WHO MUST PROSECUTE In a May 4, 2004 resolution,8 the 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor

recommended the filing of an information for syndicated and

expunge. The case was later re-raffled to Branch 214, presided by
Judge Edwin D. Sorongon.
CRIMINAL ACTION? large scale illegal recruitment against the respondents. The City
Prosecutor approved his recommendation and filed the The RTC Rulings
Republic of the Philippines corresponding criminal information with the Regional Trial Court
In its March 8, 2006 order,21 the RTC granted respondent Alamil’s
SUPREME COURT (RTC) of Mandaluyong City (docketed as Criminal Case No. MC04-
motion for reconsideration. It treated respondent Alamil’s motion
Manila 8514 and raffled to Branch 212) presided by Judge Rizalina T.
for judicial determination as a motion to dismiss for lack of
Capco-Umali.
SECOND DIVISION probable cause. It found: (1) no evidence on record to indicate
Subsequently, in a December 14, 2004 resolution, the City that the respondents gave any false information to secure a
G.R. No. 178607 December 5, 2012 Prosecutor reconsidered the May 4, 2004 resolution and filed a license to operate as a recruitment agency from the POEA; and (2)
motion with the RTC to withdraw the information.9 The petitioner that respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTC’s
DANTE LA. JIMENEZ, in his capacity as President and jurisdiction through the filing of pleadings seeking affirmative
and respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their opposition10 and
representative of UNLAD SHIPPING & MANAGEMENT relief. Thus, the RTC dismissed the case, and set aside the earlier
comment to the opposition, respectively.
CORPORATION, Petitioner, issued warrants of arrest.
vs. In an August 1, 2005 resolution,11 the RTC denied the motion to
HON. EDWIN SORONGON (in his capacity as Presiding Judge of withdraw information as it found the existence of probable cause On April 3, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration,
Branch 214 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City), to hold the respondents for trial.12 Thus, the RTC ordered the stressing the existence of probable cause to prosecute the
SOCRATES ANTZOULATOS, CARMEN ALAMIL, MARCELl GAZA and issuance of warrants of arrest against the respondents. respondents and that respondent Alamil had no standing to seek
MARKOS AVGOUSTIS, Respondents. any relief from the RTC.22
On August 26, 2005, respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed an
DECISION omnibus motion for reconsideration and for deferred On April 26, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the
enforcement of the warrants of arrest.13 In a September 2, 2005 motion for being a prohibited pleading since the motion did not
BRION, J.: have the public prosecutor’s conformity.23
order,14 the RTC denied the omnibus motion, reiterating that the
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari[ 1] filed by Dante trial court is the sole judge on whether a criminal case should be
In its May 10, 2006 order,24 the RTC denied the petitioner’s
La. Jimenez (petitioner) to challenge the twin resolutions of the dismissed or not.
motion for reconsideration, finding that the petitioner merely
Court of Appeals ( CA) dated November 23, 20062 and June 28, reiterated arguments in issues that had been finally decided. The
On September 26, 2005, respondent Alamil filed a motion for
20073 in CA-G.R. SP No. 96584, which dismissed the petitioner's RTC ordered the motion expunged from the records since the
judicial determination of probable cause with a request to defer
petition for certiorari and denied his motion for reconsideration, motion did not have the public prosecutor’s conformity.
enforcement of the warrants of arrest.15
respectively.
On September 29, 2005, the petitioner filed his opposition with On May 19, 2006, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal.25
The Factual Antecedents
motion to expunge, contending that respondent Alamil, being a
On May 30, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the
The petitioner is the president of Unlad Shipping & Management fugitive from justice, had no standing to seek any relief and that
petitioner’s notice of appeal since the public prosecutor did not
Corporation, a local manning agency, while Socrates Antzoulatos, the RTC, in the August 1, 2005 resolution, already found probable
authorize the appeal and the petitioner had no civil interest in the
Carmen Alamil, Marceli Gaza, and Markos Avgoustis (respondents) cause to hold the respondents for trial.16
case.26
are some of the listed incorporators of Tsakos Maritime Services,
In a September 30, 2005 order,17 the RTC denied respondent
Inc. (TMSI), another local manning agency. On June 27, 2006, the petitioner filed his comment to the motion
Alamil’s motion for being moot and academic; it ruled that it had
to expunge, claiming that, as the offended party, he has the right
On August 19, 2003, the petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit4 with already found probable cause against the respondents in the
to appeal the RTC order dismissing the case; the respondents’
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City against the August 1, 2005 resolution, which it affirmed in the September 2,
fraudulent acts in forming TMSI greatly prejudiced him.27
respondents for syndicated and large scale illegal 2005 order.
recruitment.5 The petitioner alleged that the respondents falsely In its August 7, 2006 joint order,28 the RTC denied the petitioner’s
On October 10, 2005, respondent Alamil moved for
represented their stockholdings in TMSI’s articles of notice of appeal since the petitioner filed it without the
reconsideration and for the inhibition of Judge Capco-Umali, for
incorporation6 to secure a license to operate as a recruitment conformity of the Solicitor General, who is mandated to represent
being biased or partial.18 On October 25, 2005, the petitioner filed
agency from the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA). the People of the Philippines in criminal actions appealed to the
an opposition with a motion to expunge, reiterating that
CA. Thus, the RTC ordered the notice of appeal expunged from the
On October 9, 2003, respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their respondent Alamil had no standing to seek relief from the RTC.19
records.
joint counter-affidavit denying the complaint-affidavit’s
In a January 4, 2006 order,20 Judge Capco-Umali voluntarily
allegations.7 Respondents Avgoustis and Alamil did not submit any On October 18, 2006, the petitioner elevated his case to the CA
inhibited herself from the case and did not resolve respondent
counter-affidavit. via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari assailing the RTC’s March 8,
Alamil’s motion for reconsideration and the petitioner’s motion to
2006, May 10, 2006, and August 7, 2006 orders.
The CA Ruling contingent, subordinate or consequential interest.35 When the Thus, by filing several motions before the RTC seeking the
plaintiff or the defendant is not a real party in interest, the suit is dismissal of the criminal case, respondent Alamil voluntarily
In its November 23, 2006 resolution,29 the CA dismissed outright dismissible.36 submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC. Custody of the law is not
the petitioner’s Rule 65 petition for lack of legal personality to file required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application
the petition on behalf of the People of the Philippines. It noted Procedural law basically mandates that "[a]ll criminal actions for bail.42
that only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) has the legal commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted
personality to represent the People, under Section 35(1), Chapter under the direction and control of a public prosecutor."37 In WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal. The twin resolutions of
12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code. It also held appeals of criminal cases before the CA and before this Court, the the CoUJt of Appeals dated November 23, 2006 and June 28, 2007
that the petitioner was not the real party in interest to institute OSG is the appellate counsel of the People, pursuant to Section in CAG. R. SP No. 96584 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the
the case, him not being a victim of the crime charged to the 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative petitioner.
respondents, but a mere competitor in their recruitment business. Code. This section explicitly provides:
The CA denied30 the motion for reconsideration31 that followed. SO ORDERED.
SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. — The Office of the Solicitor
The Petition General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
The petitioner argues that he has a legal standing to assail the litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the
dismissal of the criminal case since he is the private complainant services of lawyers. . . . It shall have the following specific powers
and a real party in interest who had been directly damaged and and functions:
prejudiced by the respondents’ illegal acts; respondent Alamil has
no legal standing to seek any relief from the RTC since she is a (1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the
fugitive from justice. Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the
Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and Court of
The Case for the Respondents Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and
special proceedings in which the Government or any officer
The respondents32 submit that the petitioner lacks a legal standing
thereof in his official capacity is a party. (emphasis added)
to assail the dismissal of the criminal case since the power to
prosecute lies solely with the State, acting through a public The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only
prosecutor; the petitioner acted independently and without the the OSG can represent the People in criminal proceedings pending
authority of a public prosecutor in the prosecution and appeal of in the CA or in this Court. This ruling has been repeatedly stressed
the case. in several cases38 and continues to be the controlling doctrine.
The Issue While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may
be allowed to pursue the criminal action on his own behalf39 (as
The case presents to us the issue of whether the CA committed a
when there is a denial of due process), this exceptional
reversible error in dismissing outright the petitioner’s Rule 65
circumstance does not apply in the present case.
petition for certiorari for lack of legal personality to file the
petition on behalf of the People of the Philippines. In this case, the petitioner has no legal personality to assail the
dismissal of the criminal case since the main issue raised by the
Our Ruling
petitioner involved the criminal aspect of the case, i.e., the
The petition lacks merit. existence of probable cause. The petitioner did not appeal to
protect his alleged pecuniary interest as an offended party of the
The petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of crime, but to cause the reinstatement of the criminal action
the criminal case against the respondents. This involves the right to prosecute
which pertains exclusively to the People, as represented by the
It is well-settled that "every action must be prosecuted or OSG.40
defended in the name of the real party in interest[,]" "who stands
to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the Respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTC’s jurisdiction
party entitled to the avails of the suit."33Interest means material
interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or As a rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have
judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere interest in the submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. Filing pleadings seeking
question involved.34 By real interest is meant a present substantial affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the
interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, consequent jurisdiction of one's person to the jurisdiction of the
court.41
 By Resolution of this Court dated August 27, 1975, the respondent independently of and take a position inconsistent with that of the
Judge was required to file his answer within ten (10) days from Solicitor General.
Republic of the Philippines notice, and in connection therewith, a temporary restraining
SUPREME COURT order was issued to enjoin the respondent from further To begin with, it will be noted that the participation of the private
Manila proceeding with the afore-mentioned criminal cases. The petition prosecution in the instant case was delimited by this Court in its
was subsequently amended to include the People of the Resolution of October 1, 1975, thus: "to collaborate with the
SECOND DIVISION Solicitor General in the preparation of the Answer and pleadings
Philippines and thereafter, on January 14, 1976, the Solicitor
General, on behalf of the People of the Philippines, submitted his that may be required by this Court." To collaborate means to
G.R. Nos. L-41213-14 October 5, 1976
Comment to the petition. The Solicitor General informed this cooperate with and to assist the Solicitor General. It was never
JORGE P. TAN, JR., CESAR TAN, LIBRADO SODE TEOFANIS Court, thus: that they are "persuaded that there are bases for intended that the private prosecutors could adopt a stand
BONJOC, OSMUNDO TOLENTINO and MARIANO stating that the rendition of respondent Judge's decision and his independent of or in contravention of the position taken by the
BARTIDO, petitioners, resolution on the motion for new trial were not free from Solicitor General.
vs. suspicion of bias and prejudice ... . Considering the circumstances
There is no question that since a criminal offense is an outrage to
JUDGE PEDRO GALLARDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of of the instant case, the seriousness of the charges and counter-
the sovereignty of the State, it is but natural that the
Circuit Criminal Court, 13th Judicial District, Tacloban City, and charges and the nature of the evidence on hand to support them,
representatives of the State should direct and control the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. we feel that respondent Judge "appeared to have been heedless
prosecution. As stressed in Suarez v. Platon, et al., 3the
of the oft-reiterated admonition addressed to trial judges to avoid
Pelaez, Jalandoni & Adriano for petitioner Jorge P. Tan, Jr. prosecuting officer "is the representative not of. an ordinary party
even the impression of the guilt or innocence of the accused being
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
dependent on prejudice or prejudgment" and, therefore, it was
K.V. Faylona & Associates for petitioner Cesar Tan. impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
the submission of said official "that the case should he remanded
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it
Ruperto Kapunan, Jr. for petitioner Teofanis Bondoc. to the trial court for the rendition of a new decision and with
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a
instruction to receive additional evidence proferred by the
peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
Amadeo Seno, Artemio Derecho & Manuel Quimbo for petitioners accused with the right of the prosecution to present rebuttal
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence
Librado Isode, Osmundo, Tolentino and Mariano Bartido. evidence as inay be warranted" and, therefore, they interpose no
suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor—indeed, he
objection to the remand of the aforementioned criminal cases
Solicitor General Estilito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at
"for the rendition of a new decision by another trial judge, after
Alicia Simpio-Diy and Solicitor Eduardo L. Kilayko for respondents. liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from
the parties shall have adduced such additional evidence as they
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as
may wish to make, under such terms and conditions as this
Estanislao A. Fernandez and Dakila F. Castro & Associate as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one."
Honorable Court may deem fit to impose. 2
private prosecutors. Thus, it was stressed in People v. Esquivel, et al., 4 that there is an
On January 30, 1976, private prosecutors submitted their absolute necessity for prosecuting attorneys to lay "before the
Comment in justification of the challenged Orders of the court the pertinent facts at their disposal with methodical and
respondent Judge and objected to the remand of this case. meticulous attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps
ANTONIO, J.:
and loopholes in their evidence, to the end that the court's mind
In this Special Civil Action for certiorari with Prohibition, On February 12, 1976, the petitioners moved to strike out the may not be tortured by doubts, that the innocent may not suffer
petitioners seek the annulment of respondent Judge's Orders in "Motion to Admit Attacked Comment" and the "Comment" of the and the guilty not escape unpunished. Obvious to all, this is the
Criminal Cases Nos. CCC—XIII-50-L-S'72 and CCC-XIII-51-L- private prosecutor on the ground that the latter has "absolutely prosecution's prime duty to the court, to the accused, and to the
S'72, 1 to wit: (a) Order of July 21, 1975, denying petitioners' no standing in the instant proceedings before this Honorable state." It is for the purpose of realizing the afore-mentioned
motion for respondent Judge to disqualify or to inhibit himself Court and, hence, without any personality to have any paper of objectives that the prosecution of offenses is placed under the
from hearing and acting upon their Motion for New Trial and/or his entertained by this Tribunal. direction, control, and responsibility of the prosecuting officer.
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for New Trial; (b)
The private prosecutors now contend that they are entitled to The role of the private prosecutors, upon the other hand, is to
Order of July 23, 1975, denying petitioners' Motion for New Trial
appear before this Court, to take part in the proceedings, and to represent the offended parts, with respect to the civil action for
and/or Reconsidertion and Supplemental Motion for New Trial;
adopt a position in contravention to that of the Solicitor General. the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense. 'This civil
and (c) Order of July 25, 1975, ordering the transfer of the
action is deemed instituted with the criminal action, unless the
accused (petitioners herein) from Camp Bumpus PC headquarters, The issue before Us is whether or not the private prosecutors offended party either expressly waives the civil action or reserves
Tacloban city, to the Nationial Penitentiary, New Bilibid Prisons, have the right to intervene independently of the Solicitor General to institute it separately.5 Thus, "an offended party may intervene
Muntinlupa, Rizal. It is likewise sought, by way of prohibition, to and to adopt a stand inconsistent with that of the latter in the in the proceedings, personally or by attorney, specially in case of
compel respondent Judge to desist from further proceeding with present proceedings. offenses which can not be prosecuted except at the instance of
the afore-mentioned criminal cases.
the offended party. 6 The only exception to this is when the
There are important reasons which support the view that in the
offended party waives his right to civil action or expressly reserves
present proceedings, the private prosecutors cannot intervene
his right to institute it after the termination of the case, in which
case he lost his right to intervene upon the theory that he is direction and control of a criminal proceeding in violation of the on the subsequent motions by the respondent Judge were not
deemed to have lost his interest in its prosecution. 7 And in any provisions of the above-cited section 107 of General Orders, No. free from suspicion of bias and prejudice, the Solicitor General
event, whether an offended party intervenes in the prosecution of 58. stated:
a criminal action, his intervention must always be subject to the
direction and control of the prosecuting official. " 8 As explained Consequently, where from the nature of the offense, or where the In alleging bias and manifest partiality on the part of respondent
in Herrero v. Diaz, supra, the "intervention of the offended party law defining and punishing the offense charged does not provide judge, petitioners assert that:
or his attorney is authorized by section 15 of Rule 106 of the Rules for an indemnity, the offended party may not intervene in the
prosecution of the offense. 12 (a) Respondent judge kept improper contact with and was illegally
of Court, subject to the provisions of section 4 of the same Rule
influenced by the Larrazabals in connection with the decision of
that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by
There is no question that the Solicitor General represents the the two cases against petitioners herein;
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of
People of the Philippines or the State in criminal proceedings
the Fiscal." (Emphasis supplied) (b) In the latter part of 1973, with the trial of the Tan cases still in
pending either in the Court of Appeals or in this Court. Thus,
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 478, "Defining the Powers progress, respondent judge received, through one of his court
Therefore, although the private prosecutors may be permitted to
and Functions of the Office of the Solicitor General", provides: stenographers, two bottles of whisky from Mayor Inaki Larrazabal,
intervene, they are not in control of the case, and their interests
brother and uncle of the deceased victims Feliciano and Francisco
are subordinate to those of the People of the Philippines
SECTION 1. Function and Organization. (1) The Office of the Larrazabal;
represented by the fiscal. 9 The right which the procedural law
Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the
reserves to the injured party is that of intervening in the (c) On one occasion, Mayor Larrazabal had a short talk with
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and
prosecution for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability for respondent judge, after which the latter received from one of the
agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
the criminal action and not of demanding punishment of the private prosecutors a bottle of wine wrapped in a newspaper
requiring the services of a lawyer. ... The office of the Solicitor
accused. 10 As explained in People v. Orais: 11 which was "thick" and "bulky" and which allegedly contained
General shall constitute the law office of the Government, and
such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer. It "something else inside";
... the position occupied by the offended party is subordinate to
that of the promotor fiscal because, as promotor fiscal alone is shall have the following specific powers and functions:
(d) Respondent judge prepared the decision in the Tan cases
authorized to represent the public prosecution, or the People of based on the memorandum of the prosecution which was literally
(a) Represent the Governemnt in the Supreme Court and the
the Philippine Islands, in the prosecution of offenders, and to copied in said decision although with some corrections; and
Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the
control the proceeding, and as it is discretionary with him to
Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of
institute and prosecute a criminal proceeding, being at liberty to (e) After an alleged meeting with Mayor Inaki Larrazabal,
Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and
commence it or not, depending upon whether or not there is, in respondent judge amended his already prepared decision in the
special proceedings in which the Government or any officer
his opinion, sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the two criminal cases involved herein by changing the penalty of
thereof in his official capacity is the party.
accused beyond reasonable doubt, except when the case is double life sentence for the double murder charge against the
pending in the Court of First Instance, the continuation of the xxx xxx xxx petitioners to the death penalty.
offended party's intervention depends upon the continuation of
the proceeding. Consequently, if the promotor fiscal desists from (k) Act and represent the Republic and/or the people before any The foregoing alleged irregularities are mainly supported by an
pressing the charge or asks the competent Court of first Instance court, tribunal, body or commission in any matter, action or affidavit executed on June 26, 1975 by Gerardo A. Makinano Jr.,
in which the case is pending for the dismissal thereof, and said proceeding which in his opinion, affects the welfare of the people court stenographer of the Circuit Criminal Court, Tacloban City
court grants the petition, the intervention of the person injured by as the ends of justice may require. (Annex "E", Petition). The truth of the charges made in such
the commission of the offense ceases by virtue of the principle affidavit are denied by respondent judge (in his answer to the
that the accessory follows the principal. Consequently, as the xxx xxx xxx instant petition dated October 11, 1975), who in turn claims that
offended party is not entitled to represent the People of the it was petitioners who tried to bribe him into acquitting them in
It is evident, therefore, that since the Solicitor General alone is the aforesaid criminal cases, after they were illegally furnished a
Philippine Islands in the prosecution of a public offense, or to
authorized to represent the State or the People of the Philippines copy of the draft of his decision of conviction by the same court
control the proceeding once it is commenced, and as his right to
the interest of the private prosecutors is subordinate to that of stenographer Gerardo A. Makinano Jr. (please see Answer of
intervene therein is subject to the promotor fiscal's right of
the State and they cannot be allowed to take a stand inconsistent respondent judge, pp. 12-13). Unlike in the cases of Mateo vs.
control, it cannot be stated that an order of dismissal decreed
with that of the Solicitor General, for that would be tantamount Villaluz, 50 SCRA 191 (1973), and Castillo vs. Juan, 62 SCRA 124
upon petiton of the promotor fiscal himself deprives the offended
to giving the latter the direction and control of the criminal (1974) relied upon mainly by herein petitioners, the facts alleged
party of his right to appeal from an order overruling a complaint
proceedings, contrary to the provisions of law and the settled as constituting the grounds for disqualifying the respondent judge
or information, which right belongs exclusively to the promotor
rules on the matter. in the instant petition are disputed.
fiscal by virtue of the provisions of section 44 of General Orders,
No. 58. To permit a person injured by the commission of an Moreover, the position taken by the Solicitor General in Apart from the sworn statements submitted before this Court in
offense to appeal from an order dismissing a criminal case issued recommending the remand of the case to the trial court is not support or in denial of the alleged bribery of respondent judge,
by a Court of First Instance upon petition of the promotor fiscal, without any plausible justification. Thus, in support of his we have been informed of evidence obtained by the National
would be tantamount to giving said offended party of the contention that the rendition of the decision and the resolution Bureau of Investigation when it cannot appropriate for us at this
time, however, and we are unable to do so, to submit to this
Court definite conclusions on the charges and counter-charges. An
exhaustive inquiry and open hearing should perhaps precede the
making of categorical conclusions. But we are persuaded that
there are bases for stating that the rendition of respondent
Judge's decision and his resolutions on the motions for new trial
were not free from suspicion of bias and prejudice (See Martinez
Gironella, 65 SCRA 245 [July 22, 1975]).

Considering the circumstances of the instant case, the seriousness

of the charges and counter-charges and the nature of the
evidence on hand to support them, we feel that respondent Judge
appeared to have been heedless to the oft-reiterated admonition
addressed to trial judges to avoid even the impression of the guilt
or innocence of the accused being dependent on prejudice or
prejudgment (Fernando, J., Concurring opinion, Martinez
Gironella, supra, at 252). ...

It is undisputed that the sole purpose of courts of justice is to

enforce the laws uniformly and impartially without regard to
persons or their circumstances or the opinions of men. A judge,
according to Justice Castro, now Chief Justice of this Court, should
strive to be at all times "wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent. Elementary due process requires a hearing before
an impartial and disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty
of rendering a just decision and the duty, of doing it in a manner
completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his
integrity. 13 Thus, it has always been stressed that judges should
not only be impartial but should also appear impartial. For
"impartiality is not a technical conception, It is a state of
mind" 14 and, consequently, the "appearance of impartiality is an
essential manifestation of its reality. 15 It must be obvious,
therefore, that while judges should possess proficiency in law in
order that they can competently construe and enforce the law, it
is more important that they should act and behave in such a
manner that the parties before them should have confidence in
their impartiality.

It appears, however, that respondent Judge is no longer in the

judicial service, hence, the question as to whether or not he
should be disqualified from further proceeding with the
aforementioned criminal cases has already become moot.

WHEREFORE, this Court grants the petition and hereby demands

the case to the trial court in order that another Judge may hear
anew petitioners' motion for new trial and to resolve the issue
accordingly on the basis of the evidence. No Special
pronouncement as to costs.

