoy routes will
working over water. also be apparent.
Pre-war British planning had assumed that, with the powerful Italian air force
201
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
included 4 battleships, of which only one, the flagship Warspite, had been
squadron' of Admiral
Cunningham's modernized. There was the veteran carrier Eagle, 5 modern light crUIsers,
Mediterranean Fleet. 16 destroyers and 10 submarines.
202
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-45
2°3
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
2°4
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-45
reconnaissance by the DAK's commander, Erwin Rommel, turned into an OVERLEAF: Enemy aircraft
advance that pushed Wavell back to the Egyptian frontier by April. Deliberately frequently attempted to
close the Suez canal by
left invested at Tobruk, however, was a powerful garrison, whose occupation of
sowing magnetic mines.
the port left Rommel unable to advance to a point that would have left the canal This mine-spotting post is
zone within Luftwaffe range. manned by Egyptian
In the four months to January 1941 almost 200,000 tons were followed by personnel. Passing through
is HMS Euryalus~ one of the
about 450,000 tons to June as the Italians continued to exploit Malta's
hard-worked Dido-class
discomfiture under continuous bombing. During March, in contrast, Admiral anti-aircraft cruisers. She
Cunningham's full force covered the four ships of convoy MC.9, which delivered distinguished herself at
45,000 tons to the island. Second Sirte and in Force K~
the Malta strike force.
At this time, too, a light striking force (Force K) was established at Malta.
Consisting initially of four powerfully gun-armed destroyers, the group
immediately exploited Ultra intelligence to annihilate a five-ship enemy convoy
and its three escorts at the cost of one destroyer. So anxious was the War Cabinet
to halt the flow of supplies to the Germans in North Africa that Cunningham
had been instructed to block Tripoli by scuttling the battleship Barham and a
light cruiser in the port. The success of Force K and a fleet bombardment of the
port allowed Cunningham to circumvent the order. The need to evacuate the
remnants of Wavell's once-victorious army from Crete to Alexandria, following
the ill-advised intervention in Greece, was now to result in extensive loss and
damage to Cunningham's warships. Inevitably, this filtered down to further
relieve the pressure on the Axis link to Libya.
Ceaseless bombing made the situation of surface ships in Malta virtually
untenable and submarines remained the navy's only strike weapon. Porpoise-class
minelayers, together with the fast Manxman-class layers, ran in essential stores
and personnel, but attack was now mainly the responsibility of the little U-class
boats. These were well suited to the conditions, contributing greatly to the Axis
loss of 115 ships of 250,000 grt in the first five months of 1941. The Axis forces
needed 60,000-70,000 tons of supplies per month and, despite a loss rate of over
25 per cent, this was being delivered to Benghazi. Moving it forward to the front
line, however, proved difficult as the Desert Air Force targeted road and coastal
traffic. Rommel was obliged to pull back to the strong position at Agheila,
whence his lines of communication were shorter.
In July and September 1941 the British ran the very successful Substance and
Halberd convoys, delivering a total of 150,000 tons to Malta at small loss. The
Italian fleet continued to be deterred by carrier air attack, while lacking the
reconnaissance support necessary to exploit its superior strength and speed.
Torpedo bombers were now a very real threat, to meet which carrier fighters were
essential. Malta-based Swordfish and Albacore torpedo droppers worked
effectively by night while the RAF hit enemy ships from Cyrenaican airstrips
using alternative routes from the Dodecanese.
Following the German invasion of Russia in June 1941, much of Fliegerkorps
X was transferred and, with the resultant reduction of air attack, Malta's own
2°5
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
206
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-45
2°7
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
aerial strike forces prospered, extending their raids both to the Italian ports of
origin and to the congested destination of Tripoli.
In September 1941 British 'U-boats' sank two 19,500-ton liners out of a three-
ship troop convoy, and two destroyers during the night of 8/9 November. Sixty
thousand tons of supplies were thus destroyed under the noses of two Italian
heavy cruisers, which did not have the benefit of radar.
