Mesana, Joje C.

Case No. 6

Cabador v People – Trial

Facts:

On June 3, 2000, the public prosecutor accused petitioner Antonio Cabador before the RTC of Quezon City of murdering,
in conspiracy with others, Atty. Jun N. Valerio. On February 13, 2006, after presenting only five witnesses over five years
of intermittent trial, the RTC declared at an end the prosecution’s presentation of evidence and required the prosecution
to make a written or formal offer of its documentary evidence within 15 days from notice. But the public prosecutor asked
for three extensions of time, the last of which was to end on July 28, 2006. Still, the prosecution did not make the required
written offer. On August 1, 2006, Cabador filed a motion to dismiss the case, complaining, among others, of a turtle-paced
proceeding in the case since his arrest and detention in 2001 and invoking his right to a speedy trial. Unknown to him,
the prosecution asked the RTC for another extension of the period for its formal offer, which offer eventually made on
August 1, 2006, the day Cabador filed his motion to dismiss. On August 31, 2006, the RTC issued an Order treating
Cabador’s motion to dismiss as a demurrer to evidence. And since he filed his motion without leave of court, the RTC
declared him to have waived his right to present evidence in his defense. The RTC deemed the case submitted for decision.
Cabador filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Cabador questioned the RTC’s action before the CA
but the latter denied his petition and affirmed the lower court’s actions. His motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not Cabador’s motion to dismiss before the trial court was in fact a demurrer to evidence filed without leave
of court, with the result that he effectively waived his right to present evidence in his defense and submitted the case for
decision insofar as he was concerned.

Held:

No. The trial proper in a criminal case usually has two stages: first, the prosecution’s presentation of evidence against the
accused; and second, the accused’s presentation of evidence in his defense. If, after the prosecution has presented its
evidence, the same appears insufficient to support a conviction, the trial court may at its own initiative or on motion of
the accused, dispense with the second stage and dismiss the criminal action. The order of dismissal amounts to an
acquittal. But because some have in the past used the demurrer in order to delay the proceedings in the case, the remedy
now carries a caveat. When the accused files a demurrer without leave of court, he shall be deemed to have waived the
right to present evidence and the case shall be submitted for judgment. A demurrer to evidence assumed that the
prosecution has already rested its case as provided under Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
As enunciated in Enojas. Jr. v Commission on Elections, to determine whether the pleading filed is a demurrer to evidence
or a motion to dismiss, the Court must consider (1) the allegations in it made in good faith; (2) the stage of the proceeding
at which it is filed; and (3) the primary objective of the party filing it.

In this case, since Cabador filed his motion to dismiss before he could object to the prosecution’s formal offer, before the
trial court could act on the offer, and before the prosecution could rest its case, it could not be said that he had intended
his motion to dismiss to serve as a demurrer to evidence. In criminal cases, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground
of denial of the accused’s right to speedy trial. This denial is characterized by unreasonable, vexatious and oppressive
delays without fault of the accused, or by unjustified postponements that unreasonably prolonged the trial. This was the
main thrust of Cabador’s motion to dismiss and he had the right to bring this up for a ruling by the trial court.
Case No. 17

People v Baron – Judgment

Facts:

In an Information, accused-appellant Baron was charged with rape and killing of a seven-year old girl identified as AAA.
Several witnesses, including children of tender age, testified that the accused was the person who picked up the victim
and the last one who was seen with the victim going to the seawall/river where the victim’s body was found. The RTC,
Iloilo City found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide and sentenced him to death. Subsequently,
Baron filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) his Notice of Appeal. The CA then forwarded its records to the Supreme
Court (SC). Baron was of the position that the prosecution has not established his involvement with certainty. He bewails
the prosecution’s reliance on supposedly tenuous circumstantial evidence.

Issue:

Whether or not Baron’s guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt.

Held:

Yes. The requirements for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction are settled. Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than on
circumstances; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. In the given case, a careful examination of
the records shows that there is nothing that warrants a reversal of the Decisions of the RTC and CA. As pointed out by the
CA, a multiplicity of circumstances, which were attested to by credible witnesses and duly established form the evidence,
points to no other conclusion that the accused was responsible for the rap and killing of seven-year old child, AAA.
Testimonies regarding the details of the crime were given by disinterested witnesses whom Barron himself had not
managed to discredit for having any ill-motive against him. Two (2) of the prosecution witnesses re even children of tender
age. As against these details and testimonies, all that the accused had offered in defense were denial and alibi – defenses
that jurisprudence has long considered weak and unreliable.
Case No. 28

Macapagal v People – Appeals

Facts:

On November 25, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa for misappropriating,
for her own benefit, the total amount of P800,000.00, which is the value of the unreturned and unsold pieces of jewelry.
Petitioner received the decision on January 13, 2009 then she timely moved for reconsideration, but was likewise denied
in an Order dated May 20, 2009 which the petitioner allegedly received on July 31, 2009. She supposedly filed a Notice of
Appeal on August 3, 2009, but the same was denied on June 29, 2010 for having been filed out of time. Hence, this petition
for review on certiorari.

