SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 83598. March 7, 1997.]

LEONCIA BALOGBOG and GAUDIOSO BALOGBOG , petitioners, vs .

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RAMONITO BALOGBOG and
GENEROSO BALOGBOG , respondents.

Ramon V . Ceniza for petitioners.

Antonio T . Bacaltos & Raul D. Bacaltos for private respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; CIVIL CODE; MARRIAGE CELEBRATED UNDER CIVIL CODE OF

1889; EXISTENCE DETERMINED BY PROVISIONS OF PRESENT CIVIL CODE AND THE
RULES OF EVIDENCE. — Art. 53 provides that marriages celebrated under the Civil Code of
1889 should be proven only by a certi ed copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry,
unless the books thereof have not been kept or have been lost, or unless they are
questioned in the courts, in which case any other proof, such as that of the continuous
possession by parents of the status of husband and wife, may be considered, provided
that the registration of the birth of their children as their legitimate children is also
submitted in evidence. This Court noted long ago, however, that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil
Code of 1889 of Spain did not take effect, having been suspended by the Governor General
of the Philippines shortly after the extension of that code to this country. Consequently,
Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case was brought in the lower court in
1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in accordance with the present
Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil Code, except as they related to
vested rights, and the rules on evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that
a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married. This
presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; MARRIAGE MAY BE PROVED BY SECONDARY
EVIDENCE. — Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage,
the failure to present it is not a proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be
presented to prove marriage.
3. LAW; CIVIL CODE; MARRIAGE; EXCHANGE OF VOWS, PRESUMED. — Neither
is there merit in the argument that the existence of the marriage cannot be presumed
because there was no evidence showing in particular that Gavino and Catalina, in the
presence of two witnesses, declared that they were taking each other as husband and
wife. An exchange of vows can be presumed to have been made from the testimonies of
the witnesses who state that a wedding took place, since the very purpose for having a
wedding is to exchange vows of marital commitment. It would indeed be unusual to have a
wedding without an exchange of vows and quite unnatural for people not to notice its
absence. The law favors the validity of marriage, because the State is interested in the
preservation of the family and the sanctity of the family is a matter of constitutional
concern.
4. ID.; ID.; FILIATION; PROVED BY CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF STATUS OF
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 LEGITIMATE CHILD AND ADMISSION OF UNCLE; CASE AT BAR. — Petitioners contend that
private respondents' reliance solely on testimonial evidence to support their claim that
private respondents had been in the continuous possession of the status of legitimate
children is contrary to Art. 265 of the Civil Code which provides that such status shall be
proven by the record of birth in the Civil Register, by an authentic document or by nal
judgment. But in accordance with Arts. 266 and 267, in the absence of titles indicated in
Art. 265, the liation of children may be proven by continuous possession of the status of
a legitimate child and by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws.
The marriage of Gavino and Catalina has already been shown in the preceding discussion.
The treasurer of Asturias, Cebu certi ed that the records of birth of that municipality for
the year 1930 could not be found, presumably because they were lost or destroyed during
the war. But Matias Pogoy testi ed that Gavino and Catalina begot three children, one of
whom, Petronilo, died at the age of six. Catalina testi ed that private respondents
Ramonito and Generoso are her children by Gavino Balogbog. That private respondents
are the children of Gavino and Catalina Balogbog cannot therefore be doubted. Moreover,
the evidence in the record shows that petitioner Gaudioso Balogbog admitted to the
police of Balamban, Cebu that Ramonito is his nephew.