Later the same month Force K repeated the experience on a smaller convoy
only to run into a minefield off Tripoli shortly afterwards, losing a cruiser and a
destroyer, with two further cruisers severely damaged.
There followed a sequence of disaster for the Royal Navy. Ten German U-
boats had been dispatched to the Mediterranean and these sank the carrier Ark
Royal (13 November), the Barham (25 November) and a light cruiser (14/15
December). Neatly avenging Taranto, Italian frogmen attached limpet mines to
the battleships Queen Elizabeth and Valiant, putting them on the bottom in
Alexandria harbour (14 December). This was the time of Pearl Harbor and the
Admiralty was seeking to reduce Cunningham's strength further in order to send
a modern force to the Far East.
Despite British tribulation, Rommel's fuel situation had reached crisis point.
The Italians resorted to the desperate solution of transporting cased petrol
aboard fast light cruisers. Following a single successful experiment, they
dispatched a pair of ships which encountered four Allied destroyers off Cape Bon
on 13 December. Within two minutes each was an inferno. Over nine hundred
Italian seamen died.
Two battle-hardened Australian divisions had been withdrawn to meet the
new Japanese threat. When two shiploads of armour arrived safely at Benghazi in
mid December, Rommel saw an opportunity and went unexpectedly on the
offensive, pushing the British back to Gazala. Here he paused, built up strength,
and attacked again. By July 1942 the British were back in the El Alamein position.
Meanwhile Kesselring's Luftwaffe forces bl .zed Malta to the extent that even
the submarines had to be evacuated. In the six months to June 1942, over 440,000
tons of supplies were sent over to Libya at a loss rate of only 6 per cent. On the
other hand, the British loss of Cyrenaican airfields made running convoys from
Alexandria very risky. A four-ship convoy, MG.1, went through in March 1942 in
the face of direct opposition from an Italian battle-group but, ultimately, every
merchantman was lost and little cargo landed. Rommel's capture of Tobruk in
June 1942 won him huge quantities of fuel. German plans were to supply the
DAK through the port, via Crete, for the final push to the canal zone. Malta's
capture, if then necessary at all, could be delayed until Cairo had been taken.
British airpower, however, continued to target the enemy's long desert supply
lines and Rommel dissipated his resources beating futilely at the strong Alamein
positions.
Having received no real supplies during the first six months of 1942, Malta's
situation was becoming desperate. Cunningham's successor, Admiral Sir Henry
208
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-45
Harwood, resolved to run in convoys from east and west simultaneousl~ Eleven The successful British raid
ships (Vigorous) and six ships (Harpoon) were heavily escorted but faced their on Taranto in November
1940 was neatly offset by the
sternest test yet under every type of enemy assault. Only 25,000 tons managed to
I talians themselves thirteen
get through. months later when three
An August convoy was essential now to the island's very survival. Fourteen 'human torpedoes~
merchantmen, with about 140,000 tons of supplies, were supported by a massive penetrated Alexandria
harbour. Static charges were
force, supplemented by Home Fleet units. It included 2 battleships, 4 carriers, 7
positioned below the
cruisers and 33 destroyers. Forewarned, the enemy assembled some 780 aircraft flagship Queen Elizabeth,
on adjacent airfields, deployed 20 submarines, laid temporary minefields and her sister, Valiant, and a
formed torpedo craft and cruiser groups to attack on the final leg. tanker, putting all three on
the bottom.
The result, Operation Pedestal, was a sheer trial of strength. A carrIer
and 2 cruisers were lost, together with 9 cargo ships. Predictably, the enemy
claimed a significant victory but wiser heads knew that the 55,000 tons that had
been delivered meant that Malta's future was reasonably secured. Nevertheless,
during 1942, 38 merchantmen had so far been dispatched to Malta. Only 10 had
arrived and, of these, 3 had been sunk following their arrival.
