[G.R. No. 10678. August 17, 1915.

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MANUEL BAUTISTA, Defendant-

Appellant.

Mauricio Ilagan for Appellant.

Attorney-General Avanceña for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. RESISTANCE TO AGENTS OF THE AUTHORITIES; RESISTING ARREST. — One

who resists an arrest, without knowing that the person or persons who are attempting to
make the arrest are vested with authority, but who submits to the arrest immediately
upon being informed that such persons have a right to make the arrest, is not guilty of
the crime of resistance to the agents of the authorities.

DECISION

JOHNSON, J. :

This defendant was charged with the crime of assault upon agents of the authorities and
insulting them. Upon said complaint the defendant was arrested, arraigned, tried, found
guilty, .and sentenced by the Honorable Vicente Nepomuceno to be imprisoned for a
period of four years two months and one day of prision correccional, with the accessory
penalties of article 61 of the Penal Code, to pay a fine of P300, and in case of
insolvency to suffer subsidiary imprisonment, in accordance with the provisions of the
law, and to pay the costs. From that sentence the defendant appealed to this court.

In this court the appellant alleges that the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause
was not sufficient to show that he was guilty of the crime charged in the complaint.

The record shows that some time in the month of November, 1914, an order of arrest
was issued for the defendant and placed in the hands of the chief of police of the
municipality of Gerona. On or about the 15th of November, the chief of police,
accompanied by another policeman, went to the house where the defendant was
staying for the purpose of making the arrest. Upon arrival at the house, inquiry was
made of some of the occupants whether or not the defendant was there. Upon being
informed that he was in the house, the policeman who accompanied the chief of police
entered the house without permission and attempted to arrest the defendant without
explaining to him the cause or nature of his presence there. The defendant, according
to the declaration of the chief of police, resisted the arrest, calling to his neighbors for
assistance, using the following language: "Come here; there are some bandits here and
they are abusing me." Many of his neighbors, hearing his cry, according to the
testimony of the chief of police, immediately came to his assistance and surrounded his
house.

The policeman, who accompanied the chief, in his declaration said that when he
attempted to arrest the defendant, the defendant said to him: "Why do you enter my
house, you shameless brigands?" and called to one Basilio,
saying:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"There are some bandits here!"

The policeman further testified that he then informed the defendant that he came there
for the purpose of arresting him, and the defendant asked him if he had an order of
arrest, which question was answered by the policeman in the affirmative. Said
policeman further testified that immediately after he had notified the defendant that he
was a policeman and had an order of arrest, the defendant submitted to the arrest
without further resistance or objection.

The whole record shows that the resistance given by the defendant was done under the
belief that the persons who had entered his house were tulisanes. The record also
shows, by the declaration of the witnesses for the prosecution, that as soon as he had
been informed that they were officers of the law, armed with an order of arrest, he
peaceably submitted and accompanied them. We do not believe that the- law
contemplates the punishment of persons for resistance of the authorities under
circumstances such as those which are disclosed in the present case. If the defendant
believed that those who had entered his house were, in fact, tulisanes, he was entirely
justified in calling his neighbors and in making an attempt to expel them from his
premises.

After a careful examination of the evidence, we are of the opinion that the record does
not disclose sufficient facts to justify the sentence imposed by the lower court. The
defendant is not guilty of the crime described in the complaint. The sentence of the
lower court is therefore hereby revoked, the complaint is hereby ordered dismissed, and
the defendant is discharged from the custody of the law. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-24978 March 27, 1926

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FERNANDO DE FERNANDO, defendant-appellant.

W. A. Armstrong for appellant.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

VILLA-REAL, J.:

This appeal has been taken by the defendant Fernando de Fernando from the judgment
of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, in which he was held guilty of the crime of
murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of twenty years cadena temporal, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Buenventura Paulino in the sum of P1,000 and to
pay the costs, by virtue of a complaint filed by the fiscal charging with the said crime.

As a basis for his appeal the accused assigns the following errors as committed by the
trial court: (1) in holding that the acts committed by the accused constituted the crime
for murder; (2) in not holding that the accused was exempt from criminal liability and in
not acquitting him.

At the trial the following facts were proven beyond a reasonable doubt: Before the day
of the crime several Moro prisoners had escaped from the Penal Colony of San Ramon,
Zamboanga. The residents of the barrio of Municahan of the municipality of Zamboanga
were alarmed by the presence of three suspicious looking persons who were prowling
around the place. The accused Fernando de Fernando who, at that time, was a
municipal policeman, when passing in front of the house of one Remigio Delgado, was
called by the latter's daughter Paciencia Delgado, who stated that her father wished to
see him. When the policeman came up the house Remigio Delgado informed him that
three unknown and suspicious looking persons, dressed in blue, prowling around his
house. The accused remained in the said house talking with Paciencia Delgado, both
being seated on a bench near the window. While they were thus talking, at about 7
o'clock at night, there appeared in the dark, at about 4 meters from the stairs, a person
dressed in dark clothes, calling "Nong Miong." At the time the accused nor Paciencia
Delgado knew who was thus calling. The accused inquired what he wanted but instead
of answering he continued advancing with bolo in hand. Upon seeing this Fernando de
Fernando took out his revolver and fired a shot in the air. As he saw that the unknown
continued to ascend the staircase he fired at him. The unknown disappeared and ran to
the house of a neighbor Leon Torres, where, after placing upon a table the bolos that he
carried, he fell on the floor and expired. Remigio Delgado, who was in the kitchen and
had recognized the voice of the unknown, on hearing the shots ran into the parlor, took
hold of the arm of the defendant and asked him why he had fired at Buenventura
Paulino. Fernando de Fernando only said "Let me go, that is a cross eyed person" and
immediately repaired to the house of the teniente of the barrio, Santiago Torres, from
where he telephoned to the chief of police advising him of what had happened. When
the body was examined it was found that a bullet had penetrated the base of the neck at
the right, imbedding itself in the left side under the skin.

The status of the accused on the night in question was that of an agent of the law, to
whom notice had been given of the presence of suspicious looking persons who might
be the Moro prisoners who had escaped from the Penal Colony of San Ramon. The
appearance of a man, unknown to him, dressed in clothes similar in color to the
prisoner's uniform who was calling the owner of the house, and the silence of Paciencia
Delgado, who did not at the time recognize the man, undoubtedly caused the accused
to suspect that the unknown man was one of the three persons that the owner of the
house said were prowling around the place. The suspicion become a reality in his mind
when he saw that the man continued ascending the stairs with a bolo in his hand, not
heeding his question as to who he was. In the midst of these circumstances and
believing undoubtedly that he was a wrongdoer he tried to perform his duty and first
fired into the air and then at the alleged intruder. But it happened that what to him
appeared to be wrongdoer was the nephew of the owner of the house who was carrying
three bolos tied together. At that psychological moment when the forces of far and the
sense of duty were at odds, the accused was not able to take full account of the true
situation and the bundle of bolos seemed to him to be only one bolo in the hands of a
suspicious character who intended to enter the house. There is, however, a
circumstance that should have made him suspect that the man was not only a friend but
also a relative of the owner of the house from the fact he called "Nong Miong," which
indicated that the owner of the house might be an older relative of the one calling, or an
intimate friend; and in not asking Paciencia Delgado who was it was that was calling her
father with such familiarity, he did not use the ordinary precaution that he should have
used before taking such fatal action.

Taking into consideration the estate of mind of the accused at the time, and the
meaning that he gave to the attitude of the unknown person, in shooting the latter he felt
that he was performing his duty by defending the owners of the house against an
unexpected attack, and such act cannot constitute the crime of murder, but only that of
simple homicide. He cannot be held guilty, however, as principal with malicious intent,
because he though at the time that he was justified in acting as he did, and he is guilty
only because he failed to exercise the ordinary diligence which, under the
circumstances, he should have by investigating whether or not the unknown man was
really what he though him to be. In firing the shot, without first exercising reasonable
diligence, he acted with reckless negligence.
The crime committed by the caused, therefore, is homicide through reckless negligence
defined and punished in article 568, in relation with article 404, of the Penal Code, the
penalty prescribed by law arresto mayor in its maximum degree to prision correcional in
its minimum degree.

In view of the foregoing and reversing the appealed judgment, the accused is held guilty
of the crime of homicide through reckless negligence, and he is sentenced to suffer one
year prision correcional, to pay the amount of P500 to the heirs of the deceased as an
indemnity, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, the costs and with credit
of one-half of the preventive imprisonment already suffered. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Street, Malcom, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 80747-48 October 17, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MERLO RAMIREZ, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Bernardo F. Ligsay for accused-appellant.

NARVASA, J.:

In the late afternoon of June 23, 1981, at Tayug, Pangasinan Merlo Ramirez, a sergeant
of the 151st PC Company headquartered at that place, fired his pistol at former Vice
Mayor Aureo ("Alo") Zaragoza III four (4) times. All four shots found their mark in
various parts of the latter's body and resulted in his death within two (2) hours. The
autopsy report of the Senior Resident Physician of the Eastern Pangasinan General
Hospital, Dr. Felipe Cantor, 1 set out the cause of death as, "Massive intra-thoracic and
intra abdominal hemorrhage due to gunshot wounds, right side chest macerating the
right lobe of the liver and penetrating the right kidney," and included the following
remarks, "Patient arrived at the hospital in shock and with marked pallor pulseless, BP-
0/0 Patient expired one hour 15 mins. after arrival in the hospital inspite of all heroic an
remedial measures done." On the same occasion, Ramirez also allegedly shot at
another person, Rogelio Robosa, but failed t hit him.

Ramirez was thereafter charged with consummated and attempted murder in the
Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, 2 under separate indictments. 3 On arraignment,
he entered pleas of not guilty to both offenses. The cases were consolidated, and tried
and decided jointly. 4 The Trial Court's judgment, dated August 12, 1987, 5 rejected
Merlo Ramirez's claim of self-defense, pronounced him guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of both the crimes ascribed to him, and declared him to be criminally and civilly liable
therefor as follows:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court is of the opinion and so holds that the
accused Merlo Ramirez is proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder committed against the victim defined and penalized by Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code and taking into consideration the concurrence of the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation and there being no mitigating
circumstance to offset the same the imposable penalty should be death.
HOWEVER, with the abolition of capital punishment under the new constitution
(Sec. 19, Article III), the Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
in the sum of P57,700.00 and to pay the costs.

Likewise, the Court finds accused proven GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Attempted Murder against Rogelio Robosa, penalized by Art. 284 in
relation to Art. 6, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code (and) applying the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court hereby SENTENCES
said accused to suffer an Indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS, TEN (10)
MONTHS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS of prision correccional as minimum to
EIGHT (8) YEARS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS of prision mayor as maximum.

From this joint judgment, Ramirez has appealed to this Court; and here, he attributes to
the Trial Court the following errors:

1) disregarding his evidence of self-defense, and in the process;

2) imposing its own surmises and conjectures;

3) not considering his testimony in relation to his sworn statement executed immediately
after the incident, relating exactly what happened;

4) giving credence to the palpably perjured testimonies of prosecution witnesses

Arestado and Robosa;

5) finding him guilty of attempted murder on the basis of the perjured testimonies of
Arestado and Robosa.