DECISION

MENDOZA , J : p

This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, a rming the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu City (Branch IX), declaring private
respondents heirs of the deceased Basilio and Genoveva Balogbog entitled to inherit from
them.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog
and Genoveva Arnibal who died intestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively. They had an older
brother, Gavino, but he died in 1935, predeceasing their parents.
In 1968, private respondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought an action
for partition and accounting against petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate
children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such, they were entitled to the one-third
share of Gavino in the estate of their grandparents.
In their answer, petitioners denied knowing private respondents. They alleged that
their brother Gavino died single and without issue in their parents' residence at Tag-
amakan, Asturias, Cebu. In the beginning they claimed that the properties of the estate had
been sold to them by their mother when she was still alive, but they later withdrew this
allegation. cdtai

Private respondents presented Priscilo Y. Trazo, 2 then 81 years old, mayor of the
municipality of Asturias from 1928 to 1934, who testi ed that he knew Gavino and
Catalina to be husband and wife and Ramonito to be their rst child. On cross-examination,
Trazo explained that he knew Gavino and Catalina because they performed at his
campaign rallies, Catalina as "balitaw" dancer and Gavino Balogbog as her guitarist. Trazo
said he attended the wedding of Gavino and Catalina sometime in 1929, in which Rev.
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 Father Emiliano Jomao-as o ciated and Egmidio Manuel, then a municipal councilor,
acted as one of the witnesses.
The second witness presented was Matias Pogoy, 3 a family friend of private
respondents, who testi ed that private respondents are the children of Gavino and
Catalina. According to him, the wedding of Gavino and Catalina was solemnized in the
Catholic Church of Asturias, Cebu and that he knew this because he attended their
wedding and was in fact asked by Gavino to accompany Catalina and carry her wedding
dress from her residence in Camanaol to the poblacion of Asturias before the wedding
day. He testi ed that Gavino died in 1935 in his residence at Obogon, Balamban, Cebu, in
the presence of his wife. (This contradicts petitioners' claim made in their answer that
Gavino died in the ancestral house at Tag-amakan, Asturias.) Pogoy said he was a
carpenter and he was the one who had made the co n of Gavino. He also made the co n
of the couple's son, Petronilo, who died when he was six.
Catalina Ubas testi ed concerning her marriage to Gavino. 4 She testi ed that after
the wedding, she was handed a "receipt," presumably the marriage certi cate, by Fr.
Jomao-as, but it was burned during the war. She said that she and Gavino lived together in
Obogon and begot three children, namely, Ramonito, Petronilo, and Generoso. Petronilo
died after an illness at the age of six. On cross-examination, she stated that after the death
of Gavino, she lived in common law relation with a man for a year and then they separated.
Private respondents produced a certi cate from the o ce of the Local Civil
Registrar (Exh. P) that the Register of Marriages did not have a record of the marriage of
Gavino and Catalina, another certi cate from the o ce of the Treasurer (Exh. L) that there
was no record of the birth of Ramonito in that o ce and, for this reason, the record must
be presumed to have been lost or destroyed during the war, and a certi cate by the Parish
Priest of Asturias that there was likewise no record of birth of Ramonito in the church, the
records of which were either lost or destroyed during the war. (Exh. M)
On the other hand, as defendant below, petitioner Leoncia Balogbog testi ed 5 that
Gavino died single at the family residence in Asturias. She denied that her brother had any
legitimate children and stated that she did not know private respondents before this case
was led. She obtained a certi cate (Exh. 10) from the Local Civil Registrar of Asturias to
the effect that o ce did not have a record of the names of Gavino and Catalina. The
certi cate was prepared by Assistant Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga, who testi ed
that there was no record of the marriage of Gavino and Catalina in the Book of Marriages
between 1925 to 1935. 6
Witness Jose Narvasa testi ed 7 that Gavino died single in 1935 and that Catalina
lived with a certain Eleuterio Keriado after the war, although he did not know whether they
were legally married. He added, however that Catalina had children by a man she had
married before the war, although he did not know the names of the children. On cross-
examination, Narvasa stated that Leoncia Balogbog, who requested him to testify, was
also his bondsman in a criminal case filed by a certain Mr. Cuyos.
Ramonito Balogbog was presented 8 to rebut Leoncia Balogbog's testimony.
On June 15, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered judgment for
private respondents (plaintiffs below), ordering petitioners to render an accounting from
1960 until the nality of its judgment, to partition the estate and deliver to private
respondents one-third of the estate of Basilio and Genoveva, and to pay attorney's fees
and costs.
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 Petitioners led a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, contending that the
