Kuroda v. Jalandoni, G.R. No.

L-2662, March 26, 1949

DECISION
(En Banc)

MORAN, C.J.:

I. THE FACTS

Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in
the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, was charged before the Philippine Military
Commission of war crimes. He questioned the constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that created the
National War Crimes Office and prescribed rules on the trial of accused war criminals. He contended
the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land
Warfare and therefore he is charged of crimes not based on law, national and international.

II. THE ISSUES

Was E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition and upheld the validity and constitutionality of E.O. No. 68.]

YES, E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional.

Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that –

The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.

In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day
including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international
jurisprudence established by the United Nation all those person military or civilian who have been
guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and
offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of
humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and
enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with
the generally accepted and policies of international law which are part of the our Constitution.

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for
acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the
Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied
that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly
based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules and principles
were accepted by the two belligerent nations the United State and Japan who were signatories to
the two Convention. Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the
Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been
deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and
principle of international law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or
shall be a signatory.

Facts:
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of
the Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines during Second World War. He was charged before a military
commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully
disregarded and failed to discharge his duties as such command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities
and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in
violation of the laws and customs of war”. The said military commission was empaneled under the authority of
Executive Order 68 of the President of the Philippines.

Kuroda challenged the validity of Executive Order 68. His arguments, were as follows:
(1) Executive Order 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the provisions of our constitutional law
but also our local laws.
(2) Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try him for acts committed in violation of the Hague
Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the
second only in 1947 and, therefore, he is charged with “crime” not based on law, national or international
(3) Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecutors in this case because they are not qualified to practice
law in Philippines in accordance with our Rules of court and the appointment of said attorneys as prosecutors
is violative of our national sovereignty.

Issue/s:
Whether or not Executive Order 68 had violated the provisions of our constitutional law

Discussions:
The provision of Article 2 Sec 3 states that “The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy,
adopts generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the
policy of peace, equality, justice freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations”. Every State is, by reason of
its membership in the family of nations, bound by the generally accepted principles of international law, which
are considered to be automatically part of its own laws.

Ruling/s:
No. Executive Order 68 has not violated the provision of our constitutional law. The tribunal has jurisdiction to
try Kuroda. This executive order is in accordance with Article 2 Sec 3, of Constitution. It is in accordance with
generally accepted principles of international law including the Hague Convention and Geneva Convention,
and other international jurisprudence established by the UN, including the principle that all persons (military or
civilian) guilty of plan, preparing, waging a war of aggression and other offenses in violation of laws and
customs of war.
The Philippines may not be a signatory to the 2 conventions at that time but the rules and regulations of both
are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international law. They were accepted even by the 2
belligerent nations (US and Japan)
Furthermore, the Phil. Military Commission is a special military tribunal and rules as to parties and
representation are not governed by the rules of court but the provision of this special law.

Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan Keh

Facts of the case: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court of
First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused
to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated
and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law,
lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the
defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese).
The court resolved three issues:
1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained
valid even after the American occupation;
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that “all laws,
regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null
and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” invalidated all
judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts;
3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation, those courts could continue hearing
the cases pending before them.
Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and
valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may
be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war.
Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror.
Civil obedience is expected even during war, for “the existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the
bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. And if they were not
valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them.
The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase “processes of any other government”
and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese
military occupation.
IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto governments are valid
and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated, then it could not have been MacArthur’s
intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of international law.
A well-known rule of statutory construction is: “A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other possible construction remains.”
Another is that “where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great mischief done, such
construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of
the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words.”
Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and violate international
law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the
phrase “processes of any other governments.”
In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they
become his and derive their force from him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become, by being
continued as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan.
It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, “law once established continues until changed by some
competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY.” Until, of course, the
new sovereign by legislative act creates a change.
Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and courts of
the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon
them have continued in force until now, it follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction
over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws
creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government.
DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take
cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012.
Summary of ratio:
1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue even during occupation
unless repealed.
2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because
such a construction would violate the law of nations.
3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending before it.
***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets possession and control through force
or the voice of the majority and maintains itself against the will of the rightful government)
through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in
the course of war; denoted as a government of paramount force)
through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in
insurrection against the parent state)

CO KIM CHAM VS VALDEZ TAN KEH

G.R. No. L-5 75 Phil 113, 122 September 17, 1945
CO KIM CHAM (alias CO KIM CHAM), petitioner,
vs.
EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Co Kim Cham had a pending Civil Case with the Court of First Instance of Manila initiated during
the time of the Japanese occupation.

