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FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets: Fire Protection For Gas Turbines and Electric Generators
FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets: Fire Protection For Gas Turbines and Electric Generators
Table of Contents
Page
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7-79 Gas Turbines and Electric Generators
Page 2 FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets
List of Figures
Fig. 1. Water spray protection for steel columns .......................................................................................... 5
Fig. 2. Schematic example of emergency drainage and containment system for unenclosed
combustion turbine installation ........................................................................................................... 6
Fig. 3. Cable protection for dc lube oil pump ................................................................................................ 6
Fig. 4. Guard piping ....................................................................................................................................... 7
Fig. 5. Enclosed gas turbine protection system ........................................................................................... 12
Fig. 6. Schematic of fire protection system for unenclosed gas turbine installation .................................... 14
Fig. 7. Roof level sprinkler option ................................................................................................................ 16
Fig. 8. Local sprinkler option ....................................................................................................................... 16
Fig. 9. Typical gaseous fuel system (double block and vent) ..................................................................... 19
Fig. 10. Gaseous fuels (triple block and double vent) ................................................................................ 19
Fig. 11. Gaseous fuels (triple block, double vent, and pressurized pipe section) ...................................... 20
Fig. 12. Typical liquid fuel system (double block and drain) ....................................................................... 20
Fig. 13. Lube-oil release source: broken supply line .................................................................................. 27
Fig. 14. Mineral oil spray fire (90 psig [6 barg]) demonstration test performed by FM Global .................. 28
Fig. 15. Oil-release and fire scenario checklist ........................................................................................... 31
List of Tables
Table 1. Sprinkler Densities for Roof-Level and Local Protection Options ................................................. 17
Table 2. Ceiling Sprinkler Design Criteria for Turbine Buildings with Combustible Roof Construction ....... 18
1.0 SCOPE
This data sheet recommends safeguards to protect gas turbine installations against property damage and
loss of production due to fires. For combined cycle power generation installations, use this data sheet for the
gas turbines and Data Sheet 7-101, Fire Protection for Steam Turbines and Electric Generators, for the steam
turbines. For information regarding driven equipment other than electric generators, use this data sheet in
conjunction with other applicable data sheets (e.g., refer to Data Sheet 7-95, Compressors, for information
on compressors). Finally, refer to Data Sheet 13-17, Gas Turbines, for recommendations regarding turbine
monitoring devices, maintenance and testing, and information regarding other equipment hazards.
1.1 Changes
January 2018. Interim revision. Minor editorial changes were made.
2.1 Introduction
Severe fires in gas turbine installations can occur as a result of the accidental release and ignition of fuel
or lubrication, control, or seal oil systems. Such fires can cause forced outages and result in extensive damage
to inadequately protected turbine units and building structures. The safeguards recommended in this data
sheet address gas turbine fire hazards using the following basic prevention and mitigation strategies:
A. Fire prevention incorporated into operating procedures and training
B. Location and construction designed to isolate and limit the fire area
C. Fixed automatic protection in all areas where fires could occur
D. An effective emergency shutdown system for the turbine
E. Personnel preparedness for effective response in fire emergencies
The recommendations in this data sheet are based on conservative assumptions regarding the severity of
the initiating events that could result in turbine fires. The isolation and protection criteria for lubrication oil fires
are intended for large releases, as may occur following mechanical breakdown of equipment. Such releases
have occurred in the past and can potentially occur at any given turbine unit despite the best efforts at
prevention. This data sheet also considers other gas turbine hazards, such as high-pressure gas piping and
potential explosions within gas turbine compartments. Loss experience has shown that the mitigation
measures recommended in this data sheet can help prevent the majority of fire and explosion losses, even
in the case of severe initiating events.
Use FM Approved equipment, materials, and services whenever they are applicable. For a list of products
and services that are FM Approved, see the Approval Guide, an online resource of FM Approvals.
2.2.1 General
2.2.1.1 Locate gas turbines in buildings constructed of noncombustible or fire-resistant materials.
2.2.1.2 Where a new turbine unit is located inside or attached to a main building occupied for another purpose,
such as manufacturing, offices or warehousing, provide 2-hour fire-rated cut-offs and direct access to the
turbine from outside the main building.
2.2.1.3 Provide space separation, fire walls, curbing, and/or emergency drainage to prevent a fire in one
unit from exposing adjacent equipment.
2.2.1.4 Provide ready access for hose streams to fight inlet air-filter fires.
2.2.5.1 Locate lubrication and control-oil systems, including reservoirs, storage tanks, conditioning equipment
(coolers, oil filtration, and centrifuge systems), and pumps in a separate fire area from the turbine. Provide
at least 1-hour fire-rated construction.
2.2.5.2 Locate any indoor main lube-oil storage tanks in a separate cutoff room in accordance with Data
Sheet 7-88, Ignitable Liquid Storage Tanks.
2.2.5.3 Where applicable, make the following provisions for power and control cables for critical functions
such as lubrication of the turbine and power for hydrogen seal-oil pumps:
A. Route the cables to minimize exposure to potential oil fires.
B. Locate control and instrumentation cable for individual units to minimize the chance a fire will result
in an extended outage to multiple units.