Fernando, (Chairman), Barredo, Aquino, and concepcion Jr. JJ.,

concur.
Republic of the Philippines there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously arrest and detain said objected to this motion on the ground that there was sufficient
SUPREME COURT Attorney Fortunato Suarez in the train while the latter was going proof to warrant the prosecution of the accused. The case in this
Manila to Calauag, and with the purpose of concealing the illegality of state when Judge Emilio Pena was appointed to the place of Judge
said arrest and detention of said Fortunato Suarez said accused Gutierres David. Later, Judge Serviliano Platon, one of the
EN BANC Vivencio Orais conniving with the other accused, Damian Jimenez, respondents herein, was appointed to preside over case No. 6426
justice of the peace of the said municipality, prepared and corresponded, and the case was thus transferred to that sala for
G.R. No. 46371 February 7, 1940
subscribed under oath before said Fortunato Suarez with the action. Judge Platon, after consideration of all the facts and proofs
FORTUNATO N. SUAREZ, petitioner, commission of the crime of sedition; that the said justice of the submitted in the case, considered the court's order of August 14,
vs. peace Damian Jimenez, conniving with the other accused Vivencio 1936, and dismissed the case, holding that the evidence was
SERVILLANO PLATON, Judge of Court of First Instance of Orais with the same purpose of concealing the illegality of the insufficient to convict the accused of the crime charged. From this
Tayabas, The PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF TAYABAS, VIVENCIO ORAIS arrest and detention of said Fortunato Suarez, without legal order, the petitioner herein appealed to this Court and the case
and DAMIAN JIMENEZ, respondents. grounds whatsoever willfully and unlawfully issued an order was here docketed as G.R. No. 45431. On June 30, by a closely
declaring that there were merits in the complaint thereby divided court, the appeal was dismissed.
Godofredo Reyes for petitioner. sanctioning the illegal and unjust arrest and detention of
Provincial Fiscal of Tayabas Hermogenes Caluag for respondents. Fortunato Suarez who was kept in the municipal jail of Calauag for The petitioner has now filed with this Court the present petition,
eight hours. in which, as stated in the opening paragraph of this decision, we
LAUREL, J.: are asked to issue the peremptory writ of mandamus to compel
The justice of the peace of Calauag, being one of the accused, the the respondent judge to reinstate the criminal case which had
This is an original petition for the peremptory writ preliminary examination was conducted by the justice of the been ordered dismissed by the said judge. The petitioner gives the
of mandamus filed by Fortunato N. Suarez with this court, to peace of Lopez, Tayabas, who thereafter bound the defendants following grounds for the issuance of said writ:
compel the respondent judge to reinstate criminal case No. 6426 over to the Court of First Instance, where the case was docketed
of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas so that the case may as criminal case No. 6426. While the case was pending in the Que el mencionado Juez Hon. Servillano Platon incurrio en un
proceed to trial in the ordinary course. latter court, on petition, of the accused, the provincial fiscal of abuso manifiesto de discrecion al sobreseer la mencionada causa
Tayabas, Ramon Valdez y Nieto, reinvestigated the case. After contra los otros dos recurridos Vivencio Orais y Damian Jimenez,
It appears on May 9, 1935, Lieutenant Vivencio Orais, of the despues de que el Juzgado de Paz de Lopez habia declarado que
such reinvestigation, he filed on April 23, 1936, a motion for the
Philippine Constabulary, one of the respondents in this case, filed existen meritos para proseguirse contra los mismos y despues de
dismissal of the case. Fortunato N. Suarez, the petitioner herein,
a complaint under oath with the justice of the peace of Calauag, que un Juez de Primera Instancia de la misma categoria que el
on May 5, 1936, asked the court to appoint Attorney Godofredo
Province of Tayabas, charging the petitioner herein, Fortunato N. Juez Platon habia rehusado sobreseer la causa por creer que
Reyes as acting provincial fiscal to handle the prosecution,
Suarez, and one Tomas Ruedas, with sedition under Article 142 of existian meritos para proceder contra los acusados.
alleging, among other things, that the provincial fiscal had no
the Revised Penal Code. The complaint, upon preliminary
courage to prosecute the accused. On May 11, 1936, Attorney
examination, was docketed and given due course. While the said Que el mencionado Juez Hon. Servillano Platon incurrio en un
Godofredo Reyes entered his appearance as private prosecutor,
case was pending preliminary investigation, Lieutenant Orais, in abuso grave de discrecion por cuanto que las pruebas existentes
and vigorously objected to the motion of dismissal filed by the
obedience to an order of the Provincial Commander of Tayabas, en la causa, en las cuales se fundo el fiscal provincial al presentar
provincial fiscal. The Bar Association of Tayabas, through its
moved for the temporary dismissal of the case. This motion was la querella en el Juzgado de Paz, demuestran de un modo claro y
president, Emiliano A. Gala, entered its appearance as amicus
granted by the justice of the peace of Calauag on May 20, 1935, concluyente el delito cometido y la responsibilidad de los
curiae and likewise objected to the dismissal of the case. On
and the case thus dismissed. acusados. [Las expresadas pruebas constan a paginas 65 al 106 del
August 14, 1936, the then presiding judge of Branch I of the Court
adjunto alegato anexo ("A").]
At the instance of the petitioner herein, Fortunato N. Suarez, the of First Instance of Tayabas, Hon. Ed. Gutierrez David, after
deputy provincial fiscal of Tayabas, Perfecto R. Palacio, in turn hearing, denied the motion, ruling that there was prima facie case Que el Hon. Servillano Platon incurrio en un grave abuso de
charged Lieutenant Vivencio Orais and Damian Jimenez in the against the accused. The court, upon petitioner of the provincial discrecion al juzgar dichas pruebas con un criterio de un Tribunal
justice of the peace court of Calauag with the crime of arbitrary fiscal, designated Deputy Provincial Fiscal Perfecto R. Palacio to "sentenciador" cuando que su unica mision era considerarlas bajo
detention committed, according to the information under date of handle the prosecution. But Fiscal Palacio, being apparently of the el criterio de un tribunal meramente "investigador". (E.U. vs.
July 8, 1935, as follows: same opinion as the provincial fiscal, declined to proceed, and Barredo, 32 Jur. Fil., 462, 482.)
moved that a practicing attorney or a competent attorney in the
That on or about the 9th day of May, 1935, in the municipality of Bureau of Justice be designated in his stead. Accordingly, the Should the writ of mandamus prayed for be issued? We observe
Calauag, Province of Tayabas, P.I., and within the jurisdiction of provincial fiscal of Sorsogon, Jacinto Yamson, at the request of the that after the filing of the information by the provincial fiscal of
this Court, the accused Vivencio Orais being then a public officer judge a quo was assigned by the Department of Justice to handle Tayabas for arbitrary detention against Lieutenant Orais and the
to wit: a second lieutenant of the Philippine Constabulary duly the prosecution of the case. Fiscal Yamson after going over the justice of the peace of Lopez, the same fiscal moved for the
appointed and qualified as such and detailed in the Province of case likewise entered a nolle prosequi. So, on September 23 1936, dismissal of the case, because 'despues' de una reinvestigacion de
Tayabas, without warrant of arrest and without any legal ground he moved for reconsideration of the court's order of August 14, los hechos que dieron margen a la presente causa, y examinada la
whatsoever, moved by personal grudge and ill-feeling which he 1936, denying the motion for dismissal presented by the misma con la debida atencion que su importancia require asi
entertained against Attorney Fortunato Suarez, did, then and provincial fiscal. Attorney Godofredo Reyes again vigorously como las circunstancias del caso, ha llegado a la conclusion de que
no hay base justificativa para la prosecucion de esta causa." The to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
grounds for this action of the provincial fiscal are stated in his said impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
motion for dismissal of April 23, 1936: whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a
We have not overlooked the fact that this motion for dismissal peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the two
was denied by Judge Gutierrez David of August 14, 1936. It fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.
appears, however, that subsequently Fiscal Yamsom who, as He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor — indeed, he
stated above was assigned by the Department of Justice to should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at
conduct the prosecution of the case, moved for reconsideration of liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from
the Court's order of August 14, 1936, denying the motion for improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as
dismissal. Judge Servillano Platon granted the motion for it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one," (69
reconsideration and dismissed the case. In this motion for United States Law Review, June, 1935, No. 6, p. 309.)
reconsideration not only does Fiscal Yamson reiterate the
arguments advanced by Fiscal Valdez y Nieto in the latter's motion Considering all the circumstances, we cannot say that Judge
for dismissal, but adds: Servillano Platon, in granting the motion for the dismissal of the
case for arbitrary detention against Lieutenant Orais and the
(a) En lo que respecta al acusado Teniente Orais, no existe prueba justice of the peace of Lopez, abused his discretion so flagrantly as
alguna en los autos de esta causa que dicho acusado haya to justify, in the interest of justice, a departure from the well-
arrestado al abogado Suarez y Tomas Ruedas, solamente por el settled rule that an inferior tribunal in the performance of a
mero gusto de arrestarles. Tampoco existe pruebas de que el judicial act within the scope of its jurisdiction and discretion
teniente Orais haya sido inducido por motivos de venganza o cannot be controlled by mandamus. This is especially true in a
resentimiento alguno contra dicho abogado Suarez y Tomas matter involving the examination of evidence and the decision of
Ruedas al arrestales en el dia de autos. Aunque es verdad que el questions of law and fact, since such a duty is not ministerial.
Teniente Orais ha sido acusado ante el Juzgado de pazde Sariaya (High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, sec. 156, pp. 173-175). Upon
por 'abusos de autoridad', sin embargo, no consta en los autos de the other hand, it should be observed that in the case of
dicha causa que el abogado Suarez y Tomas Ruedas hayan Lieutenant Orais, in the face of the circumstances surrounding the
intervenido como abogado ni parte ofendida o testigos en la arrest as set forth in the two motions for dismissal by the
misma, por tanto, no vemos razon alguna para que el Teniente provincial fiscal of Tayabas, which facts and circumstances must
Orais tenga motivos de vengarse de estos por dicha causa. (Vease have been investigated and duly weighed and considered by the
pag. 1, Anexo O.) A falta de prueba sobre estos hechos, en nuestra respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, the
humilde opinion, existe a favor de Teniente Orais la presuncion de arrest effected by Lieutenant Orais cannot be said to have be
haber cumplidocon su deber al arrestar al abogado Fortunato N. entirely unjustified. If, "under trying circumstances and in a
Suarez y Tomas Ruedas, teniendo en cuenta las circunstancias zealous effort to obey the orders of his superior officer and to
extraordinarias reinantes entonces en Calauag a raiz de los enforce the law, a peace officer makes a mere mistake in good
disturbios y desordenes publicos que tuvieron lugar en los faith, he should be exculpated. Otherwise, the courts will put a
municipios de Cabuyao y Sta. Rosa de la Provincia de Laguna, dias premium on crime and will terrorize peace officers through a fear
antes de ocurrir el suceso de autos. Se debe tener en cuenta, of themselves violating the law. See generally Voorhees on Arrest;
ademas, el hecho de que despues de haber arrestado al abogado 5 Corpus Juris, pp. 399, 416; 2 R.C.L., 450. (United States vs.
Fortunato N. Suarez y Tomas Ruedas, el aqui acusado Teniente Santos, 36 Phil., 853, 855.)"
Vivencio Orais presento denuncia inmediatamente ante su
coacusado Damian Jimenez, juez de paz de Calauag, por infraccion The petition is hereby dismissed, without pronouncement
del articulo 142 del Codigo Penal Revisado. regarding cost. So ordered.

We cannot overemphasize the necessity of close scrutiny and Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur
investigation of prosecuting officers of all cases handled by them,
but whilst this Court is averse to any form of vacillation by such
officers in the prosecution of public offenses, it is unquestionable
that they may, in appropriate cases, in order to do justice and
avoid injustice, reinvestigate cases in which they have already
filed the corresponding informations. In the language of Mr.
Justice Sutherland of the Supreme Court of the United States, the
prosecuting officer "is the representative not of an ordinary party
EN BANC On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino to dismiss the said case, and declaring the obligation of petitioner
Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition for review reversed the as purely civil. 16
June 30, 1987 resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the
fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed In a resolution of May 19, 1980, the Second Division of this Court
G.R. No. L-53373 without giving due course to the petition required the
against the accused. 8 A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of
evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 respondents to comment to the petition, not to file a motiod to
MARIO FL. CRESPO, petitioner,
with the trial court, 9 attaching thereto a copy of the letter of dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. In the comment filed by
vs.
Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2, 1978 the the Solicitor General he recommends that the petition be given
HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT
private prosecutor was given time to file an opposition due course, it being meritorious. Private respondent through
CRIMINAL COURT OF LUCENA CITY, 9th Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE
thereto.10 On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion counsel filed his reply to the comment and a separate conunent to
OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL,
and set the arraigniment stating: the petition asking that the petition be dismissed. In the
RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET AL., respondents.
resolution of February 5, 1981, the Second Division of this Court
ORDER resolved to transfer this case to the Court En Banc. In the
resolution of February 26, 1981, the Court En Banc resolved to
For resolution is a motion to dismiss this rase filed by the give due course to the petition.
GANCAYCO, J.: procuting fiscal premised on insufficiency of evidence, as
suggested by the Undersecretary of Justice, evident from Annex Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective briefs
The issue raised in this ease is whether the trial court acting on a "A" of the motion wherein, among other things, the Fiscal is urged while the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in lieu of brief
motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal to move for dismissal for the reason that the check involved reiterating that the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case having been issued for the payment of a pre-existing obligation be reversed and that respondent Judge be ordered to dismiss the
was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist the Hability of the drawer can only be civil and not criminal. information.
on the arraignment and trial on the merits.
The motion's thrust being to induce this Court to resolve the It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced
On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the innocence of the accused on evidence not before it but on that by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the
approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa adduced before the Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that not direction and control of the fiscal. 17 The institution of a criminal
against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena only disregards the requirements of due process but also erodes action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or
City which was docketed as Criminal Case No. CCCIX-52 (Quezon) the Court's independence and integrity, the motion is considered may not file the complaint or information, follow or not fonow
'77.1 When the case was set for arraigment the accused filed a as without merit and therefore hereby DENIED. that presented by the offended party, according to whether the
motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of
pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of WHEREFORE, let the arraignment be, as it is hereby set for the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 18 The reason for placing
the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of December 18, 1978 at 9:00 o'clock in the moming. the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the
the information. In an order of August 1, 1977, the presiding fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private
SO ORDERED. 11
judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. 2 A persons. 19 It cannot be controlled by the
motion for reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and complainant. 20 Prosecuting officers under the power vested in
August 5, 1977 but the arraignment was deferred to August 18, mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of them by law, not only have the authority but also the duty of
1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of prosecuting persons who, according to the evidence received
appellate court. 3 Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-08777. 12 On January from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime
23, 1979 a restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals committed within the jurisdiction of their office. 21 They have
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a equally the legal duty not to prosecute when after an
against the threatened act of arraignment of the accused until
preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused in the investigation they become convinced that the evidence adduced is
further orders from the Court. 13 In a decision of October 25, 1979
Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06978. 4 In not sufficient to establish a prima faciecase. 22
the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the
an order of August 17, 1977 the Court of Appeals restrained Judge
restraining order of January 23, 1979. 14 A motion for
Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation 23 that the
reconsideration of said decision filed by the accused was denied in
further orders of the Court. 5 In a comment that was filed by the fiscal determines the existence of a puma facie case that would
a resolution of February 19, 1980. 15
Solicitor General he recommended that the petition be given due warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere
course. 6 On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by the Court Hence this petition for review of said decision was filed by with the fiscal's discretion and control of the criminal prosecution.
of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually restraining the judge accused whereby petitioner prays that said decision be reversed It is not prudent or even permissible for a Court to compel the
from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the and set aside, respondent judge be perpetually enjoined from fiscal to prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by him on an
accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall have enforcing his threat to proceed with the arraignment and trial of information, if he finds that the evidence relied upon by him is
finally resolved the petition for review. 7 petitioner in said criminal case, declaring the information filed not insufficient for conviction. 24 Neither has the Court any power to
valid and of no legal force and effect, ordering respondent Judge order the fiscal to prosecute or file an information within a certain
period of time, since this would interfere with the fiscal's
discretion and control of criminal prosecutions. 25 Thus, a fiscal not impair the substantial rights of the accused. 36 or the right of In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of
who asks for the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence the People to due process of law. 36a the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may
has authority to do so, and Courts that grant the same commit no be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should,
error. 26 The fiscal may re-investigate a case and subsequently Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for
move for the dismissal should the re-investigation show either was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint
that the defendant is innocent or that his guilt may not be Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should
established beyond reasonable doubt. 27 In a clash of views to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant be left entirely for the determination of the Court.
between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits
or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, proceed for the proper determination of the case. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without
those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail. 28 On the other hand, pronouncement as to costs.
However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the
neither an injunction, preliminary or final nor a writ of prohibition
motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal upon the directive of the SO ORDERED.
may be issued by the courts to restrain a criminal
Secretary of Justice will there not be a vacuum in the prosecution?
prosecution 29 except in the extreme case where it is necessary for
A state prosecutor to handle the case cannot possibly be
the Courts to do so for the orderly administration of justice or to
designated by the Secretary of Justice who does not believe that
prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an op pressive and
there is a basis for prosecution nor can the fiscal be expected to
vindictive manner. 30
handle the prosecution of the case thereby defying the superior
However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any order of the Secretary of Justice.
limitation or control. The same is subject to the approval of the
The answer is simple.1âwphi1 The role of the fiscal or prosecutor
provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case
as We all know is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to
maybe and it maybe elevated for review to the Secretary of
secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts.
Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action
Thus, in spite of his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the
or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may
fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of the
direct that a motion to dismiss the rase be filed in Court or
prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own
otherwise, that an information be filed in Court. 31
independent judgment as to whether the accused should be
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the
criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the responsibility of appearing for the People of the Philippines even
case, which is the authority to hear and determine the under such circumstances much less should he abandon the
case. 32 When after the filing of the complaint or information a prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a private
warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will be null and
and the accused either voluntarily submited himself to the Court void. 37 The least that the fiscal should do is to continue to appear
or was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over for the prosecution although he may turn over the presentation of
the person of the accused. 33 the evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his direction
and control. 38
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the
purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or
warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its
filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as above dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the
action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even
to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on
permission of the Court must be secured. After such the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do
reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its
should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. 34 While exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the
it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has
determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is
or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the
disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the rase motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the
thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.
Court, 35 The only qualification is that the action of the Court must
FIRST DIVISION On 3 November 1995, SPO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot dead at [A]ccused Yabut brothers (Kati and Billy) strongly suggested to
his residence in Barangay San Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga. Virgilio Dimatulac to go down to see the Mayor outside in front of
his house to say sorry.
On 5 November 1995, a complaint for Murder was filed before the
G.R. No. 127107 October 12, 1998 Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Macabebe-Masantol in [W]hen Virgilio Dimatulac went down his house, suddenly [a] gun
Macabebe, Pampanga, by SPO1 Renato Layug of the Masantol shot was heard and then, the son of Virgilio Dimatulac, Peter Paul,
PETER PAUL DIMATULAC and VERONICA
Police Station against private respondents Mayor Santiago Yabut, started to shout the following words: "What did you do to my
DIMATULAC, petitioners,
Martin Yabut, Servillano Yabut, Evelino David, Justino Mandap, father?!"
vs.
Casti David, Francisco Yambao, Juan Magat, Arturo Naguit,
HON. SESINANDO VILLON in his capacity as Presiding Judge of One of the men of Mayor "Docsay" Yabut shot Virgilio Dimatulac,
Fortunato Mallari, Jesus de la Cruz, Joselito Miranda, SPO3
the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 54; HON. and as a consequence, he died; and before he expired, he left a
Gilberto Malabanan, Aniano Magnaye, Vladimir Yumul, a certain
TEOFISTO GUINGONA, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice; dying declaration pointing to the group of Mayor "Docsay" Yabut
"Danny," and a certain "Koyang/Arding." The complaint was
MAYOR SANTIAGO YABUT, SERVILLANO YABUT, MARTIN YABUT as the one responsible.
docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-360. After conducting a
and FORTUNATO MALLARI, respondents.
preliminary examination in the form of searching questions and
That right after Virgilio Dimatulac was shot, accused "Docsay"
answers, and finding probable cause, Judge Designate Serafin B.
Yabut ordered his men to go on board the truck and immediately
David of the MCTC issued warrants for the arrest of the accused
left away leaving Virgilio Dimatulac bleeding and asking for help.
DAVIDE, JR., J.: and directed them to file their counter-affidavits.
On their way home to Minalin, accused Santiago "Docsay" Yabut
The issues raised by petitioners in their Memorandum1 and by the Only accused Evelino David, Justino Mandap, Juan Magat and
gave money to accused John Doe Dan/Danny and Francisco "Boy"
Office of the Solicitor General in its Comment2 in this special civil Francisco Yambao were arrested; while only Francisco Yambao
Yambao was asked to bring the accused John Doe to Nueva Ecija
action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of submitted his counter affidavit.3
which he did.
the Rules of Court filed by petitioners, children of the deceased
Police Officer 3 (PO3) Virgilio Dimatulac of Masantol, Pampanga, On 1 December 1995, after appropriate proceedings, Judge David
Further, accused Santiago "Docsay" Yabut told his group to deny
may be summarized as follows: issued a Resolution4 in Criminal Case No. 95-360 finding
that they ever went to Masantol.
reasonable ground to believe that the crime of murder had been
A. WHETHER THE OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR committed and that the accused were probably guilty thereof. His The court, after having conducted preliminary examination on the
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN: (1) GIVING DUE findings of fact and conclusions were as follows: complainant and the witnesses presented, [is] satisfied that there
COURSE TO THE MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION BY PRIVATE is a [sic] reasonable ground to believe that the crime of murder
RESPONDENTS AGAINST WHOM WARRANTS OF ARREST WERE That on or about November 3, 1995, all the accused under the
was committed and that the accused in conspiring and
ISSUED BUT WHO HAD NOT YET BEEN BROUGHT INTO THE leadership of Mayor Santiago "Docsay" Yabut, including two John
confederating with one another are probably guilty thereof.
CUSTODY Of THE LAW; and (2) FILING THE INFORMATION FOR Does identified only as Dan/Danny and Koyang/Arding, went to
HOMICIDE DESPITE KNOWLEDGE OF THE APPEAL FROM SAID Masantol, Pampanga for the purpose of looking for a certain PO3 Circumstantial evidence strongly shows the presence of
PROSECUTOR'S RESOLUTION TO THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY Virgilio Dimatulac. conspiracy.
OF JUSTICE.
At first, the accused, riding on [sic] a truck, went to the Municipal That in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, warrants of
B. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF Hall of Masantol, Pampanga inquiring about PO3 Virgilio arrest were issued against Santiago Yabut, Martin Yabut,
JURISDICTION IN PROCEEDING WITH THE ARRAIGNMENT AND IN Dimatulac. Thereafter, they went to the house of Mayor Lacap for Servillano Yabut, Francisco Yambao, Avelino David, Casti David,
DENYING PETITIONERS' MOTIONS TO SET ASIDE ARRAIGNMENT the purpose of inquiring [about] the [the location of the] house of Catoy Naguit, Fortunato Mallari, Boy dela Cruz, Lito Miranda and
AND RECONSIDERATION THEREOF DESPITE HIS KNOWLEDGE OF PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac, until finally, they were able to reach the Juan Magat with no bail recommended.
THE PENDENCY OF THE APPEAL AND THE SUBMISSION OF VITAL house of said Virgilio Dimatulac at San Nicolas, Masantol,
EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT MURDER AND NOT HOMICIDE WAS Pampanga. However, with respect to accused Dan/Danny and Koyang/Arding,
COMMITTED BY THE ACCUSED. the court directed the police authorities to furnish the court [a]
Upon reaching the house of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac, the truck the description personae of the accused for the purpose of issuing the
C. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF JUSTICE accused were all riding, stopped and parked in front of the house needed warrant of arrest.
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RECONSIDERING of said PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac, some of the accused descended
HIS ORDER FINDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED WAS MURDER from the truck and positioned themselves around the house while The accused were furnish [sic] copies of the complaint and
AND DIRECTING THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR TO AMEND THE others stood by the truck and the Mayor stayed [in] the truck with affidavits of witnesses for them to file their counter-affidavits in
INFORMATION FROM HOMICIDE TO MURDER. a bodyguard. accordance to [sic] law.