As General Bernard Montgomery, the new British commander, amassed men
and materiel behind the Alamein defences, Rommel received 36,000 personnel,
mainly by air, but a barely sustainable level of supplies. While the British had the
benefit of the long Suez canal route, the Italians enjoyed no such advantage. By
September 1942 they had less than one million grt of merchant shipping
2°9
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
Convoy - Operation
Pedestal 11-13 August 1942
Pedestal convoy route
with dates and times
ffi Axis air bases
December by American
\
\
\
F r e n c h
the movement resulted in a \
heavy bombers. sheer trial of strength, with
disproportionately high
losses. N
32
l00km
I
I
100 miles
210
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-45
convoy (Stoneage) in this month without loss, while further striking forces now
worked out of Algerian ports. Despite this, the Italians doggedly persevered,
delivering 300,000 tons mainly through Tunisian ports between November 1942
:'and April 1943.
In all, Axis shipping loaded some 2.7 million tons of materiel for North
Africa, of which 435,000 tons were lost. The effort cost 1,324 merchantmen,
aggregating 2.1 million grt. A total of over 11,400 Italians were killed while
engaged on the service.
~
Oorsica
-
1s .
~ .
.JlL 1.15 pm
..:;:!:- Eagle sunk
~
Alger a
Arrives Malta 13 Aug.
(4 freighters
and 1tanker)
o r t h A f r c a
(under Axis control)
iT u n s a
' - -"'-,
,,
,,
.... ,
-,,
\
,
\
211
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
EPILOGUE
212
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-45
21 3
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
BIOGRAPHIES
BEATTY, ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET SIR DAVID V-boats. With war, he was single-minded in his
(1871-1936) conviction that sinking merchant ships would secure
Personality, dash and courage complemented the victory: He succeeded Raeder as commander-in-
ability which saw Beatty made a full captain at only chief of the German navy early in 1943, retaining
29 years of age. In 1914, as rear admiral, he was control of V-boats, and managed to maintain
appointed to command the Grand Fleet's morale among crews to the end. He was nominated
battlecruisers. His willingness to take risks resulted leader following Hitler's suicide.
in the catastrophic loss of several of these flawed
beauties. Succeeding Jellicoe after Jutland he was, FISHER, ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET SIR JOHN A.
CUNNINGHAM, ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET SIR HALSEY, FLEET ADMIRAL WILLIAM F. JR.
DONITZ, GRAND ADMIRAL KARL (1891-1980) HIPPER, ADMIRAL FRANZ RITTER VON (1836-1932)
A V-boat commander during the First World War, Rated 'the outstanding sea officer of the wa,r' by
Donitz trained a nucleus of new personnel until Marder, Hipper came from a non-naval
1936, when he was appointed commander of background. 'Energetic and impulsive', he never
21 4
BIOGRAPHIES
held a senior staff appointment ashore and spent MACARTHUR, GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS A.
21 5
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
leadership. Having failed to follow up his advantage squadron, Scheer succeeded as commander-in-chief
at Santa Cruz, he was relieved. He committed through the illness of Pohl. He immediately
suicide following the loss of Saipan. imparted a more offensive edge to fleet activity,
although his tactical competence at Jutland was
NIMITZ, FLEET ADMIRAL CHESTER W (1885-1966) questionable. Failure to better the Grand Fleet led
An experienced sea commander, Nimitz was him to support resumption of unrestricted
appointed Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet submarine warfare. In August 1918 he succeeded as
following Pearl Harbor. Flying his flag ashore, his Chief of the Admiralty Staff.
major responsibility was the Pacific Ocean Area,
across which his amphibious forces closed on Japan. SCOTT, ADMIRAL SIR PERCY (1853-1924)
Courteous and calm in demeanour, he inspired Through his belief in training gun crews practically,
confidence in his subordinates, who broke the power rather than theoretically, Scott more than doubled
of the Japanese navy in a series of decisive the navy's average rate of hitting at the turn of the
encounters. Post-war, Nimitz became Chief of centur~ Fisher (First Sea Lord) and Jellicoe
Naval Operations. (Director of Naval Ordnance) were able to build on
this improvement. Hugely unpopular through
POUND, ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET SIR A. DUDLEY outspokenness, Scott was memorably defended by
(1877-1943) Fisher: 'I don't care if he drinks, gambles and
A torpedo specialist, Pound commanded the womanizes; he hits the target!'