C. Provide separate routing for cables for primary and backup lube-oil pumps (see Figure 3).
D. Provide a 1-hour fire-rated, FM Approved fire wrap for cables that cannot be routed separately and
for cables that enter within the same pool or spill-fire area. Provide the fire wrap for 20 ft (6.1 m) beyond
the fire area (see Figure 3). Verify the wrap will not result in cable de-rating.
Roof Ventilation
Floor Slope to Drain
Curb Curb System
Floor Drain
Compressor
Turbine
Crane
Generator Exhaust
Combustor
A A
(Note 1)
Curb
AC Compressor
Combustor
Pump Lube oil
DC reservoir
Curb Pump Curb Generator Turbine Exhaust
Approved
Hydraulic
Fluid
High Voltage
Drain
Switchgear
Switchgear
To Oil-Water Section A-A
Control
Room
Separator Tank
DC Cable in Elevation View
Conduit
Plan View
Note 1: See Section 2.2.5 for preferred location of lube oil reservoir and pumps.
Fig. 2. Schematic example of emergency drainage and containment system for unenclosed combustion turbine installation
Unprotected cable
Cable in conduit or
fire wrap
Alternate Routing
20 ft (6.1 m)
2.2.6.2 Locate and arrange primary liquid fuel storage and pumps in accordance with Data Sheet 7-88,
Ignitable Liquid Storage Tanks, and Data Sheet 7-32, Ignitable Liquid Operations.
2.2.6.3 Where separate fuel pumps are located indoors, provide a 1-hour fire-rated cutoff room with
appropriate emergency drainage and containment (see section 2.2.4) to remove fuel spills to a safe location
outside the building and away from important equipment.
2.2.6.4 Locate storage tanks and vaporizers for liquefied petroleum gas fuel systems in accordance with
Data Sheet 7-55, Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) in Stationary Installations.
2.2.6.5 Where fuel is heated using an organic heat transfer fluid, locate and arrange the system in accordance
with Data Sheet 7-99, Heat Transfer by Organic and Synthetic Fluids.
2.2.6.6 Locate fuel gas compressor stations in open outdoor areas or in detached buildings of damage-limiting
construction in accordance with Data Sheet 1-44, Damage-Limiting Construction, and Data Sheet 7-95,
Compressors. Locate high-pressure gas piping aboveground and arrange it in accordance with American
National Standard B31.1, Power Piping, B31.3, Process Piping Guide, or applicable international standards.
2.2.6.7 Arrange piping systems located in 500-year or less earthquake zones in accordance with Data Sheet
1-2, Earthquakes.
2.2.6.8 Provide emergency fuel shutoff valves where they will be readily accessible in the event of
emergencies.
Bearing Housing
Guard Pipe
To Oil Reservoir
Section A-A
A
Fig. 4. Guard piping
2.2.7.4 Earthquake
2.2.7.4.1 In areas exposed by earthquakes, do not install seismic shutoff switches for lube-oil systems. Refer
to Data Sheet 1-11, Fire Following Earthquake, for further information regarding the omission of seismic
shutoff valves.
2.2.7.4.2 Design oil piping systems to resist damage in the event of an earthquake as follows:
A. Limit gross movement of the equipment to which the piping is connected.
B. Provide flexibility to accommodate relatively small movement at equipment, or larger movement due
to piping deflection.
C. Ensure pipe movement does not result in loss of vertical supports.
2.3 Occupancy
2.3.1 Housekeeping
Maintain high standards of housekeeping in all areas.
2.3.1.1 Conduct periodic recorded housekeeping inspections.
2.3.1.2 Provide a management reporting channel for prompt correction of housekeeping deficiencies.
2.3.1.3 Store flammable gas cylinders in a detached, dedicated area in accordance with DS 7-50,
Compressed Gases in Cylinders.
2.3.1.4 Store drums of lubricating or hydraulic oils outside of the turbine enclosure and turbine building or
in a cutoff room located and constructed in accordance with DS 7-29, Ignitable Liquid Storage in Portable
Containers.
2.3.1.5 Provide FM Approved cabinets for small containers of ignitable liquids.
2.3.5 Earthquake
In 500-year or less earthquake zones, anchor electrical cabinets and storage racks in accordance with Data
Sheet 1-11, Fire Following Earthquake.
2.4 Protection
Provide the following fire protection for turbine compartments and turbine buildings where fire could result
in significant property damage or loss of production.
B. Establish alarm and trip “set points” below 25% of the lower explosive limit (LEL) of the fuel and at
the lowest feasible gas concentration level to avoid spurious trips.
C. Where the turbine is inside a room or compartment, also provide gas detection interlocks to operate
dampers and fans to cause all exhaust to be discharged outdoors and away from any important equipment
or building air intakes.
D. Additional guidance is provided in Data Sheet 5-48, Gas and Vapor Detectors and Analysis Systems.
2.4.1.2 For units capable of running on liquid fuel, provide fuel leak detection at the turbine and fuel pump
block. Adhere to the following recommendations:
A. If the fuel temperature is above its flash point, provide vapor LEL detection in accordance with Section
2.4.1.1.
