G.R. No.

82511 March 3, 1992 After due hearing, the Labor Arbiter in a decision dated
July 16, 1985, ordered petitioner company to reinstate
GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO private respondent to her former or equivalent position
CORPORATION, petitioner, and to pay her full backwages and other benefits she
vs. would have received were it not for the illegal dismissal.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and Petitioner was also ordered to pay private respondent
IMELDA SALAZAR, respondents. moral damages of P50,000.00. 3

Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioner. On appeal, public respondent National Labor Relations,
Commission in the questioned resolution dated
Gerardo S. Alansalon for private respondent. December 29, 1987 affirmed the aforesaid decision with
respect to the reinstatement of private respondent but
ROMERO, J.: limited the backwages to a period of two (2) years and
deleted the award for moral damages. 4
For private respondent Imelda L. Salazar, it would seem
that her close association with Delfin Saldivar would Hence, this petition assailing the Labor Tribunal for
mean the loss of her job. In May 1982, private having committed grave abuse of discretion in holding
respondent was employed by Globe-Mackay Cable and that the suspension and subsequent dismissal of
Radio Corporation (GMCR) as general systems analyst. private respondent were illegal and in ordering her
Also employed by petitioner as manager for technical reinstatement with two (2) years' backwages.
operations' support was Delfin Saldivar with whom
private respondent was allegedly very close. On the matter of preventive suspension, we find for
petitioner GMCR.
Sometime in 1984, petitioner GMCR, prompted by
reports that company equipment and spare parts worth The inestigative findings of Mr. Maramara, which
thousands of dollars under the custody of Saldivar were pointed to Delfin Saldivar's acts in conflict with his
missing, caused the investigation of the latter's activities. position as technical operations manager, necessitated
The report dated September 25, 1984 prepared by the immediate and decisive action on any employee closely,
company's internal auditor, Mr. Agustin Maramara, associated with Saldivar. The suspension of Salazar
indicated that Saldivar had entered into a partnership was further impelled by th.e discovery of the missing
styled Concave Commercial and Industrial Company Fedders airconditioning unit inside the apartment
with Richard A. Yambao, owner and manager of Elecon private respondent shared with Saldivar. Under such
Engineering Services (Elecon), a supplier of petitioner circumstances, preventive suspension was the proper
often recommended by Saldivar. The report also remedial recourse available to the company pending
disclosed that Saldivar had taken petitioner's missing Salazar's investigation. By itself, preventive suspension
Fedders airconditioning unit for his own personal use does, not signify that the company has adjudged the
without authorization and also connived with Yambao to employee guilty of the charges she was asked to
defraud petitioner of its property. The airconditioner was answer and explain. Such disciplinary measure is
recovered only after petitioner GMCR filed an action for resorted to for the protection of the company's property
replevin against Saldivar.1 pending investigation any alleged malfeasance or
misfeasance committed by the employee.5
It likewise appeared in the course of Maramara's
investigation that Imelda Salazar violated company Thus, it is not correct to conclude that petitioner GMCR
reglations by involving herself in transactions conflicting had violated Salazar's right to due process when she
with the company's interests. Evidence showed that she was promptly suspended. If at all, the fault, lay with
signed as a witness to the articles of partnership private respondent when she ignored petitioner's
between Yambao and Saldivar. It also appeared that memorandum of October 8, 1984 "giving her ample
she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of opportunity to present (her) side to the Management."
the Fedders airconditioner but failed to inform her Instead, she went directly to the Labor Department and
employer. filed her complaint for illegal suspension without giving
her employer a chance to evaluate her side of the
Consequently, in a letter dated October 8, 1984, controversy.
petitioner company placed private respondent Salazar
under preventive suspension for one (1) month, But while we agree with the propriety of Salazar's
effective October 9, 1984, thus giving her thirty (30) preventive suspension, we hold that her eventual
days within which to, explain her side. But instead of separation from employment was not for cause.
submitting an explanations three (3) days later or on
October 12, 1984 private respondent filed a complaint What is the remedy in law to rectify an unlawful
against petitioner for illegal suspension, which she dismissal so as to "make whole" the victim who has not
subsequently amended to include illegal dismissal, merely lost her job which, under settled Jurisprudence,
vacation and sick leave benefits, 13th month pay and is a property right of which a person is not to be
damages, after petitioner notified her in writing that deprived without due process, but also the
effective November 8, 1984, she was considered compensation that should have accrued to her during
dismissed "in view of (her) inability to refute and the period when she was unemployed?
disprove these findings. 2
Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides: Compare this with the sole.provision on Labor in the
1973 Constitution under the Article an Declaration of
Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, Principles and State Policies that provides:
the employer shall not terminate the services of an
employee except for a just cause or when authorized by Sec. 9. The state shall afford protection to labor,
this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from promote full employment and equality in employment,
work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race,
seniority rights and other privileges and to his full or creed, and regulate the relations between workers
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other and employers. The State shall ensure the rights of
benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from workers to self-organization, collective baegaining,
the time his compensation was withheld from him up to security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of
the time of his actual reinstatement. 6 (Emphasis work. The State may provide for compulsory
supplied) arbitration. 11

Corollary thereto are the following provisions of the To be sure, both Charters recognize "security of tenure"
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor as one of the rights of labor which the State is
Code: mandated to protect. But there is no gainsaying the fact
that the intent of the framers of the present Constitution
Sec. 2. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular was to give primacy to the rights of labor and afford the
employments, the employer shall not terminate the sector "full protection," at least greater protection than
services of an employee except for a just cause as heretofore accorded them, regardless of the
provided in the Labor Code or when authorized by geographical location of the workers and whether they
existing laws. are organized or not.

Sec. 3. Reinstatement. — An employee who is unjustly It was then CONCOM Commissioner, now Justice
dismissed from work shall by entitled to reinstatement Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who substantially contributed to
without loss of seniority rights and to the present formulation of the protection to labor
backwages."7 (Emphasis supplied) provision and proposed that the same be incorporated
in the Article on Social Justice and not just in the Article
Before proceeding any furthers, it needs must be on Declaration of Principles and State Policies "in the
recalled that the present Constitution has gone further light of the special importance that we are giving now to
than the 1973 Charter in guaranteeing vital social and social justice and the necessity of emphasizing the
economic rights to marginalized groups of society, scope and role of social justice in national
including labor. Given the pro-poor orientation of development." 12
several articulate Commissioners of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986, it was not surprising that a whole If we have taken pains to delve into the background of
new Article emerged on Social Justice and Human the labor provisions in our Constitution and the Labor
Rights designed, among other things, to "protect and Code, it is but to stress that the right of an employee not
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, to be dismissed from his job except for a just or
reduce social, economic and political inequalities, and authorized cause provided by law has assumed greater
remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth importance under the 1987 Constitution with the
and political power for the common good." 8 Proof of singular prominence labor enjoys under the article on
the priority accorded to labor is that it leads the other Social Justice. And this transcendent policy has been
areas of concern in the Article on Social Justice, viz., translated into law in the Labor Code. Under its terms,
Labor ranks ahead of such topics as Agrarian and where a case of unlawful or unauthorized dismissal has
Natural Resources Reform, Urban Land Roform and been proved by the aggrieved employee, or on the
Housing, Health, Women, Role and Rights of Poople's other hand, the employer whose duty it is to prove the
Organizations and Human Rights.9 lawfulness or justness of his act of dismissal has failed
to do so, then the remedies provided in Article 279
The opening paragraphs on Labor states should find, application. Consonant with this liberalized
stance vis-a-vis labor, the legislature even went further
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and by enacting Republic Act No. 6715 which took effect on
overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full March 2, 1989 that amended said Article to remove any
employment and equality of employment opportunities possible ambiguity that jurisprudence may have
for all. generated which watered down the constitutional intent
to grant to labor "full protection." 13
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to
self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, To go back to the instant case, there being no evidence
and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to to show an authorized, much less a legal, cause for the
strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled dismissal of private respondent, she had every right, not
to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a only to be entitled to reinstatement, but ay well, to full
living wage. They shall also participate in policy and backwages." 14
decision-making processes affecting their rights and
benefits is may be provided by law.10(Emphasis The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin
supplied) remedies of reinstatement and payment of backwages
is, in the former, to restore the dismissed employee to In such cases, it should be proved that the employee
her status before she lost her job, for the dictionary concerned occupies a position where he enjoys the
meaning of the word "reinstate" is "to restore to a state, trust and confidence of his employer; and that it is likely
conditione positions etc. from which one had been that if reinstated, an atmosphere of antipathy and
removed"15 and in the latter, to give her back the antagonism may be generated as to adversely affect
income lost during the period of unemployment. Both the efficiency and productivity of the employee
remedies, looking to the past, would perforce make her concerned.
"whole."
A few examples, will suffice to illustrate the Court's
Sadly, the avowed intent of the law has at times been application of the above principles: where the employee
thwarted when reinstatement has not been forthcoming is a Vice-President for Marketing and as such, enjoys
and the hapless dismissed employee finds himself on the full trust and confidence of top management; 28 or is
the outside looking in. the Officer-In-Charge of the extension office of the bank
where he works; 29 or is an organizer of a union who
Over time, the following reasons have been advanced was in a position to sabotage the union's efforts to
by the Court for denying reinstatement under the facts organize the workers in commercial and industrial
of the case and the law applicable thereto; that establishments; 30 or is a warehouseman of a non-profit
reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the organization whose primary purpose is to facilitate and
long passage of time (22 years of litigation) or because maximize voluntary gifts. by foreign individuals and
of the realities of the situation; 16 or that it would be organizations to the Philippines; 31 or is a manager of its
"inimical to the employer's interest; " 17 or that Energy Equipment Sales. 32
reinstatement may no longer be feasible; 18 or, that it
will not serve the best interests of the parties Obviously, the principle of "strained relations" cannot be
involved; 19 or that the company would be prejudiced by applied indiscriminately. Otherwisey reinstatement can
the workers' continued employment; 20 or that it will not never be possible simply because some hostility is
serve any prudent purpose as when supervening facts invariably engendered between the parties as a result
have transpired which make execution on that score of litigation. That is human nature. 33
unjust or inequitable 21 or, to an increasing extent, due
to the resultant atmosphere of "antipathy and Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid
antagonism" or "strained relations" or "irretrievable and legal act of asserting one's right; otherwise an
estrangement" between the employer and the employee who shall assert his right could be easily
employee. 22 separated from the service, by merely paying his
separation pay on the pretext that his relationship with
In lieu of reinstatement, the Court has variously ordered his employer had already become strained. 34
the payment of backwages and separation pay 23 or
solely separation pay. 24 Here, it has not been proved that the position of private
respondent as systems analyst is one that may be
In the case at bar, the law is on the side of private characterized as a position of trust and confidence such
respondent. In the first place the wording of the Labor that if reinstated, it may well lead to strained relations
Code is clear and unambiguous: "An employee who is between employer and employee. Hence, this does not
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to constitute an exception to the general rule mandating
reinstatement. . . . and to his full reinstatement for an employee who has been unlawfully
25
backwages. . . ." Under the principlesof statutory dismissed.
construction, if a statute is clears plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and On the other hand, has she betrayed any confidence
applied without attempted interpretation. This reposed in her by engaging in transactions that may
plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from the have created conflict of interest situations? Petitioner
maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of GMCR points out that as a matter of company policy, it
intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words prohibits its employees from involving themselves with
employed by, the legislature in a statute correctly any company that has business dealings with GMCR.
express its intent or will and preclude the court from Consequently, when private respondent Salazar signed
construing it differently. 26 The legislature is presumed as a witness to the partnership papers of Concave (a
to know the meaning of the words, to:have used words supplier of Ultra which in turn is also a supplier of
advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of GMCR), she was deemed to have placed. herself in an
such words as are found in the statute.27 Verba legis untenable position as far as petitioner was concerned.
non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute
there should be no departure. Neither does the However, on close scrutiny, we agree with public
provision admit of any qualification. If in the wisdom of respondent that such a circumstance did not create a
the Court, there may be a ground or grounds for conflict of interests situation. As a systems analyst,
non-application of the above-cited provision, this should Salazar was very far removed from operations involving
be by way of exception, such as when the the procurement of supplies. Salazar's duties revolved
reinstatement may be inadmissible due to ensuing around the development of systems and analysis of
strained relations between the employer and the designs on a continuing basis. In other words, Salazar
employee. did not occupy a position of trust relative to the approval
and purchase of supplies and company assets.
In the instant case, petitioner has predicated its This case presents for determination the scope of the
dismissal of Salazar on loss of confidence. As we have State's liability under Rep. Act No. 7309, which among
held countless times, while loss of confidence or breach other things provides compensation for persons who
of trust is a valid ground for terminations it must rest an are unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned but on
some basis which must be convincingly appeal are acquitted and ordered released.
established. 35 An employee who not be dismissed on
mere presumptions and suppositions. Petitioner's Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo
allegation that since Salazar and Saldivar lived together Balderrama, were convicted of frustrated murder and of
in the same apartment, it "presumed reasonably that two counts of frustrated murder for the killing of
complainant's sympathy would be with Saldivar" and its Federico Boyon and the wounding of the latter's wife
averment that Saldivar's investigation although Florida and his son Tirso, at Palo, Calanuga,
unverified, was probably true, do not pass this Court's Rapu-Rapu, Albay, on the night of June 26, 1988. The
test. 36 While we should not condone the acts of motive for the killing was apparently a land dispute
disloyalty of an employee, neither should we dismiss between the Boyons and petitioner. Petitioner and his
him on the basis of suspicion derived from speculative son-in-law were sentenced to imprisonment and
inferences. ordered immediately detained after their bonds had
been cancelled.
To rely on the Maramara report as a basis for Salazar's
dismissal would be most inequitous because the bulk of Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. Only petitioner's
the findings centered principally oh her friend's alleged appeal proceeded to judgment, however, as the appeal
thievery and anomalous transactions as technical of the other accused was dismissed for failure to file his
operations' support manager. Said report merely brief.
insinuated that in view of Salazar's special relationship
with Saldivar, Salazar might have had direct knowledge On June 22, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered a
of Saldivar's questionable activities. Direct evidence decision acquitting petitioner on the ground that the
implicating private respondent is wanting from the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy between him and
records. his son-in-law. He had been pointed to by a daughter of
Federico Boyon as the companion of Balderrama when
It is also worth emphasizing that the Maramara report the latter barged into their hut and without warning
came out after Saldivar had already resigned from started shooting, but the appellate court ruled that
GMCR on May 31, 1984. Since Saldivar did not have because petitioner did nothing more, petitioner's
the opportunity to refute management's findings, the presence at the scene of the crime was insufficient to
report remained obviously one-sided. Since the main show conspiracy.
evidence obtained by petitioner dealt principally on the
alleged culpability of Saldivar, without his having had a Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under
chance to voice his side in view of his prior resignation, Rep. Act No. 7309, sec. 3(a), which provides for the
stringent examination should have been carried out to payment of compensation to "any person who was
ascertain whether or not there existed independent unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but
legal grounds to hold Salatar answerable as well and, subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of
thereby, justify her dismissal. Finding none, from the acquittal."1 The claim was filed with the Board of Claims
records, we find her to have been unlawfully dismissed. of the Department of Justice, but the claim was denied
on the ground that while petitioner's presence at the
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of public scene of the killing was not sufficient to find him guilty
respondent National Labor Relations Commission beyond reasonable doubt, yet, considering that there
dated December 29, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED. was bad blood between him and the deceased as a
Petitioner GMCR is ordered to REINSTATE private result of a land dispute and the fact that the convicted
respondent Imelda Salazar and to pay her backwages murderer is his son-in-law, there was basis for finding
equivalent to her salary for a period of two (2) years that he was "probably guilty."
only.
On appeal, respondent Secretary of Justice affirmed
This decision is immediately executory. the Board's ruling. Said the Secretary of Justice in his
resolution dated March 11, 1993:
SO ORDERED.
It is believed therefore that the phrase "any person . . .
G.R. No. 109445 November 7, 1994 unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned" in Section
3(a) of R.A. No. 7309 refers to an individual who was
FELICITO BASBACIO, petitioner, wrongly accused and imprisoned for a crime he did not
vs. commit, thereby making him "a victim of unjust
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF imprisonment." In the instant case, however,
JUSTICE, FRANKLIN DRILON in his capacity as Claimant/Appellant cannot be deemed such a victim
Secretary of Justice, respondent. since a reading of the decision of his acquittal shows
that his exculpation is not based on his innocence, but
Amparita S. Sta. Maria for petitioner. upon, in effect, a finding of reasonable doubt.

MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner brought this petition for review on certiorari. The truth is that the presumption of innocence has
Neither Rule 45 nor Rep. Act No. 7309, however, never been intended as evidence of innocence of the
provides for review by certiorari of the decisions of the accused but only to shift the burden of proof that he is
Secretary of Justice. Nonetheless, in view of the guilty to the prosecution. If "accusation is not
importance of the question tendered, the Court resolved synonymous with guilt,"4so is the presumption of
to treat the petition as a special civil action innocence not a proof thereof. It is one thing to say that
for certiorari under Rule 65. the accused is presumed to be innocent in order to
place on the prosecution the burden of proving beyond
Petitioner questions the basis of the respondent's ruling reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty. It is quite
that to be able to recover under sec. 3(a) of the law the another thing to say that he is innocent and if he is
claimant must on appeal be found to be innocent of the convicted that he has been "unjustly convicted." As this
crimes of which he was convicted in the trial court. Court held in a case:
Through counsel he contends that the language of sec.
3(a) is clear and does not call for interpretation. The Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of
"mere fact that the claimant was imprisoned for a crime rape with homicide, we emphasize that we are not
which he was subsequently acquitted of is already ruling that he is innocent or blameless. It is only the
unjust in itself," he contends. To deny his claim because constitutional presumption of innocence and the failure
he was not declared innocent would be to say that his of the prosecution to build an airtight case for conviction
imprisonment for two years while his appeal was which saved him, not that the facts of unlawful conduct
pending was justified. Petitioner argues that there is do not exist.5
only one requirement for conviction in criminal cases
and that is proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the To say then that an accused has been "unjustly
prosecution fails to present such proof, the presumption convicted" has to do with the manner of his conviction
that the accused is innocent stands and, therefore, rather than with his innocence. An accused may on
there is no reason for requiring that he be declared appeal be acquitted because he did not commit the
innocent of the crime before he can recover crime, but that does
compensation for his imprisonment. not necessarily mean that he is entitled to
compensation for having been the victim of an "unjust
Petitioner's contention has no merit. It would require conviction." If his conviction was due to an error in the
that every time an accused is acquitted on appeal he appreciation of the evidence the conviction while
must be given compensation on the theory that he was erroneous is not unjust. That is why it is not, on the
"unjustly convicted" by the trial court. Such a reading of other hand, correct to say as does respondent, that
sec. 3(a) is contrary to petitioner's professed canon of under the law liability for compensation depends
construction that when the language of the statute is entirely on the innocence of the accused.
clear it should be given its natural meaning. It leaves
out of the provision in question the qualifying word The phrase "unjustly convicted" has the same meaning
"unjustly" so that the provision would simply read: "The as "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment" in art. 204
following may file claims for compensation before the of the Revised Penal Code. What this Court held in In re
Board: (a) any person who was accused, convicted, Rafael C. Climaco 6 applies:
imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a
judgment of acquittal." In order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown beyond
But sec. 3(a) requires that the claimant be doubt that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to
"unjustly accused, convicted [and] imprisoned." The fact law or is not supported by the evidence, and the same
that his conviction is reversed and the accused is was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an
acquitted is not itself proof that the previous conviction injustice . . . .
was "unjust." An accused may be acquitted for a
number of reasons and his conviction by the trial court To hold a judge liable for the rendition of manifestly
may, for any of these reasons, be set aside. For unjust judgment by reason of inexcusable negligence or
example, he may be acquitted not because he is ignorance, it must be shown, according to Groizard, that
innocent of the crime charged but because of although he has acted without malice, he failed to
reasonable doubt, in which case he may be found civilly observe in the performance of his duty, that diligence,
liable to the complainant, because while the evidence prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact in
against him does not satisfy the quantum of proof the rendering of any public service. Negligence and
required for conviction, it may nonetheless be sufficient ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manifest
to sustain a civil action for damages.2 In one case the injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable
accused, an alien, was acquitted of statutory rape with interpretation. Inexcusable mistake only exists in the
homicide because of doubt as to the ages of the legal concept when it implies a manifest injustice, that is
offended parties who consented to have sex with him. to say, such injustice which cannot be explained by a
Nonetheless the accused was ordered to pay moral and reasonable interpretation, even though there is a
exemplary damages and ordered deported.3 In such a misunderstanding or error of the law applied, yet in the
case to pay the accused compensation for having been contrary it results, logically and reasonably, and in a
"unjustly convicted" by the trial court would be utterly very clear and indisputable manner, in the notorious
inconsistent with his liability to the complainant. Yet to violation of the legal precept.
follow petitioner's theory such an accused would be
entitled to compensation under sec. 3(a).
Indeed, sec. 3(a) does not refer solely to an unjust his claim that he had been unjustly accused, convicted
conviction as a result of which the accused is unjustly and imprisoned before he was released because of his
imprisoned, but, in addition, to an unjust accusation. acquittal on appeal. We hold that in view of these
The accused must have been "unjustly accused, in circumstances respondent Secretary of Justice and the
consequence of which he is unjustly convicted and then Board of Claims did not commit a grave abuse of its
imprisoned. It is important to note this because if from discretion in disallowing petitioner's claim for
its inception the prosecution of the accused has been compensation under Rep. Act No. 7309.
wrongful, his conviction by the court is, in all probability,
also wrongful. Conversely, if the prosecution is not WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
malicious any conviction even though based on less
than the required quantum of proof in criminal cases SO ORDERED.
may be erroneous but not necessarily unjust.
G.R. No. 177333 April 24, 2009
The reason is that under Rule 112, sec. 4, the question
for the prosecutor in filing a case in court is not whether PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING
the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt but only CORPORATION (PAGCOR) represented by ATTY.
whether "there is reasonable ground to believe that a CARLOS R. BAUTISTA, JR., Petitioner,
crime has been committed and the accused is probably vs.
guilty thereof." Hence, an accusation which is based on PHILIPPINE GAMING JURISDICTION
"probable guilt" is not an unjust accusation and a INCORPORATED (PEJI), ZAMBOANGA CITY
conviction based on such degree of proof is SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY, et
not necessarily an unjust judgment but only an al., Respondent.
erroneous one. The remedy for such error is appeal.
DECISION
In the case at bar there is absolutely no evidence to
show that petitioner's conviction by the trial court was CARPIO MORALES, J.:
wrongful or that it was the product of malice or gross
ignorance or gross negligence. To the contrary, the Before the Court is a petition for Prohibition.
court had reason to believe that petitioner and his
co-accused were in league, because petitioner is the
Republic Act No. 7903 (R.A. No. 7903), which
father-in-law of Wilfredo Balderrama and it was
was enacted into law on February 23, 1995, created the
petitioner who bore the victim a grudge because of a
Zamboanga City Special Economic Zone
land dispute. Not only that. Petitioner and his
(ZAMBOECOZONE) and the ZAMBOECOZONE
coaccused arrived together in the hut of the victims and
Authority. Among other things, the law gives the
forced their way into it.
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority the following power under
Sec. 7 (f), viz:
The Court of Appeals ruled there was no conspiracy
only because there was no proof that he did or say
Section 7.
anything on the occasion. Said the appellate court.
xxxx
Both eyewitness testimonies fail to show the appellant
Felicito Basbacio to have committed any act at all. Both
(f) To operate on its own, either directly or through a
fail to show Felicito Basbacio as having said anything at
subsidiary entity, or license to others, tourism-related
all. Both fail to show Felicito Basbacio as having
activities, including games, amusements and
committed anything in furtherance of a conspiracy to
recreational and sports facilities;
commit the crimes charged against the defendants. It
seems to be a frail and flimsy basis on which to
conclude that conspiracy existed between actual killer xxxx
Wilfredo Balderrama and Felicito Basbacio to commit
murder and two frustrated murders on that night of June Apparently in the exercise of its power granted under
26, 1988. It may be asked: where was the coming the above provision, public respondent
together of the two defendants to an agreement to ZAMBOECOZONE Authority passed Resolution No.
commit the crimes of murder and frustrated murder on 2006-08-03 dated August 19, 2006 approving the
two counts? Where was Basbacio's contribution to the application of private respondent Philippine E-Gaming
commission of the said crimes? Basbacio was — as the Jurisdiction, Inc. (PEJI) to be a Master
record shows — nothing but part of the dark shadows of Licensor/Regulator of on-line/internet/electronic
that night. . . . gaming/games of chance.

One may take issue with this ruling because precisely PEJI forthwith undertook extensive advertising
conspiracy may be shown by concert of action and campaigns representing itself as such licensor/regulator
other circumstances. Why was petitioner with his to the international business and gaming community,
son-in-law? Why did they apparently flee together? And drawing the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
what about the fact that there was bad blood between Corporation (PAGCOR) to file the present petition for
petitioner and the victim Federico Boyon? These Prohibition which assails the authority of the
questions may no longer be passed upon in view of the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or
acquittal of petitioner but they are relevant in evaluating
regulate the operation of games of chance in the And Republic Act No. 7916 or the "Special Economic
ZAMBOECOZONE. Zone Act of 1995," enacted on February 24, 1995
authorizing other economic zones established under
PAGCOR contends that R.A. No. 7903, specifically the defunct Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA)
Section 7(f) thereof, does not give power or authority to and its successor Philippine Economic Zone Authority
the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or (PEZA) to establish casinos and other games of chance
regulate the operation of games of chance in the under the license of PAGCOR by way of the ipso facto
ZAMBOECOZONE. Citing three (3) statutes, which it clause, viz:
claims are in pari materia with R.A. No. 7903 as it
likewise created economic zones and provided for the SECTION 51. Ipso Facto Clause. - All privileges,
powers and functions of their respective governing and benefits, advantages or exemptions granted to special
administrative authorities, PAGCOR posits that the economic zones under Republic Act No. 7227 shall ipso
grant therein of authority to operate games of chance is facto be accorded to special economic zones already
clearly expressed, but it is not similarly so in Section 7(f) created or to be created under this Act. The free port
of R.A. No. 7903. status shall not be vested upon the new special
economic zones.
Thus PAGCOR cites these three statutes and their
respective pertinent provisions: PAGCOR maintains that, compared with the
above-quoted provisions of the ecozone-related
Republic Act No. 7227, or the "Bases Conversion and statutes, Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 does not
Development Authority Act" enacted on March 13, categorically empower the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority
1992: to operate, license, or authorize entities to operate
games of chance in the area, as the words "games" and
Section 13. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. – "amusement" employed therein do not include "games
of chance." Hence, PAGCOR concludes,
xxxx ZAMBOECOZONE Authority’s grant of license to
private respondent PEJI encroached on its (PAGCOR’s)
(b) Powers and functions of the Subic Bay Metropolitan authority under Presidential Decree No. 1869 vis-a-vis
Authority. – The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, the above-stated special laws to centralize and regulate
otherwise known as the Subic Authority, shall have the all games of chance.
following powers and functions:
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority, in its
xxxx Comment,1 contends that PAGCOR has no personality
to file the present petition as it failed to cite a superior
(7) To operate directly or indirectly or license law which proves its claim of having been granted
tourism-related activities subject to priorities and exclusive right and authority to license and regulate all
standards set by the Subic Authority including games games of chance within the Philippines; and that,
and amusements, except horse-racing, dog-racing and contrary to PAGCOR’s assertion, the words "games"
casino gambling which shall continue to be licensed by and "amusements" in Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903
the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation include "games of chance" as was the intention of the
(PAGCOR) upon recommendation of the Conversion lawmakers when they enacted the law.
Authority; to maintain and preserve the forested areas
as a national park; In its Reply Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam,2 PAGCOR
cites the November 27, 2006 Opinion3 rendered by the
xxxx Office of the President through Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs Manuel B. Gaite, the
pertinent portions of which read:
Republic Act No. 7922 or the "Cagayan Economic Zone
Act of 1995" enacted on February 24, 1995:
Coming to the issue at hand, the ZAMBOECOZONE
Charter simply allows the operation of tourism-related
Section 6. Powers and Functions of the Cagayan
activitiesincluding games and amusements without
Economic Zone Authority – The Cagayan Economic
stating any form of gambling activity in its grant of
Zone Authority shall have the following powers and
authority to ZAMBOECOZONE.
functions:

xxxx
xxxx

In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that

(f) To operate on its own, either directly or through a
under its legislative franchise (RA 7903), the
subsidiary entity, or license to others, tourism-related
ZAMBOECOZONE is not authorized to enter into any
activities, including games, amusements, recreational
gaming activity by itself unless expressly authorized by
and sports facilities such as horse-racing, dog-racing
law or other laws specifically allowing the same.
gambling, casinos, golf courses, and others, under
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
priorities and standards set by the CEZA;

xxxx
The Court finds that, indeed, R.A. No. 7903 does not The Court takes note of the above-mentioned Opinion
authorize the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate of the Office of the President which, after differentiating
and/or license games of chance/gambling. the grant of powers between the Cagayan Special
Economic Zone and the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority,
Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 authorizes the states that while the former is authorized to, among
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority "[t]o operate on its own, other things, operate gambling casinos and internet
either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license gaming, as well as enter into licensing agreements, the
to others, tourism-related activities, including games, latter is not. The relevant portions of said Opinion read:
amusements and recreational and sports facilities."
The difference in the language and grant of powers to
It is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that CEZA and ZAMBOECOZONE is telling. To the former,
where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free the grant of powers is not only explicit, but amplified,
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and while to the latter the grant of power is merely what the
applied without attempted interpretation.4 law (RA 7903) states. Not only are the differences in
language telling, it will be noted that both charters of
The plain meaning rule or verba legis, derived from the CEZA and ZAMBOECOZONE were signed into law
maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of only one (1) day apart from each other, i.e., February 23,
intention), rests on the valid presumption that the words 1995 in the case of ZAMBOECOZONE and February
employed by the legislature in a statute correctly 24, 1995 in the case of CEZA. x x x Accordingly, both
express its intention or will, and preclude the court from laws have to be taken in the light of what Congress
construing it differently. For the legislature is presumed intended them to be, and the distinction that the
to know the meaning of the words, to have used them lawmakers made when they enacted the two laws.
advisedly, and to have expressed the intent by use of
such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non Coming to the issue at hand, the ZAMBOECOZONE
est recedendum. From the words of a statute there Charter simply allows the operation of tourism-related
should be no departure.5 activities including games and amusements without
stating any form of gambling activity in its grant of
The words "game" and "amusement" have definite and authority to ZAMBOECOZONE. On the other hand, the
unambiguous meanings in law which are clearly grant to CEZA included such activities as horse-racing,
different from "game of chance" or "gambling." In its dog-racing and gambling casinos.
ordinary sense, a "game" is a sport, pastime, or contest;
while an "amusement" is a pleasurable occupation of xxxx
the senses, diversion, or enjoyment.6 On the other hand,
a "game of chance" is "a game in which chance rather In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that
than skill determines the outcome," while "gambling" is under its legislative franchise (RA 7903), the
defined as "making a bet" or "a play for value against an ZAMBOECOZONE is not authorized to enter into any
uncertain event in hope of gaining something of gaming activity by itself unless expressly authorized by
value." 7 law or other laws specifically allowing the same.
(Emphasis supplied)
A comparison of the phraseology of Section 7(f) of R.A.
No. 7903 with similar provisions in the three cited Both PAGCOR and the Ecozones being under the
statutes creating ECOZONES shows that while the supervision of the Office of the President, the latter’s
three statutes, particularly R.A. No. 7922 which interpretation of R.A. No. 7903 is persuasive and
authorized the Cagayan Economic Zone Authority to deserves respect under the doctrine of respect for
directly or indirectly operate gambling and casinos administrative or practical construction. In applying said
within its jurisdiction, categorically stated that such doctrine, courts often refer to several factors which may
power was being vested in their respective be regarded as bases thereof – factors leading the
administrative bodies, R.A. No. 7903 did not. courts to give the principle controlling weight in
particular instances, or as independent rules in
The spirit and reason of the statute may be passed themselves. These factors include the respect due the
upon where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, governmental agencies charged with
contradiction, injustice, or defeat the clear purpose of administration, their competence, expertness,
the lawmakers.8 Not any of these instances is present experience, and informed judgment and the fact
in the case at bar, however. Using the literal meanings that they frequently are the drafters of the law they
of "games" and "amusement" to exclude "games of interpret; that the agency is the one on which the
chance" and "gambling" does not lead to absurdity, legislature must rely to advise it as to the practical
contradiction, or injustice. Neither does it defeat the working out of the statute, and practical application of
intent of the legislators. The lawmakers could have the statute presents the agency with unique opportunity
easily employed the words "games of chance" and and experiences for discovering deficiencies,
"gambling" or even "casinos" if they had intended to inaccuracies, or improvements in the statute.8
grant the power to operate the same to the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority, as what was done in R.A. In fine, Section 7(f) did not grant to the
No. 7922 enacted a day after R.A. No. 7903. But they ZAMBOECOZONE Authority the power to operate
did not. and/or license games of chance/gambling.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Public Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
respondent Zamboanga Economic Zone Authority is Voidable Marriages.
DIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST from exercising
jurisdiction to operate, license, or otherwise authorize On November 23, 2006, a motion to reconsider the
and regulate the operation of any games of chance. denial of Danilo’s appeal was likewise denied.
And private respondent Philippine Gaming Jurisdiction,
Incorporated is DIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order
from operating any games of chance pursuant to the declaring its August 2, 2006 decision final and
license granted to it by public respondent. executory and granting the Motion for Entry of
Judgment filed by Cynthia.
SO ORDERED.
Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition
G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010 for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders
of the RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse of
CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, Petitioner, discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction,
vs. to wit: 1) the September 19, 2006 Order which denied
DANILO T. BOLOS, Respondent. due course to Danilo’s appeal; 2) the November 23,
2006 Order which denied the motion to reconsider the
DECISION September 19, 2006 Order; and 3) the January 16,
2007 Order which declared the August 2, 2006 decision
MENDOZA, J.: as final and executory. Danilo also prayed that he be
declared psychologically capacitated to render the
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be
of the Rules of Court seeking a review of the December declared guilty of abandoning him, the family home and
10, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in an their children.
original action for certiorari under Rule 65 entitled
"Danilo T. Bolos v. Hon. Lorifel Lacap Pahimna and As earlier stated, the CA granted the petition and
Cynthia S. Bolos," docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 97872, reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC.
reversing the January 16, 2007 Order of the Regional The appellate court stated that the requirement of a
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69 (RTC), declaring its motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal
decision pronouncing the nullity of marriage between under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case
petitioner and respondent final and executory. as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was
solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family
On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Code took effect. It relied on the ruling of this Court in
Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration of Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli3 to the effect that the
nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo "coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC] extends only to
Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code, those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the
docketed as JDRC No. 6211. Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988."

