Understanding Irony: Three Essais on Friedrich Schlegel

Author(s): Georgia Albert

Source: MLN, Vol. 108, No. 5, Comparative Literature (Dec., 1993), pp. 825-848
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
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 Understanding Irony:
Three essaison FriedrichSchlegel

GeorgiaAlbert

Ironyis unrelievedvertige,
dizzinessto thepointofmadness.
Paul de Man

[. Chaos and Vertigo

In a note writtenaround 1800 Schlegel recorded his dissatisfaction
with Kant's conclusion that the question about the infinityof the
world is a meaningless and emptyone for human reason: "The
Antinomiesshould not have moved Kant to giveup the infinite[das
Unendliche], but the principle Schlegel's aver-
ofnon-contradiction-."1
sion to the logical axiom called the principleof non-contradiction,
which statesthe invalidityof anyjudgment thatmakes twoopposite
predicationsabout the same object, is not withoutprecedent in his
writings.Similarlytransgressiveviews against it are also expressed
elsewherein textsfromthisperiod, as forexample in the note from
1797 whichstates:"Everysentence,everybook thatdoes not contra-
dict itselfis incomplete-" (KFSA 18:83), or in the Athendum Frag-
ment 39:
Mostthoughtsare onlytheprofilesofthoughts.Theyhaveto be turned
aroundand synthesized withtheirantipodes.This is howmanyphilo-
thattheywouldotherwise
interest
sophicalworksacquirea considerable
havelacked.(KFSA2:171;Fragments,23)
Most often,the name Schlegel givesto the situationin which the
principleof non-contradictionis defied is "irony."In contrastto the
view adopted by rhetoricaltreatisesat least since Aristotle,ironyis

MLN, 108 (1993): 825-848 ? 1993 by The JohnsHopkins University

Press

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826 GEORGIA ALBERT

not understood here as the rhetoricalconvention that allows the

speaker to express somethingby sayingits opposite, and the inter-
pretationof the ironic discourse does not consistsimplyin turning
the "literal"statementupside down to obtain the "intended"mean-
ing: ironyis the simultaneous presence of twomeanings between
whichit is not possible to decide. Such, forexample, is the viewput
forthin the definitionof ironyas "analysisof thesisand antithesis"
(KFSA 16:154), where "analysis"is presumablyto be understoodnot
in Kant's but in Fichte's sense as "theprocedure bywhichone looks
for the characteristicin which the compared entities are opposed
."2 A betterknownand more extensivelyargued con-
[entgegengesetzt]
demnationof the traditional,one-sidedviewof ironyis found in the
LyceumFragment108:
[Socraticirony]is meantto deceiveno one exceptthosewhoconsiderit
a deceptionand who eithertakepleasurein the delightful rogueryof
makingfoolsofthewholeworldor else becomeangrywhentheygetan
inklingtheythemselves mightbe included.In thissortof irony,every-
thing should be playfuland everythingshouldbe serious,everything
guilelessly open and everythingdeeply hidden.... It contains and
betweentheabsoluteand
arousesa feelingof indissolubleantagonism
and the necessityof complete
the relative,betweenthe impossibility
13, translationmodified).3
communication (Fragments,
To understand ironyaccording to the classical definitionis to un-
derstand it as deception (Tduschung):those who do this never get
more than half the message,and in factdo not understandironyat
all. If "in [it] everythingshould be playful[Scherz]and everything
should be serious [Ernst],"it is useless to tryto separate what is
"meant"fromwhatis "said": howevercontradictory the relationship
of the two sides of the statementto each other mightbe, both are
necessaryand have to be taken into account.4
The rejection of the principle of non-contradictionexpressed in
the note about Kant is, then, nothing new for Schlegel: similar,if
less explicit,statementscan be found in numerous other textsfrom
the same period. What is particularlyinterestingin thisfragmentis
the factthatthe issue is takenup in connectionwiththe question of
infinity.Schlegel's reference in the note is to the section of the
CritiqueofPureReasondevoted to the "Antinomiesof Pure Reason."
There, Kant showsthatit is possible to make perfectlycoherentand
logicallycorrectargumentsboth to prove and to disprovethe spatial
and temporalinfinity of the world.Since, however,thispossibilityis
logicallyunacceptable (because of its incompatibilitywiththe prin-

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 MLN 827

ciple of non-contradiction),Kant is led to conclude that the two

opposed parties are "quarrelingabout nothing."5The violation of
the principleof non-contradictionbythe possibilityof both an affir-
mativeand a negative answer is taken to prove the incongruityof
the question-the fact that infinitycan be no concern for reason.
Schlegel, faced withthe same problem of the mutual exclusivityof
the question of infinity and the principle of non-contradiction,re-
versesKant's conclusion. It is not the case thatthe principleof non-
contradictionrenders the question of infinityinvalid; rather,it is
infinity thatrenders thisprinciple expendable. The reason for this
lies in Schlegel's understandingof infinity, whichis definedprecise-
ly as the possibilitythat opposed and mutuallycontradictoryele-
mentsmightbe presentat the same time. The Athendum Fragment
412, for example, states:
Who has a sensefortheinfinite and knowswhathe wantsto do withit
separatingand unitingpowers... and
sees in it theresultof eternally
utters,whenhe expresseshimself nothingbutcontradictions
decisively,
(KFSA 2:243; Fragnents,83, TM).
(lauterWiderspriiche)

"Who has a sense for the infinite... utters,when he expresses

himselfdecisively,nothingbut contradictions."This connection be-
tween a self-contradictory way of speaking and what Schlegel calls
infinityfounds many of his best-knownassertionsregardingirony.
Since ironyis the place whereopposites come into contactwitheach
other (it is "theformof paradox": LyceumFragment48, KFSA 2:153;
Fragments, 6), it also constitutesthe possibilityof achievingsome sort
of link with infinity.It remains to ask in what, exactly,this link
consists.
Perhaps the most explicit referenceto this question is found in
one of the unpublished "Philosophical Fragments"Schlegel wrote
in 1798 afterthe publicationof the Athendum fragments:"Ironyis so
to speak the cEtiSEttiiof the infinite,of universality, of the sense for
the universe"(KFSA 18:128). The rhetoricalterm"epideixis"enters
Schlegel's vocabularybywayofAristotle'sdistinction(in Rhetorici.3)
between differenttypesof public speech. Defined by contrastwith
the speech in council, meant to convince or dissuade, and the
speech in court,aimed at provinginnocence or guilt,the epideictic
speech was supposed to praise or censure the actions of a public
figure.6The relevance of this concept to the relationshipbetween
ironyand what Schlegel calls "the infinite,""universality," and "the
sense for the universe,"though not immediatelyobvious, becomes

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828 GEORGIA ALBERT

easier to see once one takesnotice of the slightlydifferentmeaning

the termacquires in Schlegel's use of it. Schlegel's own definitionof
the concept is found in the introductionto his translationof the
EpitaphofLysias:the "goal" of the "epideictickind [of speech]" is, he
says, "to let the abilityof the orator shine before an assemblyof
listenersor readers" (KFSA 1:141). The importanceof the epideictic
speech consists in the proof it delivers of the orator's skill. The
interestis less in the contentof the speech than in the speech itself,
less in whatis said than in how well it is said. While Aristotlemakes
the distinctionbetween the differenttypesof speech dependent on
their themes, this plays a secondary role in Schlegel's definition.
The orator's proof of his abilityis not based on an argumentabout
it: the speech itselfshowsit simplyby being a good speech. That is,
the real theme of the speech is not what it discusses, but what it
demonstratesor stages.7
The relationshipbetween ironyand infinityis thereforedefined
in this fragmentas a veryparticulartypeof reference,one that is
based on the possibilityof makingsomethingvisiblebyputtingit on
displayor givingit an appearance (by "playing"it) ratherthan by
talking about it. Irony "means" infinityby representingit; more
precisely,and anticipatingsomewhat:by reproducingits structure.
This structureis thatof the paradox, of constitutiveand irreducible
self-contradiction, of the simultaneousco-presence of mutuallyex-
clusive elements. The other name for "the infinite,""universality,"
and "the sense forthe universe"is in factanother of Schlegel's key
termsfromthisperiod, a word he uses in itsetymologicaland there-
fore in a similarsense: chaos (cf. Idee69, KFSA 2:263).8 "Only that
kind of confusion is a chaos"-defines Schlegel-"out of which a
world can arise" (Idee 71, KFSA 2:263). How? "Through the under-
standing"("Uber die Unverstandlichkeit," KFSA2:370; "On Incom-
prehensibility," Wheeler, 38, TM). Chaos is the original indefinite-
ness, what is there before the understandingsortsit out in pairs of
opposites; irony,the possibilityof defyingthe understanding,offers
a chance infinitelyto approach this state.
How, exactly,is this supposed to function?Schlegel's assertion
about Socratic irony that "in it everythingshould be playfuland
everythingshould be serious" (LyceumFragment108) is once again
a helpfulhint.The point is not to discard the "pretended"meaning
for the "intended" one: both sides of irony have to be thought
together.This is, however,preciselywhat is impossible. The two
"sides"are unable to coexistpeacefully:Schlegel speaks,in different