Issued:

Whether or not the RTC erred in denying the Notice of Appeal filed by Macapagal.

Held:

No. The petition should be denied on the following grounds: (1) petitioner availed of the wrong mode of assailing the trial
court’s denial of her notice of appeal contrary to the rules provided under Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. No appeal shall be taken from an order disallowing or dismissing an appeal. Rather, the
aggrieved party can elevate the matter through a special civil action under Rule 65; (2) even if we treat this petition as
one for certiorari under Rule 65, it still dismissible for violation of hierarchy of courts. Direct resort to the Supreme Court
is allowed only if there are special, important and compelling reasons clearly and specifically spelled out in the petition,
which are not present in this case; (3) the petitioner failed to attach a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true
copy of the assailed decision, final order or judgment. The main reason for the prescribed attachments is to facilitate the
review and evaluation of the petition by making readily available to the Court all the orders, decisions, pleadings,
documents, transcripts, and pieces of evidence that are material and relevant to the issues presented in the petition
without relying on the case records of the lower court; and (3) petitioner’s repeated disregard of the Rules and the Court’s
lawful orders such as the submission of, among others, an affidavit of service on the RTC and on the Office of the Solicitor
General.

Indeed, cases should be determined on the merits after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and
defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections in order to serve better ends of justice. However,
it should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a procedural
remedy of statutory origin any may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing its
exercise. The requirements of the rules on appeal cannot be considered a merely harmless and trivial technicalities that
can be discarded at whim. In these times when court dockets are clogged with numerous litigations, parties have to abide
by these rules with greater fidelity in order to facilitate the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.
Case No. 39

Manansala v People – Appeals

Facts:

On May 31, 1999, private complainant Siy, former Vice President for Finance of Urban Finance and Leasing Corporation,
now UMC Financing and Lease Corporation (UMC), instructed her secretary, Bautista to withdraw via Automated Teller
Machine (ATM) the amount of P38,000.00 from her Metrobank and Bank of Philippine Islands bank accounts. However,
Bautista was not able to make such withdrawal as the ATM was offline so she took upon herself to get such amount from
petty cash custodian of UMC instead, but she forgot to inform Siy where she got the money. UMC Finance Manager
Lacanilao then informed Siy that as per Petty Cash Replenishment Report of the same date prepared by Petty Cash
Custodian Manansala, she allegedly made a cash advance in the amount of P38,000.00 which remained unliquidated. It
was only then that Siy found out what Bautista had done, and she immediately rectified the situation by issuing two checks
to reimburse UMC’s petty cash account. As the petty cash account was replenished, Lacanilao instructed Manansala to
revise the subject report by deleting the entry relating to Siy’s alleged cash advance, to which Manansala acceded.
Lacanilao then reported the incident to UMC President Marty. Thereafter, Lacanilao instructed Manansala to retrieve the
subject report, re-insert the entry relating to Siy’s alleged cash advance therein, reprint the same on a scratch paper, and
repeatedly fold the paper to make it look old. On the basis of the reprinted subject report, Siy was administratively charged
for using office funds for public use. Siy was terminated from her job and Lacanilao succeeded her in the position she left
vacant. This prompted Siy to charge Marty, Lacanilao and Manansala of Falsification of Private Documents to the charge
against Marty was subsequently withdrawn.

The MeTC found Lacanilao and Manansala guilty beyond were reasonable doubt. It appreciated the mitigating
circumstance of acting under an impulse of uncontrollable fear in favor of Manansala. The latter appealed her conviction
to the RTC which affirmed the MeTC decision in toto. Manansala filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was
denied by the RTC. The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the RTC ruling. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA correctly affirmed Manansala’ conviction for Falsification of Private Documents.

Held:

Yes. In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors,
though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court’s decision based on grounds other than those
that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such
court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper
provision of the penal law.

The Court agrees with the ruling of the courts a quo convicting Manansala of the crime of Falsification of Private
Documents, but disagrees in the appreciation of the “mitigating circumstance” acting under an impulse of uncontrollable
fear in her favor. To begin with, “acting under an impulse of uncontrollable fear” is not among the mitigating
circumstances enumerated in Article 13 of the RPC, but is an exempting circumstance provided under Article 12 (6) of the
same Code. Moreover, for such a circumstance to be appreciated in favor of an accused, the following elements must
concur: (a) the existence of a uncontrollable fear; (b) the fear must be real and imminent; and (c) the fear of an injury is
greater than, or at least equal to, that committed. In the instant case, while the records show that Manansala was
apprehensive in committing a falsity in the preparation of the subject report as she did not know the repercussions of her
actions, nothing would show that Lacanilao, or any of her superiors at UMC for that matter, threatened her with loss of
employment should she fail to do so. As there was an absence of any real and imminent threat, intimidation, or coercion
that would have compelled Manansala to do what she did, such a circumstance cannot be appreciated in her favor.