The records and the pleadings of the parties disclose the Accused Billy Yabut, Kati Yabut and Francisco Yambao, went inside As of this date, only accused Francisco "Boy" Yambao filed his
antecedents. the house of Virgilio Dimatulac [and] were even offered coffee. counter-affidavit and all the others waived the filing of the same.
A close evaluation of the evidence submitted by the accused submitted their counter-affidavits to Assistant Provincial 2. The case be dismissed against accused Evelino David, Justino
Francisco Yambao which the court finds it [sic] straightforward Prosecutor Alfonso Flores. Mandap a.k.a. Casti David, Francisco Yambao, Juan Magat, Arturo
and more or less credible and seems to be consistent with truth, Naguit, Bladimir Dimatulac, Fortunato Mallari, Aniano Magnaye,
human nature and [the] natural course of things and lack of In her Resolution dated 29 January 1996, 9 Assistant Provincial Gilberto Malabanan, Jesus dela Cruz and Joselito Miranda.
motives [sic], the evidence of guilt against him is rather weak Prosecutor Alfonso-Flores found that the YABUTs and the
[compared to] the others, which [is why] the court recommends a assailant Danny, to the exclusion of the other accused, were in Bail of P20,000.00 for each of the accused is likewise
cash bond of P50,000.00 for his provisional liberty, and the court's conspiracy with one another, but that the offense committed was recommended.
previous order of no bail for said accused is hereby reconsidered. only homicide, not murder. In support of such finding, Alfonso-
Flores reasoned thus: The Resolution discloses that Alfonso-Flores conducted a hearing
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Clerk of Court is directed on 11 January 1996 and clarificatory questions were propounded
to forward he entire records of the case to the Office of the The complainant in this case charges the crime of Murder only to Peter Paul Dimatulac.
Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga for further action, together qualified by treachery. It must be noted that to constitute
treachery, two conditions must be present, to wit, 1) the On 23 February 1996, before the Information for homicide was
with the bodies of accused Francisco Yambao and Juan Magat to
employment of the [sic] means of execution were give [sic] the filed, complainants, herein petitioners, appealed the resolution of
be remanded to the provincial Jail of Pampanga.5 (emphasis
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; Alfonso-Flores to the Secretary of the Department of Justice
supplied)
and 2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously (DOJ). 10 They alleged in their appeal that:
In a sworn statement,6 petitioner Peter Paul Dimatulac narrated adopted . . . .
1. THE ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR NOT ONLY ERRED IN
that Mayor Santiago Yabut, accompanied by a number of
In the instant case, the presence of the first requisite was clearly RULING THAT THERE WAS NO TREACHERY TO QUALIFY THE CRIME
bodyguards, went to the residence of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac to
established by the evidence, such that the attack upon the victim TO MURDER, BUT LIKEWISE ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE
talk about a problem between the Mayor and Peter Paul's uncle,
while descending the stairs was so sudden and unexpected as to PRESENCE OF OTHER QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES, TO WIT:
Jun Dimatulac. Virgilio warmly welcomed the group and even
prepared coffee for them. Servillano and Martin Yabut told Virgilio render him no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate.
(A) THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED THE CRIME WITH THE AID OF
to come down from his house and apologize to the Mayor, but However, the circumstances, as portrayed by witness Peter Paul
ARMED MEN AND WITH THE USE OF A PERSON TO INSURE OR
hardly had Virgilio descended when Peter Paul heard a gunshot. Dimatulac, negate the presence of the second requisite. According
AFFORD IMPUNITY;
While Peter Paul did not see who fired the shot, he was sure it to the said witness, the victim was already descending when
was one of Mayor Yabut's companions. Peter Paul opined that his Mayor Yabut commanded the assailant to shoot him, and (B) THAT THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED IN CONSIDERATION OF A
father was killed because the latter spoke to the people of immediately thereafter, he heard the gunshot. This would PRICE, REWARD, OR PROMISE;
Minalin, Pampanga, against the Mayor, Peter Paul added in a therefore show that the assailant did not consciously adopt the
supplemental statement (Susog na Salaysay) 7 that he heard position of the victim at the time he fired the fatal shot. The (C) THAT THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED ON THE OCCASION OF A
Mayor Yabut order Virgilio killed. command of Mayor Yabut to shoot came so sudden as to afford DESTRUCTIVE CYCLONE, WHEN THE SUPER-TYPHOON "ROSING"
no opportunity for the assailant to choose the means or method WAS RAGING ON NOVEMBER 3, 1995;
It his Sinumpaang Salaysay,8 Police Officer Leopoldo Soriano of of attack. The act of Mayor Yabut in giving the command to shoot
the Masantol Municipal Police Station in Masantol, Pampanga, further bolster[s] the fact that the conspirator did not concert the (D) THAT THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED WITH EVIDENT
declared that on 3 November 1995, between 3:30 and 4:00 p.m., means and method of attack nor the manner thereof. Otherwise PREMEDITATION;
while he was at the polite station, three men approached him and there would have been no necessity for him to give the order to
2. THAT THE HONORABLE INVESTIGATING ASSISTANT
asked for directions to the house of Mayor Epifanio Lacap. Soriano the assailant. The method and manner of attack was adopted by
PROSECUTOR ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AGAINST
recognized one of the men as SPO1 Labet Malabanan of Minalin, the assailant at the spur of the moment and the vulnerable
FORTUNATO MALLARI AND FRANCISCO YAMBAO BY RULING OUT
Pampanga. The group left after Soriano gave them directions, but position of the victim was not deliberately and consciously
CONSPIRACY WITH THE YABUT BROTHERS AS AGAINST
one of the three returned to ask whether PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac adopted. Treachery therefore could not be appreciated and the
FORTUNATO MALLARI AND NOT CHARGING FRANCISCO YAMBAO
was on duty, to which Soriano replied that Dimatulac was at crime reasonably believe[d] to have been committed is Homicide
AS AN ACCESSORY TO MURDER.
home. The group left on board a military truck headed for San as no circumstance would qualify the killing to murder.
Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga. Later that day, SPO2 Michael Viray To refute Alfonso-Flores' finding that the means of execution were
received a telephone call at the police station reporting that Alfonso-Flores then ruled:
not deliberately adopted, petitioners asserted that the meeting of
someone had shot Virgilio Dimatulac. the accused and the victim was not accidental as the former
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby recommended
that: purposely searched for the victim at the height of a typhoon,
Thereafter, Pampanga Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Sylvia Q.
while accused Mayor Santiago Yabut even remarked to his co-
Alfonso-Flores conducted a reinvestigation. However, it is not
1. An information be filed with the proper court charging accused "Danny," "Dikitan mo lang, alam mo na kung ano ang
clear from the record whether she conducted the same motu
Santiago, Servillano and Martin all surnamed Yabut, and one John gagawin mo, bahala ka na" (Just stay close to him, you know what
proprio or upon motion of private respondents Santiago Yabut,
Doe aliasDanny as conspirators in the crime of Homicide; to do). Thus, Danny positioned himself near the stairs to goad the
Servillano Yabut and Martin Yabut (hereafter YABUTs). All of the
victim to come out of his house, while Fortunato Mallari
accused who had not submitted their counter-affidavits before
represented to the deceased that the latter was being invited by a
the MCTC, except accused "Danny" and "Koyang/Arding,"
certain General Ventura. When the victim declined the invitation On 29 February 1996, Atty. Amado Valdez, who had entered his of Justice." Judge Roura also set the arraignment of the accused
by claiming he was sick, accused Servillano Yabut persuaded the appearance as private prosecutor, filed two (2) motions with the on 12 April 1996. 23
victim to come down by saying, "[T]o settle this matter, just trial court: (1) a Motion to Issue Hold Departure Order Against All
apologize to the Mayor who is in the truck." In view of that Accuseds14 [sic]; and an (2) Urgent Motion to Defer It would appear that the private prosecution moved to reconsider
enticement, the victim came down, while Danny waited in Proceedings, 15 copies of which were furnished the Office of the the order denying the Motion to Defer Proceedings since, on 12
ambush. To emphasize the accused's resolve to kill the deceased, Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga. The second motion was April 1996, Judge Roura issued an Order 24 giving the private
petitioners further narrated that when the deceased ran away grounded on the pendency of the appeal before the Secretary of prosecutor "ten (10) days from today within which to file a
after the first shot, the gunman still pursued him, while Mayor Justice and a copy thereof was attached to the motion. Judge petition for certiorari questioning the order of the Court denying
Santiago Yabut, who was a doctor, kept away at a safe distance Roura set the motions for hearing on 8 March 1996. 16 his motion for reconsideration of the order of March 26, 1996."
and told everyone in the truck, "Tama na, bilisan ninyo," (That's Arraignment was then reset to 3 May 1996.
enough, move quickly) without giving medical assistance to the On 7 March 1996, Judge Roura ordered the arrest of the
remaining accused, Danny Manalili. 17 On 19 April 1996, petitioners filed a motion to inhibit Judge
deceased and without exerting any effort to arrest the gunman.
Roura 25 from hearing Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M) on the
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga was On 8 March 1996, the YABUTs filed their opposition 18 to the ground that he: (a) hastily set the case for arraignment while the
furnished with a copy of the Appeal. Motion to Issue Hold Departure Order and the Motion to Defer former's appeal in the DOJ was still pending evaluation; and (b)
Proceedings. The YABUTs asserted that, as to the first, by posting prejudged the matter, having remarked in open court that there
On 26 February 1996, Provincial Prosecutor Jesus Y. Manarang bail bonds, they submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court and was "nothing in the records of the case that would qualify the
issued a Resolution 11 ordering the release of accused Evelino were bound by the condition therein to "surrender themselves case into Murder." At the same time, petitioners filed a petition
David, Justino Mandap, Juan Magat and Arturo Naguit (who were whenever so required by the court, and to seek permission from for prohibition 26 with the Court of Appeals docketed therein as
then detained) in view of the aforementioned resolution of the court should any one of them desire to travel;" and, as to the CA-G.R. SP No. 40393, to enjoin Judge Roura from proceeding
Alfonso-Flores, which, as stated in the order, the Provincial second, the pendency of the appeal before the Secretary of with the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M).
Prosecutor approved "on February 7, 1996." Justice was not a ground to defer arraignment; moreover, the trial
court had to consider their right to a speedy trial, especially since On 24 April 1996, Public Prosecutor Olimpio R. Datu filed a
On 28 February 1996, an Information 12 for Homicide, signed by there was no definite date for the resolution of the appeal. Then Manifestation and Comment 27 with the trial court wherein he
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Flores and Provincial Prosecutor invoking this Court's rulings in Crespo v. Mogul 19 and Balgos v. opposed the motion to inhibit Judge Roura; manifested that
Jesus Y. Manarang, was filed before Branch 55 of the Regional Sandiganbayan, 20 the YABUTs further asserted that petitioners "there is nothing in the record . . . which shows that the subject
Trial Court (RTC) in Macabebe, Pampanga, against the YABUTs and should have filed a motion to defer the filing of the information killing is qualified into murder;" and announced that he "will no
John Doe alias "Danny Manalili" and docketed as Criminal Case for homicide with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, or longer allow the private prosecutor to participate or handle the
No. 96-1667(M). The accusatory portion of the information read sought, from the Secretary of Justice, an order directing the prosecution of [the] case" in view of the latter's petition to inhibit
as follows: Provincial Prosecutor to defer the filing of the information in Judge Roura.
court.
That on or about the 3rd day of November, 1995, in the On 29 April 1996, Judge Roura voluntarily inhibited himself and
municipality of Masantol, province of Pampanga, Philippines and In a Reply 21 to the opposition, the private prosecution, citing ordered the case transferred to Branch 54 of the RTC, presided
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named Section 20 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, insisted on the need over by herein public respondent Judge Sesinando Villon. 28
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually for a hold-departure order against the accused; argued that the
helping one another, with deliberate intent to take the life of PO3 On 30 April 1996, the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 54 of the
accused's right to a speedy trial would not be impaired because
Virgilio A. Dimatulac, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and RTC received the record of Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M). 29
the appeal to the Secretary of Justice was filed pursuant to
feloniously shoot the said PO3 Virgilio A. Dimatulac on his Department Order No. 223 of the DOJ and there was clear and On 30 April 1996, petitioners filed with the trial court a
abdomen with the use of a handgun, thereby inflicting, upon him convincing proof that the killing was committed with treachery Manifestation 30 submitting, in connection with their Motion to
a gunshot wound which cause[d] the death of the said victim. and other qualifying circumstances not absorbed in treachery; and Defer Proceedings and Motion to Inhibit Judge Roura,
contended that the accused's invocation of the right to a speedy documentary evidence to support their contention that the
All contrary to law.
trial was inconsistent with their filing of various dilatory motions offense committed was murder, not homicide. The documents
The Information, although dated 29 January 1996 was signed by during the preliminary investigation. The YABUTs filed a which they claimed were not earlier submitted by the public
Provincial Prosecutor Manarang on "2/27/96", i.e., a day before Rejoinder 22 to this Opposition. prosecution were the following:
its filing in court.
On 26 March 1996, Judge Roura deferred resolution of the Motion a. Counter-Affidavit of SPO1 Gilberto D. Malabanan.
On 28 February 1996, Judge Reynaldo V. Roura, presiding judge of to Issue a Hold Departure Order until "such time that all the
Branch 55, approved the cash bonds of the YABUTs, each in the accused who are out on bail are arraigned," but denied the b. Sinumpaang Salaysay of Vladimir Yumul y Dimatulac.
amount of P20,000.00, and recalled the warrants for their Motion to Defer Proceedings as he found no compelling reason
therefor, considering that although the appeal was filed on 23 c. Counter-Affidavit of Francisco I. Yambao.
arrest. 13
February 1996, "the private prosecution has not shown any
d. Counter-Affidavit of SPO2 Fortunato Mallari.
indication that [the] appeal was given due course by the Secretary
e. Sinumpaang Salaysay of Aniano Magnaye. attendance of circumstances qualifying the killing to murder;" and there being a qualifying circumstance of treachery, the crime
asserted that a number of Supreme Court decisions supported committed herein is murder, not homicide (People vs. Gapasin,
f. Sinumpaang Salaysay of Leopoldo Soriano. suspension of the proceedings in view of the pendency of their 231 SCRA 728 [1994]).
appeal before the DOJ.
g. Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the Preliminary Anent the alleged participation of respondents Fortunato Mallari
Investigation of Criminal Case No. 95-360, containing the On 31 May 1997, Judge Villon issued an Order 36 directing the and Francisco Yambao, we find sufficient evidence against Mallari
testimony of: accused to file their comment on the Urgent Motion to Set Aside as part of the conspiracy but not against Yambao. As can be
Arraignment within fifteen days from notice. gleaned from the sworn-statement of Yambao, which appears to
a. Peter Paul Dimatulac
be credible, Mallari tried also to persuade the victim to go with
In a letter 37 addressed to the Provincial Prosecutor dated 7 June them, using as a reason that he (victim) was being invited by
b. Vladimir D. Yumul
1996, public respondent Secretary Teofisto Guingona of the DOJ General Ventura. He was also seen trying to fix the gun which was
c. SPO1 Gilberto Malabanan resolved the appeal in favor of petitioners. Secretary Guingona used in killing the victim. These actuations are inconsistent with
ruled that treachery was present and directed the Provincial the claim that his presence at the crime scene was merely passive.
d. PO3 Alfonso Canilao Prosecutor of San Fernando, Pampanga "to amend the
information filed against the accused from homicide to murder," On the other hand, we find credible the version and explanation
h. Investigation Report-dated November 4, 1995. and to include Fortunato Mallari as accused in the amended of Yambao. Indeed, under the obtaining circumstances, Yambao
information. The findings and conclusions of Secretary Guingona had no other option but to accede to the request of Mayor Yabut
i. Dying declaration of Virgilio Dimatulac.
read as follows: to provide transportation to the assailant. There being an actual
j. Sketch danger to his life then, and having acted under the impulse of an
Contrary to your findings, we find that there is treachery that uncontrollable fear, reason dictates that he should be freed from
k. Unscaled Sketch attended the killing of PO3 Dimatulac. Undisputedly, the victim criminal liability. 38
was suddenly shot while he was descending the stairs. The attack
Likewise on 30 April 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated, in was unexpected as the victim was unarmed and on his way to The YABUTs moved to reconsider the resolution, 39 citing Section 4
CA-G.R. SP No. 40393, a Resolution 31directing respondent therein make peace with Mayor Yabut, he was unsuspecting so to speak. of "Administrative/Administration Order No. 223 of the DOJ." 40
to file his comment to the petition within ten days from notice From the circumstances surrounding his killing, PO3 Dimatulac
and to show cause within the same period "why no writ of was indeed deprived of an opportunity to defend himself or to In an Ex-Parte Manifestation 41 dated 21 June 1996, petitioners
preliminary injunction should be issued as prayed for in the retaliate. called the trial court's attention to the resolution of the Secretary
petition." However, the Court of Appeals "deferred action" on the of Justice, a copy of which was attached thereto. Later, in a
prayer for a temporary restraining order "until after the required Corollarily, we are also convinced that such mode of attack was Manifestation and Motion 42 dated 1 July 1996, petitioners asked
comment [was] submitted." consciously and deliberately adopted by the respondents to the trial court to grant their motion to set aside arraignment.
ensure the accomplishment of their criminal objective. The Attached thereto was a copy of the Manifestation and
On 3 May 1996, petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation 32 with admission of respondent Malabanan is replete with details on Motion 43 of the Solicitor General dated 18 June 1996 filed with
the RTC, furnishing the trial court with a copy of the how the principal respondent, Mayor Yabut, in conspiracy with the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393 wherein the Solicitor
aforementioned resolution of the Court of Appeals and drawing the assailant and others, had consciously and deliberately General joined cause with petitioners and prayed that "in the
the attention of the trial court to the rulings of this Court in adopted means to ensure the execution of the crime. According to better interest of justice, [the] Petition for Prohibition be
"Valdez vs. Aquilisan, (133 SCRA 150), Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, him, while they were on their way to the victim's house, Mayor GRANTED and a writ of prohibition be ISSUED forthwith." In
and Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. vs. Court of Appeals . . . Yabut already instructed Danny, the assailant, that, "Dikitan mo support of said prayer, the Solicitor General argued:
as well as the decision in Paul G. Roberts vs. The Court of lang, alam no na king ano ang gagawin mo, bahala ka na" This
Appeals." explains why Danny positioned himself near the stairs of the 2. There is merit to the cause of petitioners. If the Secretary of
victim's house armed with a handgun, such positioning was Justice would find their Appeal meritorious, the Provincial
On 3 May 1996, Judge Villon issued an order resetting precisely adopted as a means to ensure the accomplishment of Prosecutor would be directed to upgrade the Information to
arraignment of the accused to 20 May 1996. 33 On the latter date, their evil design and Mayor Yabut ordered nobody else but Danny Murder and extreme prejudice if not gross injustice would thereby
the YABUTs each entered a plea of not guilty. 34 to shoot the victim while descending the stairs as his position was have been avoided.
very strategic to ensure the killing of the victim.
Alarmed by the conduct of arraignment, petitioners filed, on 27 3. Consequently, the undersigned counsel interpose no objection
May 1996, an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Arraignment,35 citing As has been repeatedly held, to constitute treachery, two to the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining respondent Judge
the resolution of 30 April 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. conditions must be present, to wit: (1) employment of means of from holding further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 96-1667-M,
SP No. 40393 which,inter alia, deferred resolution on the execution that gives the person [attacked] no opportunity to particularly in holding the arraignment of the accused, pending
application for a temporary restraining order "until after the defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were resolution of the Appeals with the Secretary of Justice.
required comment is submitted by the respondent;" stressed that deliberately or consciously adopted (People vs. Talaver, 230 SCRA
the filing of the information for the lesser offense of homicide was The YABUTs opposed 44 petitioner's Manifestation and Motion
281 [1994]). In the case at bar, these two (2) requisites are
"clearly unjust and contrary to law in view of the unquestionable dated 1 July 1996 because they had already been arraigned and,
present as established from the foregoing discussion. Hence,
therefore, would be placed in double jeopardy; and that the In an order 55 dated 15 October 1996, Judge Villon denied (3) The information for homicide was nevertheless filed despite
public prosecutor — not the private prosecutor — had control of reconsideration of the order denying petitioners' motion to set notice to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of the appeal filed
the prosecution of the case. aside arraignment, citing the YABUTs' right to a speedy trial and with the Secretary of Justice and request to defer any action on
explaining that the prosecution of an offense should be under the the case.
In his letter 45 dated 1 July 1996 addressed to the Provincial control of the public prosecutor, whereas petitioners did not
Prosecutor of Pampanga, the Secretary of Justice set aside his obtain the conformity of the prosecutor before they filed various (4) The Office of the Public Prosecutor of Pampanga disallowed
order to amend the information from homicide to murder motions to defer proceedings. Considering said order, Judge Villon the private prosecutor from further participating in the case.
considering that the appeal was rendered moot and academic by deemed accused Mallari's motion for reconsideration moot and
the arraignment of the accused for homicide and their having (5) Judge Roura denied the motion to defer proceedings and
academic. 56
entered their pleas of not guilty. The Secretary stated: declared in open court that there was no prima facie case for
On 16 October 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated its murder, notwithstanding the pendency of petitioners' appeal with
Considering that Santiago Yabut, Servillano Yabut and Martin decision 57 in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393 dismissing the petition therein respondent Secretary of Justice.
Yabut had already been arraigned on May 20, 1996 and had for having become moot and academic in view of Judge Roura's
pleaded not guilty to the charge of homicide, as shown by a copy (6) Even before receipt by petitioners of Judge Roura's order
voluntary inhibition, the arraignment of the YABUTs and the
of the court order dated May 20, 1996, the petition for review inhibiting himself and the order regarding the transfer of the case
dismissal, by the Secretary of Justice, of petitioners' appeal as it
insofar as the respondents-Yabut are concerned has been to Branch 54, public respondent Judge Villon set the case for
had been mooted by said arraignment.
rendered moot and academic. arraignment and, without notice to petitioners, forthwith
Judge Villon was later detailed to Branch 24 of the Regional Trial arraigned the accused on the information for homicide on 20 May
However, the Secretary reiterated that Fortunato Mallari should Court of Manila, and Judge Roura was ordered by the Supreme 1996, despite the pendency of the petition for prohibition before
be included in the information for homicide. Court to preside over cases pending in Branch 54 of the Regional the Court of Appeals and of the appeal before the DOJ.
Trial Court of Macabebe, Pampanga, which was previously
On 30 July 1996, Public Prosecutor Jaime Bustos filed a Motion for (7) The Pampanga Provincial Prosecutor's Office did not object to
presided over by Judge Villon. 58 Judge Roura informed the Office
Leave to Amend Information and to Admit Amended the arraignment nor take any action to prevent further
of the Court Administrator and this Court that he had already
Information.46 The Amended Information 47 merely impleaded proceedings on the case despite knowledge of the pendency of
inhibited himself from hearing Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M). 59
Fortunato Mallari as one of the accused. the appeal.
On 28 December 1996, petitioners filed the instant Petition
In his Order 48 of 1 August 1996, Judge Villon denied petitioners' (8) The Provincial Prosecutor did not comply with the resolution of
for Certiorari/Prohibition and Mandamus. They urge this Court to
motion to set aside arraignment, citing Section 4, DOJ Department 7 June 1996 of the Secretary of Justice directing the amendment
reverse the order of respondent Judge denying their Motion to
Order No. 223, and the letter of the Secretary of Justice of 1 July of the information to charge the crime of murder.
Set Aside Arraignment; set aside arraignment of private
1996. Petitioners forthwith moved for reconsideration 49 of the
respondents; order that no further action be taken by any court in Petitioners argue that in light of Roberts, Jr., v. Court of
order, arguing that the Motion to Defer the Proceedings filed by
Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M) until this petition is resolved; and Appeals, 60 respondent Judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction in
petitioners was meritorious and did not violate the accused's right
order respondents Secretary of Justice and the prosecutors proceeding with private respondents' arraignment for homicide
to speedy trial; and that the DOJ had ruled that the proper offense
concerned to amend the information from homicide to murder. and denying petitioners' motion to set aside arraignment.
to be charged was murder and did not reverse such finding.
Petitioners also cited the Solicitor General's stand 50 in CA-G.R. SP Moreover, although respondent Judge Villon was not the
Petitioners insist that the killing of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was
No. 40393 that holding accused's arraignment in abeyance was respondent in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393; he should have deferred the
attended by treachery since private respondents tricked the
proper under the circumstances. Finally, petitioners contended proceedings just the same as the very issue in said case was
victim into coming out of his house and then shot him while he
that in proceeding with the arraignment despite knowledge of a whether or not the RTC could proceed with the arraignment
was going down the stairs. There was, petitioners claim, "an
petition for prohibition pending before the Court of Appeals, the despite the pending review of the case by respondent Secretary of
orchestrated effort on the part of [private respondents] to
trial court violated Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court on Justice. Further, Judge Villon unjustly invoked private
manipulate the rules on administrative appeals with the end in
indirect contempt. The YABUTs opposed the motion on the respondents' right to a speedy trial, after a lapse of barely three
view of evading prosecution for the [non-bailable] offense of