B. If the fuel temperature is below its flash point, provide FM Approved hydrocarbon leak detector.
C. Interlock the leak detection system to trip the unit and isolate the fuel supply by means of a fast-acting
shutoff valve.
D. Provide high-liquid-level alarms in fuel spill collection tanks.
2.4.1.3 Provide all liquid and gaseous leak-detection devices with electronic supervision and transmit all
alarms to the control room or other constantly attended location.
2.4.1.4 Establish and document the frequency at which detectors are to be recalibrated and tested based
on Data Sheet 5-49, Gas and Vapor Detectors and Analysis Systems, facility experience, and the detector
manufacturer’s recommendations.
2.4.1.5 Design and install leak-detection systems so the controls and all components and devices can be
readily inspected, calibrated, and tested according to the manufacturer’s recommended method and the
frequency established per section 2.4.1.4.
B. The maximum projected time needed to achieve a safe shutdown of the lube-oil system following
emergency trip of the turbine, plus 10 minutes. Determine maximum safe shutdown time based on the
emergency shutdown procedure (see section 2.6.2).
Enclosure
Fuel
Exhaust
Compartment
Enclosure
Lube Oil
Gas
Turbine
Compartment
Air
Intake
Load Compartment
Batteries
Unit 2 Unit 1
A A
Control
MCC
Rm
Transformer
(Protect in Accordance
with D.S. 5-4)
MCC Control
Rm * Note: Automatic sprinkler
Cable Spreading protection may be used
Room as a alternative for
(Protect in Accordance the lube oil enclosure
Section A-A with DS 5-32) and fuel enclosure.
C. The maximum projected time to allow exposed hot surfaces to cool below the autoignition temperature
of the oil.
2.4.3.3 Activate automatic fire protection systems using the detection system described in Section 2.4.2.
Ensure the detection system is compatible with the fire protection system.
2.4.3.4 Provide capability for remote manual activation of the fire protection systems by operators from the
control room or other area that will be accessible during a fire emergency.
2.4.3.5 Provide one of the following FM Approved automatic fire protection systems for the insides of turbine
and generator compartments, as well as enclosures for auxiliary equipment such as fuel skids and lubrication
fluid pumping and conditioning equipment (see Figure 5):
A. FM Approved inert gas or carbon dioxide (CO2) system.
B. Total flooding water mist system FM Approved for the protection of gas turbines or machinery in
enclosures, as applicable.
C. Hybrid (water and inert gas) system FM Approved for the protection of gas turbines or machinery in
enclosures, as applicable.
D. Where fuel, lubrication, and hydraulic oil tanks, pumps, or other equipment not subject to potential
water damage are located inside a dedicated room or an enclosure, automatic sprinkler protection
designed in accordance with Section 2.4.4 may be provided as an alternative to options A, B, and C above.
Do not provide this option for gas turbine enclosures.
2.4.3.5.1 When a carbon dioxide (CO2) system is provided to protect a turbine compartment, use the following
design criteria:
A. Install the system in accordance with its listing in the Approval Guide, the manufacturer’s instructions,
and Data Sheets 4-0, Special Protection Systems, and 4-11, Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems.
B. Provide sufficient agent to achieve an initial CO2 design concentration of at least 34% by volume within
one minute, and maintain a minimum of 30% for the remainder of the concentration hold time determined
in Section 2.4.3.2, in either the largest single hazard zone or group of hazard zones protected by the
system simultaneously.
C. Locate and orient CO2 discharge nozzles to avoid direct impingement by the discharge jet onto the
gas turbine.
2.4.3.5.2 When an inert gas system is provided to protect a turbine compartment, use the following design
criteria:
A. Install the system in accordance with its listing in the Approval Guide, the manufacturer’s instructions,
and Data Sheets 4-0, Special Protection Systems, and 4-9, Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems.
B. Provide sufficient agent to achieve and maintain a concentration in accordance with the manufacturer’s
recommendations and Data Sheet 4-9, Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems, for the concentration
hold time determined in Section 2.4.3.2, in the largest single hazard zone or group of hazard zones
protected by the system simultaneously.
C. Locate and orient discharge nozzles to avoid direct impingement by the discharge jet onto the gas
turbine.
2.4.3.5.3 When a water mist or hybrid (water and inert gas) system is provided to protect a turbine
compartment, use the following design criteria:
A. Install the system in accordance with its listing in the Approval Guide, the manufacturer’s
recommendations, and Data Sheets 4-0, Special Protection Systems, and 4-2, Water Mist Systems, as
applicable.
B. Ensure all system limitations, such as protected volume size, ventilation rate, and opening size, are
met.
C. Hydraulically design the water mist or hybrid system in accordance with the manufacturer’s
recommendations and the system’s listing in the Approval Guide.
D. Design the water mist or hybrid agent supply to provide discharge to the largest single hazard zone
or group of hazard zones protected by the system simultaneously, for the time specified in Section 2.4.3.2.
