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FMDS 0779
FMDS 0779
Table of Contents
Page
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7-79 Gas Turbines and Electric Generators
Page 2 FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets
List of Figures
Fig. 1. Water spray protection for steel columns .......................................................................................... 5
Fig. 2. Schematic example of emergency drainage and containment system for unenclosed
combustion turbine installation ........................................................................................................... 6
Fig. 3. Cable protection for dc lube oil pump ................................................................................................ 7
Fig. 4. Guard piping ....................................................................................................................................... 8
Fig. 5. Enclosed gas turbine protection system ........................................................................................... 13
Fig. 6. Schematic of fire protection system for unenclosed gas turbine installation .................................... 15
Fig. 7. Roof level sprinkler option ................................................................................................................ 17
Fig. 8. Local sprinkler option ....................................................................................................................... 17
Fig. 9. Typical gaseous fuel system (double block and vent) ..................................................................... 20
Fig. 10. Gaseous fuels (triple block and double vent) ................................................................................ 20
Fig. 11. Gaseous fuels (triple block, double vent, and pressurized pipe section) ...................................... 21
Fig. 12. Typical liquid fuel system (double block and drain) ....................................................................... 21
Fig. 13. Lube-oil release source: broken supply line .................................................................................. 28
Fig. 14. Mineral oil spray fire (90 psig [6 barg]) demonstration test performed by FM Global .................. 29
Fig. 15. Oil-release and fire scenario checklist ........................................................................................... 31
List of Tables
Table 1. Sprinkler Densities for Roof-Level and Local Protection Options ................................................. 17
Table 2. Ceiling Sprinkler Design Criteria for Turbine Buildings with Combustible Roof Construction ....... 19
1.0 SCOPE
This data sheet recommends safeguards to protect gas turbine installations against property damage and
loss of production due to fires. For combined cycle power generation installations, use this data sheet for the
gas turbines and Data Sheet 7-101, Fire Protection for Steam Turbines and Electric Generators, for the steam
turbines. For information regarding driven equipment other than electric generators, use this data sheet in
conjunction with other applicable data sheets (e.g., refer to Data Sheet 7-95, Compressors, for information
on compressors). Finally, refer to Data Sheet 13-17, Gas Turbines, for recommendations regarding turbine
monitoring devices, maintenance and testing, and information regarding other equipment hazards.
1.1 Changes
July 2013. The following major changes have been made.
A. The title of the document has been changed from Fire Protection for Combustion Turbine Installations
to Fire Protection for Gas Turbines and Electric Generators.
B. References to “combustion turbine” have been replaced with “gas turbine” throughout the document.
C. References to “flammable” and “combustible” liquids have been replaced with “ignitable liquids”
throughout the document.
D. The document has been reorganized where necessary to provide a format that is consistent with other
data sheets.
E. Recommendations for structural steel protection, including where protection is necessary, have been
clarified.
F. Recommendations for containment and emergency drainage have been clarified.
G. An option to provide containment of mineral oil without the need for emergency drainage has been
added. This option is contingent on several other factors, such as the design of the containment and
automatic fire protection features.
H. The intent of cable protection guidance has been clarified. The use of FM Approved cable coatings
as a protection method has been removed.
I. Recommendations related to electric generators have been added.
J. The necessary discharge duration for special extinguishing systems has been clarified.
K. Hybrid (water and inert gas) fire extinguishing systems have been added as options for the protection
of gas turbine compartments.
L. Automatic sprinklers and water spray have been removed as options for the protection of gas turbine
compartments.
M. Information on acceptance testing of special extinguishing systems has been added.
N. The fire protection recommendations for unenclosed turbines have been modified.
O. Additional general information on the design of sprinkler systems has been added, including guidance
on spacing and sprinkler system types.
P. Compressed air foam (CAF) systems have been added as an alternative to emergency drainage and
for supplemental protection of the turbine building.
Q. The intent of an Oil Fire Hazards Assessment has been clarified.
R. A discussion of ignition sources and information regarding which compartments need fire protection
has been added to Section 3, Support for Recommendations.
S. Recommendations for gas turbine fuel train arrangements and combustion safeguards have been
added.
T. Recommendations on how to address hydrogen, ignitable liquid, fuel gas, and sprinkler piping systems
in areas exposed to earthquakes have been added.
U. Recommendations for hose streams to be included in the capacity of drains and containment have
been removed.
2.1 Introduction
Severe fires in gas turbine installations can occur as a result of the accidental release and ignition of fuel
or lubrication, control, or seal oil systems. Such fires can cause forced outages and result in extensive damage
to inadequately protected turbine units and building structures. The safeguards recommended in this data
sheet address gas turbine fire hazards using the following basic prevention and mitigation strategies:
A. Fire prevention incorporated into operating procedures and training
B. Location and construction designed to isolate and limit the fire area
C. Fixed automatic protection in all areas where fires could occur
D. An effective emergency shutdown system for the turbine
E. Personnel preparedness for effective response in fire emergencies
The recommendations in this data sheet are based on conservative assumptions regarding the severity of
the initiating events that could result in turbine fires. The isolation and protection criteria for lubrication oil fires
are intended for large releases, as may occur following mechanical breakdown of equipment. Such releases
have occurred in the past and can potentially occur at any given turbine unit despite the best efforts at
prevention. This data sheet also considers other gas turbine hazards, such as high-pressure gas piping and
potential explosions within gas turbine compartments. Loss experience has shown that the mitigation
measures recommended in this data sheet can help prevent the majority of fire and explosion losses, even
in the case of severe initiating events.
Use FM Approved equipment, materials, and services whenever they are applicable. For a list of products
and services that are FM Approved, see the Approval Guide, an online resource of FM Approvals.
2.2.1 General
2.2.1.1 Locate gas turbines in buildings constructed of noncombustible or fire-resistant materials.
2.2.1.2 Where a new turbine unit is located inside or attached to a main building occupied for another purpose,
such as manufacturing, offices or warehousing, provide 2-hour fire-rated cut-offs and direct access to the
turbine from outside the main building.
