Professional Documents
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People v. Wags
People v. Wags
DECISION
BERSAMIN , J : p
The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of an accused to be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved. In order to overcome the presumption of innocence, the
Prosecution is required to adduce against him nothing less than proof beyond reasonable
doubt. Such proof is not only in relation to the elements of the offense, but also in relation
to the identity of the offender. If the Prosecution fails to discharge its heavy burden, then it
is not only the right of the accused to be freed, it becomes the Court's constitutional duty
to acquit him.
The Case
Gilbert R. Wagas appeals his conviction for estafa under the decision rendered on
July 11, 2002 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, in Cebu City (RTC), meting on him the
indeterminate penalty of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 30 years of reclusion
perpetua, as maximum.
Antecedents
Wagas was charged with estafa under the information that reads:
That on or about the 30th day of April, 1997, and for sometime prior and
subsequent thereto, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, with intent to gain
and by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, to wit: knowing that he did not
have su cient funds deposited with the Bank of Philippine Islands, and without
informing Alberto Ligaray of that circumstance, with intent to defraud the latter,
did then and there issue Bank of the Philippine Islands Check No. 0011003, dated
May 08, 1997 in the amount of P200,000.00, which check was issued in payment
of an obligation, but which check when presented for encashment with the bank,
was dishonored for the reason "drawn against insu cient funds" and inspite of
notice and several demands made upon said accused to make good said check
or replace the same with cash, he had failed and refused and up to the present
time still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of Alberto
Ligaray in the amount aforestated.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
After Wagas entered a plea of not guilty, 2 the pre-trial was held, during which the
Defense admitted that the check alleged in the information had been dishonored due to
insufficient funds. 3 On its part, the Prosecution made no admission. 4
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At the trial, the Prosecution presented complainant Alberto Ligaray as its lone
witness. Ligaray testi ed that on April 30, 1997, Wagas placed an order for 200 bags of
rice over the telephone; that he and his wife would not agree at rst to the proposed
payment of the order by postdated check, but because of Wagas' assurance that he would
not disappoint them and that he had the means to pay them because he had a lending
business and money in the bank, they relented and accepted the order; that he released the
goods to Wagas on April 30, 1997 and at the same time received Bank of the Philippine
Islands (BPI) Check No. 0011003 for P200,000.00 payable to cash and postdated May 8,
1997; that he later deposited the check with Solid Bank, his depository bank, but the check
was dishonored due to insufficiency of funds; 5 that he called Wagas about the matter, and
the latter told him that he would pay upon his return to Cebu; and that despite repeated
demands, Wagas did not pay him. 6 cTEICD
Lastly, I would like to manifest that it is not my intention to shy away from
any financial obligation. SaDICE
Respectfully yours,
Wagas admitted the letter, but insisted that it was Cañada who had transacted with
Ligaray, and that he had signed the letter only because his sister and her husband (Cañada)
had begged him to assume the responsibility. 1 1 On redirect examination, Wagas declared
that Cañada, a seafarer, was then out of the country; that he signed the letter only to
accommodate the pleas of his sister and Cañada, and to avoid jeopardizing Cañada's
application for overseas employment. 1 2 The Prosecution subsequently offered and the
RTC admitted the letter as rebuttal evidence. 1 3
Decision of the RTC
As stated, the RTC convicted Wagas of estafa on July 11, 2002, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court nds the accused GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt as charged and he is hereby sentenced as follows:
SO ORDERED. 1 4
The RTC held that the Prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt all the
elements constituting the crime of estafa, namely: (a) that Wagas issued the postdated
check as payment for an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (b) that
he failed to deposit an amount su cient to cover the check despite having been informed
that the check had been dishonored; and (c) that Ligaray released the goods upon receipt
of the postdated check and upon Wagas' assurance that the check would be funded on its
date.
Wagas led a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, 1 5 arguing that the
Prosecution did not establish that it was he who had transacted with Ligaray and who had
negotiated the check to the latter; that the records showed that Ligaray did not meet him
at any time; and that Ligaray's testimony on their alleged telephone conversation was not
reliable because it was not shown that Ligaray had been familiar with his voice. Wagas also
sought the reopening of the case based on newly discovered evidence, speci cally: (a) the
testimony of Cañada who could not testify during the trial because he was then out of the
country, and (b) Ligaray's testimony given against Wagas in another criminal case for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
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On October 21, 2002, the RTC denied the motion for new trial and/or
reconsideration, opining that the evidence Wagas desired to present at a new trial did not
qualify as newly discovered, and that there was no compelling ground to reverse its
decision. 1 6 DSAEIT
The circumstances beg the question: did the Prosecution establish beyond
reasonable doubt the existence of all the elements of the crime of estafa as charged, as
well as the identity of the perpetrator of the crime?