The respondent judge, Judge Arsenio Dizon, refused to continue hearings on the case which were initiated
during the Japanese military occupation on the ground that the proclamation issued by General MacArthur that
“all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation
and control” had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the court of
the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation, and that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the
Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority.

Respondent, additionally contends that the government established during the Japanese occupation were no de
facto government.

Issues:

1. Whether or not judicial acts and proceedings of the court made during the Japanese occupation were valid
and remained valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and
Filipino forces.
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation issued by General MacArthur declaring that “all laws,
regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth
are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control”
has invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts.
3. Whether or not those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them, if the said judicial acts
and proceedings were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation.

Discussions:

 Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good
and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese
occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their
authority from the laws of war. The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work
on International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): “The right of one belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of
the enemy while in its military possession, is one of the incidents of war, and flows directly from the right
to conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the Constitution or political institutions of the conqueror, for
authority to establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his possession, during its military
occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of such government are regulated and limited. Such
authority and such rules are derived directly from the laws war, as established by the usage of the world,
and confirmed by the writings of publicists and decisions of courts — in fine, from the law of nations. . . .
The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private rights, continue in force
during military occupation, excepts so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror. . . .
He, nevertheless, has all the powers of a de facto government, and can at his pleasure either change the
existing laws or make new ones.”
 General MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments in his proclamation October 23, 1944, but
this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of
nations.
 If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military occupation
had been continued during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine Executive Commission,
and the so-called Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts, which had become
re-established and conceived of as having in continued existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of
the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminy (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 516), may
continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said courts, without necessity of enacting a law
conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings. As Taylor graphically points out in
speaking of said principles “a state or other governmental entity, upon the removal of a foreign military
force, resumes its old place with its right and duties substantially unimpaired. . . . Such political
resurrection is the result of a law analogous to that which enables elastic bodies to regain their original
 shape upon removal of the external force, — and subject to the same exception in case of absolute
crushing of the whole fibre and content.”

Rulings:

1. The judicial acts and proceedings of the court were good and valid. The governments by the Philippine
Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation
being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the court of
justice of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid. Those not
only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto government, which are not of a political complexion,
remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and
Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur.
2. The phrase “processes of any other government” is broad and may refer not only to the judicial processes,
but also to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of the
Philippines or other governmental agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese occupation.
Taking into consideration the fact that, as above indicated, according to the well-known principles of
international law all judgements and judicial proceedings, which are not of a political complexion, of
the de facto governments during the Japanese military occupation were good and valid before and
remained so after the occupied territory had come again into the power of the titular sovereign, it should
be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General Douglas MacArthur, in
using the phrase “processes of any other government” in said proclamation, to refer to judicial processes,
in violation of said principles of international law.
3. Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of
course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the
administration of justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer
the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to respect. An Executive Order
of President McKinley to the Secretary of War states that “in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not
usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals
substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be
adhered to on the present occasion.” And Taylor in this connection says: “From a theoretical point of view
it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his arbitrary will for all pre-existing
forms of government, legislative, executive and judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice such
arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the law of nations which compels the conqueror to continue
local laws and institution so far as military necessity will permit.” Undoubtedly, this practice has been
adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged,
inasmuch as belligerent occupation is essentially provisional, and the government established by the
occupant of transient character.
MEJOFF vs. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS [G.R. No. L-4254; September 26, 1951]
Facts:

The petitioner Boris Mejoff is an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this
country from Shanghai as a secret operative by the Japanese forces during the latter's
regime in the Philippines. Upon liberation, he was arrested as a Japanese spy by US
Army Counter Intelligence Corps. The People's Court ordered his release but the
Deportation Board taking his case found that having no travel documents, Mejoff was an
illegal alien in this country and must referred the matter to the immigration authorities.
After corresponding investigation, the Immigration Board of Commissioners declared
that Mejoff entered the Philippine illegally and therefore must be deported on the first
available transportation to Russia. The petitioner was then under custody. After
repeated failures to ship this deportee abroad, the authorities moved him to Bilibid
Prison at Muntinlupa where he has been confined up to the present time. Two years
had elapsed but the Government has not found ways and means of removing the
petitioner out of the country although it should be said in fairness to the deportation
authorities that it was through no fault of theirs that no ship or country would take the
petitioner.

Issue:

Whether or not Mejoff should be released from prison pending his deportation.

Held:

The Philippines adopts the Universal Declaration of Human Rights since it is a

generally accepted principle of international law. It should be applied also to illegal
aliens like Mejoff so that it would be a violation of the said international law to detain him
for an unreasonable length of time since no vessel from his country is willing to take
him. Considering that the Government desires to expel the alien and does not relish
keeping him at the people's expense, we must presume it is making efforts to carry out
the decree of exclusion by the highest officer of the land. On top of the presumption,
assurances were made during the oral argument that the Government is really trying to
expedite the expulsion of Mejoff. The petitioner can be released if there is a record
shown that the deportee is being imprisoned under the pretense of awaiting a chance
for deportation or unless the Government admit that it can not deport him or he is being
held for too long a period our courts will not interfere. Article 2 of the Philippine
Constitution states that, "The Philippines renounces war as instrument of national
policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and
amity with all nations. The protection against deprivation of liberty without due process
of law, and except for crimes committed against the laws of the land, is not limited to
Philippine citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of
nationality.

BAER vs. TIZONFACTS:

This is a petition seeking to nullify
seeking to nullify the orders of respondent Judge denying hismotion to dismiss a complaint filed
against him by the private respondent, Edgardo Gener,on the ground of sovereign
immunity of a foreign power, his contention being that it was in effect a suit against the United
States, which had not given its consent.
Private respondent Edgardo Gener is engaged in logging operations
and his operations werestopped by the
American Naval Base authorities. Hence, he filed a petition for preliminaryi n j u n c t i o n r e s t r a i n i n g p
e t i t i o n e r , B a e r , f r o m i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h h i s l o g g i n g o p e r a t i o n s . T h e restraining order
was granted by the lower court.Counsel for petitioner, contested the jurisdiction of respondent Judge, on
the ground that thesuit was against a foreign sovereign without its consent. The petitioner
filed a motion todismiss reiterating such ground. It was pointed out that he is the chief or head of an
agencyor instrumentality of the United States of America, with the subject matter of the action
beingofficial acts done by him for and in behalf of the United States of America. It was added thatin
directing the cessation of logging operations by respondent Gener within the Naval Base,petitioner was
entirely within the scope of his authority and official duty, the maintenance of the security of the Naval
Base and of the installations therein being the first concern and most important duty of the
Commander of the Base.Gener opposed on motion to dismiss, relying on the principle that "a private
citizen claimingtitle and right of possession of certain property may, to recover possession of said
property,s u e a s i n d i v i d u a l s , o f f i c e r s a n d a g e n t s o f t h e G o v e r n m e n t , w h o a r e s a i d
t o b e i l l e g a l l y withholding the same from him, though in doing so, said officers and agents claim that
theya r e a c t i n g f o r t h e G o v e r n m e n t . " T h a t w a s h i s b a s i s f o r s u s t a i n i n g t
h e j u r i s d i c t i o n o f respondent Judge.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Baer, acting in its official function is immune from suit.
RULING:
The invocation of the doctrine of immunity from suit of a foreign state without its consent
isappropriate. The U.S. Government has not given its consent to the filing of this suit which isessentially
against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit
against his own Government without the latter's consent but it is of a citizen filingan action against a
foreign government without said government's consent, whi ch rendersmore obvious the lack
of jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The principles of law behindthis rule are so elementary and of
such general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary tocite authorities in support thereof.T h e
solidity of the stand of petitioner is therefore evident. He cannot be prevented
f r o m performing his official function which is to protect and maintain the security of the
base.Continued logging operation by Mr. Gener within the boundaries of the U.S. Naval
Basewould not be consistent with the security and operation of the Base.

