Kpolleh et al v RL

Treason
William Gabriel Kpolleh and others were charged, indicted, tried and convicted by the 1st Judicial
Circuit Court for treason and sentenced to ten (10) years of imprisonment. They appealed. One
of their contentions is that the trial judge committed a reversible error when in selecting the
jurors as judges of the fact to proceed in their room of deliberation, he wrongfully selected the
first and fifth jurors so qualified out of a total of fifteen (15) subpoena to serve as alternates
rather than the last three so qualified as required by law. This irregular and prejudicial act on the
part of the trial judge, they say, warrants the reversal of the judgment entered against the
appellants in the proceeding in its entirety. The state contended that the trial judge did not
commit any reversible error when jurors Catherine Merchant and George Lansanna were named
as alternates and discharged from the panel prior to the jury retiring into their room of
deliberation, as this act of the court was discretionary and did not prejudice the interest of the
appellants nor was any harm done to them.
Issue:
Whether or not a harmless error committed by a judge in a criminal proceedings in the selecting
the 1st and 5th jurors as alternate jurors instead of the last three jurors as required by statute,
constitutes a reversible error to serve as a basis for an appellate court in ordering a new trial.
Holding: No
Rule:
It is harmless error where the first and fifth juror of a panel are being selected as alternate
jurors, and same does not invalidate the panel.
Reasoning:
The jury is to be drawn in the manner prescribed by the statutes which are usually discretionary.
In other words, the provisions of the statute ordinarily are construed as directory, unless a
contrary intent is manifested, and should be liberally construed. Statutorily, provisions as to
material matters designed to secure a fair and impartial trial are mandatory especially in criminal
cases and must be substantially complied with. It is also provided by law, the most important
requirement is that the panel shall be drawn and not arbitrarily selected and any act on the part
of the clerk or any other officer infringing on this requirement is ground for challenge to the
array; and where the jury is drawn and selected in strict accordance with a valid statute, the
selection cannot be said to be arbitrary. The argument of appellants' counsel not being that the
jurors were drawn by unauthorized persons or officers of court rather that the alternate jurors
were irregularly drawn. The fact that the first and fifth jurors were selected as alternates does
not invalidate the panel. From our view point, this was a more procedural technicality, which is
not fatal. It is a harmless error which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties in this
case. It should therefore be disregarded, in keeping with the provisions of our statute which
states: No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in
any ruling or order in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties is ground for
granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise
disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court
inconsistent with substantial justice. The Court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard
any error which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. Civil Procedure Law, Rev.
Code 1:1.5.
Decision: Reversed and remanded for new trial.
Note: 15 jurors are empanelled as grand jury. 12 will sit on the panel as petit jurors. Error made
in empanelling of jury is not a ground for new trial.
Netty-Blanquett v RL et al
Motion to return seized property and to suppress evidence

The National Security Agency (NSA) applied to the Monrovia City Court for a warrant of search and
seizure for the express purpose of finding stolen items or "diverted relief items" which
they described to include: "lap tops, computers and other relief materials" The search
warrant commanded the Magistrate Police to "search from 6:00a.m.-6:00p.m. the
home of Mrs. Cece Blanquette, wife of Mr. Peter Blanquette, a German National
heading the operations of the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), which said premises
are located on the Cece Beach, located in Virginia for the purpose of finding relief items
diverted.
Aggrieved by the search and seizure of properties, and citing jurisdictional grounds, defendant
filed a motion before the stipendiary magistrate praying the court to return the seized properties
and to suppress evidence. The motion essentially contended that the Monrovia City Court
was without jurisdiction to carry out and execute a warrant of search and seizure in
Banjor, township of Virginia in the face of existence of Brewerville Magisterial Court,
Montserrado County. For refusal to granted movant (Cecee) motion, the City Court Judge was
taken on summary by movant at Criminal Court C where he was mandated to dispose of the
jurisdictional issue. The City Court determined that it lacked jurisdiction and ruled that the seized
items should be forwarded to Brewerville Magisterial Court instead of returning the property from
where they were seized. For the second time, the Judge was taken on summary at Criminal Court
C where the previous ruling of Judge Ware was set aside by Judge Kontoe and instructed the Judge
of the City Court to resume jurisdiction over the matter and determine ownership to the seized
items.
Issue:

Whether or not a an appellate court is justified in granting movant’s motion to return properties
seized as a result of a search and seizure warrant issued by a court lacking jurisdiction which does
not meet the statutory requirement of specificity and particularity .

Holding: Yes

Rule:
Where want of jurisdiction over the cause appears upon the records, it may be taken advantage
of by a plea in abatement or objection made to the jurisdiction at any stage of the proceedings;
for any act of a court beyond the jurisdiction conferred upon it by law is null and void.
Reasoning:
For hoary with age in this jurisdiction has been that: Where judicial tribunals have no jurisdiction
of the subject matter on which they assume to act, their proceedings are absolutely void in the
strictest sense of the term; a court will recognize want of jurisdiction over the subject matter even
if no objection is made. Therefore, whenever a want of jurisdiction is suggested, by the court's
examination of the case or otherwise, it is the duty of the court to consider it, for if the court is
without jurisdiction, it is powerless to act in the case

Decision: Reversed.

Williams v RL
Motion to dismiss appeal
Defendant John Williams took appeal from a judgment rendered against him for s certain criminal offense
at the 4th Judicial Circuit in Maryland County. At the call of this case, the State filed motion to dismiss the
appeal on ground that the notice of appeal certified in the record from the court below, did not show
that it had been served by the sheriff in keeping with statute, since the return of the sheriff was not made
to appear as required by law. Appellant contends that the notice of appeal was indeed returned by
the sheriff but that the record of the said returns were omitted by the clerk in copying the
records for transmission to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the omission from the records of a return of the notice of appeal is
sufficient to justify an appellate court in granting appellee’s motion to dismiss appellant appeal.

Holding: Yes

Rule:

As important as the other jurisdictional steps necessary to the completion of an appeal might be
service of the notice of appeal is most important because without it the appellate court is
without jurisdiction over one of the parties, and so would be unable to render judgment against
him should the case be decided in favor of the other party.

Reasoning:
The omission from the records of a return to the notice of appeal is a material error, and is ground
for dismissal of the appeal. Unless the appellee is notified by the proper ministerial officer that he
should appear and defend his interest in the appellate court, he will have been deprived of
fundamental rights should the court render judgment against him, since the appellate court would
be without jurisdiction over his person. It would be unfair, therefore, to hear an appeal, where
both parties were not properly under our jurisdiction.
Decision: Appeal dismissed.
Note: Double jeopardy is being tried twice for the same offence.

R.L. v. Anderson
Action: Motion to dismiss appeal

Defendant Anderson was convicted for a certain criminal offense at the 1st Judicial Circuit; he then
appealed to the Supreme Court. At the call of the case, the State informed the court that it had
filed a motion to dismiss appellant’s appeal. The State’s motion to dismiss did not specify the
mistake, omission, defect or irregularity upon which the motion was based or in other words, the
State did not state facts sufficient to invoke the statute. The motion was then denied.

Issue:

Whether or not failure of a moving party for the dismissal of an appeal to state facts sufficient to
invoke the statute, constitutes a sufficient ground to for the denial of said motion.

Holding: Yes

Rule:

If the mistake, omission, defect or irregularity upon which a motion is based is not specified in
the moving papers, such ground cannot be urged upon the motion, and in the absence of other
valid grounds, the motion will be denied.
Reasoning:

A motion to dismiss should be precise and certain so that the court may determine just what
relief the moving party seeks, and it is no hardship to require of litigants substantial conformity
to such a rule.

Decision: Motion denied.

Yancy et al v. R.L

MOTION FOR RECUSATION OF THREE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT

Yancy and others were charged, indicted, tried and convicted for murder at the 4th Judicial Circuit in
Maryland. During the trial in the circuit court, one of the appellants applied for a writ of certiorari on two
occasions: one for refusal of the circuit judge to admit him to bail and the other for refusal of the circuit
judge to grant him continuance. The chamber Justice denied both petitions. At the call of the case on
appeal, the appellants moved for the recusation of three of the justices based on the "rulings" of the two
Justices in chamber which appellants contended disqualified them from hearing and determining the
appeal from the conviction.

Issue: whether or not a chamber justice’s refusal to issue an alternative writ on a petition for certiorari is
by itself sufficient to disqualify him from participating in hearing any appeal growing out of said case,
absent showing of proper legal reason by the requesting party such that an appellate court is justified in
denying appellants’ motion for recusation.

Holding: Yes

Rule:

Refusal by a Justice in chambers to issue an alternative writ on a petition for certiorari is not by itself a
ground for disqualifying him from participating in the hearing of an appeal in the case out of which the
petition grew.

Reasoning:

Neither of the two petitions for certiorari denied by the two Justices had the merits of the case been
involved, and that therefore questions which would confront them in deciding the appeal from the
conviction would be considered afresh and that they were in no sense barred from a fair and just
determination of these new issues.

Decision: Motion for recusation denied.

RL v Kenneh
Motion to intervene
Kenneh sued Lofa County Agricultural Development Project in damages and got judgment at the
Tenth Judicial Circuit in Lofa. Defendant appealed. While the appeal was pending, the Republic of
Liberia, through the Ministry of Justice, filed before the Supreme Court a motion to intervene in
the action.
Issue: whether or not application for a motion to intervene not made before the
commencement of trial or before judgment is rendered, but filed in the Supreme Court while a
case is pending for hearing on appeal is timely to justify an appellate court in granting said
motion.
Holding: No
Rule:
An application to intervene must be timely made, meaning that the application must be made in
the trial court before commencement of the trial and before judgment is rendered, and not in
the Supreme Court where the case is pending on appeal.
Reasoning:

While the statute does not provide for a time in which intervention must be made, any
unreasonable delay or lashes serve to defeat the right to intervene. Also, the motion to intervene
should have been filed before the commencement of trial and rendition of judgment, not before
the Supreme Court while the case was pending for hearing on appeal. Accordingly, the court would
not entertain any attempt to circumvent the intent of the Legislature by construing the law
otherwise.

Decision: motion to intervene denied.

Freeman v RL
Assault and battery with intent to kill
Freeman was arrested from his home and brought to court for disobeying a court’s order. He was
ordered by the Magistrate to sit on the prisoner bench but he refused. Freeman, an NBI officer
drew his gun and pointed it at the magistrate when the court officers on order of the Magistrate
tried to force him to sit on the bench. During a scuffle with the court officers, his weapon
discharged and inflicted wounds on one of the officers. He was indicted for assault and battery
with intent to kill, tried, convicted by a jury, and sentenced to prison for five years. Defendant
appealed. His main contention was the lack of criminal intent, since he bore no actual malice
against the persons involved.
Issue:
Whether or not a law enforcement officer is justified in drawing his gun in a court in anger because
he is offended by some act of the judge, absent any imminent physical danger of death to this
person.

Holding: No
Rule:
Only when legitimate necessity arises, and in case of imminent physical danger to themselves or
their charges, might the use of a gun legally issued to a security officer be justified.

Reasoning:
The legal issuance of deadly weapons to security officers, and their right to carry such weapons,
does not justify their promiscuous, illegal, and unwarranted use of them. Only when legitimate
necessity arises, and in cases of imminent physical danger to themselves or their charges, might
the use of a government-issued gun to a security officer be justified, or be lawful. To use their
weapons otherwise is an abuse of the authority given to peace officers to carry weapons.

Decision: Affirmed.

If you have 10 days to file your responsive pleadings, holidays and Sundays are included in the
computation of time; when the last day of your filing falls on Sunday, you are permitted to file on
Monday. If the time is less than 10 days, Sundays and holidays are excluded from the computation
of time. A criminal prosecution may be commenced with a police charge sheet or by direct
complaint to the magistrate.

Williams et al v. R.L.

Action: Murder

Hans Williams and his wife Mardia were charged with murder for the death of Angel Togba who was
discovered hanging by a rope in the bathroom at the residence of Appellants. The Appellants subsequently
rushed her to JFK, where she was pronounced dead upon arrival. A medical report issued by Dr. Williamina
Jallah of the JFK Hospital on November 30, 2007, states, among other things, that Angel Togbah's hymen
was not intact; that bruises were seen on the left and right side of the neck and under the chin; that there
was slight bruise around the rectal area and that there was evidence of past sexual intercourse or trauma
to the vagina and neck. The medical report, however, failed to state how these conditions occurred or by
whom. Appellants were convicted and they appealed.

Issue:

Whether or not the conflicting medical examination reports presented by the state to establish the exact
cause of Angel Togba’s death were sufficient to overcome defendant’s presumption of innocence beyond
a reasonable.

Holding: No

Rule:

Article 21(h) of the Liberian Constitution (1986) provides: "In all criminal cases, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. And Chapter 2 Section 2.1 of
our Criminal Procedure Law provides that a defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent
until the contrary is proved; and in cases of a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown,
he is entitled to an acquittal.

Reasoning:

Presumption of innocence is a constitutional and statutory right guaranteed to all criminal defendants.
Thus, any doubt as to their guilt entitles said defendant to acquittal.

Decision: reversed.

Bestman v RL
Action: Theft of property
Bestman and Arinette were involve in a public fight in which Arinette accused Bestman of stealing
her Sony Ericson phone worth $ 275. Arintette took the matter to the police, an investigation was
conduction and the police charged Bestman with theft of property and send the parties to the
Monrovia City magisterial court. The magistrate forwarded the case to Criminal Court C where
defendant was convicted. Defendant appealed arguing that: the state failed to establish her guilt
beyond reasonable doubts in that: private prosecutrix described the phone in issue as silver and
black while the State second witness describe same as gray. That the date on the proforma
invoice was different from the date private prosecutirx said her husband gave her the phone.
Issue:
Whether or not conflicts in the description of the allegedly missing phone and failure of the state
to clearly establish private prosecutrix ownership of the phone fell short of overcoming
defendant’s presumption of innocence to entitle her to acquittal.
Holding: Yes
Rule:

Article 21(h) of the Liberian Constitution (1986) provides: "In all criminal cases, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. And Chapter 2 Section 2.1 of
our Criminal Procedure Law provides that a defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent
until the contrary is proved; and in cases of a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown,
he is entitled to an acquittal.

Reasoning:

Presumption of innocence is a constitutional and statutory right guaranteed to all criminal defendants.
Thus, any doubt as to their guilt entitles said defendant to acquittal.

Decision: Reversed.
Note: the grand jury’s function is to find probable cause or sufficient evidence to charge the
defendant; find out whether the complaint is valid but not to establish guilt. It’s on the grand
jury’s true bill that the county attorney will prepare the indictment. A bill of ignoramus means
the jury doesn’t believe the defendant should be charged or prosecuted. The presumption of
innocence remains with the defendant throughout the trial while the burden of proof remains
on the prosecution throughout the case.

Davies v Kontoe et al
Action: Theft of property
Davies and others were charged, indicted, tried, and convicted for theft of property
in the amount of US$205,000.00 from LBDI by criminal court C. Defendant was
sentenced to five years of imprisonment and ordered to restitute the amount
charged in the indictment (US$205,000.00)
Issue:
Whether or not the unrefuted and corroborated testimonies of state witnesses as
to the involvement of appellant in the illegal transfers of money to their accounts,
established a prima facie case for the state to overcome appellant’s presumption
of innocence and prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Holding: Yes
Rule:
Prima facie evidence of fact is in law sufficient to establish a fact, unless rebutted.
Reasoning:

The appellant and his expert witness in their testimonies said nothing to refute the
very serious and key damning testimonies made against the appellant by state
witness.
Decision: Affirmed.
Note:

Prima facie evidence is that which, either alone or aided by other facts presumed from those
established by the evidence, shows the existence of the fact it is adduced to prove, unless
overcome by counter evidence; evidence which, unexplained or un-contradicted, is sufficient to
maintain the proposition affirmed. Prima facie evidence is sufficient to support a verdict in favor
of the party by whom it is introduced where no controverting evidence is introduced by the
adverse party.
Darpul et al., v Judge Williams et al
Action: Murder
Wilson Darpul and others were charged, indicted, tried and convicted for murder
in the River Gee Circuit court for the death of one Abdulayee Jalloh Bah. Defendants
were arrested and subjected to criminal investigation and made to sign voluntary
statement of confession without the benefit of legal counsel. Defendants appealed
contending that their Miranda Rights were violated. The records of the court
showed that state prosecutors provided contradictory testimonies regarding
defendants Miranda rights being accorded them; also, defence counsel application
in open court requesting for continuance in order to have the opportunity to confer
with their clients was denied by the trial judge giving that all efforts to make contact
with the accused up to the commencement of the of the trial had proven futile.
Issue:
Whether or not violation of a criminal defendant’s Miranda rights constitutes
denial of his constitutional right to free and impartial trial as to justify an appellate
court in setting aside the conviction.
Holding: Yes
Rule:
Every person suspected or accused of committing a crime shall be entitled to
counsel at every stage of the investigation and shall have the right not to be
interrogated except in the presence of counsel. Any admission or other statements
made by the accused in the absence of such counsel shall be deemed inadmissible
in a court of law. Article 21 (c) of the Liberian Constitution (1986).
Reasoning:
In all criminal trials, an essential element for determining whether the defendant
was accorded fair and impartial trial is competent legal representation. But in the
case at bar, the defence lawyers demonstrated monstrous incompetence in their
legal representation of the appellants in these proceedings. While the records
reveal that counsel informed the trial judge that they had not been able to confer
with their clients [the appellants] to enable them to mount the necessary defense,
a claim not refuted by prosecution, Judge Williams' denial of defense request for
continuance, under those circumstances, effectively deprived the
appellants/defendants of adequate legal representation, to which they were
constitutionally entitled in Liberia. Every suspect/accused is entitled to a lawyer at,
and during every stage in criminal inquiry. The preservation of this right by state
security and prosecution personnel is mandatory. By its expression, the Liberian
Constitution has safeguarded the right of the accused person to an attorney at
every stage in a criminal investigation. It is a duty under the Liberian Constitution,
not police discretion.
Decision: REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED.
Note:
The term due process of law, when applied to judicial proceedings means that there
must be a competent tribunal to pass on the subject matter; notice actual or
constructive, an opportunity to appear and produce evidence, to be heard in
person or by counsel, and if the subject-matter involves a determination of the
personal liability of defendant he must be brought within the jurisdiction by service
of process within the state, or by his voluntary appearance. And there must be a
course of legal proceedings according to those rules and principles which have been
established by our jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of private
rights.
The magistrate must inform every criminal defendant that he has a right to bail, to
preliminary hearing etc.
Fallah v RL
Rape.
Fallah was charged and indicted by the first Judicial Circuit for the crime of rape. The
indictment charged that defendant had sexual intercourse with on Ruth, a nine-year old
girl by penetrating her vagina with his penis which caused her to bleed profusely. Due to
defendant’s inability to obtain counsel, the state provided him one. At trial, one of the
state witnesses (Ruth’s mother) testified that defendant and his relatives offered her
money to forget the rape case. Defendant and his two witness said nothing in their
testimonies to counter this incriminating allegation from the state witness. The court
records showed that the original counsel for defendant was absent from court that day
and the trial judge appointed a new counsel for the defendant. This new counsel who was
not given a reasonable time to consult with the defendant in order to familiarize himself
with the case so he did not pose any question to defendant on the direct examination as a
"refresher" for defendant to comment on the serious allegation that he and his relatives
gave money to the victim's mother so that she would forget about the case. Also, the two
ladies who testified for the defendant testimonies have no direct bearing on the cause.
Defendant was convicted and he appealed contending that he was inadequately
represented by his assigned counsel.
Issue:
Whether or not absence of an assigned counsel representing a criminal defendant who
pled informa pauperis, from the crucial stage of the trial and the subsequent appointment
of a total stranger to represent such criminal defendant, who failed to pose any question
to defendant on the direct examination as a refresher for defendant to comment on any
serious allegations made by the state witnesses, constitute gross inadequate legal
representation to justify the Supreme Court in reversal the conviction.
Issue: Whether or not inadequate representation is a violation a criminal defendant’s
constitutional right. Or Whether or not adequate representation is a necessity for the
Supreme Court to affirm the conviction of a criminal defendant. No evidence in criminal
matter is evidence unless it is corroborated.
Holding: Yes
Rule:
Where a criminal proceeding is conducted informa pauperis, and counsel is assigned by
the court to represent that defendant, the court should assign the most competent
available counsel particularly in cases of capital offenses.
Reasoning:
Counsellor Mabande, a counsel not of record and a total stranger to the case was not in
the position to provide adequate and competent representation to the Appellant as the
law requires, and this, no doubt, affected the Appellant's trial; thus, the lack of adequate
legal representation for the Appellant deprives the Supreme Court of knowing whether
or not the Appellant has any evidence of his own to rebut, repel or contradict the
evidence of the State.
Decision: reversed and remanded for new trial.

Rogers v. R.L
Rogers was charged, indicted, tried and convicted for the crime of rape at the 1st
Judicial Circuit. The indictment charged that defendant kidnapped and kept Jacob
and her 11 years of old sister mother Korhorn for 2 months and forcibly had sexual
intercourse with Mother Korhorn, which caused her to bleed profusely. At the call
of the case the appellant informed the court that he did not have a lawyer because
he was financially unable to retain legal counsel and that he desired to have a legal
counsel assigned to represent him. The trial court assigned the County Defense
Counsel of Montserrado County, Counsellor Elijah T. Cheapoo to represent the
defendant. The court record showed that at trial, defence counsel did ensure the
appearance of any of the subpoena witness to testified for the defendant thus,
leaving defendant lone testimony which is insufficient to establish his innocence as
the only testimony on the records of the case. Also, defence counsel that ensure
that Evee, whom appellant had testified that she was the one who saw the two
children coming and called his attention to testify; the Adviser of Kabar Town whom
the appellant said he took the children whenever they went to spend time with him
to testify; the father of the victim to testify; the mother of the victim to testify when
her testimony would have cleared the doubt whether or not she sent her children
to the appellant and whether or not she visited the home of the appellant while the
children were there; Mother Kohorn's brother who is said to have been in the room
when she was allegedly raped by the appellant to testify when his testimony would
have clearly established who reported the rape matter to the police. Defendant
appealed contending inadequate legal representation of counsel.
Issue:
Whether or not failure of the assigned counsel representing an indigent criminal
defendant to ensure the appearance of other witnesses to testify for said defendant
such that their testimonies may corroborate defendant’s testimony to rebut proof
of his guilt, constitutes inadequate legal representation to justify Supreme Court’s
reversal of the conviction.
Holding: Yes
Rule:
Where a criminal proceeding is conducted informa pauperis, and counsel is assigned by
the court to represent that defendant, the court should assign the most competent
available counsel particularly in cases of capital offenses.
Reasoning:
Knowing that the testimonies of other witnesses were necessary to corroborate the
appellant, since the controlling law in our jurisdiction is that the uncorroborated
testimony of the accused person is not sufficient to rebut proof of guilt, the defense
counsel for the appellant knew, or ought to have known that the lone testimony of
the appellant was not sufficient to establish his innocence. Also, defence counsel did
not object to the illegal evidence admitted against his client. Thus, his failure to have
ensured that other witness appear to testify for the appellant was a serious
dereliction of duty amounting to gross inadequate legal representation of counsel.
Decision: reversed and remanded for new trial.
Darpul et al., v Judge Williams et al
Action: Murder
Wilson Darpul and others were charged, indicted, tried and convicted for murder
in the River Gee Circuit court for the death of one Abdulayee Jalloh Bah. Defendants
were arrested and subjected to criminal investigation and made to sign voluntary
statement of confession without the benefit of legal counsel. Defendants appealed
contending that their Miranda Rights were violated. The records of the court
showed that state prosecutors provided contradictory testimonies regarding
defendants Miranda rights being accorded them; also, defence counsel application
in open court requesting for continuance in order to have the opportunity to confer
with their clients was denied by the trial judge giving that all efforts to make contact
with the accused up to the commencement of the of the trial had proven futile.
Issue:
Whether or not denial of defence counsel for a criminal defendant motion for
continuance to confer with such a defendant, constitutes a depravation of the
defendant’s constitutional right to adequate legal representation as to justify an
appellate court in setting aside the conviction.
Holding: Yes
Rule:
Every person suspected or accused of committing a crime shall be entitled to
counsel at every stage of the investigation and shall have the right not to be
interrogated except in the presence of counsel. Any admission or other statements
made by the accused in the absence of such counsel shall be deemed inadmissible
in a court of law. Article 21 (c) of the Liberian Constitution (1986).
Reasoning:
In all criminal trials, an essential element for determining whether the defendant
was accorded fair and impartial trial is competent legal representation. But in the
case at bar, the defence lawyers demonstrated monstrous incompetence in their
legal representation of the appellants in these proceedings. While the records
reveal that counsel informed the trial judge that they had not been able to confer
with their clients [the appellants] to enable them to mount the necessary defense,
a claim not refuted by prosecution, Judge Williams' denial of defense request for
continuance, under those circumstances, effectively deprived the
appellants/defendants of adequate legal representation, to which they were
constitutionally entitled in Liberia. Every suspect/accused is entitled to a lawyer at,
and during every stage in criminal inquiry. The preservation of this right by state
security and prosecution personnel is mandatory. By its expression, the Liberian
Constitution has safeguarded the right of the accused person to an attorney at
every stage in a criminal investigation. It is a duty under the Liberian Constitution,
not police discretion.
Decision: REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED.

Mayango v Quaqua

Action: Rape

Mayango, aged 47, was arrested and charged with rape for forcibly having sex with
Pinky Dennis, a 14 year girl. He was indicted and arraigned in the absence of
counsel. While in court and in the absence of a lawyer, defendant entered a not
guilty plea stating his lack of confidence in the public defence team to represent his
legal interest and requesting for seven days to obtain a counsel of his choice
through the assistance of his Uncle. Without any information as to whether or not
defendant has secured his counsel, the court appointed Mr. Elijah Y. Cheapoo to
represent defendant. At the time the court was admitting evidence, defendant
chose to remain silent. The defense counsel included other facts and evidence in
his legal memorandum which could have properly been adduced during the time
of admission of evidence. At the close of the trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict
against defendant and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. Defendant appealed
contending that the trial judge erred when he arraigned the defendant in the
absence of counsel either of his choice or by court appointment pursuant to Article
21 (h) of the Liberia Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the arraignment of a criminal defendant in the absence of a counsel
constitutes a violation of the defendant’s constitutional right to adequate legal
representation as to justify the Supreme Court in reversing said defendant’s
conviction.
Holding: Yes
Rule: Article 21 (h) of the constitution: states: "No person shall be held to answer
for a capital or infamous crime except in cases of impeachment, cases arising in the
Armed Forces and petty offenses, unless upon indictment by a Grand Jury; and in all
such cases, the accused shall have the right to a speedy, public and impartial trial by
a jury of the vicinity, unless such person shall, with appropriate understanding,
expressly waive the right to a jury trial. In all criminal cases, the accused shall have
the right to be represented by counsel of his choice, to confront witnesses against
him and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. He shall
not be compelled to furnish evidence against himself and he shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. No person shall be
subject to double jeopardy. (i) The right to counsel and the rights of counsel shall be
inviolable. There shall be no interference with the lawyer-client relationship. In all
trials, hearings, interrogatories and other proceedings where a person is accused of
a criminal offense, the accused shall have the right to counsel of his choice; and
where the accused is unable to secure such representation, the Republic shall make
available legal aid services to ensure the protection of his rights.
Reasoning:
We are of the opinion that the defendant was not adequately and effectively
represented. An ineffective representation is tantamount to no representation and
in the absence of representation for a defendant in a criminal case there can be no
fair trial however straight forward the prosecution's case might be. We cannot
therefore in good conscience uphold this judgment. It is a good thing for criminals
to be brought to justice and the victim vindicated. But it is a bad thing when the
defendant has been poorly and ineffectively counseled or represented during trial.
Decision: Reversed and remanded.
Mayango v Quaqua

Note:

At the stage of drawing up of the indictment by the grand jury, defendant should not be
represented; only the prosecution is represented. Arraignment is a procedure to ascertain
whether a defendant is guilty (joining issue).
Action: Rape

Mayango, aged 47, was arrested and charged with rape for forcibly having sex with
Pinky Dennis, a 14 year girl. He was indicted and arraigned in the absence of counsel.
At trial, defendant made an application to the court to remain silent; meaning to not
testify or produce any evidence in his behalf and the court granted this request.
Defendant was brought down guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment. He
appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not a criminal defendant has the right to remain silent in line with our
constitution.
Holding: Yes
Rule:
Article 21(c) of the constitution of Liberia states: Every person suspected or accused
of committing a crime shall immediately upon arrest be informed in detail of the
charges, of the right to remain silent and of the fact that any statement he makes
could be used against him in a court of law.
Reasoning:
The state has the burden of proving the guilty of the defendant beyond a reasonable
doubt and this burden remains with it throughout the trial; thus, the defendant is
has the right not to testify.
Decision: Reversed and remanded.
Appleton v RL
Action: Malfeasance
Defendant was charged, indicted, tried, and convicted for malfeasance. The
indictment alleged that defendant in his capacity as County Inspector of Maryland,
wrote the Justice of the Peace (Neufville) for Maryland County authorizing him to
cooperate with one Mr. Sunday Collins to stop some Mandingoe people who were
entering Liberia through the Ivorian border with prohibited drugs and elephant tusks
and returning to Ivory coast with rifles in they purchased from Liberia in great
quantities without permits. At trial, defendant chose not to take the witness stance
and testify; this led to one of the State Counsels in person of Cllr. Yancy in making
this inflammatory remark “you would be fools to bring a verdict of not guilty in favor
of a defendant, when the defendant has not taken the stand to tell you that he did
not commit the offense." The trial judge did not inform the jury not to draw any
inference of guilt from the defendant’s refusal to testify in his own behalf in his
charge to the jury. The jury brought a guilty verdict and defendant appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not failure of a trial judge in his charge to the jury to instruct them not
to draw any inference of guilt from a criminal defendant’s refusal to testify
constitutes a violation of said defendant’s constitutional right to remain silent.
Holding: Yes.
Rule:
Criminal Procedure Law Code 2:2.4 states: an accused has a privilege not to be
called as a witness and not to testify, and no inference should arise from his failure
to testify.
Reasoning:
Counsellor Yancy's remarks tended to mislead the jury with respect to the inference
to be drawn when a defendant in a criminal trial does not take the stand. The judge
should have instructed the jury to disregard these remarks.
Decision: Reversed.
WRIGHT v. REEVES
Action: Murder
Wright was charged, indicted, tried, and convicted for murder at the 5th Judicial
Circuit in Grand Cape Mount County. The judge, his honor Brathwait suasponte and
set the jury’s verdict aside and granted defendant a new trial. Upon the assignment
of a new circuit judge, Reeves, the case was assigned for a new trial, the defendant
moved for release and discharge on the principle of double jeopardy. On denial of
the motion, defendant excepted to the ruling and applied for a writ of certiorari to
the Justice in chambers, who forwarded it for decision by the bench en banc. The
respondents contend that thanking the trial judge for ordering a new trial amounted
to a waiver by the petitioner of his constitutional right not to be twice put in
jeopardy, and therefore the petitioner is estopped from repudiating the action of
the judge to which he had impliedly consented. Defendant’s petition for certiorari
was granted and he was released and discharged from be tried twice.
Issue:
Whether or not absent manifest necessity, the trial of a defendant twice for the
same offense constitutes a violation of the defendant’s right not be subjected to
double jeopardy as provided by our constitution.
Holding: Yes
Rule:
The doctrine of double jeopardy prevents an accused person who is put to trial
before a jury from being tried again on the same charge, and this is so even though
no verdict of guilt or innocence has been returned.
Reasoning:
It further held that a new trial on the same charge would under the circumstances
have violated defendant's right against double jeopardy.
Decision: Reversed.
Lumel et al v Swope

Action: Theft of property

Lumel and others were charged with theft of property during the February, A.D.
1999 term of Criminal Court C presided over by Judge Yussif D. Kaba; defendants
were arraigned and they pleaded not guilty. However, no jury was empanelled to
try the case as Judge Kaba could not continue with the matter because his term
had expired. When Judge Timothy Z. Swope took over Court "C" during the May
term, A.D. 1999, defendants, through their lawyer, filed a motion to be released
and discharged from further answering to the charge of theft of property on the
ground of double jeopardy. They contended that they were tried during the
February, A.D. 1999 term of the court presided over by Judge Kaba, and that the
trial was not concluded due to no act attributable to them, therefore, they should
not be twice put in jeopardy of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Judge
Swope denied the motion; defendants then filed a petition before Associate Justice
Elwood L. Jangaba, then presiding in chambers, praying for the issuance of the writ
of certiorari to correct what they considered "the erroneous ruling" made by Judge
Swope denying their motion to release and discharge them from further answering
to the charge of theft of property on the ground of double jeopardy. Associate
Justice Jangaba refused to issue the alternative writ of certiorari and ordered the
trial court to resume jurisdiction over the case and proceed in keeping with law.
Judge Timothy Z. Swope again presided over the May, 2000 term of Criminal Court
"C" and assigned the matter for trial. During the trial, three (3) jurors were
discharged from sitting on the case due to illness leaving only (12) twelve jurors
(just a bare quorum) to try the case. Both the State and defense (defendant)
lawyers agreed to proceed with the twelve (12) jurors. The forelady of the jury took
sick and was accompanied for treatment by the sheriff; defense counsel filed a
motion for the discharge of the forelady on the ground that she has been tampered
with. Judge Swope granted the motion, discharging the forelady from
participating in the matter, thereby reducing the number of jurors sitting on the
case to eleven (11). When the matter could not be proceeded with further
because eleven jurors, under our law, cannot sit on a jury case, the lawyer
representing defendants filed a motion praying the trial court to release and
discharge the defendants from further answering to the charge of theft of
property, again, on the ground of double jeopardy. Judge Swope denied the
motion; whereupon defendants filed another petition for the writ of certiorari,
this time before Associate Justice M. Wilkins Wright presiding in chambers, who
ordered the alternative writ of certiorari issued. Associate Justice Karmo Soko
Sackor, Sr. who succeeded Associate Justice Wright in chambers assigned the
case, heard argument pro et con and made ruling on November 19, 2002. He
denied and dismissed the alternative writ of certiorari and refused the issuance
of the peremptory writ of certiorari. Justice Sackor held that double jeopardy
would not lie because the termination of the case was due to "manifest
necessity. Defendant appealed to the full bench of the Supreme Court
Issue:
Whether or not double jeopardy will lie where a case is terminated due to
manifest necessity.
Holding: No
Rule:
While Article 21 (h) of the Constitution of the Republic of Liberia provides that No
person shall be subject to double jeopardy, Section 3.1 of the Criminal Procedure
Law of Liberia prescribes the confines within which double jeopardy may apply. It
states: the doctrine of double jeopardy shall be applicable to all criminal
prosecutions. Jeopardy attaches when a person has been placed on trial before a
Court of competent Jurisdiction under a valid indictment or a complaint upon which
he has been arraigned and to which he has pleaded, and a proper jury has been
empanelled and sworn to try the issue raised by the plea or, if the case is properly
being tried by a court without a jury, after the court has begun to hear evidence
thereon. Termination of the trial thereafter by the court because of manifest
necessity, however, shall not bar another prosecution for the offense set forth in
the indictment or complaint.
Reasoning:
The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellants’ contention that during the
February, 1999 term of the trial court when Judge Kaba did not conclude trial of
the case, they were placed in jeopardy because, the records do not show that a jury
was empanelled to try the case, as Judge Kaba's assignment over the trial court had
expired. It is trite law in this jurisdiction that a judge whose assignment over a court
has expired has no authority to preside over and decide a case in that court. So,
where a case is terminated for reason that the trial judge's assignment has expired,
this amounts to manifest necessity, a condition beyond the control of the parties,
which does not bar subsequent trial of the matter; thus, when a juror is released,
relieved and discharged from jury service as was done in the case of the forelady in
the matter before us, it amounts to manifest necessity; and where manifest
necessity is a ground for terminating a case, the defendant will face subsequent
trial for the same offense.
Decision:
The ruling of Associate Justice Karmo Soko Sackor, which confirmed the ruling of
Judge Timothy Z. Swope, denying the writ of certiorari, from which an appeal was
taken to the full bench of this Court, is hereby confirmed. The alternative writ of
certiorari is ordered quashed, and the peremptory writ denied.