ground that it raised no argument which had not yet been (3) months from the filing of the information on 23 February
murder," as shown by the following events or circumstances:
resolved. 51 1996; overlooked that private respondents were estopped from
(1) Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfonso-Flores downgraded the invoking said right as they went into hiding after the killing, only
On 3 September 1996, petitioners filed a Motion to Defer nature of the crime committed to homicide, a bailable offense, on to resurface when the charge was reduced to homicide; and failed
Arraignment of Accused Fortunato Mallari, 52 which the trial court strength of a motion for reinvestigation filed by the YABUTs who to detect the Provincial Prosecutor's bias in favor of private
granted in view of petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the had not yet been arrested. respondents. Judge Villon should have been more circumspect as
court's order denying petitioners' motion to set aside private he knew that by proceeding with the arraignment, the appeal with
respondents' arraignment. 53 As expected, Mallari moved to (2) Respondent Mayor and his companions returned to Minalin the DOJ would be rendered technically nugatory.
reconsider the trial court's order and clamored for consistency in after the killing and went into hiding for four (4) months until the
the trial court's rulings. 54 offense charged was downgraded. Finally, petitioners submit that the DOJ rule prohibiting appeals
from resolutions of prosecutors to the Secretary of Justice once
the accused had already been arraigned applies only to instances by the Court of Appeals of the petition for prohibition, and since that there was no qualifying circumstance attending the killing,
where the appellants are the accused, since by submitting to said Court did not issue any restraining order, arraignment was and that the private prosecution had convincing arguments to
arraignment, they voluntarily abandon their appeal. properly had; and (d) reliance on Roberts is misplaced, as there, support the appeal. The subsequent resolution of the Secretary of
accused Roberts and others had not been arraigned and Justice confirmed the correctness of the private prosecution's
In their comment, private respondents contend that no sufficient respondent Judge had ordered the indefinite postponement of stand and exposed the blatant errors of Alfonso-Reyes.
legal justification exists to set aside private respondents' the arraignment pending resolution of their petitions before the
arraignment, it having already been reset twice from 12 April Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. Fourth, despite the pendency of the appeal, Alfonso-Reyes filed
1996 to 3 may 1996, due to petitioners' pending appeals with the the Information for homicide on 28 February 1996. It is interesting
DOJ; and from 3 May 1996 to 20 May 1996, due to the transfer of We now consider the issues enumerated at the outset of to note that while the information was dated 29 January 1996, it
this case to Branch 54. Moreover, as of the latter date, the DOJ this ponencia. was approved by the Provincial Prosecutor only on 27 February
had not yet resolved petitioners' appeal and the DOJ did not 1996. This simply means that the Office of the Prosecutor was not,
request that arraignment be held in abeyance, despite the fact Plainly, the proceedings below were replete with procedural initially, in a hurry to file the Information. No undue prejudice
that petitioners' appeal had been filed as early as 23 February irregularities which lead us to conclude that something had gone could have been caused to the YABUTs if it were filed even later
1996, at least 86 days prior to private respondents' arraignment. awry in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga for the YABUTs were still at large; in fact, they filed their bonds of
They point out that petitioners did not move to reconsider the resulting in manifest advantage to the accused, more particularly P20,000.00 each only after the filing of the Information. If Alfonso-
RTC's 26 March 1996 denial of the Motion to Defer, opting instead the YABUTs, and grave prejudice to the State and to private Flores was extremely generous to the YABUTs, no compelling
for Judge Roura's recusal and recourse to the Court of Appeals, complainants, herein petitioners. reason existed why she could not afford the offended parties the
and as no restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals, it same courtesy by at least waiting for instructions from the
First, warrants for the arrest of the YABUTs were issued by the
was but proper for respondent Judge to proceed with the Secretary of Justice in view of the appeal, if she were unwilling to
MCTC, with no bail recommended for their temporary liberty.
arraignment of private respondent, to which the public and voluntarily ask the latter for instructions. Clearly, under the
However, for one reason or another undisclosed in the record, the
private prosecutors did not object. circumstances, the latter course of action would have been the
YABUTs were not arrested; neither did they surrender. Hence,
most prudent thing to do.
Private respondents further argue that the decision of respondent they were never brought into the custody of the law. Yet, Asst.
Secretary, involving as it did the exercise of discretionary powers, Provincial Fiscal Alfonso Reyes, either motu proprio or upon Fifth, as if to show further bias in favor of the YABUTs, the Office
is not subject to judicial review. Under the principle of separation motion of the YABUTs, conducted a reinvestigation. Since said of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga did not even bother
of powers, petitioners' recourse should have been to the accused were at large, Alfonso-Reyes should not have done so. to motu proprio, inform the trial court that the private
President. While as regards petitioners' plea that the Secretary be While it may be true that under the second paragraph of Section prosecution had appealed from the resolution of Alfonso-Flores
compelled to amend the information from homicide to murder, 5, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the provincial prosecutor may and had sought, with all the vigour it could muster, the filing of an
private respondents submit thatmandamus does not lie, as the disagree with the findings of the judge who conducted the information for murder, as found by the MCTC and established by
determination as to what offense was committed is a prerogative preliminary investigation, as here, this difference of opinion must the evidence before it.
of the DOJ, subject only to the control of the President. be on the basis of the review of the record and evidence
transmitted by the judge. Were that all she did, as she had no Unsatisfied with what had been done so far to accommodate the
As regards DOJ Department Order No. 223, private respondents other option under the circumstance, she was without any other YABUTs, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor did not even have
theorize that appeal by complainants is allowed only if the choice but to sustain the MCTC since the YABUTs and all other the decency to agree to defer arraignment despite its continuing
complaint is dismissed by the prosecutor and not when there is a accused, except Francisco Yambao, waived the filing of their knowledge of the pendency of the appeal. This amounted to
finding of probable cause, in which case, only the accused can counter-affidavits. Then, further stretching her magnanimity in defiance of the DOJ's power of control and supervision over
appeal. Hence, petitioners' appeal was improper. favor of the accused, Alfonso-Reyes allowed the YABUTs to submit prosecutors, a matter which we shall later elaborate on.
their counter-affidavits without first demanding that they Moreover, in an unprecedented move, the trial prosecutor,
Finally, private respondents stress the fact that petitioners never surrender because of the standing warrants of arrest against Olimpio Datu, had the temerity, if not arrogance, to announce
appealed the withdrawal by the public prosecutor of the private them. In short, Alfonso-Reyes allowed the YABUTs to make a that "he will no longer allow the private prosecutor to participate
prosecutor's authority to handle the case. mockery of the law in order that they gain their provisional liberty or handle the prosecution of [the] case" simply because the
pending trial and be charged with the lesser offense of homicide. private prosecution had asked for the inhibition of Judge Roura.
In its comment for the public respondents, the Office of the
Said prosecutor forgot that since the offended parties here had
Solicitor General (OSG) prays that the petition be denied because: Second, Alfonso-Reyes recommended a bond of only P20,000.00 not waived the civil action nor expressly reserved their right to
(a) in accordance with Section 4 of DOJ Order No. 223, upon for the YABUTs and co-accused "Danny," despite the fact that they institute it separately from the criminal action, then they had the
arraignment of the accused, the appeal to the Secretary of Justice were charged with homicide and they were, at the time, fugitives right to intervene in the criminal case pursuant to Section 16 of
shall be dismissed motu proprio; (b) the filing of the information from justice for having avoided service of the warrant of arrest Rule 1l0 of the Rules of Court.
for homicide was in compliance with the directive under Section issued by the MCTC and having failed to voluntarily surrender.
4(2), D.O. No. 223, i.e., an appeal or motion for reinvestigation It is undebatable that petitioners had the right to appeal to the
from a resolution finding probable cause shall not hold the filing Third, Alfonso-Reyes was fully aware of the private prosecution's DOJ from the resolution of Alfonso-Flores. The last paragraph of
of the information in court; (c) the trial court even accommodated appeal to the DOJ from her resolution. She could not have been Section 4 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court provides:
petitioners by initially deferring arraignment pending resolution ignorant of the fact that the appeal vigorously assailed her finding
If upon petition by a proper party, the Secretary of Justice decision or action of said chief of bureau, office, division or We cannot accept the view of the Office of the Solicitor General
reverses the resolution of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state service. and private respondents that Section 1 of DOJ Department Order
prosecutor, he shall direct the fiscal concerned to file the No. 223 is the controlling rule; hence, pursuant to the second
corresponding information without conducting another "Supervision" and "control" of a department head over his paragraph thereof the appeal of petitioners did not hold the filing
preliminary investigation or to dismiss or move for the dismissal of subordinates have been defined in administrative law as follows: of the information. As stated above, Section 4 applies even to
the complaint or information. appeals by the respondents or accused. The provision reads:
In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power
It is clear from the above, that the proper party referred to therein or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform Sec. 4. Non-appealable cases. Exceptions. — No appeal may be
could be either the offended party or the accused. their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former taken from a resolution of the Chief State Prosecutor/Regional
may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them State Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor finding probable
More importantly, an appeal to the DOJ is an invocation of the perform such duties. Control, on the other hand, means the cause except upon a showing of manifest error or grave abuse of
Secretary's power of control over prosecutors. Thus, in Ledesma v. power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a discretion. Notwithstanding the showing of minifest error or grave
Court of Appeals, 16 we emphatically held: subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and abuse of discretion, no appeal shall be entertained where the
to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. appellant had already been arraigned. If the appellant is arraigned
Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to
during the pendency of the appeal, said appeal shall be
the secretary of justice who, under the Revised Administrative Review as an act of supervision and control by the justice
dismissed motu proprio by the Secretary of Justice.
Code, 62 exercises the power of direct control and supervision over secretary over the fiscals and prosecutors finds basis in the
said prosecutors; and who, may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which holds An appeal/motion for reinvestigation from a resolution finding
modify their rulings. that mistakes, abuses or negligence committed in the initial steps probable cause, however, shall not hold the filing of the
of an administrative activity or by an administrative agency should information in court. (emphasis supplied)
Sec. 39, Chapter 8, Book IV in relation to Section[s] 5, 8, and 9, be corrected by higher administrative authorities, and not directly
Chapter 2, Title III of the Code gives the secretary of justice by courts. As a rule, only after administrative remedies are The underlined portion indisputably shows that the section refers
supervision and control over the Office of the Chief Prosecutor exhausted may judicial recourse be allowed. to appeals by respondents or accused. So we held in Marcelo v.
and the Provincial and City Prosecution Offices. The scope of his Court of
power of supervision and control is delineated in Section 38, DOJ Order No. 223 of 30 June 1993 recognizes the right of both Appeals, 63 that nothing in the ruling in Crespo v.
paragraph 1, Chapter 7, Book IV of the Code: the offended parties and the accused to appeal from resolutions Mogul, 64 reiterated in Roberts v. Court of Appeals, 65forecloses
in preliminary investigations or reinvestigations, as provided for in the power of authority of the Secretary of Justice to review
(1) Supervision and Control. — Supervision and control shall Section 1 and Section 4, respectively. Section 1 thereof provides, resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases despite an
include authority to act directly whenever a specific function is thus: information already having been filed in court. The Secretary of
entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the
Justice is only enjoined to refrain, as far as practicable, from
performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, Sec. 1. What May Be Appealed. — Only resolutions of the Chief
entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the
approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate State Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Prosecutor or City
prosecutor once a complaint or information is filed in court. In any
officials or units; . . . . Prosecutor dismissing a criminal complaint may be the subject of
case, the grant of a motion to dismiss, which the prosecution may
an appeal to the Secretary of Justice except as otherwise provided
Supplementing the aforequoted provisions are Section 3 of R.A. file after the Secretary of Justice reverses an appealed resolution,
in Section 4 hereof.
3783 and Section 37 of Act 4007, which read: is subject to the discretion of the court. In Roberts we went
While the section speaks of resolutions dismissing a criminal further by saying that Crespo could not have foreclosed said
Sec. 3. . . . complaint, petitioners herein were not barred from appealing power or authority of the Secretary of Justice "without doing
from the resolution holding that only homicide was committed, violence to, or repealing, the last paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112
The Chief State Prosecutor, the Assistant Chief State Prosecutors, of the Rules of Court" which is quoted above.
considering that their complaint was for murder. By holding that
the Senior State Prosecutors, and the State Prosecutors shall . . .
only homicide was committed, the Provincial Prosecutor's Office
perform such other duties as may be assigned to them by the Indubitably then, there was on the part of the public prosecution,
of Pampanga effectively "dismissed" the complaint for murder.
Secretary of Justice in the interest of public service. indecent haste in the filing of the information for homicide,
Accordingly, petitioners could file an appeal under said Section 1.
depriving the State and the offended parties of due process.
xxx xxx xxx To rule otherwise would be to forever bar redress of a valid
grievance, especially where the investigating prosecutor, as in this As to the second issue, we likewise hold that Judge Roura acted
Sec. 37. The provisions of the existing law to the contrary case, demonstrated what unquestionably appeared to be with grave abuse of discretion when, in his order of 26 March
notwithstanding, whenever a specific power, authority, duty, unmitigated bias in favor of the accused. Section 1 is not to be l996, 66 he deferred resolution on the motion for a hold departure
function, or activity is entrusted to a chief of bureau, office, literally applied in the sense that appeals by the offended parties order until "such time that all the accused who are out on bail are
division or service, the same shall be understood as also conferred are allowed only in cases of dismissal of the complaint, otherwise arraigned" and denied the motion to defer proceedings for the
upon the proper Department Head who shall have authority to act the last paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112, Rules of Court would be reason that the "private prosecution has not shown any indication
directly in pursuance thereof, or to review, modify, or revoke any meaningless. that [the] appeal was given due course by the Secretary of
Justice." Neither rhyme nor reason or even logic, supports the
ground for the deferment of the first motion. Precisely, immediate should arraignment be precipitately held. However, Judge Villon the evidence, with a view to erasing all doubt from the court's
action thereon was called for as the accused were out on bail and, cursorily ignored all this. While it may be true that he was not mind as to the accused's innocence or guilt.
perforce, had all the opportunity to leave the country if they bound to await the DOJ's resolution of the appeal, as he had,
wanted to. To hold that arraignment is a prerequisite to the procedurally speaking, complete control over the case and any The judge, on the other hand, "should always be imbued with a
issuance of a hold departure order could obviously defeat the disposition thereof rested on his sound discretion, 68 his judicial high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his
purpose of said order. As to the second motion, Judge Roura was instinct should have led him to peruse the documents submitted obligation to promptly and properly administer justice." 74 He
fully aware of the pendency of petitioner's appeal with the DOJ, on 30 April 1996 and to initially determine, for his own must view himself as a priest, for the administration of justice is
which was filed as early as 23 February 1996. In fact, he must have enlightenment with serving the ends of justice as the ultimate akin to a religious crusade. Thus, exerting the same devotion as a
taken that into consideration when he set arraignment of the goal, if indeed murder was the offense committed; or, he could priest "in the performance of the most sacred ceremonies of
accused only on 12 April 1996, and on that date, after denying have directed the private prosecutor to secure a resolution on the religious liturgy," the judge must render service with impartiality
petitioners' motion to reconsider the denial of the motion to appeal within a specified time. Given the totality of circumstances, commensurate with the public trust and confidence reposed in
defer proceedings, he further reset arraignment to 3 May Judge Villon should have heeded our statement in Marcelo 69 that him. 75 Although the determination of a criminal case before a
1996 and gave petitioners ten (10) days within which to file a prudence, if not wisdom, or at least, respect for the authority of judge lies within his exclusive jurisdiction and competence, 76 his
petition for certiorari to question his denial of the motion to defer the prosecution agency, dictated that he should have waited for discretion is not unfettered, but rather must be exercised within
and of the order denying the reconsideration. In any event, the the resolution of the appeal then pending before the DOJ. All told, reasonable confines. 77 The judge's action must not impair the
better part of wisdom suggested that, at the very least, he should Judge Villon should not have merely acquiesced to the findings of substantial rights of the accused, nor the right of the State and
have asked petitioners as regards the status of the appeal or the public prosecutor. offended party to due process of law. 78
warned them that if the DOJ would not decide the appeal within a
We do not then hesitate to rule that Judge Villon committed grave Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is
certain period, then arraignment would proceed.
abuse of discretion in rushing the arraignment of the YABUTs on not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of society
Petitioners did in fact file the petition with the Court of Appeals the assailed information for homicide. Again, the State and the and the offended parties which have been wronged must be
on 19 April 1996 and, at the same time, moved to inhibit Judge offended parties were deprived of due process. equally considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not
Roura. These twin moves prompted Judge Roura to "voluntarily" necessarily a denial of justice; and an acquittal is not necessarily a
inhibit himself from the case on 29 April 1996 67 and to transfer Up to the level then of Judge Villon, two pillars of the criminal triumph of justice, for, to the society offended and the party
the case to the branch presided by public respondent Judge Villon. justice system failed in this case to function in a manner wronged, it could also mean injustice. 79 Justice then must be
The latter received the records of the case on 30 April 1996. From consistent with the principle of accountability inherent in the rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one hand, and
that time on, however, the offended parties did not receive any public trust character of a public office. Judges Roura and Villon the State and offended party, on the other.
better deal. Acting with deliberate dispatch, Judge Villon issued an and prosecutors Alfonso-Flores and Datu need be reminded that it
is in the public interest that every crime should be punished 70 and In this case, the abuse of discretion on the part of the public
order on 3 May 1996 setting arraignment of the accused on 20
judges and prosecutors play a crucial role in this regard for theirs prosecution and Judges Roura and Villon was gross, grave and
May 1996. If Judge Villon only perused the record of the case with
is the delicate duty to see justice done, i.e., not to allow the guilty palpable, denying, the State and the offended parties their day in
due diligence, as should be done by anyone who has just taken
to escape nor the innocent to court, or in a constitutional sense, due process. As to said judges,
over a new case, he could not have helped but notice: (a) the
suffer. 71 such amounted to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or that their court
motion to defer further proceedings; (2) the order of Judge Roura
was ousted of the jurisdiction in respect thereto, thereby
giving petitioners ten days within which to file a petition with the
Prosecutors must never forget that, in the language of Suarez v. nullifying as having been done without jurisdiction, the denial of
Court of Appeals; (3) the fact of the filling of such petition in CA-
Platon, 72 they are the representatives not of an ordinary party to the motion to defer further hearings, the denial of the motion to
G.R. SP No. 40393; (4) the resolution of the Court of Appeals
a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern reconsider such denial, the arraignment of the YABUTs and their
directing respondents to comment on the petition and show
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and plea of not guilty.
cause why the application for a writ of preliminary injunction
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it
should not be granted and deferring resolution of the application These lapses by both the judges and prosecutors concerned
shall win every case but that justice be done. As such, they are in a
for a temporary restraining order until after the required cannot be taken lightly. We must remedy the situation before the
peculiar and every definite sense the servants of the law, whose
comment was filed, which indicated a prima facie showing of onset of any irreversible effects. We thus have no other recourse,
two-fold aim is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.
merit; (5) the motion to inhibit Judge Roura precisely because of for as Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee pronounced in Galman v.
his prejudgment that the crime committed was merely homicide; Prosecutors are charged with the defense of the community Sandiganbayan: 80
(6) Judge Roura's subsequent inhibition; (7) various pieces of aggrieved by a crime, and are expected to prosecute the public
documentary evidence submitted by petitioners on 30 April 1996 action with such zeal and vigor as if they were the ones personally The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict
supporting a charge of murder, not homicide; and (8) most aggrieved, but at all times cautious that they refrain from and travesty of justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land
importantly , the pending appeal with the DOJ. improper methods designed to secure a wrongful under its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They
conviction. 73 With them lies the duty to lay before the court the would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as
All the foregoing demanded from any impartial mind, especially mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and
pertinent facts at the judge's disposal with strict attention to
that of Judge Villon, a cautious attitude as these were suppress the truth, instead of repositories of judicial power whose
punctilios, thereby clarifying contradictions and sealing all gaps in
unmistakable indicia of the probability of a miscarriage of justice judges are sworn and committed to render impartial justice to all
alike who seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the the case 82 is void, hence double jeopardy cannot be invoked by
prevention of redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and the accused. If this is so in those cases, so must it be where the
removed from the pressures of politics and prejudice. arraignment and plea of not guilty are void, as in this case as
above discussed.
We remind all members of the pillars of the criminal justice
system that theirs is not a mere ministerial task to process each WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of Judge
accused in and out of prison, but a noble duty to preserve our Reynaldo Roura of 26 March 1996 denying the Motion to Defer
democratic society under a rule of law. Proceeding and of 12 April 1996 denying the motion to reconsider
the denial of said Motion to Defer Proceedings, and the orders of
Anent the third issue, it was certainly grave error for the DOJ to respondent Judge Sesinando Villon of 3 May 1996 resetting the
reconsider its 7 June 1996 resolution, holding that murder was arraignment to 20 May 1998 and of 25 October 1996 denying the
committed and directing the Provincial Prosecutor to accordingly Motion to Set Aside Arraignment in Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M)
amend the information, solely on the basis of the information that are declared VOID and SET ASIDE. The arraignment of private
the YABUTs had already been arraigned. In so doing, the DOJ respondents Mayor Santiago Yabut, Servillano Yabut and Martin
relinquished its power of control and supervision over the Yabut and their separate pleas of not guilty are likewise declared
Provincial Prosecutor and the Assistant Provincial Prosecutors of VOID and SET ASIDE. Furthermore, the order of public respondent
Pampanga; and meekly surrendered to the latter's inappropriate Secretary of Justice of 1 July 1996 is SET ASIDE and his order of 7
conductor even hostile attitude, which amounted to neglect of June 1996 REINSTATED.
duty or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, as
well as to the undue haste of Judge Roura and Villon in respect of The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga is DIRECTED
the arraignment of the YABUTs. The sins of omission or to comply with the order (letter) of the Secretary of Justice of 7
commission of said prosecutors and judges resulted, in light of the June 1996 by forthwith filing with the trial court the amended
finding of the DOJ that the crime committed was murder, in information for murder. Thereafter the trial court shall proceed in
unwarranted benefit to the YABUTs and gross prejudice to the said case with all reasonable dispatch.
State and the offended parties. The DOJ should have courageously
exercised its power of control by taking bolder steps to rectify the No pronouncement as to costs.
shocking "mistakes" so far committed and, in the final analysis, to
SO ORDERED.
prevent further injustice and fully serve the ends of justice. The
DOJ could have, even if belatedly, joined cause with petitioners to
set aside arraignment. Further, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers over its personnel, the DOJ could have directed the public
prosecutors concerned to show cause why no disciplinary action
should be taken against them for neglect of duty or conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service in not, inter alia,
even asking the trial court to defer arraignment in view of the
pendency of the appeal, informing the DOJ, from time to time, of
the status of the case, and, insofar as prosecutor Datu was
concerned, in disallowing the private prosecutor from further
participating in the case.