The basic issue, in fine, is whether or not the evidence of the prosecution, in relation to
that of the defense, does indeed prove the guilt of Merlo Ramirez of the felonies with
which he is charged, or show that his acts are justified, having been done in legitimate
self-defense. Stated otherwise, the ultimate question is which set of witnesses is more
deserving of credit, that of the prosecution, or the defense.
It is not disputed that the shooting was preceded by a conversation between Sgt.
Ramirez and Alo Zaragoza at the "Express Lounge and Restaurant" in Tayug. The
conversation took place at a table in an interior room of the restaurant. Also seated at
the same table were Ramirez's companion, PC Sgt. Espero, "Boy" Mamenta, a court
employee, and two local police officers, Patrolmen Carbonel and Castulo. At another
table in the main dining area outside the room were two other acquaintances, Rogelio
Robosa and Antonio Arestado, who both could see the group through the doorway. 6
Apparently, the conversation dealt with the setting up of a "jueteng" gambling operation
in the town, although it is not clear who precisely was making the proposal. What is
certain is that Alo Zaragoza very shortly became agitated and stood up, angrily uttering
some words and pounding the table with his hand. Ramirez also stood up and walked
away from the table, towards the comfort room. A few minutes afterwards Zaragoza
also walked out of the room. From this point, there is disagreement between the
prosecution and the defense as to the ensuing events.

The evidence of the prosecution tends to show that after leaving the room, Zaragoza
stopped between two tables in the main eating area and there paused to drink beer
from the mug he was holding; that it was at this point, while he was standing, head up,
pouring beer down his throat, that Ramirez suddenly reappeared and fired three (3)
successive shots at Zaragoza with a hand gun; that Rogelio Robosa grabbed Ramirez
from behind to stop him from firing more shots, but Ramirez was able to squeeze off
one more shot at Zaragoza; that Ramirez wrenched himself free of Robosa's embrace
and this somehow caused Robosa to be thrown to the floor, and the pistol to slip from
Ramirez's hand; that, however, Ramirez quickly retrieved his gun and fired at Robosa
as Robosa was rising from the floor; and that Ramirez thereupon fled from the
restaurant, followed by Sgt. Espero. Zaragoza, who had been hit by all four (4) shots
discharged at him, managed to walk to the restaurant's kitchen where Robosa found
him moments later, on the floor, being assisted by Castulo. He was rushed to the
hospital, but expired an hour or so after arriving there.

Ramirez's version is different. It was Zaragoza who suggested the setting up of the
jueteng operation. When the suggestion was made, Ramirez simply said that he was a
mere NCO operation officer, and that the proposal should be made to people higher up.
For some reason the remark incensed Zaragoza. In a loud voice, he said, "No more
jueteng, jueteng," slapping the table with the palm of his hand. Pointing a finger at
Ramirez, he added, "Okinnam, ado ti basol mon ditoy Tayug, ket no kayat ko nga
mapukaw, ka, mapukaw ka" (which the Trial Court translated as follows: "Vulva of your
mother, you have so many faults already here in Tayug and If I want you to disappear,
you will disappear"). Then, turning to his companion, Pat. Castulo, and extending his
hand to him, Zaragoza said "Man ta paltog mo, Condring, ta paltogak" (meaning,
according to the Court: "Give me your gun, Condring, as I will shoot him"). To avoid
trouble, Ramirez abruptly bade the group goodbye and went to the counter to pay his
bill, but seeing no one there, moved towards the toilet. On his way out, Pat. Carbonel
held him by the waist and asked him to go home directly as "Don Alo" (Zaragoza) was
very angry. Ramirez shoved Carbonel away, causing him to fall. As he was walking
towards the door, he saw Zaragoza emerge from the inner room, cursing him and
saving, "I am going to kill you." Because of Zaragoza's earlier threat to shoot him, and
fearing that he had indeed succeeded in getting Pat. Castulo's firearm, Ramirez drew
his gun and started shooting at Zaragoza while making his way towards the exit.

Upon the foregoing set of facts, Ramirez's lawyer, Atty. Bernardo Ligsay, argues that
Ramirez should be exonerated because he had acted under a mistake of fact — in the
not unreasonable belief that Zaragoza was going to shoot him. 7 Atty. Ligsay adds that
Ramirez had acted reflexively, in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation, and in
his brief invokes "People v. Tarlit, ('76 O.G. 4490, p. 821')" allegedly to the effect that:
"In emergencies where the person or life of another is imperilled, human nature does
not act upon formal reason but in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation." 8 Atty.
Ligsay omits to mention, however, that Tarlit — whose citation should correctly read,
"76 O.G. No. 26, pp. 4490" — is a decision of the Court of Appeals, not of this Court;
that the facts of that case are quite different from those of the present case; and the
legal principle predicated on those facts quite inimical to his cause, as would have been
immediately disclosed had he but reproduce in full the paragraph from which he had
taken the statement quoted by him. The paragraph reads in full as follows. 9

In emergencies where the person or life of another is imperilled, human nature

does not act upon formal reason but in obedience to the instinct of self-
preservation. In a situation, like the one at bar, where the deceased was taller,
bigger and stronger than the accused, the latter had to act fast or otherwise the
aggression on his person would have continued and his life ended. There being
no other means by which accused-appellant could prevent or repel the unlawful
aggression, he, Tarlit, had to use the very same weapon which wounded him
(accused). There was reasonable necessity for the accused to use the said
weapon because he was already losing strength and could not run due to loss of
blood.

Even conceding that Tarlit (a Court of Appeals decision) is binding on this Court, it is at
once evident that the ruling therein is inapplicable to the case at bar. In Tarlit, the
accused was (1) actually attacked by the deceased; (2) said deceased was taller, bigger
and stronger than the accused; (3) the accused had been wounded and was in fact
already losing strength and could no longer run due to loss of blood; and (4) he could no
longer repel the aggression and would surely have lost his life had he not used on the
aggressor the very same weapon by which he had been wounded by the latter. Not one
of these circumstances is present in the present case. Indeed, as shown the proofs of
both the prosecution and the defense, the victim, Zaragoza, had no gun or weapon of
any other sort when he emerged from the interior room. The State's evidence is that at
this time he was holding nothing more intimidating than a glass of beer, and doing
nothing more belligerent than gulping down the beer while standing in the middle of the
dining area.
It is contended by the defense that as Zaragoza emerged from the innder room he was
swearing at Ramirez and repeating the threat to kill him. However, there is nothing but
Ramirez's uncorroborated testimony to establish this; and it is belied by the evidence of
the prosecution. But even conceding this, Ramirez would quickly have seen that
Zaragoza bore no arms and was launching nothing more perilous than a verbal
onslaught.

In either case Zaragoza's acts could not be deemed to constitute unlawful aggression
on his part, or to have placed Ramirez in an emergency situation analogous to that in
the Tarlit case cited by him. More to the point, to be sure, is the precedent cited by the
Trial Judge, People v. Macaso, 10 from which the following is quoted:

. . . A review of the evidence fails to lend credence to the accused-appellant's

claim that the deceased was the unlawful aggressor. He was not even armed at
the time, while the man he was up against was a policeman who was in
possession of his service pistol. . . . True, the deceased acted rather
belligerently, arrogantly and menacingly at the accused-appellant, but such
behavior did not give rise to a situation that posed a real threat to the life or
safety of the accused-appellant. The peril to the latter's life was not imminent and
actual. To constitute unlawful aggression, it is necessary that an attack or
material aggression, an offensive act positively determining the intent of the
aggressor to cause injury, shall have been made. A mere threatening or
intimidating attitude is not sufficient . . . there must be a real danger to life or
personal safety.

Ramirez however invokes, as above stated, 11 the familiar mistake-of-fact doctrine

enunciated by this Court in U.S. v. Ah Chong 12 to exempt himself from criminal liability.
Here again he relies on inapplicable precedent. In Ah Chong, it will be recalled the
accused stabbed dead his friend and roommate in the mistaken belief that the latter was
a ladron, or burglar, attempting to force entry into the room they commonly shared. The
door of the room was secured only by a small hook or catch in lieu of a permanent lock,
a flimsy expedient which it was the occupants' habit to reinforce by putting a chair
against the door. On the night in question the accused was awakened by the sound of
someone trying to force the door open. He called out twice to the person to identify
himself. Receiving no answer, he uttered the warning, "if you enter the room, I will kill
you." It was at that moment that he was hit above the knee by the chair that had been
placed against the door. It could well be that the chair had merely been pushed back by
the opening of the door against which it rested; but thinking that he was being attacked
by the unknown intruder, the accused seized a kitchen knife kept under his pillow and
struck out blindly, hitting the latter who turned out to be his roommate, and who later
expired from his wounds. Now, the two had understanding that whoever returned at
night should knock at the door and identify himself, and the Court found nothing to
explain — except as probably a practical joke — the victim's failure to do so on that
occasion. It was upon these facts that the Court reversed on appeal the conviction of
the accused, holding that he had acted . . . in good faith, without malice or criminal
intent, in the belief that he was no more than exercising his legitimate right of self
defense."

There is however no semblance of any similarity or parallel between the facts in Ah

Chong and those of the present case, nothing here that would have caused the
accused-appellant, Ramirez, to entertain any well-grounded fear of imminent danger to
his life by reason of any real or perceived unlawful aggression on the part of the victim,
Zaragoza. Upon the evidence, at the time he was shot and killed, the latter was doing
nothing more hostile than drinking a bottle of beer; if he had earlier cursed or threatened
Ramirez, it was unaccompanied by any overt act of bodily assault. There was no
unlawful aggression.

Absent this essential element of unlawful aggression on the part of Zaragoza or, at the
least, of circumstances that would engender a reasonable belief thereof in the mind of
Ramirez, any consideration of self-defense, complete or incomplete, is of course
entirely out of the question. 13

By and large, the Court is persuaded that the Trial Courts basic conclusion that Merlo
Ramirez is criminally liable for the death of Aureo Zaragoza is correct and that the
defense has not demonstrated any serious or reversible error threin.

The Court finds itself unable to agree, however, with the conclusion that alevosia, as a
circumstance qualifying the killing of Zaragoza to murder, and evident premedition, as a
generic aggravating circumstance, should be appreciated against Ramirez.

While Ramirez's shooting of Zaragoza was, as regards, the latter, sudden and
unexpected and gave him no opportunity whatever to undertake any form of defense or
evasion, this does not necessarily justify a finding of treachery or alevosia, absent any
evidence that this mode of assault was consciously and deliberately adopted to insure
execution of the crime without risk to the offender. Ramirez acted on the umpulse of the
moment, rashly and not improbably, out of resentment at having been publicly cursed,
insulted and treatened. Thus, on seeing Zaragoza come out of the room, Ramirez had
forthwith drawn his service pistol and begun to shoot at Zaragoza. As recently observed
by this Court: 14

Well settled is the rule that the circumstances which would qualify a killing to
murder must be proven as indubitably as the crime itself. There must be a
showing, first and foremost, that the offender consciously and deliberately
adopted the particular means, methods and forms in the execution of the crime
 which tended directly to insure such execution without risk to himself. It does not
always follow that if the attack was sudden and unexpected, it should be deemed
attended with treachery.