After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for Cynthia sought reconsideration of the ruling by filing her
annulment in a Decision, dated August 2, 2006, with the Manifestation with Motion for Extension of Time to File
following disposition: Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Partial
Reconsideration [of the Honorable Court’s Decision
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring dated December 10, 2008]. The CA, however, in its
the marriage between petitioner CYNTHIA S. BOLOS February 11, 2009 Resolution,4 denied the motion for
and respondent DANILO T. BOLOS celebrated on extension of time considering that the 15-day
February 14, 1980 as null and void ab initio on the reglementary period to file a motion for reconsideration
ground of psychological incapacity on the part of both is non-extendible, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 40, 1997
petitioner and respondent under Article 36 of the Family Rules on Civil Procedure citing Habaluyas v. Japson,
Code with all the legal consequences provided by law. 142 SCRA 208. The motion for partial reconsideration
was likewise denied.
Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan as well as
the National Statistics Office (NSO) copy of this Hence, Cynthia interposes the present petition via Rule
decision. 45 of the Rules of Court raising the following

SO ORDERED.2 ISSUES

A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on I

August 25, 2006. He timely filed the Notice of Appeal on
September 11, 2006. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN ISSUING THE
In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied QUESTIONED DECISION DATED
due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure to file the DECEMBER 10, 2008 CONSIDERING
required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in THAT:
violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of
A. THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE From the arguments advanced by Cynthia, the principal
HONORABLE COURT IN ENRICO V. question to be resolved is whether or not A.M. No.
SPS. MEDINACELI IS NOT 02-11-10-SC entitled "Rule on Declaration of Absolute
APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
CASE CONSIDERING THAT THE Marriages," is applicable to the case at bench.
FACTS AND THE ISSUE THEREIN
ARE NOT SIMILAR TO THE INSTANT Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also
CASE. applicable to marriages solemnized before the
effectivity of the Family Code. According to Cynthia, the
B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT CA erroneously anchored its decision to an obiter
THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE dictum in the aforecited Enrico case, which did not even
HONORABLE COURT IS involve a marriage solemnized before the effectivity of
APLLICABLE TO THE INSTANT the Family Code.
CASE, ITS RULING IN ENRICO V.
SPS. MEDINACELI IS PATENTLY She added that, even assuming arguendo that the
ERRONEOUS BECAUSE THE pronouncement in the said case constituted a decision
PHRASE "UNDER THE FAMILY on its merits, still the same cannot be applied because
CODE" IN A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC of the substantial disparity in the factual milieu of the
PERTAINS TO THE WORD Enrico case from this case. In the said case, both the
"PETITIONS" RATHER THAN TO THE marriages sought to be declared null were solemnized,
WORD "MARRIAGES." and the action for declaration of nullity was filed, after
the effectivity of both the Family Code in 1988 and of
C. FROM THE FOREGOING, A.M. NO. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC in 2003. In this case, the
02-11-10-SC ENTITLED "RULE ON marriage was solemnized before the effectivity of the
DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE Family Code and A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC while the
NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND action was filed and decided after the effectivity of both.
ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE
MARRIAGES" IS APPLICABLE TO Danilo, in his Comment,6 counters that A.M. No.
MARRIAGES SOLEMNIZED BEFORE 02-11-10-SC is not applicable because his marriage
THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY with Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980,
CODE. HENCE, A MOTION FOR years before its effectivity. He further stresses the
RECONSIDERATION IS A meritorious nature of his appeal from the decision of the
PRECONDITION FOR AN APPEAL BY RTC declaring their marriage as null and void due to his
HEREIN RESPONDENT. purported psychological incapacity and citing the mere
"failure" of the parties who were supposedly "remiss,"
D. CONSIDERING THAT HEREIN but not "incapacitated," to render marital obligations as
RESPONDENT REFUSED TO required under Article 36 of the Family Code.
COMPLY WITH A PRECONDITION
FOR APPEAL, A RELAXATION OF The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.
THE RULES ON APPEAL IS NOT
PROPER IN HIS CASE. Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs
this case. Her stance is unavailing. The Rule on
II Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on
ERRED IN ISSUING THE March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the
QUESTIONED RESOLUTION DATED Rule, in fact, reads:
FEBRUARY 11, 2009 CONSIDERING
THE FOREGOING AND THE Section 1. Scope – This Rule shall govern petitions for
FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and
THIS CASE. annulment of voidable marriages under the Family
Code of the Philippines.
III
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
THE TENETS OF JUSTICE AND FAIR
PLAY, THE NOVELTY AND The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE AND leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to
THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the
THIS CASE JUSTIFY AND WARRANT Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.7 The
A LIBERAL VIEW OF THE RULES IN rule sets a demarcation line between marriages
FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER. covered by the Family Code and those solemnized
MOREOVER, THE INSTANT under the Civil Code.8
PETITION IS MERITORIOUS AND
NOT INTENDED FOR DELAY.5 The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s
interpretation that the phrase "under the Family Code"
in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word "petitions" right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right,
rather than to the word "marriages." nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system
and courts should proceed with caution so as not to
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure
law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for
is no room for construction or interpretation. There is the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from
only room for application.9 As the statute is clear, plain, the constraints of technicalities.
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. In the case at bench, the respondent should be given
This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his
or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi appeal considering that what is at stake is the
sermo, or "speech is the index of intention." sacrosanct institution of marriage.
Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est
recedendum, or "from the words of a statute there No less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage
should be no departure."10 as an inviolable social institution. This constitutional
policy is echoed in our Family Code. Article 1 thereof
There is no basis for petitioner’s assertion either that emphasizes its permanence and inviolability, thus:
the tenets of substantial justice, the novelty and
importance of the issue and the meritorious nature of Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent
this case warrant a relaxation of the Rules in her favor. union between a man and a woman entered into in
Time and again the Court has stressed that the rules of accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal
procedure must be faithfully complied with and should and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an
not be discarded with the mere expediency of claiming inviolable social institution whose nature,
substantial merit.11 As a corollary, rules prescribing the consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
time for doing specific acts or for taking certain not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to settlements may fix the property relations during the
prevent needless delays and to orderly and promptly marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
discharge judicial business. By their very nature, these
rules are regarded as mandatory.12 This Court is not unmindful of the constitutional policy to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic
The appellate court was correct in denying petitioner’s autonomous social institution and marriage as the
motion for extension of time to file a motion for foundation of the family.16
reconsideration considering that the reglementary
period for filing the said motion for reconsideration is Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is
non-extendible. As pronounced in Apex Mining Co., Inc. not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 13 State is vitally interested. The State finds no stronger
anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The
The rule is and has been that the period for filing a break up of families weakens our social and moral
motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. The Court fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the concern
has made this clear as early as 1986 in Habaluyas alone of the family members.17
Enterprises vs. Japzon. Since then, the Court has
consistently and strictly adhered thereto.1avvphil WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Given the above, we rule without hesitation that the SO ORDERED.

appellate court’s denial of petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration is justified, precisely because G.R. No. 109835 November 22, 1993
petitioner’s earlier motion for extension of time did not
suspend/toll the running of the 15-day reglementary JMM PROMOTIONS & MANAGEMENT,
period for filing a motion for reconsideration. Under the INC., petitioner,
circumstances, the CA decision has already attained vs.
finality when petitioner filed its motion for NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
reconsideration. It follows that the same decision was ULPIANO L. DE LOS SANTOS, respondent.
already beyond the review jurisdiction of this Court.
Don P. Porciuncula for petitioner.
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting
aside the RTC decision which denied due course to Eulogio Nones, Jr. for private respondent.
respondent’s appeal and denying petitioner’s motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration.

Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. Its

CRUZ, J.:
purpose is to bring up for review a final judgment of the
lower court. The courts should, thus, proceed with
The sole issue submitted in this case is the validity of
caution so as not to deprive a party of his right to
the order of respondent National Labor Relations
appeal.14 In the recent case of Almelor v. RTC of Las
Commission dated October 30, 1992, dismissing the
Pinas City, Br. 254,15 the Court reiterated: While the
petitioner's appeal from a decision of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration on the ground of the Labor Arbiters and not of the POEA. Appeals from
failure to post the required appeal bond.1 decisions of the POEA, he says, are governed by the
following provisions of Rule V, Book VII of the POEA
The respondent cited the second paragraph of Article Rules:
223 of the Labor Code as amended, providing that:
Sec. 5. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. The appeal
In the case of a judgment involving a monetary award, shall be filed within the reglementary period as provided
an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under oath with proof
the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of
reputable bonding company duly accredited by the a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this
Commission in an amount equivalent to the monetary Rule; shall be accompanied by a memorandum of
award in the judgment appealed from. appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and
the arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for;
and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of and a statement of the date when the appellant
the NLRC, as amended, reading as follows: received the appealed decision and/or award and proof
of service on the other party of such appeal.
Sec. 6. Bond — In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter
involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer A mere notice of appeal without complying with the
shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or other requisites aforestated shall not stop the running of
surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company the period for perfecting an appeal.
duly accredited by the Commission or the Supreme
Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary award. Sec. 6. Bond. In case the decision of the Administration
involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer
The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
abuse of discretion in applying these rules to decisions surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company
rendered by the POEA. It insists that the appeal bond is duly accredited by the Commission in an amount
not necessary in the case of licensed recruiters for equivalent to the monetary award. (Emphasis supplied)
overseas employment because they are already
required under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA The question is, having posted the total bond of
Rules not only to pay a license fee of P30,000 but also P150,000 and placed in escrow the amount of
to post a cash bond of P100,000 and a surety bond of P200,000 as required by the POEA Rules, was the
P50,000, thus: petitioner still required to post an appeal bond to perfect
its appeal from a decision of the POEA to the NLRC?
Upon approval of the application, the applicant shall pay
a license fee of P30,000. It shall also post a cash bond It was.
of P100,000 and surety bond of P50,000 from a
bonding company acceptable to the Administration and The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily
duly accredited by the Insurance Commission. The shows that in addition to the cash and surety bonds and
bonds shall answer for all valid and legal claims arising the escrow money, an appeal bond in an amount
from violations of the conditions for the grant and use of equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect
the license, and/or accreditation and contracts of an appeal from a decision of the POEA. Obviously, the
employment. The bonds shall likewise guarantee appeal bond is intended to further insure the payment of
compliance with the provisions of the Code and its the monetary award in favor of the employee if it is
implementing rules and regulations relating to eventually affirmed on appeal to the NLRC.
recruitment and placement, the Rules of the
Administration and relevant issuances of the It is true that the cash and surety bonds and the money
Department and all liabilities which the Administration placed in escrow are supposed to guarantee the
may impose. The surety bonds shall include the payment of all valid and legal claims against the
condition that the notice to the principal is notice to the employer, but these claims are not limited to monetary
surety and that any judgment against the principal in awards to employees whose contracts of employment
connection with matters falling under POEA's have been violated. The POEA can go against these
jurisdiction shall be binding and conclusive on the bonds also for violations by the recruiter of the
surety. The surety bonds shall be co-terminus with the conditions of its license, the provisions of the Labor
validity period of license. (Emphasis supplied) Code and its implementing rules, E.O. 247
(reorganizing POEA) and the POEA Rules, as well as
In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow the settlement of other liabilities the recruiter may incur.
the sum of P200,000 with the Philippine National Bank
in compliance with Section 17, Rule II, Book II of the As for the escrow agreement, it was presumably
same Rule, "to primarily answer for valid and legal intended to provide for a standing fund, as it were, to be
claims of recruited workers as a result of recruitment used only as a last resort and not to be reduced with the
violations or money claims." enforcement against it of every claim of recruited
workers that may be adjudged against the employer.
Required to comment, the Solicitor General sustains This amount may not even be enough to cover such
the appeal bond requirement but suggest that the rules claims and, even if it could initially, may eventually be
cited by the NLRC are applicable only to decisions of exhausted after satisfying other subsequent claims.
As it happens, the decision sought to be appealed Davide and Quiason, JJ., concur.
grants a monetary award of about P170,000 to the
dismissed employee, the herein private respondent. Bellosillo, J, is on leave.
The standby guarantees required by the POEA Rules
would be depleted if this award were to be enforced not G.R. No. 75222 July 18, 1991
against the appeal bond but against the bonds and the
escrow money, making them inadequate for the RADIOLA-TOSHIBA PHILIPPINES, INC., through its
satisfaction of the other obligations the recruiter may assignee-in-insolvency VICENTE J.
incur. CUNA, petitioner,
vs.
Indeed, it is possible for the monetary award in favor of THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON.
the employee to exceed the amount of P350,000, which LEONARDO I. CRUZ, as Judge of the Regional Trial
is the sum of the bonds and escrow money required of Court of Angeles City, Branch No. LVI, EMILIO C.
the recruiter. PATINO, as assignee-in-insolvency of CARLOS and
TERESITA GATMAYTAN, SHERIFF OF ANGELES
It is true that these standby guarantees are not imposed CITY, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ANGELES CITY,
on local employers, as the petitioner observes, but SANYO MARKETING CORPORATION, S & T
there is a simple explanation for this distinction. ENTERPRISES INC., REFRIGERATION INDUSTRIES
Overseas recruiters are subject to more stringent INC., and DELTA MOTOR
requirement because of the special risks to which our CORPORATION, respondents.
workers abroad are subjected by their foreign
employers, against whom there is usually no direct or Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for petitioner.
effective recourse. The overseas recruiter is solidarily Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. for private respondents.
liable with a foreign employer. The bonds and the
escrow money are intended to insure more care on the
part of the local agent in its choice of the foreign
principal to whom our overseas workers are to be sent. BIDIN, J.:

It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting This is a petition for certiorari of the March 31, 1986
a statute (or a set of rules as in this case), care should Decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court * in
be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the A.C-G.R. SP No. 04160 entitled "Radiola-Toshiba
theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure Philippines, Inc. vs. Hon. Leonardo I. Cruz, et al."
and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Ut denying the petition for certiorari and mandamus; and
res magis valeat quam pereat. 2 Under the petitioner's its Resolution of July 1, 1986 denying the motion for
interpretation, the appeal bond required by Section 6 of reconsideration.
the aforementioned POEA Rule should be disregarded
because of the earlier bonds and escrow money it has The antecedent facts of this case, as found by the then
posted. The petitioner would in effect nullify Section 6 Intermediate Appellate Court, are as follows:
as a superfluity but we do not see any such redundancy;
on the contrary, we find that Section 6 complements
On July 2, 1980, three creditors filed a petition for the
Section 4 and Section 17. The rule is that a construction
involuntary insolvency of Carlos Gatmaytan and
that would render a provision inoperative should be
Teresita Gatmaytan, the private respondents herein,
avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions
the case docketed as Special Proceeding No. 1548 of
should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a
the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
coordinated and harmonious whole.
Court) of Pampanga and Angeles City.

Accordingly, we hold that in addition to the monetary

On July 9, 1980, the respondent court issued an order
obligations of the overseas recruiter prescribed in
taking cognizance of the said petition and stating inter
Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules and the
alia that:
escrow agreement under Section 17 of the same Rule,
it is necessary to post the appeal bond required under
. . . the Court forbids the payment of any debts, and the
Section 6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules, as a
delivery of any property owing and belonging to said
condition for perfecting an appeal from a decision of the
respondents-debtors from other persons, or, to any
POEA.
other persons for the use and benefit of the same
respondents-debtors and/or the transfer of any property
Every intendment of the law must be interpreted in favor
by and for the said respondents-debtors to another,
of the working class, conformably to the mandate of the
upon petitioners' putting up a bond by way of certified
Constitution. By sustaining rather than annulling the
and reputable sureties. (Annex 1, Comment).
appeal bond as a further protection to the claimant
employee, this Court affirms once again its commitment
Counsel for the petitioners-creditors informed
to the interest of labor.
respondent sheriff Angeles City of the aforesaid order
(Annex 2, Ibid) and on March 26, 1981, also
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs
communicated with counsel for the petitioner herein
against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
regarding same order, apprising the latter that "the
personal and real property which have been levied
upon and/or attached should be preserved till the final parties-claimants desire to clear with their principals,
determination of the petition aforementioned." (Annex shall have already been reported.
3, Ibid).
The assignee shall see to it that the properties of the
On April 12, 1983, petitioners-creditors filed second insolvents which are now in the actual or constructive
urgent motion for issuance of insolvency order and custody and management of the receiver previously
resolution of the case, alleging among other things, that appointed by the Court on petitioners' and claimants'
in November, 1982, they filed an urgent motion to issue proposals be placed under this actual or constructive
insolvency order; on December 2, 1982, they presented custody and management, such as he is able to do so,
a motion to prohibit the city sheriff of Angeles City from as the Court hereby dissolves the receivership
disposing the personal and real properties of the previously authorized, it having become a superfluity.
insolvent debtors, Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita (Annex "F").
Gatmaytan; on January 18, 1983, they (sic) appealed in
the Bulletin Today issue of even date a news item to the On May 18, 1984, the Regional Trial Court, Branch CLII,
effect that Radiola-Toshiba Phil. Inc. has already shut Pasig, Metro Manila, in Civil Case No. 35946, issued an
down its factory, sometime in March 1983, through their order directing respondent Sheriff of Angeles City, or
representative, they caused to be investigated the real whoever is acting in his behalf, to issue within seven (7)
properties in the names of Carlos Gatmaytan and days from notice thereof a final deed of sale over the
Teresita Gatmaytan and they were surprised to find out two (2) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates
that some of the aforesaid properties were already of Titles Nos. 18905 and 40430 in favor of petitioner.
transferred to Radiola-Toshiba Phil. Inc.; and that in (Annex "G").
view of such development, it is their submission that
without an insolvency order and a resolution of the case In said Civil Case No. 35946, a case for collection of
which was ripe for resolution as early as March 3, 1982, sum of money covering the proceeds of television sets
the rights and interest of petitioners-creditors would be and other appliances, the then Court of First Instance of
injured and jeopardized. (Annex "C"). Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Metro Manila, issued a writ of
preliminary attachment on February 15, 1980 upon
On April 15, 1983, petitioner filed an opposition to the application of the petitioner, as plaintiff, which put up a
said motion vis-a-vis the prayer that the insolvency bond of P350,000.00. On March 4, 1980, 3:00 P.M.,
order (which has not been rendered yet by the court) be levy on attachment was done in favor of petitioner on
annotated on the transfer certificates of title already the real properties registered in the names of spouses
issued in its name (Annex "D"). Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan under TCT
Nos. 18905 and 40430 of the Registry of Deeds of
On April 22, 1983, judgment was rendered declaring the Angeles City, per Entry No. 7216 on said titles. (Annex
insolvency of respondents-debtors Carlos Gatmaytan "A" and "B").
and Teresita Gatmaytan.
On December 10, 1980, a decision was rendered in
On April 28, 1983, petitioner filed a supplemental favor of petitioner, ordering private respondents and
opposition to the same second urgent motion and their co-defendant Peoples Appliance Center, Inc. to
motion to direct respondent sheriff to issue a final pay petitioner, jointly and severally, the sum of
certificate of sale for the properties covered by TCT Nos. P721,825.91 plus interest thereon of 14% per
18905 and 40430 in its favor (Annex "E"). annum from October 12, 1979 until fully paid;
P20,000.00, for and attorney's fees; and the costs of
On February 3, 1984, acting upon petitioner's motion suit (Annex "5", Comment). After the said decision in
claiming that ownership of certain real properties of the the aforementioned Civil Case No. 35946 became final
insolvents had passed to it by virtue of foreclosure and executory, a writ of execution for the satisfaction
proceedings conducted in Civil Case No. 35946 of the thereof issued on March 18, 1981; and on May 4, 1981,
former Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, respondent sheriff of Angeles City sold at auction sale
Metro Manila, which properties were not redeemed the attached properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905
within the period of redemption, respondent court and 40430, to petitioner as the highest bidder, and the
issued an order disposing, thus: certificate of sale was accordingly issued in its favor.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby, confirms the election On September 21, 1982, the court ordered the
of Mr. Emilio C. Patino, as assignee of all the registered consolidation of ownership of petitioner over said
claimants in this case, and, in consequence thereof, the properties; but respondent sheriff of Angeles City
said assignee is hereby directed to post a bond in the refused to issue a final certificate of sale in favor of
amount of P30,000.00 and to take his oath thereafter so petitioner.
as to be able to perform his duties and discharge his
functions, as such. On May 30, 1984, petitioners-creditors interposed their
opposition, stating among other things, that subject
The Court, likewise, sets the meeting of all the creditors motion is improper and premature because it treats of
with the attendance, of course, of the assignee, on matters foreign to the insolvency proceedings; and
March 9, 1984, at 8:30., as by that time the proposals, premature, for the reason that the properties covered by
which the respective representatives of the TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430-Angeles City were brought
to the jurisdiction of the insolvency court for the
determination of the assets of the insolvents available as the property of the debtor. Such assignment shall
for distribution to the approved credits/liabilities of the operate to vest in the assignee all of the estate of the
insolvents. Petitioners-creditors theorized that the insolvent debtor not exempt by law from execution. It
insolvency court is devoid of jurisdiction to grant the shall dissolve any attachment levied within one month
motion referring to matters involved in a case pending next preceding the commencement of the insolvency
before a coordinate court in another jurisdiction (Annex proceedings and vacate and set aside any judgment
"l"). entered in any action commenced within thirty days
immediately prior to the commencement of insolvency
Prior thereto or on July 13, 1984, to be precise, proceedings and shall set aside any judgment entered
respondent court came out with its assailed extended by default or consent of the debtor within thirty days
order with the following decretal portion: immediately prior to the commencement of the
insolvency proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, and also for the reason stated in the
aforequoted order issued in pursuance of a similar Relative thereto, the findings of the then Intermediate
motion of the movant, the Court denies, as it is hereby Appellate Court are undisputed that the levy on
denied the motion of Radiola-Toshiba, dated May 28, attachment against the subject properties of the
1984 and directs the latter to participate in the Gatmaytans, issued by the then Court of First Instance
supposed meeting of all the creditors/claimants of Pasig in Civil Case No. 35946, was on March 4, 1980
presided by the duly elected assignee. (Annex "J"). while the insolvency proceeding in the then Court of
First Instance of Angeles City, Special Proceeding No.
On September 8, 1984, herein petitioner 1548, was commenced only on July 2, 1980, or more
Radiola-Toshiba Philippines, Inc. (RTPI, for short) filed than four (4) months after the issuance of the said
a petition for certiorari and mandamus with respondent attachment. Under the circumstances, petitioner
Intermediate Appellate Court. contends that its lien on the subject properties overrode
the insolvency proceeding and was not dissolved
The then Intermediate Appellate Court, in a Decision thereby.
promulgated on March 31, 1986, denied petitioner's
aforesaid petition. On April 19, 1986, petitioner filed a Private respondents, on the other hand, relying on
motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied in Section 79 of the said law, which reads:
a Resolution dated July 1, 1986.
Sec. 79. When an attachment has been made and is
Hence, the instant petition. Herein petitioner raised two not dissolved before the commencement of
issues — proceedings in insolvency, or is dissolved by an
undertaking given by the defendant, if the claim upon
1. WHETHER OR NOT CERTIORARI IS A REMEDY which the attachment suit was commenced is proved
DESIGNATED FOR THE CORRECTION OF ERRORS against the estate of the debtor, the plaintiff may prove
OF JURISDICTION ONLY; and the legal costs and disbursements of the suit, and of the
keeping of the property, and the amount thereof shall
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE REFUSAL OF THE be a preferred debt.
COURTS TO ENFORCE THE LIEN OF PETITIONER
ARISING FROM A LEVY OF ATTACHMENT NOT and the fact that petitioner and its counsel have full
MADE WITHIN ONE MONTH NEXT PRECEDING THE knowledge of the proceedings in the insolvent case,
COMMENCEMENT OF THE INSOLVENCY argue that the subsequent Certificate of Sale on August
PROCEEDING IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 3, 1981, issued in favor of petitioner over the subject
properties, was issued in bad faith, in violation of the
The main issue in this case is whether or not the levy on law and is not equitable for the creditors of the insolvent
attachment in favor of the petitioner is dissolved by the debtors; and pursuant to the above quoted Section 79,
insolvency proceedings against respondent spouses petitioner should not be entitled to the transfer of the
commenced four months after said attachment. subject properties in its name.

On this issue, Section 32 of the Insolvency Law (Act No. Petitioner's contention is impressed with
1956, as amended), provides: merit.1âwphi1 The provision of the above-quoted
Section 32, of the Insolvency Law is very clear — that
Sec. 32 — As soon as an assignee is elected or attachments dissolved are those levied within one (1)
appointed and qualified, the clerk of the court shall, by month next preceding the commencement of the
an instrument under his hand and seal of the court, insolvency proceedings and judgments vacated and set
assign and convey to the assignee all the real and aside are judgments entered in any action, including
personal property, estate, and effects of the debtor with judgment entered by default or consent of the debtor,
all his deeds, books, and papers relating thereto, and where the action was filed within thirty (30) days
such assignment shall relate back to the immediately prior to the commencement of the
commencement of the proceedings in insolvency, and insolvency proceedings. In short, there is a cut off
shall relate back to the acts upon the adjudication was period — one (1) month in attachment cases and thirty
founded, and by operation of law shall vest the title to all (30) days in judgments entered in actions commenced
such property, estate, and effects in the assignee, prior to the insolvency proceedings. Section 79, on the
although the same is then attached on mesne process, other hand, relied upon by private respondents,
provides for the right of the plaintiff if the attachment is
not dissolved before the commencement of SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
proceedings in insolvency, or is dissolved by an PHILIPPINES, respondents.
undertaking given by the defendant, if the claim upon
which the attachment suit was commenced is proved DECISION
against the estate of the debtor. Therefore, there is no
conflict between the two provisions. REYES, R.T., J.:

But even granting that such conflict exists, it may be CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government
stated that in construing a statute, courts should adopt scholaran** accused, along with her brother, of
a construction that will give effect to every part of a swindling government funds?
statute, if at all possible. This rule is expressed in the
maxim, ut maqis valeat quam pereat or that MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang
construction is to be sought which gives effect to the iskolar ng bayan, at ang kanyang kapatid, na kapwa
whole of the statute — its every word. Hence, where a pinararatangan ng estafa ng pera ng bayan?
statute is susceptible of more than one interpretation,
the court should adopt such reasonable and beneficial The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for
construction as will render the provision thereof certiorari assailing the Resolutions1 of the
operative and effective and harmonious with each other Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, denying petitioner’s
(Javellana vs. Tayo, 6 SCRA 1042 [1962]; Statutory motion to quash the information and her motion for
Construction by Ruben E. Agpalo, p. 182). reconsideration.

Neither can the sheriff's sale in execution of the The Antecedents

judgment in favor of the petitioner be considered as a
fraudulent transfer or preference by the insolvent Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior
debtors, which constitute a violation of Sec. 70 of the student of the University of the Philippines-Cebu. A
Insolvency Law. In the case of Velayo vs. Shell Co. of student of a state university is known as a government
the Philippines (100 Phil. 187, [1956]), this Court ruled scholar. She was appointed by then President Joseph
that Sections 32 and 70 contemplate only acts and Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a student regent of
transactions occurring within 30 days prior to the UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000
commencement of the proceedings in insolvency and, and ending on December 31, 2000.
consequently, all other acts outside of the 30-day period
cannot possibly be considered as coming within the
In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with
orbit of their operation.
President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex
in UP Diliman.2 On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with
Finally, petitioner correctly argued that the properties in her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities
question were never placed under the jurisdiction of and Exchange Commission the Office of the Student
respondent insolvency court so as to be made available Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).3
for the payment of claim filed against the Gatmaytans in
the insolvency proceedings.
One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of
the Vinzons Hall Annex.4 President Estrada gave
Hence, the denial by respondent insolvency court to Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as
give due course to the attachment and execution of financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The
Civil Case No. 35946 of the CFI of Rizal constitutes a source of the funds, according to the information, was
freezing of the disposition of subject properties by the the Office of the President.
former which were not within its jurisdiction; undeniably,
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of
The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to
jurisdiction, correctable by certiorari.
materialize.5 The succeeding student regent, Kristine
Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman,
WHEREFORE, the March 31, 1986 decision of the then Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a
Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby Reversed and system-wide alliance of student councils within the state
SET ASIDE. The attachment and execution sale in Civil university, consequently filed a complaint for
Case No. 35946 of the former CFI of Rizal are given Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the
due course and petitioner's ownership of subject Office of the Ombudsman.6
properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 is
ordered consolidated.
On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due
investigation, found probable cause to indict petitioner
SO ORDERED. and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 27819 of the
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Davide, Jr., 7
Sandiganbayan. The Information reads:
JJ., concur.
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office
G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008 of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses HANNAH
EUNICE D. SERANA and JADE IAN D. SERANA of the
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner, crime of Estafa, defined and penalized under
vs.
Paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, was a simple student and did not receive any salary as
as amended committed as follows: a student regent.

That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or She further contended that she had no power or
subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, authority to receive monies or funds. Such power was
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable vested with the Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole.
Court, above-named accused, HANNAH EUNICE D. Since it was not alleged in the information that it was
SERANA, a high-ranking public officer, being then the among her functions or duties to receive funds, or that
Student Regent of the University of the Philippines, the crime was committed in connection with her official
Diliman, Quezon City, while in the performance of her functions, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of the
official functions, committing the offense in relation to Sandiganbayan citing the case of Soller v.
her office and taking advantage of her position, with Sandiganbayan.11
intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D.
SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, The Ombudsman opposed the motion.12 It disputed
unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government by petitioner’s interpretation of the law. Section 4(b) of
falsely and fraudulently representing to former Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada that the renovation of the catch -all phrase "in relation to office," thus, the
the Vinzons Hall of the University of the Philippines will Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the charges
be renovated and renamed as "President Joseph against petitioner. In the same breath, the prosecution
Ejercito Estrada Student Hall," and for which purpose countered that the source of the money is a matter of
accused HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA requested the defense. It should be threshed out during a full-blown
amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS trial.13
(P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office
of the President, and the latter relying and believing on According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her
said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and protestations, iwas a public officer. As a member of the
delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 BOR, she hads the general powers of administration
dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of FIFTEEN and exerciseds the corporate powers of UP. Based on
MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), which check was Mechem’s definition of a public office, petitioner’s
subsequently encashed by accused Jade Ian D. Serana stance that she was not compensated, hence, not a
on October 25, 2000 and misappropriated for their public officer, is erroneous. Compensation is not an
personal use and benefit, and despite repeated essential part of public office. Parenthetically,
demands made upon the accused for them to return compensation has been interpreted to include
aforesaid amount, the said accused failed and refused allowances. By this definition, petitioner was
to do so to the damage and prejudice of the compensated.14
government in the aforesaid amount.
Sandiganbayan Disposition
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)
In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the
Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for lack of
that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction merit.15 It ratiocinated:
over the offense charged or over her person, in her
capacity as UP student regent. The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over this case.
Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as
amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal
offenses over which the Sandiganbayan has offenses covered by Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII,
jurisdiction.8 It has no jurisdiction over the crime Book II of the Revised Penal Code are within the
of estafa.9 It only has jurisdiction over crimes covered jurisdiction of this Court. As correctly pointed out by the
by Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by prosecution, Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 provides that the
Public Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal Code Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other
(RPC). Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes offenses committed by public officials and employees in
Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the relation to their office. From this provision, there is no
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. single doubt that this Court has jurisdiction over the
offense of estafa committed by a public official in
She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the relation to his office.
government, that was duped. Even assuming that she
received the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from Accused-movant’s claim that being merely a member in
Estrada, not from the coffers of the government.10 representation of the student body, she was never a
public officer since she never received any
Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had compensation nor does she fall under Salary Grade 27,
no jurisdiction over her person. As a student regent, she is of no moment, in view of the express provision of
was not a public officer since she merely represented Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249 which provides:
her peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their
positions in an ex officio capacity. She addsed that she
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction – The Sandiganbayan shall jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that she does not
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases occupy a position classified as Salary Grade 27 or
involving: higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
(A) x x x
Finally, this court finds that accused-movant’s
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the contention that the same of P15 Million was received
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise from former President Estrada and not from the coffers
classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the of the government, is a matter a defense that should be
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 properly ventilated during the trial on the merits of this
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: case.16

xxxx On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for

reconsideration.17 The motion was denied with finality in
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of a Resolution dated February 4, 2004.18
government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations. Issue
(Italics supplied)
Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that
It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the "THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE
Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction over ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
all offenses involving the officials enumerated in AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT
subsection (g), irrespective of their salary grades, QUASHING THE INFORMATION AND DISMISING
because the primordial consideration in the inclusion of THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS HAS NO
these officials is the nature of their responsibilities and JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN
functions. THE INFORMATION."19

Is accused-movant included in the contemplated In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument
provision of law? below, namely: (a) the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over estafa; (b) petitioner is not a public
A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the officer with Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition
University of the Philippines reveals that the Board of fees; (c) the offense charged was not committed in
Regents, to which accused-movant belongs, relation to her office; (d) the funds in question
exclusively exercises the general powers of personally came from President Estrada, not from the
administration and corporate powers in the university, government.
such as: 1) To receive and appropriate to the ends
specified by law such sums as may be provided by law Our Ruling
for the support of the university; 2) To prescribe rules
for its own government and to enact for the government The petition cannot be granted.
of the university such general ordinances and
regulations, not contrary to law, as are consistent with Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to
the purposes of the university; and 3) To appoint, on quash is not correctible by certiorari.
recommendation of the President of the University,
professors, instructors, lecturers and other employees We would ordinarily dismiss this petition
of the University; to fix their compensation, hours of for certiorari outright on procedural grounds.
service, and such other duties and conditions as it may Well-established is the rule that when a motion to quash
deem proper; to grant to them in its discretion leave of in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition
absence under such regulations as it may promulgate, for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without
any other provisions of law to the contrary prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in
notwithstanding, and to remove them for cause after an their motion to quash.20 Remedial measures as regards
investigation and hearing shall have been had. interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are
frowned upon and often dismissed.21 The evident
It is well-established in corporation law that the reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a
corporation can act only through its board of directors, single action.22
or board of trustees in the case of non-stock
corporations. The board of directors or trustees, In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate
therefore, is the governing body of the corporation. Court,23 the Court clearly explained and illustrated the
rule and the exceptions, thus:
It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents of
the University of the Philippines is performing functions As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss
similar to those of the Board of Trustees of a non-stock is merely interlocutory and cannot be subject of appeal
corporation. This draws to fore the conclusion that until final judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule
being a member of such board, accused-movant 41). The ordinary procedure to be followed in such a
undoubtedly falls within the category of public officials case is to file an answer, go to trial and if the decision is
upon whom this Court is vested with original exclusive adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final
judgment. The same rule applies to an order denying a The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is
motion to quash, except that instead of filing an answer set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by
a plea is entered and no appeal lies from a judgment of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
acquittal.
We first address petitioner’s contention that the
This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is determined by
court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with Practices Act, as amended). We note that petitioner
grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition refers to Section 4 of the said law yet quotes Section 4
lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to require the of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in her motion to quash
defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and before the Sandiganbayan.25She repeats the reference
expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the in the instant petition for certiorari26 and in her
subject matter or offense, or is not the court of proper memorandum of authorities.27
venue, or if the denial of the motion to dismiss or motion
to quash is made with grave abuse of discretion or a We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere
whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. In such clerical or typographical error. It bears stressing that
cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain petitioner repeated this claim twice despite corrections
and adequate. The following are a few examples of the made by the Sandiganbayan.28
exceptions to the general rule.
Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as
In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that
of a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A
the subject matter, this Court granted the petition brief legislative history of the statute creating the
for certiorari and prohibition against the City Court of Sandiganbayan is in order. The Sandiganbayan was
Manila and directed the respondent court to dismiss the created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then
case. President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It
was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official
In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial conduct required of public officers and employees,
of a motion to quash based on lack of jurisdiction over based on the concept that public officers and
the offense, this Court granted the petition for employees shall serve with the highest degree of
prohibition and enjoined the respondent court from responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall
further proceeding in the case. remain at all times accountable to the people.29

In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No.
of a motion to dismiss based on improper venue, this 1606 which was promulgated on December 10, 1978.
Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the
the respondent judge from taking cognizance of the Sandiganbayan.30
case except to dismiss the same.
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on
In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan
a motion to dismiss based on bar by prior judgment, this jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995
Court granted the petition for certiorari and directed the made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which
respondent judge to dismiss the case. was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No.
8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the
In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As it now stands, the
denial of a motion to dismiss based on the Statute of Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:
Frauds, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and
dismissed the amended complaint. Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted involving:
the petition for certiorari after the motion to quash
based on double jeopardy was denied by respondent A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
judge and ordered him to desist from further action in other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
the criminal case except to dismiss the same. Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or
In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying more of the accused are officials occupying the
the motion to quash based on prescription was set following positions in the government, whether in a
aside on certiorari and the criminal case was dismissed permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
by this Court.24 commission of the offense:

We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
grave abuse of discretion. positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
" (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as
the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial herein provided.
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads; " The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of
" (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,
the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of
similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that
"(c ) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under
position of consul and higher; Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986:
Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall
" (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
captains, and all officers of higher rank;
" The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg.
" (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while 129, as well as the implementing rules that the
occupying the position of provincial director and those Supreme Court has promulgated and may thereafter
holding the rank of senior superintended or higher; promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to
the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and
" (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all
and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor; Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the
Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall
" (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases
government-owned or controlled corporations, state filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
universities or educational institutions or foundations. issued in 1986.