E. Locate and orient discharge nozzles in accordance with the manufacturer’s instruction.
2.4.3.6 Conduct a full discharge acceptance test, in accordance with the system manufacturer’s test protocol,
to verify the proper operation of the protection system, including all of the following:
A. Activation of the extinguishing system detectors initiates an automatic emergency trip of the turbine
prior to discharge of the agent.
B. Compartment ventilation shutdown and damper closings occur in the proper sequence prior to discharge
of the agent.
C. An alarm is transmitted to a constantly attended location.
D. The settings for time delays and any selector valves are correct.
E. Specified extinguishing concentrations are achieved and maintained for the entire duration of the
concentration hold time.
F. All discharge nozzles flow free and clear, and the discharge from nozzles relative to any obstructions
in the compartment is in accordance with the manufacturer’s guidelines.
2.4.3.6.1 To accept multiple ″identical″ units on the same site, conduct a full discharge acceptance test on
each unit where fixed protection is needed.
2.4.3.6.2 Do not conduct a “full load” trip test with the turbine at operating temperature.
2.4.3.7 Document the acceptance test procedures and results. Maintain a copy of all documentation on site
and ensure it will be available for future reference.
2.4.3.8 Conduct periodic documented visual inspections to verify compartment tightness and ensure the
proper concentration of the agent can be achieved and maintained according to design.
2.4.3.9 Conduct periodic documented re-validation of installed fire protection systems through full discharge
testing, or simulated discharge plus compartment pressurization testing, at maximum 5-year intervals.
2.4.3.10 Provide a water supply and hose connections for manual firefighting.
Crane
A A
Curb
Curb Curb
Fig. 6. Schematic of fire protection system for unenclosed gas turbine installation
A. Standpipes in basement, ground floor, and operating floor areas so all areas can be reached by at
least one hose stream.
B. Wheeled dry-chemical and carbon dioxide extinguishers on the operating floor for small fires at bearings.
Noncombustible roof
Noncombustible roof
2.4.4.2.3 Design roof-level sprinklers for a demand area of 5,000 ft2 (465 m2). Design local sprinklers for a
demand area of 5000 ft2 (465 m2) or the limits of the containment, whichever is less.
2.4.4.2.4 Where foam-water sprinklers or compressed air foam (CAF) are used to supplement the automatic
sprinkler protection or as an alternative to providing an emergency drainage system, use the following design
criteria:
A. Install the system in accordance with the manufacturer’s recommendations, the FM Approval listing,
and Data Sheet 4-12, Foam-Water Sprinkler Systems.
B. Where a foam-water sprinkler system is installed, hydraulically design the system in accordance with
Table 1 of this data sheet or the FM Approval listing density, whichever is larger, over the full demand
area.
C. Where a CAF system is installed, design the system in accordance with the manufacturer’s
recommendations and its listing in the Approval Guide, and design the sprinkler system in accordance
with the recommended sprinkler density in this data sheet.
D. Design the foam concentrate supply and air supply, if applicable, to provide the full sprinkler discharge
(use actual discharge based on water supply) plus any hose streams also arranged to provide foam
discharge for the greater of:
1. 20 minutes.
2. The maximum projected time needed to achieve a safe shutdown of the lube-oil system following
emergency trip of the turbine, plus 10 minutes. Determine maximum safe shutdown time based on the
emergency shutdown procedure (see Section 2.6.2).
E. Include an exterior hose stream allowance of 750 gpm (2,840 L/min).
F. Provide containment as recommended in this data sheet.
2.4.4.3 Fire Protection for Oil Spray Fires
Provide one of the following protection methods over oil pumps and conditioning equipment where pressurized
releases could result in spray fires that expose the turbine building roof, equipment mezzanines, building
support columns, gas turbines, or other critical targets:
A. Provide a room or enclosure around the equipment and spray source in accordance with Section 2.2.5.2.
Protect the interior of the enclosure in accordance with Section 2.4.3.
B. Provide a combination of barriers and sprinklers, designed as follows:
1. Install a heavy gauge metal (e.g., 12 gauge [2 mm]) spray hood or barrier above the spray fire source.
Provide additional barriers where sprays can expose important equipment (see item 1 in Figure 7).
Support the barrier on the unexposed side.
2. Provide a wet or deluge sprinkler system under the barrier on a maximum 10 x 10 ft (3 x 3 m) spacing.
Do not support the sprinkler piping from the hood.
3. Use a K-factor of 8.0 (115), and design the sprinklers to provide a minimum end pressure of 50
psig (3.4 barg).
4. Extend the protection at least 5 ft (1.5 m) beyond each spray source.
C. Provide closely spaced sprinklers above the spray source, designed as follows:
1. Install a deluge sprinkler system over each leak point.
2. Install pendent sprinklers with a K-factor of 8.0 (115), and provide a minimum end pressure of 50
psig (3.4 barg).
3. Locate sprinklers with approximately 6 ft (1.8 m) vertical clearance above the potential oil spray
source.
4. Provide a minimum of nine sprinklers on 5 x 5 ft (1.5 x 1.5 m) spacing. Extend the protection at
least 5 ft (1.5 m) beyond each spray source.