Neither may the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation be appreciated

against the appellant in connection with either of the two felonies with which he stands
charged, because, as the Solicitor General correctly points out, "the determination to
commit the crime was . . . almost on the spur of the moment where the appellant had no
opportunity to reflect on his action." In People v. Molato, 15 this Court made the
following relevant observation:

As held in People v. Fernandez (154 SCRA 30 [1987]) citing People v. Jardiniano

(103 SCRA [1981]) and People v. Guiapar (129 SCRA 539 [1984]), to properly
appreciate evident premeditation, it is necessary to establish proof, as clear as
the evidence of the crime itself, about — (1) the time when the offender
determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit
had clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the
determination and the execution to allow him to reflect. . . . The element of
sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution of the
criminal act to afford the culprit full opportunity for calm reflection on the
consequences of the crime was not established in this case.

It follows that Ramirez may properly be convicted only of the felony of homicide defined
and penalized in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case No. T-470
([G.R. No. 80747]) as regards Alo Zaragoza), and of attempted homicide in Criminal
Case No. T-471 ([G.R. No. 80748]) as regards Rodolfo Robosa) and should be
sentenced to the medium period of the penalty prescribed by law for each of said
offenses, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance modifying his criminal
responsibility. Moreover, in addition to the actual damages for which he was adjudged
liable by the Trial Court, he should also be made to pay to the heirs of the Zaragoza the
additional sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for the latter's death.

WHEREFORE, subject only to the modifications just indicated, the Decision of the Trial
Court in said Criminal Cases No. T-470 and T-471, dated August 12, 1987, is
AFFIRMED and the appellant Merlo Ramirez is hereby SENTENCED as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. T-470, G.R. No. 80747, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, together with all the accessory penalties thereto
appertaining, and to pay to the heirs of the deceased, Aureo "Alo" Zaragoza, the sum of
Fifty Seven Thousand Pesos (P57,000.00) as actual or compensatory damages and the
sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as indemnity for death; and
2. In Criminal Case No. T-471, G.R. No. 80748, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
from two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years
and three (3) months of prision correccional.

Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-31582 October 26, 1977

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RAYMUNDO VISTIDO y SABAYLE, defendant-appellant.
Ramon A. Gonzales & Associates for appellant.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Dominador L. Quiroz

and Solicitor Octavio R. Ramirez for appellee.

CONCEPCION JR., J.:têñ.£îhqwâ£

In Criminal Case No. CCC-263-P.C. of the Circuit Criminal Court of Rizal, Pasig, Rizal,
the accused Raymundo Vistido y Sabayle was charged together with Pepito Montañ;o
and one John Doe (both at large) with the crime of murder, allegedly committed as
follows:ñé+.£ªwph!1

That on or about the 1st day of November, 1969, in Pasay City,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, armed with a dagger, with deliberate intent to kill,
taking advantage of their superior strength and by mean of treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and hit with a dagger Restituto Belbes y
Marcelino on the lower part of the abdomen, thereby inflicting upon the
latter vital wound which caused his instantaneous death. 1

Upon arraignment, the accused Raymundo Vistido pleaded not guilty. 2 Thereafter, trial
proceeded, and in due time, the court rendered its decision finding the accused
Raymundo Vistido guilty of the crime of murder, the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows:ñé+.£ªwph!1

WHEREFORE, finding the accused, Raymundo Vistido y Sabalye,

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, of the commission of the crime of
murder, pursuant to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as charge in
the information, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
DEATH; to indemnify the heirs of the offended in the amount of TWELVE
THOUSAND (P12,000.00) PESOS; and to pay the costs. 3

The case is now before Us for mandatory review.

The evidence for the prosecution reveals that on November 1, 1969, between 3:00 and
4:00 o'clock in the morning, the deceased Restituto Belbes and his cousin, Reynaldo
Pagtakhan after coming home from their work at the cemetery went to eat at the Marzan
Restaurant on Taft Avenue, Pasay City. 4 After taking soup, 5 they took a taxi in going
home. 6 While they were alighting from the taxi on M. Francisco St., Pasay City,
Reynaldo Pagtakhan saw three men drinking wine ("nag-iinuman"), who turned out to
be the accused Raymundo Vistido, Pepito Montañ;o, and one John Doe. 7
Thereupon, Pepito Montañ;o told the deceased: 'Hoy Resting. pauwiin mo na iyong
kasama," to which the latter answered: "Huwag pinsan ko ito." 8 Whereupon, the
deceased approached the three, and immediately thereafter, a commotion, ensued.
While Reynaldo Pagtakhan was trying to pacify them, Pepito Montañ;o suddenly
stabbed the deceased, hitting him below the abdomen, and in the process also hit the
right hand of Reynaldo Pagtakhan. The deceased fell to the ground. When he stood up,
the accused

Raymundo Vistido boxed him once. 9 Then Pepito Montañ;o faced Reynaldo Pagtakhan
and tried to stab him. The latter ran away but the former with his knife and his other
companion, chased him. 10 Upon reaching their house, he called for his mother. "Inay,
Inay, tulungan ninyo ako, dalhin ninyo ako sa hospital, dahil sa may sugat ako.
Immediately, his mother called a taxi and brought him to the Philippine General
Hospital.11 Meantime, his cousin, the deceased Restituto Belbes, who has fled from the
scene of the crime, arrived in their house. 12 He was likewise, taken to the Philippine
General Hospital but was dead on arrival. 13 Reynaldo Pagtaksan's wound was treated
at the same hospital, and after the treatment he and his mother went home. 14

In the meantime, the accused Raymundo Vistido was picked up, as a suspect in the
killing of the deceased, on M. Francisco St., Pasay City, by Pat. Loreto Aguna, who
brought him to the police precinct. 15 At this time, Reynaldo Pagtakhan who was fetched
by the police from their house, arrived at the police precinct. 16 He saw the accused
Raymundo Vistido and Identified him to the investigator, Sgt. Francisco Tirona, as one
of the perpetrators of the crime. 17

"The accused Raymundo Vistido denied any participation in the commission of the
crime. According to him, on the night of October 31, 1969, he was at home. Around 9:00
o'clock in the evening, his wife asked him to buy milk at a nearby store but was not able
to do so because the store was already closed. In front of the store, he saw Conrado
Catadrilla, Antonio Ramos, Pepito Montañ;o, and Esteban Pugna. The group offered
him one-half glass of tanduay rhum. After drinking it, he felt tipsy and requested them to
take him home. Conrado Catadrilla and Antonio Ramos accompanied the accused to
his house, arriving thereat at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, and immediately, he
went to sleep. 18

Around 4:00 o'clock in the morning of November 1, 1969, a Metrocom Unit came to his
house and asked him to go with them as they would show to him some papers which he
would sign. As he could not do anything, he went with them to the Pasay City Police
Department. Immediately upon his arrival, he was maltreated by the police and
repeatedly asked him: 'Who were your companions in the killing?" to which query he
repeatedly answered: "I do not know because I was sleeping at home. 19

The trial court rejected his alibi, and finding that there was conspiracy in the commission
of the crime, convicted the accused of the crime of murder and imposed upon him the
penalty of death. In this appeal, the accused as appellant does not question the
correctness of the trial court's conclusion as to his alibi. However, he assails the court a
quo in holding that there was conspiracy in the commission of the offense. 20 The
Solicitor General maintains that there was conspiracy because the following proven
facts show a concerted action among the accused, to wit: (1) Upon alighting from the
taxi at M. Francisco Street, appellant Rayrnundo Vistido, accused Pepito Montañ;o, and
John Doe, who were together drinking wine called the deceased; (2) The three accused,
including the appellant, attacked the deceased as soon as he approached them, one of
them, Pepito Montañ;o (at large) stabbed the deceased while appellant immediately
boxed the deceased after he was thus stabbed; and (3) When Raymundo Pagtakhan, a
companion of the deceased, tried to pacify them, the three accused turned on him and
attacked him. 21

We disagree. There is no question that 'a person may be convicted for the criminal act
of another where, between them, there has been conspiracy or unity of purpose and
intention in the commission of the crime charged." 22 It is, likewise settled that "to
establish conspiracy, it is not necessary to prove previous agreement to commit a
crime, if there is proof that the malefactors have acted in consort and in pursuance of
the same objective. 23 Nevertheless, "the evidence to prove the same must be positive
and convincing. As a facile device by which an accused may be ensnared and kept
within the penal fold, conspiracy requires conclusive proof if we are to maintain in full
strength the substance of the time honored principle in criminal law requiring proof
beyond reasonable doubt before conviction. 24

In the case at bar, the evidence for the prosecution does not comply with this basic
requirement. To begin with, there is no evidence that appellant and his co-accused had
any enmity or grudge against the deceased. On the contrary, the cousin of the
deceased, Reynaldo Pagtakhan, testified that prior to the stabbing incident, they did not
have any quarrel with them. 25 In the absence of strong motives on their part to kill the
deceased, it can not safely be concluded that they conspired to commit the crime
involved herein. 26

Neither could it be assumed that when the appellant and his co-accused were together
drinking wine, at the time and place of the incident, they were there purposely to wait for
and to kill the deceased. For, they could not have surmised beforehand that between
3:00 and 4:00 o'clock in the morning of November 1, 1969, the deceased and his cousin
after coming home from their work at the cemetery would go to the Marzan Restaurant,
and thereafter, would take a taxi for home, and then, alight at M. Francisco Street. The
meeting between the appellant's group and the deceased appears to be purely
accidental which negates the existence of conspiracy between the appellant and his co-
accused.