TAÑADA VS. ANGARA

272 SCRA 18
Facts:

On April 15, 1994, respondent Navarro, Secretary of Department of Trade and Industry and
a representative of the Philippine government, signed in the Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations. Bys signing the Final Act, the
Philippines agreed to submit the agreement establishing the World Trade Organization that
require the Philippines, among others, “to place nationals and products of member-countries
on the same footing as Filipinos and local products”. To that effect, the President ratified
and submitted the same to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section21, Article VII
of the Constitution. Hence the petitioner assailed the WTO Agreement for violating the
mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos
(and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally
produced goods”.

Issue: Whether the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
contravene the provisions of Sec. 19, Art. II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Art. XII, all of the 1987
Philippines Constitution.

Held:

The court ruled the petition in favor of the respondents.

Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." These

principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement
through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its
power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws.

The provisions of Sec. 10 and 12, Article XII of the Constitution, general principles relating
to the national economy and patrimony, is enforceable only in regard to “the grants or
rights, privileges and concessions covering national economy and patrimony” and not to
every aspect of trade and commerce. While the Constitution mandates a bias in favor of
Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for
business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and
limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices
that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist
policy.

On the other hand, there is no basis on the contention that under WTO, local industries will
all be wiped out and that Filipino will be deprived of control of the economy, in fact, WTO
recognizes need to protect weak economies like the Philippines.

TANADA VS. ANGARA

GR No. 118295 May 2, 1997

FACTS

The Philippines joined World Trade Organization as a founding member with the goal of improving Philippine
access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports. The
President also saw in the WTO the opening of new opportunities for the services sector, the reduction of costs and
uncertainty associated with exporting and the attraction of more investments into the country. On April 15, 1994,
respondent Navarro, then DTI Secretary, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations. On December 14, 1994, the Senate concurred in the ratification of the
President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the WTO which includes various agreements and
associated legal instruments. On December 16, 1994,the President signed the Instrument of Ratification.

ISSUES

1. Whether the WTO Agreement violated the mandated economic nationalism by the Constitution

2. Whether the provisions of the WTO Agreement restricts and impairs Philippine sovereignty, specifically the
legislative power vested in the Congress

3. Whether the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its annexes but not in the other documents referred
to in the Final Act is defective and insufficient and thus constitutes abuse of discretion

RULING

1. No. The Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods
and services in the development of the Philippine economy. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality
and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair. The constitutional policy of a self-reliant and
independent national economy does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It
contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community.

2. No. While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is
however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a
member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the
country from the rest of the world. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted
principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our laws. A treaty engagement is not
a mere moral obligation on the parties. By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of
sovereignty. The Philippines has effectively agreed to limit the exercise of its sovereign powers of taxation, eminent
domain and police power. The underlying consideration in this partial sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of
the other contracting states in granting the same privilege and immunities to the Philippines, its officials and its
citizens. The same reciprocity characterizes the same commitments under WTO-GATT. The point is that a portion
of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of
cooperation and amity with all nations.

3. No. The petitioners submit that concurrence in the WTO Agreement alone is flawed because it is in effect a
rejection of the Final Act. The Court held that a final act is an instrument which records the winding up of the
proceedings of a diplomatic conference and not the treaty itself. On the other hand, the WTO Agreement itself
expresses what multilateral agreements are deemed included as its integral parts. It should be added that the Senate
was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the member’s deliberation.

TANADA VS ANGARA
G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997

Wigberto E. Tanada et al, in representation of various taxpayers and as non-governmental

organizations, petitioners,
vs.
EDGARDO ANGARA, et al, respondents.

Facts:
This is a case petition by Sen. Wigberto Tanada, together with other lawmakers, taxpayers, and various NGO’s
to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.

Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the growth of our National Economy and against to the
“Filipino First” policy. The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners,
through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides
new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in
the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory
Senators, a “free market” espoused by WTO.

Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of our constitution, since the said Agreement
is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because it meant that Congress could not pass
legislation that would be good for national interest and general welfare if such legislation would not conform
to the WTO Agreement.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the petition present a justiciable controversy.

2. Whether or not the provisions of the ‘Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the
Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that
agreement’ cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19,
Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of
legislative power by Congress.
4. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial power by this
Honorable Court in promulgating the rules of evidence.
5. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate ‘in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization’ implied rejection of the treaty embodied in the
Final Act.

Discussions:

 1987 Constitution states that Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
 not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government.
 Although the Constitution mandates to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy controlled
by Filipinos, does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It
contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international community.” The WTO
itself has some built-in advantages to protect weak and developing economies, which comprise the vast
majority of its members. Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto powers in
the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each
member’s vote equal in weight to that of any other. Hence, poor countries can protect their common
interests more effectively through the WTO than through one-on-one negotiations with developed
countries. Within the WTO, developing countries can form powerful blocs to push their economic agenda
more decisively than outside the Organization. Which is not merely a matter of practical alliances but a
negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize
the need of developing countries like the Philippines to “share in the growth in international trade
commensurate with the needs of their economic development.”
 In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is
bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part
of our own laws. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its
legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations
undertaken. Paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) may intrudes on the power of the Supreme
Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures. With regard to Infringement of a
design patent, WTO members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the
provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes.
 The alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the
adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and the
adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations. The Senate, after
deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby
making it “a part of the law of the land” is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power.

Rulings:

1. In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the
petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary
 to settle the dispute. As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, “the judiciary is the final
arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature.”
2. While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises,
at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of
equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and
trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist
policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine
economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and
investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of
equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
3. By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary
act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or
derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of
mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their
otherwise absolute rights. As shown by the foregoing treaties Philippines has entered, a portion of
sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines
“adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to
the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.”
4. The provision in Article 34 of WTO agreement does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is
with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system.
5. The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required from
its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement. Moreover, the Senate was well-
aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the members’ deliberation on August 25, 1994. After
reading the letter of President Ramos dated August 11, 1994, the senators of the Republic minutely
dissected what the Senate was concurring in.

Lim vs. GMA

GR 151445, 11 April 2002
Facts: On 1 February 2002, petitioners Arturo D. Lim and Paulino Ersando filed this petition for certiorari
and prohibition attacking the constitutionality of the so-called “Balikatan 01-1.” The “Balikatan” exercises
are the largest combined training operations involving Filipino and American troops. It is pursuant to the
Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the US in 1951
and an effect of the Visiting Forces Agreement between the two nations of 1999.
Issues: Whether “Balikatan 02-1” is covered by the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).
Whether the VFA authorized American soldiers to engage in combat operations in Philippine territory.
Held: In resolving the first issue, it is necessary to refer to the VFA itself. However, not much help can be
had therefrom, unfortunately, since the terminology employed is itself the source of the problem. The VFA
permits United States personnel to engage on an impermanent basis in “activities”, the exact meaning of
which was left undefined. The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that
United States personnel must “abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement,
and in particular, from any political activity.”
The Supreme Court, after studied reflection of Articles 31 and 32 of Section 3 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, concluded that the ambiguity sorrounding the meaning of the word “activities” arose
from accident. In our view, it was deliberately made that way to give both parties a certain leeway in
negotiation. Under these auspices, the VFA if given legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercise. It is only
logical to assume that “Balikatan 02-1” a mutual anti-terrorism advising, assisting and training exercise,”
falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of the agreement. In
connection with the second issue, both the history and intent of the MDT and the VFA support conclusion
that combat-related activities, as opposed to combat itself are indeed authorized.
More so, the Terms of Reference are explicit enough. Paragraph 8 of Section I stipulates that US exercise
participants may not engage in combat “except in self-defense.” It is the opinion of the Court that neither
the MDT nor the DFA allow foreign troops to engage in an offensive war in Philippine territory bearing in
mind the salutory prescription stated in the Charter of the United Nations.
In the same manner, both the MDT and the VFA, as in all other treaties and international agreements to
which the Philippines is a party, must be read in the context of the 1987 Constitution. Although the
Constitution present a conflict between the fundamental law and our obligations from international
agreements, it however resolves it in section 2 of Article VIII of the Constitution.
The foregoing premises leave us no doubt that US forces are prohibited from engaging in an offensive war
on the Philippine territory.
Yamashita vs Styer
NOVEMBER 4, 2014 | KAAARINA