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 MLN 829

contexts,of theirevocationof an "indissolubleantagonism"(Lyceum

Fragment 108) and of the "continual self-creatinginterchangeof
two conflictingthoughts" (AthendumFragment 121, KFSA 2:184;
Fragments, 33). The relation between the two "sides" of ironyis by
necessitya warlikeone: theycan onlyexistat each other's expense,
since each of them is the negation and thus the annihilationof the
other.
The reader of the ironic textis thereforeconfrontedwitha pecu-
liarlydifficulttask. He must tryto understand the text,but that
means tryingto gain controlover it preciselythroughthe "Satz des
Widerspruchs"-through the verykind of binarylogic thatthe text
bringsinto question. Thus the reading of the ironic textbecomes a
sequence of incomplete interpretations in whichfirstthe one, then
the other "side" is privileged,and mustconstantlyattemptto finda
way to bring the dialectical back-and-forthoscillation to its final
goal, to a synthesisof the two poles and therebyto rest.This final
synthesis,however,is regarded by Schlegel as unreachable: this is
shown by the unambiguous characterizationof the "antagonism"
ironyconsistsin as "indissoluble"as well as by the surprisingand
strongwordingof itsdefinitionas "analysisof thesisand antithesis."
Two aspects of ironybecome importantin thiscontext.The first:
the twopoles cannot be broughttogether-except, of course,in the
ironic text which contains them, and which startsthe process of
reading (in the same waythatchaos consistsof the original matter
and has to be sorted out by the understanding).The second: the
process itselfis bound to go on forever.No interpretationcan ex-
haust the meaning of the ironic textand bring it to rest:therewill
alwaysbe an aspect of it that none of the successive readings, no
matterhow comprehensiveor sophisticated,willbe able to take into
account. In its refusal to be tied down to a meaning the text be-
comes infinite,"withinits limits limitlessand inexhaustible,"in
Schlegel's formulation(Athendum Fragment297, KFSA 2:215; Frag-
ments,59, TM).
Irony,then, as a means to a goal, as a conscious way of setting
somethingin motion?This has become a commonplace of Schlegel
criticism.9Schlegel himself,however,seems to have taken his own
warningthat"ironyis somethingone simplycannot playgameswith"
("Uber die Unverstindlichkeit,"KFSA 2:370; Wheeler, 37) more
seriouslythan some of his critics,and to have been well aware of the
difficultiesthatthe attemptto use ironyforone's own purposes can
produce. One expressionof thispreoccupation is the unsettlinglist

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830 GEORGIA ALBERT

of "ironies of irony" in "On Incomprehensibility,"one of which

occurswhen "ironyturnsinto a mannerismand becomes, as itwere,
ironical about the author" (KFSA 2:369; Wheeler, 37, TM).
What can Schlegel mean when he endows ironywiththe abilityto
turnback againstthe ironist?In order to approach an answerto this
question, it is necessaryto returnto Schlegel's most explicit and
sustained discussion of irony,the LyceumFragment108. The rele-
vant parts of thislong fragmentread:
[Die sokratischeIronie] soil niemand tauschen, als die, welche sie fur
Tauschung halten, und entwederihre Freude haben an der herrlichen
Schalkheit,alle Welt zum besten zu haben, oder b6se werden,wenn sie
ahnden, sie waren wohl auch mit gemeint. In ihr soil alles Scherz und
alles Ernstsein, alles treuherzigoffenund alles tiefversteckt.... Es ist
ein sehr gutes Zeichen, wenn die harmonischPlatten gar nicht wissen,
wie sie diese stete Selbstparodie zu nehmen haben, immer wieder von
neuem glauben und miBglauben, bis sie schwindlichtwerden, den
Scherz gerade furErnst,und den ErnstfuirScherz halten (KFSA 2:160).

[ (Socraticirony)is meantto deceive no one except thosewho considerita

deception and who either take pleasure in the delightfulrogueryof
makingfools of the whole world or else become angrywhen theyget an
inklingtheythemselvesmaybe included. In thissortof irony,everything
should be playfuland serious,guilelesslyopen and deeplyhidden .... It is
a verygood signwhen the harmoniousbores are at a loss about how they
should react to thiscontinuousself-parody, when theyfluctuateendlessly
betweenbeliefand disbeliefuntiltheygetdizzyand takewhatis meantas a
joke seriouslyand what is meant seriouslyas a joke (Fragments, 13)].
To understand ironyas deception (Tduschung)means to under-
stand it according to the classical definition:as the rhetoricalcon-
vention that allows the speaker to express somethingby sayingits
opposite. Accordingto thistraditionalview,in order to understand
the real meaning of the ironic statementone only needs to know
that the speaker is makinguse of this rhetoricalconvention-that
he is speaking ironically-and to translatewhat he is sayinginto its
opposite. The resultof thismodel is the immediatedifferentiation
between the initiatesand the victimsof irony.The formerwill be
able to identifyironyin the speaker's statementand will "takeplea-
sure in the delightfulrogueryof makingfools of the whole world"
(read: thosewho don't understandirony).The initiatesdo not have
the last laugh, however,and it maywell be thatthejoke is on them
afterall: the mere suspicion that"theythemselvesmaybe included"
is enough for those who had "theirpleasure" in the game to get

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 MLN 831

angryin their turn.The reason for this is that it is not so easy to

decide foror againstthe presence of irony.Those "in the know"may
be themselvesthe object of the speaker's ironyif,for example, he
feignsironyto deceive thembut is in factperfectlyserious (already
an "ironyof irony"ifone reads the expressionas an objectivegeni-
tive:a double irony). This, however,does not mean thatthose who
had not seen any trace of ironyin the firstplace have gottenit right
and can feel in control,because there is just as littlecertitudefor
thisas forthe otherpossibility.There is no wayto stop thisconstant
back-and-forth other than a purelyarbitrarychoice, but on the way
to it all thosewho considerirony"deception,"whethertheythought
theywere on the privilegedside or not, are in for an unsettling
experience:
It is a verygood signwhentheharmonious bores[dieharmonisch
Platten]
are at a lossabouthowtheyshouldreactto thiscontinuousself-parody,
whentheyfluctuate endlessly wieder
betweenbeliefand disbelief[immer
until theyget dizzy [bissie schwindlicht
von neuemglaubenund mifiglauben]
and takewhatis meantas a joke seriouslyand whatis meant
werden]
seriouslyas a joke [den Scherzgeradefir Ernst,und den Ernstfur Scherz
halten].