2.2.1.3 Provide space separation, fire walls, curbing, and/or emergency drainage to prevent a fire in one
unit from exposing adjacent equipment.
2.2.1.4 Provide ready access for hose streams to fight inlet air-filter fires.
Provide a minimum 0.3 gpm/ft2 (12 mm/min) over the wetted area of the column (“wetted area” is the surface
area on the three sides of the reentrant space formed by the column web and flanges). The wetted area
protected by a sprinkler extends from the sprinkler down to the next sprinkler on the same side of the column.
Include flow from all nozzles on columns subject to simultaneous flame impingement in the design flow rate
when determining total water demand. Use information from an Oil Fire Hazards Assessment to determine
which columns could be subject to simultaneous flame impingement. Consider simultaneous operation of
structural steel protection and turbine lube-oil fire protection to determine total water demand (refer to Section
2.4.4.1.1).
Roof Ventilation
Floor Slope to Drain
Curb Curb System
Floor Drain
Compressor
Turbine
Crane
Generator Exhaust
Combustor
A A
(Note 1)
Curb
AC Compressor
Combustor
Pump Lube oil
DC reservoir
Curb Pump Curb Generator Turbine Exhaust
Approved
Hydraulic
Fluid
High Voltage
Drain
Switchgear
Switchgear
Separator Tank
DC Cable in Elevation View
Conduit
Plan View
Note 1: See Section 2.2.5 for preferred location of lube oil reservoir and pumps.
Fig. 2. Schematic example of emergency drainage and containment system for unenclosed combustion turbine installation
2.2.5.1 Locate lubrication and control-oil systems, including reservoirs, storage tanks, conditioning equipment
(coolers, oil filtration, and centrifuge systems), and pumps in a separate fire area from the turbine. Provide
at least 1-hour fire-rated construction.
2.2.5.2 Locate any indoor main lube-oil storage tanks in a separate cutoff room in accordance with Data
Sheet 7-88, Ignitable Liquid Storage Tanks.
2.2.5.3 Where applicable, make the following provisions for power and control cables for critical functions
such as lubrication of the turbine and power for hydrogen seal-oil pumps:
A. Route the cables to minimize exposure to potential oil fires.
B. Locate control and instrumentation cable for individual units to minimize the chance a fire will result
in an extended outage to multiple units.
C. Provide separate routing for cables for primary and backup lube-oil pumps (see Figure 3).
D. Provide a 1-hour fire-rated, FM Approved fire wrap for cables that cannot be routed separately and
for cables that enter within the same pool or spill-fire area. Provide the fire wrap for 20 ft (6.1 m) beyond
the fire area (see Figure 3). Verify the wrap will not result in cable de-rating.
Unprotected cable
Cable in conduit or
fire wrap
Alternate Routing
20 ft (6.1 m)
2.2.6.5 Where fuel is heated using an organic heat transfer fluid, locate and arrange the system in accordance
with Data Sheet 7-99, Heat Transfer by Organic and Synthetic Fluids.
2.2.6.6 Locate fuel gas compressor stations in open outdoor areas or in detached buildings of damage-limiting
construction in accordance with Data Sheet 1-44, Damage-Limiting Construction, and Data Sheet 7-95,
Compressors. Locate high-pressure gas piping aboveground and arrange it in accordance with American
National Standard B31.1, Power Piping, B31.3, Process Piping Guide, or applicable international standards.
2.2.6.7 Arrange piping systems located in 500-year or less earthquake zones in accordance with Data Sheet
1-2, Earthquakes.
2.2.6.8 Provide emergency fuel shutoff valves where they will be readily accessible in the event of
emergencies.
Bearing Housing
Guard Pipe
To Oil Reservoir
Section A-A
A
Fig. 4. Guard piping
2.2.7.3 Provide unlatched hinged covers for oil tanks associated with hydrogen seal-oil equipment.
2.2.7.4 Earthquake
2.2.7.4.1 In areas exposed by earthquakes, do not install seismic shutoff switches for lube-oil systems. Refer
to Data Sheet 1-11, Fire Following Earthquake, for further information regarding the omission of seismic
shutoff valves.
2.2.7.4.2 Design oil piping systems to resist damage in the event of an earthquake as follows:
A. Limit gross movement of the equipment to which the piping is connected.
B. Provide flexibility to accommodate relatively small movement at equipment, or larger movement due
to piping deflection.
C. Ensure pipe movement does not result in loss of vertical supports.
2.2.10.3 Seal the walls and ceilings of exposed instrumentation and electrical rooms to prevent ingress of
liquid spills and water from sprinkler/hose stream discharge.
2.2.10.4 Locate and arrange transformers in accordance with Data Sheet 5-4, Transformers.
2.3 Occupancy
2.3.1 Housekeeping
Maintain high standards of housekeeping in all areas.
2.3.1.1 Conduct periodic recorded housekeeping inspections.
2.3.1.2 Provide a management reporting channel for prompt correction of housekeeping deficiencies.
2.3.1.3 Store flammable gas cylinders in a detached, dedicated area in accordance with DS 7-50,
Compressed Gases in Cylinders.
2.3.1.4 Store drums of lubricating or hydraulic oils outside of the turbine enclosure and turbine building or
in a cutoff room located and constructed in accordance with DS 7-29, Ignitable Liquid Storage in Portable
Containers.
2.3.1.5 Provide FM Approved cabinets for small containers of ignitable liquids.
2.3.5 Earthquake
In 500-year or less earthquake zones, anchor electrical cabinets and storage racks in accordance with Data
Sheet 1-11, Fire Following Earthquake.
2.4 Protection
Provide the following fire protection for turbine compartments and turbine buildings where fire could result
in significant property damage or loss of production.
C. Interlock the leak detection system to trip the unit and isolate the fuel supply by means of a fast-acting
shutoff valve.