5. Activate deluge systems automatically using either an FM Approved flame detection system or FM
Approved line-type heat detection, with the line-type detection installed around sprinkler piping to
ensure a spray fire will activate the system.
D. Use FM Approved spray fire shields on flanges of piping containing pressurized mineral oil or industrial
fluids that are not FM Approved. The use of an FM Approved spray fire shield does not eliminate the need
for fire protection, but reduces the fire hazard from a spray fire to a localized pool and spill fire that can
be protected according to Section 2.4.4.2.
Table 2. Ceiling Sprinkler Design Criteria for Turbine Buildings with Combustible Roof Construction
Sprinkler Temperature Density Area of Demand
Type of Sprinkler System Rating gpm/ft2 (mm/min) ft2 (m2)
Wet High 0.2 (8) 5000 (465)
Dry 8000 (740)
Hose stream demand: 750 gpm (2840 L/min). Duration: 60 min (water supply duration may need to be increased
when conditions exist that could delay manual firefighting efforts.)
V = Valve
Vent PT = Pressure transmitter
FT = Flow transmitter
V3
PT PT/
FT
Fuel To gas
supply turbine
V1 V2
Fig. 9. Typical gaseous fuel system (double block and vent)
Vent Vent
V = Valve
PT = Pressure transmitter
FT = Flow transmitter
V4 V5
PT/
PT PT FT
Fuel To gas
supply turbine
V1 V2 V3
2.5.2.1.3 Use shutoff valves that meet the gas turbine original equipment manufacturer’s (OEM’s)
requirements for closing time and leakage.
2.5.2.1.4 Locate an automatic shutoff valve in a safe location outside the gas turbine enclosure to
automatically isolate the fuel supply in case of a dangerous condition.
V = Valve
PT = Pressure transmitter
Vent Vent FT = Flow transmitter
DPT = Differential pressure
transmitter
V4 V5
PT/
DPT FT
PT
Fuel To gas
supply turbine
V1 V2 V3
Vent
Air or
inert gas
supply
Fig. 11. Gaseous fuels (triple block, double vent, and pressurized pipe section)
Yes End
1
Building Construction Building and Equipment Damage
Type 1 construction Building damage = 50%
Equipment damage = 35%
Type 2 construction Building damage = 30%
Equipment damage = 10%
Type 3 construction Building damage = 20%
Equipment damage = 10%
2
Type 4 construction Building damage = 5%
Equipment damage = 10%
Fig. 12. Typical liquid fuel system (double block and drain)
2.5.2.4 Proof-of-Flame
2.5.2.4.1 Provide a flame monitoring system interlocked to close the fuel shutoff valves and trip the gas turbine
in the event of a failure-to-ignite or flameout during operation.
2.6.2.4 Develop a documented emergency shutdown procedure to help limit the extent of property damage
and downtime in case of fire.
2.6.2.5 Establish a procedure, including shutdown of lubrication oil systems, if shutdown is necessary, for
each of the following scenarios:
A. A fire that is controlled by fixed fire protection systems and/or the emergency response team (such
as a minor leak or insulation blanket fire). In this case, the unit will be tripped and the fuel will be shut off
upon operation of the fire protection system. However, based on an assessment of the fire event,
shutdown of lubrication-oil systems may not be necessary.
B. A single point release of oil and subsequent fire that is not controlled by either fixed protection or the
emergency response team, resulting in the need to shut down all equipment, including oil systems.
C. Mechanical damage to turbine generator equipment severe enough to stop the rotating element, with
a subsequent fire.
2.6.2.6 With the assistance of the turbine manufacturer or a qualified equipment expert, document the proper
sequencing and critical actions required to be taken by operators following an emergency trip of the turbine.
Ensure onsite personnel having documented authorization to implement the emergency shutdown procedure
are available on all shifts.
B. The purge credit period is maintained as long as the conditions in Part A above, Items 2, 3, and 4,
are met. The purge credit period is not limited to eight days.
C. Ensure fuel cannot enter the air or inert gas supply line at any time.
2.6.5.4 Inspect the fuel system in accordance with the OEM’s recommendations. At a minimum, inspect the
fuel system during scheduled dismantle inspections (refer to Data Sheet 13-17, Gas Turbines, for additional
information). As part of this inspection, test fuel shutoff valves for leak tightness.
2.6.5.5 Test automatic drains in the lower combustor casings and/or exhaust casing of the gas turbine annually
to ensure they operate properly.
2.7 Training
3.1 General
Despite a relatively high flash point, mineral oil used in turbine lubrication and control systems presents a
severe hazard due to the potential for a large quantity of oil to escape and ignite an uncontrolled, high
heat-release fire. A mineral oil release and fire inside a turbine building or compartment can create significant
exposures to critical equipment, production, and the building itself. Fire scenarios can include a spray fire,
a spill fire, a pool fire, or combinations of these events. The most effective means of limiting damage from oil
fires is to quickly shut down the affected oil system. Control-oil systems can usually be shut down quickly,
but lubricating-oil shutdown while the turbine is running will likely cause additional equipment damage. Fire
protection efforts recommended in this data sheet include the following:
A. A comprehensive program to prevent accidental oil releases.
B. An effective emergency shutdown procedure.
C. A combination of active and passive protection features that include construction, curbing, emergency
drainage, automatic fire protection, structural steel protection, spray hoods, barriers, and spray fire shields.