" (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof " In case private individuals are charged as
classified as Grade "27'" and up under the co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; public officers or employees, including those employed
in government-owned or controlled corporations, they
" (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the shall be tried jointly with said public officers and
provisions of the Constitution; employees in the proper courts which shall exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over them.
" (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional
Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the " Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary
Constitution; and notwithstanding, the criminal action and the
corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability
shall, at all times, be simultaneously instituted with, and
" (5) All other national and local officials classified as
jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the
Grade "27'" and higher under the Compensation and
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of
Position Classification Act of 1989.
the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry
with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve
B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or
the filing such civil action separately from the criminal
complexed with other crimes committed by the public
action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That
officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of
where the civil action had heretofore been filed
this section in relation to their office.
separately but judgment therein has not yet been
rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil
connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the
issued in 1986. appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation
and joint determination with the criminal action,
" In cases where none of the accused are occupying otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed
positions corresponding to Salary Grade "27'" or higher, abandoned."
as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or
military and PNP officer mentioned above, exclusive Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute
original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper approved on August 17, 1960. The said law represses
regional court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial certain acts of public officers and private persons alike
court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may
be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided
lead thereto.31 Pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019,
in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. all prosecutions for violation of the said law should be
filed with the Sandiganbayan.32
" The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or order of R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the
regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own cases over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.
In fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:
petitioner, deals not with the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on private B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or
individuals. We quote: complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of
Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. – (a) It this section in relation to their office.
shall be unlawful for any person having family or close
personal relation with any public official to capitalize or Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
exploit or take advantage of such family or close other felonies committed by public officials in relation to
personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or their office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to
receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in
advantage from any other person having some Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of
business, transaction, application, request or contract those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to
with the government, in which such public official has to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed
intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse or by public officials and employees mentioned in Section
relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the third civil 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the
degree. The word "close personal relation" shall include offense is committed in relation to their office.
close personal friendship, social and fraternal
connections, and professional employment all giving In Perlas, Jr. v. People,37 the Court had occasion to
rise to intimacy which assures free access to such explain that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an
public officer. indictment for estafa versus a director of the National
Parks Development Committee, a government
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to instrumentality. The Court held then:
induce or cause any public official to commit any of the
offenses defined in Section 3 hereof. The National Parks Development Committee was
created originally as an Executive Committee on
In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as January 14, 1963, for the development of the Quezon
amended, defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan Memorial, Luneta and other national parks (Executive
while R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and Order No. 30). It was later designated as the National
corrupt practices and provides for their penalties. Parks Development Committee (NPDC) on February 7,
1974 (E.O. No. 69). On January 9, 1966, Mrs. Imelda R.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia were designated
the offense of estafa. Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively (E.O. No. 3).
Despite an attempt to transfer it to the Bureau of Forest
Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner Development, Department of Natural Resources, on
contends that estafa is not among those crimes December 1, 1975 (Letter of Implementation No. 39,
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. We note that in issued pursuant to PD No. 830, dated November 27,
hoisting this argument, petitioner isolated the first 1975), the NPDC has remained under the Office of the
paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without regard President (E.O. No. 709, dated July 27, 1981).
to the succeeding paragraphs of the said provision.
Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees
The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that listed NPDC as a regular government agency under the
statutes should receive a sensible construction so as to Office of the President and allotments for its
avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion.33 Interpretatio maintenance and operating expenses were issued
talis in ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur direct to NPDC (Exh. 10-A, Perlas, Item Nos. 2, 3).
inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity,
such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and The Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over estafa was
absurdity is to be adopted. Kung saan mayroong reiterated with greater firmness in Bondoc v.
kalabuan, ang pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat Sandiganbayan.38Pertinent parts of the Court’s ruling in
maging mahirap at katawa-tawa. Bondoc read:

Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer
expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive Bondoc’s cases to the Regional Trial Court, for the
at the effect contemplated by the legislature.34 The simple reason that the latter would not have jurisdiction
intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the over the offenses. As already above intimated, the
whole text of the law and every part of the act is to be inability of the Sandiganbayan to hold a joint trial of
taken into view.35 In other words, petitioner’s Bondoc’s cases and those of the government
interpretation lies in direct opposition to the rule that a employees separately charged for the same crimes,
statute must be interpreted as a whole under the has not altered the nature of the offenses charged,
principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the as estafa thru falsification punishable by penalties
statute itself.36 Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum higher than prision correccional or imprisonment of six
statutum. Ang isang batas ay marapat na bigyan ng years, or a fine of P6,000.00, committed by government
kahulugan sa kanyang kabuuan sa ilalim ng employees in conspiracy with private persons, including
prinsipyo na ang pinakamainam na interpretasyon Bondoc. These crimes are within the exclusive, original
ay ang mismong batas. jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot
be taken cognizance of by the regular courts, apart from Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the
the fact that even if the cases could be so transferred, a Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents,
joint trial would nonetheless not be possible. directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state
Petitioner UP student regent universities or educational institutions or foundations.
is a public officer. Petitioner falls under this category. As the
Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs
Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a
She does not receive any salary or remuneration as a non-stock corporation.45 By express mandate of law,
UP student regent. This is not the first or likely the last petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by
time that We will be called upon to define a public P.D. No. 1606.
officer. In Khan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, We
ruled that it is difficult to pin down the definition of a Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not
public officer.39 The 1987 Constitution does not define an essential element of public office.46 At most, it is
who are public officers. Rather, the varied definitions merely incidental to the public office.47
and concepts are found in different statutes and
jurisprudence. Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the
public office. An investment in an individual of some
In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court held that: portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to
be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes
A public office is the right, authority, and duty created one a public officer.48
and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either
fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in
power, an individual is invested with some portion of the line with Article XIV of the Constitution. UP performs a
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise legitimate governmental function by providing advanced
by him for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and
Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a public arts, and giving professional and technical
office under our political system is therefore not a training.49 Moreover, UP is maintained by the
natural right. It exists, when it exists at all only because Government and it declares no dividends and is not a
and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly corporation created for profit.50
creating and conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64).
There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate The offense charged was committed
in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. in relation to public office, according
Excepting constitutional offices which provide for to the Information.
special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one
can be said to have any vested right in an office or its Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she
salary (42 Am. Jur. 881). is a public officer, the Sandiganbayan would still not
have jurisdiction over the offense because it was not
In Laurel v. Desierto,41 the Court adopted the definition committed in relation to her office.
of Mechem of a public office:
According to petitioner, she had no power or authority
"A public office is the right, authority and duty, created to act without the approval of the BOR. She adds there
and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, was no Board Resolution issued by the BOR
either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the authorizing her to contract with then President Estrada;
creating power, an individual is invested with some and that her acts were not ratified by the governing
portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to body of the state university. Resultantly, her act was
be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The done in a private capacity and not in relation to public
individual so invested is a public officer."42 office.

Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the
Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition averments in the information.51 More than that,
fee-paying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories
not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction set up by defendant or respondent in an answer, a
of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash.52 Otherwise,
jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely
1606. In Geduspan v. People,43 We held that while the upon the whims of defendant or respondent.53
first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary
Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no
includes other executive officials whose positions may uncertain terms that petitioner, being then a student
not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by regent of U.P., "while in the performance of her official
express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of functions, committing the offense in relation to her office
the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain,
the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a
provision of law.44 private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously defraud the government x x x."
(Underscoring supplied)

Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the

part of the Sandiganbayan when it did not quash the
information based on this ground.

Source of funds is a defense that should

be raised during trial on the merits.

It is contended anew that the amount came from

President Estrada’s private funds and not from the
government coffers. Petitioner insists the charge has no
leg to stand on.

We cannot agree. The information alleges that the

funds came from the Office of the President and not its
then occupant, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada.
Under the information, it is averred that "petitioner
requested the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos
(P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office
of the President, and the latter relying and believing on
said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and
delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353
dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of Fifteen Million
Pesos (P15,000,000.00)."

Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan

observation that the source of the P15,000,000 is a
matter of defense that should be ventilated during the
trial on the merits of the instant case.54

A lawyer owes candor, fairness

and honesty to the Court.

As a parting note, petitioner’s counsel, Renato G. dela

Cruz, misrepresented his reference to Section 4 of P.D.
No. 1606 as a quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No.
3019. A review of his motion to quash, the instant
petition for certiorari and his memorandum, unveils the
misquotation. We urge petitioner’s counsel to observe
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
specifically Rule 10.02 of the Rules stating that "a
lawyer shall not misquote or misrepresent."

The Court stressed the importance of this rule

in Pangan v. Ramos,55 where Atty Dionisio D. Ramos
used the name Pedro D.D. Ramos in connection with a
criminal case. The Court ruled that Atty. Ramos
resorted to deception by using a name different from
that with which he was authorized. We severely
reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a repetition
may warrant suspension or disbarment.56

We admonish petitioner’s counsel to be more careful

and accurate in his citation. A lawyer’s conduct before
the court should be characterized by candor and
fairness.57 The administration of justice would gravely
suffer if lawyers do not act with complete candor and
honesty before the courts.58

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726,
837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940,
964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.

c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 &
65.

d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196,

1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538,
1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595,
1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649,
1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734,
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762,
1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804,
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829,
and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844,
BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870,
INC. [MABINI], petitioners, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963,
vs. 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044,
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454,
Executive Assistant to the President , 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563,
Director, Malacañang Records Office, and 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647,
FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852,
Bureau of Printing, respondents. 854-857.

f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22,

25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120,
ESCOLIN, J.: 122, 123.

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360-
public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article 378, 380-433, 436-439.
IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would
published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively have this case dismissed outright on the ground that
promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring
compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the
cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various absence of any showing that petitioners are personally
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of non-publication of the presidential issuances in
implementation and administrative orders. question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal
personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of
issuances is sought: Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we
quote:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103,
171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal,
324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the
406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd
1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847. adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and
116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, defendant, immediately or at some other specified time,
215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of
253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, defendant.
396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498,
501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609,
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the the Solicitor General, the government officer generally
subject of the petition concerns a public right and its empowered to represent the people, has entered his
object is to compel the performance of a public duty, appearance for respondents in this case.
they need not show any specific interest for their
petition to be given due course. Respondents further contend that publication in the
Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves
as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus
General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is submitted that since the presidential issuances in
that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private question contain special provisions as to the date they
individual only in those cases where he has some are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is
private or particular interest to be subserved, or some not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed
particular right to be protected, independent of that is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the
public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the unless it is otherwise provided, ...
question is one of public right and the object of the
mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with
duty, the people are regarded as the real party in this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of
interest and the relator at whose instigation the decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the
proceedings are instituted need not show that he has Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the
any legal or special interest in the result, it being legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity
sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such date-for then the date of publication is material for
interested in the execution of the laws [High, determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth
Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431]. day following its publication-but not when the law itself
provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator
Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct
the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the
Governor General to call a special election for the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other
position of municipal president in the town of Silay, statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion
Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude
Grant T. Trent said: the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette,
even if the law itself provides for the date of its
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638
authority supports the proposition that the relator is a provides as follows:
proper party to proceedings of this character when a
public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule Section 1. There shall be published in the Official
in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and resolutions
applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2]
always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular all executive and administrative orders and
case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, proclamations, except such as have no general
because, if under the particular circumstances the applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of
reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be
applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so
error' published; [4] such documents or classes of documents
as may be required so to be published by law; and [5]
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the such documents or classes of documents as the
general rule insisted upon by counsel for the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to
respondent. The circumstances which surround this time to have general applicability and legal effect, or
case are different from those in the United States, which he may authorize so to be published. ...
inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these
proceedings no other person could be, as we have The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give
seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the the general public adequate notice of the various laws
Government to appear and represent the people in which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
cases of this character. citizens. Without such notice and publication, there
would be no basis for the application of the maxim
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of
citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right transgression of a law of which he had no notice
sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of
the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the
proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so
any other person to initiate the same, considering that
vital significance that at this time when the people have pendency of this petition, have put the question as to
bestowed upon the President a power heretofore whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to
enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to
kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar
deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic
diligent ones, ready access to the legislative and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage
records—no such publicity accompanies the District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
law-making process of the President. Thus, without
publication, the people have no means of knowing what The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the
presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, Act of Congress, having been found to be
much less a definite way of informing themselves of the unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative,
specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence
Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v.
generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry.
reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear,
Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad however, that such broad statements as to the effect of
con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5 a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken
with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute,
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and
638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored.
Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people invalidity may have to be considered in various
to be informed on matters of public concern is to be aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and
given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list official. Questions of rights claimed to have become
of what should be published in the Official Gazette. vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to
Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public
discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of
excluded from such publication. its previous application, demand examination. These
questions are among the most difficult of those which
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal
nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an
Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and
revenue measures, fall within this category. Other Consistently with the above principle, this Court
presidential issuances which apply only to particular in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party
persons or class of persons such as administrative and under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued
executive orders need not be published on the in his favor before said law was declared
assumption that they have been circularized to all unconstitutional by this Court.
concerned. 6
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential presidential decrees prior to their publication in the
issuances "of a public nature" or "of general Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past
of law that before a person may be bound by law, he cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ...
must first be officially and specifically informed of its that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
vs. COMELEC 7:
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought
instructions which all form part of the law of the land, by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette,
the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive,
demand that the Official Gazette as the official 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so
government repository promulgate and publish the texts published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of
of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof
people may know where to obtain their official and are available. But whatever their subject matter may be,
specific contents. it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has
ever been implemented or enforced by the government.
The Court therefore declares that presidential In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice
issuances of general application, which have not been Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to
published, shall have no force and effect. Some apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations
members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the and make the said penalties binding on the persons
possible unsettling effect this decision might have on affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is
acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential apparently recognized by respondent officials
decrees which were published only during the considering the manifestation in their comment that "the
government, as a matter of policy, refrains from "WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents
prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same to publish to the Official Gazette all unpublished
shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in presidential issuances which are of general application,
some other publication, even though some criminal and unless so published, they shall have no binding
laws provide that they shall take effect immediately. force and effect."cralaw virtua1aw library

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to The petitioners are now before us again, this time to
publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished move for reconsideration/clarification of that decision. 1
presidential issuances which are of general application, Specifically, they ask the following
and unless so published, they shall have no binding questions:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
force and effect.
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general
SO ORDERED. applicability" ?

[G.R. No. L-63915. December 29, 1986.] 2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general
applicability and laws which are not?
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO,
and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR 3. What is meant by "publication" ?
BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM,
INC. (MABINI), Petitioners, v. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA. 4. Where is the publication to be made?
in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the
President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity 5. When is the publication to be made?
as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that
AL., Respondents. there should be no distinction between laws of general
applicability and those which are not; that publication
means complete publication; and that the publication
must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette. 2
SYLLABUS
In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General,
he claimed first that the motion was a request for an
FERNAN, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed,
and, on the merits, that the clause "unless it is
1. CIVIL LAW; EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS; otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant
ARTICLE 2, CIVIL CODE; PUBLICATION OF LAWS that the publication required therein was not always
MADE TO ENSURE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO imperative; that publication, when necessary, did not
DUE PROCESS AND TO INFORMATION. — The have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any
categorical statement by this Court on the need for case the subject decision was concurred in only by
publication before any law be made effective seeks to three justices and consequently not binding. This
prevent abuses on the part if the lawmakers and, at the elicited a Reply 4 refuting these arguments. Came next
time, ensure to the people their constitutional right to the February Revolution and the Court required the new
due process and to information on matter of public Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view of the
concern.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the
Rules of Court. Responding, he submitted that
issuances intended only for the interval administration
of a government agency or for particular persons did
RESOLUTION not have to be published; that publication when
necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette;
and that, however, the decision under reconsideration
CRUZ, J.: was not binding because it was not supported by eight
members of this Court. 5

The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in providing as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
demanding the disclosure or a number of presidential
decrees which they claimed had not been published as "ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
required by law. The government argued that while following the completion of their publication in the
publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This
it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees Code shall take effect one year after such
themselves declared that they were to become effective publication."cralaw virtua1aw library
immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this
case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity After a careful study of this provision and of the
for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring arguments of the parties, both on the original petition
in the dispositive portion as and on the instant motion, we have come to the
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph conclusion, and so hold, that the clause "unless it is
otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and
not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of
in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that local application and private laws, shall be published as
the legislature may make the law effective immediately a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen
upon approval, or on any other date, without its days after publication unless a different effectivity date
previous publication.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary is fixed by the legislature.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and
legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual executive orders promulgated by the President in the
fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are
example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
his separate concurrence in the original decision, 6 is directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative
the Civil Code which did not become effective after rules and regulations must also be published if their
fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
but "one year after such publication." The general rule pursuant also to a valid delegation.
did not apply because it was "otherwise
provided."cralaw virtua1aw library Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in
nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause administrative agency and not the public, need not be
publication may be dispensed with altogether. The published. Neither is publication required of the
reason is that such omission would offend due process so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative
insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the followed by their subordinates in the performance of
legislature could validly provide that a law shall become their duties.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding
the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be
period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons published notwithstanding that it applies to only a
not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they portion of the national territory and directly affects only
would be so not because of a failure to comply with it the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees
but simply because they did not know of its existence. must be published, including even, say, those naming a
Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is public place after a favored individual or exempting him
commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars
measures, like a law on prescription, which must also issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they
be communicated to the persons they may affect before are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the
they can begin to operate.cralawnad details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is
supposed to enforce.
We note at this point the conclusive presumption that
every person knows the law, which of course However, no publication is required of the instructions
presupposes that the law has been published if the issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the
presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the
no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill rules laid down by the head of a government agency on
of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to the assignments or workload of his personnel or the
information on matters of public concern," and this wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal
certainly applies to, among others, and indeed ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local
especially, the legislative enactments of the Government Code.
government.
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public
those of general application, for strictly speaking all of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by
laws relate to the people in general albeit there are the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the
some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a presidential decree, the title of such decree, its
law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the
relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement
naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication
does not affect the public although it unquestionably requirement. This is not even substantial compliance.
does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General
such law is a matter of public interest which any Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree
member of the body politic may question in the political undeniably of general applicability and interest, was
forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of "published" by the Marcos administration. 7 The evident
justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public purpose was to withhold rather than disclose
would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class information on this vital law.
legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To
be valid, the law must invariably affect the public Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only
interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one four justices were categorically for publication in the
individual, or some of the people only, and not to the Official Gazette 8 and that six others felt that publication
public as a whole. could be made elsewhere as long as the people were
sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved his vote 10 and
another merely acknowledged the need for due deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and
publication without indicating where it should be made, rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless
11 It is therefore necessary for the present membership their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid
of this Court to arrive at a clear consensus on this publication intended to make full disclosure and give
matter and to lay down a binding decision supported by proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a
the necessary vote. scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless
the naked blade is drawn.
There is much to be said of the view that the publication
need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as
its erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly, above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or
newspapers of general circulation could better perform as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in
the function of communicating the laws to the people as the Official Gazette, to become effective only after
such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider fifteen days from their publication, or on another date
readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2
is that this kind of publication is not the one required or of the Civil Code.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
authorized by existing law. As far as we know, no
amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil SO ORDERED.
Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to such a
law, and we have no information that it exists. If it does,
it obviously has not yet been published.
G.R. No. 108310 September 1, 1994
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon
the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it RUFINO O. ESLAO, in his capacity as President of
impractical. That is not our function. That function Pangasinan State University, petitioner,
belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret vs.
and apply the law as conceived and approved by the COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
political departments of the government in accordance
with the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have Mehol K. Sadain for petitioner.
no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the
Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the
Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement
for their effectivity after fifteen days from such FELICIANO, J.:
publication or after a different period provided by the
legislature.chanrobles law library In this Petition for Certiorari, Rufino O. Eslao in his
capacity as President of the Pangasinan State
We also hold that the publication must be made University ("PSU") asks us to set aside Commission on
forthwith, or at least as soon as possible, to give effect Audit ("COA") Decisions Nos. 1547 (1990) and 2571
to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that (1992) which denied honoraria and per diems claimed
possibility, of course, although not suggested by the under National Compensation Circular No. 53 by
parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a certain PSU personnel including petitioner.
mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to
cause its publication as required. This is a matter, On 9 December 1988, PSU entered into a
however, that we do not need to examine at this time. Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA") 1 with the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the ("DENR") for the evaluation of eleven (11) government
instant motion is a request for an advisory opinion is reforestation operations in Pangasinan. 2 The
untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further evaluation project was part of the commitment of the
comment. Asian Development Bank ("ADB") under the
ADB/OECF Forestry Sector Program Loan to the
The days of the secret laws and the unpublished Republic of the Philippines and was one among
decrees are over. This is once again an open society, identical project agreements entered into by the DENR
with all the acts of the government subject to public with sixteen (16) other state universities.
scrutiny and available always to public cognizance. This
has to be so if our country is to remain democratic, with On 9 December 1988, a notice to proceed 3 with the
sovereignty residing in the people and all government review and evaluation of the eleven (11) reforestation
authority emanating from them. operations was issued by the DENR to PSU. The latter
complied with this notice and did proceed.
Although they have delegated the power of legislation,
they retain the authority to review the work of their On 16 January 1989, per advice of the PSU
delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their Auditor-in-Charge with respect to the payment
lights, through their freedom of expression and their of honoraria and per diems of PSU personnel engaged
right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts of the in the review and evaluation project, PSU Vice
legislature are concealed. President for Research and Extension and Assistant
Project Director Victorino P. Espero requested the
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the Office of the President, PSU, to have the University's
sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, Board of Regents ("BOR") confirm the appointments or
designations of involved PSU personnel including the On 16 November 1992, COA Decision No. 2571
rates of honoraria and per diems corresponding to their (1992) 14 was issued denying reconsideration.
specific roles and functions. 4
In the meantime, in December 1990, the DENR
The BOR approved the MOA on 30 January 1989 5 and informed petitioner of its acceptance of the PSU final
on 1 February 1989, PSU issued Voucher No. reports on the review and evaluation of the government
8902007 6representing the amount of P70,375.00 for reforestation projects. 15 Subsequently, honoraria for
payment of honoraria to PSU personnel engaged in the the period from January 1989 to January 1990 were
project. Later, however, the approved honoraria rates disbursed in accordance with NCC No. 53. A Certificate
were found to be somewhat higher than the rates of Settlement and Balances (CSB No. 92-0005-184
provided for in the guidelines of National Compensation [DENR]) 16 was then issued by the COA resident
Circular ("NCC") No. 53. Accordingly, the amounts were auditor of PSU showing disallowance of alleged excess
adjusted downwards to conform to NCC No. 53. payment of honoraria which petitioner was being
Adjustments were made by deducting amounts from required to return.
subsequent disbursements of honoraria. By June 1989,
NCC No. 53 was being complied with. 7 The instant Petition prays that (a) COA Decision Nos.
1547 (1990) and 2571 (1992) be set aside; (b) the COA
On 6 July 1989, Bonifacio Icu, COA resident auditor at be ordered to pass in audit the grant of honoraria for the
PSU, alleging that there were excess payments entire duration of the project based on the provisions
of honoraria, issued a "Notice of and rates contained in NCC No. 53; and (c) the COA be
8
Disallowance" disallowing P64,925.00 from the held liable for actual damages as well as petitioner's
amount of P70,375.00 stated in Voucher No. 8902007, legal expenses and attorney's fees.
mentioned earlier. The resident auditor based his action
on the premise that Compensation Policy Guidelines The resolution of the dispute lies in the determination of
("CPG") No. 80-4, dated 7 August 1980, issued by the the circular or set of provisions applicable in respect of
Department of Budget and Management which the honoraria to be paid to PSU personnel who took
provided for lower rates than NCC No. 53 dated 21 part in the evaluation project, i.e., NCC No. 53 or CPG
June 1988, also issued by the Department of Budget No. 80-4.
and Management, was the schedule
for honoraria and per diems applicable to work done In asserting that NCC No. 53 supplies the applicable
under the MOA of 9 December 1988 between the PSU guideline and that the COA erred in applying CPG No.
and the DENR. 80-4 as the pertinent standard, petitioner contends that:

On 18 October 1989, a letter 9 was sent by PSU Vice (a) CPG No. 80-4 applies to "special projects" the
President and Assistant Project Director Espero to the definition and scope of which do not embrace the
Chairman of the COA requesting reconsideration of the evaluation project undertaken by petitioner for the
action of its resident auditor. In the meantime, the DENR;
Department of Budget and Management ("DBM"), upon
request by PSU, issued a letter 10 clarifying that the (b) NCC No. 53 applies to foreign-assisted projects
basis for the project's honoraria should not be CPG No. ("FAPs") while CPG No. 80-4 applies to locally-funded
80-4 which pertains to locally funded projects but rather projects as no reference to any foreign component
NCC No. 53 which pertains to foreign-assisted projects. characterizing the projects under its coverage is made;
A copy of this clarification was sent to the COA upon
request by PSU. (c) the DENR evaluation project is a foreign-assisted
project per certification and clarification of the DENR
On 18 September 1990, COA Decision No. 1547 11 was and DBM respectively as well as the implied admission
issued denying reconsideration of the decision of its of the COA in its Comment; and
resident auditor. The COA ruled that CPG. No. 80-4 is
the applicable guideline in respect of the honoraria as (d) the DBM's position on the matter should be
CPG No. 80-4 does not distinguish between projects respected since the DBM is vested with authority to (i)
locally funded and projects funded or assisted with classify positions and determine appropriate salaries for
monies of foreign-origin. specific position classes, (ii) review the compensation
benefits programs of agencies and (iii) design job
PSU President Eslao sent a letter 12 dated 20 March evaluation programs.
1991 requesting reconsideration of COA Decision No.
1547 (1990) alleging that (a) COA had erred in applying The Office of the Solicitor General, in lieu of a Comment
CPG No. 80-4 and not NCC No. 53 as the project was on the Petition, filed a Manifestation 17 stating that (a)
foreign-assisted and (b) the decision was discriminatory since, per certification of the DENR and Letter/Opinion
— honoraria based on NCC No. 53 having been of the DBM that the project undertaken by PSU is
approved and granted by COA resident auditors in two foreign-assisted, NCC No. 53 should apply; and (b)
(2) other state universities engaged in the same respondent COA's contention that CPG No. 80-4 does
reforestation project. PSU then submitted to the COA (a) not distinguish between projects which are
a certification 13 from the DENR to the effect that the foreign-funded from locally-funded projects deserves no
DENR evaluation project was foreign- assisted and (b) merit, since NCC No. 53, a special guideline, must be
the letter of the DBM quoted in the margin supra. construed as an exception to CPG No. 80-4, a general
guideline. The Solicitor General, in other words, agreed Sec. 2.1 of CPG No. 80-4 defines "special project" as
with the position of petitioner.
an inter-agency or inter-committee activity or
Upon the other hand, respondent COA filed its own an undertaking by a composite group of
comment, asserting that: officials/employees from various agencies which
[activity or undertaking] is not among the regular and
(a) while the DBM is vested with the authority to issue primary functions of the agencies involved. (Emphasis
rules and regulations pertaining to compensation, this and brackets supplied)
authority is regulated by Sec. 2 (2) of Art. IX-D of the
1987 Constitution which vests respondent COA with the Respondent COA maintains that the sections of the
power to "promulgate accounting and auditing rules and MOA detailing the "Organizational Arrangement and
regulations, including those for the prevention and Obligations of the Parties" clearly show that the
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, evaluation project is an "inter-agency activity." The
extravagant or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of pertinent sections of the MOA are as follows:
government funds and properties;
ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
(b) the Organizational Arrangement and Obligations of
the Parties sections of the MOA clearly show that the A Coordinating Committee shall be created which shall
evaluation project is an "inter-agency activity" between be responsible for the overall administration and
the DENR and PSU and therefore a "special project"; coordination of the evaluation, to be chaired by a senior
officer of the DENR. The Committee shall [be]
(c) the issue as to whether the evaluation project is in composed [of] the following:
fact a "special project" has become moot in view of the
DBM's clarification/ruling that the evaluation project is Chairman : Undersecretary for Planning,
foreign-assisted and therefore NCC No. 53, not CPG Policy and Project Management
No. 80-4 which applies only to locally-funded projects, [DENR]
should apply;
Co-Chairman : Vice-President for Research
(d) the DBM issuance notwithstanding, respondent and Development [PSU]
COA applied CPG No. 80-4 to effectively rationalize the
rates of additional compensation assigned to or detailed Members : Director of FMB
in "special projects" as its application is without Dean, PSU Infanta Campus
distinction as to the source of funding and any payment Associate Dean, PSU Infanta
therefore in excess of that provided by CPG No. 80-4 is Campus
unnecessary, excessive and disadvantageous to the Chief, Reforestation
government; Division
Project Director of the ADB
(e) respondent COA's previous allowance of payment Program Loan for Forestry
of honoraria based on NCC No. 53 or the fact that a full Sector
five years had already elapsed since NCC No. 53's
issuance does not preclude COA from assailing the OBLIGATIONS OF THE PARTIES
circular's validity as "it is the responsibility of any public
official to rectify every error he encounters in the Obligations of DENR:
performance of his function" and "he is not duty- bound
to pursue the same mistake for the simple reason that The DENR shall have the following obligations:
such mistake had been continuously committed in the
past"; 1. Provide the funds necessary for the review and
reevaluation of eleven (11) reforestation projects.
(f) the DBM ruling classifying the evaluation project as
foreign-assisted does not rest on solid ground since xxx xxx xxx
loan proceeds, regardless of source, eventually
become public funds for which the government is
2. Undertake the monitoring of the study to ascertain its
accountable, hence, any project under the loan
progress and the proper utilization of funds in
agreement is to be considered locally-funded;
conformity with the agreed work and financial plan.

(g) the DBM ruling constitutes an unreasonable

3. Reserve the right to accept or reject the final report
classification, highly discriminatory and violative of the
and in the latter case, DENR may request PSU to make
equal protection clause of the Constitution; and
some revisions/modifications on the same.

(h) granting arguendo NCC No. 53 is the applicable

Obligations of the PSU:
criterion, petitioner received honoraria in excess of
what was provided in the MOA.
The PSU shall have the following obligations:
We consider the Petition meritorious.
1. Undertake the review and evaluation of the eleven committee. Thus, the project team is not a "composite
(11) DENR-funded reforestation projects in accordance group" as required by the definition of CPG No. 80-4 of
with the attached TOR; "special projects." It follows that the evaluation projects
here involved do not fall within the ambit of a "special
2. Submit regularly to DENR financial status reports project" as defined and regulated by CPG No. 80-4.
apart from the progress report required to effect the
second release of funds; We do not consider it necessary to rule on whether the
project at hand involved an undertaking "which is not
3. Submit the final report to DENR fifteen (15) days after among the regular and primary functions of the
the completion of the work. The report should at least agencies involved" since the reforestation activity
contain the information which appears in Annex D; evaluation group is not, as pointed out above, a "special
project" within the meaning of CPG No. 80-4. In any
4. Return to DENR whatever balance is left of the funds case, this particular issue was not raised by any of the
after the completion of work. parties here involved.

Simply stated, respondent COA argues that since the It is true, as respondent COA points out, that the
Coordinating Committee is composed of personnel from provisions of CPG No. 80-4 do not distinguish between
the DENR and PSU, the evaluation project is an "a special project" which is funded by monies of local or
"inter-agency activity" within the purview of the Philippine origin and "a special project" which is funded
definition of a "special project". or assisted by monies originating from international or
foreign agencies. As earlier noted, CPG No. 80-4 was
We are unable to agree with respondent COA. issued by the Department of Budget and Management
back in 7 August 1980. Upon the other hand, NCC No.
Examination of the definition in CPG No. 80-4 of a 53 was issued also by the Department of Budget and
"special project" reveals that definition has two (2) Management more than eight (8) years later, i.e., 9
components: firstly, there should be an inter-agency or December 1988. Examination of the provisions of NCC
inter-committee activity or undertaking by a group of No. 53 makes it crystal clear that the circular is
officials or employees who are drawn from various applicable to foreign-assisted projects only. The explicit
agencies; and secondly, the activity or undertaking text of NCC No. 53 states that it was issued to
involved is not part of the "regular or primary" functions
of the participating agencies. Examination of the MOA prescribe/authorize the classification and compensation
and its annexes reveals that two (2) groups were rates of positions in foreign-assisted projects(FAPs)
actually created. The first group consisted of including honoraria rates for personnel detailed to
the coordinating committee, the membership of which FAPs and guidelines in the implementation thereof
was drawn from officials of the DENR and of the PSU; pursuant to Memorandum No. 173 dated 16 May
and the second, the evaluation project team itself which 1988 19 (Emphasis supplied)
was, in contrast, composed exclusively of PSU
personnel. 18 We believe that the first component of the and which apply to all positions in foreign-assisted
CPU No. 80-4's definition of "special project" is projects only. Clearly, NCC No. 53 amended the earlier
applicable in respect of the group which is charged with CPG No. 80-4 by carving out from the subject matter
the actual carrying out of the project itself, rather than to originally covered by CPG No. 80-4 all "foreign-assisted
the body or group which coordinates the task of the [special] projects." CPG No. 80-4 was, accordingly,
operating or implementing group. To construe the modified so far as "foreign-assisted [special] projects
administrative definition of "special project" otherwise (FAPs)" are concerned. It is this fact or consequence of
would create a situation, which we deem to be NCC No. 53 that respondent COA apparently failed to
impractical and possibly even absurd, under which any grasp. Thus, CPG No. 80-4 does not control, nor even
undertaking entered into between the senior officials of relate to, the DENR evaluation project for at least two (2)
government agencies would have to be considered an reasons: firstly, the evaluation project was not a
"inter-agency or inter-committee activity," even though "special project" within the meaning of CPG No. 80-4;
the actual undertaking or operation would be carried out secondly, that same evaluation project was a
not by the coordinating body but rather by an separate Foreign-Assisted Project to which NCC No. 53 is
group which might not (as in the present case) be specifically applicable.
drawn from the agencies represented in the
coordinating group. In other words, an "inter-agency or That the instant evaluation project is a Foreign-Assisted
inter-committee activity or . . . undertaking" must be one Project is borne out by the records: (a) the MOA states
which is actually carried out by a composite group of that the project is "part of the commitment with the
officials and employees from the two (2) or more Asian Development Bank (ADB) under the Forestry
participating agencies. Sector Program Loan"; (b) the certification issued by
the DENR certifies that
As already noted, in the case at hand, the project
team actually tasked with carrying out the evaluation of . . . the review and evaluation of DENR reforestation
the DENR reforestation activity is composed exclusively projects undertaken by State Universities and Colleges,
of personnel from PSU; the project team's responsibility one of which is Pangasinan State University, is one of
and undertaking are quite distinct from the the components of the ADB/OECF Forestry Sector
responsibilities of the coordinating [DENR and PSU] Program Loan which is funded by the loan. It
is therefore a concludes that the evaluation team should be
foreign-assisted project (Underscoring supplied); and paid honorariafrom the time it proceeded with the
project and up to the time the DENR accepted its final
(c) the clarification issued by the DBM stating that report.

The honoraria rates of the detailed personnel should Mindful of the detailed provisions of the MOA and
not be based on Compensation Policy Guidelines No. Project Proposal governing project duration and project
80-4, which pertains to locally funded projects. Since financing as regulated by NCC No. 53, the Court is not
the funding source for this activity come from loan persuaded that petitioner can so casually assume
proceeds, National Compensation Circular No. 53 implicit consent on the part of the DENR to an extension
should apply. of the evaluation project's duration.