D. Provide high-liquid-level alarms in fuel spill collection tanks.
2.4.1.3 Provide all liquid and gaseous leak-detection devices with electronic supervision and transmit all
alarms to the control room or other constantly attended location.
2.4.1.4 Establish and document the frequency at which detectors are to be recalibrated and tested based
on Data Sheet 5-49, Gas and Vapor Detectors and Analysis Systems, facility experience, and the detector
manufacturer’s recommendations.
2.4.1.5 Design and install leak-detection systems so the controls and all components and devices can be
readily inspected, calibrated, and tested according to the manufacturer’s recommended method and the
frequency established per section 2.4.1.4.
Enclosure
Fuel
Exhaust
Compartment
Enclosure
Lube Oil
Gas
Turbine
Compartment
Air
Intake
Load Compartment
Batteries
Unit 2 Unit 1
A A
Control
MCC
Rm
Transformer
(Protect in Accordance
with D.S. 5-4)
MCC Control
Rm * Note: Automatic sprinkler
Cable Spreading protection may be used
Room as a alternative for
(Protect in Accordance the lube oil enclosure
Section A-A with DS 5-32) and fuel enclosure.
2.4.3.5.1 When a carbon dioxide (CO2) system is provided to protect a turbine compartment, use the following
design criteria:
A. Install the system in accordance with its listing in the Approval Guide, the manufacturer’s instructions,
and Data Sheets 4-0, Special Protection Systems, and 4-11, Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems.
B. Provide sufficient agent to achieve an initial CO2 design concentration of at least 34% by volume within
one minute, and maintain a minimum of 30% for the remainder of the concentration hold time determined
in Section 2.4.3.2, in either the largest single hazard zone or group of hazard zones protected by the
system simultaneously.
C. Locate and orient CO2 discharge nozzles to avoid direct impingement by the discharge jet onto the
gas turbine.
2.4.3.5.2 When an inert gas system is provided to protect a turbine compartment, use the following design
criteria:
A. Install the system in accordance with its listing in the Approval Guide, the manufacturer’s instructions,
and Data Sheets 4-0, Special Protection Systems, and 4-9, Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems.
B. Provide sufficient agent to achieve and maintain a concentration in accordance with the manufacturer’s
recommendations and Data Sheet 4-9, Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems, for the concentration
hold time determined in Section 2.4.3.2, in the largest single hazard zone or group of hazard zones
protected by the system simultaneously.
C. Locate and orient discharge nozzles to avoid direct impingement by the discharge jet onto the gas
turbine.
2.4.3.5.3 When a water mist or hybrid (water and inert gas) system is provided to protect a turbine
compartment, use the following design criteria:
A. Install the system in accordance with its listing in the Approval Guide, the manufacturer’s
recommendations, and Data Sheets 4-0, Special Protection Systems, and 4-2, Water Mist Systems, as
applicable.
B. Ensure all system limitations, such as protected volume size, ventilation rate, and opening size, are
met.
C. Hydraulically design the water mist or hybrid system in accordance with the manufacturer’s
recommendations and the system’s listing in the Approval Guide.
D. Design the water mist or hybrid agent supply to provide discharge to the largest single hazard zone
or group of hazard zones protected by the system simultaneously, for the time specified in Section 2.4.3.2.
E. Locate and orient discharge nozzles in accordance with the manufacturer’s instruction.
2.4.3.6 Conduct a full discharge acceptance test, in accordance with the system manufacturer’s test protocol,
to verify the proper operation of the protection system, including all of the following:
A. Activation of the extinguishing system detectors initiates an automatic emergency trip of the turbine
prior to discharge of the agent.
B. Compartment ventilation shutdown and damper closings occur in the proper sequence prior to discharge
of the agent.
C. An alarm is transmitted to a constantly attended location.
D. The settings for time delays and any selector valves are correct.
E. Specified extinguishing concentrations are achieved and maintained for the entire duration of the
concentration hold time.
F. All discharge nozzles flow free and clear, and the discharge from nozzles relative to any obstructions
in the compartment is in accordance with the manufacturer’s guidelines.
2.4.3.6.1 To accept multiple ″identical″ units on the same site, conduct a full discharge acceptance test on
each unit where fixed protection is needed.
2.4.3.6.2 Do not conduct a “full load” trip test with the turbine at operating temperature.
2.4.3.7 Document the acceptance test procedures and results. Maintain a copy of all documentation on site
and ensure it will be available for future reference.
2.4.3.8 Conduct periodic documented visual inspections to verify compartment tightness and ensure the
proper concentration of the agent can be achieved and maintained according to design.
2.4.3.9 Conduct periodic documented re-validation of installed fire protection systems through full discharge
testing, or simulated discharge plus compartment pressurization testing, at maximum 5-year intervals.
2.4.3.10 Provide a water supply and hose connections for manual firefighting.
Crane
A A
Curb
Curb Curb
Fig. 6. Schematic of fire protection system for unenclosed gas turbine installation
2.4.4.1.4 Provide standard response, high-temperature-rated automatic sprinklers if sprinklers are located
under a solid mezzanine or ceiling. The temperature rating of automatic sprinklers located below grated
mezzanines is not critical.
2.4.4.1.5 Where the distance between the floor and the sprinklers is less than 15 ft (4.5 m), use a minimum
K-factor of 8.0 (115). Where this distance is greater than or equal to 15 ft (4.5 m), use a minimum K-factor
of 11.2 (161).
2.4.4.1.6 Arrange sprinklers on a maximum 100 ft2 (9 m2) spacing.
2.4.4.1.7 Arrange sprinklers with a maximum on-line spacing of 10 ft (0.9 m). A variation of ±1 ft (0.3 m) is
acceptable on either dimension to avoid obstructions by structural elements.
2.4.4.1.8 Where K 25 EC (363 EC) pendent or upright sprinklers are used, install only at the maximum
recommended spacing, as listed in Data Sheet 2-0, Installation Guidelines for Automatic Sprinklers. At this
spacing, treat as a standard response sprinkler.