Notes: (manifest necessity is something that neither the judge nor any
of the parties has control over).
We see from the quoted statute that while our Constitution gives everyone the
right not to be subjected to double jeopardy, that right is not without a limit. In
other words, not every termination of a case by court without concluding a trial
amounts to double jeopardy. As the statute clearly states, for jeopardy to attach,
there must be a valid indictment, if the case is being tried by a jury as in the case
before us; the defendant must be arraigned; he/she must enter a plea; and a proper
jury must be empanelled and sworn to try the issue(s) raised by the plea. In our
opinion, all of these requirements must be met before jeopardy can attach. And
even where all of these prerequisites are present, the statute says that when the
case is terminated by a court due to "manifest necessity," this does not prevent the
defendant from subsequent trial(s).What constitutes manifest necessity may vary
from case to case, depending on the facts and circumstances. In the case before us,
the lawyer representing the appellants contended that during the February, 1999
term of the trial court when Judge Kaba did not conclude trial of the case, the
appellants were placed in jeopardy. We do not agree, because, the records do not
show that a jury was empanelled to try the case, as Judge Kaba's assignment over
the trial court had expired. It is trite law in this jurisdiction that a judge whose
assignment over a court has expired has no authority to preside over and decide a
case in that court. So, where a case is terminated for reason that the trial judge's
assignment has expired, this amounts to manifest necessity, a condition beyond
the control of the parties, which does not bar subsequent trial of the matter. The
Supreme Court held "... the double jeopardy statute permits termination of trial by
court because of manifest necessity. In that event, such termination does not bar
subsequent prosecution. Manifest necessity, to put it simply, relates to
circumstances over which the court has no control, for example, illness of jurors,
judge, defendant or any person whose presence and participation is indispensable
to a fair and impartial trial; expiration of the term; inability of a jury to agree; and
separation of the jury. If discharge of a jury in a criminal case is grounded upon
manifest necessity duly established by court, a new trial may properly be ordered."
This Court has held that: "It is double jeopardy for a defendant in a criminal
prosecution to be retried, after a competent panel of jurors at the first trial was
reduced below the minimum number needed to return a verdict by the
court without the defendant's assent. No appeal can be taken from the refusal of a
chambers justice to issue an alternative writ in any remedial matter. Therefore,
Associate Justice Jangaba having laid to rest, the allegation that Judge Kaba's failure
to proceed with the case amounted to double jeopardy, the same allegation should
not have been contained in another petition for certiorari which was filed before
Associate Justice M. Wilkins Wright. The law is that "A jury for the trial of a criminal
action shall be composed of twelve persons with the qualification specified in the
Judiciary Law and entitled to the exemptions provided in that title." Section
19.1,1LCL Revised, Criminal Procedure Law. The writ of certiorari will lie to review
and correct an intermediate order, or interlocutory judgment of the lower court.
But where the lower court was not wrong in its intermediate order or interlocutory
judgment, as in this case, the writ will not be granted.
Koffa v RL
Action: Murder
The defendant Koffa was tried and convicted by the petit jury of the Fourth Judicial
Circuit Court, Maryland County, for the crime of murder. The indictment charged
that the defendant had deliberately and with premeditation and malice
aforethought shot and killed one Peter Davis. Upon a motion for a new trial filed
by the defendant, the trial judge reversed the verdict and awarded the defendant
a new trial. However, before the new trial could be held, the prosecution moved
the trial court to dismiss the indictment upon which the defendant had been
originally tried, stating as the ground therefor that there was insufficient evidence
to obtain a conviction. The prosecution, however, reserved the right to file a new
indictment. The motion was granted and the case was dismissed. Shortly
thereafter, a new indictment was brought against the defendant for the crime of
murder in regard to the same incident and he was again accordingly arrested. The
defendant thereupon filed a motion requesting the court to discharge him, stating
as the basis therefor that the new indictment brought against him was tantamount
to subjecting him to double jeopardy. The motion was denied, the defendant
arraigned and a trial conducted. Following a trial, the jury returned a unanimous
verdict of guilty of murder against the defendant for murder. A motion for a new
trial filed by the defendant was denied and judgment rendered sentencing the
defendant to life imprisonment. Defendant appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not dismissal of the first indictment at any time before the jury is
impaneled or the court has begun to hear evidence, with the prosecution reserving
the right to re-file a new indictment, placed defendant in double jeopardy.
Holding: No
Rule:
The dismissal of an indictment or complaint under Criminal Procedure law section
18.1(The prosecuting attorney may by leave of court file a dismissal of an
indictment or complaint or of a count contained therein as to either all or some of
the defendants. The prosecution shall thereupon terminate to the extent indicated
in the dismissal) or 18.2 (Unless good cause is shown, a court shall dismiss a
complaint against a defendant who is not indicted by the end of the next
succeeding term after his arrest for an indictable offense or his appearance in court
in response to a summons or notice to appear charging him with such an offense.
Unless good cause is shown, a court shall dismiss an indictment if the defendant is
not tried during the next succeeding term after the finding of the indictment. A
court shall dismiss a complaint charging a defendant with an offense triable by a
magistrate or justice of the peace if trial is not commenced in court in response to
a summons or notice to appear) done at any time before the jury is impaneled or
sworn, or if the case is to be tried by the court, before the court has begun to hear
evidence, shall not constitute a bar under the provisions of section 3.1 to a
subsequent prosecution. Criminal Procedure Law, Rev. Code 2:18.3.
Reasoning:
The statute granted the prosecution the right, by leave of court, to file a dismissal
of its complaint or indictment as to any or all defendants charged with an offense
and to thereby terminate the prosecution of the said defendants. The Court
observed that the statute also provided that a dismissal by the prosecution of the
first complaint or indictment did not however constitute a bar to bringing a new
complaint or indictment with regard to any and all of the such defendants for the
same offense charged in the original complaint or indictment, if the dismissal of the
first complaint or indictment was done before the jury was empanelled (if the case
was to be tried by a jury) or before the court had begun to hear evidence (if the
case was to be tried by the court without a jury). In such instances, the Court said,
double jeopardy would not obtain. The Court noted that in the present case, a jury
had not been empanelled when the prosecution filed for a dismissal of the
indictment. Hence, it said, the defendant could not contend that he had been
subjected to double jeopardy.
Decision: Claim of double jeopardy denied.
Note: the issue must be based on the contentions of the party; look at the rule of
law to frame your issue. In double jeopardy cases, look for manifest necessity.
Logan v RL
Action: Murder
Defendant Logan was indicted for Murder at the 1st Judicial Circuit. The indictment
charged him with fatally shooting and killing Criminal Investigation Division
Captain, Winston Deshield to prevent decedent from exposing his dealing in anti-
breeze United States currency notes. At the call of the case, a nolle prosequi was
entered by the prosecution with reservation to re-indict defendant. A second
indictment was subsequently brought against the defendant accordingly, and upon
which he was tried, convicted and sentenced to death by hanging. Defendant
appealed contending that he had been subjected to double jeopardy when the
prosecution entered a nolle prosequi and subsequently had him re-indicted for the
same crime of murder.
Issue:
Whether or not the termination of a case due to a nolle prosequi entered by the
prosecution with reservation to subsequently re-indict defendant, placed
defendant in double jeopardy.
Holding: No
Rule:
The dismissal of an indictment or complaint under section 18.1 or 18.2 may be done
any time before the jury is empaneled and sworn, or, if the case is to be tried by
the court without a jury, before the court has begun to hear evidence, and such
dismissal shall not constitute a bar to a subsequent prosecution. Civil Procedure
Law, Rev. Code 2: 18.3.
Reasoning:
The statute vests in the State the right to withdraw or dismiss an indictment against
a defendant prior to the empaneling and swearing in of a jury or, where the case is
to be tried by a court without a jury, prior to the hearing of evidence; thus, once
these elements are met, double jeopardy does not attach. Therefore, the quashing
of the indictment was not equivalent to an acquittal and that the defendant was
therefore properly re-indicted and tried for the offence which had been stated in
the quashed indictment.
Decision: claim of double jeopardy denied.

Gbenyena v RL
Action: Murder
Defendant Gbenyena was indicted for murder at the 1st Judicial Circuit. At the call
of the case, he filed motion change of venue, stating impossibility to obtain a fair
and impartial trial due to local prejudice as a ground. The motion was denied by
the trial judge. The case proceed to trial and defendant was brought down guilty
and sentenced to death. Defending appealed contending that the trial judge
committed a reversible error when he overruled his application for a change of
venue due to local prejudice.
Issue:
Whether or not refusal of a judge to grant defendants’ motion for change of
venue on the ground that a fair trial would be impossible on account of local
prejudice, constitutes a violation of the defendant’s right to fair and impartial trial
Holding: Yes
Rule:
Where a defendant in a criminal case involving a felony swears that he fears that
because of local prejudice, he will be unable to obtain justice, our statutes makes
it mandatory that a change of venue be granted.
Reasoning:
In criminal prosecutions, the right of the accused to a change of venue upon the
ground of inability to obtain a fair trial in the county where the indictment is found,
or because of local prejudice and excitement is universally recognized. It is a
fundamental principle of our law that every person charged with crime shall have
a right to a fair and impartial trial and while it is generally presumed that a
defendant can obtain a fair and impartial trial in the county where the offense with
which he is charged was committed, when he can show that because of local
excitement or prejudice against him in the county where the indictment is found,
he will be unable to obtain a fair trial there, he is entitled to have the venue
changed to another county; thus, the rulings of the trial judge on appellant's
application for change of venue was a reversible error, since the ruling of the judge
on the issue denied appellant a fair and impartial trial.
Decision: Reversed and defendant discharged.
Note:
Legal authorities have also held in general that: Venue statutes ... now very
generally permit changes of venue or place of trial from the county in which an
action is properly brought, to another county, where such changes are necessary
in order to promote the ends of justice by getting rid of local prejudices, which
might be supposed to operate detrimentally to the rights or interests of a party
litigant if the case is tried in the county of the venue, or where the convenience of
the parties may be served by changing the place of trial. Statutes also in the many
cases permit changes of venue to the proper county, when action is instituted in
the wrong county. Such laws are liberally construed, so as to render possible
attainment of their objects. Statues permitting changes of venue upon grounds of
inability to fair and impartial trials are to guarantee the litigants right to fair trial,
and an application thereafter is to be granted when it is supported and proved and
is seasonably filed. An application for a change of venue addressed to the
discretion of the trial judge does not mean that he may act arbitrarily in the matter.
His discretion is judicial in character, a sound discretion guided by law, and his
ruling is therefore subject to review by an appellate court, and will be reversed
where an abuse of discretion plainly appears.
Toe v RL
Action: Murder
Appellant was charged with the murder of a female Peace Corps volunteer for whom he
worked at the Circuit Court in Nimba. He was tried and convicted. Defendant filed a motion
for a new trial which was granted by Judge Malobe. At the February 1972 Term of the
court, presiding Judge Roderick N. Lewis called the case for trial. He was informed that
defendant had filed a motion for change of venue which had been resisted by the State.
The court heard arguments on the motion, after which it entered a ruling denying it. The
trial was held and again a verdict of "guilty" was brought in by the jury; appellant appealed
contending that the trial judge erred by denial of his motion for a change of venue when
he informed the court that upon his oath he believed that he could not obtain a fair and
impartial trial in Nimba County because of existing local prejudice. Appellant further
contends that a new trial means a trial de novo and, therefore, the right to change of venue
exists when a new trial has been awarded. The State contended that appellant had waived
his right to change of venue for local prejudice when he failed to exercise that right at the
first trial, and actually took part in it.
Issue:
Whether or not the right of a criminal defendant to change of venue due to local
prejudice is exercisable after a trial has been regularly conducted and a new trial
awarded.
Holding: No
Rule:
A motion for change of venue has to be made when the case is first called for trial, and
not after the trial has been properly conducted. Criminal Procedure Law Section 5.7.2
Reasoning:
The courts have variously held that a motion for change of venue comes too late when
made after judgment has been rendered, after the issues in a case have been tried and
verdict found, after a verdict and while a motion for a new trial is pending, or after the
court has heard and decided the case. Therefore, when appellant neglected to ask for a
change of venue before the case was first called or before he was arraigned at the first
trial, he waived his right in this respect. Thus, to permit him to move for a change of venue
after trial would in effect allow a new trial, without regard to the results of the first and
thus a suit could be indefinitely protracted. Taking into consideration all the facts and
circumstances attending this case, we cannot escape the conviction that the application
made for change of venue was not only untimely, but was made for the purpose of
obstructing and delaying justice.
Decision: Affirmed.
Note:
It would seem reasonable, or better still logical, to say that the benefit of a change of
venue upon an indictment because of local prejudice should be made at the initial stage
of the trial, that is to say, when the case is first called for trial and not after a trial has
been regularly conducted and a new trial awarded. To introduce such a procedure in our
opinion affects the spirit and intent of the statute with regards to change of venue in
criminal cases." We think the ruling of the trial judge is logical and sound. It must not be
forgotten that a new trial is not on a new indictment; it is new only insofar as the judge
and trial jury are concerned; the principal evidence is more or less the same. This is more
so when the change of venue is applied for merely on the point of local prejudice.
The right of a party to a change of venue may be waived by his acts, as by invoking
affirmative action of the court inconsistent therewith. Dependent on variant statutes as
to the time when an application for a change of venue should be made and the
conditions under which it may be granted, a party's right to a change of venue may be
waived by acts of participation in the proceedings. It is ordinarily for the trial court to
determine from all the attending facts and circumstances whether the motion was made
within reasonable time after the case was at issue upon the facts, but in view of the fact
that there is a tendency to make use of the privilege of change of venue to obstruct and
delay the progress of litigation, courts have felt impelled to lay down certain rules as to
the appropriate time for seeking a change. An application for change of venue should
ordinarily be made before a cause proceeds to trial, and is usually considered to come
too late when made after the case has been tried. The statutory provisions governing the
application for a change of venue sometimes impel this conclusion. Where a reasonable
previous notice of the application is provided for, the only fair deduction to be made
from that provision is that the notice must precede the commencement of the trial.
Accordingly, it has been held that an application for a change is not timely and comes too
late if made after the trial of the case has begun and the jurors are being examined as to
their qualifications to sit in the case.

Saar v RL
Action: Murder
Defendant Saar was indicted for the crime of murder at the Tenth Judicial Circuit, Lofa
County. He was tried and convicted; so he filed a motion for new trial and same was
granted. When the case was called for the second trial, defendant appeared in person
without counsel, and asked the court for a change of venue. The court, denied the
application on the ground that the motion should have been filed under oath prior to the
calling of the case. The defendant was duly tried, convicted, and sentenced to death by
hanging. Defendant appealed contending that the denial of his motion for a change of
venue was a gross violation of his legal rights vouchsafed to him by the Constitution and
statutory laws of the Republic of Liberia.
Issue:
Whether or not failure of a criminal defendant charged with capital offense to file a
motion for change of venue sworn to by him before the call of his case, is sufficient to
justify a judge in denying the motion when subsequently filed in statutory time.
Holding: No
Rule:
In keeping with statute, one accused or charged with the commission of a capital offense
should not be deprived of his legal right to a change of venue, simply because he did not
file a written motion along with an affidavit, sworn and subscribed to by him while he is
in jail.
Reasoning:

The provisions of the statute with respect to change of venue are mandatory and not
discretionary on the part of the judge or court. It should thus not be regarded as a
privilege but a right to be enjoyed by the accused.
Decision: Reversed.
RL v Bailey et al
Action: Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

Appellants were indicted for murder at the fifth Judicial Circuit in Cape Mount; they
moved for change of venue to Montserrado County, Criminal Court B and it was
granted. At the call of the case in Court B, the State filed a motion for withdrawal
of the indictment with reservation but it was denied, with the trial judge holding
that the withdrawal could only be effected by the prosecuting attorney in the
county in which the co-respondents were indicted (Cape Mount), and that to
permit the withdrawal would be prejudicial to the co-respondents (appellants). The
State filed a petition for certiorari seeking review of the trial judge’s denial of its
motion to withdraw the indictment against appellants with reservation. In their
returns to the petition for certiorari, the respondents (appellants) contended that
only the trial judge, who is merely a nominal party to the proceedings, was named
in the petition and served with precepts, and that in any event, the trial judge did
not err in denying the prosecution's application to withdraw the indictment.

Issue:

Whether or not a change of venue vests in the prosecuting attorney of the county
to which a case is transferred the authority to continue prosecution of the case.

Holding: Yes

Rule:

When a change of venue is granted and a transfer of the case ordered, the county
attorney for the county in which the case originated loses authority to prosecute
the case, and the prosecuting attorney of the county to which the case is
transferred is then vested with the authority to continue the prosecution of the
case.
Reasoning:

The exercise of the right to withdraw an indictment against a defendant is not

limited to the prosecuting attorney in the county in which the indictment originated
but is extended also to the prosecuting attorney in the county to which the case
had been transferred by virtue of a change of venue; thus ruling of the respondent
judge is erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the State.

Decision: Petition for certiorari granted

Note:
When a case is transferred, a prosecuting attorney can raise a pre-trial motion.

The office of a writ of certiorari, and particularly as it relates to inferior courts, is

to review an intermediate order or interlocutory judgment of the court, and if
there be any error committed, to have the same corrected. The correction of
error by certiorari does not go to the merits of the pending case or extend
beyond the intermediate order or the interlocutory judgment of the inferior court
sought to be reviewed and corrected; rather, the review and correction must be
strictly confined to the order or judgment insofar as the legality of the
intermediate order or the interlocutory judgment is concerned. Certiorari will lie
in every instance where the rights of a party seem to be manifestly prejudiced
by the rulings of an inferior court during the pendency of a case.

Washington v Williams
Action: Murder
Appellant Jerry was indicted at Criminal Court A for the murder of his wife Dorcas. Police
report and testimonies of the appellant himself and prosecution’s first witness revealed
that the appellant said he was not to himself when he killed his wife Dorcas. Based upon
these assertions, the defense counsel, filed a motion for the determination of the
appellant's mental competency to stand trial. The State resisted the motion contending
that the appellant was not unfit to stand trial; that the appellant, being of sound mind
had made a voluntary statement confessing to the police that he murdered the late
Dorcas on June 1, 2006, and that there was no record before the court that the appellant
has a mental problem. The trial judge denied appellant’s motion holding that the records
in the case from the day the appellant was arrested and detained in the common prison
show no doubt as to the attitude and behavior of the appellant so as to claim the attention
of the superintendent of prison whereby a psychiatrist would be invited to examine said
appellant. The absence of such report from the superintendent of prison, coupled with
the plea of the appellant of not guilty entered when the indictment was read to him,
makes this court to feel that the motion is a fabrication of the defense counsel simply to
baffle and delay the trial. A guilty verdict was returned against appellant. He appealed.
The defense counsel's position is that there was sufficient evidence to doubt that the
appellant was of sound mind at the time of his alleged commission of the crime of murder,
therefore, the motion to determine the appellant's mental capacity should have been
granted by the trial court. The defense counsel relied on this Court's holding in: Joe Weah
v. Republic of Liberia, [1988] LRSC 88; 35 LLR 567 (1988) which says that "Where the
testimony of a witness given at trial tends to cast a doubt upon the sanity of the accused,
it is error for the trial court to refuse an application of the defendant's attorney to have
defendant examined by qualified physician".
The State on the other hand contented that the defense of insanity asserted by the
appellant should not be sustained in the face of the facts and circumstances of this case.
The facts and circumstances narrated by the State are that the appellant suspected the
late Dorcas of having affairs with Junior Mieh; that on the night of the murder he saw
Dorcas on the road leading to Junior Mieh's house; that when he confronted her
confusion ensued; that few hours after the confusion the appellant persuaded the
deceased to accompany him to an isolated location where he successfully executed his
plan to kill her as a penalty for her alleged love affairs with Junior Mieh.

The State further argued that when the appellant murdered the deceased, he cleverly
designed an alibi to the effect that "heart men" attacked them and he ran for his life and
did not know the where-about of the deceased; that the calculated plan of the appellant
to commit murder secretly and the deliberate falsehood designed to 'escape liability
cannot be an act of an insane mind. The State therefore concluded that the appellant had
malice, was of sound mind at the time he killed the late Dorcas, and that he acted
knowingly, intentionally and purposely, in reckless disregard for human life.
Issue:
Whether or not refusal of a court to grant a motion for the determination of a defendant’s
sanity to face trial where there is doubt as to such defendant’s mental capacity,
constitutes a reversible error to justify the Supreme Court in reversing the conviction.
Holding: Yes
Rule:
§ 6.2 1LCLR, Civil Procedure Law provides:
If during a criminal prosecution there is reason to doubt the defendant's fitness to
proceed, the court shall appoint at least one qualified physician to examine and report
upon the mental condition of the defendant. The court may order the defendant to be
committed to a hospital or other suitable facility for the purpose of the examination for a
period not exceeding five days and may direct that a qualified physician retained by the
defendant be permitted to witness and participate in the examination. The report of the
examination shall include an opinion as to the defendant's capacity to understand the
proceedings against him and, unless the examination is to determine whether the
execution shall proceed, a statement whether the defendant is capable of assisting in his
own defense. The report shall be filed in triplicate with the clerk of the court, who shall
cause copies to be delivered to the prosecuting attorney and to counsel for the
defendant.
Reasoning:
A defendant cannot be held accountable for a criminal act when, at the time of the
commission of said criminal act, the accused person was insane or temporarily insane, as
the case may be, and therefore could not have comprehended the repercussion of his or
her action. Insanity or temporary insanity takes away the important criminal elements of
malice and intent. The rational is that since one who is afflicted with mental disorder at
the time of a commission of crime cannot comprehend the consequence and
repercussion of his or her action, there can be no intent and malice imputed to such
action; the trial court erred when it denied the motion to determine the mental capacity
of the appellant/defendant. Had the trial court permitted the appellant to be examined
by the requisite physician, evidence would have been provided as to whether the
appellant was sane or insane at the time he allegedly killed Dorcas, and if he was not
insane at the time of his alleged commission of the crime of murder, whether he was sane
at the time of the trial and therefore fit to proceed with trial.
Decision: Reversed and remanded for new trial.
Note:

Insanity is defined as "Any mental disorder severe enough that it prevents a

person from having legal capacity and excuses the person from criminal or
civil responsibility.

It is settled law accepted in our jurisdiction that a person who was insane at
the time he or she committed an act that would otherwise be criminal cannot
be criminally held.