The "harmonischPlatten"are not simplythosewho do not under-

stand irony,but those who insiston equating ironywithdeception,
and on preferringone interpretation-either one-to the other.
Unable to make a final decision, theykeep changing their minds,
oscillating in an endlesslyrepeated movementbetween believing
and misbelieving,between reading the text as a joke [Scherz]and
reading it as straightforward [Ernst],until,havingbeen made dizzy
[schwindlicht] by this ever-acceleratingvortex,theystop the process
by blindlysettling whateverside theywere last on.
on
The Schwindel (vertigo,dizziness) is the sense of not being able to
stand, of losing one's balance. When one feels dizzy, one needs
somethingto hold on to. This is, however,preciselythe possibility
ironydoes not give:if"in it everything should be playful[Scherz]and
everything should be serious [Ernst],"it is notjust difficultbut im-
possible to make a choice. The mistakeof the "harmoniousbores"
would consistnot in theirgettingirony"right"or "wrong,"but in
theirinsistingon wantingto knowwhethertheyare gettingit right
or wrong.10
It is perhaps surprising,though not difficultto see, thatthe phe-
nomenon thatis here called "gettingdizzy"and described as a sort

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832 GEORGIAALBERT

of punishmentforthe stubbornstupidityof the "harmoniousbores"

is not essentiallydifferentfromthe dynamicscreated by opposition
thatshould have opened thewayto infinity. It is also disturbingthat
the final,arbitrary choice of the "harmoniousbores" is described as
"[taking] what is meant as a joke seriouslyand what is meant seri-
ously as a joke [den Scherz. . . furErnstund denErnst... fur Scherz
halten]":this formulationseems to presuppose the possibilityof a
"right"solution thatwould consistin understandingwhat is meant
as a joke as a joke and what is meant seriouslyseriously-a possi-
bilitythat is consistentlydenied by the rest of the fragmentand
whose assumptionwould amount to considering ironydeception,
the attitudethat is supposed to be condemned here.
Suddenly it becomes difficultto see the differencebetween the
"harmoniousbores" (those who consider ironydeception) and the
voice of the fragment,which should representthe ironistsince it
saysconfidentlyand somewhatscornfully:"To a person who hasn't
got it, [Socratic irony] will remain a riddle even afterit is openly
confessed"(KFSA 2:160; Fragments, 13). Could it be thatthe attempt
to correct the "harmonious bores" only proves the general ines-
capabilityof "harmoniousboredom," that the wayto infinity is less
serene than one mightexpect, and that the experience of vertigo
and of being the victim,ratherthan the user,of irony,belongs to it?
It is worthreading once again the sentence that assigns the posi-
tionsin thispower game: "[Socratic irony]is meant to deceive [tdu-
schen] no one except those who consider it a deception [Tdu-
schung]."One should perhaps take this sentence at its word-and
recognize that it pulls the ironistinto the vortex that causes the
dizziness of the "harmonious bores." To say that ironyshould de-
ceive only those who understandit as deception is to understandit
as deception. The sentence says:thereis a rightand a wrongwayto
read irony: the wrong way is to think that there is a rightand a
wrongway.But bymakingthisdistinction,it makes the verymistake
it warnsagainst; more importantly, it puts itselfinto a double bind
fromwhichit cannot be freed.It triesto determinethe rightwayto
read irony (which is to recognize that there is no rightor wrong
way),but preciselyby doing thatit reads ironythe wrongway.Even
the definitionof irony as something whose meaning cannot be
pinned down can itselfnot be pinned down: it brings itselfinto
question and is drawninto the verysame process the fragmentgoes
on to describe. The attemptto observeironyfromoutside,eitheras
somethingwhose meaning can be determinedor as somethingpro-

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 MLN 833

ducing an infiniteseries of contradictorymeanings,is itselfsubject

to irony.Irony seems to escape definitioneven as somethingthat
escapes definition.This would then be irony'sown irony,the irony
of irony(subjectivegenitive) as Schlegel describesit in "On Incom-
prehensibility."If irony,as seems to be the case in thisfragmentand
as Schlegel considers possible, "becomes, as it were, ironical about
the author" (KFSA 2:369; Wheeler, 37), then the ironist'scontrol
over his ironyand his privilegedposition outside the process he has
startedis in danger. Like the apprenticesorcerer,he mighthave put
somethingin motionwhich he is in no wayable to steer,and which
affectshis own position as well, causing vertigoand the loss of a
stable standpoint.11In such a situation,it can onlybe a question of
timebefore someone findscause foralarm in irony'speculiar inde-
pendence fromauthorityand, attemptingto reinstatea regime of
subjectiveresponsibility, blames it on the ironist,accusing him of
incomprehensibility.

Wer (ver)steht,
II. Schlegel's Incomprehensibility:
daB er nicht falle

The essay "Uber die Unverstandlichkeit"("On Incomprehen-

sibility")appeared in 1800 in the last issue of the Athendum, the
short-livedliteraryjournal the brothersSchlegel had foundedjust
two years earlier.12It constitutesSchlegel's answer to the accusa-
tionsof incomprehensibility thathad been levelled againstthejour-
nal in general and his fragmentsin particular,and whose cause he
identifieswiththe irony"thatto a greateror lesser extent is to be
found everywherein it" (368; Wheeler,36).13 A polemical introduc-
tion, in which several contemporaries (the popular philosopher
Garve, the chemist Girtanner and the proponents of "common
sense") are made objects of more or less pointed attacks,servesto
pave the wayto the middle part of the essay,whichis devoted to the
alleged incomprehensibilityof the texts of the Athendum. There,
Schlegel firstquotes the controversialfragmentabout the "three
greatesttendencies of the age" (Athendum Fragment216) and ex-
plains to what extent and whyit has been misunderstood;then he
discusses, also with the help of self-quotations(the LyceumFrag-
ments48 and 108), the nature and effectsof irony.The last part of
the essaydiscussesincomprehensibility in general,askswhetherit is
"so unmitigatedlycontemptibleand evil" (370; Wheeler, 38), and

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834 GEORGIAALBERT

ends witha "gloss"based on Goethe which mocks the opponents of

the Athendum and of the Romantic circle in general.
The main problem thatpresentsitselfto the reader of the essayis
thatof the reconciliationof itspolemical withitstheoreticalaspects.
The text asks at the same time a theoreticalquestion about the
possibilityof communication in general, namely "whether [the]
communication[of ideas] is at all possible" (363; Wheeler,32, TM),
and a practical one about the alleged incomprehensibility of the
textsof the Athendum; but it soon becomes clear thatthe theoretical
question about incomprehensibilityand the practical question
about the incomprehensibilityof the Athendumdo not produce
quite the same answer. On the one hand, the argumentabout in-
comprehensibilityin general is brought in connection with the
structuralincomprehensibility of ironyand in particularwith the
discussionof "Socraticirony"in the LyceumFragment108, which is
quoted almost in its entirety.An ironic text, the argument runs,
cannot be understood because it produces two equally legitimate
but mutuallyexclusivemeanings; moreover,incomprehensibility is
necessaryand good: "man's most precious possession ... depends
in the last analysis... on some such point of strengththatmustbe
leftin the dark, but that nonetheless shores up and supports the
whole burden" (370; Wheeler,38). On the otherhand, the essayis a
vehementattackagainstthe contemporaryreaders,who are accused
of being themselvesresponsibleforfindingthe Athendum incompre-
hensible: "the basis of the incomprehensible [des Unverstdndlichen]
is to be found in incomprehension [im Unverstand]" (363; Wheeler,
32-33). Incomprehensibility, it is said, is "relative"(364; Wheeler,
33), and depends on the incompetence either of the writer(e.g.,
Garve) or of the reader. Readers just have to "learn how to read"
(365; Wheeler, 33; cf. also 371), and the problem will be solved.
The peculiar superpositionof these two registersin the texthas
been noticed beforeand differently interpretedeitheras a symptom
of Schlegel's gettingcarriedawayand not being calm enough to act
on his own theoriesof ironyl4or as a particularlysophisticatedway
to increase the confusionof the reader and thereforeput the "basic
thoughtof this essay"-"praise and deeper justificationof incom-
prehensibility"'5-into practice: "The problem of incomprehen-
sibilityneeds and looks for an 'incomprehensible' formof expres-
sion".16There might,however,be other waysto read thisdifficulty
than simplyas rhetoricalsuccess or failure. It mightwell be that
thereis a structuralproblem at the base of the disorganizedimpres-