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
Article 315, paragraph 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud
another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
xxx xxx xxx
In order to constitute estafa under this statutory provision, the act of postdating or
issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the e cient cause of the
defraudation. This means that the offender must be able to obtain money or property from
the offended party by reason of the issuance of the check, whether dated or postdated. In
other words, the Prosecution must show that the person to whom the check was delivered
would not have parted with his money or property were it not for the issuance of the check
by the offender. 2 5
The essential elements of the crime charged are that: (a) a check is postdated or
issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check is issued; (b) lack or
insu ciency of funds to cover the check; and (c) damage to the payee thereof. 2 6 It is the
criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check that is punishable, not the non-payment
of a debt. 2 7 Prima facie evidence of deceit exists by law upon proof that the drawer of the
check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three days from
receipt of the notice of dishonor.
The Prosecution established that Ligaray had released the goods to Cañada
because of the postdated check the latter had given to him; and that the check was
dishonored when presented for payment because of the insufficiency of funds.
In every criminal prosecution, however, the identity of the offender, like the crime
itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. 2 8 In that regard, the
Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that it was Wagas who had
defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check.
Firstly, Ligaray expressly admitted that he did not personally meet the person with
whom he was transacting over the telephone, thus:
Q: On April 30, 1997, do you remember having a transaction with the accused
in this case?
A: He talked with me over the phone and told me that he would like
to purchase two hundred bags of rice and he will just issue a
check . 2 9
Even after the dishonor of the check, Ligaray did not personally see and meet
whoever he had dealt with and to whom he had made the demand for payment, and that he
had talked with him only over the telephone, to wit:
Q: After the check was (sic) bounced, what did you do next? STcaDI
Secondly, the check delivered to Ligaray was made payable to cash. Under the
Negotiable Instruments Law, this type of check was payable to the bearer and could be
negotiated by mere delivery without the need of an indorsement. 3 1 This rendered it highly
probable that Wagas had issued the check not to Ligaray, but to somebody else like
Cañada, his brother-in-law, who then negotiated it to Ligaray. Relevantly, Ligaray confirmed
that he did not himself see or meet Wagas at the time of the transaction and thereafter,
and expressly stated that the person who signed for and received the stocks of rice was
Cañada.
It bears stressing that the accused, to be guilty of estafa as charged, must have
used the check in order to defraud the complainant. What the law punishes is the fraud or
deceit, not the mere issuance of the worthless check. Wagas could not be held guilty of
estafa simply because he had issued the check used to defraud Ligaray. The proof of guilt
must still clearly show that it had been Wagas as the drawer who had defrauded Ligaray by
means of the check.
Thirdly, Ligaray admitted that it was Cañada who received the rice from him and who
delivered the check to him. Considering that the records are bereft of any showing that
Cañada was then acting on behalf of Wagas, the RTC had no factual and legal bases to
conclude and nd that Cañada had been acting for Wagas. This lack of factual and legal
bases for the RTC to infer so obtained despite Wagas being Cañada's brother-in-law.