Even in its Comment respondent COA submits that The "Duration of Work" clause of the MOA provides that

. . . the issue as to whether or not the project was PSU shall commence the work 10 days from receipt of
special already became moot in the face of the the Notice to Proceed and shall be completed five
opinion/ruling of the DBM that since it (the project) is months thereafter. (Emphasis supplied)
"foreign-assisted" NCC 53 should apply, for CPG No.
80-4 applies only to "locally-funded projects. 20 On 9 December 1988, the DENR advised PSU
President Rufino Eslao that PSU "may now proceed
Under the Administration Code of 1987, the with the review and reevaluation as stipulated" in the
Compensation and Position Classification Bureau of the MOA. The Notice to Proceed further stated that
DBM "shall classify positions and determine appropriate
salaries for specific position classes and review Your institution is required to complete the work within
appropriate salaries for specific position classes and five months starting ten (10) days upon receipt of this
review the compensation benefits programs of agencies notice. (Emphasis supplied)
and shall design job evaluation programs." 21 In Warren
Manufacturing Workers Union (WMWU) v. Bureau of In respect of the financial aspects of the project, the
Labor Relations, 22 the Court held that "administrative MOA provides that
regulations and policies enacted by administrative
bodies to interpret the law have the force of law and are The DENR shall have the following obligations:
entitled to great respect." It is difficult for the Court to
understand why, despite these certifications, 1. Provide the funds necessary for the review and
respondent COA took such a rigid and uncompromising reevaluation of the eleven (11) reforestation projects . . .
posture that CPG No. 80-4 was the applicable criterion in the amount not more than FIVE HUNDRED SIX
for honoraria to be given members of the reforestation THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY FOUR
evaluation project team of the PSU. PESOS (P506,224.00) which shall be spent in
accordance with the work and financial plan which
Respondent COA's contention that the DBM attached as Annex C. Fund remittances shall be made
clarification is unconstitutional as that ruling does not on a staggered basis with the following schedule:
fulfill the requisites of a valid classification 23 is, in the
Court's perception, imaginative but nonetheless an a. FIRST RELEASE
after-thought and a futile attempt to justify its action. As
correctly pointed out by petitioner, the constitutional Twenty percent (20%) of the total cost to be
arguments raised by respondent COA here were never remitted within fifteen (15) working days upon
even mentioned, much less discussed, in COA submission of work plan;
Decisions Nos. 1547 (1990) and 2571 (1992) or in any
of the proceedings conducted before it. b. SECOND RELEASE

Petitioner also argues that the project's duration Forty percent of the total cost upon submission of a
stipulated in the MOA was implicitly extended by the progress report of the activities that were so far
parties. The DENR's acceptance, without any comment undertaken;
or objection, of PSU's (a) letter explaining the delay in
its submission of the final project report and (b) the final
c. THIRD RELEASE
project report itself brought about, according to
petitioner, an implied agreement between the parties to
Thirty percent (30%) of the total amount upon
extend the project duration. It is also contended that by
submission of the draft final report;
the very nature of an evaluation project, the project's
duration is difficult to fix and as in the case at bar, the
period fixed in the MOA is merely an initial estimate d. FOURTH RELEASE
subject to extension. Lastly, petitioner argues that
whether the project was impliedly extended is an Ten percent of the total amount [upon submission] of
inconsequential consideration; the material the final report. (Underscoring supplied)
consideration being that the project stayed within its
budget. The project having been extended, petitioner Annex "C" referred to in the MOA is the Project
Proposal. Per the Proposal's "Budget Estimate,"
P175,000.00 and P92,500.00 were allotted for "Expert 50 mandays at P100/manday
Services" and "Support Services" respectively itemized including COLA
as follows:
T O T A L P92,500
PERSONAL SERVICES ————
EXPERT SERVICES
In addition, the Proposal already provided a list of
Duration identified experts:

Expert of Service Rate/ Total EXPERTS

(mo.) mo. 1. Dr. Victorino P. Espero Enviromental Science

2. Dean Antonio Q. Repollo Silviculture
1. Ecologist 4 P5,000 P20,000 3. Prof. Artemio M. Rebugio Forestry Economics
4. Ms. Naomenida Olermo Soils
2. Silviculturist 3 -do- 15,000 5. Dr. Elvira R. Castillo Social Forestry
6. Dr. Alfredo F. Aquino Management
3. Forestry Economist 4 -do- 20,000 7. Dr. Lydio Calonge Horticulture
8. Engr. Manolito Bernabe Engineering
4. Soils Expert 2 -do- 10,000 9. Dr. Elmer C. Vingua Animal Science
10. Prof. Rolando J. Andico Systems Analysts
5. Social Forestry Expert 4 -do- 20,000 Programming
11. Dr. Eusebio Miclat, Jr. Statistics/
Instrumentation
6. Management Expert 2 -do- 10,000
12. Dr. Porferio Basilio Shoreline Resources
13. Dr. Rufino O. Eslao Policy Administration
7. Horticulturist 2 -do- 10,000
who, together with six (6) staff members namely
8. Agricultural Engineer 2 -do- 10,000
Henedina M. Tantoco, Alicia Angelo Yolanda Z. Sotelo,
Gregoria Q. Calela, Nora A. Caburnay and Marlene S.
9. Systems Analysts/Programer 2 -do- 10,000
Bernebe composed the evaluation project team. At this
point, it should be pointed out that the " Budget
10. Statistician 2 -do- 10,000 Estimate even provides a duration for the participation
of each and every person whether rendering expert or
11. Shoreline Resources Expert 2 -do- 10,000 support services.

12. Animal Science Specialist 2 -do- 10,000

13. Policy/Administrative 4 -do- 20,000 On the other hand, NCC No. 53 provides:

Expert 3.3.1 The approved 0rganization and staffing shall be

valid up to project completion except for modifications
T O T A L P175,000 deemed necessary by the Project Manager. The Project
Manager shall be given the flexibility to determine the
timing of hiring personnel provided the approved
man-years for a given position for the duration of the
Support Services project is not exceeded.

Research Associates (2) P8,000 xxx xxx xxx

Honorarium P1,000/mo. for 4 months
Special Disbursing Officer (1) 4,000 3.6 A regular employee who may detailed to any FAPs
Honorarium P1,000/mo. for 4 months on a part-time basis shall be entitled to
Enumerators/Data Gatheres 36,000 receive honoraria in accordance with the schedule
360 mandays at P100/manday shown in Attachment II hereof.
including COLA
Coders/Encoders 30,000 xxx xxx xxx
300 mandays at P100/manday
including COLA 3.7 Payment of honoraria shall be made out of project
Cartographer/Illustrator 5,000 funds and in no case shall payment thereof be made
50 mandays at P100/manday out of regular agency fund.
including COLA
Documentalist 4,500 xxx xxx xxx
45 mandays at P100/manday
including COLA
3.10 The total amount of compensation to be paid shall
Typist 5,000 not exceed the original amount allocated for personal
services of the individual foreign-assisted projects. Any acceptance is recognized in our jurisdiction, 24 as a rule,
disbursement in excess of the original amount allotted silence is not equivalent to consent since its ambiguity
for personal services of the individual projects shall be lends itself to error. And although under the Civil Code
the personal liability and responsibility of the officials there are instances when silence amounts to
and employees authorizing or making such payment. consent, 25 these circumstances are wanting in the
(Underscoring supplied) case at bar. Furthermore, as correctly pointed out by
the respondent COA, the date when the DENR
Attachment II of NCC No. 53 prescribes the monthly accepted the final project report is by no means
rates allowed for officials/employees on assignment to conclusive as to the terminal date of the evaluation
foreign- assisted special projects: project. Examination of the MOA (quoted earlier on
pages 19-20) reveals that the submission of reports
A. Position Level — Project Manager/Project merely served to trigger the phased releases of funds.
Director There being no explicit agreement between PSU and
the DENR to extend the duration of the evaluation
Responsibility — . . . project, the MOA's "Budget Estimate" which, among
others, provides in detail the duration of service for
Parttime — P2,000.00 each member of the evaluation project as amended by
the rates provided by NCC No. 53 must be the basis of
B. Position Level — Assistant Project the honoraria due to the evaluation team.
Director
The other arguments of respondent COA appear to us
Responsibility — . . . to be insubstantial and as, essentially, afterthoughts.
The COA apparently does not agree with the policy
basis of NCC No. 53 in relation to CPG No. 80-4 since
Parttime — P1,500.00
COA argues that loan proceeds regardless of source
eventually become public funds for which the
C. Position Level — Project Consultant
government is accountable. The result would be that
any provisions under any [foreign] loan agreement
Responsibility — . . . should be considered locally-funded. We do not
consider that the COA is, under its constitutional
Parttime — P1,000.00 mandate, authorized to substitute its own judgment for
any applicable law or administrative regulation with the
D. Position Level — Supervisor/Senior Staff wisdom or propriety of which, however, it does not
Member agree, at least not before such law or regulation is set
aside by the authorized agency of government — i.e.,
Responsibility — . . . the courts — as unconstitutional or illegal and void. The
COA, like all other government agencies, must respect
Parttime — P1,000.00 the presumption of legality and constitutionality to which
statutes and administrative regulations are
E. Position Level — Staff Member entitled 26 until such statute or regulation is repealed or
amended, or until set aside in an appropriate case by a
Responsibility — . . . competent court (and ultimately this Court).

Parttime — P700.00 Finally, we turn to petitioner's claim for moral damages

and reimbursement of legal expenses. We consider that
Administrative and Clerical Support this claim cannot be granted as petitioner has failed to
present evidence of bad faith or tortious intent
A. Position Level — Administrative Assistant warranting an award thereof. The presumption of
regularity in the performance of duty must be accorded
Responsibility — . . . to respondent COA; its action should be seen as its
effort to exercise (albeit erroneously, in the case at bar)
Parttime — P500.00 its constitutional power and duty in respect of uses of
government funds and properties.
B. Position Level — Administrative Support
Staff WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Petition
for Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. COA Decisions Nos.
1547 and 2571, respectively dated 18 September 1990
Responsibility — . . .
and 16 November 1992, are hereby SET ASIDE. The
instant evaluation project being a Foreign-Assisted
Parttime — P400.00
Project, the following PSU personnel involved in the
project shall be paid according to the Budget Estimate
From the clear and detailed provisions of the MOA and
schedule of the MOA as aligned with NCC No. 53:
Project Proposal in relation to NCC No. 53, consent to
any extension of the evaluation project, in this instance,
A. A. For Experts
must be more concrete than the alleged silence or lack
of protest on the part of the DENR. Although tacit
Duration Rate/ No pronouncement as to costs.
Expert of month Total
Service (NCC SO ORDERED.
(mo.) No. 53)
G.R. No. 110318 August 28, 1996
1. Dr. Rufino O. Eslao Policy/Admi- 4 P2,000 P8,000
nistrative COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC., ORION PICTURES
expert*- CORPORATION, PARAMOUNT PICTURES
2. Dr. Victorino P. Espero Ecologist** 4 1,500 6,000 CORPORATION, TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM
3. Dean Antonio Q. Repollo Silvicul- 3 1,000 3,000 CORPORATION, UNITED ARTISTS CORPORATION,
turist*** UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC., THE WALT
4. Prof. Artemio M. Rebugio Forestry 4 1,000 4,000 DISNEY COMPANY, and WARNER BROTHERS,
Economist INC., petitioners,
5. Ms. Naomenida Olermo Soils Expert 2 1,000 2,000 vs.
6. Dr. Elvira R. Castillo Social 4 1,000 4,000 COURT OF APPEALS, SUNSHINE HOME VIDEO,
Forestry INC. and DANILO A. PELINDARIO, respondents.
Expert
7. Dr. Alfredo F. Aquino Management 2 1,000 2,000
Expert
8. Dr. Lydio Calonge Horticul 2 1,000 2,000 REGALADO, J.:p
turist
9. Engr. Manolito Bernabe Agricultural 2 1,000 2,000 Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the
Engineer decision of the Court of Appeals1 promulgated on July
10. Prof. Rolando J. Andico Systems 2 1,000 2,000 22, 1992 and its resolution2 of May 10, 1993 denying
Analysts/ petitioners' motion for reconsideration, both of which
Programmer sustained the order3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
11. Dr. Eusebio Miclat, Jr. Statistician 2 1,000 2,000 133, Makati, Metro Manila, dated November 22, 1988
12. Dr. Porferio Basilio Shoreline 2 1,000 2,000 for the quashal of Search Warrant No. 87-053 earlier
Resources issued per its own order4 on September 5, 1988 for
Expert violation of Section 56 of Presidential Decree No. 49, as
13. Dr. Elmer C. Vingua Animal 2 1,000 2,000 amended, otherwise known as the "Decree on the
Science Protection of Intellectual Property."
Specialist
The material facts found by respondent appellate court
41,000 are as follows:
———
Complainants thru counsel lodged a formal complaint
* Project Manager/ Project Director with the National Bureau of Investigation for violation of
** Assistant Project Director PD No. 49, as amended, and sought its assistance in
*** Project Consultants their anti-film piracy drive. Agents of the NBI and private
researchers made discreet surveillance on various
B. For Support Staff video establishments in Metro Manila including
Sunshine Home Video Inc. (Sunshine for brevity),
Duration Rate/ owned and operated by Danilo A. Pelindario with
Expert of month Total address at No. 6 Mayfair Center, Magallanes, Makati,
Service (NCC Metro Manila.
(mo.) No. 53)
On November 14, 1987, NBI Senior Agent Lauro C.
1 Henedina M. Tantoco Research 4 700 2,800 Reyes applied for a search warrant with the court a
Associate** quo against Sunshine seeking the seizure, among
2 Alicia Angelo Research 4 700 2,800 others, of pirated video tapes of copyrighted films all of
3 Yolanda Z. Sotelo Documentalist 2.04 700 1,428 which were enumerated in a list attached to the
4 Gregoria Q. Calela Special 4 700 2,800 application; and, television sets, video cassettes and/or
Disbursing laser disc recordings equipment and other machines
Officer and paraphernalia used or intended to be used in the
5 Nora A. Caburnay Typist 2.27 500 1,135 unlawful exhibition, showing, reproduction, sale, lease
6 Marlene S. Bernebe Cashier 2.27 500 1,135 or disposition of videograms tapes in the premises
above described. In the hearing of the application, NBI
——— Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes, upon questions by the
12,098 court a quo, reiterated in substance his averments in his
affidavit. His testimony was corroborated by another
* Per Attachment to DBM Clarification dated 10 witness, Mr. Rene C. Baltazar. Atty. Rico V. Domingo's
November 1989, Rollo, p. 59. deposition was also taken. On the basis of the affidavits
** Staff Member and depositions of NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes,
*** Administrative Assistants. Rene C. Baltazar and Atty. Rico V. Domingo, Search
Warrant No. 87-053 for violation of Section 56 of PD No. Rico V. Domingo as their attorney-in-fact, as being
49, as amended, was issued by the court a quo. constitutive of "doing business in the Philippines" under
Section 1 (f)(1) and (2), Rule 1 of the Rules of the Board
The search warrant was served at about 1:45 p.m. on of Investments. As foreign corporations doing business
December 14, 1987 to Sunshine and/or their in the Philippines, Section 133 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
representatives. In the course of the search of the 68, or the Corporation Code of the Philippines, denies
premises indicated in the search warrant, the NBI them the right to maintain a suit in Philippine courts in
Agents found and seized various video tapes of duly the absence of a license to do business. Consequently,
copyrighted motion pictures/films owned or exclusively they have no right to ask for the issuance of a search
distributed by private complainants, and machines, warrant.7
equipment, television sets, paraphernalia, materials,
accessories all of which were included in the receipt for In refutation, petitioners flatly deny that they are doing
properties accomplished by the raiding team. Copy of business in the Philippines,8 and contend that private
the receipt was furnished and/or tendered to Mr. Danilo respondents have not adduced evidence to prove that
A. Pelindario, registered owner-proprietor of Sunshine petitioners are doing such business here, as would
Home Video. require them to be licensed by the Securities and
Exchange Commission, other than averments in the
On December 16, 1987, a "Return of Search Warrant" quoted portions of petitioners' "Opposition to Urgent
was filed with the Court. Motion to Lift Order of Search Warrant" dated April 28,
1988 and Atty. Rico V. Domingo's affidavit of December
A "Motion To Lift the Order of Search Warrant" was filed 14, 1987. Moreover, an exclusive right to distribute a
but was later denied for lack of merit (p. 280, Records). product or the ownership of such exclusive right does
not conclusively prove the act of doing business nor
A Motion for reconsideration of the Order of denial was establish the presumption of doing business.9
filed. The court a quo granted the said motion for
reconsideration and justified it in this manner: The Corporation Code provides:

It is undisputed that the master tapes of the copyrighted Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. — No
films from which the pirated films were allegedly copies foreign corporation transacting business in the
(sic), were never presented in the proceedings for the Philippines without a license, or its successors or
issuance of the search warrants in question. The orders assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in
of the Court granting the search warrants and denying any action, suit or proceeding in any court or
the urgent motion to lift order of search warrants were, administrative agency of the Philippines; but such
therefore, issued in error. Consequently, they must be corporation may be sued or proceeded against before
set aside. (p. 13, Appellant's Brief)5 Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid
cause of action recognized under Philippine laws.
Petitioners thereafter appealed the order of the trial
court granting private respondents' motion for The obtainment of a license prescribed by Section 125
reconsideration, thus lifting the search warrant which it of the Corporation Code is not a condition precedent to
had theretofore issued, to the Court of Appeals. As the maintenance of any kind of action in Philippine
stated at the outset, said appeal was dismissed and the courts by a foreign corporation. However, under the
motion for reconsideration thereof was denied. Hence, aforequoted provision, no foreign corporation shall be
this petition was brought to this Court particularly permitted to transact business in the Philippines, as this
challenging the validity of respondent court's retroactive phrase is understood under the Corporation Code,
application of the ruling in 20th Century Fox Film unless it shall have the license required by law, and
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,6 in dismissing until it complies with the law intransacting business here,
petitioners' appeal and upholding the quashal of the it shall not be permitted to maintain any suit in local
search warrant by the trial court. courts.10 As thus interpreted, any foreign corporation
not doing business in the Philippines may maintain an
I action in our courts upon any cause of action, provided
that the subject matter and the defendant are within the
Inceptively, we shall settle the procedural jurisdiction of the court. It is not the absence of the
considerations on the matter of and the challenge to prescribed license but "doing business" in the
petitioners' legal standing in our courts, they being Philippines without such license which debars the
foreign corporations not licensed to do business in the foreign corporation from access to our courts. In other
Philippines. words, although a foreign corporation is without license
to transact business in the Philippines, it does not follow
Private respondents aver that being foreign that it has no capacity to bring an action. Such license is
corporations, petitioners should have such license to be not necessary if it is not engaged in business in the
able to maintain an action in Philippine courts. In so Philippines.11
challenging petitioners' personality to sue, private
respondents point to the fact that petitioners are the Statutory provisions in many jurisdictions are
copyright owners or owners of exclusive rights of determinative of what constitutes "doing business" or
distribution in the Philippines of copyrighted motion "transacting business" within that forum, in which case
pictures or films, and also to the appointment of Atty. said provisions are controlling there. In others where no
such definition or qualification is laid down regarding
acts or transactions failing within its purview, the Presidential Decree No. 1789,18 in Article 65 thereof,
question rests primarily on facts and intent. It is thus defines "doing business" to include soliciting orders,
held that all the combined acts of a foreign corporation purchases, service contracts, opening offices, whether
in the State must be considered, and every called "liaison" offices or branches; appointing
circumstance is material which indicates a purpose on representatives or distributors who are domiciled in the
the part of the corporation to engage in some part of its Philippines or who in any calendar year stay in the
regular business in the State.12 Philippines for a period or periods totalling one hundred
eighty days or more; participating in the management,
No general rule or governing principles can be laid supervision or control of any domestic business firm,
down as to what constitutes "doing" or "engaging in" or entity or corporation in the Philippines, and any other
"transacting" business. Each case must be judged in act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial
the light of its own peculiar environmental dealings or arrangements and contemplate to that
circumstances.13 The true tests, however, seem to be extent the performance of acts or works, or the exercise
whether the foreign corporation is continuing the body of some of the functions normally incident to, and in
or substance of the business or enterprise for which it progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the
was organized or whether it has substantially retired purpose and object of the business organization.
from it and turned it over to another.14
The implementing rules and regulations of said
As a general proposition upon which many authorities presidential decree conclude the enumeration of acts
agree in principle, subject to such modifications as may constituting "doing business" with a catch-all definition,
be necessary in view of the particular issue or of the thus:
terms of the statute involved, it is recognized that a
foreign corporation is "doing," "transacting," "engaging Sec. 1(g). "Doing Business" shall be any act or
in," or "carrying on" business in the State when, and combination of acts enumerated in Article 65 of the
ordinarily only when, it has entered the State by its Code. In particular "doing business" includes:
agents and is there engaged in carrying on and
transacting through them some substantial part of its xxx xxx xxx
ordinary or customary business, usually continuous in
the sense that it may be distinguished from merely (10) Any other act or acts which imply a continuity of
casual, sporadic, or occasional transactions and commercial dealings or arrangements, and contemplate
isolated acts.15 to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the
exercise of some of the functions normally incident to,
The Corporation Code does not itself define or or in the progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or
categorize what acts constitute doing or transacting of the purpose and object of the business organization.
business in the Philippines. Jurisprudence has,
however, held that the term implies a continuity of Finally, Republic Act No. 704219 embodies such
commercial dealings and arrangements, and concept in this wise:
contemplates, to that extent, the performance of acts or
works or the exercise of some of the functions normally Sec. 3. Definitions. — As used in this Act:
incident to or in progressive prosecution of the purpose
and subject of its organization.16 xxx xxx xxx

This traditional case law definition has evolved into a (d) the phrase "doing business shall include soliciting
statutory definition, having been adopted with some orders, service contracts, opening offices, whether
qualifications in various pieces of legislation in our called "liaison" offices or branches; appointing
jurisdiction. representatives or distributors domiciled in the
Philippines or who in any calendar year stay in the
For instance, Republic Act No. 5455 17 provides: country for a period or periods totalling one hundred
eight(y) (180) days or more; participating in the
Sec. 1. Definitions and scope of this Act. — (1) . . . ; and management, supervision or control of any domestic
the phrase "doing business" shall include soliciting business, firm, entity or corporation in the Philippines;
orders, purchases, service contracts, opening offices, and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of
whether called "liaison" offices or branches; appointing commercial dealings or arrangements, and contemplate
representatives or distributors who are domiciled in the to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the
Philippines or who in any calendar year stay in the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to,
Philippines for a period or periods totalling one hundred and in progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or
eighty days or more; participating in the management, of the purpose and object of the business
supervision or control of any domestic business firm, organization: Provided, however, That the phrase
entity or corporation in the Philippines; and any other "doing business" shall not be deemed to include mere
act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial investment as a shareholder by a foreign entity in
dealings or arrangements, and contemplate to that domestic corporations duly registered to do business,
extent the performance of acts or works, or the exercise and/or the exercise of rights as such investor; nor
of some of the functions normally incident to, and in having a nominee director or officer to represent its
progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the interests in such corporation; nor appointing a
purpose and object of the business organization. representative or distributor domiciled in the Philippines
which transacts business in its own name and for its motion pictures or films does not convert such
own account. ownership into an indicium of doing business which
would require them to obtain a license before they can
Based on Article 133 of the Corporation Code and sue upon a cause of action in local courts.
gauged by such statutory standards, petitioners are not
barred from maintaining the present action. There is no Neither is the appointment of Atty. Rico V. Domingo as
showing that, under our statutory or case law, attorney-in-fact of petitioners, with express authority
petitioners are doing, transacting, engaging in or pursuant to a special power of attorney, inter alia —
carrying on business in the Philippines as would require
obtention of a license before they can seek redress To lay criminal complaints with the appropriate
from our courts. No evidence has been offered to show authorities and to provide evidence in support of both
that petitioners have performed any of the enumerated civil and criminal proceedings against any person or
acts or any other specific act indicative of an intention to persons involved in the criminal infringement of
conduct or transact business in the Philippines. copyright or concerning the unauthorized importation,
duplication, exhibition or distribution of any
Accordingly, the certification issued by the Securities cinematographic work(s) — films or video cassettes —
and Exchange Commission20 stating that its records do of which . . . is the owner of copyright or the owner of
not show the registration of petitioner film companies exclusive rights of distribution in the Philippines
either as corporations or partnerships or that they have pursuant to any agreement(s) between . . . and the
been licensed to transact business in the Philippines, respective owners of copyright in such cinematographic
while undeniably true, is of no consequence to work(s), to initiate and prosecute on behalf of . . .
petitioners' right to bring action in the Philippines. Verily, criminal or civil actions in the Philippines against any
no record of such registration by petitioners can be person or persons unlawfully distributing, exhibiting,
expected to be found for, as aforestated, said foreign selling or offering for sale any films or video cassettes of
film corporations do not transact or do business in the which . . . is the owner of copyright or the owner of
Philippines and, therefore, do not need to be licensed in exclusive rights of distribution in the Philippines
order to take recourse to our courts. pursuant to any agreement(s) between . . . and the
respective owners of copyright in such works.21
Although Section 1(g) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Omnibus Investments Code lists, tantamount to doing business in the Philippines. We fail
among others — to see how exercising one's legal and property rights
and taking steps for the vigilant protection of said rights,
(1) Soliciting orders, purchases (sales) or service particularly the appointment of an attorney-in-fact, can
contracts. Concrete and specific solicitations by a be deemed by and of themselves to be doing business
foreign firm, or by an agent of such foreign firm, not here.
acting independently of the foreign firm amounting to
negotiations or fixing of the terms and conditions of As a general rule, a foreign corporation will not be
sales or service contracts, regardless of where the regarded as doing business in the State simply because
contracts are actually reduced to writing, shall it enters into contracts with residents of the State,
constitute doing business even if the enterprise has no where such contracts are consummated outside the
office or fixed place of business in the Philippines. The State.22In fact, a view is taken that a foreign corporation
arrangements agreed upon as to manner, time and is not doing business in the State merely because sales
terms of delivery of the goods or the transfer of title of its product are made there or other business
thereto is immaterial. A foreign firm which does furthering its interests is transacted there by an alleged
business through the middlemen acting in their own agent, whether a corporation or a natural person, where
names, such as indentors, commercial brokers or such activities are not under the direction and control of
commission merchants, shall not be deemed doing the foreign corporation but are engaged in by the
business in the Philippines. But such indentors, alleged agent as an independent business.23
commercial brokers or commission merchants shall be
the ones deemed to be doing business in the It is generally held that sales made to customers in the
Philippines. State by an independent dealer who has purchased and
obtained title from the corporation to the products sold
(2) Appointing a representative or distributor who is are not a doing of business by the
domiciled in the Philippines, unless said representative corporation.24Likewise, a foreign corporation which sells
or distributor has an independent status, i.e., it its products to persons styled "distributing agents" in the
transacts business in its name and for its own account, State, for distribution by them, is not doing business in
and not in the name or for the account of a principal. the State so as to render it subject to service of process
Thus, where a foreign firm is represented in the therein, where the contract with these purchasers is that
Philippines by a person or local company which does they shall buy exclusively from the foreign corporation
not act in its name but in the name of the foreign firm, such goods as it manufactures and shall sell them at
the latter is doing business in the Philippines. trade prices established by it.25

as acts constitutive of "doing business," the fact that It has moreover been held that the act of a foreign
petitioners are admittedly copyright owners or owners corporation in engaging an attorney to represent it in a
of exclusive distribution rights in the Philippines of Federal court sitting in a particular State is not doing
business within the scope of the minimum contact to comply with the licensing requirement, it is not
test. 26With much more reason should this doctrine capacitated to maintain any suit before our courts.
apply to the mere retainer of Atty. Domingo for legal
protection against contingent acts of intellectual piracy. Lastly, on this point, we reiterate this Court's rejection of
the common procedural tactics of erring local
In accordance with the rule that "doing business" companies which, when sued by unlicensed foreign
imports only acts in furtherance of the purposes for corporations not engaged in business in the Philippines,
which a foreign corporation was organized, it is held invoke the latter's supposed lack of capacity to sue. The
that the mere institution and prosecution or defense of a doctrine of lack of capacity to sue based on failure to
suit, particularly if the transaction which is the basis of first acquire a local license is based on considerations
the suit took place out of the State, do not amount to the of public policy. It was never intended to favor nor
doing of business in the State. The institution of a suit or insulate from suit unscrupulous establishments or
the removal thereof is neither the making of a contract nationals in case of breach of valid obligations or
nor the doing of business within a constitutional violation of legal rights of unsuspecting foreign firms or
provision placing foreign corporations licensed to do entities simply because they are not licensed to do
business in the State under the same regulations, business in the country.35
limitations and liabilities with respect to such acts as
domestic corporations. Merely engaging in litigation has II
been considered as not a sufficient minimum contact to
warrant the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign We now proceed to the main issue of the retroactive
corporation.27 application to the present controversy of the ruling
in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of
As a consideration aside, we have perforce to comment Appeals, et al., promulgated on August 19, 1988,36 that
on private respondents' basis for arguing that for the determination of probable cause to support the
petitioners are barred from maintaining suit in the issuance of a search warrant in copyright infringement
Philippines. For allegedly being foreign corporations cases involving videograms, the production of the
doing business in the Philippines without a license, master tape for comparison with the allegedly pirate
private respondents repeatedly maintain in all their copies is necessary.
pleadings that petitioners have thereby no legal
personality to bring an action before Philippine Petitioners assert that the issuance of a search warrant
Courts.28 is addressed to the discretion of the court subject to the
determination of probable cause in accordance with the
Among the grounds for a motion to dismiss under the procedure prescribed therefore under Sections 3 and 4
Rules of Court of Rule 126. As of the time of the application for the
are lack of legal capacity to sue29 and that the complaint search warrant in question, the controlling criterion for
states no cause of action. 30 Lack of legal capacity to the finding of probable cause was that enunciated
sue means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his in Burgos vs. Chief of Staff 3 7 stating that:
civil rights, or does not have the necessary qualification
to appear in the case, or does not have the character or Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such
representation he claims.31 On the other hand, a case is facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, hence been committed and that the objects sought in
grounded on failure to state a cause of action.32 The connection with the offense are in the place sought to
term "lack of capacity to sue" should not be confused be searched.
with the term "lack of personality to sue." While the
former refers to a plaintiff's general disability to sue, According to petitioners, after complying with what the
such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, law then required, the lower court determined that there
lack of juridical personality or any other general was probable cause for the issuance of a search
disqualifications of a party, the latter refers to the fact warrant, and which determination in fact led to the
that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest. issuance and service on December 14, 1987 of Search
Correspondingly, the first can be a ground for a motion Warrant No. 87-053. It is further argued that any search
to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal capacity warrant so issued in accordance with all applicable
to sue;33 whereas the second can be used as a ground legal requirements is valid, for the lower court could not
for a motion to dismiss based on the fact that the possibly have been expected to apply, as the basis for a
complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search
cause of action.34 warrant in copyright infringement cases involving
videograms, a pronouncement which was not existent
Applying the above discussion to the instant petition, at the time of such determination, on December 14,
the ground available for barring recourse to our courts 1987, that is, the doctrine in the 20th Century Fox case
by an unlicensed foreign corporation doing or that was promulgated only on August 19, 1988, or over
transacting business in the Philippines should properly eight months later.
be "lack of capacity to sue," not "lack of personality to
sue." Certainly, a corporation whose legal rights have Private respondents predictably argue in support of the
been violated is undeniably such, if not the only, real ruling of the Court of Appeals sustaining the quashal of
party in interest to bring suit thereon although, for failure the search warrant by the lower court on the strength of
that 20th Century Fox ruling which, they claim, goes Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that "(l)aws shall
into the very essence of probable cause. At the time of have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
the issuance of the search warrant involved here, provided. Correlatively, Article 8 of the same Code
although the 20th Century Fox case had not yet been declares that "(j)udicial decisions applying the laws or
decided, Section 2, Article III of the Constitution and the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of
Section 3, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal the Philippines."
Procedure embodied the prevailing and governing law
on the matter. The ruling in 20th Century Fox was Jurisprudence, in our system of government, cannot be
merely an application of the law on probable cause. considered as an independent source of law; it cannot
Hence, they posit that there was no law that was create law.40 While it is true that judicial decisions which
retrospectively applied, since the law had been there all apply or interpret the Constitution or the laws are part of
along. To refrain from applying the 20th Century the legal system of the Philippines, still they are not
Fox ruling, which had supervened as a doctrine laws. Judicial decisions, though not laws, are
promulgated at the time of the resolution of private nonetheless evidence of what the laws mean, and it is
respondents' motion for reconsideration seeking the for this reason that they are part of the legal system of
quashal of the search warrant for failure of the trial court the Philippines.41 Judicial decisions of the Supreme
to require presentation of the master tapes prior to the Court assume the same authority as the statute
issuance of the search warrant, would have constituted itself.42
grave abuse of discretion.38
Interpreting the aforequoted correlated provisions of the
Respondent court upheld the retroactive application of Civil Code and in light of the above disquisition, this
the 20th Century Fox ruling by the trial court in resolving Court emphatically declared in Co vs. Court of Appeals,
petitioners' motion for reconsideration in favor of the et al.43 that the principle of prospectivity applies not only
quashal of the search warrant, on this renovated thesis: to original or amendatory statutes and administrative
rulings and circulars, but also, and properly so, to
And whether this doctrine should apply retroactively, it judicial decisions. Our holding in the earlier case
must be noted that in the 20th Century Fox case, the of People vs. Jabinal44 echoes the rationale for this
lower court quashed the earlier search warrant it issued. judicial declaration, viz.:
On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the quashal
on the ground among others that the master tapes or Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws,
copyrighted films were not presented for comparison are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and
with the purchased evidence of the video tapes to this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil
determine whether the latter is an unauthorized Code, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
reproduction of the former. laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal
system." The interpretation upon a law by this Court
If the lower court in the Century Fox case did not quash constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date
the warrant, it is Our view that the Supreme Court would that the law was originally passed, since this Court's
have invalidated the warrant just the same considering construction merely establishes the contemporaneous
the very strict requirement set by the Supreme Court for legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to
the determination of "probable cause" in copyright effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous
infringement cases as enunciated in this 20th Century authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim "legis
Fox case. This is so because, as was stated by the interpretatio legis vim obtinet" — the interpretation
Supreme Court in the said case, the master tapes and placed upon the written law by a competent court has
the pirated tapes must be presented for comparison to the force of law. . . . , but when a doctrine of this Court is
satisfy the requirement of "probable cause." So it goes overruled and a different view is adopted, the new
back to the very existence of probable doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should
cause. . . .39 not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine
and acted on the faith thereof . . . . (Emphasis supplied).
Mindful as we are of the ramifications of the doctrine
of stare decisis and the rudiments of fair play, it is our This was forcefully reiterated in Spouses Benzonan
considered view that the 20th Century Fox ruling cannot vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,45 where the Court
be retroactively applied to the instant case to justify the expounded:
quashal of Search Warrant No. 87-053. Herein
petitioners' consistent position that the order of the . . . . But while our decisions form part of the law of the
lower court of September 5, 1988 denying therein land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code
defendants' motion to lift the order of search warrant which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive
was properly issued, there having been satisfactory effect unless the contrary is provided." This is
compliance with the then prevailing standards under the expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non
law for determination of probable cause, is indeed well respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The
taken. The lower court could not possibly have rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The
expected more evidence from petitioners in their retroactive application of a law usually divests rights
application for a search warrant other than what the law that have already become vested or impairs the
and jurisprudence, then existing and judicially accepted, obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional
required with respect to the finding of probable cause. (Francisco v. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1961]). The same
consideration underlies our rulings giving only
prospective effect to decisions enunciating new Furthermore, it is unjust and unfair to require
doctrines. . . . . compliance with legal and/or doctrinal requirements
which are inexistent at the time they were supposed to
The reasoning behind Senarillos have been complied with.
vs. Hermosisima46 that judicial interpretation of a
statute constitutes part of the law as of the date it was xxx xxx xxx
originally passed, since the Court's construction merely
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that . . . If the lower court's reversal will be sustained, what
the interpreted law carried into effect, is all too familiar. encouragement can be given to courts and litigants to
Such judicial doctrine does not amount to the passage respect the law and rules if they can expect with
of a new law but consists merely of a construction or reasonable certainty that upon the passage of a new
interpretation of a pre-existing one, and that is precisely rule, their conduct can still be open to question? This
the situation obtaining in this case. certainly breeds instability in our system of dispensing
justice. For Petitioners who took special effort to
It is consequently clear that a judicial interpretation redress their grievances and to protect their property
becomes a part of the law as of the date that law was rights by resorting to the remedies provided by the law,
originally passed, subject only to the qualification that it is most unfair that fealty to the rules and procedures
when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different then obtaining would bear but fruits of
view is adopted, and more so when there is a reversal injustice.49
thereof, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively and should not apply to parties who relied Withal, even the proposition that the prospectivity of
on the old doctrine and acted in good faith.4 7 To hold judicial decisions imports application thereof not only to
otherwise would be to deprive the law of its quality of future cases but also to cases still ongoing or not yet
fairness and justice then, if there is no recognition of final when the decision was promulgated, should not be
what had transpired prior to such adjudication.48 countenanced in the jural sphere on account of its
inevitably unsettling repercussions. More to the point, it
There is merit in petitioners' impassioned and is felt that the reasonableness of the added requirement
well-founded argumentation: in 20th Century Fox calling for the production of the
master tapes of the copyrighted films for determination
The case of 20th Century Fox Film Corporation of probable cause in copyright infringement cases
vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 164 SCRA 655 (August 19, needs revisiting and clarification.
1988) (hereinafter 20th Century Fox) was inexistent in
December of 1987 when Search Warrant 87-053 was It will be recalled that the 20th Century Fox case arose
issued by the lower court. Hence, it boggles the from search warrant proceedings in anticipation of the
imagination how the lower court could be expected to filing of a case for the unauthorized sale or renting out
apply the formulation of 20th Century Fox in finding of copyrighted films in videotape format in violation of
probable cause when the formulation was yet Presidential Decree No. 49. It revolved around the
non-existent. meaning of probable cause within the context of the
constitutional provision against illegal searches and
xxx xxx xxx seizures, as applied to copyright infringement cases
involving videotapes.
In short, the lower court was convinced at that time after
conducting searching examination questions of the Therein it was ruled that —
applicant and his witnesses that "an offense had been
committed and that the objects sought in connection The presentation of master tapes of the copyrighted
with the offense (were) in the place sought to be films from which the pirated films were allegedly copied,
searched" (Burgos v. Chief of Staff, et al., 133 SCRA was necessary for the validity of search warrants
800). It is indisputable, therefore, that at the time of the against those who have in their possession the pirated
application, or on December 14, 1987, the lower court films. The petitioner's argument to the effect that the
did not commit any error nor did it fail to comply with presentation of the master tapes at the time of
any legal requirement for the valid issuance of search application may not be necessary as these would be
warrant. merely evidentiary in nature and not determinative of
whether or not a probable cause exists to justify the
. . . (W)e believe that the lower court should be issuance of the search warrants is not meritorious. The
considered as having followed the requirements of the court cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes
law in issuing Search Warrant No. 87-053. The search were necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it
warrant is therefore valid and binding. It must be noted owns.
that nowhere is it found in the allegations of the
Respondents that the lower court failed to apply the The application for search warrants was directed
law as then interpreted in 1987. Hence, we find it against video tape outlets which allegedly were
absurd that it is (sic) should be seen otherwise, engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of
because it is simply impossible to have required the copyrighted films belonging to the petitioner pursuant to
lower court to apply a formulation which will only be P.D. 49.
defined six months later.
The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity juris against the government and liberally in favor of the
or at least substantial similarity of the purported pirated alleged offender.
works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant
must present to the court the copyrighted films to xxx xxx xxx
compare them with the purchased evidence of the video
tapes allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter This doctrine has never been overturned, and as a
is an unauthorized reproduction of the former. This matter of fact it had been enshrined in the Bill of Rights
linkage of the copyrighted films to the pirated films must in our 1973 Constitution.
be established to satisfy the requirements of probable
cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the So that lacking in persuasive effect, the allegation that
copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the issuance master tapes were viewed by the NBI and were
of a search warrant. compared to the purchased and seized video tapes
from the respondents' establishments, it should be
For a closer and more perspicuous appreciation of the dismissed as not supported by competent evidence and
factual antecedents of 20th Century Fox, the pertinent for that matter the probable cause hovers in that grey
portions of the decision therein are quoted hereunder, debatable twilight zone between black and white
to wit: resolvable in favor of respondents herein.