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 MLN 835

sion the essay makes, of the hesitations,interruptions,and shifts

that characterizeit. To writeon the possibilityor impossibilityof
communicationis, in fact,not an easy matter,especiallywhen the
disturbance of communication is identifiedwith irony. Schlegel
himselfcommentson this difficulty: in the introduction,where he
tellsabout the plan he has had fora long timeto talkto his readers
about incomprehensibility, he says:
I wantedto provethatall incomprehensibility is rela-
[ Unverstdndlichkeit]
tive . . . and so that the whole business shouldn't turn around in too
palpablea circleI had made a firmresolvereallyto be comprehensible
at leastthistime.... Consequently
[verstindlich], I had to thinkofsome
popularmediumto bond chemicallythe holy,delicate,fleeting, airy,
and, as it were,imponderablethought.Otherwise,
fragrant, howbadly
mightithavebeenmisunderstood sinceonlythrough
[miflverstanden], its
well-considered [wohlverstandnen]employmentwas an end finally to be
made ofall understandable misunderstandings[alienverstindlichen
Mifi-
(364; Wheeler, 33).
verstindnissen]?
How is it possible to speak comprehensiblyabout incomprehen-
sibility?Incomprehension shows that there is a problem, and-in
the broadest terms-that the problem is connected withone's use
of language. An argument tending to the elimination of incom-
prehensibility, since it makes use of language just like any other,is
exposed to the verysame problem thatit set out to eliminate.Only
through the understandingof the argumentwill understandingbe
possible, but this means thatin order to understandthe argument
one has to have alreadyunderstood it. A similarproblem is posed
fora textthatargues about the necessityof incomprehensibility. If
whatit saysis true,it has to be incomprehensible;but ifit is incom-
prehensible (in Schlegel's sense, that is by making two opposite
statementsabout itstopic,in thiscase incomprehensibility) itwillbe
impossible to tell what it is that it has to say about
incomprehensibility-whether or not it argues forits necessity.The
formthisquestion takes in "Uber die Unverstindlichkeit"is thatof
the difficulty(or impossibility)of interpretingirony.On the one
hand, the textis a discussionof the problemsposed byirony;on the
otherhand, it definesitselfas an ironic text.17Does it itselfpose the
problemsit discusses?And in thatcase, is it able to apply its discus-
sion to itself?
One of the most disturbingmomentsin the textfor the reader
who wants to find in it "praise and deeper justificationof incom-
prehensibility"is Schlegel's explanation of the so-called "Ten-

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836 GEORGIAALBERT

denzen" fragment(366-67; Wheeler, 34-35). If the reason for the

incomprehensibilityof the Athendumis the incompetence of its
readers (as appears to be implied at various points in the essay),
then it should be possible to explain away the difficultiesthis text
has posed. And, it seems,Schlegel triesto do just that:he quotes the
fragmentand explains,withthe fullforce of his authority,what he
had wanted to say withit, that is, how it should have been under-
stood. The "Tendenzen" fragment,Schlegel argues,is a particularly
good example of the incompetence of the readers of the Athendum,
since the wayin which it has been misunderstoodfollowsa precise
pattern:the misunderstandingconcerns the parts of the fragment
thatshould have been perfectlyunambiguous,while the partsof the
fragmentwhere the author had consciously inserted ambiguities
have created no difficulties.The criterionfor the justificationof
difficultiesin interpretationis, once again, the presence or absence
of irony.The part of the fragmentthat-according to Schlegel-
should not have been misunderstoodis the part where everything
was said "almostwithoutanyironyat all," while the part thatshould
have been incomprehensibleis where "the ironybegins" ("und da
fangtnun auch schon die Ironie an," 366; Wheeler,35). The author
of the fragmentspeaks here withthe fullforceof his rightsand lays
claim to authorityover his own text. He can say with how much
ironyhe has spoken ("almostwithoutanyironyat all") and above all
know with certaintywhere irony begins: "this is where the irony
begins" ("da . . . fngt die Ironie an"). Preciselyat the moment,
however,when the author wants to exert his control over his own
text,the text eludes this control and says somethingelse. For the
ironythat "begins" at that point in the explanation is not just the
ironythatthe author has consciouslyand on purpose injected into
the fragment,but also, and perhaps even more, another irony-the
(tragic) irony,no longer controlled by the author,of the factthat
the fragmenthas been read as ironicalwhere it was meant straight-
forwardly, and takenseriouslywhere therewould have been reasons
to read ironically.
The attemptto anticipate and steer the expected incomprehen-
sion of the text by providing it on purpose with a measurable
amount of ambiguityis an attemptto keep control over the text.
Since one expects it to be misunderstood,one triesat least to influ-
ence thewayin whichthe misunderstandingwilltake place. But the
misunderstandingof the text cannot be predicted in advance and
cannot be controlled: one has to let it happen. This second irony

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 MLN 837

that"begins"here is, then,alreadythe "ironyof irony"of the end of

the essay-the ironyplayed by ironyat the expense of the ironist
who believes he is in control,the ironythat "runswild and can't be
controlled any longer" (369; Wheeler, 37).
In the paragraph about the "ironyof irony"the textdescribesthe
verysituationwe have been discussingwhen itdefinesone versionof
the ironyof ironyas "wenn man mit Ironie von einer Ironie redet,
ohne zu merken,daB man sich zu eben der Zeit in einer viel auf-
fallenderen Ironie findet"-"when one speaks of irony ironically
[literally:withirony]withoutin the process being aware of having
falleninto a farmore noticeable irony"(369; Wheeler,37, TM). It is
possible to read this as a commentaryon the sentence "and this is
where the ironybegins."We have the ironyofwhichone speaks (the
irony that Schlegel has put into his fragment);we have the "far
more noticeable irony"in whichone findsoneself (the ironyof the
misunderstandingof the fragment);and finally,we have the irony
withwhichone speaks,namelythe ironyof the sentence "and thisis
where the ironybegins,"which on the one hand assertsthe control
of the author over his text (here is where irony starts-and you
didn't see it) and on the other hand denies it by describing the
situationin whichthe ironythatthe authorhad put into his texthas
spread out and infectedother areas of the text that should have
been "irony-free."
Not least affectedbythe epidemic, of course, is the sentence "und
da fangtnun auch schon die Ironie an" ("and this is where irony
begins"), in whichnothingspeaks againstreading the deictic "da"-
here/there-as referring-also-to itself.It is itsownironythatthe
sentence is calling attentionto at least as much as the ironyin/of
the "Tendenzen" fragment,and it is here that the movementbe-
comes dizzyingindeed. The irony"withwhich one speaks," thatis,
the ironyproduced as well as named by the sentence "und da fangt
nun auch schon die Ironie an," can hardlybe understood as inten-
tional.The textitselfis now producingthe effectof Socraticirony-
the abilityto make two incompatible statements.The two state-
ments ("I, author,knowwhathappens in mytext"and "mytextcan
also mean somethingother than whatI wanted it to mean, can also
be ironic independentlyof my will") make contradictoryclaims
about the statusof the author-and thereforeof the possibilityof
controllingor understandingirony.
The explanation of the "Tendenzen" fragmentis where the proof
for the "relativity"of incomprehensibility should be delivered. In-

