Poli Law
Poli Law
POLITICAL LAW
THE CONSTITUTION
AMENDMENTS OR REVISION
(Article XVII, 1987 Constitution)
Ratification
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[Quisumbing])
To our mind, it would be the apex of injustice and highly inequitable for us to defeat
petitioners-contractors’ right to be duly compensated for actual work performed and services
rendered, where both the government and the public have, for years, received and accepted
benefits from said housing project and reaped the fruits of petitioners-contractors’ honest toil
and labor.
Incidentally, respondent likewise argues that the State may not be sued in the instant
case, invoking the constitutional doctrine of Non-suability of the State, otherwise known as the
Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty.
Respondent’s argument is misplaced inasmuch as the principle of State immunity finds
no application in the case before us.
Under these circumstances, respondent may not validly invoke the Royal Prerogative of
Dishonesty and conveniently hide under the State’s cloak of invincibility against suit, considering
that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions. True enough, the rule, in any case, is not
absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstances.
Thus, in Amigable v. Cuenca, this Court, in effect, shred the protective shroud which
shields the state from suit, reiterating our decree in the landmark case of Ministerio v. CFI of
Cebu that “the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice on a citizen.” It is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity
to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained.
Although the Amigable and Ministerio cases generously tackled the issue of the State’s
immunity from suit vis a vis the payment of just compensation for expropriated property, this
Court nonetheless finds the doctrine enunciated in the aforementioned cases applicable to the
instant controversy, considering that the ends of justice would be subverted if we were to
uphold, in this particular instance, the State’s immunity from suit.
To be sure, this Court – as the staunch guardian of the citizens’ rights and welfare –
cannot sanction an injustice so patent on its face, and allow itself to be an instrument in the
perpetration thereof. Justice and equity sternly demand that the State’s cloak of invincibility
against suit be shred in this particular instance, and that petitioners-contractors be duly
compensated – on the basis of quantum meruit – for construction done on the public works
nd
housing project. (EPG Construction Co. v. Vigilar, 354 SCRA 566, Mar.16, 2001, 2 Div.
[Buena])
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PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
X x x
Procedural Issue
X x x
Academic Freedom
Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning. (Sec. 5[2], Art.
XIV, 1987 Constitution)
1. Legislative Scrutiny
2. Legislative Investigation
3. Legislative Supervision
Congressional Investigations
X x x
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X x x
More than half a century ago, this Court had already ruled that an ad interim
appointment is permanent in character. In Summers v. Ozaeta, decided on October 25, 1948,
we held that:
The Constitution imposes no condition on the effectivity of an ad interim appointment,
and thus an ad interim appointment takes effect immediately. The appointee can at once
assume office and exercise, as a de jure officer, all the powers pertaining to the office. X x x
Thus, the term “ad interim appointment”, as used in letters of appointment signed by the
President, means a permanent appointment made by the President in the meantime that
Congress is in recess. It does not mean a temporary appointment that can be withdrawn or
revoked at any time. The term, although not found in the text of the Constitution, has acquired a
definite legal meaning under Philippine jurisprudence. The Court had again occasion to explain
the nature of an ad interim appointment in the more recent case of Marohombsar v. Court of
Appeals, where the Court stated:
“We have already mentioned that an ad interim appointment is not descriptive of the
nature of the appointment, that is, it is not indicative of whether the appointment is
temporary or in an acting capacity, rather it denotes the manner in which the
appointment was made. In the instant case, the appointment extended to private
respondent by then MSU President Alonto, Jr. was issued without condition nor limitation
as to tenure. The permanent status of private respondent’s appointment as Executive
Assistant II was recognized and attested to by the Civil Service Commission Regional
Office No. 12. Petitioner’s submission that private respondent’s ad interim appointment
is synonymous with a temporary appointment which could be validly terminated at any
time is clearly untenable. Ad interim appointments are permanent appointment but their
terms are only until the Board disapproves them.”
An ad interim appointee who has qualified and assumed office becomes at that moment
a government employee and therefore part of the civil service. He enjoys the constitutional
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Held:
“X x x
X x x
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Police Power
Held:
X x x
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X x x
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Abdula v. Guiani
Valmonte v. De Villa
People v. Doria
Freedom of Expression
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
X x x
X x x
No law. . .
X x x
X x x
X x x
Freedom of Assembly
Freedom Parks
Freedom of Religion
Held:
Div. [Kapunan])
[Panganiban])
[Mendoza])
“X x x
CITIZENSHIP
Natural-born Citizens
X x x
Held:
Naturalization
[Callejo, Sr.])
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Flores v. Drilon
Caveat:
Preventive Suspension
Div. [Carpio-Morales])
The Doctrine of Condonation
The rationale for this holding is that when the electorate put him back into office, it is
presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life and character, including his past
misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still reelects him, then such reelection is
considered a condonation of his past misdeeds. (Mayor Alvin B. Garcia v. Hon. Arturo C.
Mojica, et al., G.R. No. 139043, Sept. 10, 1999 [Quisumbing])
Caveat:
This Doctrine of Condonation was abandoned by the Supreme Court in the more recent
case of Conchita Carpio Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), GR Nos. 217126-27,
November 10, 2015, En Banc (Perlas-Bernabe). However, the abandonment of the doctrine
was given prospective application only.
X x x
X x x
As earlier intimated, Pascual was a decision
promulgated in 1959. Therefore, it was decided within the
context of the 1935 Constitution which was silent with
respect to public accountability, or of the nature of public
office being a public trust. The provision in the 1935
Constitution that comes closest in dealing with public office
is Section 2, Article II which states that “[t]he defense of
the State is a prime duty of government, and in the
fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to
render personal military or civil service.” Perhaps owing to
the 1935 Constitution’s silence on public accountability,
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ELECTION LAWS
Held:
Makalintal v. COMELEC
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Autonomous Regions
Held:
X x x
Farinas v. Barba
The State
Territory of States
Refugees
These are:
Background Information
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