Finally, the DOJ should have further inquired into the vicissitudes
of the case below to determine the regularity of arraignment,
considering that the appeal was received by the DOJ as early as 23
February 1996.

We then rule that the equally hasty motu

proprio "reconsideration" of the 7 June 1996 resolution of the DOJ
was attended with grave abuse of discretion.

It is settled that when the State is deprived of due process in a

criminal case by reason of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court, the acquittal of the accused 81 or the dismissal of
Republic of the Philippines Respondents filed complaints against petitioners and several Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied
SUPREME COURT others with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Lucena with finality by the Secretary of Justice on November 6, 2000.
Manila City. In turn, the NBI forwarded their complaints to the Office of
the City Prosecutor, same city, for preliminary investigation, Respondents then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of
FIRST DIVISION docketed as I.S. Nos. 98-1487, 98-1621, 98-1629, and 98-1605. Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 62401. They alleged that in
issuing the Resolution dated January 3, 2000 directing the
G.R. No. 163797 April 24, 2007 In a Resolution dated March 18, 1999, Lucena City Prosecutor Prosecutor’s Office of Lucena City to file the corresponding
Romeo A. Datu (now retired), disposed of the complaints as Information only against Marissa, the Secretary of Justice
WILSON CHUA, RENITA CHUA, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and
follows: committed grave abuse of discretion. They prayed that the Court
THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF LUCENA CITY, Petitioners,
of Appeals order the Lucena City Prosecutor to withdraw the
vs. WHEREFORE, after preliminary investigation, finding sufficient Information in Criminal Case No. 99-182 and instead, file several
RODRIGO PADILLO and MARIETTA PADILLO, Respondents. evidence to warrant a finding of a prima facie case of Estafa Thru Informations against petitioners.
Falsification of Commercial Documents, let an Information be filed
DECISION
against Marissa Padillo-Chua, Wilson Chua, Renita Chua, and On January 24, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: several John Does, the same to be filed with the Regional Trial dismissing the petition, holding that there was no conspiracy
Court. among the petitioners.
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari assailing the Amended Decision1 of the Court of The case against the other respondents, namely, Perla Correa, Respondents seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration.
Appeals dated May 15, 2003 reversing its Decision2 dated January Giovani Guia, Emmanuel Garcia, Zenaida Nantes, Cherrylyn Revisiting its Decision, the Court of Appeals, on May 15, 2003,
24, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 62401, entitled "Rodrigo Padillo and Mendoza, Rosalie Mazo, Fernando Loreto, Cesar Salamat, Antonio promulgated its Amended Decision granting respondents’ motion,
Marietta Padillo, Complainants-Petitioners, versus The Secretary Bana, Isidro Manalo, Jr., Ramon Villanueva, Alexander Asiado, thus:
of Justice, et al., Respondents." Peter Tan, Jun Tan, Flaviano Evaso, Edgar Sebastian, Crisencio Asi,
Roberto Ong and Gregorio Flancia is provisionally dismissed. WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED.
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are: ACCORDINGLY, the Court orders the DOJ, City Prosecutor, Lucena
Forthwith, the City Prosecutor filed an Information City to include Wilson Chua and Renita Chua as accused in the said
Rodrigo Padillo and Marietta Padillo, respondents, are the owners for estafa against Marissa, Wilson, and Renita with the Regional case.
of Padillo Lending Investor engaged in the money lending business Trial Court of Lucena City, docketed therein as Criminal Cse No.
in Lucena City. Their niece, Marissa Padillo-Chua, served as the 99-182. It was raffled of to Branch 59. SO ORDERED.
firm’s manager. Marissa is married to Wilson Chua, brother of
Believing that a more serious offense should have been charged In reversing itself, the Court of Appeals found that it overlooked
Renita Chua, herein petitioners.
against petitioners, respondents interposed an appeal to the certain facts and circumstances which, if considered, would
One of Marissa’s functions was to evaluate and recommend loan Secretary of Justice who issued a Resolution dated January 3, establish probable cause against Wilson and Renita. The Court of
applications for approval by respondents. Once a loan application 2000, the dispositive portion of which reads: Appeals identified these facts to be: (1) Marissa’s consistent
had been approved, respondents would authorize the release of a practice of depositing checks with altered names of payees to the
check signed by them or their authorized signatory, a certain Mila WHEREFORE, the appealed resolution is modified. The City respective accounts of Wilson Chua and Renita Chua; (2)
Manalo. Prosecution Office of Lucena City is hereby directed to file the considering that Wilson and Marissa are husband and wife, it can
Information of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of be inferred that one knows the transactions of the other; and (3)
Sometime in September 1999, a post-audit was conducted. It was commercial documents defined and penalized under Article 315 Wilson had full knowledge of the unlawful activities of Marissa.
found that Marissa was engaged in illegal activities. Some of the par. 1(b) in relation to Articles 171 and 172 (58 counts) against This is supported by the affidavit of Ernesto Alcantara dated
borrowers whose loan applications she recommended for respondent Marissa Padillo-Chua and to cause the withdrawal of November 26, 1998.
approval were fictitious and their signatures on the checks were the Information of estafa through falsification of commercial
spurious. Marissa’s modus operandi was to alter the name of the documents against respondents Wilson Chua and Renita Chua. Wilson Chua and Renita Chua filed their motion for
payee appearing on the check by adding another name as an Report to us the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but the Court of
alternative payee. This alternative payee would then personally hereof. Appeals denied the same on May 28, 2004.
encash the check with the drawee bank. The cash amounts
The Secretary of Justice found that the participation of Wilson Hence, the instant petition. Petitioners contend that the Court of
received were turned over to Marissa or her husband Wilson for
Chua in the commission of the crime was not clearly established Appeals erred in compelling the Secretary of Justice to include in
deposit in their personal accounts. To facilitate encashment,
by the evidence. There was no showing that he abused the trust the Information Wilson and Renita.
Marissa would sign the check to signify to the bank that she
personally knew the alternative payee. The alternative payees and confidence of respondents when two (2) of the questioned
Section 5, Rule 110 of the 200 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
included employees of Wilson or his friends. The total amount checks were deposited in his bank account. As to Renita Chua, the
amended, partly provides that "All criminal actions either
embezzled reached ₱7 million. Secretary of Justice found no proof of conspiracy between her and
commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted
Marissa.
under the direction and control of a public prosecutor." The
rationale for this rule is that since a criminal offense is an outrage We agree.
to the sovereignty of the State, it necessarily follows that a
representative of the State shall direct and control the Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical
prosecution thereof.3 In Suarez v. Platon,4 this Court described the exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.11 We
prosecuting officer as: have carefully examined the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice
dated January 3, 2000 wherein he ruled that there was no
[T]he representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but probable cause to hold Wilson Chua and Renita Chua
of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as for estafa through falsification of commercial documents. As
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, found by the Court of Appeals, the Secretary of Justice either
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, overlooked or patently ignored the following circumstances: (1)
but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very Marissa’s practice of depositing checks, with altered names of
definite sense a servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is payees, in the respective accounts of Wilson and Renita Chua; (2)
that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. the fact that Wilson and Marissa are husband and wife makes it
difficult to believe that one has no idea of the transactions
Having been vested by law with the control of the prosecution of entered into by the other; and (3) the affidavit of Ernesto
criminal cases, the public prosecutor, in the exercise of his Alcantara dated November 26, 1998 confirming that Wilson had
functions, has the power and discretion to: (a) determine whether knowledge of Marissa’s illegal activities.
a prima facie case exists;5 (b) decide which of the conflicting
testimonies should be believed free from the interference or Indeed, as we ruled in Sanchez v. Demetriou,12 not even the
control of the offended party;6 and (c) subject only to the right Supreme Court can order the prosecution of a person against
against self-incrimination, determine which witnesses to present whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support
in court.7Given his discretionary powers, a public prosecutor at least a prima facie case. The only possible exception to this rule
cannot be compelled to file an Information where he is not is where there is an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of
convinced that the evidence before him would warrant the filing discretion on the part of the prosecutor, as in this case.
of an action in court. For while he is bound by his oath of office to
prosecute persons who, according to complainant’s evidence, are Verily, the Court of Appeals did not err in directing the City
shown to be guilty of a crime, he is likewise duty-bound to protect Prosecutor of Lucena City to include Wilson and Renita Chua in
innocent persons from groundless, false, or malicious the Information for the complex crime of estafa through
prosecution.8 falsification of commercial documents.

We must stress, however, that the public prosecutor’s exercise of WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Amended
his discretionary powers is not absolute. Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62401. Costs
against petitioner.
First, the resolution of the investigating prosecutor is subject to
appeal to the Secretary of Justice who, under the Administrative SO ORDERED.
Code of 1987, as amended, exercises control and supervision over
the investigating prosecutor. Thus, the Secretary of Justice may
affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the ruling of said prosecutor." In
special cases, the public prosecutor’s decision may even be
reversed or modified by the Office of the President.9

Second, the Court of Appeals may review the resolution of the

Secretary of Justice on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, on the ground that
he committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction.10