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838 GEORGIAALBERT

comprehensibility can onlybe "relative"ifthe author is responsible

forhis text: if he can show that and whyit is necessaryto read the
text in a particularway. But preciselyat the moment where this
claim is being made, the textescapes the controlof the author,and
it is no longer possible to decide whatit says.To attemptto explain
ironymeans to wantto prove thatit is possible to understandit,and
that to misunderstandit is not necessarybut is due to incompe-
tence. But the argument about the comprehensibilityof irony is
made bywayof a textthatis ironic-and as a consequence incom-
prehensible. The irony of the text contradictswhat is said about
ironyin the text.
There is also an alternativewayto read thispassage. On the basis
ofwhatcan indeed be recognized as the "basic thought"of the essay
("praise and ... justificationof incomprehensibility," once again in
Strohschneider-Kohrs'precise wording), it would be possible to
argue-and it has been done18-that the entireexplanation of the
"Tendenzen" fragmentis meant ironically:that it is supposed to
make fun of the "harmoniousbores" who believe that it is possible
to do such a thingas explain ironyand who keep complainingabout
incomprehensibility withoutunderstandingits necessityand worth.
This interpretationwould have the advantageof being able to recu-
perate all the statementsin the textabout a future,bettergenera-
tion of readers: these readers would not be "better"readers in the
sense that theywould no longer misunderstandthe texts of the
Athendum, but ratherin the sense thattheywould accept the incom-
prehensibility of ironyas somethingnecessaryand good. This would
confirmthat the unifyingconcern of the text is, indeed, to prove
thatironyis incomprehensibleand thatthereis a certainvalue to it;
itwould also clear awaythe problem createdbythe attemptedexpla-
nation of the "Tendenzen" fragment.It would be wrong,however,
to assume thatthissolutionmakes the textcome to reston a unified
meaning,on a unifieddefinitionof irony.In order to come to such
a unified meaning, it is necessaryto read the explanation of the
"Tendenzen" fragmentas being meant ironicallyand to understand
it correctlybytranslatingit into itsopposite. In otherwords,one has
to base one's reading on the assumptionthatthe textonlypretends
to explain irony,while what it is reallysayingis thatthisis impossi-
ble, and whatit is reallydoing is makingfunof the attempt.But this
would mean thatthe statementthatironyis incomprehensibleis, in
fact,made bywayof an ironical assertionof itscomprehensibility-
an ironicalassertionthatis fullycomprehensible:the reader hasjust

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 MLN 839

understooditbysimplytranslatingit into itsopposite. This solution,

therefore,does nothingbut produce a parallel problem:whatis said
about ironyin the text (thatit is incomprehensible)is belied bythe
ironyof the text (which is comprehensible).
To summarize:we can read the textof the explanation as being
meant ironicallyand translateit into its opposite, that is, read its
attemptto explain ironyas actuallymeaning "ironycannot be un-
derstood";however,since we have obviouslyunderstoodthe ironyof
the text,what the textsaysabout ironyis contradictedby the com-
prehensibility of itsown irony.Alternatively, we can read the textas
attempting prove irony understandable, but as producing an
to
ironic structurethat is preciselynotunderstandable since it makes
two contradictorystatements(about the understandabilityof iro-
ny).
We have come back to the problem of the beginning:in whatway
is it possible to prove the necessityof incomprehensibility? In order
to argue forit,the texthas to be comprehensible-and belie whatit
saysby being able to say it. Alternatively, the textcan be incompre-
hensible (make two opposite statements about incomprehen-
sibility),but then it willnot be possible to decide what it saysabout
incomprehensibility. The "education"of the reader consistsin mak-
ing him understand that it is not possible to understand;l' this
attempt, however, is caught up in its own impossibilityand can do
nothing but turn permanentlyon itself.The ironyof the essay"Uber
die Unverstandlichkeit" is already an "ironyof irony,"an ironyto
the second degree: it consistsin itsproducing twostatementsabout
ironywhich contradictnot only each other but also themselvesat
the same time.It is irony'sown ironythatthe attemptto defineand
thereforecontrolit (even as whatcannot be definedand getsout of
control) can do nothingbut get out of control.Ironyturnsback on
the ironistby questioninghis authorityover his text,his abilityever
to make it say what he would like it to say, and finallyeven the
possibilityof speaking about authorial intentionsat all.20
Does this mean, then, that we have finally"understood"incom-
prehensibility, and thatwe are the-somewhat belated-competent
readerswhose arrivalon the scene is announced by Schlegel at the
end of the essay?About these readers he saysthattheywill "be able
to savourthe fragmentswithmuch gratification and pleasure in the
after-dinnerhours" (371; Wheeler, 38). They will "find... A. W.
Schlegel's didactic Elegiesalmost too simple and transparent"(371;
Wheeler,38)-and thinkthattheyhave understoodeverything. But

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840 GEORGIAALBERT

preciselyfor this reason theywill not have understood. They will

have forgottenthat "a classical textmustneverbe entirelycompre-
hensible [mufinieganz verstanden werden konnen] ," as Schlegel warns,
unexpectedly,immediatelyafterhis praise of the competence of
these futurereaders.Theywillhave forgottenthatit is impossibleto
understand everythingbecause the meaning of textsdeservingof
this name (those which Schlegel considers, elsewhere, "com-
plete"21)does not let itselfbe totalized.Preciselywhen one believes
that one has understood everything,one has forgotten the
essential-namely, that the textsaysalso the opposite of what one
thinksone has understood.Justwhen one thinksone is finallyout of
it,one is pulled back into thevortexof the sequence of readingsjust
as the author is caught in the double bind of his attemptto produce
a "complete" text-in the "unaufl6sliche[n] Widerstreit... der
Unm6glichkeitund Notwendigkeiteiner vollstandigenMitteilung"
(LyceumFragment108). The back and forthof necessityand impos-
sibilityof complete communication (and understanding) is con-
demned to go on, and the feeling of "infinity" which one is sup-
posed to experience bywayof ironyis not somethingthatleaves the
subject unaffected,but is a movement one cannot stand outside of,
a vertiginousvortexthatmakes one "schwindlicht," dizzy.And once
we are again aware of thismetaphor,we should perhaps notice the
close connection between "verstehen"(understanding) and "steh-
en" (standing) and take the verylast line of the essayas a (serious?)
warningto the reader: "Und wer steht,daB er nicht falle"-"And
who stands,that he may not fall."22

III. PermanentParabasis
A furtheraspect of the problem of ironyas Schlegel describesit can
be discussed on the basis of its appearance in association with a
vocabularyborrowedfromthe worldof the theater.Thus, forexam-
ple, in the GesprdchiiberdiePoesie(Dialogueon Poetry):"Even in quite
popular genres, forexample in drama,we require irony:we require
that the events,the people, in short the whole play [Spiel] of life
should be taken and representedas play [Spiel]" (KFSA 2:323),23 or
in the much quoted posthumousfragmentthatdefines: "Ironyis a
permanentparabasis [einepermanente -" (KFSA 18:85). As
Parekbase]
is well known,the parabasis is the partin Old Atticcomedyin which
the chorus temporarilysteps out of the linear development of the
plot of the playand, turningaround to face the audience, addresses

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 MLN 841

it directly,making reference to contemporarypublic figuresand

events.In Schlegel's own definition,it is

a speechaddressedto thepeoplethatthechorusdeliveredin themiddle

oftheplayin thenameofthepoet.Itwasreallya completeinterruption
and breakingoffof theplay,in which,as in theplayitself,reignedthe
greatest and thechorus,steppingout all thewayto the
lackofrestraint,
edge of the proscenium [das bisan die GrenzedesProszeniums
heraustretende
dereuro-
Chor],wouldsaythe rudestthingsto the audience (Geschichte
KFSA 11:88).
pdischenLiteratur,

The parabasis,then,is firstof all an interruption,and the defini-

tion of ironyas "permanentparabasis,"as continuous interruption,
can be read as one more referenceto irony'sabilityto produce two
lines of meaning that constantlychallenge each other.24However,
this descriptionof ironyand the one given in the Gesprdch iiberdie
Poesieproduce a slightshiftwithrespect to other ones. This shiftis
due to theiruse of theatricalvocabulary:the two sides of ironyare
not described as simplydenyingeach other, but as exposing each
otheras fictional.This becomes clear once one asksabout the signif-
icance of the parabasis inside a play. The parabasis is, for the play,
the interruptionof the fictionalillusion: more precisely,the reality
thatopposes itselfto the fictionalillusion. It exposes fiction(Schle-
gel: "Spiel") as fictionbyopening up the closed worldof the stage to
the "real" world of the spectator area. The coherence of the se-
quence of events on the stage is therebydisrupted,and the unity
and meaning of thissequence is shown to be fictionand therefore
arbitrary.The play that is interruptedby a parabasis reflectson its
own fictionality. The parabasis connects stage and auditoriumin an
unspoken agreement:both audience and actors recognize the fic-
tion of the play as fiction,as somethingthat can be interruptedby
realityat all times. Realityalwaysreservesthe rightto unmask the
fiction,and the consciousness of this rightis what allows fictionto
go on and to be toleratedas a world separate fromreality.
The parabasis is, however,notjust the irruptionof realityin the
fiction:by the same token,it is the infiltrationof fictionin reality,
since the interruptionof the fictionalillusion,which showsthe play
to be fictionby representingitselfas reality,is itselfexposed as
fiction.Structurally,this is clear since the parabasis occupies the
same position in the play thatthe play occupies in reality(as inter-
ruption of the normal course of thingswhich is, however,inter-
ruptedin itsturnbythe latter'sresumption);but it is also clear from