Besides, the appellant was unarmed; only his two companions (Pepito Montañ;o and
one John Doe) were armed with daggers. 27 If he (appellant) had really conspired with
his co-accused to kill the deceased, he could have provided himself with a weapon. But
he did not. Again, this fact belies the prosecution's theory that the appellant had entered
into a conspiracy with his co-accused to kill the deceased. 28
Moreover, although the appellant and his co-accused acted with some degree of
simultaneity in attacking the deceased, nevertheless, the same is insufficient to prove
conspiracy. The rule is well-settled that "simultaneousness does not of itself
demonstrate the concurrence of Will nor the unity of action and purpose which are the
basis of the responsibility of two or more individuals. 29 To establish common
responsibility it is not sufficient that the attack be joint and simultaneous; it is necessary
that the assailants be animated by one and the same purpose. 30 In the case at bar, the
appellant Raymundo Vistido and the accused Pepito Montañ;o, did not act pursuant to
the same objective. Thus, the purpose of the latter was to kill as shown by the fact that
he inflicted a mortal wound below the abdomen of the which caused his death. On the
other hand, the act of the appellant in giving the deceased one fist blow after the latter
was stabbed by the accused Pepito Montañ;o — an act which is certainly unnecessary
and not indispensable for the consummation of the criminal assault — does not indicate
a purpose to kill the deceased, but merely to "show off" or "press his sympathy or
feeling of camaraderie with the accused Pepito Montañ;o. Thus, in People vs.
Portugueza, 31 this Court held that:ñé+.£ªwph!1

Although the appellants are relatives and had acted with some degree of
simultaneity in attacking their victim, nevertheless, this fact alone does not
prove conspiracy. (People vs. Caayao, 48 Off. Gaz. 637). On the contrary,
from the nature and gravity of the wounds inflicted on the deceased, it can
be said that the appellant and the other defendant did not act pursuant to
the same objective. Florentino Gapole's purpose was to kill the deceased,
as shown by the fact that he inflicted a mortal wound which almost
severed the left arm. The injury inflicted by the appellant, merely
scratching the subcutaneous tissues, does not indicate a purpose to kill
the victim. It is not enough that appellant had participated in the assault
made by his codefendant in order to consider him a co-principal in the
crime charged. He must have also made the criminal resolution of his co-
accused his own. ....

and, in People vs. Vicente, 32 this Court likewise held:ñé+.£ªwph!1

In regard to appellant Ernesto Escopizo, there seems; to be no dispute

that he stabbed Soriano several times with a small knife only after the
latter had fallen to the ground seriously wounded, if not already dead.
There is no showing that this accused had knowledge of the criminal intent
of Jose Vicente against the deceased. In all likelihood, Escorpizo's act in
stabbing the fallen Soriano with a small knife was not in furtherance of
Vicente's aim, which is to kill, but merely to 'show off' or express his
sympathy or feeling of camaraderie with Vicente. ....

By and large, the evidence for the prosecution failed to show the existence of
conspiracy which, according to the settled rule, must be shown to exist as clearly and
convincingly as the crime itself. In the absence of conspiracy, the liability of the
defendants is separate and individual each is liable for his own acts, the damage
caused thereby, and the consequences thereof. 33 While the evidence shows that the
appellant boxed the deceased, it is, however, silent as to the extent of the injuries, in
which case, the appellant should be held liable only for slight physical injuries. 34

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the trial court is modified and another one entered
holding the appellant Raymundo Vistido y Sabayle guilty of the crime of slight physical
injuries. He is thereby sentenced to suffer fifteen (15) days of arresto menor. 35
Considering the period of preventive imprisonment that he has undergone, he is hereby
ordered released immediately from custody. With costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Castro, C.J., Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Muñ;oz Palma, Martin, Santos, Fernandez
and Guerrero, JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët

Teehankee, J., concurs with the dissent of Justice Aquino.

Antonio, J., agrees that appellant is guilty as accomplice in homicide.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., dissenting:

Appellant is guilty as an accomplice homicide with the mitigating circumstance of

drunkenness (People vs. Babiera, 52 Phil. 97; People vs. Cortes, 55 Phil. 143).

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., dissenting:

Appellant is guilty as an accomplice homicide with the mitigating circumstance of

drunkenness (People vs. Babiera, 52 Phil. 97; People vs. Cortes, 55 Phil. 143)
G.R. No. 108293 September 15, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PAT. DAVID MANZANO y HERILLA, ROMULO ORDOÑEZ y NABOR, JAIME
BALCORTA y MANZANO, JULITO BARRACAS y BALCORTA, RICHARD DOE,
JOHN DOE, PETER DOE, REX DOE, ARIEL DOE & JOHN DOE, accused.

PAT. DAVID MANZANO y HERILLA, ROMULO ORDOÑEZ y NABOR, JAIME

BALCORTA y MANZANO, JULITO BARRACAS y BALCORTA, accused-appellants.

MELO, J.:

Accused were charged with robbery with rape in an Amended Information, thusly:

That on or about the 11th day of July, 1991, in Quezon City, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, all armed with hand guns, conspiring together, confederating
with and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain and by means of
violence and intimidation against persons, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously rob the residence of FELICIDAD BAIRAN y
MARASIGAN located at No. 63 Doña Carmen St., Don Jose Subdivision,
Fairview, this City in the following manner, to wit: on the date and place
aforementioned, accused pursuant to their conspiracy, barged into the
residence of said FELICIDAD BAIRAN y MARASIGAN and at gun point,
hogtied the occupants thereof and thereafter robbed, took and carried
away the following:

FROM FELICIDAD BAIRAN y MARASIGAN

1 Cash Money — P50,000.00

2 One (1) pc. of earring — 100,000.00
3 One (1) pc. of necklace — 300,000.00
4 One (1) pc. of ring — 300,000.00
5 One (1) Seiko watch — 1,000.00
6 One (1) pc. of Gold — 80,000.00
Necklace
7 One (1) pc. of bracelet — 50,000.00

FROM SUSAN BAIRAN y MAGSALIN

 1 Cash Money — P50,000.00
2 Assorted jewelries
and assorted lotion
and perfumes — 500,000.00

all in the total amount of P1,431,000.00, Philippine Currency, and on the

occasion of the aforementioned offense, accused DAVID MANZANO y
HERILLA, by means of violence, intimidation of person, did, then and
there, with lewd designs, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of Susan Bairan y Magsalin, against the latter's will and
consent, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended parties in the
aforementioned amount and in such other amount as may be awarded to
them under the provisions of the New Civil Code of the Philippines,
contrary to Article 294, par. 2, in relation to Art. 335 of the Revised Penal
code.

(p. 9, Rollo.)

Of those charged, only Pat. David Manzano, Romulo Ordoñez Jaime Balcorta, and
Julito Barracas were arrested. The others, unidentified as they have remained, were
never arrested.

Upon arraignment, all the accused entered pleas of not guilty, and following trial, the
trial court found all of them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in a
decision dated December 17, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads:

Samakatwid, nang dahil sa pagkakasa-alang-alang sa mga nabanggit sa

dakong itaas at mga katibayang iniharap laban sa mga nasasakdal,
walang makatwirang alinlangan na sina Pat. DAVID MANZANO y
HERILLA, ROMULO ORDOÑEZ y NABOR, JAIME BALCORTA y
MANZANO at JULITO BARRACAS y BALCORTA ay pawang nagkasala
ng Pagnanakaw na kalakip ang Panggagahasa at nilabag nila ang Artikulo
294, Talata Bilang 2 ng Binagong Kodigo Penal at iginagawad sa kanila
ng hukumang ito ang parusang reklusyon perpetua o habang-buhay na
pagkabilanggo.

Inuutusan ng hukumang ito na bayaran nina Pat. David Manzano y Herilla,

Romulo Ordoñez y Nabor, Jaime Balcorta y Manzano at Julito Barracas y
Balcorta sina Gng. Felicidad Bairan at Gng. Susan Bairan ang halagang
P1,431,000.00, salapi ng Pilipinas, ang katumbas na ari-ariang ninakaw at
tinangay ng mga nasasakdal at ang pananagutan ng bawat isa hinggil sa
pagbabayad ng halagang ito ay buo at solidaryo (in solidum). Inuutusan
din ng hukumang ito si Pat. David Manzano y Herilla na bayaran si Susan
Bairan ng halagang P50,000.00, salapi ng Pilipinas, bilang bayad-pinsala
sa nasirang puri at karangalan ng huli.
 Ang pansamantalang pagkakakulong ng mga nasasakdal na sina Pat.
David Manzano y Herilla, Romulo Ordoñez y Nabor, Jaime Balcorta y
Manzano at Julito Barracas y Balcorta, sa panahon ng paglilitis ay
bibilangin kasama sa pagtutuos ng parusang iginawad sa kanila.

Ang ginugol sa pag-uusig (kostas) ay babayaran ng mga ipinagsakdal.

(pp. 42-43, Rollo.)

From said decision, the instant appeal has been interposed, with reversal anchored
upon the following assignments of error:

The trial court erred in believing the prosecution witnesses, and

disbelieving the defense of alibi of the accused-appellants.

II

The trial court erred in declaring that the prosecution witnesses had
positively identified the accused-appellants despite the fact that they were
identified only after they were illegally arrested by the CIS.

III

The trial court erred in declaring that just because three of the accused-
appellants are relatives, and the four of them live in but one residence
shows that they conspired to commit the crime of robbery with rape.

IV

The trial court erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with rape.

(pp. 1-2, Appellants' Brief; p.266, Rollo.)

The facts of the case, as borne out by the record were correctly summarized by the
Office of the Solicitor General as follows:

On July 11, 1991, at about 10:30 o'clock in the evening, Jovencio Nemis,
driver in Mrs. Felicidad Bairan's house at 63 Doña Carmen St. Don Jose
Subdivision, Fairview, Quezon City, drove home the spouses Ongbuco
who were visitors of Susan Bairan, daughter-in-law of Mrs. Bairan. Upon
returning to the Bairan house, but before he could get inside the gate, a
group of armed men poked their guns at him. Jose Raquedan, one of the
students being supported by Mrs. Bairan, saw the incident. He
 immediately ran to the basement of the house and told his companions to
close the door and windows. Homer Gana, another of Mrs. Bairan's
supported students, forthwith went upstairs, put out the lights, and closed
the door and windows. He, however, heard someone knocking at the door,
and when he opened it he saw Jovencio Nemis and a group of armed men
with their guns poked at the latter. Instinctively he tried to close the door,
but it was pushed open by the armed men who then got inside the house
(pp. 4-10, tsn., October 10, 1991).

Inside the house, the armed men gathered all the occupants in the sala
and tied their arms and feet with torn clothes, except Mrs. Bairan (pp. 9-
10, tsn., supra.) In order to gain entrance into the bedroom of Mrs. Bairan
— inside which were Mrs. Bairan, her daughter-in-law Susan Bairan, and
the latter's three children — the armed men used Jovencio Nemis to call
and knock at the bedroom's door. Once inside, the armed men ransacked
the room, opened the drawers, aparador and other places where money,
jewelries and other valuables were kept. They scattered things all around
and the room was in disarray.

While the room was being ransacked, accused Pat. David Manzano
dragged Susan Bairan inside the adjoining bedroom. With his gun pointed
at Susan's head, Pat. Manzano told the latter, thus: "Putang ina mo,
huwag kang maingay, papatayin kita" (pp. 14-15, tsn., November 27,
1991). Manzano warned Susan that if she will resist and fight back, he will
kill her. He then held the arms of Susan and forcibly made her lie down on
the carpet. He removed his pants and briefs, then raised Susan's duster or
"malong" and removed her panty. While Susan was on a lying position
and resisting with her two arms being held by Manzano, the latter tried to
insert his penis inside Susan's. By sheer force Manzano was ultimately
able to accomplish his evil desire, after which he warned Susan that
should the latter report what happened, he will kill her. While Susan was
being raped by Manzano, somebody knocked at the door and shouted:
"Ilabas mo ang babae" (p. 21, tsn., supra.).

Dr. Annabelle Soliman, NBI Medico Legal Officer, identified and submitted
Living Case Report No. MG-91-760 (Exh ."F") on rape subject Susan
Bairan (pp. 5-9, tsn., March 19, 1992).