Here, we note that the Court of Appeals, on motion for

reconsideration by respondents, ruled that the Secretary of
Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in resolving that only
Marissa should be charged.
Republic of the Philippines falsehoods against him, particularly on the material date of the On October 7, 2004, the MTCC issued Warrants of Arrest against
SUPREME COURT alleged sale and the fact that he sold products which are to be respondents. On the same day, respondent Florencio posted bail.
Manila given free to doctors. He also argued that the alleged acts of Respondent Paro followed suit on October 8, 2004.
"channeling" by him are false and unfounded.
SECOND DIVISION In a Resolution dated October 14, 2004, a TRO was issued by the
Subpoenas were issued by the City Prosecutor against CA, the pertinent portion of which reads:
G.R. No. 171643 August 8, 2010 respondents for the submission of their respective counter-
affidavits; however, the return of the subpoenas showed that xxxx
FILEMON A. VERZANO, JR., Petitioner,
respondents could not be located at their given addresses.
vs. In order not to render moot and academic the instant petition, a
FRANCIS VICTOR D. PARO, JANET A FLORENCIO, HON. REGIONAL In a Resolution8 dated March 3, 2004, notwithstanding that no temporary restraining order (TRO) is hereby issued temporarily
STATE PROSECUTOR, and HON. CITY PROSECUTOR OF counter-affidavits were submitted by respondents, the City enjoining the public respondent Chief Prosecutor from acting on
BACOLOD, Respondents. Prosecutor resolved to dismiss petitioner’s complaint, the the assailed Order issued by the public respondent Regional State
dispositive portion of which reads: Prosecutor for a period of sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.17
DECISION
WHEREFORE, finding no probable cause, all the charges are In light of the issuance of a TRO by the CA, respondents filed with
PERALTA, J.: the MTCC a Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Suspend
hereby recommended dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.9
Proceedings18 on November 2, 2004.
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari,1 under Rule
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration,10 which was,
45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the July 28, 2005 On November 10, 2004, the MTCC issued an Order,19 granting
however, denied by the City Prosecutor in a Resolution11 dated
Decision2 and the February 7, 2006 Resolution3 of the Court of respondent’s motion to suspend the proceedings.
June 11, 2004.
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 86521.
Petitioner appealed the Resolution of the City Prosecutor to the On July 28, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision,20 ruling in favor of
The facts of the case are as follows: respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Office of Regional State Prosecutor via a petition for review.12 On
On March 14, 2002, petitioner Filemon A. Verzano, Jr., former July 30, 2004, the Regional State Prosecutor issued a
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby
District Manager of Wyeth Philippines, Inc. (Wyeth) for the islands Resolution13 finding merit in petitioner’s appeal, the dispositive
GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Resolutions dated July 30,
of Panay and Negros, was dismissed from service upon an portion of which reads:
2004 and August 25, 2004 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
administrative complaint filed against him. Among the individuals
WHEREFORE, your Resolution dated March 3, 2004 is hereby
who filed the complaint against petitioner were respondents SO ORDERED.21
reversed and you are hereby directed to file the appropriate
Francis Victor D. Paro (Paro) and Janet A. Florencio (Florencio)
information for Perjury against Francis Victor D. [Paro] and Janet In ruling against petitioner, the CA ruled, among others, that the
who were territory managers under the supervision of petitioner.
A. Florencio within (5) days from receipt hereof, furnishing this Regional State Prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion
The complaint was founded on petitioner’s alleged violation of Office with proof of compliance within the same period.14 when he directed the filing of the Informations for perjury on the
company policy on prohibited sale of drug samples given for free simple reason that no counter-affidavits were submitted by
Aggrieved, respondents filed a motion for reconsideration.15 In a
to doctors and for the unauthorized act of "channeling," or the respondents. In addition, the CA held that even though the
Resolution16 dated August 25, 2004, the Regional State Prosecutor
transfer of stocks within the same area falsely creating an Informations had already been filed in the MTCC, the same did
denied respondents’ motion.
impression that there was a sale. After conducting its own not bar the CA from reviewing and correcting acts tainted with
investigation and giving petitioner an opportunity to explain his On September 20, 2004 two Informations for perjury were filed grave abuse of discretion.
side, Wyeth resolved to dismiss petitioner tendering him a Notice against respondents in the Municipal Trial Court in the Cities
of Termination.4 Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which
(MTCC), Bacolod City. The Information against respondent
was, however, denied by the CA in a Resolution22dated February
Florencio was docketed as Criminal Case No. 049-8479, whereas,
Aggrieved by his termination, petitioner filed a Complaint5 for 7, 2006.
the Information against respondent Paro was docketed as
illegal dismissal with the Regional Labor Arbitration Board,
Criminal Case No. 049-8480. Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising the following issues
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Bacolod City against
Wyeth. For its part, Wyeth filed its Position Paper to rebut the for this Court’s consideration, to wit:
On the same day, September 20, 2004, respondents filed a
charges of petitioner. Attached to the position paper of Wyeth petition for certiorari before the CA assailing the Resolutions of I.
were the affidavits6 of respondents Paro and Florencio. the Regional State Prosecutor which reversed the earlier
Resolution of the City Prosecutor. Respondents likewise prayed THE PETITION FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WITH THE COURT
It was on account of the said affidavits that petitioner filed a
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) from the OF APPEALS HAD BEEN RENDERED MOOT AND ACADEMIC BY THE
criminal complaint7 against respondents for perjury, false
CA. FILING OF THE CASES IN COURT.
testimony and incriminatory machination. In said complaint,
petitioner argued that the affidavits of respondents contained II.
THE REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTOR DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE approval of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor. Perusal of the affidavits executed by Francis Victor D. [Paro] and
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE RESOLUTION OF THE Thereafter, it may be appealed to the secretary of justice. Janet A. Florencio reveals the following:
CITY PROSECUTOR.
The justice secretary's power of review may still be availed of a) The material matter contained in these affidavits refer to the
III. despite the filing of an information in court. x x x27 act of selling by Filemon Verzano, Jr. of Tazocin products intended
to be distributed as free samples in violation of company policy.
THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY HEREIN PRIVATE In the case at bar, while it is generally the Secretary of Justice who The date when the sale was made is not a material issue.
RESPONDENTS WITH THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT has the authority to review the decisions of the prosecutors, this
THE PROPER REMEDY.23 Court agrees with the CA that the same precedential principles b) The affidavits of the respondent were executed before a Labor
apply in full force and effect to the authority of the CA to correct Arbiter and a Notary Public who are persons authorized to
The petition has no merit. the acts tainted with grave abuse of discretion by the administer oaths.
prosecutorial officers notwithstanding the filing of the
Anent the first issue, petitioner argues that the filing of the c) There is also no question that these affidavits are required by
informations before the MTCC.28 The authority of the CA is
informations in the MTCC had already removed the cases from law as they were attached as part of the position paper submitted
bolstered by the fact that the petition filed before it was one
the power and authority of the prosecution to dismiss the same in with the Labor Arbiter handling the labor case.
under Rule 65, therefore it has the jurisdiction to determine
accordance with the doctrine laid down in Crespo v.
whether or not the Regional State Prosecutor acted with grave
Mogul24 (Crespo), to wit: d) Although there is yet no clear evidence that there was an
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
apparent willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood on their
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or part, the respondents by their failure to file or submit their
Ledesma29 adds that where the secretary of justice exercises his
information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its respective counter-affidavit for their defense, are deemed to have
power of review only after an Information has been filed, trial
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the waived the same and in effect, the allegations in the complaint
courts should defer or suspend arraignment and further
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the remain uncontroverted.
proceedings until the appeal is resolved. On this note, the MTCC
direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even
was thus correct when it suspended the proceedings in view of
while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on The case record will show that your Office, in the determination of
the appeal taken by respondents to the resolution of the Regional
the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do probable cause vis-à-vis the attending set of facts and
State Prosecutor. As observed by the CA, the suspension of the
with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its circumstances, failed to consider the application of the procedure
proceedings by the MTCC was done in the exercise of its
exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the laid down under Section 3 paragraph (d) of Rule 112 of the
jurisdiction, to wit:
case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has Revised Rules of Procedure which provides:
the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is To a certain extent, the respondents’ asseverations are correct
done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does
when they say by the operative act of filing of the informations
motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the not submit counter-affidavits within the ten (10)-day period, the
before it, the MTCC has acquired jurisdiction over the criminal
Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigating officer shall resolve the complaint based on the
proceedings against petitioners. Indeed, the suspension of said
investigation.25 evidence presented by the complainant.
proceedings is one such exercise of jurisdiction, and therefore,
respondents’ worries of the MTCC being divested of jurisdiction or Only a counter-affidavit subscribed and sworn to by the
In addition, petitioner points out that warrants of arrest were
competence over the proceedings are at best, speculative and respondent before the Public Prosecutor can dispute or put at
already issued by the MTCC and that respondents had already
illusory.30 issue the allegations in the complaint thus, a respondent who fails
individually posted bail. Petitioner thus concludes, that the issue
of whether or not the Regional State Prosecutor committed grave to submit his counter-affidavit within the required period is
Anent the second issue raised by petitioner, the same is without
abuse of discretion when he directed the filing of Informations for deemed not to have controverted the complainant’s evidence.31
merit. Petitioner argues that the Regional State Prosecutor did not
perjury against respondents had already become moot and commit grave abuse of discretion when it reversed the finding of Contrary to the claim of petitioner that the Regional State
academic. the city prosecutor that no probable cause existed to warrant the Prosecutor found probable cause, the July 30, 2004 Resolution
filing of the Informations against respondents. does not show that the latter actually made an independent
Petitioner is not entirely correct. As discussed in Ledesma v. Court
of Appeals26 (Ledesma), Crespo does not foreclose an appeal assessment of the evidence presented in the investigation. As a
In finding grave abuse of discretion, the CA opined that the
made to the resolution of a prosecutor in the determination of matter of fact, the clear import of the July 30, 2004 Resolution is
Regional State Prosecutor reversed the finding of the City
probable cause notwithstanding that informations had already that the mere failure of respondents to submit counter-affidavits
Prosecutor on the simple reason that respondents failed to submit
been filed in court, to wit: automatically warrants a finding of probable cause against
counter-affidavits. The CA ruled that it would have been different
them.ten.lihpwal The fallacy in such theory is very apparent and
had the Regional State Prosecutor reversed the resolutions of his
In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals, the Court clarified that Crespo did the CA is thus correct when it observed that:
subordinate upon a positive finding of probable cause.
not foreclose the power or authority of the secretary of justice to
review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases. The Court To follow the public respondent Regional State Prosecutor’s
The pertinent portions of the July 30, 2004 Resolution of the
recognized in Crespo that the action of the investigating fiscal or skewed premise that only counter-affidavits can dispute or
Regional State Prosecutor is hereunder reproduced, to wit:
prosecutor in the preliminary investigation is subject to the controvert allegations in the Complaint, would be to perpetuate
an absurdity wherein a criminal complaint should automatically be Based on the foregoing, because of the manner by which the The court is the best and sole judge of what to do with the case
resolved in favor of the complainant in the absence of counter- Regional State Prosecutor resolved the case, this Court finds that before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive
affidavits. x x x32 the same constitutes grave abuse of discretion, as his jurisdiction and competence. Thus, the court may deny or grant a
interpretation and appreciation of the Rules of Court have no legal motion to withdraw an information, not out of subservience to
It is not disputed that the Regional State Prosecutor has the bases. the (Special) Prosecutor, but in faithful exercise of judicial
authority to reverse the findings of the existence of probable discretion and prerogative.42 The dismissal of the two
cause on review. However, a perusal of the July 30, 2004 Lastly, petitioner argues that the petition for certiorari filed by informations against respondents were subject to the MTCC’s
Resolution would show that little attempt was made by the respondents with the CA was the wrong remedy, considering that jurisdiction and discretion in view of the circumstances of the case
Regional State Prosecutor to discuss the existence or non- the proper procedure was to appeal to the Secretary of Justice at bar. Such dismissal ultimately renders the case moot and
existence of probable cause and that much reliance was made on under Department Circular No. 70,35 otherwise known as the academic.
a flawed interpretation of Section 3, paragraph (d) of the Revised "2000 NPS Rule on Appeal."
Rules of Procedure.1avvphi1 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The
The same deserves scant consideration. July 28, 2005 Decision and the February 7, 2006 Resolution of the
What makes matters worse is that in his August 25, 2004 Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 86521, are AFFIRMED.
Resolution which dealt with respondents’ Motion for Time and again, this Court has held that the principle of
Reconsideration, the Regional State Prosecutor stuck with his exhaustion of administrative remedies is not without exception. SO ORDERED.
theory and even relied on another flawed interpretation of Based on the previous discussion, the actions of the Regional
Section 3, paragraph (b) of Rule 112, to wit: State Prosecutor, being patently illegal amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, the same constitutes an exception to the
x x x It would have been a different scenario if it falls within the rule on administrative remedies.36
scope of Rule 112, Section 3, paragraph (b) which provides:
Finally, what is damning to petitioner’s cause is the fact that the
b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the MTCC had already withdrawn the two Informations filed against
investigating officer shall either dismiss it if he finds no ground to respondents. As previously stated, the MTCC suspended the
continue with the investigation, or issue a subpoena to the proceedings before it in view of the petition filed by the
respondent attaching to it a copy of the complaint and its respondents with the CA. In Ledesma,37 this Court stated that such
supporting affidavits and documents. deferment or suspension, however, does not signify that the trial
court is ipso facto bound by the resolution of the secretary of
In the instant case, the Investigating Prosecutor found ground to justice. Jurisdiction, once acquired by the trial court, is not lost
continue with the inquiry which is why he issued subpoenas to the despite a resolution by the secretary of justice to withdraw the
respondents to submit their counter affidavit within the 10-day information or to dismiss the case.38 Since the Informations for
period, since he could have dismissed it initially if indeed there perjury had already been filed in the MTCC, any subsequent
was really no evidence to serve as a ground for continuing with action must be addressed to the said court’s discretion.
the inquiry. For failure of the respondents to file their respective
counter-affidavits, they are deemed to have forfeited their right In the case at bar, the CA found that the Regional State Prosecutor
to preliminary investigation as due process only requires that the acted with grave abuse of discretion when he ordered the City
respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavit, Prosecutor to file the Informations for perjury against
if he is so minded. x x x33 respondents. It was because of the CA Decision that the City
Prosecutor eventually filed two Motions for Leave to Withdraw
The clear import of Section 3, paragraph (b), of Rule 112 is that Informations39 with the MTCC. On August 30, 2005, the MTCC
the Investigating Prosecutor may issue subpoenas if he finds issued an Order40 granting the motion, to wit:
grounds to continue with the investigation. However, the
continuance of the investigation does not necessarily mean that Acting on the Motion for Leave to Withdraw Informations filed by
the result will be an automatic conclusion of a finding of probable the prosecution, through 2nd Asst. City Prosecutor Arlene
cause. To subscribe to such a theory would defeat the very Catherine A. Dato, and finding it to be impressed with merit, the
purpose of a counter-affidavit which is to honor due process and same is hereby Granted.
to provide respondents an opportunity to refute the allegations
made against them. Again, the conclusion reached by the Regional Accordingly, the information against accused Janet Florencio in
State Prosecutor is manifestly wrong as the CA was correct when the above-entitled case is hereby Withdrawn.
it observed that the issuance of a subpoena would become
SO ORDERED.41
unceremoniously clothed with the untoward implication that
probable cause is necessarily extant.34
Republic of the Philippines praying that Criminal Cases No. 119830, No. 119831 and No. 119832, as the presentation of evidence and prosecution in each
SUPREME COURT 119832 be consolidated together with Criminal Cases No. 119828 of the five cases involved were to be done separately. The
Manila and No. 119829, which the trial court granted. presentation of evidence in Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832,
however, were done simultaneously, because they involved
THIRD DIVISION On 21 December 2000, Criminal Cases No. 119830, No. 119831 similar offenses of non-disclosure of beneficial ownership of
and No. 119832 were raffled off to the Pasig RTC, Branch 153, stocks proscribed under Rule 36(a)-19 in relation to Sections 32(a)-
G.R. No. 173637 April 21, 2009 presided by Judge Briccio C. Ygana. Criminal Cases No. 119828 and 110and 5611 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 178, otherwise known as
No. 119829 also went to the same court. the "Revised Securities Act." Criminal Case No. 119830 pertains to
DANTE T. TAN, Petitioner,
vs. alleged violation of Section 27 (b),12 in relation to Section 56 of
Petitioner was arraigned on 16 January 2001, and pleaded not
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. said act.
guilty to the charges.6
DECISION On 22 December 2003, Judge Briccio C. Ygana of the Pasig RTC,
On 6 February 2001, the pre-trial was concluded, and a pre-trial
Branch 153, ruled that the delays which attended the proceedings
order set, among other things, the first date of trial on 27
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: of petitioner’s case (Criminal Case No. 119830) were vexatious,
February 2001.7
capricious and oppressive, resulting in violation of petitioner’s
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under right to speedy trial. The RTC ordered13 the dismissal of Criminal
Atty. Celia Sandejas of the Securities and Exchange Commission
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking the reversal and Case No. 119830, disposing as follows:
(SEC), under the direct control and supervision of Public
setting aside of the Decision1 dated 22 February 2006 and
Prosecutor Nestor Lazaro, entered her appearance for the People;
Resolution2 dated 17 July 2006 issued by the Court of Appeals in WHEREFORE, foregoing premises duly considered and finding the
Atty. Agnes Maranan for petitioner Dante Tan; Atty. Sigfrid Fortun
CA-G.R. SP No. 83068 entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Hon. motion to dismiss to be meritorious, the Court hereby orders
for Eduardo Lim, Jr.; and Atty. Rudolf Brittanico for Jimmy Juan.
Briccio C. Ygana, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 153, Criminal Case No. 119830 DISMISSED.1avvphi1
State Prosecutors Susan Dacanay and Edna Villanueva later on
Regional Trial Court, Pasig City and Dante Tan."
took over as lawyers for the People. On motion for reconsideration, the prosecution insisted that the
The assailed Decision reinstated Criminal Case No. 119830, earlier parties agreed to hold separate trials of the BW cases, with
The People insists that during the pendency of the initial hearing
dismissed by the trial court due to an alleged violation of petitioner acquiescing to the prosecution of Criminal Cases No.
on 27 February 2001, the parties agreed that Criminal Cases No.
petitioner Dante T. Tan’s right to speedy trial.lawphil.net The 119831 and No. 119832 ahead of Criminal Case No. 119830. In an
119831 and No. 119832 would be tried ahead of Criminal Case No.
assailed Resolution denied his Motion for Reconsideration and Order dated 20 January 2004, the RTC denied the Motion for
119830, and that petitioner would not interpose any objection to
Motion to Inhibit. Reconsideration for lack of merit.
its manifestation, nor would the trial court disapprove it.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the instant petition are The RTC’s order of dismissal was elevated to the Court of Appeals
Thereafter, the People presented evidence for Criminal Cases No.
as follows: via a petition for certiorari, with the People contending that:
119831 and No. 119832. On 18 September 2001, the prosecution
On 19 December 2000, a Panel of Prosecutors of the Department completed the presentation of its evidence and was ordered by RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN
of Justice (DOJ), on behalf of the People of the Philippines the RTC to file its formal offer of evidence within thirty days. RULING THAT THE PEOPLE VIOLATED DANTE TAN’S RIGHT TO
(People), filed three Informations against Dante T. Tan (petitioner) SPEEDY TRIAL, ALBEIT, THE LATTER AND RESPONDENT JUDGE
After being granted extensions to its filing of a formal offer of
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. The cases were HIMSELF HAVE CONFORMED TO THE DEFERMENT OF CRIMINAL
evidence, the prosecution was able to file said formal offer for
docketed as Criminal Cases No. 119830, No. 119831 and No. CASE NO. 119830 PENDING HEARING OF THE TWO OTHER
Criminal Cases No. 119831 and No. 119832 on 25 November
119832, all entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Dante Tan." RELATED CASES.
2003.8
Criminal Case No. 1198303 pertains to allegations that petitioner Setting aside the trial court’s order of dismissal, the Court of
On 2 December 2003, petitioner moved to dismiss Criminal Case
employed manipulative devises in the purchase of Best World Appeals granted the petition for certiorari in its Decision dated 22
No. 119830 due to the People’s alleged failure to prosecute.
Resources Corporation (BW) shares. On the other hand, Criminal February 2006. In resolving the petition, the appellate court
Claiming violation of his right to speedy trial, petitioner faults the
Cases No. 1198314 and No. 1198325involve the alleged failure of reinstated Criminal Case No. 119830 in this wise:
People for failing to prosecute the case for an unreasonable
petitioner to file with the Securities and Exchange Commission
length of time and without giving any excuse or justification for WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the assailed Orders
(SEC) a sworn statement of his beneficial ownership of BW shares.
the delay. According to petitioner, he was persistent in asserting dated December 22, 2003 and January 20, 2004 are set aside.
In two other related cases, two Informations were filed against a his right to speedy trial, which he had allegedly done on several Criminal Case No. 119830 is reinstated and the trial court is
certain Jimmy Juan and Eduardo G. Lim for violation of the instances. Finally, he claimed to have been substantially ordered to conduct further proceedings in said case
Revised Securities Act involving BW shares of stock. These were prejudiced by this delay. immediately.14
docketed as Criminal Cases No. 119828 and No. 119829.
The prosecution opposed the Motion, insisting on its claim that Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the Decision and filed a
On the same day, the DOJ, through Assistant Chief State the parties had an earlier agreement to defer the trial of Criminal motion for inhibition of the Justices who decided the case.
Prosecutor Nilo C. Mariano, filed a Motion for Consolidation Case No. 119830 until after that of Criminal Cases No. 119831-
On 17 July 2006, the Court of Appeals denied both motions. criminal offenses, including the conduct of preliminary historical perspective on the evolution of the right to speedy trial,
investigation, subject to review by the Secretary of Justice. Since it we reiterate the old legal maxim, "justice delayed is justice
Petitioner Dante Tan, henceforth, filed the instant petition for is the DOJ which is the government agency tasked to prosecute denied." This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious
review on certiorari, raising the following issues: criminal cases before the trial court, the DOJ is best suited to resolution of disputes, much more so in criminal cases where an
attest whether a similar or related case has been filed or is accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy trial.22
I.
pending in another court of tribunal. Acting DOJ Secretary
Merceditas N. Gutierrez, being the head of the DOJ, therefore, Following the policies incorporated under the 1987 Constitution,
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTING SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MAY
had the authority to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping for Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as "The Speedy Trial Act
VALIDLY EXECUTE THE CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING
Criminal Case No. 119830, which was filed on behalf of the People of 1998," was enacted, with Section 6 of said act limiting the trial
ATTACHED TO THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY THE
of the Philippines. period to 180 days from the first day of trial.23 Aware of problems
PEOPLE WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS EVEN THOUGH THE
resulting in the clogging of court dockets, the Court implemented
CRIMINAL ACTION WAS INSTITUTED BY A COMPLAINT
The preliminary issues having been resolved, the Court shall the law by issuing Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98, which has
SUBSCRIBED BY THE AUTHORIZED OFFICERS OF THE SECURITIES
proceed to discuss the main issues. been incorporated in the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure,
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION.
Section 2 of Rule 119.24
At the crux of the controversy is the issue of whether there was a
II.WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI VIOLATED
violation of petitioner Dante Tan’s right to speedy trial. In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan,25 the Court had occasion to state –
TAN’S RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
Petitioner Dante Tan assails the Decision and Resolution of the The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy
III.WHETHER OR NOT CRIMINAL CASE NO. 119830 WAS
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83068. The appellate court disposition of the case against him was designed to prevent the
CORRECTLY DISMISSED BY THE TRIAL COURT ON THE GROUND OF
determined that he "impliedly agreed" that Case No. 119830 oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution
VIOLATION OF TAN’S RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL.
would not be tried until after termination of Criminal Cases No. suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays
IV.WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE 119831-119832, which finding was grounded entirely on in the administration of justice by mandating the courts to
ABUSE OF DISCRETION. speculations, surmises and conjectures. proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases.
Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is
We first resolve the preliminary issues. Both parties concede that this issue is factual. It is a basic rule that violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
factual issues are beyond the province of this Court in a petition capricious and oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not
In an attempt at having the instant petition dismissed, petitioner for review, for it is not our function to review evidence all over an accused has been denied such right is not susceptible by
contends that the certificate of non-forum shopping attached to again.17 Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that only questions precise qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a
the People’s appeal before the Court of Appeals should have been of law may be raised in this Court in a petition for review on relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.
signed by the Chairman of the SEC as complainant in the cases certiorari.18 The reason is that the Court is not a trier of
instead of Acting DOJ Secretary Merceditas N. Gutierrez. facts.19 However, the rule is subject to several exceptions.20 Under While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential
these exceptions, the Court may delve into and resolve factual ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot
Petitioner’s argument is futile. The Court of Appeals was correct in issues, such as in cases where the findings of the trial court and be definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice is
sustaining the authority of Acting DOJ Secretary Merceditas the Court of Appeals are absurd, contrary to the evidence on supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays
Gutierrez to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping of the record, impossible, capricious or arbitrary, or based on a and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the accused,
petition for certiorari before said court. It must be stressed that misappreciation of facts. but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must
the certification against forum shopping is required to be be borne in mind that the rights given to the accused by the
executed by the plaintiff.15 Although the complaint-affidavit was In this case, the Court is convinced that the findings of the Court Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons;
signed by the Prosecution and Enforcement Department of the of Appeals on the substantial matters at hand, while conflicting hence, courts are to give meaning to that intent.
SEC, the petition before the Court of Appeals originated from with those of the RTC, are adequately supported by the evidence
Criminal Case No. 119830, where the plaintiff or the party on record. We, therefore, find no reason to deviate from the The Court emphasized in the same case that:
instituting the case was the People of the Philippines. Section 2, jurisprudential holdings and treat the instant case differently.
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court leaves no room for doubt and A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the
establishes that criminal cases are prosecuted in the name of the An accused’s right to "have a speedy, impartial, and public trial" is accused necessarily compels the court to approach speedy trial
People of the Philippines, the offended party in criminal cases. guaranteed in criminal cases by Section 14(2) of Article III of the cases on an ad hoc basis.
Moreover, pursuant to Section 3, paragraph (2) of the Revised Constitution. This right to a speedy trial may be defined as one
free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its "salutary In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right
Administrative Code, the DOJ is the executive arm of the
objective" being to assure that an innocent person may be free to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four
government mandated to investigate the commission of crimes,
from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for
prosecute offenders and administer the probation and correction
of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time the delay; (c) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (d)
system. It is the DOJ, through its prosecutors, which is authorized
compatible with the presentation and consideration of prejudice to the defendant. x x x.
to prosecute criminal cases on behalf of the People of the
Philippines.16 Prosecutors control and direct the prosecution of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose.21 Intimating
Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification Petitioner’s objection to the prosecution’s stand that he gave an Your Honor please, as we x x x understand, this is not a joint trial
of the State for such delay. Different weights should be assigned implied consent to the separate trial of Criminal Case No. 119830 but a separate trial x x x so as manifested by the SEC lawyer, the
to different reasons or justifications invoked by the State. x x x.26 is belied by the records of the case. No objection was interposed witness is being presented insofar as 119831 and 119832 as
by his defense counsel when this matter was discussed during the against Dante Tan only x x x.36
Exhaustively explained in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, an accused’s initial hearing.33 Petitioner’s conformity thereto can be deduced
right to speedy trial is deemed violated only when the proceeding from his non-objection at the preliminary hearing when the The transcript of stenographic notes taken from the 3 April 2001
is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. In prosecution manifested that the evidence to be presented would hearing further clarifies that only the two cases against Dante Tan
determining whether petitioner was deprived of this right, the be only for Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832. His failure to were being prosecuted:
factors to consider and balance are the following: (a) duration of object to the prosecution’s manifestation that the cases be tried
the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure ATTY. DE LA CRUZ [new counsel for accused Eduardo Lim, Jr.]:
separately is fatal to his case. The acts, mistakes and negligence of
to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay.27 counsel bind his client, except only when such mistakes would Your Honor, please, may I request clarification from the
result in serious injustice.34 In fact, petitioner’s acquiescence is prosecutors regarding the purpose of the testimony of the witness
From the initial hearing on 27 February 2001 until the time the
evident from the transcript of stenographic notes during the initial in the stand. While the Private Prosecutor stated the purpose of
prosecution filed its formal offer of evidence for Criminal Cases
presentation of the People’s evidence in the five BW cases on 27 the testimony of the witness. . .
No. 119831-119832 on 25 November 2003, both prosecution and
February 2001, herein quoted below:
defense admit that no evidence was presented for Criminal Case
xxxx
No. 119830. Hence, for a period of almost two years and eight COURT: Atty. Sandejas, call your witness.
months, the prosecution did not present a single evidence for PROSECUTOR LAZARO:
Criminal Case No. 119830. ATTY. SANDEJAS [SEC Prosecuting Lawyer]: May we make some
manifestation first, your Honor, before we continue presenting I was present during the last hearing. I was then going over the
The question we have to answer now is whether there was our witness. First of all, this witness will only be testifying as to transcript of this case, well, I believe the testimony x x x mainly [is]
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay. To this, we apply the two (2) of the charges: non-disclosure of beneficial ownership of on accused Dante Tan, your Honor. As a matter of fact, there was
four-factor test previously mentioned. Dante Tan x x x. a clarification made by the parties and counsels after the witness
had testified that the hearing in these cases is not a joint trial
We emphasize that in determining the right of an accused to xxxx because it involves separate charges, involving different
speedy trial, courts are required to do more than a mathematical
documents, your Honor. That is why the witness already testified
computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled COURT: (to Atty. Sandejas) Call your witness.
only concerning Dante Tan. Per the query made by Atty. Fortun,
hearings of the case. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time
ATTY. SANDEJAS: Our witness is Mr. Wilfredo Baltazar of the because at that time, Atty. Fortun was still representing Mr. Lim, I
involved is clearly insufficient,28 and particular regard must be
Securities and Exchange Commission, your Honor. We are believe, your Honor, then I understand that the testimony of this
given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.29
presenting this witness for the purpose of non-disclosure of witness cannot just be adopted insofar as the other accused, your
In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan,30 the Court ruled that there was no beneficial ownership case… Honor.
violation of the right to speedy trial and speedy disposition. The
COURT: I would advise the counsel from the SEC to make it very ATTY. MARANAN:
Court took into account the reasons for the delay, i.e., the
frequent amendments of procedural laws by presidential decrees, clear your purpose in presenting your first witness.
We confirm that, your Honor, since x x x particularly since this is
the structural reorganizations in existing prosecutorial agencies already cross, it is clear that the direct examination dealt
ATTY. SANDEJAS: Yes, your Honor. Can I borrow the file?
and the creation of new ones by executive fiat, resulting in exclusively with Mr. Dante Tan.
changes of personnel, preliminary jurisdiction, and the functions COURT: Show it to counsel.
and powers of prosecuting agencies. The Court also considered PROS. LAZARO:
the failure of the accused to assert such right, and the lack of ATTY. SANDEJAS: Crim. Case Nos. 119831 and 119832, for
prejudice caused by the delay to the accused. Violation of RA Rule 36(a)1, in relation to Sec. 32 (a)-1 of the Mr. Dante Tan, involving the 2 (two) cases.37
Revised Securities Act when he failed to disclose his beneficial
In Defensor-Santiago v. Sandiganbayan,31 the complexity of the Moreover, although periods for trial have been stipulated, these
ownership amounting to more than 10% which requires disclosure
issues and the failure of the accused to invoke her right to speedy periods are not absolute. Where periods have been set, certain
of such fact.35
disposition at the appropriate time spelled defeat for her claim to exclusions are allowed by law.38 After all, this Court and the law
the constitutional guarantee. During the same hearing, the People manifested in open court recognize that it is but a fact that judicial proceedings do not exist
that the parties had agreed to the separate trials of the BW Cases: in a vacuum and must contend with the realities of everyday life.
In Cadalin v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration’s In spite of the prescribed time limits, jurisprudence continues to
Administrator,32 the Court, considering also the complexity of the PROSECUTOR LAZARO: adopt the view that the fundamentally recognized principle is that
cases and the conduct of the parties’ lawyers, held that the right the concept of speedy trial is a relative term and must necessarily
to speedy disposition was not violated therein. May we be allowed to speak, your Honor? be a flexible concept.39
As to the assertion that delay in the presentation of evidence for or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we have held that
Criminal Case No. 119830 has prejudiced petitioner because the for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or dismissal of cases on the ground of failure to prosecute is
witnesses for the defense may no longer be available at this time, frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of
suffice it to say that the burden of proving his guilt rests upon the or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former the accused for the same offense. It must be stressed, however,
prosecution.40 Should the prosecution fail for any reason to complaint or information. that these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the
present evidence sufficient to show his guilt beyond reasonable accused to speedy trial. These cases are not applicable to the
doubt, petitioner will be acquitted. It is safely entrenched in our For double jeopardy to attach then, the following elements in the petition at bench considering that the right of the private
jurisprudence that unless the prosecution discharges its burden to first criminal case must be present: respondents to speedy trial has not been violated by the State. x x
prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt, the latter x.
(a) The complaint or information or other formal charge was
need not even offer evidence in his behalf.41
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction;(b) The From the foregoing, it follows that petitioner cannot claim that
In the cases involving petitioner, the length of delay, complexity of court had jurisdiction;(c) The accused had been arraigned and had double jeopardy attached when said RTC order was reversed by
the issues and his failure to invoke said right to speedy trial at the pleaded; and(d) He was convicted or acquitted or the case was the Court of Appeals. Double jeopardy does not apply to this case,
appropriate time tolled the death knell on his claim to the dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of considering that there is no violation of petitioner’s right to
constitutional guarantee.42 More importantly, in failing to the accused.43 speedy trial.
interpose a timely objection to the prosecution’s manifestation
Among the above-cited elements, we are concerned with the The old adage that justice delayed is justice denied has never
during the preliminary hearings that the cases be tried separately,
fourth element, conviction or acquittal, or the case was dismissed been more valid than in our jurisdiction, where it is not a rarity for
one after the other, petitioner was deemed to have acquiesced
or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the a case to drag in our courts for years and years and even decades.
and waived his objection thereto.
accused. This element is crucial since, as a general rule, the It was this difficulty that inspired the constitutional requirement
For the reasons above-stated, there is clearly insufficient ground dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal, made with the that the rules of court to be promulgated by the Supreme Court
to conclude that the prosecution is guilty of violating petitioner’s express consent of the accused or upon his own motion, will not shall provide for a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
right to speedy trial. Grave abuse of discretion defies exact place the accused in double jeopardy.44 This rule, however, admits speedy trial and disposition of cases.50 Indeed, for justice to
definition, but generally refers to "capricious or whimsical of two exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of prevail, the scales must balance, for justice is not to be dispensed
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." Any the right to speedy trial.45 While indeed petitioner was in fact the for the accused alone.51
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment in dismissing a one who filed the Motion to Dismiss Criminal Case No. 119830,
criminal case is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. This is true in the the dismissal thereof was due to an alleged violation of his right to Evidently, the task of the pillars of the criminal justice system is to
instant case. speedy trial, which would otherwise put him in double jeopardy preserve our democratic society under the rule of law, ensuring
should the same charges be revived. Petitioner’s situation is that all those who appear before or are brought to the bar of
There is also no merit to petitioner’s claim that a reversal of the different. Double jeopardy has not attached, considering that the justice are afforded a fair opportunity to present their side. As
RTC’s Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 119830 is a violation of dismissal of Criminal Case No. 119830 on the ground of violation correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, Criminal Case No.
his constitutional right against double jeopardy which dismissal of his right to speedy trial was without basis and issued with grave 119830 is just one of the many controversial cases involving the
was founded on an alleged violation of his right to speedy trial. abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. BW shares scam where public interest is undoubtedly at stake.
Where the right of the accused to speedy trial has not been The State, like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in court, and
The constitutional protection against double jeopardy shields one violated, there is no reason to support the initial order of to a reasonable opportunity to present its case. A hasty dismissal,
from a second or later prosecution for the same offense. Article dismissal. instead of unclogging dockets, has actually increased the
III, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution declares that no person workload of the justice system and unwittingly prolonged the
shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, Following this Court’s ruling in Almario v. Court of Appeals,46 as litigation.52
providing further that if an act is punished by a law and an petitioner’s right to speedy trial was not transgressed, this
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a exception to the fourth element of double jeopardy – that the Finally, we reiterate that the rights given to the accused by the
bar to another prosecution for the same act. defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons.
or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the Courts are tasked to give meaning to that intent. There being no
Following the above constitutional provision, Section 7, Rule 117 accused – was not met. Where the dismissal of the case was capricious, vexatious, oppressive delay in the proceedings, and no
of the Revised Rules of Court found it apt to stipulate: allegedly capricious, certiorari lies from such order of dismissal postponements unjustifiably sought, we concur in the conclusions
and does not involve double jeopardy, as the petition challenges reached by the Court of Appeals.
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. – When
not the correctness but the validity of the order of dismissal; such
an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed 22 February
grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, which
him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express 2006 Decision and 17 July 2006 Resolution issued by the Court of
prevents double jeopardy from attaching.47
consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83068 are hereby AFFIRMED.
complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form As this Court ruled in People v. Tampal,48 reiterated in People v.
and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had Leviste,49 where we overturned an order of dismissal by the trial
pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused court predicated on the right to speedy trial –
The instant case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch
153, Pasig City for further proceedings in Criminal Case No.
119830 with reasonable dispatch.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 209342 and prejudice; that on the occasion of the said robbery and to the gasoline station where they found Diaz already dead,
insure their purpose, the said accused, conspiring, confederating Dimatulac gasping for breath, and Regencia wounded and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee and mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill, crawling. By then, the robbers were rushing towards the
vs. did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, highway.10
CRISENTE PEPAÑO NUÑEZ, Accused-Appellant assault and shoot said Felix V. Regencia, Alexander C. Diaz and
Byron G. Dimatulac on the different parts of their bodies, thereby Perez's testimony recounted that in the evening of June 22, 2000,
DECISION she was working as a sales clerk in the Caltex gasoline station
inflicting gunshot wounds which directly caused their deaths.4
adverted to in the Information. While seated with Cruz near the
LEONEN, J.:
At first, only Marciales and Nabia were arrested, arraigned, and gasoline pumps, she saw Nuñez, who was pointing a gun at Diaz,
To convict an accused, it is not sufficient for the prosecution to tried. In its December 9, 2005 Decision,5 the Regional Trial Court and another man who was pointing a gun at Regencia, inside the
present a positive identification by a witness during trial due to found the offense of robbery with homicide as alleged in the gasoline station's office. Diaz shouted that they were being
the frailty of human memory. It must also show that the identified Information, along with Marciales and Nabia's conspiracy with robbed. Another man then rushed to the gasoline station's office,
person matches the original description made by that witness Pobre and Jun to commit this offense, to have been established. as did her co-employee Dimatulac. A commotion ensued where
when initially reporting the crime. The unbiased character of the Thus, it pronounced Marciales and Nabia guilty beyond the robber identified as Marciales shot Dimatulac, Diaz, and
process of identification by witnesses must likewise be shown. reasonable doubt and sentenced them to death.6 The case against Regencia. They then ran to their employer's house.11
Pobrn and Jun was archived subject to revival upon their
Criminal prosecution may result in the severe consequences of apprehension.7 Nunez testified in his own defense and recalled the circumstances
deprivation of liberty, property, and, where capital punishment is of his apprehension. He stated that when he was apprehended on
imposed, life. Prosecution that relies solely on eyewitness On July 2, 2006, accused-appellant Nunez was apprehended by July 2, 2006, he was on his way to his aunt's fish store where he
identification must be approached meticulously, cognizant of the the Philippine National Police Regional Intelligence Office on the was helping since 1999 when a man approached him. He was then
inherent frailty of human memory. Eyewitnesses who have premise that he was the same ''Paul Pobre" identified in the dragged and mauled. With his face covered, he was boarded on a
previously made admissions that they could not identify the Inforn1ation. Upon arraigru11ent, Nuñez moved that the case vehicle and brought to Camp Vicente Lim in Laguna. He further
perpetrators of a crime but, years later and after a highly against him be dismissed as he was not the "Paul Pobre" charged claimed that on June 22, 2000, he was in Muzon, Taytay, Rizal
suggestive process of presenting suspects, contradict themselves in the Information. However, prosecution witnesses identified him with his aunt at her fish store until about 5:00 p.m. before going
and claim that they can identify the perpetrator with certainty are as one (1) of the alleged robbers and his motion to dismiss was home. At home, his aunt's son fetched him to get pails from the
grossly wanting in credibility. Prosecution that relies solely on denied. The information was then atnended to state Nuñez's store and bring them to his aunt's house.12
these eyewitnesses' testimonies fails to discharge its burden of name in lieu of "Paul Pobre."8
On February 24, 2010, the Regional Trial Court rendered a
proving an accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
During trial, the prosecution manifested that it would be adopting Decision13 finding Nunez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
This resolves an appeal from the assailed June 26, 2013 the evidence already presented in the course of Marciales and robbery with homicide. This four (4)-page Decision incorporated
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 04474, Nabia's trial. Apart from this, it also recalled prosecution the original Regional Trial Court December 9, 2005 Decision and
which affirmed with modification the February 24, 2010 witnesses Ronalyn Cruz (Cruz) and Relen Perez (Perez). In their added the following singular paragraph in explaining Nunez's
Decision2 of Branch 67, Regional Trial Court, Binangonan, Rizal. testimonies, they both positively identified Nunez as among the supposed complicity:
This Regional Trial Court Decision found accused-appellant perpetrators of the crime.9
To convict Nunez of robbery with homicide requires proof beyond
Crisente Pepaño Nuñez (Nuñez) guilty beyond reasonable doubt
Cruz's testimony recounted that in the evening of June 22, 2000, reasonable doubt that he: (1) took personal property which
of robbery with homicide.
she was working as an attendant at the Caltex gasoline station belongs to another; (2) the taking is unlawful; (3) the taking is
In an Information, George Marciales (Marciales), Orly Nabia mentioned in the Infonnation. She was then sitting near the done with intent to gain; and (4) the taking was accomplished
(Nabia), Paul Pobre (Pobre), and a certain alias "Jun'' (Jun) were g1;1,soline pumps with her co-employees, the deceased Byron G. with the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or by
charged with robbery with homicide, under Article 294(1) of the Dimatulac (Dimatulac) and prosecution witness Pierez. They using force upon things. Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code
Revised Penal Code,3 as follows: noticed that the station's office was being held up. There were and (5) when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime
two (2) persons poking guns at and asking for money from the of homicide shall have been committed[.] The facts are simple.
That on or about the 22nd of June 2000, in the Municipality of deceased Alex Diaz (Diaz) and Felix Regencia (Regencia). Regencia Nuñez along with Marciales and Nabia robbed the Tayuman Caltex
Binangonan, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the hancied money to one (1) of the robbers while the other robber gas station of ₱5,000.00 and some cans of oil. For such booty,
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, reached for a can of oil. Regencia considered this as enough of a he[,] along with his fellow thieves[,] shot and killed Felix Regencia,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and aiding one distraction to put up a fight. Regencia and Diaz grappled with the Alexander C. Diaz and Byron G. Dimatulac. He was positively and
another, armed with handguns, by means of violence against or robbers. In the scuffle, Diaz shouted. At the sound of this, two (2) unequivocally identified by Renel Cruz and Ronalyn Perez as [one]
intimidation of the persons of Felix V. Regencia, Alexander C. Diaz men ran to the office. The first was identified to be Marciales and of the perpetrators even as he tried to hide behind another name
and Byron G. Dimatulac, with intent to gain, did then and there, the second, according to Cruz, was Nunez. Dimatulac also ran to and was arrested later. He ran but could not hide as the long arm
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away the the office to assist Regencia and Oiaz. Marciales then shot of the law finally caught up with him. As a defense, he can only
money amounting to ₱5,000.00 belonging to the Caltex gasoline Dimatulac while Nunez shot Diaz. Cruz and Perez sought refuge in offer his weak alibi which cannot offset the positive identification
station owned by the family of Felix V. Regencia to their damage a computer shop. About 10 to 15 minutes later, they returned to
of the prosecution witnesses. His guilt was proven beyond 23, 2013. The Resolution gave due course to Nuñez's Notice of and almost nine (9) years, for the second witness, from the time
reasonable doubt.14 Appeal.20 of the commission of the offense.