Joillia v RL
Action: Murder
Jollia was indicted, tried, and convicted of murder at the Tenth Judicial Circuit in Lofa
County for killing Moijamas Kanneh. At the trial, two of the State witnesses including the
magistrate testified that the defendant's conduct and statement showed an evident state
of mental derangement. When defendant took the witness stand, she testified that she
remembered going to the farm at a certain time and returning but that thereafter she did
not know anything about herself until one morning she saw her feet in the sticks. She
remembered seeing one Abdullah Kanneh, who told her that she was naked and gave her
panties to wear. At this point, the defense counsel moved the court to have a psychiatrist
to come and testify in favor of the defendant as to her mental competence to stand trial,
but the trial court denied the application for the psychiatrist and also subpoenaed a
certain Varfolly, and not those persons desired by the defendant, to testify for the
defendant. Defendant upon conviction was sentenced to death. Defendant appealed
contending that she was denied her constitutional and statutory right to compulsory
process to obtain witnesses in person of a psychiatrist and another person to testify for
her. The State contends that the judgment of the trial court should not be disturbed
because the trial was regular and fair, and that appellant took the witness stand in her
own behalf and testified to facts within her own knowledge and recollection without
showing any sign or insanity.
Issue:
Whether or not denial of a defendant’s motion to have a psychiatrist testify to her insanity
where there is doubt as to her mental fitness to stand trial, constitutes a violation of her
constitutional right to compulsory process of obtaining witnesses in her favor such that
the Supreme Court is justified in ordering a new trial .
Holding: Yes

Rule:
Article I Section 7th of the suspended Constitutions of Liberia, under which appellant was
indicted, tried and convicted for the crime of murder, provides that: No person shall be
held to answer for a capital or infamous crime, except in cases of impeachment, cases
arising in the army and navy, and petty offenses, unless upon presentment by a grand
jury; and every person criminally charged, shall have a right to be reasonably furnished
with a copy of the charge to be confronted with the witnesses against him to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to have a speedy, public and
impartial trial by a jury of the vicinity. He shall not be compelled to furnish or give
evidence against himself; and no person shall for the same offense, be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb.
Reasoning:
It was error for a trial court to deny a defendant charged with murder the right to produce
witnesses to testify that he suffered from temporary spells of insanity since he was
entitled under the Constitution to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor; thus, the trial judge, committed a prejudicial and reversible error in denying
appellant the right to have a psychiatric examination so as to determine medically
whether or not appellant was sane to stand trial. Furthermore, the refusal of the trial
judge to compel the sheriff to make diligent search for appellant's witnesses, John Foday
and Abdulia Kanneh was another serious and reversible error committed by the trial
judge. Appellant was therefore deprived of the legal right to obtain witnesses in her own
favor. The Supreme Court cannot legally order the discharge of the appellant charged
with the commission of the crime of murder, who has raised the plea of insanity, and
subsequently requested the trial court to be subjected to a psychiatric examination, nor
can the Supreme Court affirm the judgment of the trial court without firstly determining
whether the appellant herein, was sane or not. The defense of insanity can only be settled
by the report of a psychiatrist, who alone is competent to testify as regards the mental
fitness of the accused to stand trial. Finally, when the plea of insanity is raised in a criminal
trial, the burden of proving it rests on the party who alleges it; and on the other hand, the
burden is on the State to prove that at the time of the commission of the offense, the
defendant was sane.
Decision: Reversed and remanded for new trial

Tay v RL
Action: Murder
Defendant Tay was indicted for murder for killing his wife Kor-Thro. On the witness stand,
he testified that he was subject to recurrent spells of temporary insanity and offered to
produce witnesses to substantiate this. The prosecution, however, objected to said
witnesses being allowed to testify on the ground that the persons whom defendant
desired to bring before court to prove that he was subject to these spells of
temporary insanity were not qualified to give expert testimony, which objection of the
prosecution the trial judge sustained. Defendant was found guilty; he appealed
contending that he was denied the right to bring witnesses to testify in his favor to prove
that he was subject to sudden spells of insanity.
Issue:
Whether or not denial of a criminal defendant’s witnesses to testify to said defendant’s
claim of insanity, violates his constitutional right to have compulsory process of obtaining
witnesses in his favor.
Holding: Yes
Rule:
Article I, section 7 of the Constitution provides that: Every person criminally charged, shall
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.
Reasoning:
It was error for a trial court to deny to a defendant charged with murder the right to
produce witnesses to testify that he suffered from temporary spells of insanity, since he
was entitled under the Constitution to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor.
Decision: Reversed and remanded for new trial

Note:
Change of venue can also be granted due to entrenched cultural beliefs in a particular
place. Criminal trial is about fairness and impartiality to get justice.
Serjleh v. RL
Action: Murder
The defendant Serjleh was indicted for murder for killing one Apostle Samuel in Monrovia.
During trial, defendant raised a plea of insanity was raised; hence he was submitted for
psychiatric examination for the purpose of ascertaining his mental state which would
determine his ability to formulate criminal intent. Dr. Ronald Winthrop, then medical
officer in charge of the Catherine Mills Rehabilitation Center established through
diagnosis that appellant at the time of the commission of the offense was suffering from
a severe mental disorder. The precise psychiatric diagnosis was acute schizophrenic
reaction paranoid type. The State provided no evidence to refute this medical report. In
the end, the jury brought a guilty verdict against defendant and he was sentenced to
death. Defendant’s motion for new trial was also denied. Defendant appealed contending
that the evidence of his insanity was of very high grade and could not be overlooked
without grave injustice to him. That there was no evidence produced by the State to
refute the conclusion of the doctor on the question of his sanity, relying heavily on Ledlow
v. Republic of Liberia, in the Ledlow case, this Court held that the plea of sanity is a good
plea in bar and when entered by the prisoner it becomes imperative upon the State to
prove the sanity of the prisoner to warrant conviction. The law states unequivocally that
criminal intent must coalesce with the overt act before criminal responsibility is
chargeable against a particular individual. The accused must be possessed of the
necessary mensrea to be criminally responsible for his acts.
Issue:
Whether or not a raising of the plea of insanity by a criminal defendant shifts the burden
of proving the defendant’s sanity at the time of commission of the crime on the State.
Holding: Yes
Rule:
Where an individual upon a trial in a criminal cause pleads that he was insane at the time
of commission of the act of which he is accused, the burden shifts from the accused to
the accuser, meaning thereby the State, to prove the sanity of the accused at the time
the act was committed for the proper establishment of criminal responsibility.
Reasoning:
There was strong and sufficient evidence produced at the trial to show that the accused,
at the time the crime was committed, was laboring under the delusion that people
wanted to kill him and that his life was in imminent danger, and this fact, taken in
connection with the circumstances under which the homicide was committed, renders
the offense excusable in law. The court below therefore erred in not awarding the new
trial and in pronouncing sentence upon one whom it had been clearly shown was not
sound in mind and memory. This Court does not hesitate to declare its unwillingness to
confirm a judgment of death where it appears that the homicide is excusable; it is clearly
evident that the report of the psychiatrist was not given proper weight by the jury in
arriving at its verdict. Besides, as stated in the Ledlow case, where the plea of insanity is
raised, the burden of proof shifts and it then becomes the responsibility of the State to
prove the sanity of the accused, and in this the State has failed.
Decision: Reversed
Note:
A plea of insanity in a criminal case will be established if the defense shows that the
mental condition under which defendant labored at the time of the commission of the
crime, herein murder, had so impaired his judgment that he cannot be said to have been
possessed of a criminal intent.
Gbenyena v RL

Action: Murder

Joe was indicted for murder at Criminal Court B, Montserrado County. During trial,
defense counsel moved the trial judge requesting him to defer or postpone the
empaneling of the trial jury in order to have the defendant sent to a medical doctor to be
examined in order to determine whether he was fit to undergo trial, because from
defense counsel's interview with defendant, he did not appear to be of sound mind. This
was objected to by the prosecution, and sustained by the judge. The State argued that
while the plea of insanity when raised, shifts the responsibility of sanity to the
prosecution; however, there has not been any evidence introduced through the entire
trial proceeding to exclude every reasonable hypothesis as to defendant’s criminal intent
which he labored at the time the crime of murder was committed, to disprove. Defendant
was convicted and sentenced to death. Defendant appealed contending that erred in
denying his application to be examined by a medical doctor to ascertain his mental
competence to stand trial, relying on the case Gartagar v. Republic, [1934] LRSC 8; 4 LLR
70 (1934), where the Supreme Court held that "where the testimony of witnesses given
at a trial tends to cast a doubt upon the sanity of the accused, it is error for the trial court
to refuse an application of defendant's attorney to send defendant to the government's
medical officer in order that he may pass upon his sanity.
Issue:
Whether or not the State is under duty to prove the sanity of a criminal defendant in a
murder trial where such defendant enters a plea of insanity.
Holding: Yes
Rule:
In a murder trial, when a plea of insanity is entered by defendant, it becomes imperative
upon the state to prove the sanity of the prisoner to warrant conviction.
Reasoning:

The trial judge should not have denied appellant's application for medical examination of
his mental state, because in such matters, the court must rely on an expert; thus the ruling
of the trial judge on appellant's application for a medical examination was a reversible
error, since the ruling of the judge on the issue denied appellant a fair and impartial trial.
Decision: Reversed and defendant discharged.
Note:
According to legal authorities: 'The object of all testimony is to determine
accurately where to place the responsibility arising out of the evaluation of the laws
governing human affairs, the testimony that persuades the understanding as to the
'truth of certain facts beyond a reasonable doubt,' possesses the highest legal value
and is the 'best testimony.' Such testimony is expected from the witness who has
the most intimate acquaintance with the facts, and can communicate the same so
as to be most clearly comprehended. A witness possessing these qualifications is
properly an expert on the topic. WHARTON CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, § 258, the Value
of Expert Testimony at 1686-1687.
Ben v RL

Action: Murder

Defendant Ben was indicted by the grand jury at the Eighth Judicial Circuit Court for
Nimba County for murder by shooting. During the trial, defense counsel objected to the
admissibility of the coroner’s report into evidence arguing that same was not signed on
its face and the coroner jurors as laymen were not medical practitioner to establish the
cause of death in a case of homicide by shooting. This objection was overruled. At the
close of trial, defendant was convicted and sentenced to death by hanging. Defendant
appealed contending that the coroner’s report was drawn contrary to statute in that the
coroner who drew up the report was not a medical practitioner and did not procure the
attendance of a doctor to determine the cause of death in a case of homicide caused by
shooting. Defendant further argued that the coroner jury which, along with the coroner,
conducted the inquest being laymen and lacked adequate medical qualification, were
incompetent to establish the cause of death by a gunshot victim in a murder trial, relying
on the case Dennis and Muhlenberg v. Republic, [1970] LRSC 38; 20 LLR 47, (1970) and
Criminal Procedure Law, Rev. Code 2:7.1. to 7.4. The State countered defense argument
by contending that it is not mandatory for the coroner to be a medical practitioner in the
Liberian jurisdiction. That any layman holding an executive commission as a coroner is
qualified. Further, that it is only when the coroner jury is unable to ascertain the cause of
death that it may call upon one who is a competent medical practitioner. However, in the
instant case, the State continued, the cause of death was readily ascertained and
established by the coroner jury during its investigation. The appellee cited in support of
its argument on the coroner's report, the case Yancy and Delaney v. Republic, [1933] LRSC
14; 4 LLR 3 (1933) and Criminal Procedure Law, Rev. Code 2:7.2. & 7.4.
Issue:
Whether or not absence a medical practitioner or doctor to attend upon the coroner
inquest to determine the cause of death and the coroner jury not being medical
practitioners to establish the cause of death in an investigation of homicide by shooting,
is sufficient to bar the admissibility of the coroner's report into evidence.
Holding: No
Rule:
The participation of a medical practitioner or doctor in the examination of a dead body
under the inquest of a coroner jury is not a statutory requirement in order to warrant the
establishment of the cause of death, nor can the absence of a medical report bar the
admissibility into evidence of a coroner jury's report.
Reasoning:
The admissibility of all evidence is within the province of the court, but when admitted,
its credibility is to be left to the jury. Hence, all documentary evidence which is material
to issues of fact raised in the pleadings, and which is received and marked by the court,
should be presented to the jury. Therefore, the attendance of a medical practitioner or a
medical doctor upon a coroner inquest to determine the cause of death is not a statutory
requirement to the making of such report or the admissibility of such report into
evidence.
Decision: affirmed.
Note:
Our Statute says, the coroner jury can or are competent to establish the cause of death.
Zoe Banjoe v RL
Action: Murder
Defendant Zoe Banjoe was indicted at the 1st Judicial Circuit for the murder of Benjamin
Samor and Amadu by shooting while trying to kill one Edwin Sando in the Rally Town
Market area in Monrovia. The indicted stated that the two decedents died instantly from
shots fired by defendant Banjoe. During trial, defendant Zoe Banjoe testified on his own
behalf denying that his gun had killed the decedents and alleged that it was the shots fired
by the soldiers and policemen who were pursuing him that killed the two decedents. The
State did not refute defendant’s testimony. The State did not produce into any coroner's
report; no autopsy was performed, and no medical report of any examination of the bodies
was put in evidence; no doctor was called to testify at the trial to explain the "dead on
arrival" contained in Dr. Cooper's letter of addressed to E. Winfred Smallwood, County
Attorney for Montserrado County. The State only assumed that these decedents died of
gunshot wounds inflicted by defendant Zoe Banjoe during his admitted shooting in Rally
Town Market. The jury returned a guilty verdict against defendant and he appealed.
Issue:
Where or not failure of the State to connect a defendant charged with murder by shooting
to the criminal agency either by an autopsy or qualified explanation of the cause of death,
constitutes insufficient evidence to convict said defendant.
Holding: Yes
Rule:
In a prosecution for murder by shooting where there was no autopsy performed on the
bodies of the decedents and no qualified explanation of the cause of death, there is
insufficient evidence to support a conviction.
Reasoning:
The State only assumed that decedents died as a result of gunshot wounds inflicted on
them by defendant; this assumption cannot amount to proof, and certainly cannot be used
to determine whether or not Zoe Banjoe must be punished for the deaths of these two
persons. Before the Supreme Court can uphold a judgment against the appellant in a
murder case, his responsibility for the death of decedent must have been proved beyond
the shadow of a reasonable doubt. Especially do we hold this to be necessary in this case,
since the appellant admits, as will be shown later, that he did shoot with his Remington
shotgun three times, but that the shots which killed the decedents did not come from his
gun, but rather came from the weapons being fired by soldiers and policemen who were
shooting at him in the crowded market place on that occasion. While it is true that there
was no corroboration to this part of appellant's testimony, and while it is also true that the
uncorroborated testimony of one accused of crime is not sufficient to acquit, Zaiglor-Or v.
Republic, [1927] LRSC 5; 2 LLR 624. (1927) , we feel that under the circumstances it was
incumbent upon the prosecution to have rebutted this part of the defendant's testimony.
And while it might be true that his admission of shooting in the market place would have,
according to some authorities, necessitated his having to prove that it was not his weapon
that killed, the most positive means of proving this would have been by the performance
of autopsies on the dead bodies. We do not need to belabor the point that failure to have
had the autopsies performed according to law cannot be made the responsibility of the
accused. How else could it have been positively determined what kind of weapon killed the
decedents without removing the bullets and examining them, as the law requires? But this
was not done; nor were the bodies examined, nor was Zoe Banjoe's insistence that his gun
did not kill the decedents rebutted, as also should have been done. None of these
necessary steps was taken, even though competent medical skill was available at the J. F.
Kennedy Memorial Hospital in Monrovia, where surgeons and pathologists are always on
duty. The coroner may, if he is unable to ascertain the cause of death by preliminary
examination, perform, if he is a competent medical practitioner, or authorize to be
performed by a competent medical practitioner, an autopsy on the body of the deceased
for the purpose of determining the cause and circumstances of death. Every such autopsy
must be witnessed by two credible and discreet residents of the county, territory, or
district in which it is performed, and the coroner shall have the power to compel their
attendance by subpoena." Rev. Code 2:7.4. The report of the coroner must in every case
be submitted to the prosecuting attorney, and based upon it he prepares the charge
against the accused. Since the report must state the time and every circumstance of the
death, and the conclusion of the coroner and the jury as to its cause, there would be no
latitude left for doubt where all of this information necessary to secure a proper conviction
of the accused for the commission of the crime is presented. § 7.5. But in this case there
was no coroner's report; no autopsy was performed, and no medical report of any
examination of the bodies was put in evidence; no doctor was called to testify at the trial
to explain the "dead on arrival" contained in Dr. Cooper's letter of March 29, 1976, found
in the record and addressed to E. Winfred Smallwood, County Attorney for Montserrado
County. Thus there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
two decedents were killed by defendant's shotgun, especially since it appeared that the
deaths might have occurred as a result of shots fired by soldiers and policemen pursuing
him.
Decision: Reversed.
Note:
Our Criminal Procedure Law provides that in all cases of violent death, including death by
shooting, the coroner shall have the body examined at an inquest over which he shall
preside with a jury of fifteen persons, and at which he shall have authority to compel the
appearance of a medical practitioner to determine the cause and manner of death. "It shall
be the duty of any government official or other person who learns of a death to report it
to the coroner for the county, territory, or district in which the body is found, if he has
reason to believe that the deceased : (a) died violently, that is, by homicide, suicide, or
accident. Upon being notified of a death of the type described in the preceding section,
the coroner shall go to the place where the body is, take charge of and examine it, record
all material facts and circumstances surrounding the death, and take the names and
addresses of all witnesses. He shall convene at that place a formal inquest with a jury of
fifteen persons in the course of which inquest the coroner and jury may hear the testimony
of witnesses. Any such testimony shall be reduced to writing by the coroner or a clerk
appointed by him and shall be included in the report required by section 7.5. "If the coroner
is not himself a medical practitioner, he shall have the authority to compel any medical
practitioner resident within his jurisdiction or the medical practitioner most convenient to
the place of investigation to assist him in examining the body of the deceased.
Note:
Pretrial motions must be filed before the commencement of trial. They include: motion to
dismiss for failure to proceed, motion for recusal, motion to dismiss indictment for
defectiveness, motion to suppress evidence and to return seized items, motion for change
of venue, motion for advancement of trial, motion for joinder and severance. Motions
during trial include: motion for judgment of acquittal; post trial motion include: motion for
new trial, motion in arrest of judgment, motion to withdraw the plea of guilty. There should
not be preliminary examination done in rape cases.
First degree misdemeanors are offenses where a person may go to jail for a maximum
period of one year not more. As per our constitution, an accused can only be called upon
to charges against him only on a valid indictment. Only courts of records i.e circuit courts
can issue the writ of habeas corpus. If a defendant is not charged in 48 hours, he can file
for habeas corpus.
Pewue v RL
Action: Murder
Pewue was indicted for murder for allegedly killing one Korwah Saysay who accused him
of stealing palm wine. The indictment charged that after the Pewue, the decedent and
others had consumed a certain quantity of palm wine, the remaining had been left in the
care of the decedent; the decedent later accused Pewue of stealing the palm wine which
led to a fight between decedent and Pewue. Though this fight was stopped, Pewue later
went to the decedent premises where a second fight occurred, resulting in Pewue killing
the decedent. During the investigation, Pewue allegedly admitted to killing Saysay. The
indictment stated that during the fight, the Pewue beat Korwah Saysay, the decedent, and
broke two of his rib bones, burst his left eye and one of his testicles, and cut him on the
mouth, thereby inflicting fatal and mortal wounds in and upon the body of the decedent,
and from which serious injuries Korwah Saysay died. The jury returned a guilty verdict and
defendant Pewue was sentenced to death. He appealed contending that the doctor who
determined the cause of decedent’s death through an autopsy should have appeared to
testify.
Issue:
Where or not failure of the State to connect a defendant charged with murder to the
criminal agency either by an autopsy or qualified means, constitutes insufficient evidence
to convict said defendant.
Holding: Yes
Rule:
Although the State may have established the first part required in a murder case, that is,
the corpus delicti or death of the decedent, it is also incumbent upon it to prove the second
part, which is to connect the defendant to the criminal agency, the death of the victim. A
conviction in which these elements are missing is a palpable misapplication of the law.
Reasoning:
Although almost all of the witnesses for the prosecution testified that the accused had
confessed to the killing, done by him beating the decedent to death, none of them testified
to seeing the alleged fight or to seeing the decedent alive after the alleged fight. Since the
defendant categorically denied killing the decedent, we feel that under the circumstances
it was incumbent upon the prosecution to have established at least the cause of death by
producing the doctor to testify to this effect. While a medical report of the examination of
the body was put in evidence, the doctor allegedly cited did not appear to explain the
contents of his report.
Decision: Reversed.
Bolobo Man v. R.L

Action: Murder

Bolobo Man bickered with his wife the whole day and in the end, he kicked her in her
stomach once which resulted to her death. The gist of the is that he and his wife, the
decedent were due to go to the farm but before doing so she was to cook some cassava
for them to eat, which she refused to do, and so he went on ahead of her to the farm.
Upon his return he found no cassava cooked, and so he asked a cousin of his for a cassava
which he roasted and ate. Afterwards, his wife brought the cooked cassava, but he told her
he was filled. Decedent reported this matter of his refusing to eat her cassava to his cousin.
After his cousin importuned him to eat some of the food, he reached out for two bowls,
one with rice and the other with palm butter, at which time decedent took the food, and
after mixing everything up, cassava, rice and palm butter, she wasted it. He became angry
and attempted to grab her, but the people stopped him; but decedent insisted on fighting,
and it was then he kicked her. Though there was no medical report establishing the cause
of decedent’s death, Bolobo Man was indicted for murder in Maryland County. Prosecution
major contention was that a coroner or a doctor would be the best people to determine
the cause of decedent’s death in line with the best evidence rule and not any lay witness.
Defendant was convicted and sentenced to death, he appealed contending that the Judge
err in sustaining prosecution objection to his questions to the State witnesses as to the
cause of decedent’s death.

Note:
A coroner jury as lay person can established the cause of death under our statute
Issue:

Where or not failure of the State to connect a defendant charged with murder by kicking
to the criminal agency either by an autopsy or qualified means, constitutes insufficient
evidence to convict said defendant.
Holding: Yes
Rule:
Although the State may have established the first part required in a murder case, that is,
the corpus delicti or death of the decedent, it is also incumbent upon it to prove the second
part, which is to connect the defendant to the criminal agency, the death of the victim. A
conviction in which these elements are missing is a palpable misapplication of the law.
Reasoning:
Even though the prosecution insisted that a medical doctor would produce the best
evidence to establish the cause of death, and rightly so, there is no indication in the record
that any doctor testified to the cause of death. Neither is there any medical certificate in
the record before the Supreme Court for review indicating the cause of death.
Decision: Reversed
Note:
Habeas corpus is prayed for where any authority has arrested and imprisoned a person for
48 hours without a charge or an arrest warrant. Under two circumstances, a person can be
arrested when caught in commission of a crime or when such person has committed a
crime and he is fleeing. An accused in furtherance of his constitution right to liberty may
request a magisterial court for preliminary examination- which is simply to say, the
defendant want to see the evidence the prosecution has against defendant in support of
their allegation against defendant. Circuit Court cannot commence trial in any case without
an indictment because at that time, the court has not acquired jurisdiction over the
accused’s case.

Note:
Whether in determining the cause of death, a coroner jury must be literate in order for
defendant to have fair trial.
Whether or not the dying declaration of a decedent is sufficient to establish the cause of
death in a suspicious death investigation.
Whether or not failure of the state to establish the cause of death beyond reasonable, is
sufficient to entitle a defendant to acquittal.

RL v Kermue et al
Action: Extradition
Pursuant to the Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and Liberia,
(United States Treaty signed 1 November 1937), the United States Government requested
the extradition of Melee I. L. Kermue and Wilma Bailey to the United States to face
criminal prosecution for Health Care Fraud allegedly committed by them while in the
United States. The preliminary extradition hearing began on 3 December 2005 with two
witnesses testifying for the State. On the resting of evidence by the State, the defendants
requested the court to dismiss the entire proceedings on the grounds that the writ upon
which the defendants were arrested is insufficient and defective because the writ does
not set forth with certainty the nature and substance of the offense charged; and article
8 of the Extradition Treaty provides that neither of the high contracting parties shall be
bound to deliver up its own citizens. The State, resisting the defendant’s request,
maintained essentially that: the defendants should have pleaded the alleged insufficiency
and defectiveness of the writ prior to the presentation of evidence by the State; (3) the
only grounds upon which a defendant in extradition proceedings may be discharged are
where the person arrested is not the fugitive, the offense charged is not an extraditable
offense, and the offense charged is a political offense; and (4) the guilt or innocence of
the fugitive may not be inquired into in any extradition proceeding. The trial court held
that condition of the applicable provision of the extradition as contained in the requisition
for defendants are well founded since indeed and in fact there have been no showing that
the crime for which they are charged is a political offense; rather, same is in conformity
with the relevant treaty and the statute laws of our country. We find, therefore, that the
requisition of the United States Government for the extradition of the defendants is well
founded. The Circuit reversed this decision holding that the Treaty which came into being
on 1939 expired in 1944. The State appealed contending the procedure which had been
adopted by the Circuit Court in conducting a de novo hearing growing out of the appeal
from Magistrate Taylor’s find that the appellants were extraditable and ordering a
warrant of committal, was irregular.
Issue:
Whether or not the ruling of a magistrate in a preliminary extradition hearing that a
defendant is extraditable and the issuance of a warranty of committal for the defendant,
is appealable under our statute.
Holding: No
Rule:
Criminal procedure law § 8.9. Writ of habeas corpus application to review committal; time
limitation.
Upon a committal a fugitive has a right to apply for a writ of habeas corpus at any time
before the expiration of the period specified in the applicable extradition arrangement
during which no surrender of the fugitive may be made to the agent of the foreign state.
Notice of the time and place of hearing thereof shall be given to the Ministry of Justice.
Reasoning:
Because there is no provision under Criminal Procedure Law, 1 L.C.L. Rev., title.2 providing
for an appeal from the finding and ruling of a magistrate or justice of the peace ordering
the committal of a fugitive following an extradition hearing, we hold that the entire
proceedings conducted by Judge Zotaa, including his ruling dated 12 January 2006, were
null and void ab initio.
Decision Reversed.
Vakery et al. v His Honor Chinneh
Action: Extradition
The State indicted eight (8) Ivoirians along with 19 Liberians for the crimes of mercenarism,
murder, rape, arson, and theft of property. The Government of the Ivory Coast by a note
verbal, requested the Liberian Government for the extradition of the eight (8) Ivorian
nationals to stand trial in Ivory Coast for the same crimes for which they were indicted by
the Republic of Liberia. At the preliminary extradition hearing in the Monrovia City Court,
the State informed the court that Liberia has an Extradition Treaty with Ivory Coast signed
in 1973. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the extradition proceedings against them
because there is a case pending against them for this same cause at Criminal Court A (the
principle of lis pendents); and that article 6(a) of the 1973 Extradition Treaty forbids the
extradition of a person if there is a criminal proceeding pending in the requested State
(Liberia) against the person for the same offense they are sought to be extradited. Based
on these two grounds, the case was dismissed. The State then entered nolle prosequi in
respect of all proceedings against the respondents. Subsequently, the State again
petitioned the Monrovia City Magisterial Court to order the extradition of the
Respondents. The Respondents formally appeared and moved the magisterial court to
dismiss the State’s petition evoking the principle of res judicata, indicating that the new
petition for extradition before the court had been previously settled and disposed of on
February 25, 2013. The State resisted the submission on grounds that the doctrine of res
judicata was inapplicable since the first petition for extradition was never decided on its
merits and the judgment reached by the court was interlocutory and not final as
maintained by the moving party (respondents). Magistrate Chinneh denied respondents
petition and Circuit Judge Blamo agreed with the Magistrate holding that the doctrine of
res judicata cannot hold and lie in the instant case, res judicata can only be properly
invoked and applied where there has been a determination of the matter on the merits;
that there is an existing final judgment rendered upon the merits of a cause by a court of
competent jurisdiction and is conclusive as to the rights, questions and facts in issue as to
the parties. Respondents appealed contending that the judgment rendered on February
25, 2013 by Magistrate Chinneh in the first extradition proceedings, was conclusive as to
the rights, questions and facts in issue to the parties and as such the State is barred under
the doctrine of res judicata to re-litigate a second petition for extradition.
Issue:
Whether or not the doctrine of res judicata will apply to bar the State from re-litigating an
extradition proceedings against a fugitive where the previous proceedings was dismissed
on jurisdictional grounds.
Holding: No
Rule:
Res judicata will bar a subsequent hearing when and where the matter in issue has been
passed upon and a judgment rendered thereon by a court of competent authority. But
where pleas in bar prevent a review of the merits of the subject matter in the case, res
judicata will not lie. Also, a judgment dismissing a suit on account of any technical defect,
irregularity, or informality is not on the merits and is therefore no bar to subsequent
actions.
Reasoning:
In regards to the present case before us, it can be recalled that the State first extradition
proceedings filed on December 19, 2012 against the eight Respondents was denied by
Magistrate Chinneh on jurisdictional grounds. The Magistrate’s ruling was based on Article
6(a) of the treaty and the doctrine of lis pendis and not on the merits of the extradition
proceedings contemplated by our criminal statute. Under our Criminal Procedure Law, the
following constitute the merits of an extradition proceeding:
a) The person arrested is the fugitive charged with having committed the extraditable
offense, and
b) The offense charged is an extraditable offense, and
c) The offense charged is not a political offense, if such defense has been urged by the
fugitive; Criminal Procedure Law Rev Code. 2:8.8.
A review of the records revealed that all these elements quoted supra were not passed on
by the Magistrate before dismissing the first extradition proceeding and that the said
dismissal prevented the Magistrate from delving into the merits of the case. Therefore, we
hold that given the principle of lis pendis, the requisite provision of the 1973 Extradition
Treaty quoted herein and absent the elements espoused in the Criminal Procedure Law
Rev Code 2:8.8, the Magistrate’s ruling of February 25, 2013 was not on the merits of the
case; neither did it conclude the rights, questions and facts in issue of the extradition
proceedings thus the doctrine of res judicata must crumble.
Decision: Affirmed.
Note:
The doctrine of res judicata is a rule of law founded on the soundest consideration of public
policy. It means that if an action be brought, and the merits of the question to be discussed
between the parties, and a final judgment to be obtained by either party, the parties are
concluded, and cannot again canvass the same question in another action. It is founded
upon two maxims of the law, one of which is that a man should not be twice vexed for the
same cause; it is also for the public good that there be an end of litigation.
Cooper v RL
Action: obtaining money under false pretenses
One Cobb, agent of Shell Company gave defendant Cooper $9,000.00 as lease money after
defendant had misrepresented to him that he had a piece of land at the corner of Randall
and Carey Streets, in the City of Monrovia, and that he wanted to lease said property,
knowing fully well that he had previously leased the identical property to one Kiadii. The
defendant was indicted for obtaining money under false pretenses, having sold the same
parcel of realty twice. He was tried in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit and
convicted. The defendant filed a motion in arrest of judgment, for want of jurisdiction. The
State also filed a motion requesting the Supreme Court to dismiss appellant’s motion.
Issue:
Whether or not a circuit court has original jurisdiction over subject matter of a cause
properly cognizable before a magisterial court in a criminal prosecution.
Holding: No
Rule:
The crime of obtaining money under false pretenses, being one which is punishable by fine
of not more than one hundred dollars, properly falls within the concurrent jurisdictions of
the Stipendiary Magistrate and the Justice of the Peace, and the jurisdiction of the Circuit
Court is appellate only and not original in such cases.
Reasoning
Any person who makes false representation, with a fraudulent design to obtain goods,
wares or merchandise, with intent to cheat another, or a representation of some fact or
circumstance alleged to be existing calculated to mislead, which is not true, or does not
exist, with intent to cheat another of his goods, wares, money, merchandise or other
property of value, is guilty of obtaining money under false pretense and punishable by a
fine of not more than one hundred dollars; he shall be required to make restitution of the
money or thing of value obtained. A crime is an act or omission forbidden by law, and is
either a felony or misdemeanor. "2. A felony is a crime punishable by death or by
imprisonment without the option of a fine. All other crimes are misdemeanors. "3. Any
offense punishable by a fine of one hundred dollars or less without imprisonment as a
necessary element of the punishment is a petty offense. It is, therefore, established that
the crime of obtaining money under false pretenses is a petty offense. Therefore, though
a misdemeanor, it has been classified by the Legislature as an offense of a low grade. Our
Judiciary Law provides, in the 1956 Code 18:556 "Trial jurisdiction of justices of the peace.
Justices of the peace shall have jurisdiction within the county for which they were
appointed to try the following without jury: (d) Cases of petty larceny, and of any other
crime punishable by a fine of one hundred dollars or less without mandatory
imprisonment, if no court or officer other than a magistrate has jurisdiction by express
provisions of statute. We must, therefore, conclude that in cases as the one at bar, the
jurisdiction of the circuit court over the particular subject matter can only be appellate. In
view of the above, it is our determination that the Circuit Court for the First Judicial Circuit,
Montserrado County, wrongfully assumed jurisdiction over the case, for the subject matter
of the particular cause was not properly before that court, but should have been before
the Magisterial Court. The appellant's motion is, therefore, granted, the motion to dismiss
the appeal denied, and the judgment reversed for want of proper jurisdiction over the
subject matter in the court of first instance. And it is hereby so ordered.
Decision: Motion to dismiss appeal denied, motion to reverse judgment granted; reversed.
Note:
We cannot agree with the position of the judge in this instance, for this Court has held, "In
computing the statutory 42-day period of a quarterly session of a circuit court during which
a jury may be empaneled, only Sundays and holidays may be excluded; any other days on
which the court is adjourned or for any reason fails to convene may not be excluded.
A trial judge can exercise trial jurisdiction only upon assignment given by the Chief Justice
and that when the jurisdiction of a circuit judge assigned to preside within a given circuit
shall have expired either by his adjournment before the term normally expires, or by
effluxion of time, he loses trial jurisdiction except for the purposes of hearing motions
arising out of cases already determined and giving judgment thereon, or approving bills of
exceptions, all of which should be concluded within ten days. And he can exercise trial
jurisdiction thereafter only in the event (a) a case in which a jury was impaneled before the
end of the trial term had not been concluded, or (b) in the event he had received a special
assignment from the Chief Justice which had extended his jurisdiction beyond the term.
Note: in criminal matters, an accused is brought under the jurisdiction of a court, by service
of precepts, writ of summons, and writ of arrest. Only indictable offenses that don’t require
jury trials are held in circuit courts.

Tolbert v R.L
Action: Murder
Tolbert was indicted at the Ninth Judicial Circuit in Bong County for murder. The indictment
alleged that defendant Tolbert did aim at and shoot his late wife, Beatrice Walker-Tolbert,
three times with his .38 caliber revolver and killed her instantly. Defendant was tried and
convicted. He appealed contending that the court had not properly acquired jurisdiction
over him as no indictment was returned in open court against him and filed upon orders
of the judge by the clerk of court as required by law.
Issue:
Whether or not failure of a trial judge to investigate any alleged irregularities of the clerk
of court in filling of the indictment, is a ground for a court to lose its jurisdiction over an
on-going case.
Holding: No
Rule:
Decision: Affirmed.
Note: when a jury time expires and the jury is taking evidence, the case will not
stop; but if a trial Judge time expired and once to hear a case, he needs the
permission of the Chief Justice. Jurisdictional issues are raised through pre-trial
motion.

Where the defendant has been brought under the jurisdiction of the court by means of
process and has been furnished with a copy of the indictment, alleged irregularities of the
clerk of court in the filing of the indictment will not affect the jurisdiction of the court, and
any such irregularities may be considered waived if not questioned before trial.
Reasoning:
The indictment along with the writ of arrest having been served on the appellant before
trial, the failure of the trial judge to investigate any alleged irregularities of the clerk’s office
will not affect the jurisdiction of the court. Further the Circuit court had jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the trial because the records of court showed that the indictment
charging the appellant with murder was returned by a grand jury and was filed within term
time, that is, on February 22, 1980. The court also noted, among other things, that the
alleged irregularities of the clerk should have been brought to the attention of the court
before trial. We are in perfect agreement with the holding of the trial judge, because an
objection to an indictment must be made and heard before defendant is called upon to
plead. Any defense or objection which is capable of determination without trial of the
general issue may be raised before trial by motion to dismiss the indictment. Defenses and
objections raised on defects in the institution of the prosecution or in the indictment, other
than that fails to show jurisdiction in the court over the subject matter or to charge an
offense, may be raised only by motion to dismiss before trial.