Finally, Ligaray's declaration that it was Wagas who had transacted with him over the
telephone was not reliable because he did not explain how he determined that the person
with whom he had the telephone conversation was really Wagas whom he had not yet met
or known before then. We deem it essential for purposes of reliability and trustworthiness
that a telephone conversation like that one Ligaray supposedly had with the buyer of rice
to be rst authenticated before it could be received in evidence. Among others, the person
with whom the witness conversed by telephone should be rst satisfactorily identi ed by
voice recognition or any other means. 3 2 Without the authentication, incriminating another
person just by adverting to the telephone conversation with him would be all too easy. In
this respect, an identi cation based on familiarity with the voice of the caller, or because of
clearly recognizable peculiarities of the caller would have su ced. 3 3 The identity of the
caller could also be established by the caller's self-identi cation, coupled with additional
evidence, like the context and timing of the telephone call, the contents of the statement
challenged, internal patterns, and other distinctive characteristics, and disclosure of
knowledge of facts known peculiarly to the caller. 3 4
Verily, it is only fair that the caller be reliably identi ed rst before a telephone
communication is accorded probative weight. The identity of the caller may be established
by direct or circumstantial evidence. According to one ruling of the Kansas Supreme Court:
Communications by telephone are admissible in evidence where they are
relevant to the fact or facts in issue, and admissibility is governed by the same
rules of evidence concerning face-to-face conversations except the party against
whom the conversations are sought to be used must ordinarily be identi ed. It is
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not necessary that the witness be able, at the time of the conversation, to identify
the person with whom the conversation was had, provided subsequent
identi cation is proved by direct or circumstantial evidence somewhere in the
development of the case. The mere statement of his identity by the party
calling is not in itself su cient proof of such identity, in the absence
of corroborating circumstances so as to render the conversation
admissible. However, circumstances preceding or following the
conversation may serve to su ciently identify the caller. The
completeness of the identi cation goes to the weight of the evidence
rather than its admissibility, and the responsibility lies in the rst
instance with the district court to determine within its sound discretion
whether the threshold of admissibility has been met. 3 5 (Bold emphasis
supplied) CHTcSE
Yet, the Prosecution did not tender any plausible explanation or offer any proof to
de nitely establish that it had been Wagas whom Ligaray had conversed with on the
telephone. The Prosecution did not show through Ligaray during the trial as to how he had
determined that his caller was Wagas. All that the Prosecution sought to elicit from him
was whether he had known and why he had known Wagas, and he answered as follows:
Q: Do you know the accused in this case?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: If he is present inside the courtroom [. . .]
A: No, sir. He is not around.
Q: Why do you know him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: But you cannot really ascertain that it was the accused whom you
are talking with?
A: I know it was him because I know him .
Q: Am I right to say [that] that was the rst time that you had a
transaction with the accused through telephone conversation, and
as a consequence of that alleged conversation with the accused
through telephone he issued a check in your favor?
A: No. Before that call I had a talk[ ] with the accused.
Q: But still through the telephone?
A: Yes, sir.
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Q: There was no instant (sic) that the accused went to see you
personally regarding the 200 bags rice transaction?
A: No. It was through telephone only.
Q: In fact[,] you did not cause the delivery of these 200 bags of rice
through the accused himself?
A: Yes. It was through Robert.
Q: So, after that phone call[,] you deliver[ed] th[ose] 200 sacks of
rice through somebody other than the accused?
A: Yes, sir . 3 7
Ligaray's statement that he could tell that it was Wagas who had ordered the rice
because he "know[s]" him was still vague and unreliable for not assuring the certainty of
the identi cation, and should not support a nding of Ligaray's familiarity with Wagas as
the caller by his voice. It was evident from Ligaray's answers that Wagas was not even an
acquaintance of Ligaray's prior to the transaction. Thus, the RTC's conclusion that Ligaray
had transacted with Wagas had no factual basis. Without that factual basis, the RTC was
speculating on a matter as decisive as the identification of the buyer to be Wagas. DIESHT
The letter of Wagas did not competently establish that he was the person who had
conversed with Ligaray by telephone to place the order for the rice. The letter was
admitted exclusively as the State's rebuttal evidence to controvert or impeach the denial of
Wagas of entering into any transaction with Ligaray on the rice; hence, it could be
considered and appreciated only for that purpose. Under the law of evidence, the court
shall consider evidence solely for the purpose for which it is offered, 3 8 not for any other
purpose. 3 9 Fairness to the adverse party demands such exclusivity. Moreover, the high
plausibility of the explanation of Wagas that he had signed the letter only because his
sister and her husband had pleaded with him to do so could not be taken for granted.
It is a fundamental rule in criminal procedure that the State carries the onus
probandi in establishing the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, as a
consequence of the tenet ei incumbit probation, qui dicit, non qui negat, which means that
he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove, 4 0 and as a means of respecting the
presumption of innocence in favor of the man or woman on the dock for a crime.