2.4.4.1.9 Provide FM Approved fire pumps, controllers, and drivers as applicable. Install the equipment in
accordance with the recommendations in Data Sheet 3-7, Fire Protection Pumps.If electric motor-driven
pumps are used, supply power from a source that will not be interrupted in the event of loss of main power
to the facility.
2.4.4.1.10 Arrange fire protection equipment located in areas exposed by earthquakes in accordance with
Data Sheet 2-8, Earthquake Protection for Water-Based Fire Protection Systems.
2.4.4.1.11 Locate automatic deluge and preaction valves and water spray control valves where they can
be manually operated from a safe, easily accessible location during a fire.
2.4.4.1.12 Space detectors for interior deluge systems (either pilot sprinkler, electric, or pneumatic) as follows:
A. Install pilot sprinklers on the same spacing as sprinklers.
B. Install electric or pneumatic devices under smooth ceilings using the spacing requirements listed in
the Approval Guide for the particular model, or as recommended in data sheets that cover the specific
occupancy.
2.4.4.1.13 Space detectors for preaction systems (pilot sprinkler, electric, or pneumatic) as follows:
A. Install electric or pneumatic detectors at a spacing of one-half the listed linear detector spacing, or
the full sprinkler spacing, whichever is greater (e.g., if a detector is FM Approved for 30 ft by 30 ft [9.1
m by 9.1 m] and allowable sprinkler spacing is 100 ft2 [9 m2], then maximum allowable linear detector
spacing is 15 ft by 15 ft [4.6 m by 4.6 m]). For design purposes, treat preaction systems with this detector
spacing the same as wet systems.
1. If a preaction system has a detector spacing greater than the above spacing, consider it a deluge
system for design purposes. Refer to the Approval Guide for the maximum allowable spacing.
B. Install pilot sprinklers on the same spacing as the sprinklers. For design purposes, treat preaction
sprinkler systems that use pilot sprinklers the same as dry systems, regardless of detector spacing.
2.4.4.1.14 Transmit fire alarm, water flow alarms, and pump supervisory signals to an alarm panel in the
control room.
2.4.4.1.15 Provide portable extinguishing equipment as follows:
A. Standpipes in basement, ground floor, and operating floor areas so all areas can be reached by at
least one hose stream.
B. Wheeled dry-chemical and carbon dioxide extinguishers on the operating floor for small fires at bearings.
Noncombustible roof
Noncombustible roof
2.4.4.2.3 Design roof-level sprinklers for a demand area of 5,000 ft2 (465 m2). Design local sprinklers for a
demand area of 5000 ft2 (465 m2) or the limits of the containment, whichever is less.
2.4.4.2.4 Where foam-water sprinklers or compressed air foam (CAF) are used to supplement the automatic
sprinkler protection or as an alternative to providing an emergency drainage system, use the following design
criteria:
A. Install the system in accordance with the manufacturer’s recommendations, the FM Approval listing,
and Data Sheet 4-12, Foam-Water Sprinkler Systems.
B. Where a foam-water sprinkler system is installed, hydraulically design the system in accordance with
Table 1 of this data sheet or the FM Approval listing density, whichever is larger, over the full demand
area.
C. Where a CAF system is installed, design the system in accordance with the manufacturer’s
recommendations and its listing in the Approval Guide, and design the sprinkler system in accordance
with the recommended sprinkler density in this data sheet.
D. Design the foam concentrate supply and air supply, if applicable, to provide the full sprinkler discharge
(use actual discharge based on water supply) plus any hose streams also arranged to provide foam
discharge for the greater of:
1. 20 minutes.
2. The maximum projected time needed to achieve a safe shutdown of the lube-oil system following
emergency trip of the turbine, plus 10 minutes. Determine maximum safe shutdown time based on the
emergency shutdown procedure (see Section 2.6.2).
E. Include an exterior hose stream allowance of 750 gpm (2,840 L/min).
F. Provide containment as recommended in this data sheet.
Table 2. Ceiling Sprinkler Design Criteria for Turbine Buildings with Combustible Roof Construction
Sprinkler Temperature Density Area of Demand
Type of Sprinkler System Rating gpm/ft2 (mm/min) ft2 (m2)
Wet High 0.2 (8) 5000 (465)
Dry 8000 (740)
Hose stream demand: 750 gpm (2840 L/min). Duration: 60 min (water supply duration may need to be increased
when conditions exist that could delay manual firefighting efforts.)
V = Valve
Vent PT = Pressure transmitter
FT = Flow transmitter
V3
PT PT/
FT
Fuel To gas
supply turbine
V1 V2
Fig. 9. Typical gaseous fuel system (double block and vent)
Vent Vent
V = Valve
PT = Pressure transmitter
FT = Flow transmitter
V4 V5
PT/
PT PT FT
Fuel To gas
supply turbine
V1 V2 V3
2.5.2.2.2 Where fuel gas is preheated using steam or feedwater from the balance-of-plant (e.g., in combined
cycle plants), provide a method to detect fuel gas in the water or condensate line, or water in the fuel line
during operation, as applicable. The specific type of leak detection will depend on the design of the heating
system and system parameters such as fuel and water pressure.
2.5.2.2.3 Develop a shutdown procedure to be used to prevent gas migration through the balance of plant
in the event a leak is detected prior to shutting the plant down for maintenance. If leak detection is not installed
per Section 2.5.2.2.2, follow this shutdown procedure for all maintenance shutdowns (i.e., assume a leak
is present whenever a shutdown occurs for the purposes of maintenance activities).
2.5.2.2.4 Prior to performing maintenance on a component(s) that may have had fuel gas collect in it due
to leakage, test the atmosphere inside the component(s) for the presence of fuel gas. Use an FM Approved
flammable vapor indicator to determine if flammable vapors are present, and purge the equipment of vapors
before repairs are made. Route displaced flammable vapors to a safe location. Refer to Data Sheet 7-59,
Inerting and Purging of Equipment, for additional information.