The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment, as follows: In its Resolution21 dated December 4, 2013, this Court noted the The frailty of human memory is a scientific fact. The danger of
records forwarded by the Court of Appeals and informed the inordinate reliance on human memory in criminal proceedings,
Based on the foregoing, we find accused Crisente Pepaño Nuñez parties that they may file their supplemental briefs. However, where conviction results in the possible deprivation of liberty,
both parties manifested that they would no longer do so.22 property, and even life, is equally established.
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code and The occurrence of the robbery occasioned by the killing of Human memory does not record events like a video recorder. In
sentences (sic) him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Regencia, Diaz, and Dimatulac is no longer in issue as it has been the first place, human memory is more selective than a video
Perpetua and order him to pay: established in the original proceedings which resulted in the camera. The sensory environment contains a vast amount of
conviction of Marciales and Nabia. information, but the memory process perceives and accurately
1. The heirs of Felix Regencia Php. 151,630.00 expenses for the
records only a very small percentage of that information. Second,
wake, burial lot and funeral service; Php. 75,000.00 death All that remains in issue for this Court's resolution is whether or because the act of remembering is reconstructive, akin to putting
indemnity; Php. 5,000.00 money stolen from the victim; not accused-appellant Crisente Pepaño Nuñez is the same person, puzzle pieces together, human memory can change in dramatic
exemplary damages of Php. 50,000.00; and Php. 2,214,000.00 earlier identified as Paul Pobre, who acted in conspiracy with and unexpected ways because of the passage of time or
unearned income; Marciales and Nabia. subsequent events, such as exposure to "postevent" information
2. The heirs of Alexander Diaz Php. 20,000.00 expenses for funeral like conversations with other witnesses or media reports. Third,
Contrary to the conclusions of the Court of Appeals and Regional
service; Php. 75,000.00 death indemnity; Php. 50,000.00 memory can also be altered through the reconstruction process.
Trial Court, this Court finds that it has not been established
exemplary damages; and Php. 1,774,080.00 unearned income; Questioning a witness about what he or she perceived and
beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant Crisente Pepaño
requiring the witness to reconstruct the experience can cause the
Nuñez is thy same person identified as Paul Pobre. Thus, this
3. The heirs of Byron Dimatulac Php. 18,000.00 for funeral service; witness memory to change by unconsciously blending the actual
Court reverses the courts a quo and acquits accused-appellant
Php. 75,000.00 death indemnity; Php. 50,000.00 exemplary fragments of memory of the event with information provided
Crisente Pepano Nunez.
damages; and Php. 966,240.00 unearned income[;] and during the memory retrieval process.23
The prosecution's case rises and falls on the testimonies of
4. The costs. Eyewitness identification, or what our jurisprudence
eyewitnesses Cruz and Perez. The necessity of their identification
commendably refers to as "positive identification," is the bedrock
Let the case against alias "Jun" who remains at large be archived. of Nunez is so manifest that the prosecution saw it fit to recall
of many pronouncements of guilt. However, eyewitness
them to the stand, even as it merely adopted the evidence already
identification is but a product of flawed human memory. In an
SO ORDERED.15 presented in the trial of Marciales and Nabia. Cruz's and Perez's
expansive examination of 250 cases of wrongful convictions
testimonies centered on their supposed certainty as to how it was
On March 5, 2010, Nuñez fifed his Notice of Appeal.16 where convicts were subsequently exonerated by DNA testing,
Nuñez himself, excluding any other person, who participated in
Professor Brandon Garett (Professor Garett) noted that as much
the robbery and homicide.
On June 26, 2013, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed as 190 or 76% of these Wrongful convictions were occasioned by
Decision17 affirming Nunez's conviction, with modification to the This Court finds this supposed certainty and the premium placed flawed eyewitness identifications.24 Another observer has more
awards of moral and exemplary damages, as follows: on it by the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court to be starkly characterized eyewitness identifications as ''the leading
misplaced. cause of wrongful convictions."25
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision dated February 24, 2010 I Yet, even Professor Garrett's findings are not novel. The fallibility
of the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 67, in of eyewitness identification has been recognized and has been the
Criminal Case No. 00-473 is hereby AFFIRMED with There are two (2) principal witnesses who allegedly identified subject of concerted scientific study for more than a century:
MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Crisente Pepaño Nuñez is accused-appellant as the same Pobre who participated in the
ordered to pay ₱75,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as robbery holdup. When Cruz, the first witness, was initially put on This seemingly staggering rate of involvement of eyewitness
exemplary damages each to the heirs of Felix Regencia, the heirs the witness stand, she asserted that she could not recall any of errors in wrongful convictions is, unfortunately, no surprise.
of Alexander Diaz and the heirs of Byron Dimatulac. the features of Pobre. After many years, with the police Previous studies have likewise found eyewitness errors to be
presenting her with accused-appellant, she positively identified implicated in the majority of cases of wrongful conviction. But
SO ORDERED.18 him as the missing perpetrator. The second principal witness' Garrett's analysis went farther than these previous studies. He not
testimony on the alleged participation of accused-appellant is so only documented that eyewitness errors occurred in his cases. He
Nuñez then filed his Notice of Appeal.19 also tried to determine why they occurred - an issue eyewitness
fundamentally at variance with that of the other principal witness.
The prosecution did not account for the details of the science has investigated for over 100 years.26
The Court of Appeals elevated the records of this case to this
Court on October 22, 2013 pursuant to its Resolution dated July presentation of accused· appellant to the two (2) witnesses after
The dangers of the misplaced primacy of eyewitness identification
he was arrested. Finally, these witnesses' alleged positive
are two (2)-pronged: on one level, eyewitness identifications are
identification occurred almost eight (8) years, for the first witness,
inherently prone to error; on another level, the appreciation by witness reports elicited by cross-examination are flawed: for and the defendant's actual description, any identification prior to
observers, such as jurors, judges, and law enforcement officers of example, with respect to factors such as original witnessing lineup of another person, the identification by picture of the
how an eyewitness identifies supposed culprits is just as prone to conditions (e.g., duration of exposure), post-event influences (e.g., defendant prior to the lineup, failure to identify the defendant on
error: conversations with co-witnesses), or police suggestion (e.g., a prior occasion, and the lapse of time between the alleged act
repo1is of police comments or behaviors during identification and the lineup identification."36
The problem of eyewitness reliability could not be more clearly procedures).29
documented. The painstaking work of the Innocence Project, Nine (9) months later, in Simmons v. United States, the United
Brandon Garrett, and others who have documented wrongful II States Supreme Court calibrated its approach by "focusing in that
convictions, participated in the exonerations of the victims, and case on the overall reliability of the identification evidence rather
documented the role of flawed evidence of all sorts has clearly Legal traditions in various jurisdictions have been responsive to than merely the flaws in the identification procedure."
and repeatedly revealed the two-pronged problem of unreliability the scientific reality of the frailty of eyewitness identification.
for eyewitness evidence: (1) eyewitness identifications are subject Ultimately, the Court concluded there was no due process
In the United States, the Supreme Court "ruled for the first time violation in admitting the evidence because there was little doubt
to substantial error, and (2) observer judgments of witness
that the Constitution requires suppression of some identification that the witnesses were actually correct in their identification of
accuracy are likewise subject to substantial error.27
evidence"30 in three (3) of its decisions, all rendered on June Simmons. Scholars have frequently characterized Simmons as the
The bifurcated difficulty of misplaced reliance on eyewitness 12, 1967-United States v. Wade,31 Gilbert v. beginning of the Court's unraveling of the robust protection it had
identification is borne not only by the intrinsic limitations of California, 32 and Stovall v. Denno.33 Stovall emphasized that such offered in Stovall; while Stovall provided a per se rule of exclusion
human memory as the basic apparatus on which the entire suppression, when appropriate, was "a matter of due process."34 for evidence derived from flawed procedures, Simmons rejected
exercise of identification operates. It is as much the result of and this categorical approach in favor of a reliability analysis that
Until the latter half of the twentieth century, the general rule in
is exacerbated by extrinsic factors such as environmental factors, would often allow admission of eyewitness evidence even when
the United States was that any problems with the quality of
flawed procedures, or the mere passage of time: an identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive.37
eyewitness identification evidence went to the weight, not the
More than 100 years of eyewitness science has supported other admissibility, of that evidence and that the jury bore the ultimate In more recent Supreme Court decisions, the United States has
conclusions as well. First, the ability to match faces to responsibility for assessing the credibility and reliability of an "reaffirmed its shift toward a reliability analysis, as opposed to a
photographs (even when the target is present while the witness eyewitness's identification. In a trilogy of landmark cases released focus merely on problematic identification procedures" beginning
inspects the lineup or comparison photo) is poor and peaks at on the same day in 1967, however, the Supreme Court ruled for in 1972 through Neil v. Biggers:38
levels far below what might be considered reasonable doubt. the first time that the Constitution requires suppression of some
Second, eyewitness accuracy is further degraded by pervasive identification evidence. In United The Biggers Court stated that, at least in a case in which the
environmental characteristics typical · of many criminal cases such States v. Wade and Gilbert v. California, the Court held that a confrontation and trial had taken place
as: suboptimal lighting; distance; angle of view; disguise; witness post-indictment lineup is a critical stage in a criminal prosecution, before Stovall, identification evidence would be admissible, even
distress; and many other encoding conditions. Third, memory is and, unless the defendant waives his Sixth Amendment rights, if there had been an unnecessarily suggestive procedure, so long
subject to distortion due to a variety of influences not under the defense counsel's absence from such a procedure requires as the evidence was reliable under the totality of the
control of law enforcement that occur between the criminal event suppression of evidence from the lineup. The court also ruled, circumstances. To inform its reliability analysis, the Biggers Court
and identification procedures and during such procedures. Fourth, however, that even when the lineup evidence itself must be articulated five factors it considered relevant to the inquiry:
the ability of those who must assess the accuracy of eyewitness suppressed, a witness would be permitted to identify the
defendant in court if the prosecution could prove the witness had [(l)] the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the
testimony is poor for a variety of reasons. Witnesses' ability to
an independent source for his identification ... time of the crime, [(2)] the witness' degree of attention, [(3)] the
report on many issues affecting or reflecting accuracy is flawed
accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, [(4)] the
and subject to distortion (e.g., reports of duration of observation.
…. level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
distance, attention, confidence, and others). thereby providing a
confrontation, and [(5)] the length of time between the crime and
flawed basis for others' judgments of accuracy.28 In Stovall v. Denno, the Court held that, regardless of whether a the confrontation.
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were in1plicated or violated,
Likewise, decision-makers such as jurists and judges, who are
some identification procedures are "so unnecessarily suggestive The Biggers Court clearly proclaimed that the "likelihood of
experts in law, procedure, and logic, may simply not know better
and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification" that misidentification," rather than a suggestive procedure in and of
than what their backgrounds and acquired inclinations permit:
eyewitness evidence must be suppressed as a matter of due itself, is what violates a defendant's due process rights. However,
Additionally, the limits and determinants of performance for facial process.35 (Citations omitted) the BiggersCourt left open the possibility that per se exclusion of
recognition are beyond the knowledge of attorneys, judges, and evidence derived from unnecessarily suggestive confrontations
In Wade, the United States Supreme Court noted that the factors might be available to defendants whose confrontations and trials
jurors. The traditional safeguards such as cross-examination are
judges should evaluate in deciding the independent source took place after Stovall.39
not effective and cannot be effective in the absence of accurate
question include:
knowledge of the limits and determinants of witness performance
The Biggers standard was further affirmed in 1977 in Manson v.
among both the cross-examiners and the jurors who must judge [T]he prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act, the Brathwaite; 40
the witness. Likewise, cross-examination cannot be effective if the existence of any discrepancy between any pre-lineup description
The Manson Court made clear that the standard factors already identified by the United States Supreme Court presence of a weapon on a witness' attentiveness. Since the
from Biggers would govern all due process challenges to in Neil v. Biggers:51 1970s, it has been hypothesized that the presence of a weapon
eyewitness evidence, stating that judges should weigh the five captures a witness' attention, thereby reducing his or her
factors against the "corrupting effect of the suggestive (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the attentiveness to other details such as the perpetrator's facial and
identification." Ultimately, the Court affirmed that "reliability is crime; other identifying features.59 Research on this has involved an
the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification enactme1'1t model involving two (2) groups: first, an enactment
(2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy
testimony." In rejecting the per se exclusionary rule, the Court with a gun; and second, an enactment of the same incident using
of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of
acknowledged that such a rule would promote greater deterrence an implement like a pencil or a syringe as substitute for an actual
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5)
against the use of suggestive procedures, and it noted a gun. Both groups are then asked to identify the culprit in a lineup.
the length of time between the crime and the identification; and,
"surprising unanimity among scholars" that the per se approach Results reveal a statistically significant difference in the accuracy
(6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.52
was "essential to avoid serious risk of miscarriage of justice." of eyewitness identification between the two (2) groups:60
However, the Court concluded the cost to society of not being A witness' credibility is ascertained by considering the first two
able to use reliable evidence of guilt in criminal prosecutions [T]he influence of [a weapon focus] variable on an eyewitness's
factors, i.e., the witness' opportunity to view the malefactor at the
would be too high. The Manson Court also made clear that its new performance can only be estimated post hoc. Yet the data here do
time of the crime and the witness' degree of attention at that
stm1dard would apply to both pre-trial and in-court identification offer a rather strong statement: To not consider a weapon's effect
time, based on conditions of visibility and the extent of time, little
evidence, thus resulting in a unified analysis of all identification on eyewitness performance is to ignore relevant information. The
and fleeting as it may have been, for the witness to be exposed to
evidence in the wake of suggestive procedures. In contrast, weapon effect does reliably occur, particularly in crin1es of short
the perpetrators, peruse their features, and ascertain their
the Stovall Court had not specified whether unnecessarily duration in which a threatening wea.pon is visible. Identification
identity.53 In People v. Pavillare: 54
suggestive procedures would require per se exclusion of both pre- accuracy and feature accuracy of eyewitnesses are likely to be
trial identification evidence and any in-court identification, or Both witnesses had ample opportunity to observe the kidnappers affected, although, as previous research has noted ... there is not
alternatively, whether witnesses who had viewed unnecessarily and to remember their faces. The complainant had close contact necessarily a concordance between the two.61
suggestive procedures might nonetheless be allowed to identify with the kidnappers when he was abducted and beaten up, and
Our jurisprudence has yet to give due appreciation to scientific;
defendants in court after an independent source determination.41 later when the kidnappers haggled on the amount of the ransom
data on weapon focus. Instead, what is prevalent is the contrary
money. His cousin met Pavillare face to face and actually dealt
A 2016 article notes that Manson "remains the federal view which empirical studies discredit.62 For instance, in People v.
with him when he paid the ransom money. The two-hour period
constitutional standard."42 It' also notes that "[t]he vast majority Sartagoda:
that the complainant was in close contact with his abductors was
of states have also followed Manson in interpreting the sufficient for him to have a recollection of their physical [T]he most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence [is] to
requirements of their own constitutions."43 appearance. Complainant admitted in court that he would strive to see the looks a..11d faces of their assailants and observe
recognize his abductors if he s[aw] them again and upon seeing the manner in which the crime was committed. Most often the
The United Kingdom has adopted the Code of Practice for the
Pavillare he immediately recognized him as one of the malefactors face of the assailant and body movements thereof, create a
Identification of Persons by Police Officers.44 It "concerns the
as he remember[ed] him as the one who blocked his way, beat lasting impression which cannot easily be erased from their
principal methods used by police to identify people in connection
him up, haggled with the complainant's cousin and received the memory.63
with the investigation of offences and the keeping of accurate and
ransom money. As an indicium of candor the private complainant
reliable criminal records" and covers eyewitness identifications.
admitted that he d[id] not recognize the co-accused, Sotero Rather than a sweeping approbation of a supposed natural
This Code puts in place measures advanced by the corpus of
Santos for which reason the case was dismissed against him.55 propensity for remembering the faces of assailants, this Court
research in enhancing the reliability of eyewitness identification,
now emphasizes the need for courts to appreciate the totality of
specifically by impairing the suggestive tendencies of conventional Apart from extent or degree of exposure, this Court has also circumstances in the identification of perpetrators of crimes.
procedures. Notable measures include having a parade of at least appreciated a witness' specialized skills or extraordinary
nine (9) people, when one (1) suspect is included, to at least 14 capabilities.56 People v. Sanchez57 concerned the theft of an Apart from the witness' opportunity to view the perpetrator
people, when two (2) suspects are included45 and forewarning the armored car. The witness, a trained guard, was taken by this Court during the commission of the Grime and the witness' degree of
witness that he or she may or may not actually see the suspect in as being particularly alert about his surroundings during the attention at that time, the accuracy of any prior description given
the lineup.46Additionally, there should be a careful recording of attack. by the witness is equally vital. Logically, a witness' credibility is
the witness' pre-identification description of the perpetrator47 and enhanced by the extent to which his or her initial description of
explicit instructions for police officers to not "direct the witness' The degree of a witness' attentiveness is the result of many the perpetrator matches the actual appearance of the person
attention to any individual."48 factors, among others: exposure time, frequency of exposure, the ultimately prosecuted for the offense.
criminal incident's degree of violence, the witness' stress levels
III and expectations, and the witness' activity during the commission Nevertheless, discrepancies, when properly accounted for, should
of the crime.58 not be fatal to the prosecution's case, For instance,
Domestic jurisprudence recognizes that eyewitness identification
in Lumanog v. People,64 this Court recognized that age estimates
is affected by "normal human fallibilities and suggestive The degree of the crime's violence affects a witness' stress levels. cannot be made accurately:
influences."49 People v. Teehankee, Jr. 50 introduced in this A focal point of psychological studies has been the effect of the
jurisdiction the totality of circumstances test, which relies on
Though his estimate of Joel's age was not precise, it was not that individuals involved in the event.71 As noted by cognitive This Court found the show-up, with respect to the rape victim,
far from his true age, especially if we consider that being a tricycle psychologist Elizabeth F. Loftus, "[p]ost[-]event information can and the lineup, with respect to the four (4) other witnesses, to
driver who was exposed daily to sunlight, Joel's looks may give a not only enhance existing memories but also change a witness's have been tainted with irregularities. It also noted that the out-of-
first impression that he is older than his actual age. Moreover memory and even cause nonexistent details to become court identification could have been the subject of objections to
Alejo's description of Lumanog as dark-skinned was made two (2) incorporated into a previously acquired memory."72 its admissibility as evidence although these objections were never
months prior to the dates of the trial when he was again asked to raised during trial.84
identify him in court. When defense counsel posed the question Thus, the totality of circumstances test also requires a
of the discrepancy in Alejo's description of Lumanog who was consideration of the suggestiveness of the identification Although these objections were not timely raised, this Court
then prese11ted as having a fair complexion and was 40 years old, procedure undergone by a witness. Both verbal and non-verbal found that the prosecution failed to establish the accused's guilt
the private prosecutor manifested the possible effect of information might become inappropriate cues or suggestions to a beyond reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused.85 It noted
Lumanog's incarceration for such length of time as to make his witness: that the victim was blindfolded throughout her ordeal. Her
appearance different at the time of trial.65 identification was rendered unreliable by her own admission that
A police officer may tell a witness that a suspect has been caught she could only recognize her perpetrator through his eyes and his
The totality of circumstances test also requires a consideration of and the witness should look at some photographs or come to view voice. It reasoned that, given the limited exposure of the rape
the degree of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the a lineup and make an identification. Even if the policeman does victim to the perpetrator, it was difficult for her to immediately
moment of identification. What is most critical here is the initial not explicitly mention a suspect, it is likely that the witness will identify the perpetrator. It found the improper suggestion made
identification made by the witness during investigation and case believe he is being asked to identify a good suspect who will be by the police officer as having possibly aided in the identification
build-up, not identification during trial.66 one of the members of the lineup or set of photos ... If the officer of the suspect.86 The Court cited with approval the following
should unintentionally stare a bit longer at the suspect, or change excerpt from an academic journal:
A witness' certainty is tested in court during cross-examination. In his tone of voice when he says, "Tell us whether you think it is
several instances, this Court has considered a witness' straight and number one, two, THREE, four, five, or six," the witness's opinion Social psychological influences.Various social psychological factors
candid recollection of the incident, undiminished by the rigors of might be swayed.73 also increase the danger of suggestibility in a lh1eup
cross-examination as an indicator of credibility.67 confrontation. Witnesses, like other people, are motivated by a
In appraising the suggestiveness of identification procedures, this desire to be correct and to avoid looking foolish. By arranging a
Still, certainty on the witness stand is by no means conclusive. By Court has previously considered prior or lineup, the police have evidenced their belief that they have
the time a witness takes the stand, he or she shall have likely contemporaneous74 actions of law enforcers, prosecutors, media, caught the criminal; witnesses, realizing this, probably will feel
made narrations to investigators, to responding police or or even fellow witnesses. foolish if they cannot identify anyone and therefore1 may choose
barangay officers, to the public prosecutor, to any possible private someone despite residual uncertainly. Moreover, the need to
prosecutors, to the families of the victims, other sympathizers, In People v. Baconguis,75 this Court acquitted the accused, whose
reduce psychological discomfort often motivates the victim of a
and even to the media. The witness, then, may have established identification was tainted by an improper suggestion.76 There, the
crime to find a likely target for feelings of hostility.
certainty, not because of a foolproof cognitive perception and witness was made to identify the suspect inside a detention cell
recollection of events but because of consistent reinforcement which contained only the suspect.77 Finally, witnesses are highly motivated to behave like those
borne by becoming an experienced narrator. Repeated narrations around them. This desire to conform produces an increased need
People v. Escordiaz78 involved robbery with rape. Throughout their
before different audiences may also prepare a witness for the to identify someone in order to show the police that they, too,
ordeal, the victim and her companions were blindfolded.79 The
same kind of scrutiny that he or she will encounter during cross- feel that the criminal is in the lineup, and makes the witnesses
victim, however, felt a "rough projection''80 on the back of the
examination. Again, what is more crucial is certainty at the onset particularly vulnerable to any clues conveyed by the police or
perpetrator. The perpetrator also spoke, thereby familiarizing the
or on initial identification, not in a relatively belated stage of other witnesses as to whom they suspect of the
victim with his voice.81 Escordial recounted the investigative
criminal proceedings. crime.87 (Emphasis in the original)
process which resulted in bringing the alleged perpetrator into
The totality of circumstances test also requires a consideration of custody. After several individuals were interviewed, the People v. Pineda, 88 involved six (6) perpetrators committing
the length of time between the crime and the identification made investigating officer had an inkling of who to look for. He "found robbery with homicide aboard a passenger bus.89 A passenger
by the witness. "It is by now a well established fact that people accused-appellant [in a] basketball court and 'invited' him to go to recalled that one (1) of the perpetrators was referred to as "Totie"
are less accurate and complete in their eyewitness accounts after the police station for questioning."82 When the suspect was by his companions. The police previously knew that a certain Totie
a long retention interval than after a short one."68 Ideally then, a brought to the police station, the rape victim was already there. Jacob belonged to the robbery gang of Rolando Pineda (Pineda).
prosecution witness must identify the suspect immediately after Upon seeing the suspect enter, the rape victim requested to see At that time also, Pineda and another companion were in
the incident. This Court has considered acceptable an the suspect's back. The suspect removed his shirt. When the detention for another robbery. The police presented photographs
identification made two (2) days after the commission of a victim saw a "rough projection" on the suspect's back, she spoke of Pineda and his companion to the witness, who positively
crime,69 not so one that had an interval of five and a half (5 to the police and stated that the suspect was the perpetrator. The identified the two (2) as among the perpetrators.90
1/2)months.70 police then brought in the other witnesses to identify the suspect.
Four (4) witnesses were taken to the cell containing the accused This Court found the identification procedure unacceptable.91 It
The passage of time is not the only factor that diminishes and they consistently pointed to the suspect even as four (4) then articulated two (2) rules for out-of-court identifications
memory. Equally jeopardizing is a witness' interactions with other other individuals were with him in the cell.83 through photographs:
The first rule in proper photographic identification procedure is tendency to rely more on testimonial evidence rather than on appellant Nuñez is the same Pobre who supposedly committed
that a series of photographs must be shown, and not merely that physical evidence. Unlike the latter, testimonial evidence can be the robbery with homicide along with Marciales and Nabia.
of the suspect. The second rule directs that when a witness is swayed by improper suggestions. Legal scholar Patrick M. Wall
shown a group of pictures, their arrangement and display should notes that improper suggestion "probably accounts for more The prosecution banks on the following portion of Cruz's
in no way suggest which one of the pictures pertains to the miscarriages of justice than any other single factor[.]"95 Marshall testimony.100 The Court of Appeals heavily relies on the same
suspect.92 Houts, who served the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the portion, reproducing parts of it in its Decision:101
American judiciary, concurs and considers eyewitness
Non-compliance with these rules suggests that any subsequent Q: Madam Witness, where were you on June 22, 2000 in the
identification as "the most unreliable form of evidence[.]"96
corporeal identification made by a witness may not actually be afternoon?
A: I was on duty at Tayuman Caltex station, Ma'am.
the result of a reliable recollection of the criminal incident. People v. Rodrigo97 involved the same circumstances
Q: And while you were on duty, what happened if any?
Instead, it will simply confirm false confidence induced by the as Pineda. The police presented a singular photograph for the
A: While we were on duty there was a pick-up which was getting
suggestive presentation of photographs to a witness. eyewitness to identify the person responsible for a robbery with
gas and a person was in front and we were joking baka kami
homicide. The witness identified the person in the photograph as mahold-up yun pala, hinoholdup na kami sa opisina.
Pineda further identified 12 danger signals that might indicate among the perpetrators. This Court stated that, even as the Q: You mentioned that there was already hold-up happening?
erroneous identification. Its list is by no means exhaustive, but it witness subsequently identified the suspect in court, such A: Yes, Ma'am.
identifies benchmarks which may complement the application of identification only followed an impermissible suggestion in the Q: What time was that when you noticed that holdup?
the totality of circumstances rule. These danger signals are: course of the photographic identification. This Court specifically A: Around 8:00p.m.
stated that a suggestive identification violates the right of the Q: Where was the hold-up going on?
(1) the witness originally stated that he could not identify anyone; A: In the office, Ma'am.
accused to due process, denying him or her of a fair trial:98
Q: And how far is that office from where you were at that time,
(2) the identifying witness knew the accused before the crime, but
The greatest care should be taken in considering the identification how many meters?
made no accusation against him when questioned by the police; A: From here to the wall of the court.
of the accused especially, when this identification is made by a
sole witness and the judgment in the case totally depends on the Court:
(3) a serious discrepancy exists between the identifying witness'
reliability of the identification. This level of care and Anyway, I have the reference.
original description and the actual description of the accused;
circumspection applies with greater vigor when, as in the present Prosecutor Aragones:
Q: What happened after you saw that there was [a] hold[-up]
(4) before identifying the accused at the trial, the witness case, the issue goes beyond pure credibility into constitutional
going on inside the office of the Caltex Station?
erroneously identified some other person; dimensions arising from the due process rights of the accused.
A: After that me and my companions ran to the computer shop
…. which is beside the office.
(5) other witnesses to the crime fail to identify the accused;
Q: By the way, why were you at the Caltex gasoline station?
(6) before trial, the witness sees the accused but fails to identify The initial photographic identification in this case carries serious A: I was an attendant, Ma'am.
constitutional law implications in terms of the possible violation of Q: You mentioned that you proceeded to the computer shop
him;
which is beside the office?
the due process rights of the accused as it may deny him his rights
(7) before the commission of the crime, the witness had limited A: Yes, Ma'am.
to a fair trial to the extent that his in-court identification
opportunity to see the accused; Q: Where did you run, inside or outside the computer shop?
proceeded from and was influenced by impermissible suggestions A: Inside, Ma'am.
in the earlier photographic identification. In the context of this Q: Before you went inside, what did you witness after you saw
(8) the witness and the person identified are of different racial
case, the investigators might not have been fair to Rodrigo if they that there was hold-up inside the office?
groups;
themselves, purposely or unwittingly, fixed in the mind of Rosita, A: I saw that one of our companions, a gun was pointed to him
(9) during his original observation of the perpetrator of the crime, or at least actively prepared her mind to, the thought that Rodrigo and also to our employer.
the witness was unaware that a crime was involved; was one of the robbers. Effectively, this act is no different from Q: Who was your companion you saw who was pointed with a
coercing a witness in identifying an accused, varying only with gun?
(10) a considerable time elapsed between the witness' view of the respect to the means used. Either way, the police investigators A: Alex Diaz, and Kuya Alex my employer.
criminal and his identification of the accused; a.re the real actors in the identification of the accused; evidence Q: Who were those persons who pointed guns to your co-worker
of identification is effectively created when none really and to your employer?
(11) several persons committed the crime; and A: The two accused who were first arrested.
exists.99 (Emphasis supplied)
Q: Aside from the two accused, do they have other companions?
(12) the witness fails to make a positive trial identification.93 IV A: Yes, Ma'am.