Blanquett v RL et al
Action: application for search and seizure warrant
The National Security Agency (NSA), applied for a warrant of search and seizure to His
Honor, Stipendiary Magistrate Milton D. Taylor of the Monrovia City Court at the Temple
of Justice to search two locations situated in Fiamah and Virginia/Hotel Africa,
respectively. The warrant was issued. Pursuant thereto, the magistrate police searched
said two areas. Appellant Cece’s premises, Cece Beach at Banjol, in the Township of
Virginia, was one of the two areas searched and properties seized therefrom. An
uncontested inventory listing of seized properties from appellant's Banjol premises
included cash and jewelry. Certified records from Monrovia City Court did not show that
the executing magistrate police provided appellant any inventory or listing of the seized
properties. This fact was also undisputed. Aggrieved by the search and seizure of
properties, and citing jurisdictional grounds, appellant Cece filed a motion before the
stipendiary magistrate praying the court to return the seized properties and to suppress
evidence. Although His Honor Milton D. Taylor in his ruling conceded want of territorial
jurisdiction, yet he denied the motion. Thereupon the magistrate was summoned before
Criminal Assizes "C", First Judicial Circuit for Montserrado County. Following hearing, His
Honor, William Ware, presiding by assignment, mandated the Monrovia City Court to
resume jurisdiction and first "establish as provided by statute whether or not it has the
authority; if it is established that it does not have jurisdiction, those items should be
returned from where they were seized. The case resumed and Magistrate Taylor
determined that the Monrovia City Court lacked territorial jurisdiction. But rather than
returning the properties, as directed by the First Judicial Circuit, "from where they were
seized", the magistrate ruled that the seized items be forwarded to Brewerville
Magistrate Court, whose territorial jurisdiction encompasses the Township of Virginia. For
the second time, appellant Cece took the magistrate on summary before the same court,
Criminal Assizes "C", but this time, before a succeeding Circuit Judge, His Honor, J. Boima
Kontoe. To what Judge Kontoe styled as to "give meaning and effect' to the mandate of
his colleague predecessor, he set aside Magistrate Taylor's ruling. Judge Kontoe then
ordered the magistrate to resume jurisdiction and determine ownership to the seized
items. Appellant Cece appealed assigning error to Judge Kontoe's conduct, contending
that said ruling, in effect, amounted to review of a colleague judge of equal judicial
ranking.
Issues:
Whether or not a magistrate has jurisdiction to order issue a warrant of search and seizure
of properties not located in the territorial area covered by his magistracy.
Whether or not judges of concurrent jurisdictions have the authority to review the acts
of one another
Holding: no to both
Rule:
Chapter 11, sub-section 11.1, captioned" authority to issue warrant, states specifically,"
that a search warrant may be issued by a Magistrate and JP or any other judicial officer
empowered to perform such function whose jurisdiction encompasses the area within
which the property sought is located.
No judge has the power to review, modify, or rescind any decision by another judge who
is of the same official hierarchy on any point already passed upon by his predecessor,
however, erroneous the act of his colleague may be.
Reasoning:
Criminal Procedure Law, title II 1L.C.L. section 11.10, provides numerous grounds in this
regard. Aggrieved by an unlawful search, this provision may be invoked by a party to
compel return of property and suppression of evidence on any of the following grounds:
(e) the warrant was illegally executed; this Court also notes with utter disappointment
that immediately following the search and seizure, the executing magisterial officer
informed the court in his returns dated August 18, 2006, of a long list of seized items. The
seized items, which should have been relief items and drugs, surprisingly included jewelry
and cash in US and Liberian dollars, seized from appellant's premises. This apparent
authorized conduct as inferred from issuance of warrant number 4704, speaks volume to
the illegality and total unlawfulness of the entire search and seizure exercise. It is
important to remember that the magistrate conceded in his ruling herein quoted that it
is evidenced that indeed this court did not have jurisdiction over Virginia from where the
properties were seized. Having so determined, this Court is totally at loss having so
admitted to error, how the magistrate could thereafter properly exercise any authority
which he attempted to so exercise by issuing further orders in these proceedings. In the
face of lack of jurisdiction, and having so accepted, the only proper and lawful order the
magistrate could have given was simply to act as s directed by Judge Ware; and that is, to
return the seized items to where they were taken.
Where want of jurisdiction over the cause appears upon the records, it may be taken
advantage of by a plea in abatement or objection made to the jurisdiction at any stage of
the proceedings; for any act of a court beyond the jurisdiction conferred upon it by law is
null and void. For hoary with age in this jurisdiction has been that: "Where judicial
tribunals have no jurisdiction of the subject matter on which they assume to act, their
proceedings are absolutely void in the strictest sense of the term; a court will recognize
want of jurisdiction over the subject matter even if no objection is made. Therefore,
whenever a want of jurisdiction is suggested, by the court's examination of the case or
otherwise, it is the duty of the court to consider it, for if the court is without jurisdiction,
it is powerless to act in the case. The issue of jurisdiction is of such significance that this
Court has directed that whenever it is questioned in judicial proceedings, as in the
instance, it is only but proper for the court to first determine its own status from a
jurisdictional point, and to refuse to hear the case if it determines that it does not have
jurisdiction.
Decision: reversed and properties seized returned.
Note: when a jurisdiction issue is raised, a judge cannot even transfer the case.
To examine related questions of the validity of a search warrant, the requirements as
directed by statute include: specificity and particularity of the places and items to be
searched for as well as providing a person subjected to search and seizure an inventory
itemizing all items seized and removed from the premises on the strength of the executed
warrant. Article 21(a) of the Liberian Constitution states: No person shall be made subject
to search or seizure of his person or property, whether on a criminal charge or for any
other purpose, unless upon warrant lawfully issued upon probable cause supported by a
solemn oath or affirmation, specifically identifying the person or place to be searched and
stating the object of the search.
Note:
When a person commits a crime and crosses one country border to another, the way to
bring him back for trial is by extradition; and for this process to work, the two countries
need to have a valid extradition treaty.

Raynes et al v RL
Action: Murder
Raynes and others were indicted at the ninth judicial circuit in Bong County for Murder.
During police investigation, the homes and persons of some of the defendants were
searched without search warrants being duly issued and served according to law. During
trial, the court admitted into evidence, over the objection of defendants, articles of
clothing allegedly worn by the defendants during the alleged commission of the crime but
which were not properly identified. In charging the jury, however, the judge failed to
charge them on the law controlling the issuance and service of search warrants. A guilty
verdict was returned against defendants whereby defendants were sentenced to death
by hanging. Defendants appealed contending that their premises were searched contrary
to law. The State contended that they have obtained a search warrant prior to searching
the defendants' premises.
Issue:
Whether or not a warrant for search and seizure not duly issued and served in accordance
with the provisions of the Constitution, is violative of the rights of an accused, such that
a judgment based on evidence so gathered is null and void.
Holding: Yes
Rule:
Article 21b of the Constitution provides that:
No person shall be subject to search or seizure of his person or property, whether on a
criminal charge or for any other purpose, unless upon a warrant lawfully issued,
specifically identifying the person or place to be searched and stating the object of the
search; provided, however, that a search or seizure shall be permissible without a search
warrant where the arresting authorities act during the commission of a crime or in hot
pursuit of a person who has committed a crime.
Reasoning:
Since the prosecution claimed to have obtained a search warrant prior to searching the
appellants' premises, it had the burden of proof to show that such a warrant was in fact
obtained in the face of appellants' denial. However, the prosecution never proffered a
copy of the alleged search warrant to sustain this burden. On the other hand, appellants
put on the witness stand a magistrate and an associate magistrate who testified under
oath that to the best of their knowledge they could not recall ordering the issuance of a
search warrant thus, the appellants' premises were searched contrary to law.
Decision: Reversed.
Note: the Supreme Court will only remand a case if there will be a new outcome from the
new trial. When a writ of arrest is served on a defendant and the return of the sheriff is
made, a court has acquired jurisdiction of the defendant. The court can only keep into its
custody items that have been admitted into evidence. Evidence gathered from a search
and seizure are usually kept by law enforcement officers: sheriffs, police, MoJ etc.
Jahweh v Jawhary
Action: Theft of Property
The Republic of Liberia obtained a search warrant to search the premises of the petitioner
Jawhary located in Congo Town for building materials allegedly stolen from the private
prosecutor Kaba Kamara. During the search, several items were seized from the premises
of the petitioner. Consequently, Petitioner Jawhary appeared in the magisterial court and
demanded return of the items. He contended that he was not at the premises when the
court officer conducted the search and the officer failed to serve the warrant on the
person who was at the premises the day of the searching. The magistrate denied the
request claiming that the warrant was legally served because it was served on one Miss
Zeyton Smith who introduced herself to the officer as the caretaker of the premises. The
Petitioner then filed a petition for summary proceedings against Hon. Frederick A. B.
Jayweh, Stipendiary Magistrate, City of Monrovia, before His Honor M. Wilkins, Assigned
Circuit Judge, presiding over the First Judicial Circuit Court, Criminal Assizes "A",
Montserrado County, Republic of Liberia. On the 18th day of September A. D. 1992, the
circuit court Judge rendered his ruling granting the petition in summary proceedings and
declaring that the search warrant was not served in keeping with statute and ordered the
return to the petitioner "properties" seized under the search warrant. The respondent
magistrate noted his exception and announced an appeal to the Supreme Court, which
was granted. On October 8, 1992, the appellee, H.M. Jawhary, filed a motion before the
Supreme Court to dismiss the appeal of the appellant magistrate contending that the
respondent had failed to file a bill of exceptions within ten days from the date of rendition
of final judgment, and that the search warrant was not legally served. The petitioner
attached a certificate issued and signed by the clerk of the court to the effect that the
final judgment was rendered on September 18, 1992, but that the bill of exceptions was
not filed until September 30, 1992. The respondent resisted the motion, contending that
the bill of exceptions was filed and served within ten days from the date of rendition of
final judgment in keeping with statute. The respondent also attached a certificate issued
and signed by the clerk of the trial court stating that although the final judgment was
dated and signed on September 18, 1992, it was not officially rendered until the 21st of
September 1992, and that the earlier certificate issued in favor of petitioner to the effect
that final judgment was rendered on September 18, 1992 was an error.
Issues:
Whether or not failure to serve the search and seizure warrant on the accused or any
person in attendance at the premises to be searched, violates section 11.5 (2) of the
Criminal Procedure Law, Rev. Code 2:11.5.
Whether or not a magisterial court is the proper forum for a person aggrieved by an
unlawful search and seizure to file a motion for the return of the property and to suppress
for use as evidence anything so obtained.
Whether or not failure to file a bill of exception growing out of a ruling in a summary
proceedings regarding unlawful search and seizure of properties from an accused
premises in 10 days after rendition of the final judgment, is a ground for dismissal of the
appeal.
Holding: Yes to issue 1, No to issues 2 and 3
Rules:
Section 11.5 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Law, Rev. Code 2:11.5: Mode of procedure
before entry: states that before searching a person or entering upon premises to be
searched by virtue of a search warrant, the officer executing it shall inform the person to
be searched or any person attending to the premises to be searched of his authority and
purpose and of the fact that a search warrant has been issued. If the person to be
searched, or any person attending to the premises to be searched so requires, the warrant
shall be shown to him immediately upon request.
Even though a search warrant is issued by a magistrate or justice of the peace, a motion
for the return of the property in case of an unlawful search or seizure may be made in the
circuit court in the area in which the property involved was seized.
A summary proceedings is a criminal action and as such, only the criminal procedure law
was applicable. In interpreting sections 24.7 and 24.9 of the said statute, the Court stated
that the failure to file a bill of exceptions within ten days from the rendition of final
judgment was not a ground for dismissal of the appeal, but that the bill of exceptions and
the entire appeal process must be completed within sixty days from the date of rendition
of final judgment, the failure of which constitutes a ground for the dismissal of the appeal.
Reasoning:
Whether or not the search warrant was legally served is the issue to be decided in the
appeal case but because we have a motion to dismiss the appeal before us, we are
prevented from opening the records in the appeal case. During the argument, the movant
was asked whether he applied for the return of the property in keeping with section 11.10
of the Criminal Procedure Law. His answer was that the magisterial court is not a court of
record so he could not file a motion for the return of the property before the magistrate.
We feel ourselves compelled to interpret section 11.10 of the Criminal Procedure Law
since it does not form a part of the issues in the appeal. Section 11.10 of the Criminal
Procedure Law provides that any person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may
make a motion for the return of the property and to suppress for use as evidence anything
so obtained on seven different grounds laid in the statute. Paragraph two of section 11.10
reads: "Courts Having Jurisdiction of Motion.”
The motion may be made before the court, the jurisdiction of which encompasses the
area in which the property involved is seized, or in the court where the trial is to be held".
Criminal Procedure Law, Rev. Code 2:11.10. It is therefore clear that even though a
magistrate or justice of the peace court may issue the search warrant, the motion for the
return of the property in case of an unlawful search and seizure, may be made in the court
the jurisdiction of which encompasses the area in which the property involved is seized,
or in the court where the trial is to be held. In this case, the area in which the property
was seized is Congo Town, Montserrado County, Criminal Court "C", which has jurisdiction
over theft cases in Montserrado County, is the court, the jurisdiction of which
encompasses the area, Congo Town, in which the property in this case was seized and
therefore the motion for the return of the property ought to have been filed in Criminal
Court "C".
The appellee has asked this Court to dismiss the appeal because the bill of exceptions was
filed late. Having determined that summary proceedings is a criminal action, it is therefore
clear that we must apply the criminal procedure law. From the records before this Court,
it is clear that the ruling of the circuit judge in the summary proceedings was rendered on
the 18th day of September 1992, and the bill of exceptions was not presented to the judge
for his approval until September 30, 1992, two days after the time allowed by statute for
the bill of exceptions to be presented to the judge. The statute provides that the bill of
exceptions shall be presented by the appellant to the judge within ten days after rendition
of judgment. Civil Procedure Law, Rev. Code 1:24.9. Under the Criminal Procedure Law,
the appellant, after announcement of appeal, has sixty days within which to complete his
appeal. The bill of exceptions must be presented to the judge within ten days after
rendition of judgment; the judge must sign it within ten days after it is presented to him
and the appellant shall file the bill of exceptions within six days after rendition of
judgment with the clerk of the trial court. The statute does not specify the time within
which the notice of completion of the appeal shall be filed. All of the jurisdictional steps
for the completion of the appeal are to be taken within sixty days after the rendition of
judgment.
In count seven of the motion to dismiss, petitioner/movant contends that the "purported
bill of exceptions is further made illegal by filing same outside the statutory period often
(10) days after the rendition of the final judgment". We do not agree with this contention
because the appeal is taken from a ruling in a summary proceedings which grew out of
the issuance and service of a search warrant. The two proceedings are criminal in nature
and therefore the criminal procedure law requires the bill of exceptions to be filed within
sixty days following the rendition of judgment. The judgment or ruling in the summary
proceedings out of which the appeal grew was rendered on September 18, 1992, and the
bill of exceptions and the notice of completion of the appeal were filed on September 30,
1992, just twelve days following the rendition of the ruling. The appeal taken from the
ruling of the trial judge having been perfected, should be sent forward to this Court for
final determination. The items seized under the search warrant should remain in the
custody of the officer of court until this Court makes a final determination of the appeal.
Decision: motion to dismiss appeal denied.
Note:
A motion for return of property for crimes over which a magistrate has jurisdiction is
triable by a magistrate.
Thomas v MOJ et al
Action: Petition for a writ of Prohibition
The petitioner Ellen Thomas was arrested on a warrant, charged with the commission of
the offense of larceny by tricks and artifice, and later released on bail. Because the subject
matter was beyond the trial jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court, the matter was
forwarded to the First Judicial Circuit where the accused would be held to answer. Shortly
thereafter the complainant, Mary Dennis, who first took the matter to the Justice of the
Peace, complained to the Ministry of Justice, and both parties were asked to appear at
the Ministry for an investigation into the complaint. At the investigation the petitioner
informed the investigating officer of the earlier proceedings before the Justice of the
Peace and requested the Ministry not to proceed with the investigation, but allow the
matter to be handled in the courts. The investigating officer denied the request on the
following grounds: 1. that a Justice of the Peace Court is not clothed with sufficient
authority to try a case for larceny by tricks and artifice involving such a huge sum as
$10,495.20, which the writ shows on its face. 2. That Justices of the Peace are
constitutionally under the authority of the executive and judicial branches of government.
3. That since this matter involves an indictable offense, the Ministry of Justice has power
to conduct a preliminary hearing to determine whether or not an indictment should be
drawn or made against the defendant. 4. That in view of the fact that a Justice of the
Peace Court is without jurisdiction in the instant case, there is no conflict between the
executive and judicial branches of government since the Ministry of Justice is the organ
from whence most criminal indictments originate. Because of this denial, the petitioner
applied for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Ministry of Justice from continuing its
investigation. The respondents, in their returns, countered the petition by contending
inter alia that they were conducting an administrative hearing in accordance with the
Administrative Procedure Act of 1972, Executive Law, ch. 82; that the Justice of the Peace
had not forwarded the matter to the First Judicial Circuit Court; and that since the Justice
of the Peace did not have jurisdiction over the offense charged, he illegally assumed
jurisdiction, thus negating everything that had transpired in his court, and therefore
nothing was pending before the judiciary.
Note: the purpose of preliminary examination is to establish probable cause to draw an
indictment against a criminal defendant.
Issues:
Whether or not a Justice of the Peace has the authority to hold preliminary examination
in a criminal matter over which it has no trial jurisdiction.
Whether or not The Ministry of Justice is authorized by the Administrative Procedure Act
to hold preliminary examination in a criminal matter that is sub judice.
Whether or not a writ of prohibition will lie to prevent a court or tribunal from assuming
jurisdiction not legally vested in it.
Holding: Yes to issues 1 and 3, No to issue 2
Rules:
1. A Justice of the Peace Court has jurisdiction to hold a preliminary examination in a
criminal matter even though a superior court has original jurisdiction to try the offense.
2. The Ministry of Justice is not a tribunal and may not determine any criminal matter, nor
is it authorized by the Administrative Procedure Act to hold a preliminary examination in
any such matter which is sub judice.
3. A writ of prohibition will lie to prevent a court or tribunal from assuming jurisdiction
not legally vested in it.
Reasoning:
The offense of larceny by tricks and artifice is a felony, 1956 Code 27:5 (2), 5 :297, for
which punishment can be imposed only upon a legal conviction in a court having
jurisdiction, 1956 Code 27:30. Thus the Penal Law states with clarity that a court and not
an agency of the executive branch has jurisdiction over the offense. It is not consistent
with the theory of our system of government that the Legislature should, after having
defined an offense as a crime, provide that the question of guilt should be established by
a member of a branch other than the judiciary. The Justice of the Peace Court does have
jurisdiction to hold preliminary examination in a criminal matter over which it does not
have trial jurisdiction. In the words of the new Judiciary Law of 1972, Rev. Code 17:83 (b):
As provided in the Criminal Procedure Law, justices of the peace shall hold court for the
examination of persons charged with an offense over which a superior court has original
jurisdiction. The Criminal Procedure Law, Rev. Code 2:12.1-12.3, also deals with the
Magistrate and the Justice of the Peace Courts' jurisdiction with respect to preliminary
examination in a matter over which a superior court has original jurisdiction. The last
sentence of section 12.3 reads: "If from the evidence it appears to the court that there is
probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant
has committed it, the court shall forthwith hold him to answer in the Circuit Court;
otherwise the court shall discharge him. Additionally, section 12.4 provides that: after
concluding the preliminary examination, if the defendant has been held to answer, the
magistrate or justice of the peace shall transmit forthwith to the clerk of the Circuit Court
having jurisdiction of the offense all papers in the proceeding and any bail which has been
taken.
In the case at bar, the Justice of the Peace issued a writ of arrest, and after the accused
was brought before him and preliminary examination was waived, admitted the
defendant to bail and forwarded the matter to the Circuit Court because he could not try
it. Since the procedure followed by the Justice of the Peace was in strict compliance with
the statute just cited, it is clear that he acted within the pale of the law. Where the Justice
of the Peace Court had assumed jurisdiction over the case, had proceeded to handle it in
accordance with law, and had forwarded it to the Circuit Court for trial, the Ministry of
Justice could not thereafter assume jurisdiction to hold a preliminary examination in the
same matter on the ground that it was doing so under the Administrative Procedure Act.
It is our opinion that as soon as it was brought to the Ministry's attention that the matter
was pending before a court, the Ministry should have desisted from pursuing the matter
insofar as holding an investigation was concerned.

Aside from the fact that the statute puts the offense charged within the jurisdiction of the
court, it is our opinion that the Act was neither designed nor intended to handle criminal
matters of the type under consideration. Furthermore, the Act does not oust the courts
of jurisdiction over matters within their special competence. Rlyad v. Dennis[1974] LRSC
42; , 23 LLR 165 0974). The Ministry of Justice is not another tribunal and, while it may
hold preliminary examinations on its own, it cannot determine any criminal matter. More
important it should not hold such hearings when the matter is sub judice. The Ministry is
the prosecuting arm of the government and represents the Republic in criminal actions,
and in its attempt to conduct hearings it must be careful not to act as prosecutor and
judge, for the functions of the two positions are incompatible. This is of particular
importance since counsel for the Ministry argued that he was conducting the
investigation in order to ascertain whether the evidence was sufficient to warrant the
preparation of an indictment. This is not the purpose of the Act. Generally, agencies acting
under the Act perform functions similar to a tribunal, and the hearing or presiding officer
cannot perform any duties inconsistent with his duties and responsibilities as a hearing
officer. Administrative Procedure Act, Executive Law, section 82.2. It is clear that the
hearing officer cannot perform both roles at the same time without being inconsistent.
This matter is not one involving concurrent jurisdiction of the judiciary and an
administrative agency. The offense charged is cognizable before only the judiciary, and
no party by himself, nor both parties acting in concert, can confer jurisdiction over this
matter on any other agency. Administrative functions and relationships are no concern of
the judiciary, unless fundamental rights are being violated, or unless, as in this case, a
statute has imposed a specific duty on the courts with respect to them. Even if the
question of concurrent jurisdiction were involved, the rule is that when two or more
tribunals have concurrent jurisdiction in cases relating to the same parties and the same
subject matter, the tribunal first assuming jurisdiction retains it to the exclusion of all
other tribunals in which the proceeding might have been initiated. Thereafter another
tribunal, although it might originally have taken jurisdiction, may be restrained by
prohibition if it attempts to proceed. The Supreme Court held that the offense charged
was cognizable only before a court and that the Ministry of Justice was without authority
to conduct a preliminary examination. The writ of prohibition was granted.
Decision:
The petition is granted, and the peremptory writ is hereby issued prohibiting the
respondents from continuing their investigation into the matter which is pending before
the First Judicial Circuit Court. And it is hereby so ordered. Petition granted.
Gray v RL
Action: Theft of property
The defendant in the court below was first arrested by the Bong Mine security service on
the charge of grand larceny by tricks and artifice. The value of the goods involved totaled
$250, an amount in excess of the jurisdiction of the Stipendiary Magistrate Court for Bong
County, Salala District; hence the associate magistrate only conducted a preliminary
investigation with the intent that if an excessive amount should be found to be involved,
the case would be forwarded to the county attorney for prosecution. But, when the
preliminary examination was conducted, the associate magistrate dismissed the case of
grand larceny by tricks and artifice as beyond his jurisdiction. Due to this dismissal, when
the action of petty larceny was subsequently brought before the Bong Mine Magistrate
Court against defendant Donatus Gray for theft of two pieces of plywood which formerly
had been introduced as part of the evidence in the case of grand larceny by tricks and
artifice, counsel for defendant Gray moved the court to refuse jurisdiction of the case,
discharge the defendant without day, and return his bond, on the basis that defendant
had been tried and acquitted of the charge of grand larceny by tricks and artifice and that
the subject matter of that case included the two pieces of plywood for which he was then
standing trial under the charge of Grand larceny. Counsel for defendant relied on the
defense of double jeopardy, as stated in section 3.1 and 3.2 of the Criminal Procedure
Law. Rev. Code, Title 2. The Magistrate denied defendant’s motion and ruled the case of
petty larceny against defendant Gray to trial. Defendant was found guilty and he appealed
to the Ninth Judicial Circuit Court, Bong County, before Judge Napoleon B. Thorpe,
presiding by assignment. Upon arraignment the defendant pleaded not guilty and the trial
of the case was heard de novo. After hearing the evidence on both sides during its
chambers session, the court adjudged the defendant guilty. The defendant excepted to
the judgment of the Bong Circuit Court and has brought his appeal to the Supreme Court
for final determination.
Issues:
Whether or not discharge of a defendant by a magistrate on a preliminary examination
for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of a criminal charge, is such an adjudication
in his favor as to bar any subsequent prosecution for the offense.
Whether or not the defense of double jeopardy will lie to preclude a criminal defendant
from subsequent prosecutions for the same offense, where the previous proceedings was
terminated on a jurisdictional ground.
Holding: No to both issues
Rules:
The discharge of a defendant by a magistrate on a preliminary examination is not such an
adjudication in his favor as will bar a subsequent prosecution for the offense.
Jeopardy attaches when a person has been placed on trial before a court of competent
jurisdiction under a valid indictment or complaint upon which he has been arraigned
and to which he has pleaded, and a proper jury has been empanelled and sworn to try
the issue raised by the plea or, if the case is properly being tried by a court without a
jury, after the court has begun to hear evidence thereon. Termination of the trial
thereafter by the court because of manifest necessity, however, shall not bar another
prosecution for the offenses set forth in the indictment or complaint." Rev. Code 2:3.1.
Reasoning:
This Court holds that the judge in the court below was correct in ruling the petty larceny
case to trial for reason that the principle of double jeopardy in accordance with the
statutes of this Republic does not apply. In the first place the defendant has never been
jeopardized, since the Stipendiary Magistrate Court did not have jurisdiction over the
matter, and its function was limited to that of a preliminary hearing. While we have said
that the principle of double jeopardy does not apply in this case, it is perhaps advisable
to clarify the issue raised by counsel for defendant which relates to the natural
consequence of a valid acquittal of conviction of a greater offense as a bar to lesser. It is
generally agreed that where a person is tried for a greater offense, he cannot be tried
thereafter for a lesser offense necessarily involved in and a part of the greater offense.
For example, where one has been acquitted of a charge of robbery, he cannot thereafter
be tried for larceny arising out of the same transaction.
Decision: Reversed.
Note: the purpose of search and seizure want is to gather evidence to charge a person
suspected of committing a crime. Sheriff’s return is evidence of service. It doesn’t matter
whether or not the person to be searched accepts or rejects the warrant. Indictable
offense means a cause beyond the jurisdiction of a Magistrate, thus trial by a circuit court
only. The purpose of preliminary examination is to draw an indictment against an
accused. That is to establish probable cause to indict a defendant. For capital offenses,
the defendant can file a motion only at a circuit court for admission to bail. In the case of
preliminary examination, double jeopardy will not lie. Before indictment of a person for
capital offenses, the State has the burden of proving that proof is evident and
presumption is greater, is on the State; after the defendant is indicted, he has the burden
of proving that proof is not evident and presumption is not great. Preliminary examination
does not bar prosecution.
Zuo v Morris et al
Action: PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF MANDAMUS
Mr. Jimmy Zuo, was a former comptroller of the Judicial Branch. Mr. Zuo was arrested
and charged with the crime of Economic Sabotage, for allegedly converting to his own use
$50,000.00 of Government funds intended for jurors' pay. He was thereafter put into
prison. At Criminal Court "C", defendant tendered to Judge Morris for his approval, a bond
executed by two legally qualified sureties to secure his release from detention. Said bond
was secured by unencumbered real property owned by these sureties with an assessed
value of $102,600.00. Judge Morris refused to approve the bond because he was not
satisfied that said bond met the requirements of the statute relating to the crime of
economic sabotage with which the defendant is charged, which requires that a person
charged with the crime of Economic Sabotage shall post a cash bond in an amount
equivalent to the charge. The accused being dissatisfied with the Judge's refusal to
approve his bond, fled to Chambers Justice Hne and prayed for a writ of mandamus to
compel His Honor Judge Morris to approve the bond which defendant had tendered for
his release. The gravamen of petitioner's contentions are essentially that section 15.86
under sub-chapter "F" of the New Penal Law which relates to bail bond for a person
charged with economic sabotage: (a) denies petitioner of his constitutional right to bail;
and (b) deprives petitioner of his right under the Constitution to enjoy equal protection
of the law. Petitioner therefore requests this Court to declare this statute
unconstitutional.
Issues:
Whether or not the restricting of a criminal defendant’s means of posting bail to only cash
bond is a violation of his constitutional right to bail, to justify the Supreme Court in issuing
a writ of Mandamus to compel a judge to admitted defendant to bail.
Whether or not the Supreme Court is justified in declaring as unconstitutional, a statute
which denies a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to bail by requiring excessive bail.
Whether or not limiting a criminal defendant’s mode to post bail for his release from
detention only to cash, violates Section 63.1 of chapter 63 of the Civil Procedure Law.