V = Valve
PT = Pressure transmitter
Vent Vent FT = Flow transmitter
DPT = Differential pressure
transmitter
V4 V5
PT/
DPT FT
PT
Fuel To gas
supply turbine
V1 V2 V3
Vent
Air or
inert gas
supply
Fig. 11. Gaseous fuels (triple block, double vent, and pressurized pipe section)
Yes End
1
Building Construction Building and M&E Damage
Type 1 construction Building damage = 50%
M&E damage = 35%
Type 2 construction Building damage = 30%
M&E damage = 10%
Type 3 construction Building damage = 20%
M&E damage = 10%
2
Type 4 construction Building damage = 5%
M&E damage = 10%
Fig. 12. Typical liquid fuel system (double block and drain)
2.5.2.3.4 Install automatic drains (false start drains) in the lower combustor casings and/or exhaust casing
of the gas turbine.
2.5.2.4 Proof-of-Flame
2.5.2.4.1 Provide a flame monitoring system interlocked to close the fuel shutoff valves and trip the gas turbine
in the event of a failure-to-ignite or flameout during operation.
4. During the startup sequence, with airflow passing through the gas turbine, prove the most
downstream shutoff valve (V3) meets the OEM’s leakage criteria. If leakage exceeds the OEM’s criteria,
abort the start.
B. With this configuration, the maximum gas turbine purge credit period allowed is eight days (192 hours).
If a unit purge is performed during the eight-day period, the purge credit is reinitiated for an eight-day
period. Unit purges can be performed as needed to continue to extend the purge credit period provided
the conditions in Section 2.6.5.3.1(A) are satisfied.
2.6.5.3.2 Triple Block, Double Vent, and Pressurized Pipe Configuration
A. Provide the following for a gaseous fuel-fired unit to qualify for purge credit using a triple block, double
vent, and pressurized pipe configuration (Figure 11):
1. During the shutdown sequence, prior to pressurizing the piping between valves V2 and V3, verify
the second shutoff valve (V2) meets the OEM’s leakage criteria.
2. Introduce air or inert gas to create and maintain a pressurized pipe section between the middle and
most downstream shutoff valves (V2 and V3).
3. Continuously monitor fuel gas shutoff and vent valve positions. If continuous monitoring is lost or
any valve deviates from its assigned position, purge credit is lost and a subsequent start of the gas
turbine requires a unit purge prior to light-off.
4. Continuously monitor pressures in the two double block and vent pipe sections. If the continuous
monitoring is lost, or the pressure downstream of the middle shutoff valve falls to within 3 psi (0.2 bar)
of the pressure upstream of this valve, purge credit is lost and subsequent start of the gas turbine
requires a unit purge.
5. During the startup sequence, with airflow passing through the gas turbine, prove the most
downstream shutoff valve (V3) meets the OEM’s leakage criteria. If leakage exceeds the OEM’s criteria,
abort the start.
B. The purge credit period is maintained as long as the conditions in Part A above, Items 2, 3, and 4,
are met. The purge credit period is not limited to eight days.
C. Ensure fuel cannot enter the air or inert gas supply line at any time.
2.6.5.4 Inspect the fuel system in accordance with the OEM’s recommendations. At a minimum, inspect the
fuel system during scheduled dismantle inspections (refer to Data Sheet 13-17, Gas Turbines, for additional
information). As part of this inspection, test fuel shutoff valves for leak tightness.
2.6.5.5 Test automatic drains in the lower combustor casings and/or exhaust casing of the gas turbine annually
to ensure they operate properly.
2.7 Training
2.8.4.2 Provide a method of communication (e.g., cellular phones or radios) for control room operators in
the event normal communication methods are interrupted during a fire. Ensure emergency calls will go to the
public fire service nearest the facility.
2.8.4.3 Prepare schematics to guide responders and indicate the location, contents, emergency access route,
and emergency remote controls for shutting down equipment.
2.8.4.4 Train and authorize designated personnel to be liaisons with the public fire service.
2.8.4.5 Provide the local fire service with sufficient knowledge of turbine fire hazards and response procedures
to aid them in conducting firefighting operations. Document this information in the pre-incident plan with the
local fire service.
2.8.4.6 Where applicable, account for earthquake perils in the emergency response plan according to Data
Sheet 10-2, Emergency Response.
3.1 General
Despite a relatively high flash point, mineral oil used in turbine lubrication and control systems presents a
severe hazard due to the potential for a large quantity of oil to escape and ignite an uncontrolled, high
heat-release fire. A mineral oil release and fire inside a turbine building or compartment can create significant
exposures to critical equipment, production, and the building itself. Fire scenarios can include a spray fire,
a spill fire, a pool fire, or combinations of these events. The most effective means of limiting damage from
oil fires is to quickly shut down the affected oil system. Control-oil systems can usually be shut down quickly,
but lubricating-oil shutdown while the turbine is running will likely cause additional equipment damage. Fire
protection efforts recommended in this data sheet include the following:
A. A comprehensive program to prevent accidental oil releases.
B. An effective emergency shutdown procedure.
C. A combination of active and passive protection features that include construction, curbing, emergency
drainage, automatic fire protection, structural steel protection, spray hoods, barriers, and spray fire shields.
The key goals of any fire protection scheme are to shut down the fuel supply as quickly as possible, control
where the released oil flows, and use automatic sprinkler protection to provide cooling and possible
extinguishment of burning pools of oil. This combination of protection elements is used to limit the extent
of damage. Turbine buildings contain high values per unit of floor area. Loss of generating capability can result
in substantial loss of business income.
Automatic sprinkler discharge may help limit damage to the building structure and prevent involvement of
other combustibles, but the spray fire will not be extinguished and may open an excessive number of
sprinklers unless the oil discharge is cut off promptly.