battleship Colossus at Jutland. Commander-in-
Chief, Mediterranean Fleet during the crisis years SIMS, ADMIRAL WILLIAM S. (1858-1936)
1936-9, he was appointed First Sea Lord and Chief Sims met Scott in the Far East when the latter was
of the Naval Staff shortly before the outbreak of commanding HMS Terrible. Impressed by Scott's
war. Quiet-mannered but determined, Pound was gunnery training methods, Sims successfully
not overawed by Churchill although, like him, he persuaded the president to have them introduced in
tended to intervene directl~ His control was the US Nav~ In 1917, with the United States still
unspectacular but sure. He died in office, being neutral, Sims was posted to London as liaison officer.
succeeded by Cunningham. Thence he became Commander US Naval Forces
Operating in European Waters. His Anglophilia was
RAEDER, GRAND ADMIRAL ERICH (1876-1960) not widely appreciated elsewhere in the US Nav~
Until late 1917, Raeder served as chief of staff to
Admiral Hipper in the High Seas Fleet scouting SOMERVILLE, ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET SIR JAMES F.
216
BIOGRAPHIES
SPRUANCE, ADMIRAL RAYMOND A. (1886-1969) missed Jutland because the Admiralty initially
Best known for his brilliant tactical instinct while ordered it to cover the English Channel approaches
commanding the American carrier force at Midway, as a precaution. Surprisingly, Tyrwhitt was not
Spruance went on, as Commander Fifth Fleet, to promoted to full flag rank until 1919.
draw heavy criticism at the Philippine Sea, where his
strict observance of priorities let the Japanese 'off WILHELM II, KAISER UND KONIG (1895-1941)
the hook'. He then commanded naval support at Iwo Ambivalent in his attitude to Britain, Wilhelm
Jima and Okinawa. Modest and quiet-mannered, he created his fleet as a means of strengthening
succeeded Nimitz in the command of the Pacific Germany's standing in the world, and to make her
Fleet. more attractive as an all~ Arrogant, yet weak-willed
and vacillating, Wilhelm courted opprobrium in
SUETER, REAR ADMIRAL SIR MURRAY (1872-1960) Britain, dispensed with the moderating influence of
Highly innovative, Sueter was involved in the early Bismarck, and sidelined Tirpitz, the creator of the
development of wireless telegraphy and the fleet which he then proved over-reluctant to risk. He
submarine. Connected with the RNAS from its abdicated at close of hostilities.
inception he became Inspecting Captain of Airships,
then Director of the Admiralty Air Department and YAMAMOTO, ADMIRAL ISOROKU (1884-1943)
Superintendent of Aircraft Construction, building Commander-in-chief of the Imperial Japanese Navy,
up the force and championing the torpedo aircraft. Yamamoto master-minded naval support for the
Over-critical of policy, he was banished to a army campaign that overran South-east Asia.
Mediterranean command and, in 1920, retired into Unpretentious, and with a warm personality,
politics. Yamamoto was a skilled poker player. Opposed to
war with the West and frequently at odds with the
TIRPITZ, GRAND ADMIRAL ALFRED VON army, he none the less committed himself fully once
(1849-1930) the die was cast. His complex battle plans were
A fortuitous proposal for an ambitious fleet largely ruined by American code-breaking.
expansion led Tirpitz to be made rear admiral by the
sea-minded Kaiser and appointed Secretary of State
at the Navy Office. From 1897 he created the
Imperial German Navy according to his 'risk
theory'; designed to deter action by the numerically
superior Royal Navy through the likelihood of its
incurring unacceptable loss. He resigned in March
1916 after being increasingly sidelined in decision
making.
