University of the Philippines College of Law

Topic Real Party in Interest

Case Name SMU Association of Women Law Students v. Wynee and Jaffe
Ponente Ainsworth, j.

PARTIES:
Plaintiff: SMU Association of Women Law Students
Defendant: Wynne Jaffe law firm

RELEVANT FACTS
First Suit:
1. SMU Association of Women Law Students (SMU) filed a complaint, on behalf of itself, its women members
and all women situated similarly to its women members against Wynne Jaffe (WJ), a Dallas law firm.
 SMU charged that WJ violated Title VII (Act with the Equal Employment Opportunity commission
– EEOC) by discriminating against women in hiring summer law clerks (illegal sex discrimination).1
2. WJ filed an answer – denied the charges.
3. The parties served interrogatories on each other.
 WJ’s interrogatories [among others, I put only the relevant part]:
i. sought to ascertain the identities of the officers and members of SMU’s governing body
ii. requested the identity of Association members who "had applied for and were refused
employment with WJ because of WJ’s “alleged discrimination" and of those members
who would have applied but for that purported discrimination
iii. asked the identity of any persons who had requested the Association to file charges
against WJ with the EEOC
4. SMU filed objections to WJ’s interrogatories and moved for a protective order.
 It averred that WJ’s interrogatories sought information privileged from disclosure under the
Constitution and Title VII.
 The disclosure would cause embarrassment, annoyance and economic loss to the Association’s
officers, the women members and the women represented by the Association.
 At most, if the interrogatories of WJ will be sustained, the information should be available only in
confidence to WJ’s attorney.
5. The EEOC filed a motion for leave to intervene as a party-plaintiff.
6. Judge Higginbotham issued an order that WJ’s counsel shall not communicate SMU’s answer to any
person other than the 2 named partners of WJ and ordered these lawyers not to "communicate such
answers of SMU to any other person except upon further application to and order of the court.

Second Suit
7. SMU filed a separate suit against Thompson, Knight, Simmons Bullion (TK), another Dallas law firm
alleging similar Title VII violations in the hiring of summer law clerks and associates.
 TK denied the charges.
 EOCC filed a motion for leave to intervene.

8. While the EEOC's motions to intervene in the two actions were still pending, the cases were transferred
from Judge Higginbotham to Judge Woodward.

1
The EEOC invited SMU and WJ to enter into a conciliation but SMU did not want to. So, EEOC gave SMU the Notice to Sue
within 90 days, hence the present suit.
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9. SMU moved for permission to file amended complaints in both actions on March 15, seeking to add as
named plaintiffs the following alleged victims of each firm's purported discrimination:
 Lawyer A and Lawyer B in the WJ suit
 Lawyers A-D in the action against TK.
10. These anonymous persons and the Association moved for protective orders in each case, asking the court
to limit to defendants' respective counsel pretrial disclosure of "the identities, or information which
reasonably discloses the identities" of the anonymous plaintiffs and the members of the Association.
11. Judge Woodward issued an order granting the EEOC's motions to intervene in the two actions and the
Association's request for leave to amend its complaints by adding A-D as parties plaintiff "except that the
identities of Lawyers A, B, C and D must be disclosed for these complaints and for all further purposes.”
 Rationale: the demand of the Association to prevent disclosure of Lawyers A-D is not mandated.
This is not a case involving racial strife or labor informants. Present there, but not here, were
dangers of physical harm to the protected parties. Here the harm is at the most economic and at
the least social. Further, the mechanics of non-disclosure would only further complicate an
already complicated set of cases
12. SMU filed a motion to amend court order to permit an interlocutory appeal -> DENIED
13. Second set of interrogatories were served to SMU. Then, SMU filed for a protective and retraining order
to object to the queries with respect to the Association's current membership list and the identities of the
women whom plaintiffs alleged were reluctant to join or "labor for the Association in the public eye" and
fearful "that, if they are associated with the Association, they will be singled out for discrimination by
Defendants and other law firms.
14. Judge Woodward’s order declared that he would grant a defense motion to produce the Association's
current membership list "if same is not voluntarily produced by the plaintiffs" and instructed plaintiffs to
reply to the other contested interrogatories.

SMU wants the court in this petition to reverse the trial court’s orders compelling disclosure of the identities of
A-D and information regarding the Association's membership.
Arguments:
1. the four anonymous lawyers and the organization's members will "suffer economically and socially should
their participation in these actions become generally known." The lawyers believed that they will be
assigned less desirable matters by their current employer if their identities will become known.
ISSUE AND RATIO DECIDENDI