Holding: Yes to all

Rules:
All accused persons shall be bailable upon their personal recognizance or by sufficient
sureties, depending upon the gravity of the charge, unless charged for capital offense or
grave offenses as defined by law. Excessive bail shall not be required, or excessive fines
imposed, nor excessive punishment inflicted." LIB. CONST., Art. 21 (d)( i)(ii).
The statute entitled "An Act To Amend Chapter 15 Of The New Penal Law, By Adding
Thereto A New Sub-Chapter To Be Sub-chapter "F" To Provide For The Crime of "Economic
Sabotage", approved July 31, 1989 and published September 22, 1989, is unconstitutional
in so far as it requires an accused "to post a cash bond in the amount equivalent to the
amount charged.
Section 63.1 of the Civil Procedure Law, provides four modes by which a person may post
a bond, namely: a. Cash to the value of the bond; or cash deposited in the bank to the
value of the bond as evidenced by a bank certificate; b. Unencumbered real property on
which taxes have been paid and which is held in fee by the person furnishing the bond; c.
Valuable to the amount of the bond which are easily converted into cash; or d. Sureties
who meet the requirements of section 63.2.
Reasoning:
The Economic Sabotage Act quoted above, denies the accused the right to choose any
one of the four modes which he may desire or which may be convenient or fair to enable
the accused to obtain his release from detention. The accused is given a single mode only
to post bail for his release from detention under this Act. In Addo-Mills v. Thorpe, [1975]
LRSC 2; 24 LLR 27(1975), this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice George E. Henries, said:
We see no justifiable reason for limiting the means of obtaining bail to the presentation
of cash bond. The purpose of bail is to serve the convenience of the accused, without
interfering with or defeating the administration of justice. Therefore in the exercise of his
right to bail, an accused shall be given a fair opportunity to obtain bail. The primary
purpose of bail in a criminal case are to relieve the accused of imprisonment, to relieve
the state of the burden of keeping the accused pending trial and at the same time to keep
the accused constructively in the custody of the court, whether before or after conviction,
to ensure that he will submit to the jurisdiction of the court and be in attendance thereon
whenever his attendance is required.
The subject statute which we are called upon to declare unconstitutional is section 15.86,
entitled bail bond, under sub-chapter "F" of the New Penal Law which reads as follows:
A person charged under this sub-chapter "F" shall be required to post a cash bond in the
amount equivalent to the amount charged, but shall not be less than the amount of the
fine of $10,000.00 as prescribed herein."
This Court continues to believe as was expressed in Addo-Mills by Mr. Justice George
Henries, that the purpose of the constitutional provisions relating to the right of an
accused to obtain bail is to prevent the practical denial of bail either by fixing the amount
so unreasonably high that it cannot be given, or restraining the means by which bail can
be given." We should also add that the criminal statutes enacted in pursuance of these
constitutional provisions are also for the purpose of ensuring that an accused shall have
the widest opportunity to obtain bail fairly, cheaply and without unnecessary difficulty.
The statute under review is inimical to such purpose. The fair opportunity to obtain bail is
provided for under section 63.1 of the Civil Procedure Law because under this law
defendant may choose any of four reasonable modes which said section allows to
obtain bail. This choice of the accused is an independent choice which no individual or
law shall be permitted to prohibit. The petitioner was denied his right to choose. Hence,
such denial is tantamount to a denial of the accused constitutional right to bail as well as
his right to be treated equally before the law. Petitioner's liberty even now is being
restrained by his detention because of an oppressive law which prevented him from
obtaining his release by posting a bail bond under section 13.3 of the Criminal Procedure
Law. Petitioner has been denied his right of enjoying liberty and also equal protection of
the law as guaranteed to him under Article 11 of the Constitution of Liberia. The accused
in the case tendered a bond executed by legally qualified sureties which was secured by
their property value at $102,600.00, an amount which is over one hundred percent of the
amount charged against the accused. Can we not say with great emphasis that the
purpose for which bail in this criminal case is required would be achieved so as to warrant
the release of the petitioner? The statute under review appears to have as its primary
objective to keep the accused in jail until he has been tried and either acquitted or found
guilty. The practice adopted by Anglo-American law, and which we have also adopted in
this jurisdiction, is intended to keep an accused out of jail until he is found guilty. This
practice squares with our basic principle which presumes that an accused is presumed
innocent until he is found guilty in accordance with due process of law. The statute under
review is not in harmony with the Constitution and therefore we have to declare it
unconstitutional. For the reason stated in this opinion, we hold that the statute entitled
"AN ACT TO AMEND CHAPTER 15 OF THE NEW PENAL LAW, by adding thereto a new sub-
chapter to be SUBCHAPTER "F" to provide for the crime of "Economic Sabotage" approved
July 31, 1989 and Published September 22, 1989, is unconstitutional insofar as it requires
an accused "to post a cash bond in the amount equivalent to the amount charged.
Decision:
Petition granted. The peremptory writ is hereby ordered issued and the respondents are
ordered to approve the proper bond which conforms to the requirements under the
Criminal Procedure Statutes whenever it is presented by the petitioner.
Note: a bail can be filed in a bailable offense even on appeal.
Kaifa v RL
Action: Murder
In August, 1958, Thomas Kaifa was arrested for murder, and incarcerated in the Central
Prison in Monrovia pending indictment and trial. It would appear that, after appellant's
arrest and imprisonment, although more than two sittings of the grand jury met and
adjourned, no indictment was found against him, but he still continued to languish in
prison, deprived of his liberty and without benefit of bail. It was in these circumstances
that his Lawyer filed a petition for jail delivery on his behalf. The State resisted the
application and the judge entered the following ruling denying same: the court says that
the statute controlling the issue now at bar (jail delivery) provides that a defendant
arrested for an indictable offense who is not indicted at the end of the next succeeding
term after his arrest shall be discharged from custody. From an inspection of the petition
it is observed that the petitioner has failed to set forth therein the time of his arrest so as
to enable this court to pass upon the merits or demerits therein contained. Aside from this,
it is set forth in our Circuit Court Rules, that the prosecuting officer may, in resisting
applications of this nature, show reason why the prisoner has not been indicted; and if
those grounds are feasible and of legal efficacy the prisoner may not be discharged. In view
of the foregoing rules of law and in consideration of the reasons set forth in the resistance
made by the prosecution the petition is denied. Nevertheless it is further ordered that the
cause which has led up to the defendant not yet being indicted be tried by the next term
of court, and if there are any just causes he should be dealt with accordingly. Exceptions
were taken to this ruling, and appeal was announced therefrom by the defendant’s
counsel. In the August, 1959 term of court, that is to say the second term of court after jail
delivery had been denied, the accused, while still in prison without an indictment having
been found against him, applied for bail. The State again resisted the application and again
the judge denied it. Appeal was taken from this ruling also; hence the two rulings before
us for review.
Issues:
Whether or not a criminal defendant accused of capital offense not indicted after two
successive jury terms, is entitled to jail delivery.
Holding: No to all
Rules:
Bail cannot constitutionally be granted to a prisoner who has been regularly committed to
jail after having been duly charged with commission of a capital offense.
Jail delivery is not a trial and the release of a prisoner from detention is not an indication
of innocence but merely a means provided by law to protect prisoners from being buried
away in detention tombs and forgotten; its main purpose is to force a hearing or
examination of the charge upon which the prisoner is held without bail in offenses other
than capital crimes.
Reasoning
The disposition of applications for jail delivery and bail is left to the sound discretion of the
judge acting within the scope of the law. There are generally two categories of crime--
misdemeanors and felonies. Felonies are divided into capital and non-capital offenses. The
Constitution provides that all prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties unless for
capital offenses. Murder falling within the class of capital offenses, the judge was left no
alternative when he denied the application for bail. Our law provides, and it is the
procedure known and followed in our courts, that upon arrest for a capital offense the
accused has a right to apply to a court of first instance. There the State's witnesses will be
examined in the presence of the accused, with a view of ascertaining whether the proof of
the commission of the crime is clear or the evidence of the accused's guilt is strong. If the
court of first instance so finds it will commit the accused to prison and report the findings
to the superior court which has trial jurisdiction; if the court of first instance finds to the
contrary, the accused may be released on bail pending trial for a less offense. We inquired
of appellant's counsel whether these necessary legal steps had been taken in his client's
interest, and were surprised to learn that no such effort had been made by him to put the
machinery of the law into operation in the interest of justice and in fairness to the accused.
Although we cannot condone the conduct of the prosecutors in detaining indefinitely and
without indictment a prisoner accused of murder, nevertheless it would not be lawful for
us to reverse the rulings of the judges who respectively denied the petition for jail delivery
and the application for bail. We therefore affirm both of these rulings.
Affirmed.
Note:
Rule 24 of our Circuit Court Rules provides as follows: On the last day of the trial term and
after discharge of the Grand Jury, should there be persons in prison charged with the
commission of crimes other than capital offenses, against whom no indictment has been
brought, the Court may upon application, and in its discretion, grant a general delivery for
such persons.
Yancy et al v RL
Action: Murder
Yancy and others were arrested for murder in Maryland, fourth Judicial Circuit. While
defendants were in jail awaiting indictment, defendant James Daniel Anderson applied to
Circuit Judge Brathwaite for admission to bail. This application was denied by Judge
Brathwaite. Defendant Anderson then applied for a writ of certiorari to Chambers Justice
Pierre who refused to issue the writ holding that nowhere in the petition for certiorari it is
shown that indictment has been found against the defendants, including Mr. Anderson;
and if there is no indictment then there is no case of murder pending out of which certiorari
could grow.
Issue:
Whether or not a circuit judge can grant bail in a case over which he had no jurisdiction
Holding: No
Rule:
The Circuit Court takes jurisdiction over murder and other felonies in accordance with law,
that is, by indictment. No Circuit Judge can legally acquire jurisdiction over a felonious
crime otherwise.
Reasoning:
In the case of the petition for bail to be granted the petitioner after arrest and before
indictment for murder, the practice extant in this jurisdiction is for preliminary examination
to be requested in the arresting court, which was the Magistrate Court in Harper City,
Maryland County. Before indictment, the Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction over the
person of the accused, nor over a case of murder against the accused, since no charge of
murder had been filed in that court. Rev. Code 2:12.1, 12.2. The writ of certiorari could not
confer jurisdiction in the Circuit Court over murder in the absence of an indictment.
Moreover, if there was no indictment for murder, there was no murder case pending out
of which certiorari could grow, which is a mandatory requirement in certiorari proceedings.
And if there was no murder case pending before the Circuit Court, how could the circuit
judge grant bail in a case over which he had no jurisdiction.
Decision: Petition for the writ of certiorari denied.
Gardea v RL
Action: Rape

Joseph Gardea was indicted for raping his 12 years of step daughter Dekontee. The
indictment charged that while defendant’s wife Mardea Clement was away on business
trip, defendant on three separate occasions, around October 2009, at the victim's
(Dekontee) residence at Chicken Soup Factory, Monrovia, defendant, Joseph Gardea, did
rape the victim, Dekontee Gardea, either by placing his finger or penis, or both, in her
vagina. The indicted further charged that on two of those occasions, the victim's sister,
Sarah Gardea, had seen the Defendant and the victim under a blanket together. Dekontee
became severely sick; she was rushed to JFK where she died. Before her death, she
revealed that defendant raped her. A guilty verdict was returned against defendant and
sentenced to life imprisonment. Defendant appealed.

Issue:

Whether or not the indictment under which defendant was tried and convicted, properly
charged an offense recognized by the penal code in line with the Lewis Principle, to form
a basis for juridical conviction.

Holding: Yes

Rule:

According to the Lewis’ principle, to be deemed as valid, the indictment first and foremost
must correctly charge an offense and provide the accused satisfactory details in respect to
the circumstances attending the commission of the crime charged. In order for an
indictment to be deemed as valid, it must have been duly presented by a grand
jury, charging therein an offense recognized under the Penal law of Liberia.
Reasoning:
Mr. Justice Harris accentuated the features of a valid indictment in Republic v.
Brown, [1963] LRSC 4; 15 LLR 199 (1963): first, that the indictment be presented to some
court having jurisdiction of the offense stated therein and that it alleges specifically that
the crime was committed within the jurisdiction of that court,· second, that it appears to
have been found by the grand jury of the proper county or district· third, that the
indictment be founded on a true bill and signed by the foreman of the grand jury; and
fourth, that it be framed with sufficient certainty, for which purpose the charge must
contain a certain description of the crime or misdemeanor of which the defendant is
accused, as well as a statement of the facts which constituted it. ld. 203. Also, Criminal
Procedure law, Rev. Code, 2:15.12.
Our inspection of the records certified to this Court clearly reveals that the Grand Jury for
the County of Montserrado, Republic of Liberia, sitting during the February 2010 Term of
court, found a true bill and presented an indictment. This was consistent with law. Also,
the appellant, Joseph Gardea, was charged with rape, an offense clearly recognized under
Chapter 14, Section 14.70 of the New Penal Code of Liberia, published on January 17, 2006.
Surely, the indictment met the legal requirement of providing detailed information to the
criminal defendant in respect to the circumstances attending the commission of the crime,
especially the approximate time and place the offense was reportedly committed. We note
that the indictment adequately informed the defendant that sometime in October, 2009,
while at Mardea Clement's house, located at Chicken Soup Factory, Gardnersville, on three
occasions, raped Dekontee Gardea. As required of Prosecution, the indictment gave the
defendant notice as to when and where the crime as charged was committed for the
purpose of preparing an adequate defense.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Note:
Where there is suspicious death, there must be a conduct of an autopsy to acertain the
cause of death. The judgment of acquittal is permissible where the State has rested
production of evidence. The defendant will file a motion for judgment of acquittal when it
believes the State has not established a prima facie case against the defendant. When a
motion for acquittal has been granted in favor of a defendant, the State can appeal in this
circumstance.
The two circumstances under which a State may appeal in a criminal matter are: i. a
dismissal or quashing of an indictment due to defectiveness on motion of a criminal
defendant ii. Granting of judgment of acquittal in favor of the defendant. The purpose for
search and seizure is to find evidence that will be used in prosecution of a criminal
defendant. Non dais is a day you can’t count in the computation of legal time ex: Sundays,
Saturdays, Legal Public Holidays etc.
For the circuit court, the process is writ of arrest and charging the defendant based on the
indictment. The concurrence of 12 or more of the 15 grand jurors will lead to a true bill or
bill of ignoramus. The Judge has four days to confirm and affirm the jury’s verdict. The
purpose of an indictment is to give sufficient information to the defendant to properly
prepare his defense. Where the indictment is vague, defense counsel should file a motion
in arrest of judgment. The existence of prejudice is the guiding principle in the decision to
grant change of venue.
For double jeopardy to attach, the court must be of competent jurisdiction; in other words,
the court must have subject matter jurisdiction over the offense. When the jurors don’t
follow a judge’s decision, he is not to set the verdict aside but to send the jurors back with
redirection. A jury’s verdict can only be set aside on motion of the defendant. A judgment
can only be arrested when the indictment fails to charge an offense or the court lacks jurisdiction of the
offense charged.
Arraignment is a criminal proceeding where a criminal defendant appears or is presented in open court to
answer to criminal charges against him by entering a plea (guilty or not guilty) to the indictment. Lack of
jurisdiction to try the offense, or the failure of the indictment or information to charge an offense, shall
be noticed by the court at any stage of the proceeding.
Togba v RL

Action: Embezzlement

Appellant Togba was indicted for the crime of embezzlement at the First Judicial Circuit; he was arraigned
and pleaded not guilty. The indictment charged that appellant as Director General of Public Health Service,
Republic of Liberia, he received into his custody as wages for laborers of entity the sum of $48,866.60,
same being the rightful property of the Government of the Republic of Liberia; and without making any
such payment, converted and appropriated the amount aforesaid to his own use and benefit. A guilty
verdict was returned against appellant and judgment sentencing him to imprisonment for a period of one
year, a fine of $300, and restitution of the sum of $48,866.6o was made. Appellant appealed contending
that the Judge committed a reversible error when he admitted into evidence the payrolls, vouchers and
checks produced by the State. He contends further that he was deprived of his fundamental right to
notice, in that the prosecution did not attach to the indictment a bill of particulars consisting of certified
copies of said vouchers, payrolls, and checks.

Issues:

Whether or not a criminal defendant’s participation in a trial without requesting a bill of particulars,
constitutes a waiver of that right so as to not justify his request for acquittal on this basis.

Whether or not a failure to furnish a bill of particulars not applied for is ground to discharge an accused.

Holding: Yes to 1, No to two

Rule:

The right of one criminally indicted to a bill of particulars is waived by participation in trial without demand
for such a bill.

The requirement that a general description, in statutory language, of the crime charged in an indictment
must be supplemented by such a statement of the facts and circumstances as will inform the accused of
the specific offense with which he is charged, does not imply that the prosecution must furnish a separate
bill of particulars containing material of an evidentiary nature, when no such bill of particulars was
demanded by the accused.

Reasoning:

The payrolls, vouchers and checks by which the amount charged was disbursed by the Treasury as a result
of the acts of appellant constituted the main evidence on which the prosecution relied to convict the
defendant of the crime charged. The prosecution's failure to supply defendant with this detailed evidence
cannot be regarded as having taken him by surprise, especially since the vouchers and payrolls were
executed by him in his capacity as Director General of the Public Health Service.

Appellant had the opportunity of disproving their genuineness at any time during the trial; nor did he, at
any time, deny having executed said payrolls and vouchers. Instead, he merely contended that proceeds
from the checks that were issued on said payrolls and vouchers never came into his possession.
A bill of particulars in a criminal prosecution is designed to make more specific general allegations in the
indictment or information in order to enable the accused to prepare his defense and to avoid surprise at
the trial.

In jurisdictions in which a short or simplified form of indictment has been authorized the statute usually
requires the state to file a supporting bill of particulars on demand by the accused. The motion ordinarily
should be allowed only where the charges of an indictment are so general that they do not advise the
accused of the specific acts of which he is accused, and the court feels that the bill should be furnished
him, so that he may properly prepare his defense; where the indictment or information informs accused
of the crime sufficiently to enable him to prepare his defense, a bill of particulars need not be required. A
request for a bill of particulars seeking the disclosure of the evidence of the prosecution, or the theory
under the indictment on which the prosecution intends to go to the jury, ordinarily will be denied. The bill
of particulars should not be granted where its result would be to limit the government unduly, by
confining its evidence so narrowly as that it may shut out proper and material evidence of which the
government may not yet be advised. "The state cannot be required to give a bill of particulars as to matters
particularly within, or already within, the knowledge or possession of accused, nor can the statement of
the mere conclusion of law, be required. Where accused has obtained all particulars necessary to enable
him to prepare his defense from the prosecution in some other manner, the refusal of the bill of
particulars is not error. Unless a bill of particulars is demanded by accused it need not be required. The
application must be timely made. The motion ordinarily must be made before plea to the merits, or before
trial. The principles of law summarized supra require specific declarations to be made in the indictment
informing the accused of the offense he is charged with having committed, thereby placing him in the
position to make a defense. The contention of appellant that a bill of particulars was required to
accompany the indictment, so as to give notice of all the facts and circumstances on which he stood
charged, implies that, after presentment by a grand jury, which immediately follows the arrest of the
accused, he is entitled, at the same time when he is served with the copy of the indictment, to be furnished
with a bill of particulars. This contention does not seem tenable because, more often than not, a
defendant's arraignment and trial do not take place until more than one calendar year after he has been
served with a copy of the indictment. The instant case is an example. Appellant was indicted in the month
of February, 196o; but the case never came on for trial until August, 1961. Our Criminal Procedure Law
provides that: "A bill of particulars must accompany the indictment at the time of arraignment." 1956
Code, tit. 8, 144. Arraignment takes place at the time of trial, not when the accused is arrested, or at the
time when he is served with a copy of the indictment. This variation in the time of service of a bill of
particulars, when necessary, seems logically to suggest that if, at the time of arrest and service of a copy
of the indictment, the defendant feels that the indictment upon its face does not give sufficient
information of the facts and circumstances connected with the offense for which he is charged, he has
the right to demand a bill of particulars, if he considers it necessary. If he does not demand it, his assent
to trial on the indictment must be deemed a waiver of this right. Moreover, it is well settled that the
prosecution cannot be required to disclose in the indictment evidence on which it relies to convict the
defendant. "While an indictment must set out facts it is neither necessary nor proper to allege evidence
or disclose in the indictment or information the proof which the prosecution relies upon to establish the
charge, or to allege the specific act or acts which proximately caused the result upon which the indictment
is based. Only ultimate facts need be averred in an indictment or information, and matters of evidence,
as distinguished from the facts essential to the description of the offense, need not be averred. The
unnecessary insertion of evidentiary matters, however, does not vitiate an indictment.
Decision: Affirmed.

Note: failure to give a bill of particulars will not invalidate the indictment.

Tolbert v RL
Action: Murder
Appellant Tolbert was indictment at the Ninth Judicial Circuit in Bong County for Murder; he was
arraigned and pleaded not guilty. The Indictment charged that appellant shot his wife Beatrice
three times and instantly killed her. A guilty verdict was returned against appellant; he appealed
contending the following: that some of the empanelled jurors could not read or write their names;
that he was not furnished a copy of the autopsy report.
Issues:
Whether or not the right of a criminal defendant to challenge the panel or a juror at the stage of
jury selection, constitutes a waiver and a foreclosure of his right to raise such an objection
subsequently during the trial.
Whether or not a failure to furnish a bill of particulars not applied for is ground to dismiss an
indictment or to discharge an accused.
Holding: Yes to 1, No to 2
Failure to challenge the panel or challenge a juror shall be deemed a waiver of the right to object
and shall foreclose the right to move for a new trial on such ground or to raise the objection at
any subsequent time.
In the absence of a statutory requirement, it is unnecessary to file with the indictment a bill of
particulars containing the names of witnesses or evidence on which it is expected to secure the
conviction of the accused. Thus, unless a bill of particulars is demanded by an accused, it need not
be required. Accordingly, a failure to furnish a bill of particulars not applied for is not ground to
dismiss an indictment or to discharge an accused.
Reasoning:
A party may challenge a juror on the ground that he is disqualified under the Judiciary Law for
reason of any interest or bias. Such a challenge may be made only before the jurors are sworn,
except that the court may, for good cause permit it to be made after the jurors are sworn, but
before any evidence is presented. Failure by a party to challenge the panel or to challenge a juror,
shall be deemed a waiver of the right to object and shall foreclose the right to move for a new trial
on such grounds or to raise the objection at any subsequent time. Criminal Procedure Law, Rev.
Code 2: 19.3(3)(4).
An autopsy report may be classified as a bill of particulars; but, unless it becomes necessary, a bill
of particulars is not a mandatory legal requirement in the prosecution of a criminal defendant. In
the absence of a statutory requirement, it is unnecessary to file with the indictment a bill of
particulars containing the names of witnesses or evidence on which it is expected to secure the
conviction of the accused. Unless a bill of particulars is demanded by an accused, it need not be
required, but where demanded, the application therefore must be timely made. The motion,
ordinarily, must be made before plea to the merits or before trial. According to our statute, a
motion for bill of particulars may be made only within ten days after arraignment or at such other
time after arraignment as may be ordered by the court. Such motion shall specify the particulars
sought by the defendant. Criminal Procedure Law, Rev. Code 2:14.5.
Recourse to the trial records does not show that appellant ever made an application for a copy of
the autopsy report. Given the above citations, it is our opinion that the failure to furnish a bill of
particulars not applied for is no ground to dismiss an indictment or to discharge an accused. It is
therefore our further holding that the trial judge correctly denied the motion.
Decision: Judgement affirmed.
Note:
A motion for a bill of particulars may be made only within ten days after arraignment or at such
other time after arraignment as may be ordered by the court.
Ankra v RL

Action: Embezzlement

Appellant Ankra, a cashier in the Motor Vehicle Division of the Bureau of Internal Revenues of the Ministry
of Finance was audited .The audit revealed a total cash shortage of $4,824.For this unexplained shortage,
she was indicted for the crime of embezzlement, tried, convicted and sentenced. Appellant appealed
contending that following: that the Judge erred in refusing to grant appellant’s motion to quash the
indictment for two reasons, the first being that the information laid in count one of the indictment was too
vague and did not give appellant any notice of any specific acts of which she was accused; that the
indictment is not supported by a bill of particulars attached to it.

Issue:

Whether or not failure or neglect of the prosecution to attach the bill of particulars to the indictment is a
ground for the dismissal of the indictment.

Holding: No to both

Rule:

It is only the absence of jurisdiction or the failure of the indictment to charge the defendant with a crime
cognizable under the law that is a ground for the dismissal of the indictment. Therefore, an exception to
an indictment for embezzlement on the grounds that the information laid in the said indictment is vague
will not be upheld by the Supreme Court where the trial court has jurisdiction over the cause and where
the indictment charges the defendant with the commission of an offense.
The failure to attach the bill of particulars to the indictment is not ground for the dismissal of the
indictment, because the law provides that the defendant may demand the bill of particulars within ten days
after arraignment; and, the court itself may ordered the filing of a bill of particulars at any time after
arraignment.

Reasoning:

Under our current law only the absence of the jurisdiction of the trial court over the crime stated in the
indictment and/or the failure of the indictment to specifically charge the defendant with the commission
of the crime is ground for the dismissal of the indictment. Yancy v. Republic, [1936] LRSC 20; 5 LLR
216 (1936). A perusal of the indictment reveals that it shows jurisdiction of the trial court over the cause
and it also charges the defendant with an offense, embezzlement. Therefore, appel-lant’s contention on
the sufficiency of the indictment in this regard is not well founded.

This second contention of the appellant on the sufficiency of the indictment is also unfounded because the
law provides that a bill of particulars may and can be demanded by motion of the defendant within ten
days after arraignment or at such other time after arraignment as may be ordered by the court. Criminal
Procedure Law, Rev. Code 2:14.5. Therefore, the failure or neglect of the prosecution to attach the bill of
particulars to the indictment is no ground for the dismissal of the indictment. In fact, appellant could have
moved the court to obtain a copy of the bill of particulars and her failure to exercise this right cannot be
the basis for dismissal of the indictment.

The Supreme Court therefore concluded that the weight of the evidence did not support the verdict of guilt
for embezzlement for the following reasons: (i) the documentary evidence on which the case was based
was not admissible since they were copies and the originals existed; (ii) the appellant was not confronted
with the audit report, which formed the basis of the indictment, and as such was not afforded a
fundamental constitutional right; (iii) the amount laid in the indictment was at variance with the amount
which the prosecution attempted to prove;

Decision: Judgment reversed.

Stubblefield v RL
Action: Theft of Property
Defendant Stubblefield- the President of Dinwill International Exports, Ltd. of Locust Valley,
New York, U.S.A., AIMS Enterprises & Export Ltd. also of New York, U.S.A., and Wilder
International Import & Export, of 84 Benson Street, Monrovia, Liberia was indicted for
depriving the Liberia Petroleum Refining Company (LPRC), a public corporation of the
Republic of Liberia (private prosecutor) of its lawful money in the tune of $4, 488,700.00,
crime of theft of property. He was arraigned and pleaded that guilty. Before trial,
defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment since it was the corporations and not
the defendant who had transacted business with the private prosecutor out of which the
charges grew. This motion was denied. At the end of the trial, the jury returned a guilty
verdict against defendant and he appealed contending that the judgment committed a
reversible error when he denied a motion to dismiss the indictment for want of jurisdiction
over his person; defendant further said as President, he acted behalf of his corporations in
committing the act complained of in the indictment in the name of the corporations, as
their chief executive officer.
Issue:
Whether a defendant’s plea of not guilty shifts the burden of proving his guilt beyond
reasonable doubts on the State.
Holding: Yes
Rule:
When a defendant’s plea on arraignment is not guilty, the burden of proof shifts to the
State to establish the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.
Reasoning:
Since a person is criminally liable for any conduct he performs or causes to be performed
in the name of a corporation or its behalf to the same extent as if the conduct were
performed in his own name or benefit, failure of the indictment to charge the corporation
rather than the chief executive officer of the corporation is not a basis for dismissal of an
indictment.
Decision: Affirmed with modification

Wlo Flo v RL

Action: Murder
Appellant Wlo Flo was indicted by the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Maryland County for the
murder of his son. When he was arraigned, he pleaded guilty to the charges. Upon a brief
trial, a verdict of guilty was returned by the jury, and a judgment entered affirming and
confirming the verdict and sentencing the appellant to death by hanging. From this
judgment, appellant appealed to the Supreme Court contending that the judge committed
reversible error by not ascertaining from the accused, after he entered the plea of guilty,
if he had really committed the crime charged and if he was aware of the gravity of the plea
of guilty. Appellant contended further that the trial court erred in accepting the plea of
guilty and in referring to it in his charge to the jury. In reliance, appellant cited the Criminal
Procedure Law, Rev. Code, 2: 16.4, which reads as follows: A defendant may plead guilty
or not guilty except that in a capital case only a plea of not guilty may be accepted. The
court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty in any other case, and shall not accept such plea
without first (a) making such inquiry as may satisfy it that the defendant in fact committed
the crime charged and (b) addressing the defendant personally and determining that the
plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge. If a defendant
refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea
of not guilty. The state relied on the Criminal Procedure Law, Rev. Code 2:16.3 which
states: No irregularity in the arraignment shall affect the validity of any proceeding in the
case if the defendant pleads to the indictment or complaint or proceeds to trial without
objecting to such irregularity” to counter appellant’s contentions.
Issue:
Whether or not an irregularity in the arraignment process of a criminal defendant charged
with a capital offense caused by the judge’s acceptance of a voluntary plea of guilty from
said defendant, constitutes a reversible error.
Holding: No
Rule:
It is not a reversible error for the trial judge to accept a plea of guilty in a capital case,
where the admission is made voluntarily or without threats, fear or inducement, and where
the judge adheres to the regular trial procedure in the conduct of the trial.
Reasoning:
The Supreme Court has held that a voluntary admission made by a party is evidence against
him, even when it does not appear that he was warned by the judge of the penalty he
might incur, provided his admission was not made from threats, fear or inducement and
that such evidence when admitted will not be evidence of low grade. The Court said that
the records do not show, nor has appellant complained, that the admission was made by
threats, fear or inducement but voluntarily. The Court went to add that since indeed the
trial judge adhered to the regular procedure, as if appellant pleaded not guilty, his failure
to expressly refuse to accept the plea of guilty, does not constitute a reversible error, nor
did it prejudice the interest of the defendant.
Decision: Affirmed.
Nurse v RL
Action: Embezzlement
Charles D. B. Nurse, former stipendiary magistrate at Bondiway, Firestone Plantations,
was indicted at the First Judicial Circuit Court, for converting to his own use almost all of
the bags of rice for the sustenance of prisoners and various fines rightfully owed to the
Government, in all amounting to $9,145.50. When he was arraigned, he pleaded not
guilty. Although defendant denied misappropriating fines collected after they were
imposed by him in matters brought before him as stipendiary magistrate, nor had he
converted to his own use any rice received from the Firestone store as prisoners'
subsistence, the Jury notwithstanding returned a guilty verdict against him. Defendant
filed a motion for new trial. After argument on the motion for a new trial was had,
defendant proceeded to withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty, and to
also withdraw his motion for a new trial. The court denied the motion for new trial on the
ground of waiver and withdrawal, and sentenced defendant to a year of imprisonment,
fined and ordered him to restitute the amount mentioned in the indictment. Defendant
appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not a criminal defendant is precluded from exercising his right of appeal due
to his voluntary changing of a plea of not guilty to one of guilty after arraignment.
Holding: Yes
Rule:
Changing voluntarily a plea of not guilty to one of guilty, precludes the right of appeal in
a criminal case.
Reasoning:
In view of the defendant having withdrawn his plea of not guilty and entering the plea of
guilty, and having also withdrawn his motion for a new trial, we are puzzled upon what
principle of law he relied when he subsequently filed a bill of exceptions. This act on the
part of defendant in our opinion, barred him from appeal, since he had waived all rights
thereto and made himself subject to the judgment of the court. This act of the defendant
the law considers to be voluntary and intentional and thereby he relinquished any and all
rights guaranteed to him under the Constitution. "Waiver is the intentional
relinquishment of a known right or the voluntary relinquishment of a known right.
It was surprising that the defendant charged with the crime of embezzlement would at
such a stage of his trial waive his rights for a review of his case by changing his plea to
guilty. This has happened and no one of us can determine the motive which moved him
to so act. There was no legal basis for the defendant to file the bill of exceptions when he
had withdrawn voluntarily his plea of not guilty and substituted the plea of guilty.
Decision: Affirmed.
Note: Not having a witness name on the indictment is not a ground for invalidation of the
indictment.
A person possessed of a right who, with full knowledge of the material facts, intentionally
does or does not do something, thereby evincing intent to pursue a course contrary to his
right, has waived such right and is thereafter precluded from asserting it.
According to our Penal Law, embezzlement is a felony and is thus defined: "Any person
who: (a) while employed by another and by virtue of such employment, receives and
takes into his custody money or other articles of value, and intentionally, fraudulently and
feloniously converts them to his own use; or "(b) whether for reward or not, receives
money or other articles of value to deliver to another, and during the continuance of the
bailment intentionally, fraudulently and feloniously converts the whole or any part
thereof, to his own use, is guilty of embezzlement and punishable by fine of not more
than five hundred dollars and by imprisonment for not less than three months nor more
than two years where the amount embezzled is more than one hundred dollars or
imprisonment for not more than six months where the amount embezzled is one hundred
dollars or less. Restitution shall be required.
Firestone Plantations Co. v RL (The purpose of arraignment is to ascertain the defendant’s
plea; whether guilty or not guilty) the test will be only procedural. If two terms of court
passes and a defendant is not indicted, he can file a motion to dismiss the case for failure
to proceed. The purpose is to secure the release of the defendant. 18.1 criminal procedure
law.
Action: Grand larceny
Appellee John T. Bryant- estate superintendent at Firestone plantation, based upon the
complaint of the Company, was arrested and indicted for the crime of grand larceny in
1977. After the expiration of a period of more than seven years, Mr. Bryant wrote a letter
to the judge presiding by assignment over the May Term, A. D. 1984, of the Circuit Court
for the First Judicial Circuit, criminal Assizes "A", Montserrado County, requesting the judge
to summon the management of the Firestone Plantations Company to show cause why he
should not be reinstated to his position. The presiding judge ordered Firestone Plantations
Company summoned in criminal contempt of court. After hearing into the appellee’s
John’s letter, the court ordered that the accused, John T. Bryant, be discharged from
further answering the charge of grand larceny, The ground upon which the judge ordered
Mr. Bryant discharged was the failure of the prosecution to proceed with the case. From
this ruling, the Firestone Plantations Company, the private prosecutor in the case,
announced an appeal to the Supreme Court. The appeal was originally denied, but upon
orders of the Supreme Court, growing out of a petition for a writ of mandamus, the trial
judge granted the same. Appellee contended that the private prosecutor had no legal
standing to appeal from the judgment; therefore, the judgment of the court below
dismissing the indictment against him should not be disturbed.