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842 GEORGIAALBERT

the fact that the parabasis represents itselfas realitywithrespect to

the play,i.e., playsrealityjust as much as the play does. Withinthe
boundaries of the play,the parabasis takes itselfjust as seriouslyas
"reality"does outside the play;but once the parabasis is shownto be
in its turn merelyplay of reality,the borders between realityand
fictionare no longer so clearlydrawn.
The parabasis makesvisiblethe border betweenstage and specta-
tor area bysteppingup to, steppingon, or oversteppingit. In Athe-
nian comedy thisis symbolizedby the actions of the chorus which,
as Schlegel says,goes up all thewayto the edge of the prosceniumto
address the spectators.But whathappens in thisact is not onlythat
the actors on the stage interruptthe developmentof the plot and
recognize themselvesas actors,but that the audience itselfplays a
role. The actors in the chorus "are" no longer frogsor birds,but
actors in a chorus-they play theirreal identity.In this situationit
can become difficultto decide whetherthe audience, to which a
role has also been assigned (it is addressed), consistsof citizensof
Athens or of people who are playingthis role (their everydayreal-
ity). The unmaskingof the play as fictioncan only happen to the
extent that it also at the same time points to the fact that reality
mightpossiblyalso be fiction:in Schlegel's words,thatthe "Spiel des
Lebens" mightbe just that,"Spiel."
In Old Atticcomedy thisquestioningis rigidlystructuredand its
durationhas a set limit.As soon as the parabasis ends and the play
resumes,the spectatorscan sitback and recognize themselvesagain
as spectators,that is, as realityby contrastwith the fictionof the
characterson stage. Somethingmore akin to Schlegel's idea of the
"permanent parabasis" might be, on the other hand, the list of
charactersof Tieck's play Der gestiefelte Kater(Puss-in-Boots),where
one finds,side by side withthe charactersof the King, of Gottlieb,
and of the cat Hinze, also thatof the "public" ("Das Publikum").25
Since the variousspectatorcharacterswho playan activerole in the
comedyare listedindividuallyin the characterlist ("Fischer,Mfiller,
Schlosser, B6tticher,Leutner, Wiesener, His neighbor") and are
helpfullyidentifiedas "Zuschauer,"spectators,"das Publikum"can
mean nothingother than the "real" audience thatis in the theater
to see the play.But bywayof itspresence in the listof charactersof
the play,the audience is at the same timethereto watchDergestiefelte
Katerand to play in it: it is on the one hand the realityoutside the
play and, on the other,since it has a part in it,part of itsfiction.In
this case the border between the stage and the spectatorarea, be-

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 MLN 843

tween fiction and reality,begins to lose the characteristicsof a

straightline and risksspirallinginto infinity.The spectatorswho
talk in the lobby before and afterthe play mightnever be able to
know whether they are any less fictionalthan the numerous epi-
sodes thatinterruptthe playunderstoodin a narrowsense (the tale
only to the extent that
of the cat) and that point to its fictionality
theyplay reality.26
The ironical spectator (or the ironistin general) is the one who
realizes thathe is alwaysalreadya characterin the play.Althoughhe
is obviouslyfreeto react as he wishes,his reactions (as reactionsof a
spectatorwho belongs to the play) belong in turn to the play and
are a partof his role. Even his knowledgethathe is partof the playis
partof the play;even his self-reflectiondoes not belong to him; even
his ironyis ironized.
ofCalifornia,Irvine
University

NOTES

Kritische ed. ErnstBehler withJean-JacquesAnstettand

Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe,
Hans Eichner (Munich: Sch6ningh, 1958-; henceforthKFSA),vol. 18, 410. All
quotations fromSchlegel are fromthisedition and willbe identifiedbyvolume
and page number in the main text.Translationsof the Athendum and Lyceum
("Critical") fragmentsare by Peter Firchow and are quoted from Friedrich
Schlegel, Philosophical Fragments(Minneapolis: Universityof Minnesota Press,
1991; henceforthFragments). The translationof "Uber die Unverstandlichkeit"
is also Firchow'sand is quoted fromKathleen Wheeler,ed., GermanAesthetic and
Literary TheRomanticIronistsand Goethe(Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
Criticism:
versityPress, 1984). All other translationsare mine unless otherwisespecified.
Thanks to the teachers and colleagues, too numerous to name here, who
offeredgenerous criticism,advice, and encouragement on this paper.
2 Johann GottliebFichte, GrundlagedergesamtenWissenschaftslehre (Hamburg: Fe-
lix Meiner Verlag, 1988), 32; cf. also 45. A more extensive treatmentof the
relationshipbetween Schlegel and Fichte, such as the recent ones by Riidiger
Bubner ("Zur dialektischenBedeutung romantischerIronie," in Ernst Behler
and Jochen H6risch, eds., Die AktualitdtderFriihromantik [Paderborn: Sch6n-
ingh, 1987], 85-95); Paul de Man ("The Concept of Irony,"in Aesthetic Ideology,
ed. Andrzej Warminski[Minneapolis: Universityof Minnesota Press,forthcom-
ing]); and WernerHamacher ("Der Satz der Gattung:FriedrichSchlegels poe-
tologische Umsetzung von Fichtes unbedingtem Grundsatz,"MLN 95 [1980]:
1155-80) would take us farafieldhere. However,it should be clear thatthe word
"Analyse,"takenin thissense, leaves littleroom foran understandingof ironyas
a movementtendingto unification:immediatelyafterthe definitionjust given,
Fichte goes so far as to rename the "analyticprocess" "antithetical,"partlyon
the grounds that this new name (i.e., "antithetischesVerfahren") "indicates
more clearlythat thisprocess is the opposite of the syntheticone" (33). Inter-
pretationsof thisfragmentusuallymissthe reference,takingtheword "Analyse"