Accordingly, the State has the burden of proof to show: (1) the correct identi cation of the
author of a crime, and (2) the actuality of the commission of the offense with the
participation of the accused. All these facts must be proved by the State beyond
reasonable doubt on the strength of its evidence and without solace from the weakness of
the defense. That the defense the accused puts up may be weak is inconsequential if, in
the rst place, the State has failed to discharge the onus of his identity and culpability. The
presumption of innocence dictates that it is for the Prosecution to demonstrate the guilt
and not for the accused to establish innocence. 4 1 Indeed, the accused, being presumed
innocent, carries no burden of proof on his or her shoulders. For this reason, the rst duty
of the Prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal. For
even if the commission of the crime can be established, without competent proof of the
identity of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, there can be no conviction. 4 2
There is no question that an identi cation that does not preclude a reasonable
possibility of mistake cannot be accorded any evidentiary force. 4 3 Thus, considering that
the circumstances of the identi cation of Wagas as the person who transacted on the rice
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did not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake, the proof of guilt did not measure up
to the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt demanded in criminal cases. Perforce,
the accused's constitutional right of presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved
is not overcome, and he is entitled to an acquittal, 4 4 even though his innocence may be
doubted. 4 5
Nevertheless, an accused, though acquitted of estafa, may still be held civilly liable
where the preponderance of the established facts so warrants. 4 6 Wagas as the admitted
drawer of the check was legally liable to pay the amount of it to Ligaray, a holder in due
course. 4 7 Consequently, we pronounce and hold him fully liable to pay the amount of the
dishonored check, plus legal interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision.
WHEREFORE , the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision rendered on
July 11, 2002 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, in Cebu City; and ACQUITS Gilbert R.
Wagas of the crime of estafa on the ground of reasonable doubt, but ORDERS him to pay
Alberto Ligaray the amount of P200,000.00 as actual damages, plus interest of 6% per
annum from the finality of this decision. LLpr
Footnotes
*Vice Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, who is on official trip for the Court to
attend the Southeast Asia Regional Judicial Colloquium on Gender Equality
Jurisprudence and the Role of the Judiciary in Promoting Women's Access to Justice, in
Bangkok, Thailand, per Special Order No. 1529 dated August 29, 2013.
1.Records, pp. 1-2.
2.Id. at 32.
3.Id. at 41-42.
4.Id. at 42-43.
5.TSN, May 4, 2000.
6.TSN, May 25, 2000.
7.Id.
12.Id. at 5-7.
13.Records, p. 113.
14.Rollo, p. 26.
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15.Records, pp. 149-163.
16.Id. at 243-244.
17.Id. at 246.
18.Id. at 269-270.
19.Id. at 272.
20.Rollo, p. 36.
21.Id. at 149.
22.Id. at 157.
23.Id. at 163-170.
24.Id. at 171.
25.Timbal v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136487, December 14, 2001, 372 SCRA 358, 362-363.
26.Dy v. People, G.R. No. 158312, November 14, 2008, 571 SCRA 59, 70.
27.Recuerdo v. People, G.R. No. 168217, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA 517, 532.
28.People v. Caliso, G.R. No. 183830, October 19, 2011, 659 SCRA 666, 675; People v. Pineda,
G.R. No. 141644, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 478; Tuason v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.
113779-80, February 23, 1995, 241 SCRA 695.
29.TSN, May 4, 2000, lines 54-57.
30.TSN, May 25, 2000, p. 4.
(c) When it is payable to the order of a fictitious or non-existing person, and such fact was
known to the person making it so payable; or
(d) When the name of the payee does not purport to be the name of any person; or
43.Natividad v. Court of Appeals, No. L-40233, June 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 335, 346, citing People
v. Beltran, No. L-31860, November 29, 1974, 61 SCRA 246, 250; People v. Manambit, G.R.
Nos. 72744-45, April 18, 1997, 271 SCRA 344, 377, citing People v. Maongco, G.R. Nos.
108963-65, March 1, 1994, 230 SCRA 562, 575.
44.Natividad v. Court of Appeals, No. L-40233, June 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 335, 346.
45.Pecho v. People, G.R. No. 111399, September 27, 1996, 262 SCRA 518, 533; United States v.
Gutierrez, 4 Phil. 493 (1905); People v. Sadie, No. L-66907, April 14, 1987, 149 SCRA 240,
244; Perez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 76203-04, December 6, 1989, 180 SCRA 9, 13.
46.People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 154159, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 635, 651; Eusebio-Calderon v.
People, G.R. No. 158495, October 21, 2004, 441 SCRA 137, 147; Serona v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 130423, November 18, 2002, 392 SCRA 35, 45; Sapiera v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 128927, September 14, 1999, 314 SCRA 370, 378.
47.Section 61 of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides:
Section 61. Liability of Drawer. — The drawer by drawing the instrument admits the existence
of the payee and his then capacity to indorse; and engages that, on due presentment, the
instrument will be accepted or paid, or both, according to its tenor, and that if it be
dishonoured and the necessary proceedings on dishonour be duly taken, he will pay the
amount thereof to the holder or to any subsequent indorser who may be compelled to
pay it. But the drawer may insert in the instrument an express stipulation negativing or
limiting his own liability to the holder.