The key goals of any fire protection scheme are to shut down the fuel supply as quickly as possible, control
where the released oil flows, and use automatic sprinkler protection to provide cooling and possible
extinguishment of burning pools of oil. This combination of protection elements is used to limit the extent
of damage. Turbine buildings contain high values per unit of floor area. Loss of generating capability can result
in substantial loss of business income.
Fig. 14. Mineral oil spray fire (90 psig [6 barg]) demonstration test performed by FM Global
Automatic sprinkler discharge may help limit damage to the building structure and prevent involvement of
other combustibles, but the spray fire will not be extinguished and may open an excessive number of
sprinklers unless the oil discharge is cut off promptly.
By fitting FM Approved spray fire shields over oil piping flanges, the spray fire hazard at the flange can be
reduced to a localized spill and pool fire that can be controlled by local automatic sprinkler protection, curbing,
and emergency drainage for the area of the release. FM Approved spray fire shields are subjected to a
45-minute hydrocarbon fire, during which they have demonstrated the ability to maintain their structural
integrity and limit the release of oil to within a 5 ft (1.5 m) radius from the centerline of the shield.
6. Describe the design details for fixed fire protection systems, such as automatic sprinklers, gaseous
extinguishing agents, foam, water mist, and hybrid systems.
7. Describe fire protection for high-value, critical equipment and areas (e.g., control rooms, cable spreading
and instrumentation rooms, cable trays, switchgear, etc.) that may be directly impacted by an oil fire or
exposed to nonthermal damage.
B. Determine Oil-Release Scenarios
1. Using the compiled information and the prepared schematics, conduct a table-top review of each oil system,
identifying the potential oil-release sources. Mechanical breakdown and on-line maintenance of oil systems
may lead to the release of oil.
2. Consider alternative release points for each mineral oil system.
3. For each release source, obtain the pressure and flow rate and determine the type of fire (e.g., pool fire,
spray fire).
4. Loss experience indicates the size of the release is difficult to predict. Estimate the potential release size
and resulting fire duration based on the reservoir capacity and inherent limits on oil release (approximately
2⁄3 to 3⁄4 of tank capacity).
5. Determine the likely flow path(s), starting from the source and ending at the drains, a curbed area within
or outside of the turbine compartment, or other low points.
6. Conduct a physical walk-down and revise the release scenario as needed.
7. Document the release scenarios and identify the credible worst cases in terms of size, flow rate, and flow
path taken by the released oil.
8. Estimate the release duration based on the emergency shutdown plan and in the event emergency
shutdown procedures are not followed (due to unforeseen difficulties that may occur in any fire situation).
C. Determine Oil-Fire Scenarios
1. Assuming ignition will occur, assess the potential fire damage to critical equipment and the building based
on the release mode, duration, quantity, and flow path of the oil. Take into account the mitigating effects of
fixed fire protection systems, drainage, and containment.
2. Conduct a walk-down of the fire area and revise the fire scenario as needed.
3. Document the fire scenarios and identify worst case scenarios (see Figure 15 for suggested format).
D. Evaluate Adequacy of Fire Protection, Including Prevention
1. Assess the impact of the fire scenarios in terms of potential property damage and business interruption
for the worst-case scenarios.
2. Determine where it is feasible to prevent or reduce fire damage and downtime through physical protection,
such as drainage, containment, spray fire shields, and fire protection.
3. Determine if improvements are needed in emergency shutdown plans and fire awareness/prevention
training programs. Ensure the emergency response plan incorporates appropriate measures to limit the size
and duration of an oil fire.
E. Implement Action Items
Assign follow-up responsibility for improvements in prevention and mitigation of oil fires.
F. Training and Loss Prevention Programs
1. Use the images, schematics, and findings of the OFHA to train operators and maintenance personnel in
the hazards of oil fires, as well as emergency response procedures.
2. Ensure oil-fire awareness training is conducted on an ongoing basis for all employees and reflects the
hazard as determined by the OFHA.
3. Incorporate findings into operating and maintenance procedures where appropriate to reduce errors that
could result in oil release.
Location of Leak
Oil System
Flow Rate
Pressure
Fire Type
(Spray, 3-D, Pool)
Emergency Shutdown
inadequate design and/or installation; out-of-service systems (impaired protection); loss of power; manual
actuation only (inaccessible or delayed actuation); fire spread outside the protected area/equipment; and
inadequate inspection, testing, and maintenance.
3.3.2.1 Acceptance Test Protocol
Two key acceptance criteria for a special extinguishing system are:
A. Installing an FM Approved system, and
B. Conducting a successful full discharge test with fully documented test protocol and results
demonstrating the system meets the appropriate design criteria.
Special protection systems are more complex than conventional sprinkler systems and consequently subject
to more electrical, mechanical, and software failure modes. Therefore, a full discharge concentration test
simulating activation under actual turbine operating conditions is necessary to ensure these systems will
perform as intended.