Yamashita vs Styer
G.R. No. L-129 December 19, 1945
Facts:
Petitioner Tomoyuki Yamashita, the commanding general of the 14th army group of the Japanese
Imperial Army in the Philippines, after his surrender became a prisoner of war of the United States of
America but was later removed from such status and placed in confinement as an accused war
criminal charged before an American Military Commission constituted by respondent Lieutenant
General Styer, Commanding General of the United States Army Forces, Western Pacific.

Filing for habeas corpus and prohibition against respondent, he asks that he be reinstated to his
former status as prisoner of war, and that the Military Commission be prohibited from further trying
him. He questions, among others, the jurisdiction of said Military Commission.

Issue/s:
1. Should the petitions for habeas corpus and prohibition be granted in this case?

2. Was the Military Commission validly constituted by respondent, therefore having jurisdiction over
the war crimes?

Ruling: 1. NO. 2. YES.

1. A petition for habeas corpus is improper when release of petitioner is not sought. It seeks no
discharge of petitioner from confinement but merely his restoration to his former status as a prisoner
of war, to be interned, not confined. The relative difference as to the degree of confinement in such
cases is a matter of military measure, disciplinary in character, beyond the jurisdiction of civil courts.
Prohibition cannot issue against one not made party respondent. Neither may the petition for
prohibition prosper against Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer. The Military Commission is not made party
respondent in this case, and although it may be acting, as alleged, without jurisdiction, no order may
be issued in these case proceedings requiring it to refrain from trying the petitioner.

The Court further ruled that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition even if the commission be
joined as respondent. As it has said, in Raquiza vs. Bradford (pp. 50, 61, ante), “. . . an attempt of our
civil courts to exercise jurisdiction over the United States Army before such period (state of war)
expires, would be considered as a violation of this country’s faith, which this Court should not be the
last to keep and uphold.”

2. Under the laws of war, a military commander has an implied power to appoint and convene a
military commission. This is upon the theory that since the power to create a military commission is
an aspect of waging war, military commanders have that power unless expressly withdrawn from
them.
By the Articles of War, and especially Article 15, the Congress of the United States has explicitly
provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try
offenders or offenses against the laws of war in appropriate cases.

Yamashita vs. Styer

G.R. L-129 December 19, 1945
Ponente: Moran, C.J.

Facts:
1. Yamashita was the Commanding General of the Japanese army in
the Philippines during World War 2. He was charged before the
American military commission for war crimes.

2. He filed a petition for habeas corpus and prohibition against Gen.

Styer to reinstate his status as prisoner of war from being accused as
a war criminal. Petitioner also questioned the jurisdiction of the military
tribunal.

Issue: Whether or not the military tribunal has jurisdiction

Held:

YES.
1. The military commission was lawfully created in conformity with an
act of Congress sanctioning the creation of such tribunals.
2. The laws of war imposes upon a commander the duty to take any
appropriate measures within his powers to control the troops under his
command to prevent acts which constitute violation of the laws of war.
Hence, petitioner could be legitimately charged with personal
responsibility arising from his failure to take such measure. In this
regard the SC invoked Art. 1 of the Hague Convention No. IV of 1907,
as well as Art. 19 of Hague Convention No. X, Art. 26 of 1929 Geneva
Convention among others.

3. Habeas corpus is untenable since the petitioner merely sought for

restoration to his former status as prisoner of war and not a discharge
from confinement. This is a matter of military measure and not within
the jurisdiction of the courts.

4. The petition for prohibition against the respondent will also not life
since the military commission is not made a party respondent in the
case. As such, no order may be issued requiring it to refrain from
trying the petitioner.