The valuables taken by the armed robbers from the house of Mrs. Felicidad Bairan are
the following:

FROM FELICIDAD BAIRAN y MARASIGAN

1 Cash Money — P50,000.00

2 One (1) pc. of earring — 100,000.00
3 One (1) pc. of — 300,000.00
 necklace
4 One (1) pc. of ring — 300,000.00
5 One (1) Seiko watch — 1,000.00
6 One (1) pc. of Gold — 80,000.00
Necklace
7 One (1) pc. of bracelet — 50,000.00.

FROM SUSAN BAIRAN y MAGSALIN

1 Cash Money — P50,000.00

2 Assorted jewelries
and
assorted lotion and
perfumes — 500,000.00

Aside from ransacking the house, taking valuables and raping Susan
Bairan, the armed men cooked food, ate and slept, leaving Mrs. Bairan's
residence only at about 5 o'clock in the morning of the following day, July
12, 1991 (pp. 9-11, tsn., September 12, 1991).

Mrs. Felicidad Bairan immediately reported the crime to the Quezon City
Police Station and to the Criminal Investigation Service at Camp Crame)
pp. 22-23, tsn., November 27, 1991).

In the early morning of July 21, 1991, while Herminia Pascual, Mrs.
Bairan's househelp, was on her way to visit her cousin at Litex, she saw
Jaime Balcorta inside their compound at 39 Pres. Quezon, Unit II, Brgy.
Commonwealth, Quezon City. She also saw accused Romulo Ordoñez
near the gate. Forthwith she called by phone Jerry Pablo of the CIS. At
around 7 a.m. that same day she accompanied Larry in arresting the
suspects (pp. 24-30, tsn., September 12, 1991).

At the CIS Office in Camp Crame, Pat. David Manzano, Romulo Ordoñez,
Jaime Balcorta and Julito Barracas were pointed to and identified by the
victims as among the armed men who robbed the house of Mrs. Felicidad
Bairan. In court, during the trial these accused were also positively
identified by the prosecution witnesses (p. 4, Decision).

(pp. 6-10, Appellee's Brief ff. p. 272, Rollo.)

Accused-appellants' contention that they were illegally arrested by the CIS without any
warrant of arrest is well-taken.
It is to be noted that accused-appellants were arrested on July 21, 1991, or 10 days
after the commission of the robbery with rape which was perpetrated on July 11,1991.

The warrantless arrest does not fall under any of the situations provided for by Section
5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station
or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7.

None of the circumstances mentioned in said Rule obtains in this case. Unquestionably,
accused-appellants were not arrested while they were actually committing or attempting
to commit a crime in the presence of the arresting officers, as contemplated under
paragraph (a) of Section 5. Neither is paragraph (b) applicable, for the arresting officers
had no personal knowledge indicating that accused-appellants had just committed an
offense. Obviously, paragraph (c) is not pertinent for the persons arrested had not
escaped from a penal establishment or had escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

However, the illegal arrest of accused-appellants does not negate the validity of their
conviction. For the evidence against them is not derived or drawn from their illegal
arrest or as a consequence thereof. Their conviction is based on their positive
identification by the victims as the authors of the crime. Such positive identification was
totally independent of their unlawful arrest. In fact, it was the recognition and
identification by witness Herminia Pascual, Mrs. Bairan's househelp, of accused-
appellants which led to their arrest. On the early morning of July 21, 1991, while
Herminia was on her way to visit her cousin at Litex, she saw accused-appellants Julito
Barracas, David Manzano, and Jaime Balcorta inside their compound at 39 Pres.
Quezon, Unit II, Brgy. Commonwealth, Quezon City, and she also spotted accused-
appellant Romulo Ordoñez near the gate. She immediately called up by phone Jerry
Pablo of the CIS, and at around 7 a.m., that day she accompanied Jerry in arresting
accused-appellants, It is indubitable, therefore, that their identification as the
perpetrators of the crime by at least one witness occurred prior to their arrest. Their
contention that they were identified by the witnesses only because they were arrested
and only after such arrest is thus without any factual basis. The testimony of the other
prosecution witnesses that accused-appellants committed the crime charged may be
considered as, at least, corroborative of the testimony of Herminia. However, the
testimony of Susan Bairan is not merely corroborative but is a main and principal
testimony establishing the fact she was raped by Manzano. Again, her testimony is not
dependent on the arrest of Manzano for her identification of Manzano as her rapist is
unquestionable, indisputable, unequivocal, and categorical. During the rape, she was as
close to him as is physically possible, for a man and a woman cannot be physically
closer to each other than during the sexual act. She testified that she could not forget
his face as the room where she was forcibly dragged to and raped was illuminated
through the window by a nearby mercury streetlight which passed through the thin
curtain.

The insistence that the prosecution witnesses could not have identified the culprits
because the latter wore masks during the commission of the crime is devoid of
evidentiary support. The armed robbers, some with masks, stayed for 6 to 7 hours at
the house of Felicidad Bairan where they even "cooked food, ate and slept" (p.11, tsn.,
September 12, 1991). During that long period of time those who were masked removed
their masks, from time to time, while the robbery was taking place (p.10, tsn., November
27, 1991). Thus, their faces were exposed and seen by the witnesses to the
commission of the crime resulting in accused-appellants' subsequent identification.
prosecution witness Jose Raquedan saw the culprits before they entered the house. He
declared that there were more or less 10 persons who took part in the robbery and he
was able to positively identify one of them, Pat. David Manzano. He recognized
Manzano because before the witness could close the door of the house, Manzano
called him and said, "Brod sandali lang" and told him not to run. Likewise, Dennis Gana,
a student and resident of the Bairan house, testified that when the robbers entered the
house, they were told to lie face down in the sala and they were tied; he was able to see
the faces of the armed men when he occasionally peeped at them and when he was
allowed to go to the comfort room; in court, he positively identified accused-appellants
Manzano, Barracas and Balcorta as among the robbers.

It is to be stressed that there is a total lack of ill-motive on the part of the victims and the
prosecution witnesses to testify falsely against accused-appellants. When there is no
showing that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by any improper motive,
their testimony is entitled to full faith and credit (People vs. Fuertes, 229 SCRA 289
[1994]; People vs. de la Cruz, 229 SCRA 754 [1994]).

Further, accused-appellants contend that the fact that three of them are relatives and
that all four of them lived in the same place does not show that they conspired to
commit the crime of robbery with rape. Conspiracy need not be proved by direct
evidence of prior agreement to commit the crime as it could be inferred from the
conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing
that they acted in unison with each other evincing a common purpose or design (People
vs. Dalanon, 237 SCRA 607 [1993]). The concerted acts of the accused to obtain a
common criminal objective signify conspiracy (People vs. Silong (232 SCRA 487
[1993]). The acts of accused-appellants clearly show conspiracy among them. They
entered the Bairan residence together. They tied up the occupants of the house and
divested them of money and valuables, and ransacked the house looking for valuables.
While one of them ravished Susan, the others, aware of what was taking place, did
nothing, thereby giving their implicit assent to such beastly act The facts of the case
plainly manifest the existence of conspiracy among accused-appellants.

Finally, accused-appellants interpose the defense of alibi. Manzano claims that he was
at Police Station 5 on the night of the incident, July 11, 1991; and that at 3 o'clock the
following morning he joined an operation to apprehend murder suspects in Lupang
Pangako. Jaime Balcorta and Julito Barracas profess that they were in Villacorta,
Mabini, Pangasinan on the date of the incident attending the wake of a nephew. Romulo
Ordoñez, for his part, avers that on July 11, 1991 he was in his house at San Simon,
Bani, Pangasinan, tending to their store; that on the evening of said date he went to the
house of a neighbor to attend the wake of one deceased Anacieto Bahad and left at 3
o'clock the following morning. The alibis of accused-appellants Balcorta, Barracas and
Ordoñez are bare self-serving assertions, uncorroborated by disinterested witnesses.

Alibi, we have repeatedly held, is the weakest defense and cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the accused by prosecution witnesses (People vs. Lag-aw, 229
SCRA 308 [1994]; People vs. Calope, 229 SCRA 413 [1994]). In the face of the positive
identification of accused-appellants by their very victims as the perpetrators of the crime
charged, the defense of alibi must fall. Although the alibi of Manzano appears to have
been corroborated by his fellow police officers in the precinct where he was stationed,
said defense is unworthy of belief not only because he was positively identified by the
victims of the robbery and the rape but also because it has been held that alibi becomes
more unworthy of merit where it is established mainly by the accused himself and his
relatives (People vs. Gundran, 228 SCRA 583) and by the same token if it is
established by the accused or his friends and comrades-in-arms.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against

accused-appellants.

SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR.
G.R. Nos. L-28324-5 May 19, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RAFAEL MARCO, SIMEON MARCO and DULCISIMO BELTRAN, defendants.
RAFAEL MARCO, defendant-appellant.

Jose P. Bengzon (Counsel de Oficio) for appellant.

Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Felisicimo R. Rosete

and Solicitor Teodulo R. Dino for appellee.

BARREDO, J.:

Appeal by accused Rafael Marco from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga del Sur in Criminal Case No. 2757, entitled People of the Philippines vs.
Rafael Marco, Dulcisimo Beltran and Simeon Marco, the dispositive part of which reads
thus:
 WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment as follows:

(1) In Criminal Case No, 2757, the Court finds Rafael Marco, Dulcisimo
Beltran, and Simeon Marco, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Murder, qualified by abuse of superior strength' and hereby sentences
Rafael Marco, who has neither aggravating circumstance against him or
any mitigating circumstance in his favor, to RECLUSION PERPETUA.
Simeon Marco and Dulcisimo Beltran, who surrendered voluntarily, are
hereby sentenced EACH to an indeterminate penalty consisting of TEN
(10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to
SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY of
reclusion temporal as maximum.

The Court further sentences the three defendants to pay, jointly and severally, to the
heirs of Bienvenido Sabelbero, the amount of P6,000.00, to suffer the accessory
penalties of the law, and to pay the costs. (Page 69, Record.)

Actually, there were two cases filed against appellant in connection with two successive
phases of a single occurrence. The two cases were consolidated and tried together. In
Criminal Case No. 2757, he was charged together with his son Simeon and one
Dulcisimo Beltran with the alleged murder of one Bienvenido Sabelbero. 1 In Criminal
Case 2758, he was charged together also with his son Simeon with frustrated murder
allegedly committed against Constancio Sabelbero, a brother Bienvenido. In this second
case, herein appellant was found guilty only a slight physical injuries and sentenced to
twelve (12) days of arresto menor. He did not appeal. Simeon was acquitted.

