This document outlines the case of People of the Philippines v. William Gambini and Stanley Rothenstein. The main issue is whether Gambini and Rothenstein are guilty of robbing and killing Jimmy Willis. The prosecution argues they are guilty based on witness identifications and tire mark evidence. However, the defense argues the identifications are uncertain and the tire marks could have come from a different car, casting reasonable doubt. The legal issue is whether the circumstantial evidence is enough to convict beyond reasonable doubt.
This document outlines the case of People of the Philippines v. William Gambini and Stanley Rothenstein. The main issue is whether Gambini and Rothenstein are guilty of robbing and killing Jimmy Willis. The prosecution argues they are guilty based on witness identifications and tire mark evidence. However, the defense argues the identifications are uncertain and the tire marks could have come from a different car, casting reasonable doubt. The legal issue is whether the circumstantial evidence is enough to convict beyond reasonable doubt.
This document outlines the case of People of the Philippines v. William Gambini and Stanley Rothenstein. The main issue is whether Gambini and Rothenstein are guilty of robbing and killing Jimmy Willis. The prosecution argues they are guilty based on witness identifications and tire mark evidence. However, the defense argues the identifications are uncertain and the tire marks could have come from a different car, casting reasonable doubt. The legal issue is whether the circumstantial evidence is enough to convict beyond reasonable doubt.
v. William Robert Gambini and Stanley Marcus Rothenstein, Accused-Defendants.
MAIN ISSUE AND THEORY:
Main Issue: Whether or not the accused, William Gambini and
Stanley Rothenstein, are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbing and killing Jimmy Willis.
Theory of the Prosecution: The accused, William
Gambini and Stanley Rothenstein, are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery and homicide.
Theory of the Defense: The accused, William Gambini
and Stanley Rothenstein, are not guilty of the crime of robbery and homicide.
FACTUAL ISSUES:
1. Whethere or not the accused-defendants were positively
identified by the Prosecution witnesses.
Theory of the Prosecution: The accused-defendants were
positively identified by three witnesses to be present at the scene of the crime at the time the victim was robbed and killed.
Theory of the Defense: The identifications made by the
Prosecution witnesses were merely circumstantial and can be controverted by other evidence.
2. Whether or not the automobile of the accused-defendants
produced the tire marks found at the scene of the crime.
Theory of the Prosecution: The tire marks found at the
scene of the crime were made by a 1964 Buick Skylark, the same automobile owned by the accused-defendant, William Gambini, and were driven by him at the time the crime was committed. Theory of the Defense: The tire marks found at the scene of the crime could not have been made by a 1964 Buick Skylark as it was made by a 1963 Pontiac Tempest.
LEGAL ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the circumstantial evidence by the
Prosecution is enough to convict the accused-defendants of the crime of robbery with homicide beyond reasonable doubt.
Theory of the Prosecution: The positive identification of
the accused-defendants and the evidence of the tire marks are enough to sustain conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
Theory of the Defense: The uncertain identifications by
the Prosecution Witnesses and the possibility that the tire marks found at the scene of the crime could have been made by an entirely different car casts enough doubt to produce an acquittal of the accused-defendants.
United States of America Ex Rel. Ronald O. Bisordi v. J. Edwin Lavallee, Superintendent, Clinton Correctional Facility, Dannemora, New York, 461 F.2d 1020, 2d Cir. (1972)
Joseph Subilosky v. Robert J. Moore, As He Is Superintendent of Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole, Massachusetts, 443 F.2d 334, 1st Cir. (1971)