Issues:

Whether or not a court is justified in dismissing an indictment and discharging a criminal

defendant, where the prosecution failed to proceed in more than two successive court
terms after finding the indictment.

Whether or not a private prosecutor has standing to take an appeal where the indictment
has been dismissed for failure to proceed.

Holding: Yes to 1, no to 2

Rules:

Unless good cause is shown, a court shall dismiss a complaint against a defendant who is
not indicted by the end of the next succeeding term after his arrest for an indictable
offense or his appearance in court in response to a summons or notice to appear charging
him with such an offense; or who, having been indicted, is not tried the next succeeding
term after the finding of the indictment.
The State had the right of appeal in only two instances: (a) where the trial judge grants a
motion by the defendant to dismiss the indictment, and (b) where the judge grants a
motion for judgment of acquittal thus, as neither of these grounds existed in the instant
case, the government was precluded from appealing the ruling of the judge, and that the
same prohibition applied to the private prosecutor.
Reasoning:
According to the records certified to this Court, the complainant in the court below now
appellee was indicted by the grand jury of the Circuit Court for the First Judicial Circuit,
Criminal Assizes "A", Montserrado County, for the crime of grand larceny during the
November 1977 Term of court. Mathematically, the period from November 1977, up to
June 29, 1984, the date of John T. Bryant's letter of complaint filed with the court below,
is approximately twenty-six terms of court, during which the Prosecution failed to
prosecute the appellee after his indictment. No person shall be held to answer for a capital
or infamous crime except in cases of impeachment, cases arising in the armed forces, and
petty offenses, unless upon an indictment by a grand jury; and in all such cases, the accused
shall have the right to a speedy, public and impartial trial by a jury of the vicinity, unless
such person shall with appropriate understanding, expressly waive the right to a jury trial.
Where these rights are not adhered to by the prosecution or are otherwise violated, as
where a speedy trial of the accused is not had, the trial court will be deemed to have acted
properly in dismissing the indictment.
The Court now has the duty to determine the issue of whether or not the appellant, as
private prosecutor, in the court below had any legal standing to appeal from the ruling of
the court below dismissing an indictment against the defendant/ appellee. The dismissal
of an indictment on the ground of failure by the prosecution to proceed, not being one of
the instances in which the Republic of Liberia may appeal, the Republic of Liberia is
precluded from taking an appeal. This principle applies similarly to a private prosecutor.
Accordingly, an appeal taken under these circumstances will be dismissed.

Decision: Appeal dismissed.

Note:
A private prosecutor is one who sets in motion the machinery of criminal justice against a
person whom he suspects or believes to be guilty of a crime by laying an accusation before
the proper authorities, and who is not himself an officer of justice.
To constitute contempt, there must be improper conduct in the presence of the court or
so near thereto as to interrupt or interfere with its proceedings; or some act must be done,
not necessarily in the presence of the court, which tends to adversely affect the
administration of justice.
There are only two instances in which the Republic of Liberia may appeal from a ruling of
the trial court in a criminal case: (a) from an order granting a motion by the defendant to
dismiss an indictment; and (b) from an order granting a motion for judgment of acquittal.
When the grand jury failed to come up with a true bill, the State still has a second chance;
i.e. a grand jury can sit two times on a case to determine whether or not there is probable
cause to indictment a defendant. An oral complaint can be brought to a magistrate or a
police charge sheet can be send to a magistrate upon which a magistrate can issue a writ
of arrest. The prosecution has the right to file for the dismissal of a defective indictment
before the jury is empanelled or if it is a bench trial, before the judge start to take evidence;
dismissal of the indictment on this ground will not serve as a bar to subsequent
prosecution. If an accused is convicted on a defective indictment, the Supreme Court will
reverse the judgment; if an accused files a motion for acquittal and is granted, and the
State appeals, if the State wins on appeal and a new trial is ordered, these two are not
grounds for the accused to move for double jeopardy. Anything that prevents a party from
exercising his right of appeal not based on his fault, is a ground for filing for the writ of
error. The indictment must be certain. A judge has to seek permission from the Chief
Justice to continue a trial when the 42 days jury term has expired. If the trial was
commenced and during the course the trial, the Judge has a right to continue. If the
evidence against s co-defendant indicted with your jointly for a criminal offense will
prejudice your case, you can file a motion for severance.
Only the defendant not the State can file a motion for advancement of criminal cases on
the trial docket.
Logan v RL
Action: Murder
Appellant Logan was convicted of murder at the First Judicial Circuit for fatally shooting
and killing decedent Winston Deshield, Criminal Investigation Division Captain, for fear that
decedent might exposed his dealings in anti-breeze United States currency notes. Before
the commencement of trial, appellant filed a motion for the recusal of the trial judge
arguing that trial Judge Obey served as county attorney for Montserrado County at the
time he (appellant) was arrested, that the said judge participated in the investigations by
which he was indicted, and that he was therefore required to recuse himself from the trial.
The State resisted this motion counter-arguing that there was no evidence tending to show
that the trial judge, Octavius Obey, had personally investigated the case as county attorney
for Montserrado County, since both the quashed and subsequent indictments were under
the signature of Abraham B. Kromah, who then served as county attorney, and that said
judge bore no relationship to appellant as would have required his recusal. The Judge
denied appellant’s motion and ordered the trial proceeded with. Appellant was found
guilty as charged and sentenced to death by hanging; he appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not absent evidence of some questionable relationship of a judge to the case,
is his bias in the sense of hostility prior to trial, a ground for his recusal.
Holding: No
Rule:
While a judge’s interest in or other questionable relationship with the case or the parties
thereto imposes a duty upon him to recuse himself on his own motion, or on the motion
of a party objecting to his sitting on the matter, a bias or prejudice, in the sense of hostility,
is generally not a ground for the disqualification of a judge, especially when the recusal is
sought on that ground prior to the trial of the defendant.
Reasoning:
With regard to the contention that the trial judge should have recused himself for reason
that he had served as county attorney for Montserrado County at the time the appellant
was investigated for the crime of murder, the Court held that while a trial judge’s interest
or other questionable relationship with the case before the court or to the parties imposes
a duty upon him to recuse himself, on his own motion or on the motion of an objecting
party, the mere perceived bias or prejudice was insufficient to disqualify a judge presiding
over a case. The Court noted that in the instant case, not only did the appellant not show
interest by the trial judge in the case, but the records revealed that at the time the
appellant was investigated and indicted, a different individual was county attorney for
Montserrado County. The mere fact that the trial judge was an employee of the Ministry
of Justice at the time was insufficient to warrant the judge’s recusal of himself from
presiding over the case. Several opinions of this Court have indicated that bias or prejudice
in the sense of hostility is, in general, not a ground for disqualification of a judge prior to
the trial of the defendant, and that an application for recusal of a judge is premature when
based upon such bias and hostility, especially when brought prior to the trial. It would be
unreasonable to hold that the presiding judge in this case is prejudiced as to be unfit to sit
in the trial of the case in the court below when there is no evidence whatsoever tending
to show that he will be prejudiced at the trial, or that he will not be impartial in the
adjudication of the case. No proof has been offered that he will be violating legislation
prohibiting his service, thus transgressing public policy intended for the interests of justice,
the preservation and impartiality of the courts, and the respect and confidence of the
people for their decisions. The application must also show prior participation or connection
with the case. There is no showing that the trial judge in fact assisted the police in
investigating the case. The mere fact that at the time of said investigation, the trial judge
was then an employee of the Ministry of Justice is by no means convincing evidence to
warrant his recusal.
Decision: Judgment affirmed.
Note: conflict of interest of a judge is a ground for his recusal.
Williams v RL
Action: Murder
Hans and Mardea Williams were convicted for murder of little Angel Tobga. During trial,
the State filed a motion for the Judge to recuse himself, arguing that the judge and co-
defendant Hans Williams worked for the National Patriotic Assembly Government, some
ten or more years prior to his elevation as judge. The state’s motion was denied on the
ground that it lacked any legal or factual basis. Consequently, the State filed a petition for
issuance of the Writ of Certiorari, requesting the Supreme Court to reverse the Ruling of
the Co-respondent Judge and order that he should recuse himself from presiding over the
case. Though the Supreme Court did not act on this latest petition for the Writ of Certiorari.
However, Judge Smith, recused himself from the case.
Issues:
Whether or not a judge has the authority to accede to an application for his disqualification
when the basis therefor is not thoroughly established as provided by law.
Whether or not a judge is justified in denying a motion for his recusal based the ground
that the judge and the defendant worked together before, absent evidence of any intimacy
between the judge and the defendant
Holding: No to 1, yes to 2:
Rule:
It is settled in our jurisdiction that an application to a judge for his disqualification in a case
is in effect, asking him to surrender his jurisdiction. But unless and until the basis for his
disqualification is thoroughly established in a manner and form as provided by law, he is
without authority to accede.
The grounds for the movant's motion being founded on frivolous allegation without legal
justification is sufficient for the dismissal of said motion.
Reasoning:
The opinion or sentiment expressed by the Prosecution that the judge is bias because he
worked for NPRAG with Defendant Hans Williams has no legal basis. This court says that
we are here in this court to do law and justice and that this is what we must do. Even
granted, that the defendant worked for the NPRAG, this does not in any way disqualify this
judge for merely working for the same organization and knowing each other causally with
no intimacy.
Speare-Hardy v RL
Action: Forgery:
Appellant Hardy was employed as financial secretary at the Liberian Consulate at Takoradi,
Ghana. She was tried and convicted for forgery at the First Judicial Circuit. At the call of the
case, appellant filed a motion to quash the indictment. Appellant contended that the court
has no territorial jurisdiction over the matter, in that an inspection of the indictment
discloses upon its face that the alleged offense was committed in Takoradi, Ghana, a
territory outside and beyond the domains of the Republic of Liberia. Appellant further
contended that this court can exercise no jurisdiction over offenses alleged to have been
committed outside and beyond the territorial confines of the Republic of Liberia.
Moreover, appellant also argued that the Constitution of Liberia provides that any person
criminally charged shall be charged by a jury of the vicinity wherein the offense is
committed, except where the party himself, because of local prejudice, prays for a change
of venue. Defendant therefore submits that, for him to be tried by a jury in Liberia, when
the offense for which he is charged is alleged to have been committed in another country,
namely Ghana, would certainly be depriving him of his constitutional right and guarantee.
Appellant motion was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the courts of Liberia have territorial jurisdiction over a Liberian consular
official domiciled in Liberia but working abroad who commits the crime of forgery in
connection with the consular accounts
Holding: Yes
Rule:
A Liberian consular official who is a citizen and domiciliary of Liberia may be indicted and
tried in his home county on a charge of having committed the crime of forgery, as defined
by the penal laws of Liberia, in connection with consular accounts.
Reasoning:
Consular officials are not entitled to the same extraterritorial privileges and immunities as
diplomatic officials, and are ordinarily subject to the laws of the countries where they are
stationed. It is established beyond contradiction by the records that the defendant below,
now appellant, is a citizen of the Republic of Liberia ; that he was employed by the Liberian
Government and sent into the foreign service from Monrovia, Montserrado County, his
place of residence, with assignment as financial secretary in the Liberian Consulate at
Takoradi, Ghana ; and that, whilst serving in this employ as aforesaid, he issued all checks
for and in the name of the Government of Liberia on the Bank of British West Africa,
Takoradi, which checks, although signed by appellant and the counsel, one J. Rufus
Simpson, yet the said checks were, by prefixing, altering and adding other figures on their
respective faces after being signed by the said consul, increased respectively from the
original amounts for which they were issued before they were cashed by the appellant,
with intent thereby to defraud the Government of Liberia.
It is a settled principle of international law, otherwise known as the law of nations, that,
unlike ambassadors and ministers serving in foreign countries, who enjoy inviolable
immunities, consular officials, being considered as the mercantile agents of their
governments, do not enjoy those rights and benefits; therefore it is their individual
responsibility to answer for offenses committed by them in violation of the laws of the
country in which they are assigned unless there are conventions extant between the two
countries which go to relieve them of such liability; but upon no stretch of imagination or
legal theory can it be accepted that, because they may be answerable for the violation of
the laws of the country in which they temporarily reside--if they do not enjoy the right of
exemption—they can equally and in the same manner be held to answer, tried and
punished in the country in which they hold temporary residence for violation of the laws
of the country in which they hold their allegiance ; nor can they be convicted and
sentenced out of the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of Liberia for any crime
committed against its laws. On the other hand, the principle of extraterritoriality has
always been interpreted to import that the area occupied by persons in the foreign service
of their government residing temporarily within the confines of another country, is the
territorial domain of the country to which they hold their allegiance; and therefore, all
crimes in violation of the laws of the government they represent are cognizable under such
laws, and not under the laws of the country in which they hold temporary residence by
reason of their appointments, because they continue to be subject to the laws of their own
country which governs their personal status and rights of property. It has not been
disputed that the appellant does hold citizenship in the Republic of Liberia; nor is he
excused under our law by way of exemption or otherwise from answering in our courts for
the commission of any crime.
Extraterritoriality is defined as the operation of the law of a state or country beyond or
outside of its physical boundaries.
Defendant's citizenship is known to be in Liberia. He must therefore be subject to the laws
of Liberia for the violation thereof. He was employed by the government of Liberia and
worked in her service. Enjoying those extraterritorial rights, he is supposed to have been
residing within the Liberian territorial jurisdiction at the time the crime for which he is held
liable was committed in violation of the laws of Liberia. If that is correct, as it appears to us
to be, then the charge could not have been brought against him in any other place than in
the Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County, his place of residence,
where the pure application of the Constitution in its guarantee of a trial by a jury of the
vicinity is enjoyed.
Article IV, Section 1st of our Constitution provides that the judicial power of this Republic
shall be vested in one Supreme Court and such subordinate courts as the Legislature may
from time to time establish. But the Constitution makes no provision for any other court
without the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic to exercise judicial function for the
violation of the laws of this country.
Article I, Section 8th of our Constitution provides that no person shall be held for a capital
or infamous crime, except in cases of impeachment, cases arising in the army or navy, and
petty offenses, unless upon presentment by a grand jury. These provisions of our
Constitution cannot become operative in any territory other than within the territorial
confines of Liberia. Therefore, since there is no law which authorizes anything to the
contrary, the conclusion must be that the defendant was indicted and tried within the
proper judicial forum and within the right jurisdiction.
Decision: Affirmed
George v RL
Action: Embezzlement.
Appellant George, was indicted at the First Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County, for the
crime of embezzlement. He was charged with having embezzled revenues to the total sum
$6,488.16 whilst employed by the Government of Liberia as Business Manager of the
Suacoco Experimental Station. The defendant was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the
charge. After the jury had brought in a verdict of guilty against him, the appellant filed a
motion for new trial seeking to have the verdict set aside. When this motion was denied,
he filed a motion in arrest of judgment, which, upon strong resistance by the prosecution,
was also denied. Appellant appealed. When the case was first called for hearing before the
Supreme Court, the appellant filed a motion to dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction. In
this connection he contended that, although he had been indicted, tried and convicted by
the Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County, the crime for which he
stood charged was committed in the Gbarnga District, Central Province, Liberian
Hinterland; that, according to Act of the Legislature approved December 22, 1949, the
Hinterland is divided into three separate and distinct provinces with circuits to be created
for each of the said provinces, to hear and dispose of matters of both a criminal and civil
nature; and that since these courts had not been created as the act provides, by
geographical location, Suacoco being a part of the Gbarnga District, falls within the
jurisdiction of Grand Bassa County and not Montserrado County, in which he had been
indicted, tried and convicted.

Issue:
Whether or not a motion to dismiss a criminal case for lack of territorial jurisdiction of a
court over the case, not raised in the lower court, can be raised in the Supreme Court for
the first time.
Holding: No
Rule:
Objection to the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court in a criminal prosecution cannot
properly be raised for the first time on appeal from a judgment of conviction.
Reasoning:
Appellant sought to dismiss the case against him for want of territorial jurisdiction of the
court below. This question having been raised strictly against the territorial jurisdiction of
the court, and not having been raised before the lower court, the appellant's attempt to
do so before this Court for the first time was regarded as untimely; hence this Court denied
the motion and proceeded to the hearing.
Decision: Affirmed.
Thomas v RL
Action: Theft
Appellant was an employee of the Bong Mining Company and worked in the company's
power house as a technician. He was summoned to the local police station in Bong Mines,
where he was accused of stealing two rice coupons from his divisional head at the power
house. Defendant appeared before the magistrate and pleaded not guilty, after which he
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Appellant contended that the writ which charged him with theft of property failed to state
the value of the property to give him notice and to determine the grade of the theft
allegedly committed, as well as to allow the court to determine its own jurisdiction. The
complaint had also failed to name the owner of the stolen property. The State, appellee
on the other hand, contended that the value of the coupons is generally known to
everyone in Bong Mines to be $24.00 each, and therefore the value of the stolen property
was $48.00. The magistrate denied the motion, tried the case on its merits, and eventually
convicted defendant of the crime of theft of property. In the circuit court, the case was
tried and defendant again filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the action. He maintained that a court trying an action of theft
of property determines its own jurisdiction from the value of the property allegedly stolen,
as under our law the crime is divided into grades based on the value of the stolen property.
Here, the complaint fails to indicate the value of the stolen property, which would have
given defendant notice of the extent of the charge against him; neither did it name the
owner of the stolen goods, which would have shown the owner of the property to whom
possible restitution would have been made in case defendant was convicted of the crime.
The prosecution, on the other hand, contended that defendant was barred from filing the
motion to dismiss the complaint at that stage, after pleading to the writ, as it is forbidden
to move for dismissal of a complaint after issue has been joined between the parties.
Hence, it prayed for denial of the motion and going into the merits of the matter instead.
The trial court denied the motion and ruled the case to trial on its merits for the fact that
the defendant had already pleaded to the writ. Hence, defendant was barred from moving
for dismissal of the said action. Appellant was convicted and sentenced to thirty (30) days
in jail. Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not failure of a criminal defendant to raise the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction before entering his plea to the indictment, constitutes a waiver such that he is
barred from subsequently raising the issue.
Holding: No
Rule:
The issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter can be raised by a defendant and
determined by a court competent to decide its own jurisdiction at any time before and
after final judgment.
Reasoning:
The complaint in this case is defective in one important respect: it fails to name the owner
of the goods allegedly stolen by appellant, as the statute and the rules require.
Additionally, it also fails to give the value of the stolen property, an essential element of
theft in this jurisdiction where theft is graded according to the value of the stolen property,
considering judgment may include restitution to the owner. It is not only a requirement of
the statute and rules of procedure that the complaint be a clear, concise and intelligent
statement of the offense charged, including the name of the person wronged, but more
importantly, in order to be concise and intelligible, a complaint of theft must allege the
owner of the stolen goods, if there is to be a prima facie case of theft against defendant at
all. A stolen property should be of value and have an owner who has not given consent to
the taking or transportation of said property. Penal Law, Rev. Code 26:15.54(6).
Hence, from the foregoing, we hold that the writ and complaint on which appellant was
arraigned, tried and convicted were incurably and fatally defective. It failed to give
appellant sufficient notice of the charge against him, and it in no way assisted the court
itself to determine its own jurisdiction over the charge of theft of property, which is graded
according to the value of the stolen property.
The second issue to be considered involves whether or not the lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter is one of the defenses in a criminal prosecution which must be raised before
a plea can be entered. The trial judge denied the appellant's motion to dismiss the
complaint and maintained that the issue should have been raised before a plea was
entered. Hence he concluded that the issue was barred from being raised after the issues
had been joined. However, our statute on criminal procedure provides as follows:
Defenses and objections based on defects in the institution of the prosecution or in the
indictment other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court over the subject matter
or to charge an offense, may be raised only by motion to dismiss before trial. The motion
shall include all such defenses and objections then available to the defendant. Failure to
present any such defense or objection as herein provided constitutes a waiver thereof, but
the court for cause shown may grant relief from the waiver. Lack of jurisdiction to try the
offense or the failure of the indictment or information to charge an offense shall be noticed
by the court at any stage of the proceeding." (Emphasis ours). Criminal Procedure Law,
Rev. Code 2:16.7(2).
This Court itself held on several occasions in the not too distant past that the issue of
jurisdiction over the subject matter can be raised by a defendant and determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction at anytime before and after final judgment.
From the foregoing, we conclude that the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter may
be raised at any stage of the trial before final judgment, and that the judge of the trial court
erred in denying appellant's motion to dismiss because the said motion was raised after a
plea was entered.
Decision: Judgment reversed.
Kra v RL (dismissal of an indictment for failure to proceed is not a ground or a bar to
subsequent prosecution of the defendant; in other words, double jeopardy will not
attach). For indictable offenses in criminal case, jury trial is a right of the defendant,
except he waives it. If a guilty verdict is returned against a defendant, the judge must give
5-days period to allow the defendant to file his post-trial motions (motion for new trial
and motion in arrest of judgment). If the verdict is one of acquittal, the judge enters the
final decision immediately.
Action: Piracy.

A ship of a friendly state, with whom Liberia holds treaties of friendship and of commerce,
got stranded at a remote point somewhere on the Kru Coast and the master was piratically
robbed of a large sum of money. The felon- Kra was discovered and taken into custody. A
libel was filed against the libellee, now plaintiff in error, by the libellant, now defendant in
error, in the admiralty jurisdiction of the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas of
Montserrado County, at its May term, A. D. 1904, charging the said plaintiff in error with
piratically taking from the person of one Capt. Mauser, master of the wrecked ship "Lulu
Bohlen," five hundred and sixty pounds sterling. When the case was called up for hearing,
Counsel for the plaintiff in error moved that the case be dismissed because no monition
(summons or public notice) had been issued, nor had an order to issue same been made
by the judge. The lower court refused to dismiss the suit for the reasons alleged, and
ordered the monition to be issued. During the proceedings, Counsel for the Libellee, now
plaintiff in error, again objected to the admission of depositions made by witnesses into
evidence contending that the said depositions were not taken by the deponent nor the
Justice of the Peace, but by his clerk; and that they were presented unsealed. At the close
of the trial, the libellee, now plaintiff in error, was adjudged guilty of piracy, and the
following punishment inflicted ; namely, "That the libellee, now plaintiff in error, will make
restitution of the stolen money £56o, less the amount recovered by the government, and
forfeit and pay to the government two hundred dollars; and failing to pay said amount, he
shall be imprisoned in the common jail, with hard labor in chains, sufficiently long to pay
said amount at the rate of six dollars per month. The Libellee appealed.

Issue:

Whether or not the recording of a deposition properly taken in the presence of a Justice
of the Peace by his clerk and its presentation in court unsealed, constitutes sufficient
grounds for its inadmissibility as evidence during trial, absent a showing that it has been
tampered with.
Holding: no
Rule:
Because depositions are unsealed is not sufficient ground to rule them out, where it does
not appear that they have been tampered with.
Reasoning:
As to the first ground, we fail to see the reason of it. It appears from the record, that
the depositions were properly taken before a Justice of the Peace and that they were
signed in the legal form by the deponent. The mere fact that they were recorded by the
magistrate's clerk and not by the magistrate himself, cannot impeach their genuineness
and validity; especially so when, as we have said, they were signed by the witnesses who
made the statements, and a jurat (that part of an affidavit where the officer certifies that
same was sworn before him) in legal form signed by the Justice of the Peace before whom
they were taken, which is prima facie evidence of their validity.
As to the second ground, this court is of opinion that the simple fact that
the depositions were presented at the trial unsealed, but which fact is unconnected with
any circumstance tending to show that they had been tampered with, or that they had in
any respect been altered, was not, in the opinion of this court, sufficient ground for the
court below to have ruled them out. It should be strictly observed, however, that the
exception on this point as laid in the assignment of error, is to the taking and non-sealing
of the depositions and not as to the legal right to use in evidence ex parte depositions in a
case of this nature.
Also, as we have already observed, the rule is otherwise in admiralty proceedings, where
the grand object of doing justice between the parties is superior to technicalities in form,
or other slight omissions." Supposing the judge below had adhered to the contentions of
the learned counsel for the libellee, now plaintiff in error, and dismissed the suit, and
supposing before process could be issued the accused should have absconded and his
discovery became impossible, is it difficult to imagine the ill-effect such a result would have
produced upon the minds of the tribes scattered along our coast, where the wrecks of
foreign merchantmen are frequently occurring, and whose piratical acts and maltreatment
to the passengers and crew of these wrecks have more than once been made the subject
of international inquiry.
Decision:
In an act defining piracy, found on the 145thpage of the Compiled Statutes of Liberia, in
Sec. 11 it is stated that "In all cases of conviction in any of the courts in this Republic of any
of those crimes denominated by the law as piracy, to which no specific penalty has been
assigned, and in which murder has not been committed, the penalty shall be a fine of not
less than five hundred dollars, and in default of payment, imprisonment for a term of five
years, but in cases in which murder has been committed the penalty shall be imprisonment
for life. This court therefore, under the authority of the statute above cited, reverses the
decree of the court below, so far as it relates to the punishment. This court decrees that
Kra, the plaintiff in error, is guilty of piracy and that he is sentenced to pay a fine of three
thousand dollars. Failing to pay said fine, he shall be imprisoned in the common jail for a
term of five years.
Note:
In admiralty practice the law allows a greater scope of privilege to parties than in common
law practice. In admiralty the court is bound to determine the case submitted to its
cognizance, upon equitable principles and according to the rules of natural justice. The
grand object of doing justice between the parties is superior to technical rules; and where
the strictest practice of the English common law, or the civil law, would turn a party out of
court, or defer, or prevent justice, by considering an arbitrary rule of proceedings as
paramount to all other considerations, the American admiralty finds in the educated
reason and cultivated discretion of the court the means of defeating chicanery, rectifying
mistakes, supplying defects, and of reconstructing his case, as far as necessary, without
the loss of such progress as he may have already made. In admiralty interests of great
moment are involved to the nation, whether in respect to its own citizens or to aliens. It
upholds the nation's majesty and credit. Largely it affects its revenue, which is its life-blood,
and that which enables it to exist and to maintain its independence, and to develop its
growth and afford to it the means of support and protection to its citizens; therefore the
law will not allow justice to be defeated for the want of technicalities or mere form, or
slight, non-essential omissions.
Jurat is a written and official certificate by an officer of the court that an affiant or a
deponent has confirmed or endorsed entire affidavit that the deponent proposes to sign
and also confirms that with regard to this representation, an oath has been administered
and affiant bound under oath.
Matierzo v RL
Action: Murder
Matierzo, a Filipino national employed on a Liberian registered vessel as a messman (cook), was
indicted for murder at the First Judicial Circuit Court, Criminal Assizes A, Montserrado County. The
indictment charged that while on high seas, defendant assaulted the captain of the vessel, stabbed
him in the chest and side, resulting into his instant death. During trial, Counsel for defendant made
an application for letters rogatory to have one Renato Pascion, who was considered a material and
an eye witness to the scene of the crime to testify. At the time of the application, Renato Pascion
was without the confines of the Republic of Liberia somewhere in the Philippines. The State
resisted this application on the grounds that at the commencement of the case before the
magisterial court on May 26, 1986, the application should have been made, and that not having
done so at that time constitutes waiver; that timely and adequate notice should have been given,
upon application filed before this court, as soon as the defendant had notice of the charge brought
against him in the indictment; that to grant the application of the defense at this tardy interval
would amount to granting of a continuance and paralyze the trial of this case; and finally that the
granting or denying of the application for letters rogatory is within the sound discretion of the
court. The trial judge denied defendant’s application for letters rogatory stating that although our
statute provides for the taking of deposition from absent witnesses during the trial of the case at
any time after the filing of the complaint and indictment, upon motion made upon notice to the
other parties, Criminal Procedure Law, Rev. Code 2: 17.1, yet when the said witness is outside the
confines of the Republic of Liberia the exercise becomes complicated and time consuming. We
agree with the contention that the defense should have made application for these letters
rogatory much earlier in time. Because of the complication and time consuming activities involved
in appointing a commission, or the issuance of letters rogatory, our statute further provides that
letters rogatory shall be issued only when necessary or convenient on application and notice.
Criminal Procedure Law, Rev. Code 2:13.1. Defendant was convicted and sentenced to death; he
appealed. Counsel for defendant contended that the testimony of witness Renato Pascion was
materially relevant, and the best evidence, since he was the only eye witness to the incident as to
what actually happened; and that to deny the application for these letters rogatory will be
prejudicial to defendant's right as guaranteed by the laws of this land to a fair trial, and result in a
failure of justice; that they were only retained to defend the interest of the defendant on June 30,
1986 at the time when the preliminary examination was held before the magisterial court and that
even if the application had been made and the defendant was represented at that stage, the
magisterial court could not have granted the request for letters rogatory since only our circuit
courts are empowered to do so.