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844 GEORGIA ALBERT

in an everydaysense, and tend to be ratherunconvincingas a result.For exam-

ple, D. C. Muecke comments: "Schlegel's meaning is that ironydoes not take
sides but regardsboth sides critically."The CompassofIrony(London: Methuen
& Co: 1969), 200. Similarly,Anne K. Mellor attemptsto make even thisradical
statement fit her fundamentallydomesticatingunderstanding of Schlegel's
texts. She writes:"This philosophical dialectic [between the infiniteand the
finite,the freeand the conditioned] . . . begins witha skepticalnegation,with
a 'criticalexamination' and rejectionof existingbeliefsand errors.It thusfrees
the imaginationto create a new conception of the self,of society,of nature. But
this new conception must, in turn,be subjected to the same ironic, critical
analysis,an analysisthatrecognizesitslimitationsand failings.It is in thissense
that Schlegel insists that 'Irony is analysis of thesis and antithesis.'" English
RomanticIrony(Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress, 1980), 11.
In more general terms,formulationsof this kind on Schlegel's part have
tended to pose problems not only on a local level but also for comprehensive
interpretationsof his philosophical project. To take one symptomaticinstance,
StevenAlford'sstudyof Schlegel's critiqueof traditionallogic and of itsconnec-
tions with Romantic irony is strewnwith affirmationssuch as the following:
"[T]he idea of opposites and their synthesisdominates Schlegel's thinking.
Indeed, as we have just seen the aim of Schlegel's logic is to unifyopposites."
StevenE. Alford,Ironyand theLogicoftheRomanticImagination(New York:Peter
Lang, 1984), 51.
3 A valuable recent commentaryon this fragmentin its relation to the larger
contextof German Romanticand post-romanticnotions of "Socraticirony"can
be found in Uwe Japp, TheoriederIronie(Frankfurta. M.: VittorioKlostermann,
1983), 113-33.
4 Oddly enough, even writerson ironywho claim Schlegel as an influenceseem to
ignore his critiqueof the rhetoricalhandbook versionof irony.Lillian R. Furst,
forexample, states:"Ironycan . . . be regarded as a secretlanguage, a channel
of communication between the initiates.... [B]eneath the apparent discon-
nection, there must also be a connection if ironyis to be caught. The overt
informationis accompanied by signals that negate it, and the speaker must
presentboth codes in such a waythathis interlocutoris able to decipher them
in theircontradictoryconjunction."FictionsofRomanticIrony(Cambridge: Har-
vard UniversityPress, 1984), 15.
5 "There can thereforebe no wayofsettlingitonce forall and to the satisfactionof
both sides,save bytheirbecoming convinced,since theyare able so admirablyto
refuteone another, that theyare reallyquarreling about nothing,and that a
certaintranscendentalillusion has mocked themwitha realitywhere none is to
be found." Immanuel Kant, KritikderreinenVernunft, ed. WilhelmWeischedel,
vol. 2 (Frankfurta. M.: Suhrkamp, 1968), 467; CritiqueofPure Reason,trans.
Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), 446, TM.
A more modern versionof thisattemptto make logical contradictionharm-
less by simply taking a few precautionarymeasures can be found in W. V.
Quine's classic essay "The Waysof Paradox." There, Quine classifiesparadoxes
as "veridical" and "falsidical"paradoxes and "antinomies." Since "veridical"
paradoxes turnout to be simplycleverlyput banalities (someone who was born
on February29 can be 21 afteronly 5 birthdays)and "falsidical"ones can be
proven to be based on fallacies (Quine's example is the proof that2 = 1 based
on a divisionby0), the only "real" paradoxes turnout to be the antinomies,the
kinds of paradoxes that produce the conclusion that somethingis and is not.
Quine, who as a logician is no less interestedin the preservationof the principle
of non-contradictionthan Kant is, hastensto add thatthese paradoxes, too, can
be solved provided one is willingto give somethingup: "An antinomyproduces

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 MLN 845

a self-contradiction byaccepted waysof reasoning.It establishesthatsome tacit

and trustedpatternof reasoning must be made explicit and henceforwardbe
avoided or revised.""The Waysof Paradox," in W. V. Quine, TheWaysofParadox
and OtherEssays (Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress, 1976), 5. One of the
problematichabits to come under scrutinyis the use of the word "true."
For an illuminatinghistoryof the controversysurroundingthe potentially
disruptivenature of a famous antinomy,see Richard Klein, "The Future of
Nuclear Criticism,"YaleFrenchStudies77 (1990): 76-100.
6 Aristotle,Rhetorica.TheBasic WorksofAristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York:
Random House, 1941), 1335-37.
7 Other appearances of the word in the notebooks confirmthat it is employed
consistentlyin this sense. It functionsas a synonymfor "Demonstration"and
"Beweis" (in contrastto "Darstellung"as linguisticrepresentation)in the con-
text of discussions of philosophical writing(e.g., in KFSA 18:35) and can be
found later in association with termslike "Mimos" (KFSA 16:54) and "Nach-
machen" (KFSA 16:55).
8 "XA'OE... chaos,the firststate of the universe.... 2. space, theexpanseof
time.... 3. thenether
air.... 2b. infinite darkness.... 4. anyvastgulf
abyss,infinite
or chasm."Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon,re-
vised by Sir H. S. Jones (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968).
9 See for example Ingrid Strohschneider-Kohrs, "Der Begriffder Ironie in der
Konzeption FriedrichSchlegels,"Die romantische Ironiein Theorieund Gestaltung
(Tibingen: Max NiemeyerVerlag, 1960), especially 39-41 and 70; Franz Nor-
bertMennemeier, "Fragmentund Ironie beimjungen FriedrichSchlegel,"Poet-
ica 2 (1968): 348-70, especially 366; Ernst Behler, "The Theory of Irony in
German Romanticism,"in Frederick Garber, ed., RomanticIrony(Budapest:
Akad6miai Kiad6, 1988) 43-81, especially 62 ff.
10 Eric Baker firstpointed out to me thatthe "Schwindel"implied bythe "schwind-
lichtwerden" can be understood not only in the more obvious sense of "dizzi-
ness, giddiness" but also in its second meaning as lie, swindel,or fraud. The
possibilityof thiswordplayseems especially significantin a text that discusses
the possibilityof reading ironyas Tduschungor deception. Corroboratingmate-
rial forthisreading is givenbya passage in Tieck's 1793 essayon "Shakespeares
Behandlung des Wunderbaren,"referredto byManfredFrankin his Einfiihrung
in diefriihromantischeAsthetik(Frankfurta. M.: Suhrkamp,1989), 374, where the
wordsSchwindel and Tduschungoccur in the contextof a discussionof the ability
to deceive an audience into believing in an illusion. Tieck compares Shake-
speare's treatmentof the fantasticto the dreamworld,in which "our abilityto
judge is so confused thatwe forgetthe marksby which we normallyjudge the
real, we find nothing on which to fix our eyes; our soul is sent into a sort of
dizziness [in eine Art von Schwindelversetzt], in which it finally,by necessity,
abandons itelfto the illusion [ Tduschung:deception], since it has lostsightof all
the markingsof truthand of error." Ludwig Tieck, KritischeSchriften, vol. 1
(Leipzig: Brockhaus,1848), 57. If thereis "swindel"here, however,it mightturn
out that the swindleris not so easy to find.
11 Even recent commentarieson this fragmentfail to note that the gesture it
performshas much farther-reaching consequences than simplythe disablingof
the hierarchybetween initiatesand outsiders. For example, Joseph A. Dane
observes: "Those who enjoy the superiorityaffordedby ironyare not the elect
hearerswho understandit: in fact,those who understandironyforwhat Schle-
gel says it is (deception) are those who are most thoroughlydeceived by it.
Rather,those who can attain the superiorvantage of the ironistare those who
have and produce irony,that is, other ironists."Joseph A. Dane, The Critical
Mythology ofIrony(Athens: Universityof Georgia Press, 1991), 112.