In the instant case, the lower court lifted the three But the glaring fact is that "Cocoon," the first video tape
questioned search warrants against the private mentioned in the search warrant, was not even duly
respondents on the ground that it acted on the registered or copyrighted in the Philippines. (Annex C of
application for the issuance of the said search warrants Opposition p. 152 record.) So, that lacking in the
and granted it on the misrepresentations of applicant requisite presentation to the Court of an alleged master
NBI and its witnesses that infringement of copyright or a tape for purposes of comparison with the purchased
piracy of a particular film have been committed. Thus evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated and those
the lower court stated in its questioned order dated seized from respondents, there was no way to
January 2, 1986: determine whether there really was piracy, or copying of
the film of the complainant Twentieth Century Fox.
According to the movant, all three witnesses during the
proceedings in the application for the three search xxx xxx xxx
warrants testified of their own personal knowledge. Yet,
Atty. Albino Reyes of the NBI stated that the counsel or The lower court, therefore, lifted the three (3)
representative of the Twentieth Century Fox questioned search warrants in the absence of probable
Corporation will testify on the video cassettes that were cause that the private respondents violated P.D. 49. As
pirated, so that he did not have personal knowledge of found out by the court, the NBI agents who acted as
the alleged piracy. The witness Bacani also said that witnesses did not have personal knowledge of the
the video cassettes were pirated without stating the subject matter of their testimony which was the alleged
manner it was pirated and that it was Atty. Domingo that commission of the offense by the private respondents.
has knowledge of that fact. Only the petitioner's counsel who was also a witness
during the application for the issuance of the search
On the part of Atty. Domingo, he said that the re-taping warrants stated that he had personal knowledge that
of the allegedly pirated tapes was from master tapes the confiscated tapes owned by the private respondents
allegedly belonging to the Twentieth Century Fox, were pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging
because, according to him it is of his personal to the petitioner. However, the lower court did not give
knowledge. much credence to his testimony in view of the fact that
the master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not
At the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration, Senior shown to the court during the application (Emphasis
NBI Agent Atty. Albino Reyes testified that when the ours).
complaint for infringement was brought to the NBI, the
master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were shown The italicized passages readily expose the reason why
to him and he made comparisons of the tapes with the trial court therein required the presentation of the
those purchased by their man Bacani. Why the master master tapes of the allegedly pirated films in order to
tapes or at least the film reels of the allegedly pirated convince itself of the existence of probable cause under
tapes were not shown to the Court during the the factual milieu peculiar to that case. In the case at
application gives some misgivings as to the truth of that bar, respondent appellate court itself observed:
bare statement of the NBI agent on the witness stand.
We feel that the rationale behind the aforequoted
Again as the application and search proceedings is a doctrine is that the pirated copies as well as the master
prelude to the filing of criminal cases under PD 49, the tapes, unlike the other types of personal properties
copyright infringement law, and although what is which may be seized, were available for presentation to
required for the issuance thereof is merely the presence the court at the time of the application for a search
of probable cause, that probable cause must be warrant to determine the existence of the linkage of the
satisfactory to the Court, for it is a time-honored precept copyrighted films with the pirated ones. Thus, there is
that proceedings to put a man to task as an offender no reason not the present them (Emphasis supplied ).50
under our laws should be interpreted in strictissimi
In fine, the supposed pronunciamento in said case at least, to offer for sale, lease, distribution or circulation
regarding the necessity for the presentation of the the said video tapes; and (3) a discreet but extensive
master tapes of the copyrighted films for the validity of surveillance of the suspected area was undertaken by
search warrants should at most be understood to petitioners' witnesses sufficient to enable them to
merely serve as a guidepost in determining the execute trustworthy affidavits and depositions regarding
existence of probable cause in copyright infringement matters discovered in the course thereof and of which
cases where there is doubt as to the true nexus they have personal knowledge.
between the master tape and the pirated copies. An
objective and careful reading of the decision in said It is evidently incorrect to suggest, as the ruling in 20th
case could lead to no other conclusion than that said Century Fox may appear to do, that in copyright
directive was hardly intended to be a sweeping and infringement cases, the presentation of master tapes of
inflexible requirement in all or similar copyright the copyrighted films is always necessary to meet the
infringement cases. Judicial dicta should always be requirement of probable cause and that, in the absence
construed within the factual matrix of their parturition, thereof, there can be no finding of probable cause for
otherwise a careless interpretation thereof could the issuance of a search warrant. It is true that such
unfairly fault the writer with the vice of overstatement master tapes are object evidence, with the merit that in
and the reader with the fallacy of undue generalization. this class of evidence the ascertainment of the
controverted fact is made through demonstrations
In the case at bar, NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes involving the direct use of the senses of the presiding
who filed the application for search warrant with the magistrate.57 Such auxiliary procedure, however, does
lower court following a formal complaint lodged by not rule out the use of testimonial or documentary
petitioners, judging from his affidavit51 and his evidence, depositions, admissions or other classes of
deposition,52did testify on matters within his personal evidence tending to prove the factum
knowledge based on said complaint of petitioners as probandum,58 especially where the production in court
well as his own investigation and surveillance of the of object evidence would result in delay, inconvenience
private respondents' video rental shop. Likewise, Atty. or expenses out of proportion to its evidentiary value.59
Rico V. Domingo, in his capacity as attorney-in-fact,
stated in his affidavit53 and further expounded in his Of course, as a general rule, constitutional and statutory
deposition54 that he personally knew of the fact that provisions relating to search warrants prohibit their
private respondents had never been authorized by his issuance except on a showing of probable cause,
clients to reproduce, lease and possess for the purpose supported by oath or affirmation. These provisions
of selling any of the copyrighted films. prevent the issuance of warrants on loose, vague, or
doubtful bases of fact, and emphasize the purpose to
Both testimonies of Agent Reyes and Atty. Domingo protect against all general searches.60 Indeed, Article III
were corroborated by Rene C. Baltazar, a private of our Constitution mandates in Sec. 2 thereof that no
researcher retained by Motion Pictures Association of search warrant shall issue except upon probable cause
America, Inc. (MPAA, Inc.), who was likewise presented to be determined personally by the judge after
as a witness during the search warrant examination under oath or affirmation of the
proceedings.55 The records clearly reflect that the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
testimonies of the abovenamed witnesses were particularly describing the place to be searched and the
straightforward and stemmed from matters within their things to be seized; and Sec. 3 thereof provides that
personal knowledge. They displayed none of the any evidence obtained in violation of the preceding
ambivalence and uncertainty that the witnesses in section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
the 20th Century Fox case exhibited. This categorical proceeding.
forthrightness in their statements, among others, was
what initially and correctly convinced the trial court to These constitutional strictures are implemented by the
make a finding of the existence of probable cause. following provisions of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court:

There is no originality in the argument of private Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A
respondents against the validity of the search warrant, search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause
obviously borrowed from 20th Century Fox, that in connection with one specific offense to be
petitioners' witnesses — NBI Agent Lauro C. Reyes, determined personally by the judge after examination
Atty. Rico V. Domingo and Rene C. Baltazar — did not under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
have personal knowledge of the subject matter of their witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
respective testimonies and that said witnesses' claim the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
that the video tapes were pirated, without stating the
manner by which these were pirated, is a conclusion of Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. — The
fact without basis.56 The difference, it must be pointed judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally
out, is that the records in the present case reveal that (1) examine in the form of searching questions and
there is no allegation of misrepresentation, much less a answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and
finding thereof by the lower court, on the part of any witnesses he may produce on facts personally
petitioners' witnesses; (2) there is no denial on the part known to them and attach to the record their sworn
of private respondents that the tapes seized were statements together with any affidavits submitted.
illegitimate copies of the copyrighted ones not have
they shown that they were given any authority by
petitioners to copy, sell, lease, distribute or circulate, or
Sec. 5. Issuance and form of search warrant. — If the legal standards then set forth in law and jurisprudence,
judge is thereupon satisfied of the existence of facts and not those that have yet to be crafted thereafter.
upon which the application is based, or that there is
probable cause to believe that they exist, he must issue As already stated, the definition of probable cause
the warrant, which must be substantially in the form enunciated in Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff, et
prescribed by these Rules. al., supra, vis-a-vis the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of
Rule 126, were the prevailing and controlling legal
The constitutional and statutory provisions of various standards, as they continue to be, by which a finding of
jurisdictions requiring a showing of probable cause probable cause is tested. Since the propriety of the
before a search warrant can be issued are mandatory issuance of a search warrant is to be determined at the
and must be complied with, and such a showing has time of the application therefor, which in turn must not
been held to be an unqualified condition precedent to be too remote in time from the occurrence of the
the issuance of a warrant. A search warrant not based offense alleged to have been committed, the issuing
on probable cause is a nullity, or is void, and the judge, in determining the existence of probable cause,
issuance thereof is, in legal contemplation, arbitrary.61 It can and should logically look to the touchstones in the
behooves us, then, to review the concept of probable laws theretofore enacted and the decisions already
cause, firstly, from representative holdings in the promulgated at the time, and not to those which had not
American jurisdiction from which we patterned our yet even been conceived or formulated.
doctrines on the matter.
It is worth noting that neither the Constitution nor the
Although the term "probable cause" has been said to Rules of Court attempt to define probable cause,
have a well-defined meaning in the law, the term is obviously for the purpose of leaving such matter to the
exceedingly difficult to define, in this case, with any court's discretion within the particular facts of each case.
degree of precision; indeed, no definition of it which Although the Constitution prohibits the issuance of a
would justify the issuance of a search warrant can be search warrant in the absence of probable cause, such
formulated which would cover every state of facts which constitutional inhibition does not command the
might arise, and no formula or standard, or hard and legislature to establish a definition or formula for
fast rule, may be laid down which may be applied to the determining what shall constitute probable
facts of every situation.62 As to what acts constitute 71
cause. Thus, Congress, despite its broad authority to
probable cause seem incapable of definition.63 There is, fashion standards of reasonableness for searches and
of necessity, no exact test.64 seizures,72 does not venture to make such a definition
or standard formulation of probable cause, nor
At best, the term "probable cause" has been categorize what facts and circumstances make up the
understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion, same, much less limit the determination thereof to and
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in within the circumscription of a particular class of
themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that evidence, all in deference to judicial discretion and
the person accused is guilty of the offense with which probity.73
he is charged;65 or the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite an honest belief in a Accordingly, to restrict the exercise of discretion by a
reasonable mind acting on all the facts and judge by adding a particular requirement (the
circumstances within the knowledge of the magistrate presentation of master tapes, as intimated by 20th
that the charge made by the applicant for the warrant is Century Fox) not provided nor implied in the law for a
true.66 finding of probable cause is beyond the realm of judicial
competence or statesmanship. It serves no purpose but
Probable cause does not mean actual and positive to stultify and constrict the judicious exercise of a
cause, nor does it import absolute certainty. The court's prerogatives and to denigrate the judicial duty of
determination of the existence of probable cause is not determining the existence of probable cause to a mere
concerned with the question of whether the offense ministerial or mechanical function. There is, to repeat,
charged has been or is being committed in fact, or no law or rule which requires that the existence of
whether the accused is guilty or innocent, but only probable cause is or should be determined solely by a
whether the affiant has reasonable grounds for his specific kind of evidence. Surely, this could not have
belief.67 The requirement is less than certainty or proof , been contemplated by the framers of the Constitution,
but more than suspicion or possibility.68 and we do not believe that the Court intended the
statement in 20th Century Fox regarding master tapes
In Philippine jurisprudence, probable cause has been as the dictum for all seasons and reasons in
uniformly defined as such facts and circumstances infringement cases.
which would lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed, Turning now to the case at bar, it can be gleaned from
and that the objects sought in connection with the the records that the lower court followed the prescribed
offense are in the place sought to be searched.69 It procedure for the issuance of a search warrant: (1) the
being the duty of the issuing officer to issue, or refuse to examination under oath or affirmation of the
issue, the warrant as soon as practicable after the complainant and his witnesses, with them particularly
application therefor is filed,70 the facts warranting the describing the place to be searched and the things to be
conclusion of probable cause must be assessed at the seized; (2) an examination personally conducted by the
time of such judicial determination by necessarily using judge in the form of searching questions and answers,
in writing and under oath of the complainant and
witnesses on facts personally known to them; and, (3) petitioners' motion for reconsideration and quashing the
the taking of sworn statements, together with the search warrant that —
affidavits submitted, which were duly attached to the
records. . . . The two (2) cases have a common factual milieu;
both involve alleged pirated copyrighted films of private
Thereafter, the court a quo made the following factual complainants which were found in the possession or
findings leading to the issuance of the search warrant control of the defendants. Hence, the necessity of the
now subject of this controversy: presentation of the master tapes from which the pirated
films were allegedly copied is necessary in the instant
In the instant case, the following facts have been case, to establish the existence of probable cause.75
established: (1) copyrighted video tapes bearing titles
enumerated in Search Warrant No. 87-053 were being Being based solely on an unjustifiable and improper
sold, leased, distributed or circulated, or offered for sale, retroactive application of the master tape requirement
lease, distribution, or transferred or caused to be generated by 20th Century Fox upon a factual situation
transferred by defendants at their video outlets, without completely different from that in the case at bar, and
the written consent of the private complainants or their without anything more, this later order clearly defies
assignee; (2) recovered or confiscated from defendants' elemental fair play and is a gross reversible error. In
possession were video tapes containing copyrighted fact, this observation of the Court in La Chemise
motion picture films without the authority of the Lacoste, S.A. vs. Fernandez, et al., supra, may just as
complainant; (3) the video tapes originated from easily apply to the present case:
spurious or unauthorized persons; and (4) said video
tapes were exact reproductions of the films listed in the A review of the grounds invoked . . . in his motion to
search warrant whose copyrights or distribution rights quash the search warrants reveals the fact that they are
were owned by complainants. not appropriate for quashing a warrant. They are
matters of defense which should be ventilated during
The basis of these facts are the affidavits and the trial on the merits of the case. . . .
depositions of NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes, Atty.
Rico V. Domingo, and Rene C. Baltazar. Motion As correctly pointed out by petitioners, a blind espousal
Pictures Association of America, Inc. (MPAA) thru their of the requisite of presentation of the master tapes in
counsel, Atty. Rico V. Domingo, filed a complaint with copyright infringement cases, as the prime determinant
the National Bureau of Investigation against certain of probable cause, is too exacting and impracticable a
video establishments one of which is defendant, for requirement to be complied with in a search warrant
violation of PD No. 49 as amended by PD No. 1988. application which, it must not be overlooked, is only an
Atty. Lauro C. Reyes led a team to conduct discreet ancillary proceeding. Further, on realistic
surveillance operations on said video establishments. considerations, a strict application of said requirement
Per information earlier gathered by Atty. Domingo, militates against the elements of secrecy and speed
defendants were engaged in the illegal sale, rental, which underlie covert investigative and surveillance
distribution, circulation or public exhibition of operations in police enforcement campaigns against all
copyrighted films of MPAA without its written authority forms of criminality, considering that the master tapes of
or its members. Knowing that defendant Sunshine a motion picture required to be presented before the
Home Video and its proprietor, Mr. Danilo Pelindario, court consists of several reels contained in circular steel
were not authorized by MPAA to reproduce, lease, and casings which, because of their bulk, will definitely draw
possess for the purpose of selling any of its copyrighted attention, unlike diminutive objects like video tapes
motion pictures, instructed his researcher, Mr. Rene which can be easily concealed.76 With hundreds of titles
Baltazar to rent two video cassettes from said being pirated, this onerous and tedious imposition
defendants on October 21, 1987. Rene C. Baltazar would be multiplied a hundredfold by judicial fiat,
proceeded to Sunshine Home Video and rented tapes discouraging and preventing legal recourses in foreign
containing Little Shop of Horror. He was issued rental jurisdictions.
slip No. 26362 dated October 21, 1987 for P10.00 with
a deposit of P100.00. Again, on December 11, 1987, Given the present international awareness and furor
the returned to Sunshine Home Video and rented over violations in large scale of intellectual property
Robocop with rental slip No. 25271 also for P10.00: On rights, calling for transnational sanctions, it bears calling
the basis of the complaint of MPAA thru counsel, Atty. to mind the Court's admonition also in La Chemise
Lauro C. Reyes personally went to Sunshine Home Lacoste, supra, that —
Video at No. 6 Mayfair Center, Magallanes Commercial
Center, Makati. His last visit was on December 7, 1987. . . . . Judges all over the country are well advised to
There, he found the video outlet renting, leasing, remember that court processes should not be used as
distributing video cassette tapes whose titles were instruments to, unwittingly or otherwise, aid
copyrighted and without the authority of MPAA. counterfeiters and intellectual pirates, tie the hands of
the law as it seeks to protect the Filipino consuming
Given these facts, a probable cause exists. . . .74 public and frustrate executive and administrative
implementation of solemn commitments pursuant to
The lower court subsequently executed a volte-face, international conventions and treaties.
despite its prior detailed and substantiated findings, by
stating in its order of November 22, 1988 denying III
The amendment to Section 56 of Presidential Decree constitute infringement, it is not necessary that the
No. 49 by Presidential Decree No. 1987,77 which whole or even a large portion of the work shall have
should here be publicized judicially, brought about the been copied. If so much is taken that the value of the
revision of its penalty structure and enumerated original is sensibly diminished, or the labors of the
additional acts considered violative of said decree on original author are substantially and to an injurious
intellectual property, namely, (1) directly or indirectly extent appropriated by another, that is sufficient in point
transferring or causing to be transferred any sound of law to constitute a
recording or motion picture or other audio-visual works piracy.79 The question of whether there has been an
so recorded with intent to sell, lease, publicly exhibit or actionable infringement of a literary, musical, or artistic
cause to be sold, leased or publicly exhibited, or to use work in motion pictures, radio or television being one of
or cause to be used for profit such articles on which fact,80 it should properly be determined during the trial.
sounds, motion pictures, or other audio-visual works That is the stage calling for conclusive or
are so transferred without the written consent of the preponderating evidence, and not the summary
owner or his assignee; (2) selling, leasing, distributing, proceeding for the issuance of a search warrant
circulating, publicly exhibiting, or offering for sale, lease, wherein both lower courts erroneously require the
distribution, or possessing for the purpose of sale, lease, master tapes.
distribution, circulation or public exhibition any of the
abovementioned articles, without the written consent of In disregarding private respondent's argument that
the owner or his assignee; and, (3) directly or indirectly Search Warrant No. 87-053 is a general warrant, the
offering or making available for a fee, rental, or any lower court observed that "it was worded in a manner
other form of compensation any equipment, machinery, that the enumerated seizable items bear direct relation
paraphernalia or any material with the knowledge that to the offense of violation of Sec. 56 of PD 49 as
such equipment, machinery, paraphernalia or material amended. It authorized only the seizur(e) of articles
will be used by another to reproduce, without the used or intended to be used in the unlawful sale, lease
consent of the owner, any phonograph record, disc, and other unconcerted acts in violation of PD 49 as
wire, tape, film or other article on which sounds, motion amended. . . .81
pictures or other audio-visual recordings may be
transferred, and which provide distinct bases for On this point, Bache and Co., (Phil.), Inc., et
criminal prosecution, being crimes independently 82
al. vs. Ruiz, et al., instructs and enlightens:
punishable under Presidential Decree No. 49, as
amended, aside from the act of infringing or aiding or A search warrant may be said to particularly describe
abetting such infringement under Section 29. the things to be seized when the description therein is
as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow
The trial court's finding that private respondents (People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384); or when the
committed acts in blatant transgression of Presidential description expresses a conclusion of fact — not of law
Decree No. 49 all the more bolsters its findings of — by which the warrant officer may be guided in making
probable cause, which determination can be reached the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad
even in the absence of master tapes by the judge in the Santos, J.,); or when the things described are limited to
exercise of sound discretion. The executive concern those which bear direct relation to the offense for which
and resolve expressed in the foregoing amendments to the warrant is being issued (Sec 2, Rule 126, Revised
the decree for the protection of intellectual property Rules of Court). . . . If the articles desired to be seized
rights should be matched by corresponding judicial have any direct relation to an offense committed, the
vigilance and activism, instead of the apathy of applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other
submitting to technicalities in the face of ample than those articles, to prove the said offense; and the
evidence of guilt. articles subject of search and seizure should come in
handy merely to strengthen such evidence. . . .
The essence of intellectual piracy should be essayed in
conceptual terms in order to underscore its gravity by On private respondents' averment that the search
an appropriate understanding thereof. Infringement of a warrant was made applicable to more than one specific
copyright is a trespass on a private domain owned and offense on the ground that there are as many offenses
occupied by the owner of the copyright, and, therefore, of infringement as there are rights protected and,
protected by law, and infringement of copyright, or therefore, to issue one search warrant for all the movie
piracy, which is a synonymous term in this connection, titles allegedly pirated violates the rule that a search
consists in the doing by any person, without the consent warrant must be issued only in connection with one
of the owner of the copyright, of anything the sole right specific offense, the lower court said:
to do which is conferred by statute on the owner of the
copyright.78 . . . . As the face of the search warrant itself indicates, it
was issued for violation of Section 56, PD 49 as
A copy of a piracy is an infringement of the original, and amended only. The specifications therein (in Annex A)
it is no defense that the pirate, in such cases, did not merely refer to the titles of the copyrighted motion
know what works he was indirectly copying, or did not pictures/films belonging to private complainants which
know whether or not he was infringing any copyright; he defendants were in control/possession for sale, lease,
at least knew that what he was copying was not his, and distribution or public exhibition in contravention of Sec.
he copied at his peril. In determining the question of 56, PD 49 as amended.83
infringement, the amount of matter copied from the
copyrighted work is an important consideration. To
That there were several counts of the offense of manuscripts, directories and gazetteers; and
copyright infringement and the search warrant periodicals, including pamphlets and newspapers;
uncovered several contraband items in the form of lectures, sermons, addresses, dissertations prepared
pirated video tapes is not to be confused with the for oral delivery; and letters, the failure to comply with
number of offenses charged. The search warrant herein said requirements does not deprive the copyright owner
issued does not violate the one-specific-offense rule. of the right to sue for infringement. Such
non-compliance merely limits the remedies available to
It is pointless for private respondents to insist on him and subjects him to the corresponding sanction.
compliance with the registration and deposit
requirements under Presidential Decree No. 49 as The reason for this is expressed in Section 2 of the
prerequisites for invoking the court's protective mantle decree which prefaces its enumeration of copyrightable
in copyright infringement cases. As explained by the works with the explicit statement that "the rights granted
court below: under this Decree shall, from the moment of creation,
subsist with respect to any of the following classes of
Defendants-movants contend that PD 49 as amended works." This means that under the present state of the
covers only producers who have complied with the law, the copyright for a work is acquired by an
requirements of deposit and notice (in other words intellectual creator from the moment of creation even in
registration) under Sections 49 and 50 thereof. Absent the absence of registration and deposit. As has been
such registration, as in this case, there was no right authoritatively clarified:
created, hence, no infringement under PD 49 as
amended. This is not well-taken. The registration and deposit of two complete copies or
reproductions of the work with the National Library
As correctly pointed out by private within three weeks after the first public dissemination or
complainants-oppositors, the Department of Justice has performance of the work, as provided for in Section 26
resolved this legal question as far back as December (P.D. No. 49, as amended), is not for the purpose of
12, 1978 in its Opinion No. 191 of the then Secretary of securing a copyright of the work, but rather to avoid the
Justice Vicente Abad Santos which stated that Sections penalty for non-compliance of the deposit of said two
26 and 50 do not apply to cinematographic works and copies and in order to recover damages in an
PD No. 49 "had done away with the registration and infringement suit.86
deposit of cinematographic works" and that "even
without prior registration and deposit of a work which One distressing observation. This case has been fought
may be entitled to protection under the Decree, the on the basis of, and its resolution long delayed by resort
creator can file action for infringement of its rights". He to, technicalities to a virtually abusive extent by private
cannot demand, however, payment of damages arising respondents, without so much as an attempt to adduce
from infringement. The same opinion stressed that "the any credible evidence showing that they conduct their
requirements of registration and deposit are thus business legitimately and fairly. The fact that private
retained under the Decree, not as conditions for the respondents could not show proof of their authority or
acquisition of copyright and other rights, but as that there was consent from the copyright owners for
prerequisites to a suit for damages". The statutory them to sell, lease, distribute or circulate petitioners'
interpretation of the Executive Branch being correct, is copyrighted films immeasurably bolsters the lower
entitled (to) weight and respect. court's initial finding of probable cause. That private
respondents are licensed by the Videogram Regulatory
xxx xxx xxx Board does not insulate them from criminal and civil
liability for their unlawful business practices. What is
Defendants-movants maintain that complainant and his more deplorable is that the reprehensible acts of some
witnesses led the Court to believe that a crime existed unscrupulous characters have stigmatized the
when in fact there was none. This is wrong. As earlier Philippines with an unsavory reputation as a hub for
discussed, PD 49 as amended, does not require intellectual piracy in this part of the globe, formerly in
registration and deposit for a creator to be able to file an the records of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
action for infringement of his rights. These conditions Trade and, now, of the World Trade Organization. Such
are merely pre-requisites to an action for damages. So, acts must not be glossed over but should be denounced
as long as the proscribed acts are shown to exist, an and repressed lest the Philippines become an
action for infringement may be initiated.84 international pariah in the global intellectual community.

Accordingly, the certifications85 from the Copyright WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment and resolution of
Section of the National Library, presented as evidence respondent Court of Appeals, and necessarily inclusive
by private respondents to show non-registration of of the order of the lower court dated November 22,
some of the films of petitioners, assume no evidentiary 1988, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
weight or significance whatsoever. order of the court a quo of September 5, 1988
upholding the validity of Search Warrant No. 87-053 is
Furthermore, a closer review of Presidential Decree No. hereby REINSTATED, and said court is DIRECTED to
49 reveals that even with respect to works which are take and expeditiously proceed with such appropriate
required under Section 26 thereof to be registered and proceedings as may be called for in this case. Treble
with copies to deposited with the National Library, such costs are further assessed against private respondents.
as books, including composite and cyclopedic works,
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 125183 September 29, 1997 salas of the Municipal Trial Courts and the Office of the
Municipal Prosecutors. Also constructed thereon are
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, METRO the Central Post Office Building and the Municipal High
MANILA, petitioner, School Annex Building.
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DEPARTMENT OF On October 6, 1987, after Congress had already
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, convened on July 26, 1987, former President Corazon
CORAZON DE JESUS HOMEOWNERS Aquino issued Proclamation No. 164, amending
ASSOCIATION, INC., ADRIANO A. DELAMIDA, SR. Proclamation No. 1716. Said amendatory proclamation
CELSO T. TORRES, TARCILA V. ZATA, QUIRICO T. pertinently reads as follows:
TORRES, CATALINA BONGAT, MILAGROS A.
HERBOLARIO, ROSALINDA A. PIMENTEL, PROCLAMATION NO. 164
PURIFICACION MORELLA, FRANCISCO RENION,
SR., MARCELINA CORPUZ, BENEDICTO FALCON, AMENDING PROCLAMATION NO. 1716, DATED
MAXIMO FALCON, MARIO BOLANOS, VICENTE T. FEBRUARY 17, 1978, WHICH RESERVED FOR
SURIAO, ROSARIO GREGORIA G. DORADO, MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT CENTER SITE
JEREMIAS Z. PATRON, ALEX RODRIGUEZ, MARIA PURPOSES CERTAIN PARCELS OF LAND OF THE
LUISA ALPAPARA, HERMINIA C. RODRIGUEZ, PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY
VICTORIANO ESPANOL, MARIO L. AGUILAR, OF SAN JUAN, METROPOLITAN MANILA, ISLAND
FREDDIE AMADOR, SILVERIO PURISIMA, JR., OF LUZON, BY EXCLUDING FROM ITS OPERATION
PROCOPIO B. PENARANDA, ELADIO MAGLUYAN, THE PARCELS OF LAND NOT BEING UTILIZED FOR
HELENITA GUEI, CELESTINO MONTANO, ROMEO GOVERNMENT CENTER SITES PURPOSES BUT
GOMEZ, OFELIA LOGO, JIMMY MACION, DAISY A. ACTUALLY OCCUPIED FOR RESIDENTIAL
MANGA, MAURO MANGA, ARTHUR HERBOLARIO, PURPOSES AND DECLARING THE LAND OPEN TO
MANOLITO HERBOLARIO, ROSARIO ANCHETA, DISPOSITION UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE
TERESITA A. VICTORIA, ROSALINA SAMPAGA, PUBLIC LAND ACT, AS AMENDED.
MARIQUITA RUADO, FELIPE ANCHETA,
MAGDALENA CABREZA, MARIA BIANDILLA, Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Environment
NILDA ARENSOL, LORENZO S. TOLEDO, and and Natural Resources and by virtue of the powers
NAPOLEON D. VILORIA, SR., respondents. vested in me by law, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO,
President of the Philippines, do hereby amend
Proclamation No. 1716, dated February 17, 1978,
which established for municipal government center site
MELO, J.: purposes certain parcels of land mentioned therein
situated in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila,
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under by excluding from its operation the parcels of land not
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing and seeking to being utilized for government center site purposes but
reverse and set aside: a) the decision dated November actually occupied for residential purposes and declaring
23, 1995 of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision the land so excluded, together with other parcels of land
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, not covered by Proclamation No. 1716 but nevertheless
Branch 159; and b) the resolution dated May 28, 1996 occupied for residential purposes, open to disposition
denying reconsideration of said decision. under the provisions of the Public Land Act, as
amended, subject to future survey, which are hereunder
The generative facts of the case are as follows: particularly described as follows:

On February 17, 1978, then President Ferdinand Lot 1 (Port.) Psu-73270

Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1716 reserving for
Municipal Government Center Site Purposes certain xxx xxx xxx
parcels of land of the public domain located in the
Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila. Lot 4 (Port.) Psd-740
and Psd-810
Considering that the land covered by the
above-mentioned proclamation was occupied by xxx xxx xxx
squatters, the Municipality of San Juan purchased an
18-hectare land in Taytay, Rizal as resettlement center Lot 5 (Port.) Psu-73270
for the said squatters. Only after resettling these
squatters would the municipality be able to develop and xxx xxx xxx
construct its municipal government center on the
subject land. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand
and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines
After hundreds of squatter families were resettled, the to be affixed.
Municipality of San Juan started to develop its
government center by constructing the INP Building, Done in the City of Manila, this 6th day of October in the
which now serves as the PNP Headquarters, the Fire year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.
Station Headquarters, and the site to house the two
 (Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO 164. This notwithstanding, petitioner reiterates the
reasons why the court had previously ruled in favor of
By the President: petitioner's rights over the subject property against the
claims of private respondents.
(Sgd.) CATALINO MACARAIG, JR.
Acting Executive Secretary We find good legal basis to sustain petitioner's position
on the issue of res judicata insofar as the particular
(Rollo, pp. 148-151.) area covered by Proclamation No. 164, which was the
subject matter of the earlier case, is concerned.
On June 1, 1988, the Corazon de Jesus Homeowners
Association, Inc., one of herein private respondents, The basic elements of res judicata are: (a) the former
filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National judgment must be final; (b) the court which rendered it
Capital Judicial Region (Pasig, Branch 159) a petition had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
for prohibition with urgent prayer for restraining order (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there
against the Municipal Mayor and Engineer of San Juan must be between the first and second actions identity of
and the Curator of Pinaglabanan Shrine, to enjoin them parties, subject matter, and cause of action (Mangoma
from either removing or demolishing the houses of the vs. Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 21 [1995]).
association members who were claiming that the lots
they occupied have been awarded to them by The existence of the first three elements can not be
Proclamation No. 164. disputed. As to identity of parties, we have ruled that
only substantial identity is required and not absolute
On September 14, 1990, the regional trial court identity of parties (Suarez vs. Municipality of Naujan, 18
dismissed the petition, ruling that the property in SCRA 682 [1966]). The addition of public respondent
question is being utilized by the Municipality of San DENR in the second case will thus be of no moment.
Juan for government purposes and thus, the condition Likewise, there is identity of cause of action since the
set forth in Proclamation No. 164 is absent. right of the municipality over the subject property, the
corresponding obligation of private respondents to
The appeal before the Court of Appeals was dismissed respect such right and the resulting violation of said
in a decision dated July 17, 1991. This decision became right all remain to be the same in both the first and the
final and the said judgment was duly entered on April 8, second actions despite the fact that in the first action,
1992. private respondents were the plaintiff while in the
second action, they were the respondents.
Disregarding the ruling of the court in this final judgment,
private respondents hired a private surveyor to make The last requisite is identity of subject matter. Res
consolidation-subdivision plans of the land in question, judicata only extends to such portion of land covered by
submitting the same to respondent Department of Proclamation No. 164 which the court ruled may not be
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in automatically segregated from the land covered by
connection with their application for a grant under Proclamation No. 1716. It does not include those
Proclamation No. 164. portions which are outside the coverage of
Proclamation No. 1716.
To prevent DENR from issuing any grant to private
respondents, petitioner municipality filed a petition for Withal, reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals
prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary would be justified upon the above premise and our
restraining order and preliminary injunction against discussion may properly end here. However, there
respondent DENR and private respondent Corazon de exists a more basic reason for setting aside the
Jesus Homeowners Association. appealed decision and this has reference to a
fundamental and gross error in the issuance of
The regional trial court sustained petitioner municipality, Proclamation No. 164 on October 16, 1987 by then
enjoining the DENR from disposing and awarding the President Aquino.
parcels of land covered by Proclamation No. 164.
Proclamation No. 1716 was issued by the late President
The Court of Appeals reversed, hence, the present Ferdinand E. Marcos on February 17, 1978 in the due
recourse. exercise of legislative power vested upon him by
Amendment No. 6 introduced in 1976. Being a valid act
Cutting through the other issues, it would appear that of legislation, said Proclamation may only be amended
ultimately, the central question and bone of contention by an equally valid act of legislation. Proclamation No.
in the petition before us boils down to the correct 164 is obviously not a valid act of legislation. After the
interpretation of Proclamation No. 164 in relation to so-called bloodless revolution of February 1986,
Proclamation No. 1716. President Corazon Aquino took the reigns of power
under a revolutionary government. On March 24, 1986,
she issued her historic Proclamation No. 3,
Petitioner municipality assails the decision of the Court
promulgating the Provisional Constitution, or more
of Appeals by hammering on the issue of res judicata in
popularly referred to as the Freedom Constitution.
view of the fact that an earlier judgment, which had
Under Article II, Section 1 of the Freedom Constitution,
become final and executory, had already settled the
the President shall continue to exercise legislative
respective rights of the parties under Proclamation No.
power until a legislature is elected and convened under ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity as
a new constitution. Then came the ratification of the Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, respondents.
draft constitution, to be known later as the 1987
Constitution. When Congress was convened on July 26, DECISION
1987, President Aquino lost this legislative power under
the Freedom Constitution. Proclamation No. 164, CORONA, J.:
amending Proclamation No. 1716 was issued on
October 6, 1987 when legislative power was already This petition for prohibition1 seeks to prevent
solely on Congress. respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic
Act (RA) 93352(Attrition Act of 2005).
Although quite lamentably, this matter has escaped the
attention of petitioner as well as the courts before which RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the
this case has already passed through, this Court cannot revenue-generation capability and collection of the
help noticing this basic flaw in the issuance of Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of
Proclamation No. 164. Because this unauthorized act Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and
by the then president constitutes a direct derogation of BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue
the most basic principle in the separation of powers targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions
between the three branches of government enshrined through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund
in our Constitution, we cannot simply close our eyes (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board
and rely upon the principle of the presumption of validity (Board).3 It covers all officials and employees of the BIR
of a law. and the BOC with at least six months of service,
regardless of employment status.4
There is a long standing principle that every statute is
presumed to be valid (Salas vs. Jarencio, 48 SCRA 734 The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and
[1970]; Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30 [1978]). the BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the year,
However, this rests upon the premise that the statute as determined by the Development Budget and
was duly enacted by legislature. This presumption Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or
cannot apply when there is clear usurpation of reward is taken from the fund and allocated to the BIR
legislative power by the executive branch. For this and the BOC in proportion to their contribution in the
Court to allow such disregard of the most basic of all excess collection of the targeted amount of tax
constitutional principles by reason of the doctrine of revenue.5
presumption of validity of a law would be to turn its back
to its sacred duty to uphold and defend the Constitution. The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of
Thus, also, it is in the discharge of this task that we take the Secretary of the Department of Finance (DOF) or
this exception from the Court's usual practice of not his/her Undersecretary, the Secretary of the
entertaining constitutional questions unless they are Department of Budget and Management (DBM) or
specifically raised, insisted upon, and adequately his/her Undersecretary, the Director General of the
argued. National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) or
his/her Deputy Director General, the Commissioners of
We, therefore, hold that the issuance of Proclamation the BIR and the BOC or their Deputy Commissioners,
No. 164 was an invalid exercise of legislative power. two representatives from the rank-and-file employees
Consequently, said Proclamation is hereby declared and a representative from the officials nominated by
NULL and VOID. their recognized organization.6

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and
Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE. Public respondent guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of
Department of Environment and Natural Resources is the Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for removing
hereby permanently ENJOINED from enforcing from the service officials and employees whose
Proclamation No. 164. revenue collection falls short of the target; (3) terminate
personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the
SO ORDERED. Board; (4) prescribe a system for performance
evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including the
G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008 issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an
annual report to Congress.7
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly
AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service
ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. Commission (CSC) were tasked to promulgate and
ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R. issue the implementing rules and regulations of RA
SANDOVAL, petitioners, 9335,8 to be approved by a Joint Congressional
vs. Oversight Committee created for such purpose.9
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as
Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this
PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON. tax reform legislation. They contend that, by
establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the
law "transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR constitutionality in favor of RA 9335, except as shall
and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as hereafter be discussed.
they will do their best only in consideration of such
rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives Actual Case And Ripeness
invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally
mandated duty of these officials and employees to An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal
serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible
loyalty and efficiency. of judicial adjudication.10 A closely related requirement
is ripeness, that is, the question must be ripe for
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the adjudication. And a constitutional question is ripe for
system of rewards and incentives only to officials and adjudication when the governmental act being
employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual
constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no challenging it.11 Thus, to be ripe for judicial adjudication,
valid basis for classification or distinction as to why the petitioner must show a personal stake in the
such a system should not apply to officials and outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be
employees of all other government agencies. redressed by a favorable decision of the Court.12

In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly In this case, aside from the general claim that the
delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the dispute has ripened into a judicial controversy by the
President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. mere enactment of the law even without any further
While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR overt act,13 petitioners fail either to assert any specific
and BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if and concrete legal claim or to demonstrate any direct
their revenue collections fall short of the target by at adverse effect of the law on them. They are unable to
least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue show a personal stake in the outcome of this case or an
targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue injury to themselves. On this account, their petition is
targets has been delegated to the President without procedurally infirm.
sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the
President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in This notwithstanding, public interest requires the
order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel. resolution of the constitutional issues raised by
petitioners. The grave nature of their allegations tends
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a to cast a cloud on the presumption of constitutionality in
congressional oversight committee on the ground that it favor of the law. And where an action of the legislative
violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the branch is alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
legislative function is deemed accomplished and becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the
completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, judiciary to settle the dispute.14
the creation of the congressional oversight committee
permits legislative participation in the implementation Accountability of
and enforcement of the law. Public Officers

In their comment, respondents, through the Office of the Section 1, Article 11 of the Constitution states:
Solicitor General, question the petition for being
premature as there is no actual case or controversy yet. Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
Petitioners have not asserted any right or claim that will employees must at all times be accountable to the
necessitate the exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction. people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
Nevertheless, respondents acknowledge that public loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism, and justice,
policy requires the resolution of the constitutional issues and lead modest lives.
involved in this case. They assert that the allegation
that the reward system will breed mercenaries is mere Public office is a public trust. It must be discharged by
speculation and does not suffice to invalidate the law. its holder not for his own personal gain but for the
Seen in conjunction with the declared objective of RA benefit of the public for whom he holds it in trust. By
9335, the law validly classifies the BIR and the BOC demanding accountability and service with
because the functions they perform are distinct from responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency, patriotism
those of the other government agencies and and justice, all government officials and employees
instrumentalities. Moreover, the law provides a have the duty to be responsive to the needs of the
sufficient standard that will guide the executive in the people they are called upon to serve.
implementation of its provisions. Lastly, the creation of
the congressional oversight committee under the law Public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the
enhances, rather than violates, separation of powers. It performance of their duties. This presumption
ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy and necessarily obtains in favor of BIR and BOC officials
serves as a check to any over-accumulation of power and employees. RA 9335 operates on the basis thereof
on the part of the executive and the implementing and reinforces it by providing a system of rewards and
agencies. sanctions for the purpose of encouraging the officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC to exceed their
After a careful consideration of the conflicting revenue targets and optimize their revenue-generation
contentions of the parties, the Court finds that capability and collection.15
petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of
The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrary Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause
is required to rebut it. It cannot be overturned by mere is equality under the same conditions and among
conjecture or denied in advance (as petitioners would persons similarly situated; it is equality among equals,
have the Court do) specially in this case where it is an not similarity of treatment of persons who are classified
underlying principle to advance a declared public policy. based on substantial differences in relation to the object
to be accomplished.19 When things or persons are
Petitioners’ claim that the implementation of RA 9335 different in fact or circumstance, they may be treated in
will turn BIR and BOC officials and employees into law differently. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’
"bounty hunters and mercenaries" is not only without Union,20 this Court declared:
any factual and legal basis; it is also purely speculative.
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a
A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon
presumption of constitutionality. To justify its all citizens of the [S]tate. It is not, therefore, a
nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional
breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman
one.16 To invalidate RA 9335 based on petitioners’ and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality
baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate
only of the legislature that passed it but also of the operation on persons merely as such, but on persons
executive which approved it. according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The
Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public Constitution does not require that things which are
officers may by law be rewarded for exemplary and different in fact be treated in law as though they
exceptional performance. A system of incentives for were the same. The equal protection clause does
exceeding the set expectations of a public office is not not forbid discrimination as to things that are
anathema to the concept of public accountability. In fact, different. It does not prohibit legislation which is
it recognizes and reinforces dedication to duty, industry, limited either in the object to which it is directed or
efficiency and loyalty to public service of deserving by the territory within which it is to operate.
government personnel.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the
In United States v. Matthews,17 the U.S. Supreme Court Constitution allows classification. Classification in law,
validated a law which awards to officers of the customs as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is
as well as other parties an amount not exceeding the grouping of things in speculation or practice
one-half of the net proceeds of forfeitures in violation of because they agree with one another in certain
the laws against smuggling. Citing Dorsheimer v. particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple
United States,18 the U.S. Supreme Court said: inequality. The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere
The offer of a portion of such penalties to the collectors fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
is to stimulate and reward their zeal and industry in constitutionality. All that is required of a valid
detecting fraudulent attempts to evade payment of classification is that it be reasonable, which means
duties and taxes. that the classification should be based on
substantial distinctions which make for real
In the same vein, employees of the BIR and the BOC differences, that it must be germane to the purpose
may by law be entitled to a reward when, as a of the law; that it must not be limited to existing
consequence of their zeal in the enforcement of tax and conditions only; and that it must apply equally to
customs laws, they exceed their revenue targets. In each member of the class. This Court has held
addition, RA 9335 establishes safeguards to ensure that the standard is satisfied if the classification or
that the reward will not be claimed if it will be either the distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or
fruit of "bounty hunting or mercenary activity" or the rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
product of the irregular performance of official duties.
One of these precautionary measures is embodied in In the exercise of its power to make classifications for
Section 8 of the law: the purpose of enacting laws over matters within its
jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide
SEC. 8. Liability of Officials, Examiners and Employees range of discretion. It is not necessary that the
of the BIR and the BOC. – The officials, examiners, and classification be based on scientific or marked
employees of the [BIR] and the [BOC] who violate this differences of things or in their relation. Neither is it
Act or who are guilty of negligence, abuses or acts of necessary that the classification be made with
malfeasance or misfeasance or fail to exercise mathematical nicety. Hence, legislative classification
extraordinary diligence in the performance of their may in many cases properly rest on narrow distinctions,
duties shall be held liable for any loss or injury suffered for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude the
by any business establishment or taxpayer as a result legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm,
of such violation, negligence, abuse, malfeasance, and legislation is addressed to evils as they may
misfeasance or failure to exercise extraordinary appear.21 (emphasis supplied)
diligence.
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid
Equal Protection classification, that is, a classification that has a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and not
arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its expressed (6) Administer all legal requirements that are
public policy is the optimization of the appropriate;
revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR
and the BOC.23 Since the subject of the law is the (7) Prevent and prosecute smuggling and other illegal
revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR activities in all ports under its jurisdiction;
and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided
in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies. (8) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent
Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC units;
because they have the common distinct primary
function of generating revenues for the national (9) Perform such other functions as may be provided by
government through the collection of taxes, customs law.25
duties, fees and charges.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
The BIR performs the following functions:
Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF.
Sec. 18. The Bureau of Internal Revenue. – The Bureau They principally perform the special function of being
of Internal Revenue, which shall be headed by and the instrumentalities through which the State exercises
subject to the supervision and control of the one of its great inherent functions – taxation. Indubitably,
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who shall be such substantial distinction is germane and intimately
appointed by the President upon the recommendation related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the
of the Secretary [of the DOF], shall have the following classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and
functions: the BOC under RA 9335 fully satisfy the demands of
equal protection.
(1) Assess and collect all taxes, fees and charges
and account for all revenues collected; Undue Delegation

(2) Exercise duly delegated police powers for the proper Two tests determine the validity of delegation of
performance of its functions and duties; legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the
sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets
(3) Prevent and prosecute tax evasions and all other forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
illegal economic activities; implemented by the delegate.26 It lays down a sufficient
standard when it provides adequate guidelines or
(4) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
and subordinate units; and delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot.27 To be sufficient, the standard must
(5) Perform such other functions as may be provided by specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce
law.24 the legislative policy and identify the conditions under
which it is to be implemented.28
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to
On the other hand, the BOC has the following functions: guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the
implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of
Sec. 23. The Bureau of Customs. – The Bureau of the law. Section 2 spells out the policy of the law:
Customs which shall be headed and subject to the
management and control of the Commissioner of SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is the policy of the
Customs, who shall be appointed by the President upon State to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
the recommendation of the Secretary[of the DOF] and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and
hereinafter referred to as Commissioner, shall have the the Bureau of Customs (BOC) by providing for a system
following functions: of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a
Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue
(1) Collect custom duties, taxes and the Performance Evaluation Board in the above agencies
corresponding fees, charges and penalties; for the purpose of encouraging their officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets.
(2) Account for all customs revenues collected;
Section 4 "canalized within banks that keep it from
(3) Exercise police authority for the enforcement of tariff overflowing"29 the delegated power to the President to
and customs laws; fix revenue targets:

(4) Prevent and suppress smuggling, pilferage and all SEC. 4. Rewards and Incentives Fund. – A Rewards
other economic frauds within all ports of entry; and Incentives Fund, hereinafter referred to as the Fund,
is hereby created, to be sourced from the collection of
(5) Supervise and control exports, imports, foreign the BIR and the BOC in excess of their respective
mails and the clearance of vessels and aircrafts in all revenue targets of the year, as determined by the
ports of entry; Development Budget and Coordinating Committee
(DBCC), in the following percentages:
 by Collection
Excess of Collection of the Percent (%) of the Excess revenue ortocustoms officials or employees has
Excess the Revenue Targets Accrue to the Fund suffered from economic difficulties brought about by
30% or below – 15% natural calamities or force majeure or economic causes
More than 30% as may
– 15% of the first 30% plus 20%beofdetermined
the by the Board, termination shall
remaining excess be considered only after careful and proper review by
the Board.
The Fund shall be deemed automatically appropriated
the year immediately following the year when the (c) To terminate personnel in accordance with the
revenue collection target was exceeded and shall be criteria adopted in the preceding paragraph: Provided,
released on the same fiscal year. That such decision shall be immediately executory:
Provided, further, That the application of the criteria
for the separation of an official or employee from
Revenue targets shall refer to the original estimated
service under this Act shall be without prejudice to
revenue collection expected of the BIR and the BOC
the application of other relevant laws on
for a given fiscal year as stated in the Budget of
accountability of public officers and employees,
Expenditures and Sources of Financing (BESF)
such as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
submitted by the President to Congress. The BIR
of Public Officers and Employees and the Anti-Graft
and the BOC shall submit to the DBCC the distribution
and Corrupt Practices Act;
of the agencies’ revenue targets as allocated among its
revenue districts in the case of the BIR, and the
collection districts in the case of the BOC. xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied) Clearly, RA 9335 in no way violates the security of
tenure of officials and employees of the BIR and the
BOC. The guarantee of security of tenure only means
Revenue targets are based on the original estimated
that an employee cannot be dismissed from the service
revenue collection expected respectively of the BIR and
for causes other than those provided by law and only
the BOC for a given fiscal year as approved by the
after due process is accorded the employee.31 In the
DBCC and stated in the BESF submitted by the
case of RA 9335, it lays down a reasonable yardstick
President to Congress.30 Thus, the determination of
for removal (when the revenue collection falls short of
revenue targets does not rest solely on the President as
the target by at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all
it also undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.
relevant factors affecting the level of collection. This
standard is analogous to inefficiency and incompetence
On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the
in the performance of official duties, a ground for
Board’s authority and identifies the conditions under
disciplinary action under civil service laws.32 The action
which officials and employees whose revenue collection
for removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules
falls short of the target by at least 7.5% may be
and regulations and compliance with substantive and
removed from the service:
procedural due process.
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. – The
At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as
Board in the agency shall have the following powers
sufficient standards: "public interest," "justice and
and functions:
equity," "public convenience and welfare" and
"simplicity, economy and welfare."33 In this case, the
xxx xxx xxx
declared policy of optimization of the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR
(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing and the BOC is infused with public interest.
from service officials and employees whose
revenue collection falls short of the target by at
Separation Of Powers
least seven and a half percent (7.5%), with due
consideration of all relevant factors affecting the
Section 12 of RA 9335 provides:
level of collection as provided in the rules and
regulations promulgated under this Act, subject to civil
SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. –
service laws, rules and regulations and compliance
There is hereby created a Joint Congressional
with substantive and procedural due process:
Oversight Committee composed of seven Members
Provided, That the following exemptions shall apply:
from the Senate and seven Members from the House of
Representatives. The Members from the Senate shall
1. Where the district or area of responsibility is
be appointed by the Senate President, with at least two
newly-created, not exceeding two years in operation, as
senators representing the minority. The Members from
has no historical record of collection performance that
the House of Representatives shall be appointed by the
can be used as basis for evaluation; and
Speaker with at least two members representing the
minority. After the Oversight Committee will have
2. Where the revenue or customs official or employee is
approved the implementing rules and regulations (IRR)
a recent transferee in the middle of the period under
it shall thereafter become functus officio and therefore
consideration unless the transfer was due to
cease to exist.
nonperformance of revenue targets or potential
nonperformance of revenue targets: Provided, however,
That when the district or area of responsibility covered
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA efficiency of the operation of government activities. In
9335 was created for the purpose of approving the the exercise of legislative scrutiny, Congress may
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by request information and report from the other branches
the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, of government. It can give recommendations or pass
2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it resolutions for consideration of the agency involved.
became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the
issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive xxx xxx xxx
function of implementing and enforcing the law may be
considered moot and academic. b. Congressional investigation

This notwithstanding, this might be as good a time as While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive
any for the Court to confront the issue of the process of looking at the facts that are readily
constitutionality of the Joint Congressional Oversight available, congressional investigation involves a more
Committee created under RA 9335 (or other similar intense digging of facts. The power of Congress to
laws for that matter). conduct investigation is recognized by the 1987
Constitution under section 21, Article VI,
The scholarly discourse of Mr. Justice (now Chief xxx xxx xxx
Justice) Puno on the concept of congressional
oversight in Macalintal v. Commission on Elections34 is c. Legislative supervision
illuminating:
The third and most encompassing form by which
Concept and bases of congressional oversight Congress exercises its oversight power is thru
legislative supervision. "Supervision" connotes a
Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all continuing and informed awareness on the part of a
activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its congressional committee regarding executive
understanding of and influence over operations in a given administrative area. While both
the implementation of legislation it has enacted. congressional scrutiny and investigation involve inquiry
Clearly, oversight into past executive branch actions in order to influence
concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by future executive branch performance, congressional
Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance supervision allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise
with program objectives, (b) to determine whether of delegated law-making authority, and permits
agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate Congress to retain part of that delegated authority.
executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent
executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) Congress exercises supervision over the executive
to assess executive conformity with the agencies through its veto power. It typically utilizes veto
congressional perception of public interest. provisions when granting the President or an executive
agency the power to promulgate regulations with the
The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in force of law. These provisions require the President or
the grant of legislative power itself and integral to the an agency to present the proposed regulations to
checks and balances inherent in a democratic system Congress, which retains a "right" to approve or
of government. x x x x x x x x x disapprove any regulation before it takes effect. Such
legislative veto provisions usually provide that a
Over the years, Congress has invoked its oversight proposed regulation will become a law after the
power with increased frequency to check the perceived expiration of a certain period of time, only if Congress
"exponential accumulation of power" by the executive does not affirmatively disapprove of the regulation in the
branch. By the beginning of the 20th century, Congress meantime. Less frequently, the statute provides that a
has delegated an enormous amount of legislative proposed regulation will become law if Congress
authority to the executive branch and the administrative affirmatively approves it.
agencies. Congress, thus, uses its oversight power to
make sure that the administrative agencies perform Supporters of legislative veto stress that it is necessary
their functions within the authority delegated to them. x to maintain the balance of power between the
xxxxxxxx legislative and the executive branches of government
as it offers lawmakers a way to delegate vast power to
Categories of congressional oversight functions the executive branch or to independent agencies while
retaining the option to cancel particular exercise of such
The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise power without having to pass new legislation or to
of its oversight powers may be divided repeal existing law. They contend that this arrangement
into three categories, promotes democratic accountability as it provides
namely: scrutiny, investigation and supervision. legislative check on the activities of unelected
administrative agencies. One proponent thus explains:
a. Scrutiny
It is too late to debate the merits of this delegation
Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and policy: the policy is too deeply embedded in our law and
continuity of attention to administrative operations. Its practice. It suffices to say that the complexities of
primary purpose is to determine economy and modern government have often led Congress-whether
by actual or perceived necessity- to legislate by Immigration Appeals dismissed the alien’s appeal,
declaring broad policy goals and general statutory holding that it had no power to declare unconstitutional
standards, leaving the choice of policy options to the an act of Congress. The United States Court of Appeals
discretion of an executive officer. Congress articulates for Ninth Circuit held that the House was without
legislative aims, but leaves their implementation to the constitutional authority to order the alien’s deportation
judgment of parties who may or may not have and that § 244(c)(2) violated the constitutional doctrine
participated in or agreed with the development of those on separation of powers.
aims. Consequently, absent safeguards, in many
instances the reverse of our constitutional scheme On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court declared § 244(c)(2)
could be effected: Congress proposes, the Executive unconstitutional. But the Court shied away from the
disposes. One safeguard, of course, is the legislative issue of separation of powers and instead held that
power to enact new legislation or to change existing law. the provision violates the presentment clause and
But without some means of overseeing post enactment bicameralism. It held that the one-house veto was
activities of the executive branch, Congress would be essentially legislative in purpose and effect. As such, it
unable to determine whether its policies have been is subject to the procedures set out in Article I of the
implemented in accordance with legislative intent and Constitution requiring the passage by a majority of both
thus whether legislative intervention is appropriate. Houses and presentment to the President. x x x x x x x
xx
Its opponents, however, criticize the legislative
veto as undue encroachment upon the executive Two weeks after the Chadha decision, the Court upheld,
prerogatives. They urge that any post-enactment in memorandum decision, two lower court decisions
measures undertaken by the legislative branch invalidating the legislative veto provisions in the Natural
should be limited to scrutiny and investigation; any Gas Policy Act of 1978 and the Federal Trade
measure beyond that would undermine the Commission Improvement Act of 1980. Following this
separation of powers guaranteed by the precedence, lower courts invalidated statutes
Constitution. They contend that legislative veto containing legislative veto provisions although some of
constitutes an impermissible evasion of the President’s these provisions required the approval of both Houses
veto authority and intrusion into the powers vested in of Congress and thus met the bicameralism
the executive or judicial branches of government. requirement of Article I. Indeed, some of these veto
Proponents counter that legislative veto enhances provisions were not even exercised.35 (emphasis
separation of powers as it prevents the executive supplied)
branch and independent agencies from accumulating
too much power. They submit that reporting In Macalintal, given the concept and configuration of the
requirements and congressional committee power of congressional oversight and considering the
investigations allow Congress to scrutinize only the nature and powers of a constitutional body like the
exercise of delegated law-making authority. They do Commission on Elections, the Court struck down the
not allow Congress to review executive proposals provision in RA 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting
before they take effect and they do not afford the Act of 2003) creating a Joint Congressional Committee.
opportunity for ongoing and binding expressions of The committee was tasked not only to monitor and
congressional intent. In contrast, legislative veto evaluate the implementation of the said law but also to
permits Congress to participate prospectively in the review, revise, amend and approve the IRR
approval or disapproval of "subordinate law" or those promulgated by the Commission on Elections. The
enacted by the executive branch pursuant to a Court held that these functions infringed on the
delegation of authority by Congress. They further argue constitutional independence of the Commission on
that legislative veto "is a necessary response by Elections.36
Congress to the accretion of policy control by forces
outside its chambers." In an era of delegated authority, With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional
they point out that legislative veto "is the most efficient oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it
means Congress has yet devised to retain control over neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the
the evolution and implementation of its policy as executive power to implement laws nor undermines the
declared by statute." constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral
to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic
In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. system of government. It may in fact even enhance the
Chadha, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the separation of powers as it prevents the
validity of legislative veto provisions. The case over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.
arose from the order of the immigration judge
suspending the deportation of Chadha pursuant to § However, to forestall the danger of congressional
244(c)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The encroachment "beyond the legislative sphere," the
United States House of Representatives passed a Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints
resolution vetoing the suspension pursuant to § on Congress.37 It may not vest itself, any of its
244(c)(2) authorizing either House of Congress, by committees or its members with either executive or
resolution, to invalidate the decision of the executive judicial power.38 And, when it exercises its legislative
branch to allow a particular deportable alien to remain power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought and
in the United States. The immigration judge reopened exhaustively considered, procedures" specified under
the deportation proceedings to implement the House the Constitution,39 including the procedure for
order and the alien was ordered deported. The Board of enactment of laws and presentment.
Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of
as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In whether or not they conformed with the provisions of
particular, congressional oversight must be confined to RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself,
the following: a power exclusively vested in this Court by the
Constitution.
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power of
appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in Considered Opinion of
connection with it, its power to ask heads of Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga
departments to appear before and be heard by either of
its Houses on any matter pertaining to their Moreover, the requirement that the implementing rules
departments and its power of confirmation40 and of a law be subjected to approval by Congress as a
condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal
(2) investigation and monitoring41 of the implementation constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule on
of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct presentment.52
inquiries in aid of legislation.42
Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution states:
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the
separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in
Legislative vetoes fall in this class. the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist
of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on
President or an administrative agency to present the initiative and referendum. (emphasis supplied)
proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to
Congress which, by itself or through a committee Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact,
formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or amend and repeal laws)53 is vested in Congress which
disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As consists of two chambers, the Senate and the House of
such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional Representatives. A valid exercise of legislative power
oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning requires the act of both chambers. Corrollarily, it can be
delegation designed to attach a congressional leash exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers nor
(other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an by a committee of either or both chambers. Thus,
agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated assuming the validity of a legislative veto, both a
broad powers.43It radically changes the design or single-chamber legislative veto and a congressional
structure of the Constitution’s diagram of power as it committee legislative veto are invalid.
entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying
or implementing its own laws.44 Additionally, Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution
provides:
Congress has two options when enacting legislation to
define national policy within the broad horizons of its Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress
legislative competence.45 It can itself formulate the shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the
details or it can assign to the executive branch the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it,
responsibility for making necessary managerial otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his
decisions in conformity with those standards.46 In the objections to the House where it originated, which shall
latter case, the law must be complete in all its essential enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed
terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of the to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds
legislature.47 Thus, what is left for the executive branch of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass
or the concerned administrative agency when it the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to
formulates rules and regulations implementing the law the other House by which it shall likewise be
is to fill up details (supplementary rule-making) or reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the
ascertain facts necessary to bring the law into actual Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all
operation (contingent rule-making).48 such cases, the votes of each House shall be
determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative members voting for or against shall be entered in its
agencies to implement and interpret the law which they Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of
are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are any bill to the House where it originated within thirty
entitled to respect.49 Such rules and regulations partake days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall
of the nature of a statute50and are just as binding as if become a law as if he had signed it. (emphasis
they have been written in the statute itself. As such, supplied)
they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the
presumption of constitutionality and legality until they Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the
are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a President for approval or veto. In the absence of
competent court.51 Congress, in the guise of assuming presentment to the President, no bill passed by
the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality Congress can become a law. In this sense, law-making
by subjecting them to its stamp of approval without under the Constitution is a joint act of the Legislature
disturbing the calculated balance of powers established and of the Executive. Assuming that legislative veto is a
by the Constitution. In exercising discretion to approve valid legislative act with the force of law, it cannot take
effect without such presentment even if approved by deemed to have left the hands of the legislature when it
both chambers of Congress. becomes effective because it is only upon effectivity of
the statute that legal rights and obligations become
In sum, two steps are required before a bill becomes a available to those entitled by the language of the statute.
law. First, it must be approved by both Houses of Subject to the indispensable requisite of publication
Congress.54Second, it must be presented to and under the due process clause,61 the determination as to
approved by the President.55 As summarized by Justice when a law takes effect is wholly the prerogative of
Isagani Cruz56 and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.57, the Congress.62 As such, it is only upon its effectivity that a
following is the procedure for the approval of bills: law may be executed and the executive branch
acquires the duties and powers to execute the said law.
A bill is introduced by any member of the House of Before that point, the role of the executive branch,
Representatives or the Senate except for some particularly of the President, is limited to approving or
measures that must originate only in the former vetoing the law.63
chamber.
From the moment the law becomes effective, any
The first reading involves only a reading of the number provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
and title of the measure and its referral by the Senate members to play any role in the implementation or
President or the Speaker to the proper committee for enforcement of the law violates the principle of
study. separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.
Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress
The bill may be "killed" in the committee or it may be or its members to approve the implementing rules of a
recommended for approval, with or without law after it has already taken effect shall be
amendments, sometimes after public hearings are first unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress
held thereon. If there are other bills of the same nature or its members to overturn any directive or ruling made
or purpose, they may all be consolidated into one bill by the members of the executive branch charged with
under common authorship or as a committee bill. the implementation of the law.

Once reported out, the bill shall be calendared for Following this rationale, Section 12 of RA 9335 should
second reading. It is at this stage that the bill is read in be struck down as unconstitutional. While there may be
its entirety, scrutinized, debated upon and amended similar provisions of other laws that may be invalidated
when desired. The second reading is the most for failure to pass this standard, the Court refrains from
important stage in the passage of a bill. invalidating them wholesale but will do so at the proper
time when an appropriate case assailing those
The bill as approved on second reading is printed in its provisions is brought before us.64
final form and copies thereof are distributed at least
three days before the third reading. On the third reading, The next question to be resolved is: what is the effect of
the members merely register their votes and explain the unconstitutionality of Section 12 of RA 9335 on the
them if they are allowed by the rules. No further debate other provisions of the law? Will it render the entire law
is allowed. unconstitutional? No.

Once the bill passes third reading, it is sent to the other Section 13 of RA 9335 provides:
chamber, where it will also undergo the three readings.
If there are differences between the versions approved SEC. 13. Separability Clause. – If any provision of this
by the two chambers, a conference Act is declared invalid by a competent court, the
committee58 representing both Houses will draft a remainder of this Act or any provision not affected by
compromise measure that if ratified by the Senate and such declaration of invalidity shall remain in force and
the House of Representatives will then be submitted to effect.
the President for his consideration.
In Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of
The bill is enrolled when printed as finally approved by Energy,65 the Court laid down the following rules:
the Congress, thereafter authenticated with the
signatures of the Senate President, the Speaker, and The general rule is that where part of a statute is void
the Secretaries of their respective chambers…59 as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is
valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid,
The President’s role in law-making. may stand and be enforced. The presence of a
separability clause in a statute creates the presumption
The final step is submission to the President for that the legislature intended separability, rather than
approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after the complete nullity of the statute. To justify this result, the
required publication.60 valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid
portion that it is fair to presume that the legislature
Where Congress delegates the formulation of rules to would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it
implement the law it has enacted pursuant to sufficient could not constitutionally enact the other. Enough must
standards established in the said law, the law must be remain to make a complete, intelligible and valid statute,
complete in all its essential terms and conditions when which carries out the legislative intent. x x x
it leaves the hands of the legislature. And it may be
The exception to the general rule is that when the parts recommending dismissal of the criminal cases filed
of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected, against herein petitioners, be reversed and set aside.
as conditions, considerations, inducements, or
compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief The antecedent facts are as follows.
that the legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity
of one part will vitiate the rest. In making the parts of the On July 22, 1998, the Fact-Finding and Intelligence
statute dependent, conditional, or connected with one Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a
another, the legislature intended the statute to be Complaint-Affidavit docketed as OMB-0-98-1500,
carried out as a whole and would not have enacted it if charging herein petitioners with Illegal Use of Public
one part is void, in which case if some parts are Funds as defined and penalized under Article 220 of the
unconstitutional, all the other provisions thus dependent, Revised Penal Code and violation of Section 3,
conditional, or connected must fall with them. paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,
as amended.
The separability clause of RA 9335 reveals the intention
of the legislature to isolate and detach any invalid The complaint alleged that there were irregularities in
provision from the other provisions so that the latter the use by then Congressman Carmello F. Lazatin of
may continue in force and effect. The valid portions can his Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) for the
stand independently of the invalid section. Without calendar year 1996, i.e., he was both proponent and
Section 12, the remaining provisions still constitute a implementer of the projects funded from his CDF; he
complete, intelligible and valid law which carries out the signed vouchers and supporting papers pertinent to the
legislative intent to optimize the revenue-generation disbursement as Disbursing Officer; and he received,
capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC by as claimant, eighteen (18) checks amounting to
providing for a system of rewards and sanctions ₱4,868,277.08. Thus, petitioner Lazatin, with the help of
through the Rewards and Incentives Fund and a petitioners Marino A. Morales, Angelito A. Pelayo and
Revenue Performance Evaluation Board. Teodoro L. David, was allegedly able to convert his
CDF into cash.
To be effective, administrative rules and regulations
must be published in full if their purpose is to enforce or A preliminary investigation was conducted and,
implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. thereafter, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation
The IRR of RA 9335 were published on May 30, 2006 in Bureau (EPIB) issued a Resolution2 dated May 29,
two newspapers of general circulation66 and became 2000 recommending the filing against herein petitioners
effective 15 days thereafter.67 Until and unless the of fourteen (14) counts each of Malversation of Public
contrary is shown, the IRR are presumed valid and Funds and violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.
effective even without the approval of the Joint Said Resolution was approved by the Ombudsman;
Congressional Oversight Committee. hence, twenty-eight (28) Informations docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 26087 to 26114 were filed against
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY herein petitioners before the Sandiganbayan.
GRANTED. Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the Petitioner Lazatin and his co-petitioners then filed their
implementing rules and regulations of the law is respective Motions for Reconsideration/Reinvestigation,
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and which motions were granted by the Sandiganbayan
therefore NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of the (Third Division). The Sandiganbayan also ordered the
remaining provisions of RA 9335 is UPHELD. Pursuant prosecution to re-evaluate the cases against
to Section 13 of RA 9335, the rest of the provisions petitioners.
remain in force and effect.
Subsequently, the OSP submitted to the Ombudsman
SO ORDERED. its Resolution3 dated September 18, 2000. It
recommended the dismissal of the cases against
G.R. No. 147097 June 5, 2009 petitioners for lack or insufficiency of evidence.