The incident in question took place on November 5, 1964 at about 2:30 o'clock in the
afternoon within the vicinity of the market place of Barrio Subang, Pagadian,
Zamboanga del Sur. There was a fiesta being celebrated, but it was raining. The details,
according to the the are as follows:

Constancio Sabelbero was approached by Simeon Marco who asked him if he was the
one who boxed the latter's brother the previous year. Constancio denied. Then Simeon
asked if he had cigarettes and when he said he had none, Simeon said, "I have
cigarettes; here is my cigarette", as he pulled out a one-foot long hunting knife.
Frightened, Constancio ran away and Simeon chased him. As Constancio was passing
by the place were appellant Rafael Marco, the father of Simeon, was standing, Rafael
struck Constancio with a round cane, hitting him on the left ear and left shoulder. This
was the basis of the information in Criminal Case No. 2758, where appellant was
convicted of slight physical injuries and his son, Simeon, was acquitted.

Vicente, the father of Constancio, happened to be standing in the crowd and heard
shout of "Fight! Fight!" He saw Simeon about to stab Constancio, so he grabbed the
hand of Simeon that was holding the knife.
At this juncture, Rafael Marco approached Vicente armed with a cane and a hunting
knife. Sensing danger, Vicente shouted to his son Constancio, who had been hit by
Rafael, and his other son Bienvenido, who appeared on the scene, to run away
because the Marcos were armed. Constancio was able to run away. So also Vicente.
Bienvenido who was being chased by Rafael was stabbed by the latter, and when the
parried the blow, he was wounded on the left hand. After being stabbed by Rafael,
Bienvenido still tried to run father, but unluckily, his foot got caught in a vine on the
ground and he fell, whereupon, out of nowhere, Dulcisimo Beltran, who was accused
with herein appellant and who did not appeal his conviction, arrived and stabbed
Bienvenido near his anus while he was in the position described in the record thus
"(Witness demonstrating with his two hands touching the floor and his both feet (sic) in a
forward position)". (p. 24, t.s.n.) Beltran was followed by Simeon, 2 who stabbed
Bienvenido on the left breast and the upper part of the left arm. Afterwards, Rafael,
Simeon and Beltran ran away. "Bienvenido Sabelbero stood up slowly and walked
zigzagly towards the store of Pinda and when he arrived in front of the store, he fell to
the ground." (p.27, t.s.n.)

When Vicente came to know that his son Bienvenido was wounded, he went to the
store of Pinda and found him lying there. Vicente asked him what happened,
"Bienvenido Sebelvero answered that he was wounded because he was ganged up by
them and immediately after that he died." (p. 28 t.s.n.)

For the purposes of this appeal, the foregoing facts We have gathered from the
recorded evidence and which coincide substantially with the findings and basis of tea
appealed decision are more or less admitted by appellant in the brief of his counsel de
oficio to be more credible version of what happened. Nevertheless, counsel has
assigned seven alleged errors of the trial court, although the whole thrust of this appeal
revolves around the issue of whether not with what has been proven, as narrated
above, to be the participation of appellant in the Phase of the incident that led to the
death of Bienvenido appellant, Rafael Marco, may be held liable for murder, as found by
the court below.

It will be recalled that the whole incident was started by Simeon Marco, the son of
Rafael, who approached Constancio and after asking him if he was the one who boxed
his (Simeon's) brother the year before, brandished a hunting knife, which caused
Constancio to run away. While thus running, he passed by appellant who hit him with a
round cane. Such was the first phase of the incident subject of this case. According the
trial court for such act of Rafael, he was guilty of slight physical injuries, since "it is safe
to assume that at that moment there was no intent to kill any one."

As to the second phase, according to the evidence, when Simeon was about to pursue
Constancio, Vicente grabbed Simeon's hand that was holding the knife. But when
Vicente saw that Rafael who was holding a round cane a and a hunting knife, was
approaching them, he shouted Constancio and his other son Bienvenido who was
around to run away, which they did, as he himself released Simeon and ran away.
Rafael followed Bienvenido and stabbed him, but the latter parried the blow with his left
hand. And as Bienvenido was trying to to run farther, unluckily, his feet got entangled
with some vines and he fell down. Whereupon, Beltran, who came from nowhere,
stabbed him near the anus, followed by Simeon who Stabbed him on the left side of the
breast.

Upon these facts, the People maintain that appellant is as guilty as Simeon and Beltran
of the killing of Bienvenido, the theory being that there was obvious conspiracy among
there

The trouble with the evidence of the prosecution is that it is vague and incomplete. For
instance, as to the first phase of the incident, the relative Positions and distances from
each other Of the three Protagonist, Simeon, Constancio and Rafael are not revealed.
How far Rafael was from Simeon and Constancio when Simeon sort of threatened him
with a knife is not clear. Neither is it shown how Rafael happened to be in the path of
Constancio when the latter was running away from Simeon, such that Rafael was able
to hit him with a cane. In this situation, We do not feel safe in concluding that there was
concerted connection between the act of Simeon, on the one hand, and that of Rafael,
on the other. Thus, the trial court was correct in acquitting Simeon and holding Rafael
guilty only of slight physical injuries instead of frustrated murder as charged.

Likewise, in regard to the second phase of the incident, We are at a loss as to what
Bienvenido was actually doing and what participation he had at the early stages of the
incident, when Vicente shouted him to run away. 3 The pertinent portion of testimony of
the lone eye-witness, Dominador Carbajosa, is as follows:

Q Then what happened?

A Then Vicente Sabelvero held the arm of Simeon Marco

and at the same time Vicente Sabelvero shouted to his sons,
Constancio and Bienvenido Sabelvero to run away because
they were all armed.

Q This Vicente Sebolvero you mentioned, how is he related

to Constancio and Bienvenido Sabelvero?

A Vicente Sabelvero is the father.

Q Do you know if Constancio Sabelvero and Bienvenido

Sabelvero ran away?

A Yes, they ran away.

Q This Bienvenido Sabelvero, where was he when this

incident happened?

A He was only a few meters away,

Q What happened to him?

A He was overtaken by Rafael Marco and he was stabbed

by Rafael Marco.

Q Who stabbed him'?

A Rafael Marco.

Q Will you tell the Honorable Court what part of the body of
Bienvenido Sabelvero did Rafael Marco stab?

A Bienvenido Sabelvero was able to parry the thrust which

was directed to his left side and he was not wounded and
instead in parrying the thrust he was wounded on the hand.

Q Do you know what kind of weapon did Rafael Marco use

in injuries upon Bienvenido Sabelvero?

A I know.

Q What kind of weapon?

A Flamingco or hunting knife.

Q Then after Rafael Marco inflicted injuries upon Bienvenido

Sabelvero, what to Bienvenido Sabelvero?

A While Bienvenido Sabelvero was trying to run away his

feet were wrapped by the having of the cover crop and he
fell down and right at that time Beltran approached him and
dabbed Bienvenido Sabelvero near his anus

ATTY. ORGANO —

(Addressing the Court)

If Your Honor please I would like to make it of that the

witness indicated to a portion above his body which is above
the anus.

(To the witness)

Q What was the position of Bienvenido Sebolvero when this

Dulcisimo Beltran stabbed him?
A In this manner. (Witness demonstrating with his two hands
touching the floor and his both feet in a forward position).

Q Then when Dulcisimo Beltran stabbed him in that position,

what happened next?

A While Bienvenido Sebolvero was in that position, he was

stabbed by Simeon Marco on the left breast and because he
was able to parry the weapon he was wounded on the upper
part of his left hand.

Q This Dulcisimo Beltran whom you said stabbed

Bienvenido Sebolvero, do you know what was his weapon?

A I know.

Q What was his weapon?

A Bayonet.

Q This Dulcisimo Beltran, according to you, stabbed

Bienvenido Sebolvero near the buttock?....

ATTY. PIELAGO —

Misleading, Your Honor.

COURT —

This witness testified that this Bienvenido Sebolvero was

stabbed near the anus.

(To the witness)

Q This Dulcisimo Beltran whom you said also stabbed

Bienvenido (Beltran), is he here in court?

A Yes, sir.

Q Please point to him?

A That one. (Witness pointing to accused Dulcisimo Beltran).

Q This Simeon Marco whom you said stabbed Bienvenido

Sebolvero on the left breast and hand is he here in court?
A Yes, sir.

Q Where is he?

A That one. (Witness pointing to accused Simeon Marco).

Q Do you know what kind of weapon did Simeon Marco use

in stabbing the left arm of Bienvenido Sebolvero?

A I know.

Q What kind of weapon?

A A bayonet.

(to the direct examiner)

Proceed.

ATTY. ORGANO —

(continuing)

Q Presenting to you this weapon . . . . (counsel hands over

the same to the witness). . . . Will you tell the Honorable
Court whether this is the very weapon used by Simeon
Marco in stabbing Bienvenido Sebolvero?

A It is shorter than this one.

Q Now, during that time that Rafael Marco, Simeon Marco

and Dulcisimo Beltran were inflicting injuries on the body of
Bienvenido Sebolvero, what did the father of Bienvenido
Sebolvero do? Where were they at that time?

A Constancio Sebolvero and the father ran away and they

have not seen the incident.

Q Do you remember if the father of Bienvenido Sebolvero

ever ran afterwards?

A No, sir.

Q Now, that happened to Bienvenido Sebolvero after Rafael

Marco, Dulcisimo Beltran and Simeon Marco stabbed him?
 A They ran away and after they ran away, Bienvenido
Sebolvero stood up slowly and walked zigzagly towards the
store of Pinda and when he arrived in front of the store he
fell down to the ground. (Pp. 23-27, t.s.n.)

The nearest indication of Bienvenido's position vis-a-vis those Of the Marcos and
Beltran at the moment that Vicente was holding the hand of Simeon appears only in the
cross-examination of Garbajosa, when he said that "Bienvenido Sabelvero, was nearer
to the three accused" than either Vicente or Constancio, which makes the whole matter
more confusing.

As matters stand, Our problem is to determine whether or not the act of Rafael in
stabbing Bienvenido is a separate one from the stabbing of said deceased by the two
other accused who did not appeal, Simeon Marco and Dulcisimo Beltran. To be sure,
the acts of each of the three of them followed one after the other in rather fast
succession, as if propelled by a common and concerted design, but this circumstance
alone does not prove criminal conspiracy. In order that mere simultaneity or near
simultaneity of the acts of several accused may justify the conclusion that they had
conspired together, the inference must be ineludible.

It would seem that there must have been some bad blood between the Sabelveros and
the Marcos but Vicente categorically denied that there was any misunderstanding
between them and although Constancio suggested that there was, he was quick in
adding that the same had been patched up. This makes commonality of intent on the
part of the three accused not necessarily existent.