trial court erred in not giving weight to the certi cation of the o ce of the Municipal
Treasurer of Asturias (Exh. 10) to the effect that no marriage of Gavino and Catalina was
recorded in the Book of Marriages for the years 1925-1935. Their motion was denied by
the trial court, as was their second motion for new trial and/or reconsideration based on
the church records of the parish of Asturias which did not contain the record of the alleged
marriage in that church.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals a rmed. It held that private respondents failed to
overcome the legal presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife are in fact married; that a child is presumed to be legitimate, and that
things happen according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. 9
Hence, this petition.
We find no reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals.
First. Petitioners contend that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have
been proven in accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 because this
was the law in force at the time the alleged marriage was celebrated. Art. 53 provides that
marriages celebrated under the Civil Code of 1889 should be proven only by a certi ed
copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry, unless the books thereof have not been kept
or have been lost, or unless they are questioned in the courts, in which case any other
proof, such as that of the continuous possession by parents of the status of husband and
wife, may be considered, provided that the registration of the birth of their children as their
legitimate children is also submitted in evidence.
This Court noted long ago, however, that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 1889 of
Spain did not take effect, having been suspended by the Governor General of the
Philippines shortly after the extension of that code to this country. 1 0 Consequently, Arts.
53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case was brought in the lower court in 1968,
the existence of the marriage must be determined in accordance with the present Civil
Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil Code, except as they related to
vested rights, 1 1 and the rules on evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is
that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married.
1 2 This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary. 1 3 In this case,
petitioners' claim that the certi cation presented by private respondents (to the effect that
the record of the marriage had been lost or destroyed during the war) was belied by the
production of the Book of Marriages by the assistant municipal treasurer of Asturias.
Petitioners argue that this book does not contain any entry pertaining to the alleged
marriage of private respondents' parents.
This contention has no merit. In Pugeda v. Trias , 1 4 the defendants, who questioned
the marriage of the plaintiffs, produced a photostatic copy of the record of marriages of
the Municipality of Rosario, Cavite for the month of January, 1916, to show that there was
no record of the alleged marriage. Nonetheless, evidence consisting of the testimonies of
witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage. Indeed, although a marriage
contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, 1 5 the failure to present it is not
proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to prove marriage. 1 6
Here, private respondents proved, through testimonial evidence, that Gavino and Catalina
were married in 1929; that they had three children, one of whom died in infancy; that their
marriage subsisted until 1935 when Gavino died; and that their children, private
respondents herein, were recognized by Gavino's family and by the public as the legitimate
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 children of Gavino.
Neither is there merit in the argument that the existence of the marriage cannot be
presumed because there was no evidence showing in particular that Gavino and Catalina,
in the presence of two witnesses, declared that they were taking each other as husband
and wife. 1 7 An exchange of vows can be presumed to have been made from the
testimonies of the witnesses who state that a wedding took place, since the very purpose
for having a wedding is to exchange vows of marital commitment. It would indeed be
unusual to have a wedding without an exchange of vows and quite unnatural for people not
to notice its absence.
The law favors the validity of marriage, because the State is interested in the
preservation of the family and the sanctity of the family is a matter of constitutional
concern. As stated in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee: 1 8
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of
marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new
relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony.
Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of
any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.
The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were
not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the
constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code
of Civil Procedure is "that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28)
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage. (U.S. vs.
Villafuerte and Rabano [1905], 4 Phil., 476; Son Cui vs. Guepangco, supra; U.S. vs.
Memoracion and Uri [1916], 34 Phil., 633; Teter vs. Teter [1884], 101 Ind., 129.)

