Mendoza vs. Arrieta

EDGARDO E.
MENDOZA, petitioner
vs.
HON. ABUNDIO Z. ARRIETA, Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court of First Instance of Manila,
FELINO TIMBOL, and RODOLFO SALAZAR, Respondents.
Facts:
On October 22, 1969, a three- way vehicular accident occurred along Mac-Arthur Highway, Marilao,
Bulacan, involving a Mercedes Benz owned and driven by petitioner EDGARDO E. MENDOZA; a
private jeep owned and driven by respondent Rodolfo Salazar; and a gravel and sand truck owned by
respondent Felipino Timbol and driven by Freddie Montoya. Salazar filed a case against truck-driver
Montoya, for Reckless Imprudence Causing Damage to Property in the CFI OF Bulacan while Mendoza
filed a criminal case against Salazar, for causing damage to his Mercedes Benz.
The CFI rendered judgment finding the accused Freddie Montoya GUILTY of the crime of damage to
property thru reckless imprudence and sentenced him to pay and to indemnify Rodolfo Salazar . On the
other hand, accused Rodolfo Salazar was ACQUITTED from the offense charged against him by the
petitioner, in view of its findings that the collision between Salazar's jeep and petitioner's car was the
result of the former having been bumped from behind by the truck driven by Montoya. Neither was
petitioner awarded damages as he was not a complainant against truck-driver Montoya but only against
jeep-owner-driver Salazar.
After the termination of the criminal cases, Mendoza filed damages against Salazar and Felino Timbol
(owner of the gravel and sand truck) driven. Respondent Judge Arrieta dismissed the Complaint against
truck-owner Timbol and Salazar on the grounds that it is barred by a prior judgment in the criminal cases
and that while it is true that an independent civil action for liability under Article 2177 of the Civil Code
could be prosecuted independently of the criminal action for the offense from which it arose, the New
Rules of Court requires an express reservation of the civil action to be made in the criminal action;
otherwise, the same would be barred pursuant to Section 2, Rule 111.
Now Petitioner Mendoza, seeks a review on certiorari of the Orders of respondent Judge, dismissing his
Complaint for Damages based on quasi-delict against respondents Felino Timbol and Rodolfo Salazar.
Issue:
1. WON Timbol can still be sued for damages by Mendoza after termination of the criminal cases? –
YES.
2. WON the Civil Case against jeepney driver Salazar be dismissed? YES.
Held:
1. Yes. It is well-settled rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a subsequent case. In this case,
there is no Identity of cause of action between the criminal Case No. SM-227(the case filed by Salazar
against Montoya) and Civil Case No. 80803. Obviously, in said criminal case truck-driver Montoya was
not prosecuted for damage to petitioner's car but for damage to Salazar’s jeep. Neither was truck-owner
Timbol a party in said case.
In criminal case, the cause of action was the enforcement of the civil liability arising from criminal
negligence under Article l00 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas Civil Case No. 80803 is based on quasi-
delict under Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Consequently, petitioner's cause of
action being based on quasi-delict, said case may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter. Article 31 of the Civil Code provides that when the civil action is
based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action
may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
Timbol contended that petitioner's failure to make a reservation in the criminal action of his right to file
an independent civil action bars the institution of such separate civil action, invoking section 2, Rule 111,
Rules of Court, which says that in the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action
may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is
reserved as required in the preceding section.
However, the Court, in Garcia vs. Florida said that the civil liability arising from crime is a violation of
the criminal law, while quasi-delict is a distinct and independent negligence, having always had its own
foundation and individuality. Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code were drafted and were intended to
constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso,
which is procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32,
33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in the proviso…
Inasmuch as Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code create a civil liability distinct and different from
the civil action arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code, no reservation,
therefore is needed to be made in the criminal case;
2.Yes. As observed, Petitioner had opted to base his cause of action against jeep-owner-driver Salazar
on culpa criminal and not on culpa aquiliana . The latter's civil liability continued to be involved in the
criminal action until its termination. Such being the case, there was no need for petitioner to have
reserved his right to file a separate civil action as his action for civil liability was deemed impliedly
instituted in Criminal Case No. SM-228.
Moreover, considering that the collision between the jeep and the car owned and driven by Mendoza was
the result of the hitting on the rear of the jeep by the truck driven by Montoya, the Court pronounced that
accused Salazar cannot be held able for the damages sustained by Edgardo Mendoza's car.
And even if petitioner's cause of action as against Salazar were not ex-delictu, the end result would be the
same, it being clear from the judgment in the criminal case that Salazar's acquittal was not based upon
reasonable doubt, consequently, a civil action for damages can no longer be instituted. This is explicitly
provided for in Article 29 of the Civil Code quoted here under Article 29 of the Civil Code which
provides that when the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be
instituted. If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so
declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision
whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.

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EDGARDO E.

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