As already stated, Simeon and Beltran did not appeal from the decision of the trial court
which credited them with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary and imposed on them
the penalty of only Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
Seventeen (17) Years, Four (4) Months and One (1) Day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. And indeed there can be no doubt as to the homicidal character of their
assault on Bienvenido. In the case of herein appellant, while it is true that he somehow
started the by trying to stab Bienvenido, and did cause him injury on the left hand, there
is no clear evidence connecting his act with those of Beltran and Simeon. As We have
noted earlier, Beltran came out of nowhere and it is not shown that Rafael saw him
before the latter stabbed Bienvenido near the anus. On the other hand, the most that
We can gather from Carbajosa's testimony is that Simeon was being held by Vicente,
when Rafael tried to chase Bienvenido. In any event, if Rafael had any intention to really
kill Bienvenido, he did not have to await for Simeon and Beltran to do it. Bienvenido had
fallen to the ground, and that was the chance to finish with him. But here is precisely
where the prosecution's evidence is incomplete. The distance and relative position of
Rafael from where Bienvenido fell are not indicated. What appears instead is that
Beltran and Simeon were the ones who stabbed him fatally. What Rafael did or where
he was after Bienvenido fell and while Beltran and Simeon were assaulting has not
been shown.
We find the following ratiocination of appellant's counsel de oficio to be well taken:

2. The evidence on record does not show beyond

reasonable doubt that appellant acted in conspiracy with the
two other accused in the actual killing of the decedent.

This Honorable Court has established the rule that conspiracy, although
implied or indirect, must, nonetheless, be positively and convincingly
proved and established (People vs. Aplegido, 76 Phil. 571). Only recently,
this Honorable Tribunal said, through the pen of Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro, that:

... As a facile device by which an accused may be ensnared

and kept within the penal fold, conspiracy requires
conclusive proof if we are to maintain in full subbed the
substance of the time-honored principle of criminal law
requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt before conviction ...
(People vs. Tividad,, L-21469, June 30, 1967; 20 SCRA 549,
554; emphasis supplied).

The Court also laid down the following norm in the said case of People vs.
Tividad:

... It is undubitably clear from the record that the accused did
not attack the deceased simultaneously. Even if they did,
this would not of itself indicate the existence of a conspiracy
among them as simultaneity per se is not a badge of
conspiracy, absent the requisite concurrence of wills. It is not
sufficient that the attack is joint and simultaneous; it is that
the assailants are animated by one and the same purpose
(U.S. vs. Magcomot, 13 Phil 386, 389; People vs. Caballero ,
53 Phil. 584, 595-596). Evidently, in a situation where the as
were not simultaneous but successive, greater proof is
demanded to establish concert of crime design. The
evidence for the prosecution was that the assaults on the
were out by a successively (Id., pp. 554-55; emphasis
supplied)

As happened in the Tividad case, the facts established by the evidence

hem show that appellant did not attack the document simultaneously and
in concert with the two other accuse From the testimony of Dominador
Carbajosa, it will be seen that: (1) it was the appellant who went after the
decedent first. And the situation at that moment was this: Simeon Marco
was chasing Constancio Sebelvero while appellant, on the other hand,
was approaching Vicente Sebelbero. The latter had just shouted to his two
sons to run away when the appellant overtook the document and stabbed
at hint Accused Dulcisimo Beltran, it will be noted, was not yet a
participant. (2) After the appellant wounded the decedent on the hand, the
latter continued running. There is no evidence however, that appellant
continued running after him (3) While running, the decadent ripped and fell
down. Accused Dulcisimo Beltran just came from nowhere and stabbed
the decedent near the anus. It will be noted from the time appellant
wounded the document on the hand up to the time Dulcisimo Beltran
stabbed him at the back, an appreciable length of time elapse There is no
evidence just how far Beltran was from the respondent when the latter felt
Neither is there evidence that the decadent was running in the direction of
Beltran The evidence is only that Dulcisimo Beltran came upon the
document who had fallen to the ground and nabbed him. (4) After
Dulcisimo Beltran had stabbed the decedent Simeon Marco, who earlier
had been chasing Constancio Sebelbero came also and stabbed the
decedent. From Dominador Carbajosa's testimony, it appears that there
was no appreciable lapse of time between the stabbing by Dulcisimo
Beltran and that by Simeon Marco. (5) There is no showing that appellant
joined his two other accused during or after their stabbing of the
respondent Carbajosa merely stated that after the stabbing, "they ran
away" (session of Sept. 13, 1965; t.s.n., p. 27)

From the foregoing, this Honorable Court will that the stabbing of the
decedent by the three accused (including appellant) was not
simultaneous. Rather, it was successive, with appellant inflicting the first
blow. And, Dulcisimo Beltran and Simeon Marco were nowhere around
yet. It was only after the decedent fell down that the latter two came and
successively stabbed him. The manner in which the incident occurred
indicates that there was no pre-conceived plan among the three accused
to kill the decedent. It strongly suggests, on the other hand, that Dulcisimo
Beltran and Simeon Marco participated suddenly, unexpectedly and
without any previous agreement.

Another interesting point to observe is that there is absolutely no showing

that appellant knew of the criminal intentions of Dulcisimo Beltran or
Simeon Marco as to the decedent. There is no proof that appellant chased
the decedent in the direction of Simeon Marco or Dulcisimo Beltran. It was
not even shown that appellant knew that Dulcisimo Beltran was around at
the start. As to Simeon Marco, it will be remembered that when the
appellant started after the decedent, Simeon Marco was running after
Constancio Sebelbero. Hence, appellant could not have intentionally
chased the decedent in the direction of Simeon Marco. Besides, as
previously pointed out already, there is no evidence showing that
appellant ran after or chased the decedent at all. Dominador Carbajosa
said only that appellant overtook the decedent who was just nearby and
then stabbed at him (Session of Sept. 13, 1965; t.s.n., p. 23). Likewise,
there is no evidence that after the decedent ran again, the appellant
continued going after him.

Neither is there any showing that after the decedent was able to run away
from the appellant with only a slight would on the hand, the latter shouted
to Dulcisimo Beltran or Simeon Marco for assistance. As the facts were
related by the star prosecution witness. Dulcisimo Beltran and Simeon
Marco just came upon the fallen decedent and stabbed him. There is no
showing that Dulcisimo Beltran and Simeon Marco fell upon the decedent
in response to shout or cries from the appellant. Lastly, there is no proof
that while Simeon Marco and Dulcisimo Beltran were stabbing the
decedent, appellant gave them any inciting or encouraging words, or that
he even joined them.

The point appellant wants to established with all the foregoing

considerations is that the prosecution utterly failed to established the guilty
knowledge and assent of appellant concerning the criminal design of
Dulcisimo Beltran and Simeon Marco. And the established rule is that:

xxx xxx xxx

... a person may be convicted for the criminal act of another where,
between them there has been conspiracy or unity of purpose and intention
in the commission of the crime charged. In other words, the accused must
be shown to have had guilty participation in the criminal design
entertained by the slayer, and this presupposes knowledge on his part of
such criminal design. It is not enough that there be a relation between the
acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as
co-principal or accomplice; it is furthermore, necessary that the latter, with
knowledge of the former's criminal intent, should cooperate with moral or
material aid in the consummation of the crime ... (People vs. Ibañez, 77
Phil. 664, 665-666; emphasis supplied).

The trial court, therefore, seriously erred in holding appellant responsible

together with Dulcisimo Beltran and Simeon Marco for the death of the
decedent on the basis of incorrect conspiracy.

3. Appellant cannot be held liable for the death of decedent under death of
the Revised Penal Code.

Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code provides that, "criminal

liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony
(delito)although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended." Under this provision, one who commits an intentional felony is
responsible for all the consequences which may naturally and logically
 result thereto whether form or intended or not. (I Reyes, The Revised
Penal Code, 6th ed., p. 62).

It cannot be denied that the stabbing of the decedent by the appellant

which caused a slight wound on the former's hand was intentionally made;
hence, felony. However, the ensuing death of the decedent was not the
direct, natural and logical consequence of the wound inflicted by the
appellant. There was an active intervening cause, which was no other
than the sudden and appearance and participation of Simeon Marco and
Beltran. And there is authority that if the consequences produced have
resulted from a distinct act or fact absolutely from the criminal case the
offender is not responsible for such consequence. (People vs. Rellin, 77
Phil. 1038; I Reyes, 75). (Pp. 18-22, Appellant's brief — pp. 53-57,
Record.)

All circumstances considered, We are not convinced beyond reasonable doubt that
appellant was in any conspiracy with Simeon and Beltran to kill Bienvenido or any of the
Sabelberos. In the absence of clear and convincing the We can only speculate as to
why appellant did not join his son, Simeon, and Beltran in attacking Bienvenido after he
had fallen to the ground. Either the two were too fast for him and were thus able to act
ahead of him or that he voluntarily desisted from further pursuing the deceased after
hitting him on the left hand. In line with the presumption of innocence which We are
constitutionally bound to accorded. We are constrained to hold that he had no homicidal
intent. He can be held criminally responsible only for the wound on the back of the left
hand of the deceased which is described as a "stab wound, 2-1/2 inches wide at the
back of the left hand" by witness Felix S. Toledo, the Sanitary Inspector, who examined
the corpse. And there being no evidence as to the period of incapacity or medical
attendance consequence to said wound, appellant is guilty only of slight physical
injuries. (Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. II, p. 1258, 1961 ed.)

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby modified,
and in its stead appellant is found guilty only of slight physical injuries and hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of twenty (20) days of arresto menor, and to pay the
costs.

Fernando (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, JJ., concur.

Antonio, J., took no part.

47 Phil. 48

MALCOLM, J.:

These are five related criminal cases for the crimes of falsification of public documents
and estafa committed by means of falsification of public documents, in which the
accused are Pedro A. Pacana, secretary of the provincial board of Misamis, Isidro
Adorable, member of the provincial board of Misamis, and Vicente P. Castro, member
of the provincial board of Misamis. Should convictions be sustained, Pacana will receive
sentences totalling forty-four years and five days imprisonment, and Adorable and
Castro for the alleged unlawful taking of P25 each will receive sentences of ten years
and one day imprisonment.

The charge in the first numbered case against Pedro A. Pacana relates to the
falsification by the accused of minutes of the meeting of the provincial board on June 9,
1923, for the alleged purpose of permitting the district engineer to incur illegal expenses
in the reconstruction of a provincial road. The charge in the second case against the
same accused relates to the falsification of minutes of the provincial board on June 16,
1923. The charge in the third case against the same accused relates to the falsification
of an excerpt from the minutes of the provincial board of June 9, 1923. And the last two
cases, one against provincial board member Isidro Adorable and Pedro A. Pacana, and
the other against provincial board member Vicente P. Castro and Pedro A. Pacana,
relate to the crimes of estafa committed by means of falsification of public documents,
whereby it is alleged Adorable and Castro were each able to collect the sum of P25 as
per diems for two fictitious meetings of the provincial board. Since the first three cases
were tried together and the last two together, and since the facts of all of them are
closely interwoven, for convenience sake a general statement will first be made, leaving
for special mention certain circumstances affecting particular cases.

The provincial board of Misamis is made up of Segundo Gaston, governor, and Isidro
Adorable and Vicente P. Castro, members, with Pedro A. Pacana as secretary. The
board as thus1 composed left on an inspection trip of the province on May 23, 1923. A
session of the board was held in the municipality of Tulisan, Misamis, on June 4, 1923.
It returned to Cagayan, Misamis, the provincial capital, on the morning of June 18,
1923. Following the arrival of the board at the provincial capital, it was kept busy during
the succeeding days' because on June 19, 1923, the Governor-General landed at the
port of Cagayan, because on that day was the Rizal birthday celebration, because on
June 20, 1923, the Governor-General departed, and because on the same day there
arrived the Quezon-Roxas-Osmena- Gabaldon-Guevara party which left on June 21,
1923. These facts are not disputed.