Second. Petitioners contend that private respondents' reliance solely on

testimonial evidence to support their claim that private respondents had been in the
continuous possession of the status of legitimate children is contrary to Art. 265 of the
Civil Code which provides that such status shall be proven by the record of birth in the Civil
Register, by an authentic document or by nal judgment. But in accordance with Arts. 266
and 267, in the absence of titles indicated in Art. 265, the liation of children may be
proven by continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child and by any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. Thus the Civil Code provides:
ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article,
the liation shall be proved by the continuous possession of status of a
legitimate child.
ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, nal
judgment or possession of status, legitimate liation may be proved by any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Petitioners contend that there is no justi cation for presenting testimonies as to the
possession by private respondents of the status of legitimate children because the Book
of Marriages for the years 1928-1929 is available.
What is in issue, however, is not the marriage of Gavino and Catalina but the liation
of private respondents as their children. The marriage of Gavino and Catalina has already
been shown in the preceding discussion. The treasurer of Asturias, Cebu certi ed that the
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 records of birth of that municipality for the year 1930 could not be found; presumably
because they were lost or destroyed during the war (Exh. L). But Matias Pogoy testi ed
that Gavino and Catalina begot three children, one of whom, Petronilo, died at the age of
six. Catalina testi ed that private respondents Ramonito and Generoso are her children by
Gavino Balogbog. That private respondents are the children of Gavino and Catalina
Balogbog cannot therefore be doubted.
Moreover, the evidence in the record shows that petitioner Gaudioso Balogbog
admitted to the police of Balamban, Cebu that Ramonito is his nephew. As the Court of
Appeals found:
Ironically, it is appellant Gaudioso himself who supplies the clincher that
tips the balance in favor of the appellees. In an investigation before the Police
Investigating Committee of Balamban, Cebu, held on March 8, 1968, conducted
for the purpose of inquiring into a complaint led by Ramonito against a
patrolman of the Balamban police force, Gaudioso testi ed that the complainant
in that administrative case is his nephew. Excerpts from the transcript of the
proceedings conducted on that date (Exhs. "N", "N-1", "N-2", "N-3" and "N-4") read:
"Atty. Kiamco — May it please this investigative body.
"Q.- Do you know the complainant in this Administrative Case No. 1?
"A.- Yes I know.

"Q.- Why do you know him?

"A.- I know because he is my nephew.
"Q.- Are you in good terms with your nephew, the complainant?
"A.- Yes.
"Q.- Do you mean to say that you are close to him?

"A.- Yes. We are close.

"Q.- Why do you say you are close?
"A.- We are close because aside from the fact that he is my nephew we
were also leaving (sic) in the same house in Butuan City, and I even
barrow (sic) from him money in the amount of P300.00, when I
return to Balamban, Cebu.
xxx xxx xxx

"Q.- Why is Ramonito Balogbog your nephew?

"A.- Because he is the son of my elder brother."
This admission of relationship is admissible against Gaudioso although
made in another case. It is considered as a reliable declaration against interest
(Rule 130, Section 22). Signi cantly, Gaudioso did not try to offer any explanation
to blunt the effects of that declaration. He did not even testify during the trial.
Such silence can only mean that Ramonito is indeed the nephew of Gaudioso, the
former being the son of Gavino. cdt

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

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 SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Per Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo, J., concurred in by Justices Ricardo J. Francisco and
Jose C. Campos. Jr.
2. TSN, December 3, 1969, pp. 2-6.
3. TSN, July 9, 1970, pp. 3-28.
4. TSN, July 25, 1980, pp. 3-28.

5. TSN, Aug. 12, 1972, pp. 5-18.

6. TSN, Aug. 28, 1972, p. 13.
7. TSN, Sept. 16, 1972, pp. 4-20.
8. TSN, July 7, 1983, pp. 3-5.

9. 1964 RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, §5 (z), (bb), and (cc).

10. Benedicto v. De la Rama, 3 Phil. 34 (1903).
11. CIVIL CODE, Art. 2270.
12. 1964 RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, §5(bb).
13. Alavado v. City Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230, 235 (1985); Perido v. Perido,
63 SCRA 97, 102-103 (1975).
14. 4 SCRA 849 (1962). See Madridejo v. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1 (1930); Jones v. Hortiguela, 64
Phil. 179 (1937); People v. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106 (1984).
15. Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 425 (1975).
16. Tolentino v. Paras, 122 SCRA 525 (1983); United States v. Memoracion, 34 Phil. 633
(1916); People v. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106 (1984).
17. CIVIL CODE, Art. 55.

18. 43 Phil. 43, 56 (1922). Accord, Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97 (1975).

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