Where multiple units of identical design are present on a site, conoduct a full discharge test is preferred for
each unit, for the following reasons:
A. Problems might not be identified without a full discharge test.
B. Even “identical units” will frequently have “as-built” variations that could affect the performance of the
special extinguishing system.
To ensure reliability, the acceptance test must be carefully designed to prove and verify the functionality,
timing, and sequencing of all critical devices and software needed to achieve and maintain the design
concentration following a turbine trip under actual operating conditions. The directions of the turbine
manufacturer must be followed so discharge testing will simulate operating conditions as closely as possible
without increased risk to the unit. Prior to testing, all activities, critical devices, and acceptance criteria are
documented in a check-list format that will help ensure the test is conducted properly and the results are
preserved for future reference.
B. Time to allow exposed hot surfaces to cool below the autoignition temperature of the oil
The duration of oil flow in an actual fire is an uncertain parameter that can only be estimated using the
design-basis fire scenarios and the emergency shutdown procedure for the unit. Setting the extinguishing
period equal to the maximum expected duration of oil flow (per the emergency shutdown procedure), plus at
least 10 minutes as a safety factor, will help ensure a sufficient supply of extinguishing agent for the initial
phase of the fire to give manual responders time to apply hose streams to control any subsequent reignition.
If time for cooling metal surfaces below the autoignition temperature of the fluid is not known and not available
from the turbine manufacturer, surface temperatures can be measured by thermocouples and infrared
scanning devices.
4. Monitor the pipe section between the middle and most downstream shutoff valves (V2 and V3) for
a pressure decrease. The allowable pressure decrease should be within the OEM’s acceptance
criteria. Typically, a pressure decrease of more than 10 psi (0.7 bar) in 30 seconds is considered
excessive.
5. Failure of this test indicates that a failure or leak in the most downstream shutoff valve (V3) may
have occurred. Leakage could also have been through vent valve V5.
4.0 REFERENCES
4.1 FM Global
Data Sheet 1-11, Fire Following Earthquake
Data Sheet 1-21, Fire Resistance of Building Assemblies
Data Sheet 1-29, Roof Securement and Above Deck Roof Components
Data Sheet 1-44, Damage Limiting Construction
Data Sheet 2-0, Installation Guidelines for Automatic Sprinklers
Data Sheet 2-81 Fire Protection System Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance
Data Sheet 3-7, Fire Protection Pumps
Data Sheet 4-0, Special Protection Systems
Data Sheet 4-1, Fixed Water Spray Systems for Fire Protection
Data Sheet 4-2, Water Mist Systems
Data Sheet 4-9, Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems
Data Sheet 4-11, Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems
Data Sheet 4-12, Foam-Water Sprinkler Systems
Data Sheet 5-4, Transformers
Data Sheet 5-23, Emergency and Standby Power Systems
Data Sheet 5-31, Cables and Bus Bars
Data Sheet 5-32, Data Centers and Related Facilities
Data Sheet 5-40, Fire Alarm Systems
Data Sheet 5-48, Automatic Fire Detection
Data Sheet 5-49, Gas and Vapor Detectors and Analysis Systems
Data Sheet 7-29, Ignitable Liquid Storage in Portable Containers
Data Sheet 7-32, Ignitable Liquid Operations
Data Sheet 7-50, Compressed Gases in Cylinders
Data Sheet 7-54, Natural Gas and Gas Piping
Data Sheet 7-55, Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) in Stationary Installations
Data Sheet 7-59, Inerting and Purging of Equipment
Data Sheet 7-83, Drainage Systems for Ignitable Liquids
Data Sheet 7-88, Ignitable Liquid Storage Tanks
Data Sheet 7-95, Compressors
Data Sheet 7-98, Hydraulic Fluids
Data Sheet 7-99, Heat Transfer by Organic and Synthetic Fluids
Data Sheet 7-101, Fire Protection for Steam Turbines and Electric Generators
Data Sheet 13-17, Gas Turbines
Data Sheet 9-0, Maintenance and Inspection
Data Sheet 9-7, Property Conservation
Data Sheet 10-0, The Human Factor of Property Conservation
Data Sheet 10-1, Pre-incident Planning
Data Sheet 10-2, Emergency Response
Data Sheet 10-3, Hot Work Management
Data Sheet 10-4, Contractor Management
4.2 Other
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME). Power Piping. ASME B31.1.
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME). Process Piping Guide. ASME B31.3.
Internal Fire or Explosion: A fire occurring inside one of the major components of the turbine usually due to
fuel accumulations. Fuel may accumulate due to fuel leakage past shutoff valves, delay in shutdown following
loss of flame, failure of a casing drain, or an inadequate purge. The fire or explosion occurs within the turbine,
compressor or exhaust system.
Lagging: The term ‘‘lagging’’ refers to a covering or enclosure of some kind designed to shield the hot section
of a gas turbine from external factors, such as other equipment, water discharge, or simply the environment,
and to keep personnel from accidental contact with the hot section while the turbine is operating. Lagging
consists of insulating blankets around the casing. The insulation is usually metal covered.