It is likewise admitted that the documents on which the prosecutions are based, Exhibits
C, D, Q-3, Y, and X, are actually in existence. It is the theory of the prosecution that said
documents were prepared by the provincial secretary with the connivance of the
members of the provincial board for illegal purposes. To substantiate this theory,
attention is concentrated on the following prominent facts:
Exhibits C and D were seen by the chief clerk of the district auditor, Juan Callante, in
the office of Pacana on the afternoon of June 18,1923. Copies of Exhibits C and D were
made by a clerk in the office of the district auditor, Juan Borja, on the morning of June
19,1923. An excerpt from Exhibit C containing resolution No. 224 was received in the
office of the provincial treasurer of Misamis before 5:50 o'clock on the afternoon of June
19,1923. Another excerpt from Exhibit C containing resolution No. 225, Exhibit Q-3, the
basis of the third prosecution, was received in the office of the district engineer on June
27, 1923, and when the chief clerk of this office noted the date June 9, 1923, on the
minutes and brought it to the attention of the provincial secretary, the date wag changed
to June 16, 1923. The mistake of the secretary was attempted to be rectified by the
provincial board on September 20, 1923, by changing the dates of the excerpts to June
16, 1923, and thus another error was perpetrated. (Exhibit B-2.) The originals of
Exhibits C and D have disappeared, possibly through the machinations of the provincial
secretary. The provincial board of Misamis could not have celebrated a session at
Cagayan before June 18, 1923, because of its absence on an inspection trip, and could
not have celebrated a session on the afternoon of June 19, 1923, as claimed by the
defense, because of a velada held on the same afternoon in the intermediate school of
Cagayan at which the provincial governor and member Castro were present. And finally,
before the district auditor, the three accused reaffirmed the fact that sessions' of the
provincial board were held on June 9 and 16, 1923. (Exhibits J, K, L.) The theory of the
defense is diametrically opposed to that of the prosecution. Defendants' thesis is simple
and is to the effect that on account of the carelessness of the provincial secretary and
the amount of work thrown on his inexperienced shoulders, error was committed, and
that, instead of meetings of the provincial board being held on June 9 and 16, 1923,
meetings were in reality held on June 19 and June 21, 1923. To bulwark this stand, the
defense relies on the following facts:

Meetings of the provincial board were actually had on the afternoons of June 19 and
June 21, and to this effect is the testimony of the members present, the secretary, and a
clerk. Subjects were treated in these two sessions which could not possibly have come
to the attention of the provincial board prior to the sessions. The preoccupations of the
provincial secretary due to the inspection trip of the provincial board and the arrival and
departure of the parties of the Governor-General and of the Legislature, were the cause
of the mistakes. Errors of a similar character appear in dther meetings of the provincial
board. The excerpts of the meetings transmitted to the offices of the district engineer
and district auditor, respectively, were prepared by a clerk in the office of the provincial
governor and were merely signed as a matter of form by the provincial secretary. The
book in which the minutes were kept was obtained by the district auditor so that the
original minutes could have disappeared while in his possession. The accused all
signed the statements before the district auditor not understanding what the
investigation was about. As soon as the mistakes in dates were discovered and before
the criminal prosecution was begun, the provincial board corrected its minutes. (Exhibits
8, 10.)

Certain other points in relation with the questioned documents are helpful in resolving
these cases. Turning first to Exhibit C, on which the first case is exclusively founded,
and related to three of the other cases, it is interesting to take note of its contents. It is
headed "Regular Meeting of the Provincial Board of Misamis Held at Cagayan on
Thursday, June 9, 1923." As a matter of fact, June 9 fell on a Saturday. Then after
showing who were present and who were absent and the authority for the meeting,
under the general heading "Resolutions" comes a resolution concerning the payment of
the real property tax. Further on, the letter of His Excellency (Exhibit 4) informing the
board of his disapproval of resolution No. 207 of the board, current series, is again
mentioned. As a matter of fact, this letter was dated at Manila, on June 11,1923, and
probably was not received at Cagayan until June 19, 1923. Next following in the
minutes mention is made of a "letter dated June 14, 1923, of the district engineer."
Obviously, a "letter dated June 14, 1923," could not have been acted upon at a meeting
held on June 9, 1923. Next following in the minutes, comes a resolution having to do
with a communication of the district engineer "dated June 16, 1923." Obviously, again, a
communication of the district engineer "dated June 16, 1923," could not have been
approved at a meeting of the provincial board held on June 9, 1923. Also in the same
minutes are found data as to letters of the district engineer of June 8, 1923, of the Chief
of the Executive Bureau, and of the Public Utility Commissioner. So much for Exhibit C.

As for Exhibit D, on which the second case is founded and having connection with two
other prosecutions, it shows on its face a regular meeting of the provincial board of
Misamis held at Cagayan on Saturday, June 16,1923. It discloses action taken on about
fifty resolutions of municipal councils. Included therein is approval of a resolution of the
municipal council of Salay of June f5, 1923. According to the witness Sabas Abao,
municipal secretary of Salay, this resolution was not placed in the mails until June 16,
1923, and according to the postmaster of Balingasay, could not have left for the
provincial capital until June 20,1923.

As to Exhibit Q-3, the basis of the third prosecution, it purports to be an "excerpt from
the minutes of the regular meeting of the provincial board of Misamis held at Cagayan
on Thursday, June 9, 1923." The provincial secretary then certifies to the correctness of
a resolution concerning a "letter dated June 14, 1923, of the district engineer." The utter
impossibility of such approval needs no discussion.

Exhibits Y and X, approved by the provincial governor and certified to as correct and
just by the two members of the provincial board, respectively, are provincial vouchers in
the usual form calling for services rendered as members of the provincial board during
the period June 9, 16, 23, and 26, inclusive, at P12.50 a meeting.

According to the prosecution, the motive for the criminal acts was, first, the desire on
the part of the provincial secretary to fabricate resolutions probably with the connivance
of the provincial governor and the members of the provincial board, which would placate
the American engineer, Mr. Allen. The motive in the second place, according to the
prosecution, was to permit the members of the provincial board to collect a total of P50
not legally due them. On the other hand, according to the defense, the cause of the
prosecution is the enmity existing between the district engineer and the district auditor,
and has been brought about as an act of vengeance by the district auditor. Political
intrigue is also insinuated.

Up to this point, we have endeavored to state briefly and fairly the salient facts of record
as they are pressed upon us by the opposing sides. No comment of any importance has
been proffered. Having progressed thus far, the case comes down to a determination of
whether there was an intentional and deliberate falsification of public documents on the
part of the accused, or whether there was merely a human error committed, in which
criminal intent was wholly lacking.

It must be admitted that the physical facts are mostly in favor of the accused. The
documents, Exhibits C and D, could not have been fabricated on June 9 and June 16, if
the matters to which they relate were not then before the provincial board for action.
Unless by supernatural means, that would be an utter impossibility. Just how we can
reconcile these circumstances with the strong oral testimony, mostly circumstantial in
nature, presented by the prosecution, is hard to say, unless there was exaggeration on
the part of some of the witnesses.

Now as to the motive, recognizing that a quarrel was on between two provincial officers,
and that possibly the provincial board was siding with the, district engineer and against
the district auditor, just why was it necessary to make meetings out of the air to serve
this purpose when actual meetings' would have served the same purpose just as
effectively? The resolution approving of the acts of the district engineer had to be" made
public and copies of it had to be sent to the proper authorities. Just why two members of
the provincial board would care to certify to the correctness of meetings which were
never held, in order to benefit themselves in the paltry amount of P26 each, when they
could have recovered the same amount for actual meetings, is also difficult to
understand.

The whole case impresses us as a job bunglingly performed by the provincial secretary.
He is a man who should not be entrusted with official responsibility. He has none of the
qualifications which fit one for public office. But it is a far cry from hopeless ineptitude
and hopeless stupidity to criminal intent and criminal responsibility. Still, even under the
most favorable aspect, the facts skirt perilously near to the Penal Code crime of
reckless imprudence.

Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime. Actus non
facfc reum, nisi men sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting.
Ignorance or mistake as to particular facts, honest and Teal, will, as a general rule,
exempt the doer from criminal responsibility. The exception, of course, is neglect in the
discharge of a duty or indifference to consequences, which is equivalent to a criminal
intent. The element of malicious intent is supplied by the element of negligence and
imprudence.

A decision of the supreme court of Spain of December 23, 1885, is in point. It appeared
that one of the clerks in the office of the district court, in spreading upon the record the
proceedings taken for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for certain minor children
and the declaration of heirship in their favor, entered such proceedings as of a date
anterior to the date on which they were actually entered. The clerk, for this act, was
charged with the falsification of a public document, was convicted of imprudencia
temeraria in the court of first instance, and appealed to the supreme court of Spain,
which tribunal in reversing the judgment said in part:

"Considering that even though in the falsification of public or official documents, whether
by public officials or by private persons, it is unnecessary that there be present the idea
of gain or the intent to injure a third person, for the reason that, in contradistinction to
private documents, the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the
destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed, it must, nevertheless, be borne
in mind that the change in the public document must be such as to affect the integrity of
the same or to change the effects which it would otherwise produce; for, unless "that
happens, there could not exist the essential element of the intention to commit the crime
which is required by article 1 of the Penal Code; considering that the fact that Don
Augustin Montes Moreno set out the proceedings as of a date prior to that on which
they actually occurred, and therefore incorrectly, the remaining part of the document
being true, * * * neither affected the integrity or truth of said proceedings nor affected in
any essential way their results or effects, it is necessary to conclude that the criminal
intent mentioned in the previous observation was absent; considering that, even though
the accused consciously attached incorrect dates to the proceedings, nevertheless that
act does not take on the character of a crime, and for that reason the Audiencia de
Huelva erred in convicting the accused * * *." (See further decision of supreme court of
Spain of February 25, 1885; U. S. vs. Mateo [1913], 25 Phil., 324, 334; U. S. vs. Reyes
[1902], 1 Phil., 341; U. S. vs. Ah Chong [1910], 15 Phil,, 488; U. S. vs. Catolico [1911],
18 Phil., 504; and Guevara's Penal Code, 2d edition, pp. 1-3, 401-406.)

It is a serious matter to be responsible for sending the accused to prison for long terms.
All reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate error and not crime should be indulged in
to the benefit of the prisoners at bar. The Government has suffered no loss. If the
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of
which is consistent with the innocence of the accused of the crime charged and the
other consistent with their guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral
certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. (U. S. vs. Maafio [1903], 2 Phil.,
718.) We cannot bring ourselves to find these accused guilty on the facts of record.

It results, therefore, that we must, as we hereby do, reverse the judgments appealed
from and acquit the accused of the charges laid against them, with costs de oficio. So
ordered.