By fitting FM Approved spray fire shields over oil piping flanges, the spray fire hazard at the flange can be
reduced to a localized spill and pool fire that can be controlled by local automatic sprinkler protection, curbing,
and emergency drainage for the area of the release. FM Approved spray fire shields are subjected to a
45-minute hydrocarbon fire, during which they have demonstrated the ability to maintain their structural
integrity and limit the release of oil to within a 5 ft (1.5 m) radius from the centerline of the shield.
Fig. 14. Mineral oil spray fire (90 psig [6 barg]) demonstration test performed by FM Global
Some so-called “fire-resistant fluids” will burn very intensely when released and ignited as a spray or aerosol.
FM Approved industrial fluids, which are listed in the Approval Guide, are tested to demonstrate a limited
heat release rate and inability to stabilize a spray flame, and therefore do not in and of themselves require
fire protection measures.
Involving facility personnel in a team-based approach to the OFHA will help to further their understanding
of the hazards and the critical role operators play in oil-fire protection. Equally important, these personnel can
provide detailed knowledge of oil systems, main equipment layouts, and building features that will help
develop realistic fire scenarios.
There is no single prescribed format or method for conducting a hazards assessment. The following is an
outline of one possible approach to an OFHA, where the end-product of the assessment is a document that
includes a narrative describing the oil system; schematics, drawings, and pictures describing the oil system;
design-basis fire scenarios; and safeguards that are or will be in effect.
A. Basic Design Documentation
1. Compile a description of each mineral-oil system, including (a) oil quantity or reservoir capacity, (b) pump
flow and pressure, (c) piping diagrams, and (d) piping schematics and drawings.
2. Describe the design details of existing or proposed emergency drainage and containment features for
controlling oil releases. Supplement this description with architectural, civil, structural, and equipment
arrangement drawings of the facility as needed to support the development of spill scenarios that include the
likely flow path(s) of the released oil.
3. Extract design information from these drawings and prepare working schematics to facilitate the analysis
and discussion of the fire hazards associated with the oil systems.
4. For existing installations, prepare a set of current photographs of the equipment and oil piping in a
‘‘walk-down’’ format. For both proposed and existing installations, computer-generated isometric views of the
power plant in relation to the oil systems also can be prepared to facilitate visualization of the scenarios.
The existing design drawings may provide this information.
5. Describe the normal and emergency shutdown procedure for each oil system in a narrative format, including
the timing and sequencing of the shutdown. List the designated personnel who can authorize and execute
the shutdown. Include a description of the design measures that would allow the operators to remain in the
control room to respond during fire emergencies (separate building, room under positive pressure, etc.).
6. Describe the design details for fixed fire protection systems, such as automatic sprinklers, gaseous
extinguishing agents, foam, water mist, and hybrid systems.
7. Describe fire protection for high-value, critical equipment and areas (e.g., control rooms, cable spreading
and instrumentation rooms, cable trays, switchgear, etc.) that may be directly impacted by an oil fire or
exposed to nonthermal damage.
B. Determine Oil-Release Scenarios
1. Using the compiled information and the prepared schematics, conduct a table-top review of each oil system,
identifying the potential oil-release sources. Mechanical breakdown and on-line maintenance of oil systems
may lead to the release of oil.
2. Consider alternative release points for each mineral oil system.
3. For each release source, obtain the pressure and flow rate and determine the type of fire (e.g., pool fire,
spray fire).
4. Loss experience indicates the size of the release is difficult to predict. Estimate the potential release size
and resulting fire duration based on the reservoir capacity and inherent limits on oil release (approximately
2⁄3 to 3⁄4 of tank capacity).
5. Determine the likely flow path(s), starting from the source and ending at the drains, a curbed area within
or outside of the turbine compartment, or other low points.
6. Conduct a physical walk-down and revise the release scenario as needed.
7. Document the release scenarios and identify the credible worst cases in terms of size, flow rate, and flow
path taken by the released oil.
8. Estimate the release duration based on the emergency shutdown plan and in the event emergency
shutdown procedures are not followed (due to unforeseen difficulties that may occur in any fire situation).
C. Determine Oil-Fire Scenarios
1. Assuming ignition will occur, assess the potential fire damage to critical equipment and the building based
on the release mode, duration, quantity, and flow path of the oil. Take into account the mitigating effects of
fixed fire protection systems, drainage, and containment.
2. Conduct a walk-down of the fire area and revise the fire scenario as needed.
3. Document the fire scenarios and identify worst case scenarios (see Figure 15 for suggested format).
Location of Leak
Oil System
Flow Rate
Pressure
Fire Type
(Spray, 3-D, Pool)
Emergency Shutdown
Assign follow-up responsibility for improvements in prevention and mitigation of oil fires.
F. Training and Loss Prevention Programs
1. Use the images, schematics, and findings of the OFHA to train operators and maintenance personnel in
the hazards of oil fires, as well as emergency response procedures.
2. Ensure oil-fire awareness training is conducted on an ongoing basis for all employees and reflects the
hazard as determined by the OFHA.
3. Incorporate findings into operating and maintenance procedures where appropriate to reduce errors that
could result in oil release.
G. Audits and Management of Change
Implement a management of change process for oil systems and safeguards to be certain no changes occur
that could increase the severity or consequence of an oil fire.
flow is not expected to reduce internal equipment damage, and shutdown of lube-oil pumps is recommended.
A fire chief may order lube-oil pumps shut off to prevent severe structural damage or reduce life safety
concerns.
Operators need emergency procedures that will allow proper action in the event a rapid shutdown is
necessary. Consult the turbine manufacturer to determine the speed below which oil pumps can be shut off
without causing significant damage to the equipment. In the interim, the heat release rate may be reduced
by switching from AC lube-oil pumps to the lower pressure and flow of the DC lube-oil pump.
Providing operators with an emergency response procedure and training them in its implementation is
essential. The action an operator takes in the early stages of a fire is critical. Operators also need a safe
area in which to perform their necessary actions. In many fires operators have been forced out of the control
room by smoke and heat within minutes after the start of the fire. A room outside the turbine building is best.