Issue Ratio
W/N the district court’s pretrial YES
disclosure orders are appealable
GR: CA is empowered to hear "appeals from all final decisions of the district
courts." Generally, this means "a decision by the District Court that ends the
litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the
judgment.
EXC: COLLATERAL ORDER DOCTRINE. Courts have long given this statute "a
practical rather than a technical construction.
Under the collateral order doctrine announced by the Supreme Court in Cohen
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation, a trial court order is an appealable "final
decision" when it represents "a final disposition of a claimed right which is not
an ingredient of the cause of action and does not require consideration with it"
and which presents "a serious and unsettled question" of law.
 University of the Philippines College of Law
As applied in the present case, the ff requisites must be present:
(1) they must have fully disposed of the disclosure issues raised by plaintiffs,
leaving nothing "open, unfinished or inconclusive"
(2) the orders must not have been mere steps toward a final judgment on the
merits and the disclosure issues must be "completely collateral to the cause of
action asserted"
(3) the district court's rulings must affect "important right[s] which would be
`lost, probably irreparably,' if review had to await final judgment; hence, to be
effective, appellate review in this special, limited setting must be immediate

The district court's pretrial disclosure orders pass the Cohen test of
appealability. Since there is no "plain prospect that the trial court may itself
alter the challenged rulings," we regard them as finished and conclusive.

Also, the questions whether plaintiffs must reveal the Association's

membership information and the identities of A-D are plainly "independent
and easily separable from the substance" of their allegations that defendants
have engaged in illegal sex discrimination. "Ascertaining the propriety of the
orders will not require examining either the merits of plaintiffs asserted claims
or any possible defenses of the defendants."

Moreover, to postpone review until final judgment would risk irremediable

injury to the rights that plaintiffs assert.
 Under the trial court's order, if lawyers A-D wish to preserve
anonymity, they must abandon their individual claims and rely on
other parties to vindicate their interests; if they decide instead to
continue as individual plaintiffs, the four women must fact the
purported economic and social hazards of disclosure.
 Whichever course A-D follow, delayed review could not effectively
repair any attendant damage to their rights. Similarly, because the
identities of the Association's members, once revealed, could not again
be concealed, review following a decision on the merits would come
too late to remedy any injury caused by the order to disclose the
membership information.
WN identities of the plaintiffs YES
must be disclosed
[RELEVANT PART] GR: In the complaint, the title of the action shall include the names of all the
parties.

In this case:
 The language of the Title IV invoked here establishes no exception to
the general principle that "the identity of the parties to a lawsuit
should not be concealed.”
 Plaintiffs have not cited nor has the CA found any prior decisions which
recognize or even discuss the right of Title VII plaintiffs to proceed
anonymously.
 Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor Title VII itself make
provision for anonymous plaintiffs.
 University of the Philippines College of Law
EXC: Under certain special circumstances, however, courts have allowed
plaintiffs to use fictitious names.
 Where the issues involved are matters of a sensitive and highly
personal nature," such as birth control, abortion, homosexuality or the
welfare rights of illegitimate children or abandoned families, the
normal practice of disclosing the parties' identities yields "to a policy
of protecting privacy in a very private matter.

The Exception does not apply in this case:

 The plaintiffs in the actions where the exception is applied, at the least,
divulged personal information of the utmost intimacy; many also had
to admit that they either had violated state laws or government
regulations or wished to engage in prohibited conduct.
 Here, by contrast, to prove their case, A-D need not reveal facts of a
highly personal nature or express a desire to participate in proscribed
activities.
 Furthermore, all of the plaintiffs previously allowed in other cases to
proceed anonymously were challenging the constitutional, statutory or
regulatory validity of government activity. While such suits involve no
injury to the Government's "reputation," the mere filing of a civil action
against other private parties may cause damage to their good names
and reputation and may also result in economic harm. Defendant law
firms stand publicly accused of serious violations of federal law.
 Basic fairness dictates that those among the defendants' accusers who
wish to participate in this suit as individual party plaintiffs must do so
under their real names.

Plaintiffs argue that disclosure of A-D's identities will leave them vulnerable to
retaliation from their current employers, prospective future employers and an
organized bar that does "not like lawyers who sue lawyers."
 CA: A-D face no greater threat of retaliation than the typical plaintiff
alleging Title VII violations, including the other women who, under
their real names and not anonymously, have filed sex discrimination
suits against large law firms.

There is neither an express congressional grant of the right to proceed

anonymously nor a compelling need to "protect privacy in a very private
matter," thus, these Title VII plaintiffs may not sue under fictitious names and
therefore the district court's order requiring disclosure of A-D's identities by
proper pleadings is affirmed.
WN the association’s YES.
membership must be disclosed
Under Judge Higginbotham's order of October 12, 1976, dealing with WJ’s
first set of interrogatories, defendant law firm's counsel may "not
communicate Plainti9's answers . . . to any person other" than two named
partners of the firm, who in turn are forbidden to divulge plaintiff's responses
to any other persons "except upon further application to and order of this
Court."
 University of the Philippines College of Law

We believe that this ruling strikes a sensible balance between WJ’s need to
defend this lawsuit and the Association's desire to avoid the purportedly
adverse consequences of revealing information with respect to its
membership. Therefore, we hold that the disclosure limitations announced in
the October 12, 1976 order will also apply to the Association's membership list
and plainti9s' answers to WJ’s second set of interrogatories.

RULING
Modified and affirmed.

SEPARATE OPINIONS

NOTES