Proof of Closure Switch: A device that provides feedback that a piece of equipment is in the closed position.
Purge Credit: A condition that is established by maintaining a set of parameters following a gas turbine normal
shutdown that allows the gas turbine to restart without going through a unit purge.
Rundown Time: Following a trip of the turbine, the period during which the unit is coasting down from its
operating speed to a shutdown condition (typically, once the equipment has been placed on turning gear).
Lubrication oil may continue to be supplied to the equipment during this period.
Safe Shutdown: Following the emergency response team’s assessment of the fire event, a decision to initiate
a prompt shutdown of the equipment. Rotating equipment is considered “shut down” when it has reached
a speed where the lubrication oil system can be turned off without damaging the equipment. Typically, this
is achieved once the equipment has been placed on turning gear. Safe shutdown must be accomplished
based on an evaluation of the site specific oil system design, the turbine manufacturer’s emergency
shutdown system, and emergency response procedures.
Skid: A structural steel base on which a gas turbine and/or its auxiliary components are mounted. It may
be enclosed or unenclosed.
Spray Barrier: A metal barrier located between a spray source and critical equipment serving to deflect a
horizontal spray.
Spray Fire Shield: A device placed around the flanges of pressurized piping systems, used to prevent highly
pressurized jets of fluid. The shield is designed to prevent a spray fire from developing by converting a highly
pressured spray into a low pressure, low momentum flow of liquid which can be controlled by a properly
designed sprinkler system.
Spray Fire Source: Any unguarded flange, fitting, or control device that provides containment for pressurized
combustible oil at a high pressure and is connected to a reservoir. Length of the jet flame is determined by
pump capacity and assumed pressure and orifice size for the leak.
Spray Hood: A horizontally mounted barrier located above a spray source serving to deflect a vertical spray.
Total Flooding System: A fire extinguishing system that relies on filling an enclosure with an extinguishing
agent, and maintaining the extinguishing concentration within the enclosure until the fire is extinguished and
conditions will not permit reignition. Inert gas and carbon dioxide extinguishing systems are total flooding
systems.
Unenclosed installation: A gas turbine installation, usually in a large building and possibly part of a multiple
installation, without individual enclosures for any of its auxiliaries or components.
Unit Purge: A flow of air through the gas turbine and its exhaust system at a rate and duration for a sufficient
number of volume changes to occur to remove any flammable vapors and replace them with the air.
Water Mist: A special protection system in which a distribution system is connected to a water supply that
is capable of delivering atomized water spray with droplets that are less than 1,000 microns in size. The
smaller droplets vaporize and extract heat more rapidly from flames, and are able to extinguish spray fires.
B. References to “combustion turbine” have been replaced with “gas turbine” throughout the document.
C. References to “flammable” and “combustible” liquids have been replaced with “ignitable liquids”
throughout the document.
D. The document has been reorganized where necessary to provide a format that is consistent with other
data sheets.
E. Recommendations for structural steel protection, including where protection is necessary, have been
clarified.
F. Recommendations for containment and emergency drainage have been clarified.
G. An option to provide containment of mineral oil without the need for emergency drainage has been
added. This option is contingent on several other factors, such as the design of the containment and
automatic fire protection features.
H. The intent of cable protection guidance has been clarified. The use of FM Approved cable coatings
as a protection method has been removed.
I. Recommendations related to electric generators have been added.
J. The necessary discharge duration for special extinguishing systems has been clarified.
K. Hybrid (water and inert gas) fire extinguishing systems have been added as options for the protection
of gas turbine compartments.
L. Automatic sprinklers and water spray have been removed as options for the protection of gas turbine
compartments.
M. Information on acceptance testing of special extinguishing systems has been added.
N. The fire protection recommendations for unenclosed turbines have been modified.
O. Additional general information on the design of sprinkler systems has been added, including guidance
on spacing and sprinkler system types.
P. Compressed air foam (CAF) systems have been added as an alternative to emergency drainage and
for supplemental protection of the turbine building.
Q. The intent of an Oil Fire Hazards Assessment has been clarified.
R. A discussion of ignition sources and information regarding which compartments need fire protection
has been added to Section 3, Support for Recommendations.
S. Recommendations for gas turbine fuel train arrangements and combustion safeguards have been
added.
T. Recommendations on how to address hydrogen, ignitable liquid, fuel gas, and sprinkler piping systems
in areas exposed to earthquakes have been added.
U. Recommendations for hose streams to be included in the capacity of drains and containment have
been removed.
September 2010. Minor editorial changes were made for this revision.
May 2010. Minor editorial changes were done for this revision.
January 2008. The following changes have been made:
Design criteria for turbine building sprinkler systems have been revised.
Emergency drainage and containment design criteria have been revised to account for potential fire scenarios
where more than 10 minutes of sprinkler and hose stream discharge is expected.
A recommendation has been added to provide FM Approved flange shields and deflectors to help mitigate
exposures from oil spray fires.
The design extinguishing period for special extinguishing systems protecting turbine compartments has been
revised. Refer to sections 2.4.3.2 and 3.3.2.3.