Issue:
Whether or not failure of a criminal defendant in a murder trial to have made an application for
letters rogatory, before commencement of the trial, to have a material eyewitness’s testimony
taken by deposition, constitutes sufficient ground for denial, when said application is made
subsequently during the trial.
Whether or not denial of a criminal defendant’s application for letters rogatory to have a material
and eyewitness to the scene of the crime charged testimony to be taken by deposition in a murder
trial, violates his constitutional right to compulsory process of obtaining witnesses in his favor.
Holding: No to 1, Yes to two
Rule:
If it appears that a prospective witness may be unable to attend or may be prevented from
attending a trial or hearing in which his testimony is material, and that it is necessary to take
his deposition in order to prevent the perpetration of injustice, the court, at any time after the
filing of the complaint or an indictment, upon motion made and notice to the other parties, may
order that his testimony be taken by deposition, and that any designated books, papers,
documents, or portable things, not privileged, be produced at the same time and place.
In all criminal cases, the accused shall have the right to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor. Article 21(h) of the Constitution.
Reasoning
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that the trial court had erred in denying the
appellant's application for letters rogatory. The Court opined that the denial of the application was
a violation of the right of the appellant to compulsory process guaranteed by the Liberian
Constitution and statutes, and a deprivation of his right to due process of law, also guaranteed by
the Constitution and other laws of Liberia. These denials, the Court observed, deprived the
appellant of the opportunity to establish his innocence.
Forever and again, this Court has held that it is a constitutional right of every person charged with
the commission of a crime to have compulsory process for witness, and that where this right is
denied, it is a stupendous error of the court and a flagrant violation of the organic law. Cooper v.
Republic, [1894] LRSC 2; 1 LLR 256 (1894).
We held in the same case that it is a wicked and mischievous thing to deprive a prisoner in a capital
case, such as the instant case, of the testimony of his witness because of some technicality, and
that in a criminal trial everything calculated to elucidate the transactions should be received, since
the conclusion depends on a number of links which alone is weak but taken together are strong
and able to lead the mind to a conclusion". Id, we have, in like manner, held that to convict in a
criminal case, not only should there be a preponderance of evidence but also the evidence must
be so conclusive as to exclude every reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. Logan v.
Republic, [1924] LRSC 6; 2 LLR 472 (1924). Further, in a number of other cases, we have
acknowledged that the Constitution of Liberia guarantees to every person accused "compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor and it is error for the trial court to conclude a case
without allowing the accused the exercise of such constitutional right. Ware v. Republic, [1935]
LRSC 31; 5 LLR 50 (1935); Logan v. Republic, [1924] LRSC 6; 2 LLR
472 (1924); See also Wolo v. Wolo [1937] LRSC 12; , 5 LLR 423(1947). We now hold, as we have
held before, that it is the duty of the court, on the application of a prisoner, to send for his
witnesses where ever they may be had, and if necessary, to issue compulsory process in order to
obtain them; that the general rule of law rejects all hearsay reports of transaction, whether verbal
or written given by persons not produced as witnesses; and that fairness or impartiality is expected
of every judge in the trial of every cause brought before him, in order that untainted and
transparent justice may be meted out to both parties that are before him and under the sound of
his gavel within sacred walls of justice. Witherspoon v. Republic, [1938] LRSC 6; 6 LLR 211 (1938).
This Court has also held in the past that in criminal cases, especially capital cases, the prisoner
should be afforded every opportunity to establish his innocence; and when he is deprived of any
right or privilege guaranteed to him by the Constitution or other laws of Liberia, by the subterfuge
of his opponent or the action of the court, he cannot be said to have had a fair and impartial trial. .
Republic.
We especially take note of the fact that the judge, on the 30th, day of June, A. D. 1986, was
mandated by His Honor James N. Nagbe, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to remain in
jurisdiction in the court until the said case Republic v. Matierzo, was finally heard and determined.
We wonder very seriously also why the trial judge elected to deny the defendant's request for
letters rogatory to be sent to a competent tribunal at 32000 AN SPISKENISS, NOUSWAP, NAJUHELD
STREET 9, PHILIPPINE to have Renato Pascion appear before the said court or tribunal to answer
under oath to the interrogatories annexed to and/or couched in the application, and to have
said deposition submitted in writing and returned to the court below with the letters rogatory?
Surely, the trial judge must have been fully aware that without the requested testimony justice
could not have been done between the parties in this case. Moreover, to facilitate a speedy trial,
Renato Pascion could have been contacted through WATERPORT SHIP MANAGEMENT, P.O. BOX
214 NAJUHELD STREET 9, PHILIPPINE, TELEPHONE 31 (e) 1880-13077, Telex 29624, or WATER
PORT TANKERS OF HOLLAND.
It is therefore our considered opinion that the denial by the trial judge of defendant/appellant's
application for letters rogatory to have witness Renato Pascion, who was considered a material
and an eye witness to the scene of the crime, and the motion for a new trial, in which appellant's
whereabouts were clearly designated to be in the Philippine, such ruling of the trial judge was
therefore wrapped in a NOVELTY OF PREJUDICE and the judgment founded on the verdict of the
empanelled jury cannot be upheld by this court.
Decision: reversed and remanded for new trial
Note:
Every person charged with the commission of a crime has the constitutional right to compulsory
process for witnesses, and it is a stupendous error and a flagrant violation of the organic law of
the land for the court to deny this right to him. An accused person or prisoner should be afforded
every opportunity to establish his innocence; and when he is deprived of any right or privilege
guaranteed by the Constitution or other law, by the subterfuge of his opponent, or by action of
the trial court, he cannot be said to have had a fair and impartial trial. An accused or prisoner in a
capital offense cannot be deprived of the testimony of his witness because of some technicality;
and everything calculated to elucidate the transaction should be received. Only a defendant may
waive his right to procure witnesses; it is not a matter of discretion for the trial court and the court
cannot therefore deprive the defendant of such right. Murder is the killing of a person by another
person of sound mind and discretion, with malice and without legal excuse. Thus, to constitute
murder, there must be an element of intent accompanied by malice.
It has been held that "the dearest of man's inalienable right is life. We may deprive him of liberty
with only temporary effect; we may deny him the pursuit of happiness, but such denial is not
necessarily permanent; but if we take his life, it is the end of all. Courts of justice therefore, while
never forgetting the duties to guide with jealous care the rights of litigants in general, should watch
with special care every incident of a trial where human life is at stake". Lawrence v.
Republic, [1912] LRSC 2; 2 LLR 65 (1912), text at bottom paragraph.

The due process of law was intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the
powers of government, unrestrained by the established principle of private rights and distributive
justice. To have denied appellant his constitutional right or due process of law was to debar him
from challenging the substantive content of what may appear as reasonableness in the judgment
of the court. We hold the view that any other construction given to the concept of due process of
law would raise grave constitutional doubts and unreasonable judgments.
Note:
Pulling the jury is where each juror is called upon in open court to ascertain the verdict reached.
Manifest necessity are circumstances over which the court has no control: e.g: illness of the Judge,
Jury, defendant, and persons who presence is indispensable to the trial like: lawyer, pathologist in
a murder trial, inability of the jury to agree or reach a verdict, separation of the jury ( the jury has
to still together until the trial ends). A court can sua porte and dismiss a case for failure to proceed.
Any motion that should be made before selection of jury is a pre-trial motion.

Jury Trial

Introduction

The trial of a person accused of committing an indictable offense in Liberia is a constitutional

right of the accused, not a privilege. Article 21(h) of the Constitution of Liberia provides,
amongst other things, thus: “… the accused shall have the right to a speedy, public and
impartial trial by a jury of the vicinity, unless such person shall, with appropriate
understanding, expressly waive the right to a jury trial.” Consequently, in the prosecution
of a person accused of committing an indictable offense, it is the jury that decides whether
or not the person accused of a crime is guilty or not guilty. In other words, it is the jury
that determines whether the evidence adduced at trial proves beyond a reasonable doubt
that the crime charged was committed and that the person accused was the person who
committed it. The first order of business in a jury trial is constituting a trial jury. The
procedure for constituting a trial jury is provided for under chapter 19 of the Criminal
Procedure Law. Chapter 19 of the Criminal Procedure Law provides for the number of
jurors, their qualifications, how they are summoned, the procedure for their selection,
manner of challenging or objecting to a potential juror, ground for challenges and the
number and types of challenges that are available to each party in a criminal case tried
by a jury. For a detail understanding of the number and qualification of members of the
trial jury, read Chapter 18 of the Judiciary Law, as provided herein-below. The cases
assigned under this topic are intended to give the students a full understanding of the
procedure that governs a trial by jury in a criminal case.

I. Chapter 18. JURIES AND JURORS

§ 18.1. Composition of jury.

§ 18.2. Qualifications of jurors.

§ 18.3. Exemptions from jury service.

§ 18.4. Compensation of jurors.

§ 18.5. Misconduct by jurors.

§ 18.6. Penalty for refusal to serve as juror; exception for women.

§ 18.7. Female bailiffs to attend female jurors.

§ 18.1. Composition of jury.

Every trial jury shall be composed of twelve jurors and three alternates.[95]

§ 18.2. Qualifications of jurors.

1. In all cases. Any citizen of the Republic, male or female, who has attained
the age of twenty-one year, is competent to serve as a grand or petit juror in the
county in which he or she resides unless:

(a) He or she has been convicted of an infamous crime and his civil rights have
not been restored;
(b) He or she is unable to speak and understand the English language;
(c) He or she is incapable by reason of mental or physical infirmity of rendering
efficient jury service; or
(d) He or she has served on a jury within the preceding year.

2. In the case to be tried. A person shall be disqualified from acting as a juror in

any of the following cases:
(a) One in which he or she has a pecuniary interest;
(b) He or she is unable to speak, write, read and understand the English
language;[96]
(c) One in which the spouse of the person or an ancestor or descendant,
brother, sister, uncle, aunt, niece, nephew or first cousin is a party;
(d) One in which he has expressed any opinion indicating that he would not be
an impartial juror; or
(e) One in which he served on the grand jury which found the indictment in the
case involved.[97]

§ 18.3. Exemption from jury service.

1. Classes exempted. The following classes of person are exempt from service
as jurors:

(a) Members of the armed services in active services and all marshals, sheriffs,
constables, police officers and firemen;
(b) Public officers in the executive, legislative or judicial branches of the
Republic of Liberia or any political subdivision thereof who are actively engaged
in the performance of official duties;
(c) Physicians, clergymen, teachers and nurses who are actively engaged in
the practice of their professions; and lawyers, whether actively engaged in their
profession or not.

2. Individuals exempted. A circuit court judge for good cause may excuse from
jury service any person called as a juror.[98]

§ 18.4. Compensation of jurors.

A juror shall receive a fee of five dollars per diem for services rendered in a
circuit court or on a coroner's jury.[99]

§ 18.5. Misconduct by jurors.

1. Bribery. Jurors are forbidden to receive any bribe, present or promise of

reward, either pecuniary or otherwise by which the performance of their duties
might be influenced. Any juror who violates this provision, upon conviction, shall
be found guilty of the crime of bribery and penalized under the provisions of the
Penal Law.

2. Non-observance of oath. Jurors are required to perform their duties strictly

according to the terms of the oath administered to them. Any juror who violates
this provision, upon conviction, shall be found guilty of a misdemeanor
punishable by imprisonment up to 30 days or a fine up to the sum of $200 or
both, except that acts constituting the crime of bribery shall be dealt with in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this section.[100]

§ 18.6. Penalty for refusal to serve as juror; exception for women.

1. Women may refuse. A woman summoned to serve as a juror has the option
of refusing to serve.

2. Men punishable for refusal. Any man who is summoned to serve as a juror
and who is not exempt from such service under the provisions of this chapter
and who without an excuse refuses to serve as a juror may be punished for
contempt of court.[101]

§ 18.7. Female bailiffs to attend female jurors.

The court shall appoint one or more female bailiffs to attend upon any jury in
which there are female jurors. Such bailiffs shall be paid a per diem allowance
to be fixed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.[102]

II. Chapter 22. TRIAL BY JURY

§ 22.1. Right to trial by jury.

§ 22.2. Alternate jurors.

§ 22.3. Selection of jurors.

§ 22.4. Summoning jurors.

§ 22.5. Voir dire examination.

§ 22.6. Challenges.

§ 22.7. Oath of jurors.

§ 22.8. Conduct and maintenance of jury during trial.

§ 22.9. Instructions to jury.

§ 22.10. Summary of evidence by the judge.

§ 22.11. Verdicts.

§ 22.12. Report of verdict; polling the jury; entry of verdict.

§ 22.13. Unanimous verdict required; new trial on disagreement.

§ 22.14. Special juries.

§ 22.1. Right to trial by jury.

1. Right preserved. The right to trial by jury as declared by Chapter III, Article
20(a) of the Constitution or as given by statute shall be preserved inviolate.

Note. The requirement of demand for a jury trial by a party as provided for
under section 22.1.2 up to 22.1.6 are not applicable to Criminal Procedure Law,
therefore, they are excluded hereunder.

§ 22.2. Alternate jurors.

In addition to the regular panel three jurors shall be called and empanelled to
sit as alternate jurors. Such jurors shall be drawn at the same time, from the
same source, in the same manner, and have the same qualifications and shall
be subject to the same examination and challenges as the regular jurors. They
shall be seated with and treated in the same manner as the regular jurors,
except that an alternate juror who does not replace a principal juror shall be
discharged when the jury retires to consider its verdict. If, before the final
submission of the case, a regular juror dies, or becomes ill, or for any other
reason becomes unable to perform or is disqualified from performing his duty,
the court may order him to be discharged and draw the name of an alternate,
who shall replace the discharged juror in the jury box, and be treated as if he
had been selected as one of the regular jurors.[316]

§ 22.3. Selection of jurors.

The appropriate official of each commonwealth district, municipal district, city,

and township shall submit quarterly to the clerk of the Circuit Court of the judicial
district in which such official performs his duties a list of names of a number of
persons whom he believes to be qualified to serve as jurors in his judicial
district, to be nonexempt, and to be intelligent, honest, fair-minded, of good
reputation, and capable of rendering satisfactory service. The clerk of the Circuit
Court shall select from the list submitted to him the names of forty-two persons
to compose a venire of grand and petit jurors for the following term of court. The
names selected by the clerk shall be those of persons from the various
commonwealth districts, cities, municipal districts, and townships in the judicial
district in proportion to the number of inhabitants as nearly as can be estimated.
Such persons shall be summoned to attend at the opening day of the term in
accordance with the provisions of section 22.4. On the opening day of court,
the judge of the Circuit Court shall designate fifteen of the forty-two persons
composing the venire to serve as grand jurors. Before the trial of each civil case
during the term, the names of each of the remaining twenty-seven persons
composing the venire shall be written on a separate piece of paper of the same
size and appearance as all of the other pieces. Each piece shall be folded to
conceal the name thereon and shall be placed in a box, which the sheriff shall
shake in order to mix the slips of paper as well as possible. The names shall be
drawn by the sheriff in the presence of the court. The persons whose names
are drawn shall be subject to examination and challenge as provided in sections
22.5 and 22.6. The twelve persons whose names are first drawn and who are
found acceptable shall serve as jurors and the three persons whose names are
next drawn and who are found acceptable shall serve as alternates. The judge
shall appoint the foreman. If the panel is exhausted before sufficient jurors have
been selected, the sheriff, on direction of the court, shall summon a sufficient
number of qualified persons as talesmen from the bystanders.[317]

§ 22.4. Summoning jurors.

The forty-two persons composing the venire of grand and petit jurors shall be
summoned to attend court on the opening day of the term. The summons shall
be served by the sheriff ten days previous to the opening day by delivering a
copy thereof to the person named therein or by mailing a copy to the person at
his last known address by registered mail. If service is by mail, the addressee's
receipt shall be attached to the return.[318]

§ 22.5. Voir dire examination.

The court may conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may permit the
parties or their attorneys to do so. If the court conducts the examination, it shall
permit the parties or their attorneys to supplement the examination by such
further inquiry as it deems proper or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors
such additional questions of the parties or their attorneys as it deems proper.[319]
§ 22.6. Challenges.

1. Generally. An objection to the qualifications of a juror must be made by a

challenge. A challenge may be made either to the entire panel on the ground
that it was illegally drawn or to an individual juror.

2. Challenges for cause or favor. A party may challenge a juror on the ground
that he is disqualified under the Judiciary Law or by reason of any interest or
bias. The fact that a juror is in the employ of a party to the action, or, if a party
to the action is a corporation, that he is a shareholder therein, shall constitute a
ground for a challenge to the favor as to such juror.

3. Waiver on ground of disqualification. Failure by a party to challenge the panel

or to challenge a juror under paragraph 2 of this section shall be deemed a
waiver of the right to object and shall foreclose the right to move for a new trial
on such grounds; provided that a party may be entitled to a new trial if he shows
that a juror made false answers to material questions concerning his
qualifications.

4. Rulings upon challenges. A challenge to a juror or to the panel must be heard

and determined by the court subject to the right of the objecting party to save
his objection.

5. Peremptory challenges. Each party shall be entitled to four peremptory

challenges.

§ 22.7. Oath of jurors.

Immediately after the selection of the jury and before the commencement of the
trial, all the jurors composing the jury, including the alternates, shall take the
following oath faithfully to try the cause and render a verdict according to the
law and the evidence:

"You and each of you do solemnly swear that you will well and faithfully try the
cause now before this court and a true verdict render according to the law and
the evidence, so help you God."

Any juror who has conscientious scruples against taking an oath may instead
give his solemn affirmation. In an appropriate case a juror may be sworn
according to native customary law.[321]

§ 22.8. Conduct and maintenance of jury during trial.

All the regular jurors comprising a jury shall be kept together from the time it is
sworn or affirmed until it renders a verdict and is discharged; and the alternate
jurors shall be kept with the jury until they are discharged as provided in section
22.2, provided that when a mixed jury is not engaged in hearing evidence or in
deliberation, a room shall be provided for the female jurors separate from that
for the male jurors. No juror, either regular or alternate, shall communicate with
any person other than the constable or bailiff sworn to attend them. The judge
at the trial may, however, dispense with any of these requirements.

§ 22.9. Instructions to jury.

1. Prior to retirement of jury. At the close of the evidence or at any earlier time
during the trial any party may request in writing that the court instruct the jury
on the law as set forth in his requests. The court shall inform counsel of its
proposed action upon the requests prior to their arguments to the jury, but the
court shall in such instance instruct the jury in writing after the arguments are
completed. The court shall instruct the jury on every issue of law arising out of
the facts even though no requests to charge thereon have been submitted by
counsel. No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an
instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its
verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his
objection. Opportunity shall be given to make the objection out of the hearing
of the jury.

2. After retirement of the jury. The jury may at any time during deliberations ask
the court for instructions on any point, and the court shall, if the request is
proper, give the jury such instructions.[323]

§ 22.10. Summary of evidence by the judge.

At the time of instructing the jury, the judge may sum up the evidence and
instruct the jury that they are to determine the weight of the evidence and the
credit to be given to the witnesses.[324]

§ 22.11. Verdicts.

1. In general. A general verdict is one in which the jury finds in favor of one or
more parties. A special verdict is one in which the jury finds the facts only,
leaving the court to determine which party is entitled to judgment thereon. In
every case the court shall direct the jury to return a general verdict unless in his
opinion the facts adduced in evidence justify the return of a special verdict.
2. Procedure in connection with special verdicts. When the court requires a jury
to return a special verdict, the court shall submit to the jury written questions
susceptible of categorical or other brief answer or written forms of the several
findings which might properly be made, or it may use any other appropriate
method of submitting the issues and requiring written findings thereon. The
court shall give sufficient instruction to enable the jury to make its findings upon
each issue. If the court omits any issue of fact raised by the pleadings or
evidence, each party waives his right to a trial by jury of the issue so omitted
unless before the jury retires he demands its submission to the jury. As to an
issue omitted without demand, the court may make an express finding or shall
be deemed to have made a finding in accordance with the judgment.[325]

§ 22.12. Report of verdict; polling the jury; entry of verdict.

The foreman of the jury shall deliver its verdict. On demand of a party at any
time before the jury is discharged, the jury shall be polled to determine whether
all the jurors subscribe to the verdict. On rendition of the verdict, the clerk shall
make an entry in his minutes specifying the time and place of the trial, the
names of the jurors and witnesses, the general verdict if such a verdict was
rendered, the questions or answers or other written findings constituting a
special verdict, and the direction, if any, which the court gives with respect to
subsequent proceedings.[326]

§ 22.13. Unanimous verdict required; new trial on disagreement.

The consent of all jurors is necessary to a verdict. If, after the jury has been
kept together a reasonable time, the court is satisfied that there is no prospect
that the jurors will agree on a verdict, the court shall discharge the jury and
direct a new trial before another jury.[327]

§ 22.14. Special juries.

After the conclusion of a term of a Circuit Court when civil cases remain to be
tried, a Circuit Court may in its discretion, at the request of either party, order a
special jury empaneled to try any civil case. The jury shall be selected in the
same manner as other trial juries. Immediately after final judgment has been
rendered in such a case the clerk of the court shall calculate the jury fee,
including the costs of selecting and empaneling the jury, compensation of
jurors, and other incidental expenses in connection with the jury. The party who
requested the special jury shall pay the per diem juror's fees in advance; but
when costs are assessed, the losing party must pay such fee to the sheriff within
three days or execution shall issue.[328]
II. Trial Procedures

16. Trial

a. Jury trial

i. Number, qualification of jurors

ii. Summoning and selection of jurors

iii. Challenges and grounds

iv. Waiver of challenges

v. Oath of jurors

vi. Appointment of officers, regular and alternates jurors

b. Waiver of jury trial

Cases

Monday, June 24, 2019

A. Definition and function of a trial jury

i. Padmore v RL [1933] LRSC 11; 3 LLR 418---------Nat Gbaba

ii. Simpson v. RL 3LLR 300(1932)-----Lauretta Mammah

B. Constituting a trial jury: challenges, objections, disqualification

i. Universal Printing Press, v. Blue Cross Insurance Company [2015] LRSC 43 (14 August
2015) ----Dominic Massaquoi
Note. This is a civil case but, it constitutes the same rule applicable to jury
selection in a criminal case.

ii. McBurrough v RL [1934] LRSC 3; 4 LLR 25 (1934)-------------------- ------- Romeo Bah

iii. Wilkins v RL [1960] LRSC 36; 14 LLR 18 ( 1960) --------------------- Vasco Brown
iv. Keller v RL [1979] LRSC 5; 28 LLR 49 (1979) -------------------------Anthony Stephens
v. Coleman v RL [1958] LRSC 49; 16 LLR 341 (1958) -------------Ebenezer Zonoe
vi. Watts v RL [1951] LRSC 18; 11 LLR 77 (1951) -------------------Peteryna Jah
vii. Tambo v RL [1933] LRSC 3; 3 LLR 382 (1933) ------------------Siaffa B. Kemokai
viii. Tolbert v RL [1982] LRSC 33; 30 LLR 3 (1982) -----------------Shem P. Blafouley

C. Disqualification of a juror or the jury panel after empanelment

i. Mason v RL [1934] LRSC 9; 4 LLR 81 (1934)------------Gloria Zayzay
ii. RL v Dillon [1962] LRSC 14; 15 LLR 119 (1962) --------Joseph West
iii. Seton v. RL, 4LLR 238 (1935)--------------------------Jeremiah Dougbo
iv. Pratt v. RL, 4LL386 (1935) June 28, 2019---------Harmoni Flimester
D. Improper influence on the jury
1. By a judge
i. McBurrough v RL [1934] LRSC 3; 4 LLR 25 (1934) -----Romoe Bah

2. By counsel
i. v Occidentale [1958] LRSC 20; 13 LRSC 278 (1958) ----Patrick Davis

3. Prejudgment by a juror
i. Seton v. RL, 4LLR 238 (1935)------Darlington Duoe
ii. Pratt v. RL, 4LL386 (1935)-------- George Mulbah
E. Verdict
1. Defined
i. Padmore v. RL, 3LLR418----- ----Nat Gbaba
2. Unanimous defined
i. Davidson v. Worrell, 3LLR362--- Forstina Gongbah
3. Unanimous verdict required in criminal cases
i. Johns v. RL 1LLR 240----------- Prince Decker
ii. ZANGBAH v. RL, 4LLR140……Tamia Mabane

July 1, 2019
F. Polling of Jury
i. Johnson v RL [1962] LRSC 12; 15 LLR 88 (1962)—Ezekiel Kumeh

ii. McBurrough v RL [1934] LRSC 3; 4 LLR 25 (1934) –Romeo Bah

iii. Jackparwolo v RL [1961] LRSC 18; 14 LLR 359 ----Kebeh Monee Toumasiah
 G. Validity of Verdict
i. Togba v RL [1988] LRSC 73; 35 LLR 389 (1988) Michari Tomah
ii. Bestman v RL [2013] LRSC 5 (19 February 2013) Prince Kieh

H.Right to waive jury trial

i. RL v Nbolonda [2014] LRSC 36 (14 August 2014) Emmett Kaye
Padmore v RL
Action: Murder
Appellant Padmore was indicted on the charge of murder at the First Judicial Circuit,
Montserrado County; she was arraigned upon said indictment, to which she pled "Not
Guilty. Issue being thus joined, a jury of her own choice was empanelled and hearing the
facts of the case, the jury returned a guilty verdict against appellant, and she was
sentenced to death by hanging. Appellant filed a motion in arrest of judgment to set aside
said verdict and arrest the judgment of the court against her. Appellant contended that
the indictment on its face does not show that it was found by a grand jury duly sworn; that
since the indictment was drawn contrary to the statute, the Court was without jurisdiction
to pronounce sentence; that the verdict is manifestly against the evidence and instructions
of the court.
Issue:
Whether or not the jury is the trier of facts in a case.
Whether or not the jury as triers of facts, verdict must be in conformity with the facts of
the case as submitted and the legal instructions of the court.
Holding: Yes to both
Rule:
A jury is a body of men who are sworn to declare the facts of a case as they are proven
from the evidence placed before them by witnesses under oath or affirmation; when they
become unanimous and decide on such facts and the law, they report such findings to the
court, which is called their verdict.
When the facts in the case as given by the testimony of witnesses are considered and it
cannot be clearly seen that the verdict is justified by the oath the jury took, the judgment
based on such a verdict will be reversed.
Reasoning:
When the jury is sworn, the case is usually opened, and the evidence marshalled, examined
and presented by the prosecution to enable the jury to draw their conclusions from the
facts and render that true and valid verdict for which the oath was taken. A verdict to be
valid must be in conformity with the facts submitted and the legal instructions of the court.
When the facts in this case as given by the witnesses in their testimony are considered, it
can be clearly seen that the verdict in this case is not justified by the oath which the jury
took to "well and truly try the issue joined between the Republic of Liberia and the prisoner
in this case and a true verdict given according to the evidence." If the verdict is
unsupported by evidence, then there is no foundation upon which the judgment could
rest, and if the judgment of the court below is not founded upon a legal verdict, said
judgment could not merit that consideration so as to be affirmed by this Court to say that
prisoner is guilty of wilful murder and not manslaughter.
Decision: Reversed and sentence modified.
Note:
In jury case, a judge only role is to admit evidence while the jury gives credibility to the
evidence admitted.
Simpson v RL
Action: Slave Trading
Appellant Simpson was indicted by the grand jury of Montserrado County for the crime of
slave trading at the 1st Judicial Circuit. Appellant was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. At
the close of the trial, the petit jury brought down a verdict of guilty against appellant and
he was sentenced to eighteen months of imprisonment; he appealed contending that on
the evening of the 14th day of May, 1931, when the court's session for the day had been
closed and adjourned to meet the next day at 9 o'clock a.m. and the petit jury empanelled
in the case had separated and gone out of court, the court did call the said jurors back and
empanelled them on the said case in the absence of the prisoner and his counsel. Appellant
further contended that on the 5th day of May, 1931, the jury was re-empanelled in his
absence and his counsel as well, thereby depriving him of his constitutional rights to the
effect that all persons criminally charged have a right to a public and impartial trial and
nothing can be done during the trial of the case in the absence of the prisoner or his
counsel without his consent; that not having consented to the empanelling of the jurors in
his absence and in the absence of his counsel, said act of the court worked an injustice
against him and is contrary to law and judicial procedure. Appellant argued further that
the jury’s verdict was absolutely against and in defiance of the legal instructions of the
court. Finally, appellant argued that the jury verdict cannot support the judgment because
Judge charged the jury that the evidence of parties to suit is not evidence in a court of
justice in the face of enabling Statute approved February 8, 1908, which charge of court so
prejudiced the case that the jury was misled in arriving at their verdict.
Issue:
Whether or not the re-empanelling of the petit jury after adjournment of the day’s session
without the consent of the defendant, constitutes an error, absent a showing that the re-
empanelling was prejudicial to the interest of the defendant.
Holding: No (the function of the jury is to determine the credibility of the evidence while
the judge’s function is to determine the admissibility of the evidence)
Rule:
An order of the trial judge to the sheriff to re-empanel a petit jury after the adjournment
of the day's session, in the absence of the accused, unless it is clearly shown that some act
had been done which would prejudice the interest of either party to the cause, is not error.
Reasoning:
An order of the trial judge to the sheriff to re-empanel a petit jury after the adjournment
of the day's session in the absence of the accused, unless it is clearly shown that some acts
have been done which would prejudice the interest of either party to the cause, is not
error.
The statutes of Liberia command that: "Every jury must be kept together, from the time at
which they are affirmed, until they render a verdict, without communicating with any
person, except the constable sworn to attend them, unless the court dispense with any
part of this section. It is therefore imperative that the jury be kept together, says the
statute, unless the court in its discretion shall deem it safe to all parties concerned to
dispense with this section, and in so doing the parties to the cause need not be consulted.
There is no evidence in the records of the case which has been put forward by the defense
sufficiently strong to overturn the evidence of the prosecution. While it is a general
principle of law that the burden of proof rests on the party who maintains the affirmative;
yet where the facts lie peculiarly within the knowledge of a party to a cause, he shall be
held to prove the negative.
Amended and Affirmed.
Universal Printing Press, v. Blue Cross Insurance Company
Action of damages
Universal Printing Press was insured with the Blue Cross Insurance Company. Its premises
got flooded as a result of a rainstorm which damaged its equipment and facilities; this risk
was covered under the insurance policy for which appellant has been paying premiums.
Plaintiff sent a claim to defendant to indemnify it for its loss, but defendant refused on the
ground that plaintiff’s policy has expired. On request of the plaintiff, the jury was
empanelled and the case ruled to trial. At the close of the trial, the jury returned a verdict
adjudging defendant not liable. Appellant filed a motion for new trial stating as a ground
that juror Mercy Kandakai, who had served on a panel of Jury in Criminal "C" within the
preceding year, lied about her immediate previous service and was allowed to serve on
this current panel, which constituted a sufficient basis for awarding a new trial. Further
that this act by the juror Kandakai was a violation of Section 18.2 of the New Judiciary Law
and was tantamount to a pollution of the jury; and that the act, being in violation of the
law governing the selection and service of jurors, presented a legal and valid reason for the
trial judge to set aside the verdict of the jury and award a new trial as prayed for in the
motion for new trial. Appellant’s motion for new trial was denied. Appellant appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not, where a party has failed in its due diligence obligation and has allowed a
person to be selected as a juror without objections, is such negligent party deemed to have
waived his right to subsequently question the service of that juror or seek a new trial on
that account.
Holding: Yes
Rule:
Where a party, on account of a failure of due diligence, does not challenge the jury panel,
particularly on the ground that the juror or prospective juror is disqualified under the
Judiciary Law, or by reason of interest or bias, the negligent party waives the right to object
and thereby "foreclose the right to move for a new trial on such grounds". The only
exception to this dictate of the statute is where the "juror made false answers to material
questions concerning his qualification. Civil Procedure Law, Rev. Code 1:22.6.
Reasoning:
Parties to a case must exert due diligence to ensure that the jury selection process is not
tainted with irregularities as would bring into question the neutrality of the jurors or open
avenues for challenges to or accusations of dishonesty on the part of the jury or any
member thereof during or after the trial of a case. It means further, making specific
reference to the instant case, that at the time of selection of the jurors, either at the
opening of court or at the time of selection of the jurors preparatory to the
commencement of the trial on the merits, appellant had the opportunity to challenge any
juror or jurors, peremptory or for cause, if there was evidence or even suspicion, and upon
query being made of the juror, that any juror or jurors had served on a jury panel at a term
of the court, whether in the same court or in another court, within the span of the
preceding year. It does not seem to us that due diligence was carried out in the instant
case by counsel for the appellant to ascertain if any juror or prospective juror was acting
in violation of the Judiciary Law in seeking to serve as a juror.
The statute is very clear that when such an issue is raised, and in a timely manner, the trial
judge has the legal duty to commence forthwith investigation into the allegation and to
ascertain the truthfulness thereof, and if the investigation reveals the allegation to be true,
to immediately have such person or persons; disqualified from service as jurors.
In the case Tolbert v. Republic, [1982] LRSC 33; 30 LLR 3 (1982) wherein the defendant/
appellant was charged with murder, tried, convicted and sentenced to death, he appealed
the judgment of the trial court to the Supreme Court, stating in his bill of exceptions that
certain of the jurors had not met the qualification laid down in the Judiciary Law for service
as jurors. Although the defendant/appellant did not include or pursue the contention or
traverse the issue in his Brief filed before the Supreme Court, and the Court therefore
regarded same as a waiver of the contention, it nevertheless felt the need, in passing, to
address the issue. This is what the Court said of the issue presented: "The said two counts
of the bill of exceptions not having been traversed in the appellant's brief and argued
before us, they must be treated as having been waived. However, we would like to observe
only in passing that appellant could not have successfully argued on appeal that some of
the empanelled jurors could not read or write their names, especially so when he
participated in the selection of the empanelled jury and raised no objection to any of them.
A party may challenge a juror on the ground that he [or she] is disqualified under the
Judiciary law or for reason of an interest or bias. Such a challenge may be made only before
the jurors are sworn except that the court may, for good cause, permit it to be made after
the jurors are sworn, but before any evidence is presented. Failure by a party to challenge
the panel or to challenge a juror shall be deemed a waiver of the right to object and shall
foreclose the right to move for a new trial on such grounds or to raise the objection at any
subsequent time. Although the quoted opinion involved a criminal trial, the same principle
applies to civil matters, as clearly noted from section 22.6 of the Civil Procedure law.
In the motion for new trial, the plaintiff/appellant alleged that juror Mercy Kandakai had
lied, when during the jury selection process, she stated that she had not served on any jury
panel for the two years preceding her selection. The plaintiff/appellant further alleged that
it was in consequence of the lie told by juror Kandakai that she was selected to serve as
juror. We note that without referencing any specific date and sheet, the plaintiff/appellant
requested the court to take notice of the minutes of the court. It is the opinion of this Court
that such notice to the trial court was faulty, and indeed our inspection and review of the
file of the trial revealed that no such record was ever made, either at the time of the
selection of juror Mercy Kandakai or any time thereafter, until the filing of the motion for
new trial. Thus, contrary to the allegations made by the plaintiff/appellant that the records
showed that juror Mercy Kandakai was asked about her previous service on a jury panel
within the last twelve months, the records before us state only that following the granting
of the plaintiffs/appellant's application by the trial judge for the selection of a jury panel to
try the case, a fifteen member jury panel was selected by counsels for both parties. Nothing
in the records show that any question was asked of the juror Mercy Kandakai or any other
jurors as to how long it had been since they last served as jurors, and that she or any other
jurors responded that it had been over two years since they had last served.
Further, nowhere in the records is it revealed that during the entire trial the issue was
raised or brought to the attention of the court that a juror had lied when being questioned
to see if the juror had met the qualification for service stipulated in the Judiciary Law. We
can therefore not take the allegation made by the appellant in the motion for new trial,
the bill of exceptions and the brief that juror Mercy Kandakai was asked the question as to
her last service on a jury panel and that she had lied in her response to question, to be
true, on its face, in the absence of records verifying or substantiating the allegation.
Robertson and Reeves v. Quiah Brothers, Supreme Court Opinion, October Term, A. D.
2011. The Supreme Court can only take cognizance of matters appearing in the records
made in the records in the lower court and certified by the Clerk to the Supreme Court.
The circuit court, being a court of record, this Court cannot review any act attributed to
that court where the evidence of the commission of such act is lacking in the records of
the court. Thus, to accept or endorse the contention of the appellant, in the absence of
such records or evidence to support the allegation, would be tantamount to indulging in
and endorsing speculation and conjecture, an act this Court has said repeatedly it is not
prepared to countenance. Thus, in the absence of such records, the Supreme Court would
be acting in clear violation of the statute governing challenges to a jury selection were we
to accept as true, without any appearance in the records of any challenge having been
made at the time prescribed by statute, and would be acting solely on the basis of
speculation and allegations without proof, the net effect of which would be the
overturning of the statute or restricting its application.
Further, this Court has also opined that questions relating to irregularities on the part of a
juror must be raised before the jurors are disbanded. This is what this Court said in the
case Brown et al. v. Republic, Supreme Court Opinion, October Term, 2009, delivered
January 21, 2010: "A proper basis for inclusion in a motion for a new trial and the bill of
exceptions of a complaint regarding jury tempering or irregular behavior is that it first be
raised while the jury is still empanelled, and where a party fails to follow this procedure
the issue will he considered to be improperly brought before the Supreme Court for
review." The same principle applies to the situation raised by the appellant in the instant
case.
We should emphasize further that no allegation is made by the appellant of jury tampering
as would have necessitated an investigation by the trial judge. Had such an issue been
raised, and before the jury was disbanded (Constance et al. v. Ajavon et al.[2000] LRSC 31;
, 40 LLR 295 (2000)), any refusal or failure by the trial judge to conduct an investigation
into the allegations would have constituted a reversible error and thus would be a basis
upon which we would reverse the verdict and the judgment and order a new trial. Fangi v.
Republic, [2004] LRSC 7; 42 LLR 74 (2004); Instead, as distinct from jury tampering, the
allegation set forth by the appellant is that one of the jury had lied in stating that she had
not served on a jury panel within twelve months of the time of her service in the instant
case. As stated earlier, not only was the allegation not supported by the records as to
whether the question was even asked of the juror, but the right to challenge was definitely
waived when not shown to have been made at the time the jurors were being selected.
It seems to us that counsels for the plaintiff/appellant, not having done their homework
seek, by the belated challenge made in the motion for new trial, to have the
Plaintiff/appellant fall within the exclusion or exception specified by the law for awarding
a new trial to a losing party in a trial.
However, as noted before, in order to have the appellant fall within the ambit of the
exclusion or exception regarding the qualification of a juror, the records must clearly show
that the question on the juror’s qualification was asked of the juror and that the juror had
lied in her response to the said question. The records do not reveal that any such question
was posed to juror Mercy Kandakai or that an untrue answer was given by her, as alleged
by the appellant.