(1890-1951)
Known invariably as 'Com. (T)', Tyrwhitt led the
Harwich Force throughout the war with great dash
and aggression. His light cruisers tangled with the
enemy at the Heligoland Bight, the Dogger Bank and
at various of Hipper's tip-and-run forays. The force
21 7
WAR AT SEA 1914-45
FURTHER READING
218
FURTHER READING
Captain Hugo Waldeyer-Hartz's biography Admiral Hipper (Rich & Cowan, 1933).
Essential background on both people and policies is given by other Navy Records
Society publications, notably Paul Halpern's two-volume Keyes Papers (1972-80),
A. Temple Patterson's Jellicoe Papers (1966-8) and B. M. Ranft's Beatty Papers
(1989).
Unfortunately, most of the fighting leaders, who could have added so much,
proved disappointing autobiographers, but try Admiral Goodenough's A Rough
Record (Hutchinson, 1943) and Admiral Lewis Bayly's Pull Together! (Harrap, 1939).
Patrick Beesly's Room 40: British Naval Intelligence 1914-18 (Hamish Hamilton,
1982) gives a valuable insight into behind-the-scenes work at the Admiralt):
Between-the-wars material is duller stuff. Stephen Roskill's two-volume Naval
Policy between the Wars (Collins, 1968-76) is scholarly but essential. Painfully
partisan, but with useful appendices, is Harlow A. Hyde's Scraps of Paper (Media
Publishing, Lincoln, Nebraska, 1988), dealing with the disarmament treaties. Rather
opaque, but valuable for a full understanding of the growth of American naval
aviation, is Turnbull and Lord's History of United States Naval Aviation (Yale
University Press, 1949). Edward S. Miller's War Plan Orange (Naval Institute Press,
Annapolis, 1991) gives insight into American war strategy in the Pacific.
From the other side of the hill, both Admiral Dbnitz's Memoirs, Ten Years and
Twenty Days (Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1959) and Admiral Raeder's Struggle for
the Sea (William Kimber, 1959) are valuable, if unenlightening.
Another Arthur Marder work, his part-posthumous two-volume Old Friends:1
New Enemies (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981-90) explains growing Anglo-Japanese
antagonism between the wars, then the difficulties of the Royal Navy, both in
fighting the Japanese and in co-operating with 'Ernie' King's US Nav): In
conjunction, see HMSO's six-volume War with Japan, a staff history released for
publication in 1995. Statistics are its strong feature.
Both major histories of the naval side of the Second World War - Stephen
Roskill's three-volume-in-four The War at Sea (HMSO, 1954-61) and Samuel Eliot
Morison's epic fifteen-volume History of us Naval Operations in World War II
(Oxford, 1947-62) were written before the acknowledged existence of Ultra and are
in need of revision. Roskill is austere and over-concise: Morison lavish in detail but
given to purple passages. Roskill's account of British operations, particularly in the
Mediterranean, is very usefully expanded by its two-volume equivalent, Royal
Australian Navy 1939--42 and 1942-5 (Collins, 1957 and 1968). Canada's immense
and under-recognized contribution is well related in Joseph Schull's official account
The Far Distant Ships (Ottawa, 1952).
Indispensible detail is available from two other publications of the Navy Records
Society, The Somerville Papers (1995) and The Cunningham Papers (1999).
Clay Blair's monumental Silent Victory (Lippincott, 1975) and Hitler~s U-boat
War 1939--42 and 1942-5 (Random House, 1996-9) are deservedly standard works
on the American submarine war against Japan and the war against the U-boat.
Again, the admirals who directed these campaigns are disappointing as writers.
Admiral Charles A. Lockwood's Down to the Sea in Subs (Norton, 1967) is useful on
personalities, otherwise superficial. Admiral Chalmers' account of Max Horton and
the Western Approaches (Hodder & Stoughton, 1954) is far too concise to do justice
to its subject.
Good reading!
21 9