If the control room is in the turbine building it should be of fire-resistant construction, with penetrations sealed
and an independent air supply available to pressurize the room and prevent smoke entry.
Finally, consider the difficulty in tracking the progress of the fire due to smoke limiting visibility. Operators
may not know if the fire is controlled. Consider the use of thermal imaging cameras.
2. To test V2 during the startup sequence, close the vent valve (V3) and open V1.
3. Close V1.
4. Monitor the pipe section between the shutoff valves (V1 and V2) for a pressure decrease. The
allowable pressure decrease should be within the OEM’s acceptance criteria. Typically, a pressure
decrease of more than 10 psi (0.7 bar) in 30 seconds is considered excessive.
5. Since valve V1 was proved leak-tight during the preceding shutdown, failure of this test indicates
that a failure or leak in downstream shutoff valve V2 may have occurred. Leakage could also have been
through vent valve V3.
3.5.2.2 The following is an example of a valve-proving system for a gas turbine with gaseous fuel systems
as shown in Figure 10 and 11:
A. Valve V2 leakage test (test sequence during shutdown):
1. Gas vent valves (V4 and V5) are opened, and the three fuel shutoff valves (V1, V2, and V3) are
closed when the fuel system control logic shuts off the fuel.
2. To test V2, close both vent valves (V4 and V5) and open V1.
3. Monitor the pipe section between the middle and most downstream shutoff valves (V2 and V3) for
a pressure increase. The allowable pressure decrease should be within the OEM’s acceptance criteria.
Typically, a pressure increase of more than 10 psi (0.7 bar) in 30 seconds is considered excessive.
4. Failure of this test indicates that a failure or leak in the middle shutoff valve (V2) has occurred.
B. Valve V3 leakage test (test sequence during startup):
1. Prior to any startup sequence, both gas vent valves (V4 and V5) are open, and the three fuel shutoff
valves (V1, V2, and V3) are closed.
2. To test V3 during the startup sequence, close both vent valves (V4 and V5) and open V1 and V2.
3. Close V1 and V2 and open V4.
4. Monitor the pipe section between the middle and most downstream shutoff valves (V2 and V3) for
a pressure decrease. The allowable pressure decrease should be within the OEM’s acceptance
criteria. Typically, a pressure decrease of more than 10 psi (0.7 bar) in 30 seconds is considered
excessive.
5. Failure of this test indicates that a failure or leak in the most downstream shutoff valve (V3) may
have occurred. Leakage could also have been through vent valve V5.
4.0 REFERENCES
4.1 FM Global
Data Sheet 1-11, Fire Following Earthquake
Data Sheet 1-21, Fire Resistance of Building Assemblies
Data Sheet 1-29, Roof Securement and Above Deck Roof Components
Data Sheet 1-44, Damage Limiting Construction
Data Sheet 2-0, Installation Guidelines for Automatic Sprinklers
Data Sheet 2-81 Fire Protection System Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance
Data Sheet 3-7, Fire Protection Pumps
Data Sheet 4-0, Special Protection Systems
Data Sheet 4-1, Fixed Water Spray Systems for Fire Protection
Data Sheet 4-2, Water Mist Systems
Data Sheet 4-9, Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems
Data Sheet 4-11, Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems
Data Sheet 4-14, Foam-Water Sprinkler Systems
Data Sheet 5-4, Transformers
Data Sheet 5-23, Emergency and Standby Power Systems
Data Sheet 5-31, Cables and Bus Bars
Data Sheet 5-32, Data Centers and Related Facilities
4.2 Other
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME). Power Piping. ASME B31.1.
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME). Process Piping Guide. ASME B31.3.
FM Approved Industrial Fluid: A lubricant or hydraulic fluid that has demonstrated a limited heat release rate
and an inability to stabilize a spray flame when tested according to FM Approvals Standard 6930, Approval
Standard for Flammability Classification of Industrial Fluids. FM Approved industrial fluids do not in and of
themselves require fire protection measures.
Foam-Water Sprinkler System: A foam-water sprinkler system consists of a closed or open head sprinkler
system that is connected to a low-expansion foam concentrate proportioning system designed to deliver a
fixed foam concentration. The major advantage to installing a foam system is that it can be added to an
existing sprinkler system. Closed and open head foam-water sprinkler systems are described in Data Sheet
4-12, Foam-Water Sprinkler Systems.
Gas turbine installation: The arrangement of a gas turbine and its driven machine (usually an electric
generator or compressor) in a facility. The installation is usually understood to include a lubrication system
for the machinery bearings, a hydraulic system for certain control and protective functions, liquid fuel and
gaseous fuel conditioning and delivery systems, a fire protection system, switchgear and a control room.
The air intake and filter, including silencer and air cooling system, and the exhaust duct and silencer, are part
of the installation.
Hybrid (Water and Inert Gas) System:med A special protection system that delivers a combination of water
and an inert gas (consisting of one or more of the gases helium, neon, argon, nitrogen, and carbon dioxide)
through a distribution system. Both the water and the inert gas are critical factors in fire extinguishment, for
the purposes of cooling and inerting.
Ignitable Liquid: Any liquid or liquid mixture that will burn. A liquid will burn if it has a measurable fire point.
Ignitable liquids include flammable liquids, combustible liquids, inflammable liquids, or any other term for
a liquid that will burn.
Industrial (frame) Gas Turbine:med Any gas turbine manufactured solely for use in industry. The larger
machines are referred to as “heavy-duty gas turbines” and the smaller units as “packaged gas turbines.”
Inert gas: An extinguishing agent constituted of the inert gases argon, nitrogen, helium or neon. A blended
agent may also include carbon dioxide.
Internal Fire or Explosion: A fire occurring inside one of the major components of the turbine usually due to
fuel accumulations. Fuel may accumulate due to fuel leakage past shutoff valves, delay in shutdown following
loss of flame, failure of a casing drain, or an inadequate purge. The fire or explosion occurs within the turbine,
compressor or exhaust system.