Accordingly, and for the reasons stated above, we hold that the contentions raised by the
appellant, both in its bill of exceptions and brief filed before this Court, regarding the
service on the jury panel by Ms. Mercy Kandakai not having been raised or challenged at
the time of her selection for jury service or service on the jury panel in the instant case
before the court commenced taking evidence, lack legal merits and are therefore not
sustained.
Decision: Reversed.
McBurrough v RL
Action: False Imprisonment
Appellant McBurrough was indicted for the crime of false imprisonment by the grand jury
for Maryland County, Fourth Judicial Circuit. Appellant was arraigned and pled not guilty
to the charge, whereupon the jury was duly empanelled to try the issue joined between
appellant and the State. The petit jury case returned a verdict of guilty against appellant
and he was ordered to pay a fine of two hundred dollars, or be imprisoned for six months
with hard labor. Appellant filed a motion for new trial stating as a ground that juror John
Ross of the empanelled jurors is not an enfranchised citizen of the Republic of Liberia.
Appellant appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not, where a juror has been admitted to try a case without objection or after
objection has been made and disallowed without the objecting party excepting, Is a
disqualification existing before an acceptance of a person as a juror, a ground to set aside
the jury’s verdict and order a new trial.
Holding: No
Rule:
If a juror is admitted to try a cause without objection, or after objection has been taken
and disallowed, the verdict shall not be set aside on account of any disqualification existing
before his acceptance as a juror. Rev. Stat. 467, § 360.
Reasoning:
The Constitution guarantees to every party criminally charged the right of trial by a jury of
his peers; but obviously it becomes the duty of a party desiring to enjoy the privileges
guaranteed him under the law to take advantage thereof at the proper time. At the call of
the case the trial court proceeded to select twelve good and lawful citizens of the Republic
to try the issue joined by allowing challenges for cause. But where a competent and
impartial jury shall have been secured in any proceeding its verdict will not be set aside
because the trial judge erred in retaining upon the panel one who was in fact disqualified
and who was then peremptorily challenged and admitted to which no exception was taken,
although it afterwards appears that the party had exhausted all his peremptory challenges.
From a careful inspection of the records of the case in point, it is nowhere shown that the
prisoner or his attorneys ever called the attention of the court below to the fact that the
said juror was not an enfranchised citizen of this Republic, and such failure on their part is
tantamount to a waiver. Hence defendant cannot at this stage object to the said juror as
he is also guilty of laches. Our statute provides that: any party to an action may object to
the entire panel on the ground that the same was illegally drawn or to any juror on the
ground of bias, prejudice or other cause sufficient to disqualify such juror, which objections
shall be determined by the court subject to the right of the party objecting to take an
exception, of which exception he may avail himself in the event of an appeal on his part
after the final trial of his case. After a jury is drawn for the trial of an action and before it is
sworn any party may peremptorily object to three jurors, and may examine each juror as
to his qualifications, and any objection to the competency of any juror to sit on a trial shall
be disposed of by the Court, subject to the right of the party objecting to take an exception.
Decision: Reversed.
Wilkins v RL
Action: Smuggling
Appellant Wilkins was indicted by the grand jury of Montserrado County. 1st Judicial Circuit
for the crime of smuggling. Counsel for appellant interposed an objection to the entire
panel at a time the panel had not been fully selected; only ten jurors had been selected;
and there were then before the court four jurors to be objected to or not by either side.
Counsel for appellant requested the court not to empanel the jury drawn, but to disband
them and have a set of jurors regularly drawn to try and determine the issue of this cause
and contended that the State has exercised four peremptory challenges in disqualifying
prospective jurors from serving on the panel in violation of the statute. Also that the ten
jurors already selected were illegally drawn to his client’s prejudice. Lastly, that several of
the jurors who have been excluded from the panel do not fall within the grounds laid down
by our statutes for the disqualification of jurors. The State counter-argues that it has not
used more than three peremptory challenges; that it had exercised those challenges for
good cause. The court overruled appellant’s objection to the empanelling of the jury noting
that there is not a scintilla of evidence to show that the prosecution did use four
peremptory challenges in the instant cause. The court is therefore of the opinion that
appellant’s objection is untenable in law, and will therefore proceed to complete the
empanelling of this jury; and if, at such completion, he should discover grounds sufficient
in law to warrant objection to the entire panel, he will then do so. Appellant then filed a
petition for the writ of certiorari to correct this allegedly erroneous ruling by the trial judge.
The Chambers Justice denied issuance of the writ; appellant appealed to the full bench.
Issue:
Whether or not certiorari will lie to correct alleged errors in the procedure of empanelling
a jury where a party fails to object to any of the individual jurors until after the selection of
some of the jurors, then said party proceeds to object to an entire panel before it could be
selected.
Holding: No
Rule:
Certiorari will not be granted to correct alleged errors in the procedure of empanelling a
jury where the petitioner had a remedy for such errors by way of objection and appeal.

Reasoning:

Appellant made no objections to any of the individual jurors until after the selection of the
ten, when he interposed objections not only to the three jurors then before the court, but
to the entire panel, which indicates that he elected to object to an entire panel before it
could be selected, which procedure is untenable in law. Any objection to a prospective
juror shall be decided by the court subject to the right of the objecting party to take an
exception of which he may avail himself if he takes an appeal from the judgment of the
court." 1956 Code, tit. 6, § 533. Under the statutory provisions quoted, supra, petitioner
had every legal means at his disposal to cause his objections to the alleged illegal procedure
employed by the respondent in empanelling the trial jury in question to be reviewed by
the appellate court and corrected at the appropriate time.

Decision: Affirmed.

If an indictment is dismissed due to defective, it does not discharge the defendant from
prison if the offense he’s charged with is non-bailable. If a person serves as a grand juror, he
cannot serve as petit juror; a person can only serve as juror one time in a year. In a capital offense, jury
trial cannot be waived. In raising peremptory challenges both the defence and state need not show any
cause; but when the peremptory challenges are exhausted, then any party desirous of challenging a juror
must show cause.

Keller v RL

Action: embezzlement

Appellant Keller was indicted at the 2nd Judicial Circuit in Grand Bassa County on the charge of
embezzlement. The indictment charged that appellant, a cashier in the employ of the LAMCO J.V.
Operating Company was entrusted with the amount of $14,123,606.77. When an audit was conducted, it
was alleged that appellant could not account for $82,771.67. Appellant, upon arraignment pleaded not
guilty. The jury was empaneled and the trial commenced. During the trial, the State observed that the
seating of the jurors did not show who was an alternate or regular juror, referring to jurymen, Annie
Preston and Wellington Kiah, in particular. In other words, the State was saying that jurymen Annie
Preston and Wellington Kiah were alternate jurors instead of regular jurors. The defense submitted that
the observation was in fact immaterial and that on the day of empaneling the jury, Joseph Roberts, Seekey
Yhonon and Betty Jallah were alternates instead of Annie Preston and Wellington Kiah. The trial judge,
on the suggestion of the prosecution and over the objection of appellant’s counsel, made record replacing
the two regular jurors Annie Preston and Wellington Kiah by alternate jurors Joseph Roberts and Betty
Jallah, who were originally named as alternate jurors. At the close of the trial, a guilty verdict was returned
against appellant. To this verdict, appellant excepted and filed motion for new trial. The motion for new
trial was heard and denied by the trial court. Subsequently, appellant, filed a motion in arrest of judgment,
which was heard and denied by the trial court. The trial judge rendered final judgment confirming the
verdict and sentencing appellant to two (2) years imprisonment, imposing a fine of $500.00, and ordering
restitution of the amount of $ 82,771.67. Appellant appealed contending that the trial judge erred to have
on prosecution’s petition changed regular juror Annie Preston and Wellington Kiah, for alternate jurors
Joseph Roberts and Betty Jallah to the prejudice of the defense. The State contended that the alternate
jurors should have sat separate from the regular jurors on the panel.

Issue:

Whether or not it is statutory for the alternate jurors to sit separate from the regular jurors on the panel
during trial of a case.

Whether or not absent death of a regular juror, the absence of a regular juror, or incapacitation or
incompetency of a regular juror during a trial, is a trial judge justified in substituting a regular juror for an
alternate juror on the panel. In other words, is the substitution of jurors on the panel discretional with a
judge?

Holdings: no to both

Rules:

There is no provision of law governing the selection of jury under the 1956 Code which requires that
alternate jurors sit separate from the regular jurors; and there is also no provision of law under that Code,
which makes substitution of an alternate juror for a regular juror discretional with the judge, to be done
at any time. Under the 1956 Code, the causes which necessitate substitution of a juror on the panel are:
(i) death of a regular juror during trial; (ii) the absence of a regular juror; or (iii) incapacitation or
incompetency of a regular juror during the trial. This is the only time and the causes for which an alternate
juror may be substituted for a regular juror.

Reasoning:

The Court: Wellington Kiah and Mrs. Annie Preston are serving this panel as talesmen; Joseph Roberts,
Seekey Yhonon, and Betty Jallah as alternates. From this record of the court it is quite clear that Joseph
Roberts, Seekey Yhonon and Betty Jallah were the alternate jurors named by the trial court and not Annie
Preston and Wellington Kiah. These facts support appellant’s version of what transpired in respect of the
jurors. Here is the observation of the prosecution and the judge’s ruling thereon: the county attorney
would like to make his observation for certain irregularity. He observes that the practice of having
alternates sit together for the panel is somewhat not followed at this trial, which could be by inadvertence.
By that I refer to Annie Preston and Wellington Kiah, who supposed to be alternates on the present panel,
are sitting each apart from the other. This position of Wellington Kiah, instead of giving an impression of
him being an alternate, looks to me as a regular juror. Hence the prosecution thought to bring this to the
court’s attention for an immediate investigation and proper adjustment. And submit. This Court finds no
legal support for this contention. This Court also says that the trial judge’s position in substituting the
jurors, as he did, had no support in the statutes in vogue at the time of the trial of this case. Still under
the law in vogue at the time of the trial of this case, the three alternate jurors sat with the twelve regular
members of the jury, and all jurors were entitled to question witnesses, but none of such alternate jurors
were entitled to participate in the deliberation of the jury or to sign the verdict unless he was named to
serve in lieu of a regular juror who died or was otherwise incapacitated from serving during the course of
the trial. In such latter event, a verdict signed by such alternate juror shall be valid. If after the jury had
been selected for a case it appeared that one or more jurors were absent or incompetent, the court should
substitute an alternate juror for such absent or incompetent juror. This was the statute on the selection
of jurors at the time of the trial of this case. There is no provision of that statute which requires that
alternate jurors sit separate from the regular jurors. There is also no provision of that statute which makes
substitution of an alternate juror for a regular juror discretional with the judge, to be done at any time.
There are causes which necessitate substitution of a regular juror by an alternate juror during the trial,
and they are: (i) death of a regular juror during trial; (ii) absence of a regular juror; or (iii) incapacitation
or incompetency of a regular juror. It is only at this time and for one or more of such causes that an
alternate juror may be substituted for a regular juror. In the instant case it is not shown that any of the
regular jurors had died or was absent, incompetent, or incapacitated to continue to serve on the panel
when the judge made the substitution.

Decision: reversed.

Note:

Upon empaneling the jurors, the sheriff should thereupon call off the names of the twenty seven
prospective trial jurors, four at a time, and the parties were entitled to examine them and to raise
objections as to any or all of such persons. The first fifteen not challenged or objected to or as to whom
objections have been overruled comprised the jury. The judge should name three of the fifteen as
alternate jurors and appoint a foreman. If the panel was exhausted before the fifteen jurors had been
selected, the court should directed the sheriff to summon a sufficient number of qualified persons as
talesmen to serve without regard to other provisions of the law regarding the method of selection of
jurors. Civil Procedure Law, 1956 Code 6:532.
The only grounds under our statute on which a motion in arrest of judgment may be granted are: (i) failure
of the indictment to charge an offense; and (ii) that the court has no jurisdiction of the offense charge.

Coleman v RL

Action: Treason

Appellant Coleman and others were indicted at the 1st Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County on the heinous
crime of treason. They were arraigned and pled not guilty. The court ordered the empanelling of a trial
jury and the defendants asserted their statutory right to challenge prospective jurors. The trial court
allowed each defendant 12 peremptory challenges and 13 for cause. The defendants took exceptions and
contended that they were each entitled to the 12 peremptory challenges granted as well as to 25 for cause
and that, since the judge had not granted them the said 25, their rights had been prejudiced. Appellant
also objected to some potential jurors on the ground that they cannot read and write thus they were not
of average intelligence. Appellants again entered another objection to the selection of one juror on the
ground that, being a tribal chief, he could not under public policy serve as a juror. The both objections
were overruled by the trial judge, and appellant excepted. In the end, a guilty verdict was returned against
appellants, and they appealed.

Issue:

Whether or not, where a court err in allowing less than the statutory number of challenges to the
composition of the jury in a criminal prosecution for a capital offense; is such an error considered
prejudicial to the defendant, if the number of challenges allowed was not exhausted before the full panel
of the jury had been completed.

Whether or not illiteracy of a potential juror is a ground for his disqualification from service on the panel.

Whether or not a person’s status as a tribal chief precludes from serving as a juror.

Holding: No to all

Rules:

A trial court's error in allowing fewer than the statutory number of challenges to the composition of the
jury in a criminal prosecution will not be deemed prejudicial if the number of charges allowed was not
exhausted.

A person who cannot read or write is not thereby disqualified from jury service.

A tribal chief is not necessarily disqualified from jury service.

Reasoning:

We are of opinion that each defendant in the trial of a capital offense is entitled to 12 peremptory
challenges and 25 challenges for cause. The records certified to us, however, show that even though the
trial court granted each of the defendants only 13 challenges for cause, they did not even exhaust this
number before a full panel of the jury had been completed. The argument, therefore, that their rights
have been infringed by the court's not granting them the full 25 challenges for cause does not seem to us
to be meritorious. An entirely different picture might have been painted if the 13 challenges for cause
granted by the court had been exhausted before the jury panel was full. But in this case we find ourselves
unable to agree that, when the trial court erred in granting 13 instead of 25 challenges for cause, said
error prejudiced the rights of the defendants. The appellant also objected to a particular juror because he
cannot read or write contending that he was not of average intelligence.

The controlling statute reads as follows: "No person can be a juryman in any case in which he has directly
or indirectly, a pecuniary interest or in which any ancestor, descendant, brother or sister of his, or his
wife, or the husband or wife of any such ancestor, descendant, brother or sister, has directly or indirectly,
such interest, or in which any uncle, aunt, nephew, niece or first cousin of himself or his wife, is a party or
wife to a party, or in which he has acted as agent or assistant, in any way for either party, or on the merits
of which he has expressed any opinion or in which he has previously acted as a juryman or arbitrator. This
statute specifying classes of persons who may or may not serve as jurors does not provide that anyone
unable to read or write may not so serve. On the question of average intelligence raised by the defendants
in the court below as well as in their brief argued before this bar, in which they took the position that
because a person cannot read or write he is not of average intelligence and therefore should not serve,
we are of the opinion that such an objection could not apply to persons unable to read or write, in view
of the statute making it legal for the indigenous peoples of this country to serve as jurors. Under our trial
procedure, jurors are judges of the facts and need not be able to read or write. Had the defendants
contended that those jurors objected to could not understand English, the working language of the court
and the language in which the case was tried, we might have been in a position to give their contention a
little more consideration. Even in such cases, however, it is a known fact the interpreters have been used;
so even if such had been the case, though the contention would have had more merit than the instant
one, the said difficulty could have been legally cured. We are therefore of opinion that the trial judge did
not err in overruling objections to jurors on the ground that they could not read or write. Another
objection was entered to the selection of one juror on the ground that, being a tribal chief, he could not
under public policy serve as a juror. This contention does not harmonize with the statute controlling
exemption from jury service. According to that statute, only the following persons are exempted from
service: Members of the President's Cabinet, military officers in actual service, and all constables and
police officers; All lawyers, physicians, clergymen and teachers, 2. who are actually engaged in their
profession or calling. Rev. Stat., § 359. Therefore, in our opinion, the trial judge was correct in overruling
this objection to the particular juror in question.

Decision: Affirmed

Watts v RL

Action: EMBEZZLEMENT.

Appellant indicted on the charge of embezzlement at the 1st Judicial Circuit for Montserrado County.
When the jury was being empanelled, the court inquired from them as to whether any of them had served
on the grand jury at the time a presentment was made against appellant Watt. All answered in the
negative. From an investigation it is conclusive that one Joseph Sie, who, at the time of the May term,
1948, bore the name, Joseph Sie Williams, did serve as one of the grand jurors in bringing forth a
presentment against appellant Watt, thus disqualifying said Joseph Sie from service on the panel of petty
jurors. At the end of the trial, a guilty verdict was returned against appellant; he moved for a new trial on
the ground that juror Sie provided false information to a material question. The State contended that
juror Sie had made no prejudicial statements or had formed any bias against appellant prior to his
selection on the panel. The court denied appellant’s motion for new trial; appellant appealed.
Issue:

Whether or not a person who served as a grand juror on the finding of an indictment is competent to
serve as a petty juror on the trial of the offense.

Whether or not the general rule that, if a juror is accepted to try a case without objections, the verdict
will not be set aside by reason of that juror's disqualification, is applicable where the party claiming
prejudice had no knowledge of the disqualification before the juror was accepted.

Holding: No to both

Rules:

Service on a grand jury which found an indictment renders the person who so served incompetent to
serve as a juror on the trial of the same indictment or, at least, subject to challenge for cause.

The general rule that, if a juror is accepted to try a case without objections, the verdict will not be set
aside by reason of that juror's disqualification, applies only when the party claiming prejudice had
knowledge of the disqualification before the juror was accepted.

Reasoning:

The law on the disqualification of a person who has been a grand juror from subsequent service as a petty
juror in the same proceeding is as follows: one who served as a grand juror on the finding of an indictment
is incompetent to serve as a petty juror on the trial of the offense, or on the trial of a civil action based
upon the same offense, and in an action of malicious prosecution for causing plaintiff to be indicted he
may challenge any juror who was on the grand jury that found the indictment.

It is the settled rule that the grand jury which found the indictment against the accused, and each of the
jurors, is disqualified from sitting on the petit jury to try the accused. Objection on such a ground is not
removed by statements made by him, upon examination upon the voir dire, to the effect that he had
formed no opinion, and had no bias against the prisoner.

Generally, an objection to a member of the grand jury which found the indictment as a petit juror on the
trial thereof must be made before the jury is sworn, although it has been held that the objection may be
taken advantage of after the jury has been sworn and even after the verdict has been rendered, provided
the defendant was not guilty of negligence in not taking advantage of his right to challenge.

In general the fact that a person served on the grand jury that found the indictment against the accused
renders such person incompetent to serve as a petit juror on the trial of the indictment or, at least, is
ground for challenge for cause.

In general one who served as a grand juror on the finding of an indictment is incompetent to serve as a
petit juror on the trial of the offense, or on the trial of a civil action based on the same offense, and in an
action of malicious prosecution for causing plaintiff to be indicted he may challenge any juror who was on
the grand jury that found the indictment. In some jurisdictions, however, service on the grand jury does
not render the discharge of the juror merely a necessity; it is merely a ground for challenge for cause,
which accused may rely on or waive, but the court should sustain a challenge by accused for cause on this
ground. Of course, such a challenge can be waived. This Court, in McBurrough v. Republic, [1934] LRSC
3; 4 L.L.R. 25 (1934), and Cummings v. Republic, [1935] LRSC 9; 4 L.L.R. 284 (1935), emphasized that, if a
juror is admitted to try a case without objections, or after objections have been taken and disallowed, the
verdict will not be set aside for any disqualification existing before his acceptance as such, Rev. Stat., sec.
36o. But the verdict can be upheld only where the prejudiced party had knowledge of the fact supporting
disqualification before the juror was accepted. It was incumbent upon defendant to have shown that he
knew nothing of the alleged service of this petty juror as a grand juror until after acceptance of said juror
as a petit juror. The wisdom, therefore, of permitting the investigation requested by said defendant is
seen. Such an investigation saved time and energy. To afford a person criminally charged an opportunity
for a fair, speedy, and impartial trial is a cardinal right safeguarded by the Constitution of this Republic,
and to conserve it should be the jealous care of all courts of justice especially in face of the fundamental
principle of criminal law that it is better for ninety-nine guilty persons to go free than to convict and punish
one innocent man. During the hearing of the case before us, it seemed to us almost impossible to
surmount this situation, however anxious we might have been to enter the merits of the case; and
therefore we suspended judgment. We have come to the conclusion that the verdict herein should be
vacated, and the case remanded with instructions that the lower court conduct a new trial forthwith, and
it is hereby so ordered.

Decision: Reversed.

Tambo v RL

Action: Murder

Appellant Tambo was indicted for the crime of murder at the 1st Judicial Circuit for Montserrado County.
When the jury was being empanelled, appellant did not object to any of the potential jurors. A guilty
verdict was returned against appellant and he was sentenced to death by hanging. Appellant filed as
motion in arrest of judgment setting forth as a ground that because the verdict of the jury was manifestly
prejudicial and unjust in that Charles Shelton, one of the jurors empanelled and sworn to try the issue
joined between the State and him, is not his peer by virtue of the terms of law, because Shelton is a citizen
or resident of Grand Bassa County and not that of Montserrado County, the vicinity within which the crime
was committed and within which appellant is being tried; wherefore said verdict having been illegally
obtained should be held to be a nullity and of no force and effect. This motion was denied. Appellant
appealed.

Issue:

Whether or not a judge is justified in setting aside a jury verdict and awarding the appellant a new trial
for a disqualification of a juror existing prior to his acceptance, not objected to by the appellant at the
time of empanelling the jury, absent a showing that said juror misrepresented any material fact.

Holding: No

Rule:

If a juror is admitted to try a cause without objection or after objection has been made and is disallowed,
the verdict shall not thereafter be set aside for any disqualification of the juror existing prior to his
acceptance as a juror.

Reasoning:
The statute provides that if a juror is admitted to try a cause without objection or after objection has been
had and disallowed, the verdict shall not be set aside on any disqualification existing before his acceptance
as a juror. The court below therefore did not err in refusing to arrest the judgment on the ground stated
in the first point in the bill of exceptions.

Decision: Affirmed.

Tolbert v RL

Action: Murder

Appellant Tolbert was indicted for the heinous crime of murder at the Ninth Judicial Circuit for Bong
County. He participated in the empanelling of the jury and didn’t object to any of the potential juror.
When a guilty verdict was returned against him, he appealed contending that some of the jurors could
not read and write and that the jury’s verdict was not unanimous because some of the jurors who were
illiterate failed to indicate the x-cross before their names as required by law to show that the verdict was
theirs without forgery.

Issue:

Whether or not failure of a criminal defendant to challenge the panel or a juror at the time of empanelling
the jury constitutes a waiver of his right to object and forecloses his right to move for a new trial on such
ground or to raise the objection at any subsequent time.

Holding: Yes

Rule:

Failure to challenge the panel or challenge a juror shall be deemed a waiver of the right to object and shall
foreclose the right to move for a new trial on such ground or to raise the objection at any subsequent
time.

Reasoning:

Appellant cannot successfully argued on appeal that some of the empanelled jurors could not read or
write their names, especially so when he participated in the selection of the empanelled jury and raised
no objection to any of them. A party may challenge a juror on the ground that he is disqualified under the
Judiciary Law for reason of any interest or bias. Such a challenge may be made only before the jurors are
sworn, except that the court may, for good cause permit it to be made after the jurors are sworn, but
before any evidence is presented. Failure by a party to challenge the panel or to challenge a juror, shall
be deemed a waiver of the right to object and shall foreclose the right to move for a new trial on such
grounds or to raise the objection at any subsequent time. Criminal Procedure Law, Rev. Code 2: 19.3(3)(4).
Appellant also could not have successfully argued the point that the verdict of the empanelled jury was
not unanimous on the ground that there was no indication that the x-cross were in fact the signatories of
the views invited. If there was any suspicion on the part of appellant that the verdict was not the
unanimous verdict of the empanelled jury, a request to poll the jury was the proper remedy; but there is
no indication in the record that such request was ever made. Under the law, when a verdict is returned
and before it is recorded, the jury shall be polled at the request of any party or upon the court's own
motion.
Decision: Affirmed.

Mason v RL

Action: murder

Appellant Mason was indicted for the crime of murder at the 2nd Judicial Circuit for Grand Bassa County.
He was arraigned and pled not guilty. A jury was empanelled and the trial commenced. While the counsel
for appellant was cross-examining one of the State’s witnesses, it was discovered that Samuel A. White,
one of the empanelled jurors in the case, was disqualified, because he was a member of the coroner's jury
in the case, and had expressed his opinion, which was evidenced by the verdict of the coroner's jury upon
which his name appeared. Based on this discovery, the judge proposed a disbanding the jury and awarding
a new trial. This ruling of the court was objected to by appellant. At the close of the trial a guilty verdict
was returned against appellant. He filed a motion in arrest of judgment contending that one of the jurors
was disqualified from serving on the panel because he had earlier served as a coroner jury in the case.
This motion was denied. Appellant appealed.

Issue:

Whether or not a discovery of a current petty juror’s previous service as a coroner juror for the same case
is a ground for his disqualification after empanelment of the jury. In other words, Whether or not a person
who had served as a coroner juror is competent to serve as a petty jury for the trial of the same case.

Whether or not an appellant is estopped from asserting that his conviction was illegally secured, where
he objected to the judge’s attempt to disband the jury and award him new trial on the ground that one of
the jurors was disqualified.

Rule:

A judge is correct in refusing to allow a person who had served upon a coroner's jury to serve again on
the trial jury in the same case. But if when attempting to disband the jury and award a new trial, prisoner's
counsel objects, and the judge thereupon desists from so doing, prisoner is thereafter estopped from
raising the point that the conviction thus secured was illegal.

Reasoning:

It is the duty of all parties litigant to take advantage of their legal rights at the proper time; failing to do
so is a waiver of such rights. The action of the trial judge in this instance shows very clearly that he was
endeavoring to safeguard the legal rights and privileges of the prisoner as secured to him under the law.
But the said counsel for prisoner having protested and objected to the said action of the trial judge in the
interest of his said client, the prisoner, he is now estopped from seeking same in his aforesaid motion in
arrest of judgment. The Court desires to say further that the position taken by the trial judge in suggesting
a discharge of the impanelled jury was well taken and strongly supported by law, and such ought to be
followed under similar circumstances.

Decision: Affirmed.

Note:
In the event of the failure of a jury to agree, the court may disband the jury and award a new trial, and in
such event the defendant cannot successfully plead second jeopardy.