CARMELO F. LAZATIN, MARINO A. MORALES, The Ombudsman, however, ordered the Office of the
TEODORO L. DAVID and ANGELITO A. Legal Affairs (OLA) to review the OSP Resolution. In a
PELAYO, Petitioner, Memorandum4 dated October 24, 2000, the OLA
vs. recommended that the OSP Resolution be disapproved
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO as OMBUDSMAN, and and the OSP be directed to proceed with the trial of the
SANDIGANBAYAN, THIRD DIVISION, Respondents. cases against petitioners. On October 27, 2000, the
Ombudsman adopted the OLA Memorandum, thereby
DECISION disapproving the OSP Resolution dated September 18,
2000 and ordering the aggressive prosecution of the
PERALTA, J.: subject cases. The cases were then returned to the
Sandiganbayan for continuation of criminal
This resolves the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of proceedings.
the Rules of Court, praying that the Ombudsman's
disapproval of the Office of the Special Prosecutor's Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition.
(OSP) Resolution1 dated September 18, 2000,
Petitioners allege that: of 1986] did not hesitate to recommend that the
Legislature could, through statute, prescribe such other
I. powers, functions, and duties to the Ombudsman. x x x
As finally approved by the Commission after several
THE OMBUDSMAN ACTED WITH amendments, this is now embodied in paragraph 8,
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR Section 13, Article XI (Accountability of Public Officers)
ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF of the Constitution, which provides:
HIS JURISDICTION.
Sec.13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
II. following powers, functions, and duties:

THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION xxxx

WAS BASED ON MISAPPREHENSION
OF FACTS, SPECULATIONS, Promulgate its rules and procedure and exercise such
SURMISES AND CONJECTURES.5 other functions or duties as may be provided by law.

Amplifying their arguments, petitioners asseverate that Expounding on this power of Congress to prescribe
the Ombudsman had no authority to overturn the OSP's other powers, functions, and duties to the Ombudsman,
Resolution dismissing the cases against petitioners we quote Commissioners Colayco and Monsod during
because, under Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 interpellation by Commissioner Rodrigo:
Constitution, the Ombudsman is clothed only with the
power to watch, investigate and recommend the filing of xxxx
proper cases against erring officials, but it was not
granted the power to prosecute. They point out that MR. RODRIGO:
under the Constitution, the power to prosecute belongs
to the OSP (formerly the Tanodbayan), which was Precisely, I am coming to that. The last of the
intended by the framers to be a separate and distinct enumerated functions of the Ombudsman is: "to
entity from the Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioners exercise such powers or perform such functions or
conclude that, as provided by the Constitution, the OSP duties as may be provided by law." So, the legislature
being a separate and distinct entity, the Ombudsman may vest him with powers taken away from the
should have no power and authority over the OSP. Tanodbayan, may it not?
Thus, petitioners maintain that R.A. No. 6770 (The
Ombudsman Act of 1989), which made the OSP an MR. COLAYCO:
organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman,
should be struck down for being unconstitutional. Yes.

Next, petitioners insist that they should be absolved MR. MONSOD:

from any liability because the checks were issued to
petitioner Lazatin allegedly as reimbursement for the Yes.
advances he made from his personal funds for
expenses incurred to ensure the immediate
xxxx
implementation of projects that are badly needed by the
Pinatubo victims.
MR. RODRIGO:
The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.
Madam President. Section 5 reads: "The Tanodbayan
shall continue to function and exercise its powers as
Petitioners' attack against the constitutionality of R.A.
provided by law."
No. 6770 is stale. It has long been settled that the
provisions of R.A. No. 6770 granting the Office of the
MR. COLAYCO:
Ombudsman prosecutorial powers and placing the OSP
under said office have no constitutional infirmity. The
That is correct, because it is under P.D. No. 1630.
issue of whether said provisions of R.A. No. 6770
violated the Constitution had been fully dissected as far
back as 1995 in Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman.6 MR. RODRIGO:

Therein, the Court held that giving prosecutorial powers So, if it is provided by law, it can be taken away by law, I
to the Ombudsman is in accordance with the suppose.
Constitution as paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI
provides that the Ombudsman shall "exercise such MR. COLAYCO:
other functions or duties as may be provided by law."
Elucidating on this matter, the Court stated: That is correct.

x x x While the intention to withhold prosecutorial MR. RODRIGO:

powers from the Ombudsman was indeed present, the
Commission [referring to the Constitutional Commission
And precisely, Section 12(6) says that among the The contention is not impressed with merit. x x x
functions that can be performed by the Ombudsman are
"such functions or duties as may be provided by law." xxxx
The sponsors admitted that the legislature later on
might remove some powers from the Tanodbayan and x x x Section 7 of Article XI expressly provides that the
transfer these to the Ombudsman. then existing Tanodbayan, to be henceforth known as
the Office of the Special Prosecutor, "shall continue to
MR. COLAYCO: function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter
may be provided by law, except those conferred on the
Madam President, that is correct. Office of the Ombudsman created under this
Constitution." The underscored phrase evidently refers
xxxx to the Tanodbayan's powers under P.D. No. 1630 or
subsequent amendatory legislation. It follows then that
MR. RODRIGO: Congress may remove any of the
Tanodbayan's/Special Prosecutor's powers under P.D.
Madam President, what I am worried about is, if we No. 1630 or grant it other powers, except those powers
create a constitutional body which has neither punitive conferred by the Constitution on the Office of the
nor prosecutory powers but only persuasive powers, we Ombudsman.
might be raising the hopes of our people too much and
then disappoint them. Pursuing the present line of reasoning, when one
considers that by express mandate of paragraph 8,
MR. MONSOD: Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, the
Ombudsman may "exercise such other powers or
I agree with the Commissioner. perform functions or duties as may be provided by law,"
it is indubitable then that Congress has the power to
MR. RODRIGO: place the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the
Office of the Ombudsman. In the same vein, Congress
may remove some of the powers granted to the
Anyway, since we state that the powers of the
Tanodbayan by P.D. No. 1630 and transfer them to the
Ombudsman can later on be implemented by the
Ombudsman; or grant the Office of the Special
legislature, why not leave this to the legislature?
Prosecutor such other powers and functions and duties
as Congress may deem fit and wise. This Congress did
xxxx
through the passage of R.A. No. 6770.8
MR. MONSOD: (reacting to statements of
The foregoing ruling of the Court has been reiterated
Commissioner Blas Ople):
in Camanag v. Guerrero.9 More recently, in Office of the
Ombudsman v. Valera,10 the Court, basing its ratio
xxxx
decidendi on its ruling in Acop and Camanag, declared
that the OSP is "merely a component of the Office of the
With respect to the argument that he is a toothless Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision
animal, we would like to say that we are promoting the and control, and upon authority of the Ombudsman"
concept in its form at the present, but we are also and ruled that under R.A. No. 6770, the power to
saying that he can exercise such powers and functions preventively suspend is lodged only with the
as may be provided by law in accordance with the Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman.11 The Court's
direction of the thinking of Commissioner Rodrigo. We ruling in Acop that the authority of the Ombudsman to
do not think that at this time we should prescribe this, prosecute based on R.A. No. 6770 was authorized by
but we leave it up to Congress at some future time if it the Constitution was also made the foundation for the
feels that it may need to designate what powers the decision in Perez v. Sandiganbayan,12 where it was
Ombudsman need in order that he be more held that the power to prosecute carries with it the
effective.1awphi1 This is not foreclosed. power to authorize the filing of informations, which
power had not been delegated to the OSP. It is,
So, this is a reversible disability, unlike that of a eunuch; therefore, beyond cavil that under the Constitution,
it is not an irreversible disability.7 Congress was not proscribed from legislating the grant
of additional powers to the Ombudsman or placing the
The constitutionality of Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770, OSP under the Office of the Ombudsman.
which subsumed the OSP under the Office of the
Ombudsman, was likewise upheld by the Court in Acop. Petitioners now assert that the Court's ruling on the
It was explained, thus: constitutionality of the provisions of R.A. No. 6770
should be revisited and the principle of stare decisis set
x x x the petitioners conclude that the inclusion of the aside. Again, this contention deserves scant
Office of the Special Prosecutor as among the offices consideration.
under the Office of the Ombudsman in Section 3 of R.A.
No. 6770 ("An Act Providing for the Functional and The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to
Structural Organization of the Office of the Ombudsman adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which
and for Other Purposes") is unconstitutional and void.
are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil case. They have not successfully demonstrated how or
Code of the Philippines which provides, thus: why it would be grave abuse of discretion for the
Ombudsman, who has been validly conferred by law
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the with the power of control and supervision over the OSP,
laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal to disapprove or overturn any resolution issued by the
system of the Philippines. latter.

It was further explained in Fermin v. People13 as The second issue advanced by petitioners is that the
follows: Ombudsman's disapproval of the OSP Resolution
recommending dismissal of the cases is based on
The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to misapprehension of facts, speculations, surmises and
judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country to conjectures. The question is really whether the
follow the rule established in a decision of the Ombudsman correctly ruled that there was enough
Supreme Court thereof. That decision becomes a evidence to support a finding of probable cause. That
judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases issue, however, pertains to a mere error of judgment. It
by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is must be stressed that certiorari is a remedy meant to
based on the principle that once a question of law has correct only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment.
been examined and decided, it should be deemed This has been emphasized in First Corporation v.
settled and closed to further argument.141avvphi1 Former Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals,18 to wit:

In Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts
Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel Corporation,15 the and evidence is not the province of the extraordinary
Court expounded on the importance of the foregoing remedy of certiorari, which is extra ordinem - beyond
doctrine, stating that: the ambit of appeal. In certiorari proceedings,
judicial review does not go as far as to examine and
The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy grounded assess the evidence of the parties and to weigh the
on the necessity for securing certainty and stability of probative value thereof. It does not include an
judicial decisions, thus: inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of
evidence. Any error committed in the evaluation of
Time and again, the court has held that it is a very evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot
desirable and necessary judicial practice that when be remedied by certiorari. An error of judgment is one
a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to which the court may commit in the exercise of its
a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act
and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are complained of was issued by the court without or in
substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion,
movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction
settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary
certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure
be applied to those that follow if the facts are errors of the trial court in its appreciation of the
substantially the same, even though the parties may evidence of the parties, or its conclusions anchored
be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice on the said findings and its conclusions of law. It is
that, absent any powerful countervailing not for this Court to re-examine conflicting
considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of the
Thus, where the same questions relating to the same witnesses or substitute the findings of fact of the
event have been put forward by the parties similarly court a quo.19
situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a
competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to Evidently, the issue of whether the evidence indeed
any attempt to relitigate the same issue.16 supports a finding of probable cause would necessitate
an examination and re-evaluation of the evidence upon
The doctrine has assumed such value in our judicial which the Ombudsman based its disapproval of the
system that the Court has ruled that "[a]bandonment OSP Resolution. Hence, the Petition
thereof must be based only on strong and for Certiorari should not be given due course.
compelling reasons, otherwise, the becoming virtue of
predictability which is expected from this Court would Likewise noteworthy is the holding of the Court
be immeasurably affected and the public's confidence in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
in the stability of the solemn pronouncements Behest Loans v. Desierto,20 imparting the value of the
diminished."17 Verily, only upon showing that Ombudsman's independence, stating thus:
circumstances attendant in a particular case override
the great benefits derived by our judicial system from Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987
the doctrine of stare decisis, can the courts be justified Constitution and RA 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of
in setting aside the same. 1989), the Ombudsman has the power to investigate
and prosecute any act or omission of a public officer or
In this case, petitioners have not shown any strong, employee when such act or omission appears to be
compelling reason to convince the Court that the illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has been the
doctrine of stare decisis should not be applied to this consistent ruling of the Court not to interfere with
the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and
prosecutory powers as long as his rulings are FLORIZA M. CATIIS, RANIEL R. BASCO, E.
supported by substantial evidence. Envisioned as JALIJALI, MARIO C. CARAAN, DOLORES M.
the champion of the people and preserver of the AVIADO, MICHAEL P. LAPLANA, GUILLERMO G.
integrity of public service, he has wide latitude in SORIANO, ALICE E. SOJO, ARTHUR G. NARNE,
exercising his powers and is free from intervention LETICIA SORIANO, FEDERICO RAMOS, JR.,
from the three branches of government. This is to PETERSON CAAMPUED, RODELIO L. GOMEZ,
ensure that his Office is insulated from any outside ANTONIO D. GARCIA, JR., ANTONIO GALO, A.
pressure and improper influence.21 SANCHEZ, SOL E. TAMAYO, JOSEPHINE A.M.
COCJIN, DAMIAN QUINTO, JR., EDLYN MARIANO,
Indeed, for the Court to overturn the Ombudsman's M.A. MALANUM, ALFREDO S. ESTRELLA, and
finding of probable cause, it is imperative for petitioners JESUS MEL SAYO, Petitioners,
to clearly prove that said public official acted with grave vs.
abuse of discretion. In Presidential Commission on EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive
Good Government v. Desierto,22 the Court elaborated Secretary, The Director General of the Philippine
on what constitutes such abuse, to wit: Information Agency and The National
Treasurer, Respondents.
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of DECISION
jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of power must
have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform The present controversy arose from a Petition
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. for Certiorari and prohibition challenging the
x x x23 constitutionality of Executive Order No. 378 dated
October 25, 2004, issued by President Gloria
In this case, petitioners failed to demonstrate that the Macapagal Arroyo (President Arroyo). Petitioners
Ombudsman acted in a manner described above. characterize their action as a class suit filed on their
Clearly, the Ombudsman was acting in accordance with own behalf and on behalf of all their co-employees at
R.A. No. 6770 and properly exercised its power of the National Printing Office (NPO).
control and supervision over the OSP when it
disapproved the Resolution dated September 18, 2000. The NPO was formed on July 25, 1987, during the term
of former President Corazon C. Aquino (President
It should also be noted that the petition does not Aquino), by virtue of Executive Order No. 2851 which
question any order or action of the Sandiganbayan provided, among others, the creation of the NPO from
Third Division; hence, it should not have been included the merger of the Government Printing Office and the
as a respondent in this petition. relevant printing units of the Philippine Information
Agency (PIA). Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition reads:
is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.
SECTION 6. Creation of the National Printing Office. –
SO ORDERED. There is hereby created a National Printing Office out of
the merger of the Government Printing Office and the
G.R. No. 166620 April 20, 2010 relevant printing units of the Philippine Information
Agency. The Office shall have exclusive printing
ATTY. SYLVIA BANDA, CONSORICIA O. PENSON, jurisdiction over the following:
RADITO V. PADRIGANO, JEAN R. DE MESA, LEAH
P. DELA CRUZ, ANDY V. MACASAQUIT, SENEN B. a. Printing, binding and distribution of all standard and
CORDOBA, ALBERT BRILLANTES, GLORIA BISDA, accountable forms of national, provincial, city and
JOVITA V. CONCEPCION, TERESITA G. CARVAJAL, municipal governments, including government
ROSANNA T. MALIWANAG, RICHARD ODERON, corporations;
CECILIA ESTERNON, BENEDICTO CABRAL, MA.
VICTORIA E. LAROCO, CESAR ANDRA, b. Printing of officials ballots;
FELICISIMO GALACIO, ELSA R. CALMA,
FILOMENA A. GALANG, JEAN PAUL MELEGRITO, c. Printing of public documents such as the Official
CLARO G. SANTIAGO, JR., EDUARDO FRIAS, Gazette, General Appropriations Act, Philippine
REYNALDO O. ANDAL, NEPHTALIE IMPERIO, Reports, and development information materials of the
RUEL BALAGTAS, VICTOR R. ORTIZ, FRANCISCO Philippine Information Agency.
P. REYES, JR., ELISEO M. BALAGOT, JR., JOSE C.
MONSALVE, JR., ARTURO ADSUARA, F.C. The Office may also accept other government printing
LADRERO, JR., NELSON PADUA, MARCELA C. jobs, including government publications, aside from
SAYAO, ANGELITO MALAKAS, GLORIA RAMENTO, those enumerated above, but not in an exclusive basis.
JULIANA SUPLEO, MANUEL MENDRIQUE, E.
TAYLAN, CARMELA BOBIS, DANILO VARGAS, The details of the organization, powers, functions,
ROY-LEO C. PABLO, ALLAN VILLANUEVA, authorities, and related management aspects of the
VICENTE R. VELASCO, JR., IMELDA ERENO, Office shall be provided in the implementing details
which shall be prepared and promulgated in We dismiss the petition.
accordance with Section II of this Executive Order.
Before proceeding to resolve the substantive issues,
The Office shall be attached to the Philippine the Court must first delve into a procedural matter.
Information Agency. Since petitioners instituted this case as a class suit, the
Court, thus, must first determine if the petition indeed
On October 25, 2004, President Arroyo issued the qualifies as one. In Board of Optometry v. Colet,2 we
herein assailed Executive Order No. 378, amending held that "[c]ourts must exercise utmost caution before
Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285 by, inter alia, allowing a class suit, which is the exception to the
removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over the requirement of joinder of all indispensable parties. For
printing services requirements of government agencies while no difficulty may arise if the decision secured is
and instrumentalities. The pertinent portions of favorable to the plaintiffs, a quandary would result if the
Executive Order No. 378, in turn, provide: decision were otherwise as those who were deemed
impleaded by their self-appointed representatives
SECTION 1. The NPO shall continue to provide printing would certainly claim denial of due process."
services to government agencies and instrumentalities
as mandated by law. However, it shall no longer enjoy Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a class
exclusive jurisdiction over the printing services suit, as follows:
requirements of the government over standard and
accountable forms. It shall have to compete with the Sec. 12. Class suit. – When the subject matter of the
private sector, except in the printing of election controversy is one of common or general interest to
paraphernalia which could be shared with the Bangko many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to
Sentral ng Pilipinas, upon the discretion of the join all as parties, a number of them which the court
Commission on Elections consistent with the provisions finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as
of the Election Code of 1987. to fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue or
defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall
SECTION 2. Government agencies/instrumentalities have the right to intervene to protect his individual
may source printing services outside NPO provided interest.
that:
From the foregoing definition, the requisites of a class
2.1 The printing services to be provided by the private suit are: 1) the subject matter of controversy is one of
sector is superior in quality and at a lower cost than common or general interest to many persons; 2) the
what is offered by the NPO; and parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable
to bring them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the
2.2 The private printing provider is flexible in terms of class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of
meeting the target completion time of the government the class and can fully protect the interests of all
agency. concerned.

SECTION 3. In the exercise of its functions, the amount In Mathay v. The Consolidated Bank and Trust
to be appropriated for the programs, projects and Company,3 the Court held that:
activities of the NPO in the General Appropriations Act
(GAA) shall be limited to its income without additional An action does not become a class suit merely because
financial support from the government. (Emphases and it is designated as such in the pleadings. Whether the
underscoring supplied.) suit is or is not a class suit depends upon the attending
facts, and the complaint, or other pleading initiating the
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government class action should allege the existence of the
agencies and instrumentalities are allowed to source necessary facts, to wit, the existence of a subject matter
their printing services from the private sector through of common interest, and the existence of a class and
competitive bidding, subject to the condition that the the number of persons in the alleged class, in order that
services offered by the private supplier be of superior the court might be enabled to determine whether the
quality and lower in cost compared to what was offered members of the class are so numerous as to make it
by the NPO. Executive Order No. 378 also limited impracticable to bring them all before the court, to
NPO’s appropriation in the General Appropriations Act contrast the number appearing on the record with the
to its income. number in the class and to determine whether claimants
on record adequately represent the class and the
Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their subject matter of general or common interest.
security of tenure as employees of the NPO, petitioners (Emphases ours.)
now challenge its constitutionality, contending that: (1) it
is beyond the executive powers of President Arroyo to Here, the petition failed to state the number of NPO
amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 issued by employees who would be affected by the assailed
former President Aquino when the latter still exercised Executive Order and who were allegedly represented
legislative powers; and (2) Executive Order No. 378 by petitioners. It was the Solicitor General, as counsel
violates petitioners’ security of tenure, because it paves for respondents, who pointed out that there were about
the way for the gradual abolition of the NPO. 549 employees in the NPO.4 The 67 petitioners
undeniably comprised a small fraction of the NPO
employees whom they claimed to represent. enactment, as the same was issued while President
Subsequently, 32 of the original petitioners executed an Aquino still had legislative powers under the Freedom
Affidavit of Desistance, while one signed a letter Constitution;11 thus, only Congress through legislation
denying ever signing the petition,5 ostensibly reducing can validly amend Executive Order No. 285.
the number of petitioners to 34. We note that counsel
for the petitioners challenged the validity of the Second, petitioners maintain that the issuance of
desistance or withdrawal of some of the petitioners and Executive Order No. 378 would lead to the eventual
insinuated that such desistance was due to pressure abolition of the NPO and would violate the security of
from people "close to the seat of power."6 Still, even if tenure of NPO employees.
we were to disregard the affidavit of desistance filed by
some of the petitioners, it is highly doubtful that a Anent the first ground raised in the petition, we find the
sufficient, representative number of NPO employees same patently without merit.
have instituted this purported class suit. A perusal of the
petition itself would show that of the 67 petitioners who It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the
signed the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum President has the power to reorganize the offices and
Shopping, only 20 petitioners were in fact mentioned in agencies in the executive department in line with the
the jurat as having duly subscribed the petition before President’s constitutionally granted power of control
the notary public. In other words, only 20 petitioners over executive offices and by virtue of previous
effectively instituted the present case. delegation of the legislative power to reorganize
executive offices under existing statutes.
Indeed, in MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da’wah
Council of the Philippines, Inc.,7 we observed that an In Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora,12 the Court
element of a class suit or representative suit is the pointed out that Executive Order No. 292 or the
adequacy of representation. In determining the question Administrative Code of 1987 gives the President
of fair and adequate representation of members of a continuing authority to reorganize and redefine the
class, the court must consider (a) whether the interest functions of the Office of the President. Section 31,
of the named party is coextensive with the interest of Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the said Code, is
the other members of the class; (b) the proportion of explicit:
those made a party, as it so bears, to the total
membership of the class; and (c) any other factor Sec. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to
bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for Reorganize his Office. – The President, subject to the
the rest of the class. policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have
Previously, we held in Ibañes v. Roman Catholic continuing authority to reorganize the administrative
Church8 that where the interests of the plaintiffs and the structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose,
other members of the class they seek to represent are he may take any of the following actions:
diametrically opposed, the class suit will not prosper.
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of
It is worth mentioning that a Manifestation of the President Proper, including the immediate Offices,
Desistance,9 to which the previously mentioned the President Special Assistants/Advisers System and
Affidavit of Desistance10 was attached, was filed by the the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing,
President of the National Printing Office Workers consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring
Association (NAPOWA). The said manifestation functions from one unit to another;
expressed NAPOWA’s opposition to the filing of the
instant petition in any court. Even if we take into (2) Transfer any function under the Office of the
account the contention of petitioners’ counsel that the President to any other Department or Agency as well as
NAPOWA President had no legal standing to file such transfer functions to the Office of the President from
manifestation, the said pleading is a clear indication that other Departments and Agencies; and
there is a divergence of opinions and views among the
members of the class sought to be represented, and not (3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the
all are in favor of filing the present suit. There is here an President to any other department or agency as well as
apparent conflict between petitioners’ interests and transfer agencies to the Office of the President from
those of the persons whom they claim to represent. other Departments or agencies. (Emphases ours.)
Since it cannot be said that petitioners sufficiently
represent the interests of the entire class, the instant
Interpreting the foregoing provision, we held in Buklod
case cannot be properly treated as a class suit.
ng Kawaning EIIB, thus:

As to the merits of the case, the petition raises two main

But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the
grounds to assail the constitutionality of Executive
President to reorganize any department or agency in
Order No. 378:
the executive branch does not have to end here. We
must not lose sight of the very source of the power –
First, it is contended that President Arroyo cannot that which constitutes an express grant of power. Under
amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 by the mere Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292
issuance of another executive order (Executive Order (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987),
No. 378). Petitioners maintain that former President "the President, subject to the policy in the Executive
Aquino’s Executive Order No. 285 is a legislative
Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and There is a view that the reorganization actions that the
efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to President may take with respect to agencies in the
reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of Office of the President are strictly limited to transfer of
the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the functions and offices as seemingly provided in Section
functions of other Departments or Agencies to the 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Office of the President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre [323
SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that reorganization However, Section 20, Chapter 7, Title I, Book III of the
"involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of same Code significantly provides:
offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or
redundancy of functions." It takes place when there is Sec. 20. Residual Powers. – Unless Congress provides
an alteration of the existing structure of government otherwise, the President shall exercise such other
offices or units therein, including the lines of control, powers and functions vested in the President which are
authority and responsibility between them. The EIIB is a provided for under the laws and which are not
bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It falls specifically enumerated above, or which are not
under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to delegated by the President in accordance with law.
the President’s continuing authority to (Emphasis ours.)
reorganize.13 (Emphasis ours.)
Pursuant to Section 20, the power of the President to
It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part reorganize the Executive Branch under Section 31
of the Office of the Press Secretary (which in various includes such powers and functions that may be
times has been an agency directly attached to the provided for under other laws. To be sure, an inclusive
Office of the Press Secretary or as an agency under the and broad interpretation of the President’s power to
Philippine Information Agency), is part of the Office of reorganize executive offices has been consistently
the President.14 supported by specific provisions in general
appropriations laws.
Pertinent to the case at bar, Section 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 quoted above authorizes In the oft-cited Larin v. Executive Secretary,16 the Court
the President (a) to restructure the internal organization likewise adverted to certain provisions of Republic Act
of the Office of the President Proper, including the No. 7645, the general appropriations law for 1993, as
immediate Offices, the President Special among the statutory bases for the President’s power to
Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff reorganize executive agencies, to wit:
Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or
merging units thereof or transferring functions from one Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that:
unit to another, and (b) to transfer functions or offices
from the Office of the President to any other "Sec. 48. Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities of
Department or Agency in the Executive Branch, and Agencies Within the Executive Branch. — The heads of
vice versa. departments, bureaus and offices and agencies are
hereby directed to identify their respective activities
Concomitant to such power to abolish, merge or which are no longer essential in the delivery of public
consolidate offices in the Office of the President Proper services and which may be scaled down, phased out or
and to transfer functions/offices not only among the abolished, subject to civil [service] rules and regulations.
offices in the Office of President Proper but also the rest x x x. Actual scaling down, phasing out or abolition of
of the Office of the President and the Executive Branch, the activities shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or
the President implicitly has the power to effect less Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of the
radical or less substantive changes to the functional President."
and internal structure of the Office of the President,
including the modification of functions of such executive Said provision clearly mentions the acts of "scaling
agencies as the exigencies of the service may require. down, phasing out and abolition" of offices only and
does not cover the creation of offices or transfer of
In the case at bar, there was neither an abolition of the functions. Nevertheless, the act of creating and
NPO nor a removal of any of its functions to be decentralizing is included in the subsequent provision of
transferred to another agency. Under the assailed Section 62, which provides that:
Executive Order No. 378, the NPO remains the main
printing arm of the government for all kinds of "Sec. 62. Unauthorized organizational changes. —
government forms and publications but in the interest of Unless otherwise created by law or directed by the
greater economy and encouraging efficiency and President of the Philippines, no organizational unit or
profitability, it must now compete with the private sector changes in key positions in any department or agency
for certain government printing jobs, with the exception shall be authorized in their respective organization
of election paraphernalia which remains the exclusive structures and be funded from appropriations by this
responsibility of the NPO, together with the Bangko Act."
Sentral ng Pilipinas, as the Commission on Elections
may determine. At most, there was a mere alteration of The foregoing provision evidently shows that the
the main function of the NPO by limiting the exclusivity President is authorized to effect organizational changes
of its printing responsibility to election forms.15 including the creation of offices in the department or
agency concerned.
The contention of petitioner that the two provisions are comprehensive review of their respective mandates,
riders deserves scant consideration. Well settled is the missions, objectives, functions, programs, projects,
rule that every law has in its favor the presumption of activities and systems and procedures; identify areas
constitutionality. Unless and until a specific provision of where improvements are necessary; and implement
the law is declared invalid and unconstitutional, the corresponding structural, functional and operational
same is valid and binding for all intents and adjustments that will result in streamlined organization
purposes.17 (Emphases ours) and operations and improved performance and
productivity: PROVIDED, That actual streamlining and
Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora,18 where the Court productivity improvements in agency organization and
upheld as valid then President Joseph Estrada’s operations, as authorized by the President of the
Executive Order No. 191 "deactivating" the Economic Philippines for the purpose, including the utilization of
Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) of the savings generated from such activities, shall be in
Department of Finance, hewed closely to the reasoning accordance with the rules and regulations to be issued
in Larin. The Court, among others, also traced from the by the DBM, upon consultation with the Presidential
General Appropriations Act19 the President’s authority Committee on Effective Governance: PROVIDED,
to effect organizational changes in the department or FURTHER, That in the implementation of
agency under the executive structure, thus: organizations/reorganizations, or specific changes in
agency structure, functions and operations as a result
We adhere to the precedent or ruling in Larin that this of institutional strengthening or as mandated by law, the
provision recognizes the authority of the President to appropriation, including the functions, projects,
effect organizational changes in the department or purposes and activities of agencies concerned may be
agency under the executive structure. Such a ruling realigned as may be necessary: PROVIDED, FINALLY,
further finds support in Section 78 of Republic Act No. That any unexpended balances or savings in
8760. Under this law, the heads of departments, appropriations may be made available for payment of
bureaus, offices and agencies and other entities in the retirement gratuities and separation benefits to affected
Executive Branch are directed (a) to conduct a personnel, as authorized under existing laws.
comprehensive review of their respective mandates, (Emphases and underscoring ours.)
missions, objectives, functions, programs, projects,
activities and systems and procedures; (b) identify Implicitly, the aforequoted provisions in the
activities which are no longer essential in the delivery of appropriations law recognize the power of the President
public services and which may be scaled down, to reorganize even executive offices already funded by
phased-out or abolished; and (c) adopt measures that the said appropriations act, including the power to
will result in the streamlined organization and improved implement structural, functional, and operational
overall performance of their respective agencies. adjustments in the executive bureaucracy and, in so
Section 78 ends up with the mandate that the actual doing, modify or realign appropriations of funds as may
streamlining and productivity improvement in agency be necessary under such reorganization. Thus, insofar
organization and operation shall be effected pursuant to as petitioners protest the limitation of the NPO’s
Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by the Office appropriations to its own income under Executive Order
of the President. x x x.20 (Emphasis ours) No. 378, the same is statutorily authorized by the above
provisions.
Notably, in the present case, the 2003 General
Appropriations Act, which was reenacted in 2004 (the In the 2003 case of Bagaoisan v. National Tobacco
year of the issuance of Executive Order No. 378), Administration,21 we upheld the "streamlining" of the
likewise gave the President the authority to effect a National Tobacco Administration through a reduction of
wide variety of organizational changes in any its personnel and deemed the same as included in the
department or agency in the Executive Branch. power of the President to reorganize executive offices
Sections 77 and 78 of said Act provides: granted under the laws, notwithstanding that such
streamlining neither involved an abolition nor a transfer
Section 77. Organized Changes. – Unless otherwise of functions of an office. To quote the relevant portion of
provided by law or directed by the President of the that decision:
Philippines, no changes in key positions or
organizational units in any department or agency shall In the recent case of Rosa Ligaya C. Domingo, et al. vs.
be authorized in their respective organizational Hon. Ronaldo D. Zamora, in his capacity as the
structures and funded from appropriations provided by Executive Secretary, et al., this Court has had occasion
this Act. to also delve on the President’s power to reorganize the
Office of the President under Section 31(2) and (3) of
Section 78. Institutional Strengthening and Productivity Executive Order No. 292 and the power to reorganize
Improvement in Agency Organization and Operations the Office of the President Proper. x x x
and Implementation of Organization/Reorganization
Mandated by Law. The Government shall adopt xxxx
institutional strengthening and productivity improvement
measures to improve service delivery and enhance The first sentence of the law is an express grant to the
productivity in the government, as directed by the President of a continuing authority to reorganize the
President of the Philippines. The heads of departments, administrative structure of the Office of the President.
bureaus, offices, agencies, and other entities of the The succeeding numbered paragraphs are not in the
Executive Branch shall accordingly conduct a nature of provisos that unduly limit the aim and scope of
the grant to the President of the power to reorganize but efficiency." To remain effective and efficient, it must be
are to be viewed in consonance therewith. Section 31(1) capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President
of Executive Order No. 292 specifically refers to the in the manner the Chief Executive deems fit to carry out
President’s power to restructure the internal presidential directives and policies.
organization of the Office of the President Proper, by
abolishing, consolidating or merging units hereof or The Administrative Code provides that the Office of the
transferring functions from one unit to another, while President consists of the Office of the President Proper
Section 31(2) and (3) concern executive offices outside and the agencies under it. The agencies under the
the Office of the President Proper allowing the Office of the President are identified in Section 23,
President to transfer any function under the Office of Chapter 8, Title II of the Administrative Code:
the President to any other Department or Agency
and vice-versa, and the transfer of any agency under Sec. 23. The Agencies under the Office of the
the Office of the President to any other department or President.—The agencies under the Office of the
agency and vice-versa. President refer to those offices placed under the
chairmanship of the President, those under the
In the present instance, involving neither an abolition supervision and control of the President, those
nor transfer of offices, the assailed action is a mere under the administrative supervision of the Office of the
reorganization under the general provisions of the law President, those attached to it for policy and program
consisting mainly of streamlining the NTA in the interest coordination, and those that are not placed by law or
of simplicity, economy and efficiency. It is an act well order creating them under any specific department.
within the authority of the President motivated and
carried out, according to the findings of the appellate xxxx
court, in good faith, a factual assessment that this Court
could only but accept.22 (Emphases and underscoring The power of the President to reorganize the executive
supplied.) department is likewise recognized in general
appropriations laws. x x x.
In the more recent case of Tondo Medical Center
Employees Association v. Court of Appeals,23 which xxxx
involved a structural and functional reorganization of
the Department of Health under an executive order, we Clearly, Executive Order No. 102 is well within the
reiterated the principle that the power of the President constitutional power of the President to issue. The
to reorganize agencies under the executive department President did not usurp any legislative prerogative in
by executive or administrative order is constitutionally issuing Executive Order No. 102. It is an exercise of the
and statutorily recognized. We held in that case: President’s constitutional power of control over the
executive department, supported by the provisions of
This Court has already ruled in a number of cases that the Administrative Code, recognized by other statutes,
the President may, by executive or administrative order, and consistently affirmed by this Court.24 (Emphases
direct the reorganization of government entities under supplied.)
the Executive Department. This is also sanctioned
under the Constitution, as well as other statutes. Subsequently, we ruled in Anak Mindanao Party-List
Group v. Executive Secretary25 that:
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, clearly
states: "[T]he president shall have control of all The Constitution’s express grant of the power of control
executive departments, bureaus and offices." Section in the President justifies an executive action to carry out
31, Book III, Chapter 10 of Executive Order No. 292, reorganization measures under a broad authority of
also known as the Administrative Code of 1987 reads: law.

SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to
Reorganize his Office - The President, subject to the have deliberated with full knowledge of all existing laws
policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve and jurisprudence on the subject. It is thus reasonable
simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have to conclude that in passing a statute which places an
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative agency under the Office of the President, it was in
structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, accordance with existing laws and jurisprudence on the
he may take any of the following actions: President’s power to reorganize.

xxxx In establishing an executive department, bureau or

office, the legislature necessarily ordains an executive
In Domingo v. Zamora [445 Phil. 7 (2003)], this Court agency’s position in the scheme of administrative
explained the rationale behind the President’s structure. Such determination is primary, but subject to
continuing authority under the Administrative Code to the President’s continuing authority to reorganize the
reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of administrative structure. As far as bureaus, agencies or
the President. The law grants the President the power offices in the executive department are concerned, the
to reorganize the Office of the President in recognition power of control may justify the President to deactivate
of the recurring need of every President to reorganize the functions of a particular office. Or a law may
his or her office "to achieve simplicity, economy and expressly grant the President the broad authority to
carry out reorganization measures. The Administrative the Legislature or the constitutionally-created or
Code of 1987 is one such law.26 mandated bodies. Moreover, it must be stressed that
the exercise by the President of the power to reorganize
The issuance of Executive Order No. 378 by President the executive department must be in accordance with
Arroyo is an exercise of a delegated legislative power the Constitution, relevant laws and prevailing
granted by the aforementioned Section 31, Chapter 10, jurisprudence.
Title III, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987,
which provides for the continuing authority of the In this regard, we are mindful of the previous
President to reorganize the Office of the President, "in pronouncement of this Court in Dario v. Mison28 that:
order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency."
This is a matter already well-entrenched in Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded
jurisprudence. The reorganization of such an office as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. As a
through executive or administrative order is also general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good
recognized in the Administrative Code of 1987. faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to make
Sections 2 and 3, Chapter 2, Title I, Book III of the said bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal
Code provide: (in case of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs
because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that
Sec. 2. Executive Orders. - Acts of the President case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be
providing for rules of a general or permanent character that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else but
in implementation or execution of constitutional or a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or
statutory powers shall be promulgated in purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not
executive orders. in good faith, no valid "abolition" takes place and
whatever "abolition" is done, is void ab initio. There is
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. - Acts of the President an invalid "abolition" as where there is merely a change
which relate to particular aspects of governmental of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of
operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative economy are belied by the existence of ample funds.
head shall be promulgated in administrative orders. (Emphasis ours.)
(Emphases supplied.)
Stated alternatively, the presidential power to
To reiterate, we find nothing objectionable in the reorganize agencies and offices in the executive branch
provision in Executive Order No. 378 limiting the of government is subject to the condition that such
appropriation of the NPO to its own income. Beginning reorganization is carried out in good faith.
with Larin and in subsequent cases, the Court has
noted certain provisions in the general appropriations If the reorganization is done in good faith, the abolition
laws as likewise reflecting the power of the President to of positions, which results in loss of security of tenure of
reorganize executive offices or agencies even to the affected government employees, would be valid. In
extent of modifying and realigning appropriations for Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora,29 we even
that purpose. observed that there was no such thing as an absolute
right to hold office. Except those who hold constitutional
Petitioners’ contention that the issuance of Executive offices, which provide for special immunity as regards
Order No. 378 is an invalid exercise of legislative power salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any
on the part of the President has no legal leg to stand on. vested right to an office or salary.30

In all, Executive Order No. 378, which purports to This brings us to the second ground raised in the
institute necessary reforms in government in order to petition – that Executive Order No. 378, in allowing
improve and upgrade efficiency in the delivery of public government agencies to secure their printing
services by redefining the functions of the NPO and requirements from the private sector and in limiting the
limiting its funding to its own income and to transform it budget of the NPO to its income, will purportedly lead to
into a self-reliant agency able to compete with the the gradual abolition of the NPO and the loss of security
private sector, is well within the prerogative of President of tenure of its present employees. In other words,
Arroyo under her continuing delegated legislative power petitioners avow that the reorganization of the NPO
to reorganize her own office. As pointed out in the under Executive Order No. 378 is tainted with bad faith.
separate concurring opinion of our learned colleague, The basic evidentiary rule is that he who asserts a fact
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, the objective or the affirmative of an issue has the burden of proving
behind Executive Order No. 378 is wholly consistent it.31
with the state policy contained in Republic Act No. 9184
or the Government Procurement Reform Act to A careful review of the records will show that petitioners
encourage competitiveness by extending equal utterly failed to substantiate their claim. They failed to
opportunity to private contracting parties who are allege, much less prove, sufficient facts to show that the
eligible and qualified.271avvphi1 limitation of the NPO’s budget to its own income would
indeed lead to the abolition of the position, or removal
To be very clear, this delegated legislative power to from office, of any employee. Neither did petitioners
reorganize pertains only to the Office of the President present any shred of proof of their assertion that the
and the departments, offices and agencies of the changes in the functions of the NPO were for political
executive branch and does not include the Judiciary, considerations that had nothing to do with improving the
efficiency of, or encouraging operational economy in, representative of the private sector.
the said agency. (Emphasis supplied.)

In sum, the Court finds that the petition failed to show Following a painstaking analysis, this Court, in a
any constitutional infirmity or grave abuse of discretion Decision dated July 17, 2012, declared the said practice
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in President of having two representatives from Congress with one
Arroyo’s issuance of Executive Order No. 378. vote each in the JBC unconstitutional. This Court
enunciated that the use of the singular
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and letter "a" preceding "representative of the Congress" in
the prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a the aforequoted provision is unequivocal and leaves no
Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED. No room for any other construction or interpretation. The
costs. same is indicative of the Framers' intent that Congress
may designate only one representative to the JBC. Had
SO ORDERED. it been otherwise, they could have, in no uncertain
terms, so provided. This Court further articulated that in
G.R. No. 228628 the context of JBC representation, the term "Congress"
must be taken to mean the entire legislative department
REP. REYNALDO V. UMALI, in his capacity as as no liaison between the two houses exists in the
Chairman of the House of Representatives workings of the JBC. There is no mechanism required
Committee on Justice and Ex Officio Member of the between the Senate and the House of Representatives
JBC, Petitioner in the screening and nomination of judicial officers.
vs. Moreover, this Court, quoting the keen observation of
THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, chaired by THE Retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Consuelo
HON. MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO, Chief Justice Ynares-Santiago, who is also a JBC Consultant, stated
and Ex Officio Chairperson, Respondent that the ex officio members of the JBC consist of
representatives from the three main branches of
DECISION government, to wit: the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court representing the judiciary, the Secretary of
Justice representing the executive, and a
VELASCO, JR., J.:
representative of the Congress representing the
legislature. It can be deduced therefrom that the
Stare decisis et non quieta movere. This principle of
unmistakable tenor of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
adherence to precedents has not lost its luster and
1987 Constitution was to treat each ex officio member
continues to guide the bench in keeping with the need
as representing one co-equal branch of government
to maintain stability in the law.1
having equal say in the choice of judicial nominees.
Now, to allow the legislature to have more than one
This Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule
representative in the JBC would negate the principle of
65 of the Rules of Court filed directly with this Court by equality among these three branches of the
herein petitioner Rep. Reynaldo V. Umali, current Chair government, which is enshrined in the Constitution.3
of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice,
impugns the present-day practice of six-month
The subsequent motion for reconsideration thereof was
rotational representation of Congress in the Judicial and
denied in a Resolution dated April 16, 2013, where this
Bar Council (JBC) for it unfairly deprives both Houses of
Court reiterated that Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
Congress of their full participation in the said body. The
1987 Constitution providing for "a representative of the
aforementioned practice was adopted by the JBC in
Congress" in the JBC is clear and unambiguous and
light of the ruling in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council.2
does not need any further interpretation. Besides, this
Court is not convinced that the Framers simply failed to
As an overview, in Chavez, the constitutionality of the
adjust the aforesaid constitutional provision, by sheer
practice of having two representatives from both inadvertence, to their decision to shift to a bicameral
houses of Congress with one vote each in the JBC, thus, form of legislature. Even granting that there was, indeed,
increasing its membership from seven to eight, was
such omission, this Court cannot supply the same.
challenged. With that, this Court examined the Following the rule of casus omissus, that is, a case
constitutional provision that states the composition of omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted, this Court
the JBC, that is, Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 cannot under its power of interpretation supply the
Constitution, which reads: omission even if the same may have resulted from
inadvertence or it was not foreseen or contemplated for
SECTION 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar to do so would amount to judicial legislation. Ergo, this
Council is hereby created under the Court has neither power nor authority to add another
supervision of the Supreme Court member in the JBC simply by judicial construction.4
composed of the Chief Justice as ex
officio Chairman, the Secretary of In light of these Decision and Resolution, both Houses
Justice, and a representative of the of Congress agreed on a six-month rotational
Congress as ex officio Members, a
representation in the JBC, wherein the House of
representative of the Integrated Bar, a Representatives will represent Congress from January
professor of law, a retired Member of to June and the Senate from July to December.5This is
the Supreme Court, and a now the current practice in the JBC. It is by reason of
this arrangement that the votes cast by the petitioner for JBC PROCEEDINGS AND ALL
the selection of nominees for the vacancies of then APPOINTMENTS TO THE JUDICIAL
retiring Supreme Court Associate Justices Jose P. DEPARTMENT, INCLUDING AND
Perez (Perez) and Arturo Brion (Brion) were not PARTICULARLY [TIDS COURT].
counted by the JBC during its En Banc deliberations
held last December 2 and 9, 2016. Instead, the A. THE BICAMERAL
petitioner's votes were simply placed in an envelope NATURE OF THE
and sealed subject to any further disposition as this LEGISLATIVE
Court may direct in a proper proceeding.6 This is the DEPARTMENT WAS
root of the present controversy that prompted the BELATEDLY DECIDED
petitioner to file the instant Petition for Certiorari and UNDER THE 1987
Mandamus based on the following grounds: CONSTITUTION, BUT
MUST BE DEEMED AS
I. INCORPORATED AND
MODIFYING THE JBC
THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS STRUCTURE UNDER
PROPER TO ENJOIN THE JBC TO SECTION 8(1)[,]
CORRECT ITS UNWARRANTED ARTICLE VIII OF THE
DENIAL OF THE VOTES [1987] CONSTITUTION,
REGISTERED BY [HEREIN TO GIVE FULL
PETITIONER] DURING THE EN BANC MEANING TO THE
DELIBERATIONS ON DECEMBER 2 INTENT OF ITS
AND 9, 2016 BECAUSE THE FRAMERS.
DECISION IN THE CHAVEZ CASE IS
DEFECTIVE/FLA WED. B. THERE WAS A
CLEAR OVERSIGHT
II. AND TECHNICAL
OMISSION INVOLVING
THE WRIT OF MANDAMUS IS SECTIONS 8(1)[,]
PROPER TO MANDATE THE JBC TO ARTICLE VIII OF THE
ACCEPT/COUNT SAID VOTES CAST [1987] CONSTITUTION
BY [PETITIONER] BECAUSE THE THAT SHOULD BE
RECONSTITUTION OF THE JBC IS RECTIFIED BY [TIDS
DEFECTIVE/FLA WED AND COURT].
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
C. THE FULL
III. REPRESENTATION OF
CONGRESS IN THE
THE PRESENT PRACTICE OF THE JBC IS POSSIBLE
JBC IN ALLOWING ONLY ONE ONLY WITH
REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE PARTICIPATING AND
SENATE OR THE HOUSE OF VOTING FROM
[REPRESENTATIVES] TO REPRESENTATIVES
PARTICIPATE AND VOTE ON A [6- FROM THE TWO
MONTH] ROTATION BASIS IS INDEPENDENT
IMPRACTICABLE, ABSURD AND CHAMBERS,
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, CREATES AN OTHERWISE THE JBC
[INSTITUTIONAL] IMBALANCE PROCEEDINGS ARE
BETWEEN THE TWO INDEPENDENT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
CHAMBERS OF CONGRESS, AND
INSTITUTES AN INHERENT AND D. THE PRESENCE OF
CONTINUING CONSTITUTIONAL THE SENATE AND
DEFECT IN THE PROCEEDINGS OF [THE] HOUSE OF
THE JBC THAT ADVERSELY REPRESENTATIVES
AFFECTS APPOINTMENTS TO THE MEMBERS IN THE JBC
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, INCLUDING UPHOLDS THE
AND PARTICULARLY [THIS COURT]. CO-EQUAL
REPRESENTATION IN
IV. THE COUNCIL OF THE
THREE MAIN
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION CLEARLY BRANCHES OF
GOVERNMENT. 7
REQUIRES PARTICIPATION AND
VOTING BY REPRESENTATIVES
FROM THE SENATE AND THE As instructed by this Court,8 both Houses of Congress,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN through the Manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), which acts as the People's Tribune in would not pose any problem since the voting in the JBC
this case, and the JBC commented on the Petition. is not through a "yes" or a "no" vote.15

The OSG wants this Court to revisit Chavez for its As its final argument, the OSG maintains that while
alleged unexecutability arising from constitutional Congress' participation in the JBC may be
constraints. It holds that the current practice of alternate non-legislative, still, the involvement of both Houses of
representation was only arrived at because of time Congress in its every proceeding is indispensable, as
constraints and difficulty in securing the agreement of each House represents different constituencies and
both Houses of Congress.9 And, since the Constitution would necessarily bring a unique perspective to the
itself did not clearly state who is the Congress' recommendation process of the JBC.16
representative in the JBC, the provision, therefore,
regarding the latter's composition must be harmonized For its part, the JBC vehemently pleads that the present
to give effect to the current bicameral system.10 With Petition be dismissed as its adopted rotational scheme
this in view, the OSG believes that it is only proper for and the necessary consequences thereof are not the
both Houses of Congress to be given equal proper subjects of a certiorari and even a mandamus
representation in the JBC as neither House can bind petition for the same do not involve an exercise of
the other for there can be no single member of either judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. Apart
House who can fully represent the entire legislature for from that, it committed no grave abuse of discretion in
to do so would definitely result in absurdity.11 refusing to recognize, accept and count the petitioner's
votes during its En Banc deliberations last December 2
Further, the OSG avers that Chavez's strict and 9, 2016 for it merely acted in accordance with the
interpretation of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and with the ruling in Chavez. More so,
Constitution violates the very essence of bicameralism there is no showing that the petitioner has no plain,
and sets aside the inherent dichotomy between the two speedy and adequate remedy other than this Petition
Houses of Congress.12 To note, a JBC member's votes for nowhere herein did he assert that he exerted all
are reflective of the position and the interest such efforts to have his concern addressed by Congress,
member wants to uphold, such that when the such as asking the latter to repudiate the rotational
representatives from each House of Congress vote for arrangement. Thus, for the petitioner's failure to
a certain judicial nominee, they carry the interests and exhaust all remedies available to him in Congress, he
views of the group they represent. Thus, when only one deprived the latter of an opportunity to address the
would represent both Houses of Congress in the JBC, matter. Also, the practice and acquiescence of both
the vote would not be representative of the interests Houses of Congress to such an arrangement operates
embodied by the Congress as a whole.13 as an estoppel against any member thereof to deny its
validity. As regards a writ of mandamus, it cannot be
In the same way, the OSG contends that the bicameral issued to compel the JBC to count the petitioner's votes
nature of the legislature strictly adheres to the distinct for it will not lie to control the performance of a
and separate personality of both Houses of Congress; discretionary act.17
thus, no member of Congress can represent the entire
Congress. Besides, the phrase "a representative of the The JBC further enunciates that the petitioner has
Congress" in Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 no locus standi to institute this Petition in his capacity
Constitution is qualified by the phrase "ex officio as Chairman of the House of Representatives
members." The ex officio nature of the position derives Committee on Justice and Ex Officio Member of the
its authority from the principal office. It, thus, follows JBC without the requisite resolution from both Houses
that each house of Congress must be represented in of Congress authorizing him to sue as a member
the JBC.14 thereof, which absence is a fatal defect rendering this
Petition dismissible.18
Also, the OSG states that the constitutional intent in
creating the JBC is to ensure community representation In the same vein, the JBC asseverates that this Petition
from the different sectors of society, as well as from the should also be dismissed as the allegations herein are
three branches of government, and to eliminate mere rehash of the arguments and dissents
partisan politics in the selection of members of the in Chavez, which have already been exhaustively
judiciary. The focus, therefore, is more on proper litigated and settled therein by this Court, more in
representation rather than qualitative limitation. It even particular, the interpretation of Section 8(1), Article VIII
insists that when the Framers deliberated on Section of the 1987 Constitution, hence, barred by the doctrine
8(1 ), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, they were still of stare decisis. Similarly, there exists no substantial
thinking of a unicameral legislature, thereby, giving reason or even supervening event or material change of
Congress only one representative to the JBC. However, circumstances that warrants Chavez's reversal.19
with the shift from unicameralism to bicameralism, "a
representative of the Congress" in the JBC should now The JBC likewise insists that it was the intent of the
be understood to mean one representative from each Framers of the Constitution for the JBC to have only
House of Congress. For had it been the intention of the seven members. The reason for that was laid down
Framers for the JBC to be composed only of seven in Chavez, that is, to provide a solution should there be
members, they would have specified the numbers just a stalemate in the voting. As to the alleged oversight
like in the other constitutional provisions. As such, the and technical omission of the Framers in changing the
membership in the JBC should not be limited to seven provision on the JBC to reflect the bicameral nature of
members. More so, an eventual deadlock in the voting Congress, these are flimsy excuses to override the
clear provision of the Constitution and to disturb settled formula that can automatically dissuade the courts from
jurisprudence. As explained in Chavez, Congress' resolving a case. Courts will still decide cases otherwise,
membership in the JBC was not in the interest of a moot and academic if: (1) there is a grave violation of
certain constituency but in reverence to it as a major the Constitution; (2) the exceptional character of the
branch of government.20 situation and the paramount public interest is involved;
(3) when the constitutional issue raised requires
Last of all, the JBC holds that should this Petition be formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
granted, there would be an imbalance in favor of the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of
Congress with respect to the representation in the JBC repetition yet evading review.23Considering that all the
of the three main and co-equal branches of the arguments herein once again boil down to the proper
government. For the unmistakable tenor of Section 8(1), interpretation of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution was to treat each ex Constitution on congressional representation in the JBC,
officio member as representing one co-equal branch of this Court deems it proper to proceed on deciding this
government. And, even assuming that the current Petition despite its mootness to settle the matter once
six-month rotational scheme in the JBC created an and for all.
imbalance between the two Houses of Congress, it is
not within the power of this Court or the JBC to remedy Having said that, this Court shall now resolve the issues
such imbalance. For the remedy lies in the amendment in seriatim.
of this constitutional provision.21
On petitioner's locus standi. The petitioner brings this
Given the foregoing arguments, the issues ought to be suit in his capacity as the current Chairman of the
addressed by this Court can be summed up into: (1) House of Representatives Committee on Justice
whether the petitioner has locus standi to file this and Ex Officio Member of the JBC. His legal standing
Petition even without the requisite resolution from both was challenged by the JBC for lack of an enabling
Houses of Congress permitting him to do so; (2) resolution for that purpose coming from both Houses of
whether the petitioner's direct resort to this Court via a Congress.
Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus is the plain,
speedy and adequate remedy available to him to assail Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal
the JBC's adoption of the rotational representation and substantial interest in a case such that the party
leading to the non-counting of his votes in its En Banc has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016; (3) whether the challenged governmental act. It requires a personal
the JBC acted with grave abuse of discretion in stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the
adopting the six-month rotational scheme of both concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
Houses of Congress resulting in the non-counting of the of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
petitioner's votes in its En Banc deliberations last illumination of difficult constitutional questions.24 With
December 2 and 9, 2016; (4) whether the JBC can be that definition, therefore, a party will be allowed to
compelled through mandamus to count the petitioner's litigate only when he can demonstrate that (1) he has
votes in its En Banc deliberations last December 2 and personally suffered some actual or threatened injury
9, 2016; and (4) whether this Court's ruling because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
in Chavez applies as stare decisis to the present case. government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be
Before delving into the above-stated issues, this Court redressed by the remedy being sought.25Otherwise,
would like to note that this Petition was primarily filed he/she would not be allowed to litigate. Nonetheless, in
because of the non-counting of the petitioner's votes in a long line of cases, concerned citizens, taxpayers and
the JBC En Banc deliberations last December 2 and 9, legislators when specific requirements have been met
2016 held for the purpose of determining, among others, have been given standing by this Court. This was
who will be the possible successors of the then retiring succinctly explained in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court Perez and Representatives, thus:
Brion, whose retirements were set on December 14 and
29, 2016, respectively. The list of nominees will then be When suing as a citizen, the interest of
forwarded to the President as the appointing authority. the petitioner assailing the
With the appointments of Associate Justices Samuel R. constitutionality of a statute must be
Martires (Martires) and Noel G. Tijam (Tijam) on March direct and personal. He must be able to
2 and 8, 2017, respectively, this Petition has now been show, not only that the law or any
rendered moot insofar as the petitioner's prayers to (1) government act is invalid, but also that
reverse and set aside the JBC En Banc deliberations he sustained or is in imminent danger of
last December 2 and 9, 2016; and (2) direct the JBC to sustaining some direct injury as a result
count his votes therein as its ex officio member,22 are of its enforcement, and not merely that
concerned. he suffers thereby in some indefinite
way. It must appear that the person
As a rule, courts do not entertain moot questions. An complaining has been or is about to be
issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases to denied some right or privilege to which
present a justiciable controversy so that a declaration he is lawfully entitled or that he is about
on the issue would be of no practical use or value. This to be subjected to some burdens or
notwithstanding, the Court in a number of cases held penalties by reason of the statute or act
that the moot and academic principle is not a magical complained of. In fine, when the
 proceeding involves the assertion of a particularly Section 55,
public right, the mere fact that he is a of the General
citizen satisfies the requirement of Appropriation Bill of
personal interest. 1989 (H.B. No. 19186)
and For Other
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed Purposes.
to sue where there is a claim that public
funds are illegally disbursed, or that In the United States, the legal standing
public money is being deflected to any of a House of Congress to sue has been
improper purpose, or that there is a recognized (citation omitted).
wastage of public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or While the petition in G.R. No. 113174
unconstitutional law. Before he can was filed by 16 Senators, including the
invoke the power of judicial review, Senate President and the Chairman of
however, he must specifically prove that the Committee on Finance, the suit was
he has sufficient interest in preventing not authorized by the Senate itself.
the illegal expenditure of money raised Likewise, the petitions in G.R. Nos.
by taxation and that he would sustain a 113766 and 113888 were filed without
direct injury as a result of the an enabling resolution for the purpose.
enforcement of the questioned statute
or contract. It is not sufficient that he Therefore, the question of the legal
has merely a general interest common standing of petitioners in the three
to all members of the public. cases becomes a preliminary issue
before this Court can inquire into the
xxxx validity of the presidential veto and the
conditions for the implementation of
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue some items in the GAA of 1994.
to question the validity of any official
action which he claims infringes his We rule that a member of the Senate,
prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a and of the House of Representatives for
member of the House of that matter, has the legal standing to
Representatives has standing to question the validity of a presidential
maintain inviolate the prerogatives, veto or a condition imposed on an item
powers and privileges vested by the in an appropriation bill.
Constitution in his office.26 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied.) Where the veto is claimed to have been
made without or in excess of the
The legal standing of each member of Congress was authority vested on the President by the
also upheld in Philippine Constitution Association v. Constitution, the issue of an
Enriquez,27 where this Court pronounced that: impermissible intrusion of the Executive
into the domain of the Legislature arises
The legal standing of the Senate, as an (citation omitted).
institution, was recognized in Gonzales
v. Macaraig, Jr. (citation omitted). In To the extent the powers of Congress
said case, 23 Senators, comprising the are impaired, so is the power of each
entire membership of the Upper House member thereof, since his office confers
of Congress, filed a petition to nullify the a right to participate in the exercise of
presidential veto of Section 55 of the the powers of that institution (citation
GAA of 1989. The filing of the suit was omitted).
authorized by Senate Resolution No.
381, adopted on February 2, 1989, and An act of the Executive which injures
which reads as follows: the institution of Congress causes a
derivative but nonetheless substantial
Authorizing and injury, which can be questioned by a
Directing the Committee member of Congress (citation omitted).
on Finance to Bring in In such a case, any member of
the Name of the Senate Congress can have a resort to the
of the Philippines the courts.
Proper Suit with the
Supreme Court of the Former Chief Justice Enrique M.
Philippines contesting Fernando, as Amicus Curiae, noted:
the Constitutionality of
the Veto by the This is, then, the
President of Special and clearest case of the
General Provisions, Senate as a whole or
 individual Senators as Generally, the writ of certiorari can only be availed of in
such having a the absence of an appeal or any plain, speedy and
substantial interest in adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
the question at issue. It In Bordomeo v. Court of Appeals, however, this Court
could likewise be said clarified that it is inadequacy that must usually
that there was the determine the propriety of certiorari and not the mere
requisite injury to their absence of all other remedies and the danger of failure
rights as Senators. It of justice without the writ. A remedy is considered plain,
would then be futile to speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the
raise any locus petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment,
standi issue. Any order, or resolution of the lower court or agency.29
intrusion into the domain
appertaining to the In the same way, as a matter of policy, direct resort to
Senate is to be resisted. this Court will not be entertained unless the redress
Similarly, if the situation desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower
were reversed, and it is courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances,
the Executive Branch such as in cases involving national interest and those of
that could allege a serious implications, justify the availment of the
transgression, its extraordinary remedy of the writ of certiorari, calling for
officials could likewise the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.30 In The Diocese
file the corresponding of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections,31 and again
action. What cannot be in Maza v. Turla,32this Court took pains in enumerating
denied is that a Senator the circumstances that would warrant a direct resort to
has standing to maintain this Court, to wit: (1) when there are genuine issues of
inviolate the constitutionality that must be addressed at the most
prerogatives, powers immediate time; (2) when the issues involved are of
and privileges vested by transcendental importance; (3) cases of first impression
the Constitution in his as no jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower
office (citation courts on this matter; (4) the constitutional issues raised
omitted).28 (Emphases are better decided by this court; (5) the time element
and underscoring presented in this case cannot be ignored; (6) the filed
supplied.) petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ; (7)
petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain,
It is clear therefrom that each member of Congress has speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
a legal standing to sue even without an enabling law; and (8) the petition includes questions that are
resolution for that purpose so long as the questioned dictated by public welfare and the advancement of
acts invade the powers, prerogatives and privileges of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of
Congress. Otherwise stated, whenever the acts affect justice, or the orders complained of were found to be
the powers, prerogatives and privileges of Congress, patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly
anyone of its members may validly bring an action to an inappropriate remedy.33
challenge the same to safeguard and maintain the
sanctity thereof. Here, while this Court agrees with the JBC that the
petitioner's preliminary remedy to question the
With the foregoing, this Court sustains the petitioner's rotational arrangement of Congress is to ask the latter
legal standing as Member of the House of to repudiate the same, this, however, cannot be
Representatives and as the Chairman of its Committee considered plain, speedy and adequate. This Court is,
on Justice to assail the alternate representation of thus, inclined to sustain the petitioner's direct resort to
Congress in the JBC, which arrangement led to the this Court not only because it is the plain, speedy and
non-counting of his votes in its En Banc deliberations adequate remedy available to him but also by reason of
last December 2 and 9, 2016, as it allegedly affects the constitutional issues involved herein and the
adversely Congress' prerogative to be fully represented urgency of the matter. As correctly pointed out by the
before the said body. OSG, the Constitution mandates that any vacancy to
the office of an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
On petitioner's direct resort to this Court must be filled up within the 90-day period from its
via certiorari petition. The JBC questions the propriety occurrence. Therefore, the JBC must submit the list of
of the petitioner's direct resort to this Court via the nominees prior to the start of that period. As the
present Petition to assail its adoption of the rotational nominations covered by the questioned December
representation of Congress resulting in the 2016 JBC En Banc deliberations were intended for
non-counting of his votes in its En Banc deliberations vacancies created by then Associate Justices Perez
last December 2 and 9, 2016. The JBC insists that the and Brion, who respectively retired last December 14
said scheme was a creation of Congress itself; as such, and 29, 2016, hence, any resort to Congress during that
the petitioner's plain, speedy and adequate remedy is to time would already be inadequate since the JBC list of
appeal to Congress to repudiate the same. Direct resort nominees would be submitted any moment to the Office
to this Court should not be allowed if there is a remedy of the President for the appointment of the next
available to the petitioner before Congress. Associate Justices of the Supreme Court. Since time is
of the essence, the petitioner's direct resort to this Court the JBC abuse its discretion in adopting the six-month
is warranted. rotational arrangement and in not counting the votes of
the petitioner? This Court answers in the negative. As
On the alleged grave abuse of discretion of the JBC in correctly pointed out by the JBC, in adopting the said
adopting the rotational representation of Congress arrangement, it merely acted pursuant to the
correctible by certiorari. The petitioner ascribed grave Constitution and the Chavez ruling, which both require
abuse of discretion on the part of the JBC in its adoption only one representative from Congress in the JBC. It
of the rotational scheme, which led to the non-counting cannot, therefore, be faulted for simply complying with
of his votes in its En Banc deliberations last December the Constitution and jurisprudence. Moreover, said
2 and 9, 2016, as it deprives Congress of its full arrangement was crafted by both Houses of Congress
representation therein. The JBC, on the other hand, and the JBC merely adopted the same. By no stretch of
believes otherwise for it merely acted in accordance imagination can it be regarded as grave abuse of
with the mandate of the Constitution and with the ruling discretion on the part of the JBC.
in Chavez. Also, such rotational scheme was a creation
of Congress, which it merely adopted. With the foregoing, despite this Court's previous
declaration that certiorari is the plain, speedy and
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the present adequate remedy available to petitioner, still the same
Rules of Court are the two special civil actions used for cannot prosper for the petitioner's failure to prove that
determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion the JBC acted with grave abuse of discretion in
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The sole adopting the rotational scheme.
office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of
jurisdiction, which necessarily includes the commission On the propriety of mandamus. It is essential to the
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant has a
jurisdiction.34 The burden is on the petitioner to prove clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be
that the respondent tribunal committed not merely a the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act
reversible error but also a grave abuse of discretion required. The burden is on the petitioner to show that
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Showing there is such a clear legal right to the performance of
mere abuse of discretion is not enough, for the abuse the act, and a corresponding compelling duty on the
must be shown to be grave. Grave abuse of discretion part of the respondent to perform the act. As an
means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power extraordinary writ, it lies only to compel an officer
was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary
reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the one.37 A clear line demarcates a discretionary act from
respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive a ministerial one. A purely ministerial act is one which
duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts,
to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of
tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his
powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the
be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.35 act done.38 On the other hand, if the law imposes a duty
upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide
But, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is
necessarily broader in scope and reach before this discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial
Court as the writs may be issued to correct errors of only when the discharge of the same requires neither
jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, the exercise of official discretion or judgment.39 Clearly,
board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or the use of discretion and the performance of a
ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and ministerial act are mutually exclusive. Further, the writ
restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting of mandamus does not issue to control or review the
to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or exercise of discretion or to compel a course of
instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter conduct.40
does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions. Thus, they are appropriate remedies to raise In the case at bench, the counting of votes in the
constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or selection of the nominees to the judiciary may only be
nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.36 considered a ministerial duty of the JBC if such votes
were cast by its rightful members and not by someone,
Here, it is beyond question that the JBC does not fall like the petitioner, who is not considered a member
within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer during the En Banc deliberations last December 2 and 9,
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial 2016. For during the questioned period, the lawful
functions.1âwphi1 Neither did it act in any judicial or representative of Congress to the JBC is a member of
quasi-judicial capacity nor did it assume any the Senate and not of the House of Representatives as
performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative in per their agreed rotational scheme. Considering that a
adopting the rotational scheme of Congress, which was member of the Senate already cast his vote therein, the
the reason for not counting the votes of the petitioner in JBC has the full discretion not to count the votes of the
its En Banc deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016. petitioner for it is mandated by both the Constitution and
But, despite this, its act is still not beyond this Court's jurisprudence to maintain that Congress will only have
reach as the same is correctible by certiorari if it is one representative in the JBC. As the act of the JBC
tainted with grave abuse of discretion even if it is not involves a discretionary one, accordingly, mandamus
exercising judicial and quasi-judicial functions. Now, did will not lie.
On the application of Chavez as stare decisis in this this Court would be immeasurably affected and the
case. The petitioner strongly maintains public's confidence in the stability of the solemn
that Chavez must be revisited and reversed due to its pronouncements diminished." Verily, only upon
unexecutability. But the JBC insists that the arguments showing that circumstances attendant in a particular
herein are mere rehash of those in Chavez, hence, case override the great benefits derived by our judicial
already barred by the doctrine of stare decisis. Also, system from the doctrine of stare decisis, can the courts
there is no cogent reason for Chavez's reversal. be justified in setting aside the same.41

This Court takes another glance at the arguments Here, the facts are exactly the same as
in Chavez and compares them with the present in Chavez, where this Court has already settled the
arguments of the petitioner. A careful perusal, however, issue of interpretation of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
reveals that, although the petitioner questioned the 1987 Constitution. Truly, such ruling may not be
JBC's adoption of the six-month rotational unanimous, but it is undoubtedly a reflection of the
representation of Congress leading to the non-counting wisdom of the majority of members of this Court on that
of his votes in its En Banc deliberations last December matter. Chavez cannot simply be regarded as an
2 and 9, 2016, the supporting arguments hereof still boil erroneous application of the questioned constitutional
down to the proper interpretation of Section 8(1), Article provision for it merely applies the clear mandate of the
VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Hence, being mere rehash law, that is, Congress is entitled to only one
of the arguments in Chavez, the application of the representative in the JBC in the same way that its
doctrine of stare decisis in this case is inevitable. More co-equal branches are.
so, the petitioner failed to present strong and
compelling reason not to rule this case in the same way As this Court declared in Chavez, Section 8(1), Article
that this Court ruled Chavez. VIII of the 1987 Constitution is clear, categorical and
unambiguous. Thus, it needs no further construction or
As stated in the beginning of this ponencia, stare interpretation. Time and time again, it has been
decisis et non quieta movere is a doctrine which means repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law
to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things speaks in clear and categorical language, there is
which are established. This is embodied in Article 8 of no room for interpretation, only application.42 The
the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides, thus: wordings of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution are to be considered as indicative of the
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or final intent of its Framers, that is, for Congress as a
interpreting the laws or the Constitution whole to only have one representative to sit in the JBC.
shall form a part of the legal system of This Court, therefore, cannot simply make an
the Philippines. assumption that the Framers merely by oversight failed
to take into account the bicameral nature of Congress in
The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents drafting the same. As further laid down in Chavez, the
and requires courts in a country to follow the rule Framers were not keen on adjusting the provision on
established in a decision of the Supreme Court thereof. congressional representation in the JBC as it was not in
That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be the exercise of its primary function, which is to legislate.
followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. Notably, the JBC was created to support the executive
The doctrine is based on the principle that once a power to appoint, and Congress, as one whole body,
question of law bas been examined and decided, it was merely assigned a contributory non-legislative
should be deemed settled and closed to further function. No parallelism can be drawn between the
argument. The same is grounded on the necessity for representative of Congress in the JBC and the exercise
securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus, by Congress of its legislative powers under Article VI
time and again, the court has held that it is a very and constituent powers under Article XVII of the
desirable and necessary judicial practice that when a Constitution. Congress, in relation to the executive and
court bas laid down a principle of law as applicable to a judicial branches of government, is constitutionally
certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and treated as another co-equal branch in the matter of its
apply it to all future cases in which the facts are JBC representation.43
substantially the same. It simply means that for the
sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case This Court cannot succumb to the argument that
should be applied to those that follow if the facts are Congress, being composed of two distinct and separate
substantially the same, even though the parties may be chambers, cannot represent each other in the JBC.
different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice Again, as this Court explained in Chavez, such an
that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, argument is misplaced because in the JBC, any
like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the
same questions relating to the same event have been House of Representatives, is constitutionally
put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a empowered to represent the entire Congress. It may be
previous case litigated and decided by a competent a constricted constitutional authority, but it is not an
court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to absurdity. To broaden the scope of congressional
relitigate the same issue. The doctrine has assumed representation in the JBC is tantamount to the inclusion
such value in our judicial system that the Court has of a subject matter which was not included in the
ruled that " [a]bandonment thereof must be based only provision as enacted. True to its constitutional mandate,
on strong and compelling reasons, otherwise, the the Court cannot craft and tailor constitutional
becoming virtue of predictability which is expected from provisions in order to accommodate all situations no
matter how ideal or reasonable the proposed solution
may sound. To the exercise of this intrusion, the Court
declines.44

While it is true that Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987

Constitution did not explicitly state that the JBC shall be
composed of seven members, however, the same is
implied in the enumeration of who will be the members
thereof. And though it is unnecessary for the JBC
composition to be an odd number as no tie-breaker is
needed in the preparation of a shortlist since judicial
nominees are not decided by a "yes" or "no" vote, still,
JBC's membership cannot be increased from seven to
eight for it will be a clear violation of the aforesaid
constitutional provision. To add another member in the
JBC or to increase the representative of Congress to
the JBC, the remedy is not judicial but constitutional
amendment.

In sum, this Court will not overthrow Chavez for it is in

accord with the constitutional mandate of giving
Congress "a representative" in the JBC. In the same
manner, the adoption of the rotational scheme will not in
any way deprive Congress of its full participation in the
JBC for such an arrangement is also in line with that
constitutional mandate.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant

Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.