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846 GEORGIA ALBERT

12 "Uber die Unverstandlichkeit," KFSA2:363-72.All subsequent quotations from

this essaywill be identifiedin the textby page number only.
13 For an exhaustiveaccount of the polemics surroundingthe Athendum, see Heinz
Hartl, "'Athenaum'-Polemiken,"in Hans-DietrichDahnke and Bernd Leistner,
eds., Debattenund Kontroversen. LiterarischeAuseinandersetzungen in Deutschlandam
Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag,1989), 246-357.
14 Strohschneider-Kohrs: "[Schlegel] is drivenbythe fightingspiritof the polemic
and by his commitmentto the thoughthe wantsto express.... The author of
the essay on incomprehensibilityis not allowed into the mysteryof the 'real
language,' as he himselfcalls it,evidentlybecause he lacks the calm and confi-
dence to unfold the means and principlesof the expression [des Sagens] itself
instead of subordinatingthem to what is ex-pressed [derAus-sage]"(282).
15 Strohschneider-Kohrs, 275.
16 Ralf Schnell, Die verkehrte Welt:LiterarischeIronieim 19. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart:
Metzler, 1989), 18. See also Ludwig Rohner, Der deutsche Essay. Materialienzur
Geschichte einerGattung(Darmstadt: Luchterhand, 1966), 152-66. In the same
line, although speaking more generally,Anne K. Mellor states that "romantic
ironyis a mode of consciousnessor a wayof thinkingabout the world thatfinds
a correspondingliterarymode" (Mellor, 24). The question would be what that
"finding"entails.
17 Repeatedlyin the course of the essay itself;cf. also an allusion to the essayas a
"Fuge von Ironie" in a letterfromSchlegel to Schleiermacher quoted in Aus
Schleiermachers Leben.In Briefen, eds. LudwigJonas und Wilhelm Dilthey,vol. 3
(Berlin 1861), 191. An analysis that takes this dimension of the essay as its
startingpoint is CathyComstock, "'Transcendental Buffoonery':Ironyas Pro-
cess in Schlegel's 'Uber die Unverstandlichkeit,'"Studiesin Romanticism 26
(1987): 445-64.
18 See, for example, Hartl, 288-89; also Alford,93.
19 See the "AbschluBdes Lessing-Aufsatzes" ("Conclusion of the Lessing Essay"): "I
will tell you quite brieflyand clearly,and should you nonetheless complain
about incomprehensibility [Unverstindlichkeit],as you did up to now, I hope to
make clear at least thatit does not depend on the expressionbut on the thing
itself.For the rest,I remain in thiscase onlywiththe pious wishthatyou may,at
some point, begin to understandunderstanding zu verstehen];
[das Verstehen then
you would become aware thatthe mistakeis not at all whereyou look forit,and
you would no longer delude yourselveswithsuch confused notions and empty
phantoms." (KFSA 2:412).
20 Once again, Schlegel's text seems to be aware of the problems it has to face.
"The only solution," it says,"would be to find an ironythat mightbe able to
swallowup all these big and littleironies and leave no trace of them at all...
But even thiswould only be a short-termsolution. I fear that ... soon a new
generation of littleironieswould arise .... Ironyis somethingone simplycan-
not playgames with[Mit derIronieistdurchausnichtzu scherzen]." (369-70; Wheel-
er 37, TM). On the strengthof the parallelismwiththe firstparagraph of the
essay,it is possible to understandthe "big irony"as somethinglike the abstrac-
tion of the particularin the universal:as the "concept" of irony,in otherwords.
A definitionof ironywould establishsome kind of controlover it; it is, however,
impossible.
A momentin "Uber die Unverstandlichkeit" thatcould be fruitfully read with
respect to the question of authorial intentionis the passage on Shakespeare's
"intentions"(370; Wheeler 37-38).
21 As in the note quoted above: "Everysentence, everybook thatdoes not contra-
dict itselfis incomplete."
22 Perhaps more clearly,in its syntacticalcompleteness: "Sorge ... wer stehtdaB

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 MLN 847

er nichtfalle"-"Watch ... who stands thathe maynot fall" (372: Wheeler,40,

TM). This last line, which concludes both the satirical "gloss" that closes the
essayand Goethe's-serious?-poem "Beherzigung,"has good reasons to warn
us once again thatwe mightnot be able to keep our balance, since it repro-
duces, in a whollynew way,the verytension we have been discussing.It is not
simplya question of being able to find the "boundaries between the enuncia-
tion said to be assumed by Goethe and its transformationby Schlegel," as
Marike Finlay argues (The RomanticIronyof Semiotics: FriedrichSchlegeland the
CrisisofRepresentation [New York:De Gruyter,1988], 233), but of being able to
attributeauthorshipand authorityforthe textas a whole. Withinthe contextof
the "gloss,"the sentence is at the same time Goethe's and Schlegel's, and falls
under the authorityof both and of neitherof them. It thematizes,once again,
the problem of the essay-the loss of control.For a verylucid discussionof the
related problem of the "ghostly"play of the letterin Schlegel's text,see Birgit
Baldwin, "Irony,that 'Little, Invisible Personage': a Reading of Kierkegaard's
Ghosts,"MLN 104 (1989): 1124-41.
23 Anne K. Mellor simplifiesthingssomewhatwhen faced withthe word "Spiel" in
thisstatement:in her view,Schlegel sees "thisactive embracingof chaos as an
enjoyable game" (Mellor, 24). There would seem, however,to be more at stake
in the remark:whatwould be the necessityof "requiring"somethingthatcauses
such fun?
For a discussion of irony's relationship to "Spiel," see Hans-JostFrey, Der
unendlicheText(Frankfurta. M.: Suhrkamp,1990), 272-76.
24 It is in thissense that thisexpression has been most oftenread. J. Hillis Miller,
forexample, glosses: "A parabasis momentarilysuspends the line of the action.
Irony is a permanent parabasis. This means it suspends the line all along the
line." Fictionand Repetition:SevenEnglishNovels(Cambridge: HarvardUniversity
Press, 1982), 105. See also Paul de Man, "The Rhetoricof Temporality,"Blind-
ness and Insight:Essays in theRhetoricof Contemporary Criticism,2nd ed. (Min-
neapolis: Universityof Minnesota Press, 1983), 218-22, and "The Concept of
Irony." More recently, Marike Finlay has argued-in Gerard Genette's
vocabulary-that "in permanentparabasis, what is supposed to occur is a per-
manent cancelling out of mimesisbythe diegeticact" (Finlay,225), and further
that "[a]ll that we have is permanent continuous diegesis in permanent para-
basis, since a permanentdestructionof the illusionof realityin imitationmeans
no imitationat all" (230). But clearlyif thiswere the case there would be no
need for parabasis to be "permanent,"since the illusion would be destroyed
once and forall. The need forpermanence is givenpreciselyby the impossibility
of destroyingillusion once and forall, by the endlesslyacute tension provoked
by the co-presence of illusion and the destructionof illusion.
Perhaps less frequentlynoted is the factthatonce again Schlegel's ironyturns
out to be articulated preciselyaround the intersection-and interruption-
between an example or instance (or epideixis) and a statementabout that
example. In this case, the abilityof the expression "permanentparabasis" to
functionas a definitionof ironyis at least complicated by the fact that it is
ironic-de Man calls it,in "The Concept of Irony,""violentlyparadoxical"-in
its own turn. "Permanent"and "parabasis" are words that cannot go together,
since parabasis-interruption-is only possible against the background of
somethingthat is interrupted.Interruptionis punctual and acts on something
linear; here, interruptionitselfbecomes linear-an impossibletransformation.
This is presumablyone of the reasons whyKevin Newmark,in a recent essay,
calls this fragment"the most self-resisting definitionof irony [Schlegel] ever
gave"-self-resistance, that is, permanent parabasis, being the structurethat
Newmarkshowsto be constitutive, as well as disruptive,of the Romanticproject

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848 GEORGIA ALBERT

understood as literarytheory,as the attemptedunificationof literatureand

philosophy. See Kevin Newmark,"L'absolulitteraire. FriedrichSchlegel and the
Mythof Irony,"MLN 107 (1992): 905-30.
25 LudwigTieck, Dergestiefelte vol. 5 (Berlin: G. Keimer,1828), 164.
Kater,Schriften,
The translationused is Ludwig Tieck, Der gestiefelte Kater.Puss-in-Boots,ed. and
trans.Gerald Gillespie (Austin:Universityof Texas Press, 1974), 35.
26 This situationis of course complicated by its reinscriptioninside the play-a
furtherinstance of vertiginousviolation of borders, of multidirectionaland
crossed mise-en-abime.In a scene discussed byManfredFrank,twoof the char-
actersof the playwithinthe play of DergestiefelteKater,the palace tutorLeander
and Hanswurst,"Jackpudding,"discuss a new play called Der gestiefelte Kateron
the basis, among other things,of the accuracyof its depiction of the audience.
At thispoint Fischer,one of the spectatorcharactersof the "larger"play,inter-
ruptsthe exchange: "Das Publikum?Es kommtja kein Publikumin dem Sticke
vor!" ("The public? Why,no public appears in the play."Dergestiefelte Kater,252;
Puss-in-Boots, 109). Frank (349-50) commentsby distinguishingthe audience in
the playfromthe "real" audience in the theaterand bypointingto the factthat
the depiction of the spectatorcharactersas stupid (theyare "so narrow-minded
thattheyare incapable of reflectingon theirown implicationin the plot") also
applies to the real audience since the discussion between the "fake"spectators
in the play is about the accuracyof the play's depiction of the characters.If the
play's depiction is good, as Leander claims,then the "real" audience shareswith
the "fake"one its main characteristic-its inabilityto recognize itselfas part of
the plot. The fact that this structureis repeated one more time in a place
outside the boundaries of the playwithinthe play as well as of the "frame"play
Kater,however,makes thisproblem into a much more urgentone
Der gestiefelte
forthe "real" audience. It is no longer a question of being depicted, but of not
knowingwhetherone mightbe oneself the depiction.

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