Lagging: The term ‘‘lagging’’ refers to a covering or enclosure of some kind designed to shield the hot section
of a gas turbine from external factors, such as other equipment, water discharge, or simply the environment,
and to keep personnel from accidental contact with the hot section while the turbine is operating. Lagging
consists of insulating blankets around the casing. The insulation is usually metal covered.
Proof of Closure Switch: A device that provides feedback that a piece of equipment is in the closed position.
Purge Credit: A condition that is established by maintaining a set of parameters following a gas turbine normal
shutdown that allows the gas turbine to restart without going through a unit purge.
Rundown Time: Following a trip of the turbine, the period during which the unit is coasting down from its
operating speed to a shutdown condition (typically, once the equipment has been placed on turning gear).
Lubrication oil may continue to be supplied to the equipment during this period.
Safe Shutdown: Following the emergency response team’s assessment of the fire event, a decision to initiate
a prompt shutdown of the equipment. Rotating equipment is considered “shut down” when it has reached
a speed where the lubrication oil system can be turned off without damaging the equipment. Typically, this
is achieved once the equipment has been placed on turning gear. Safe shutdown must be accomplished
based on an evaluation of the site specific oil system design, the turbine manufacturer’s emergency
shutdown system, and emergency response procedures.
Skid: A structural steel base on which a gas turbine and/or its auxiliary components are mounted. It may
be enclosed or unenclosed.
Spray Barrier: A metal barrier located between a spray source and critical equipment serving to deflect a
horizontal spray.
Spray Fire Shield: A device placed around the flanges of pressurized piping systems, used to prevent highly
pressurized jets of fluid. The shield is designed to prevent a spray fire from developing by converting a highly
pressured spray into a low pressure, low momentum flow of liquid which can be controlled by a properly
designed sprinkler system.
Spray Fire Source: Any unguarded flange, fitting, or control device that provides containment for pressurized
combustible oil at a high pressure and is connected to a reservoir. Length of the jet flame is determined by
pump capacity and assumed pressure and orifice size for the leak.
Spray Hood: A horizontally mounted barrier located above a spray source serving to deflect a vertical spray.
Total Flooding System: A fire extinguishing system that relies on filling an enclosure with an extinguishing
agent, and maintaining the extinguishing concentration within the enclosure until the fire is extinguished and
conditions will not permit reignition. Inert gas and carbon dioxide extinguishing systems are total flooding
systems.
Unenclosed installation: A gas turbine installation, usually in a large building and possibly part of a multiple
installation, without individual enclosures for any of its auxiliaries or components.
Unit Purge: A flow of air through the gas turbine and its exhaust system at a rate and duration for a sufficient
number of volume changes to occur to remove any flammable vapors and replace them with the air.
Water Mist: A special protection system in which a distribution system is connected to a water supply that
is capable of delivering atomized water spray with droplets that are less than 1,000 microns in size. The
smaller droplets vaporize and extract heat more rapidly from flames, and are able to extinguish spray fires.
P. Compressed air foam (CAF) systems have been added as an alternative to emergency drainage and
for supplemental protection of the turbine building.
Q. The intent of an Oil Fire Hazards Assessment has been clarified.
R. A discussion of ignition sources and information regarding which compartments need fire protection
has been added to Section 3, Support for Recommendations.
S. Recommendations for gas turbine fuel train arrangements and combustion safeguards have been
added.
T. Recommendations on how to address hydrogen, ignitable liquid, fuel gas, and sprinkler piping systems
in areas exposed to earthquakes have been added.
U. Recommendations for hose streams to be included in the capacity of drains and containment have
been removed.
September 2010. Minor editorial changes were made for this revision.
May 2010. Minor editorial changes were done for this revision.
January 2008. The following changes have been made:
Design criteria for turbine building sprinkler systems have been revised.
Emergency drainage and containment design criteria have been revised to account for potential fire scenarios
where more than 10 minutes of sprinkler and hose stream discharge is expected.
A recommendation has been added to provide FM Approved flange shields and deflectors to help mitigate
exposures from oil spray fires.
The design extinguishing period for special extinguishing systems protecting turbine compartments has been
revised. Refer to sections 2.4.3.2 and 3.3.2.3.
May 2000. The following changes were made:
1. The recommendation for excess flow valves as an alternate form of protection to fixed fire protection has
been removed. Excess flow valves function if the flow exceeds 110% of the rated flow. There have been
large losses in which oil or fuel leakage from a flange or a fitting has been substantially less than the rated
flow. Excess flow valves may be of benefit in installations such as engine test cells where the frequency
of a catastrophic event is substantially higher than in production machines.
2. A requirement for a full discharge trip test has been included for gaseous agent extinguishing systems.
In addition an inspection program for doors and damper intended to seal openings is recommended. The
causes of previous extinguishing system failures are reported. Also the results of a recent survey of loss
prevention engineers specializing in fire protection for utilities indicate that the reliability of these systems is
substantially improved when full discharge trip tests are conducted.
3. Protection of one set of control and power cable for ac and dc lube oil pumps is recommended.
4. Fixed fire protection system agent supply should be 10 min or the rundown time of the turbine for enclosed
turbines whichever is greater. Local application system agent supply should be 20 min or the rundown time
of the turbine whichever is greater.
5. Automatic sprinkler or water spray protection is recommended as an alternate form of protection providing
the system is arranged to prevent water discharging onto the turbine casing.
6. An annual test frequency is recommended for automatic drains in combustor casings.
7. Descriptions of tests and losses involving automatic sprinkler protection have been revised and examples
of the need to functionally test gaseous agent systems have been added.
The September 1998 revision recommended:
• The use of excess flow check valves in lubrication, hydraulic and liquid-fuel systems.
• Fine-water spray (FWS) extinguishing systems
• The use of less flammable lubricants and hydraulic fluids