Pineda underscored that "[t]he more important duty of the Applying these standards, this Court finds the identification made Q: Who was that person who was also with the two accused?
prosecution is to prove the identity of the perpetrator and not to by prosecution witnesses Cruz and Perez unreliable. Despite their A: Paul Pobre.
establish the existence of the crime."94 Establishing the identity of Q: By the way, who were those two accused you are referring to
identification, there remains reasonable doubt if accused-
perpetrators is a difficult task because of this jurisdiction's according to you were arrested?
A: George Marciales and I cannot remember the other one.
Q: You mentioned of the name Paul Pobre, kindly look around if Q: How far is that island from the cashier, from the place you Relen Perez
there is any Paul Pobre in court? were seated right now?
A: Yes, Ma'am, he is here. A: Him[,] ma'am. (witness pointing to the accused)
Q: Can you point to him? A: Around 4 to 5 meters[,] ma'am.
A: He is that one (pointing) Q: What was the participation of that man whom you pointed
INTERPRETER; Q: Were you able to hear the conversation considering that today in that robbery with homicide incident in Caltex gasoline
Witness is pointing to a person wearing yellow shirt who when distance of 4 to 5 meters? station?
asked gave his name as Crisanto Pepafio.
PROSECUTOR ARAGONES: A: I heard nothing[,] ma'am[,] except when Alex shouted[,] "Byron A: He was the one who was pointing a gun to my co-employee
Q: Who told you that the name of that person is Paul Pobre? tulong, hinoholdap tayo[.]" Alexander Diaz[,] ma'am.104
A: Kuya Rommel
Q: Alex was shouting while he was still inside the office? V
Q: Who is Kuya Rommel?
A: Brother of my employer Kuya Alex. A: Yes[,] ma'am. These identifications are but two (2) of a multitude of
Q: Who was apprehended in Laguna? Q: And it was Byron who ran towards the office? circumstances that the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
A: He is the one, Paul Pobre. A: The first one was George Marciales, Byron only followed him. Appeals should have considered in determining whether or not
Q: What was the participation of that person you pointed to as Q: Where was George Marciales before he entered that office? the prosecution has surmounted the threshold of proof beyond
being the companion of accused George Marciales and the other A: He was near the road[,] ma'am. reasonable doubt. Lamentably, they failed to give due recognition
one? Q: But that is not within the gas station's premises? to several other factors that raise serious doubts on the
A: He was the one who entered last and who shot. A: Bali eto po yung pinaka sementado, andito sya. (Witness
soundness of the identification made by prosecution witnesses
COURT: referring to the place where Marciales is)
Cruz and Perez.
Q: Who did he shoot? Q: When you said the cemented area, you were referring to the
A: Kuya Alex.102 National road?
First and most glaringly, Cruz had previously admitted to not
The prosecution similarly banks on the narration and A: Yes[,] ma'am.
remembering the appearance of the fourth robber, the same
identification made by Perez: Q: After Byron went inside the said office, were you able to see
what happened inside? person she would later claim with supposed certainty as Nuñez. In
A: Yes[,] ma'am. Nakasuntok po sya ng isa kay George tapos the original testimony she made in Marciales and Nabia's trial in
Q: Madam Witness when Alex, the accused you pointed a while
tinadyakan po siya sa tagiliran tsaka binaril po sya. Tapos 2002, she admitted to her inability to identify the fourth robber:
ago, the other accused Marciales and your boss, all of them were
inside the computer shop, the office of Caltex? bumagsak napo (sic) sya.
Q: You were still outside your office at that time? Fiscal Dela Cuesta
A: At first no[,] ma'am[.] Nagsimula po kasi andoon po kami sa A: Yes[,] ma'am.
Q: Can you describe the other holdupper during that date and time
labas may lalaking nakatayo po doon sa malapit sa road, sya po Q: Nobody was with you at that time aside from your co-
employees, only the accused was inside at that time? who were the companions of George Marciales?
yung na[] identify before as George Marciales. Ang nakita po lang
A: Yes[,] ma'am.
naming una sa loob apat po sila si boss, si Alex, that man (Nunez) Ronalyn Cruz
Q: You did not run or ask for help considering that that Caltex is
and the man identified before as Orly Nabia.
along the National road? A: Honestly speaking[,] we were not able A: I cannot describe them[,] ma 'am.
Q: Where were you at that time when these four persons were to say anything at that time[,]ma'am.
inside the office? Q: Why can you not describe the appearance of the other
A: We were sitting in an island near the three pumps in front of A: After po ng pag shoot sa kanila tumakbo po kami ni Rona doon holdupper?
the gas station[,] ma'am. sa may computer shop, sa bahay po nila. Pagkaraan po ng ilang
Q: The office in relation to that island is at the back, is that minuto lumabas kami nakita po naming sila na nagtatakbuhan A: I cannot remember their appearances, ma 'am.
correct? together with Kuya Lawrence. Nakita po naming (sic) sila na
A: Yes[,] ma'am. tumatakbo, yung dalawa papuntang Angono, yung isa hindi ko na ….
Q: There were no customers at that time? po alam kung [saan] nagpunta. Nakita na lang po naming si boss
A: None[,] ma'am. Fiscal Dela Cuesta
na gmnagapang asking for help.103
Q: The cashier were (sic) Alex is positioned is facing you[.] [I]s that
correct? The Court of Appeals also favorably cited the following Q: At what particular point in time that the 4th holdupper went
A: Yes[,] ma'am. inside the office?
identification made by Perez:
Q: So it was the back of the accused that you saw, is that correct?
Ronalyn Cruz
A: No[,] ma'am. Sa pinto po kasi yung register namin e. So andito Prosecutor Aragones
po si Alex nakatungo po sya andito po yung accused naka[-]ganito A: When they were wrestling with each other, ma'am.
po sya, nakatutok pos a (sic) kanya. (Witness was standing while Q : Now can you look inside the court and tell us if there is
demonstrating the incident between the accused and Alex inside anybody here who took part in that incident or involved in that Q: Was that before the shooting or after?
the office) very clear po yung itsura nya nung nakita po namin sya. incident?
A: Before the shooting[,] ma'am.105 was made in a context which had practically induced witnesses to when originally given the chance to identify him as the supposed
identify Nuñez as a culprit. Not only was there no effort to fourth robber. Third, a significantly long amount of time had
Second, by the time Cruz and Perez stood at the witness stand countervail the likelihood of him being identified, it even seemed lapsed since the criminal incident; the original witness' statement
and identified Nuñez, roughly eight (8) years had passed since the that the prosecution and others that had acted in its behalf such that none of his features were seen as to enable his identification;
robbery incident. as tile apprehending officers, had actively designed a situation and the positive identification made of him when the case was re-
where there would be no other possibility than for him to be opened. And finally, his presentation for identification before and
Third, as the People's Appellee's Brief concedes, witnesses'
identified as the perpetrator of the crime. during trial was peculiarly, even worrisomely, suggestive as to
identification of Nunez did not come until after he had been
practically induce in prosecution witnesses the belief that he, to
arrested. In fact, it was not until the occasion of his The dubiousness of Nunez's presentation for identification is the exclusion of any other person, must have been the supposed
arraigmnent,106 Nuñez was the sole object of identification, in an further exacerbated by the circumstances of his apprehension. In fourth robber.
identification process that had all but pinned him as the a Manifestation filed with the Court of Appeals, and which, quite
perpetrator. notably, the prosecution never bothered repudiating, Nunez These deficiencies and the doubts over Cruz's and Perez's
recounted how his apprehension appeared to have been borne by opportunity to peruse the fourth robber's features and their
VI
nothing more than the crudeness and sloth of police officers: degree of attentiveness during the crime clearly show that this
Cruz's admission that she could not identify the fourth robber case does not manage to satisfy even one (1) of the six (6) factors
6). That, the truth of the matter as far as the offended charged that impel consideration under the totality of circumstances test.
anathemized any subsequent identification. Moreover, the
against me, I ha[ve] no any truthfulness (sic) nor having any reality
prosecution, the Court of Appeals, and the Regional Trial Court all
as it was indeed only a mere strong manufactured, fabricated and VII
failed to account for any intervening occurrence that explains why
unfounded allegations against me just to get even with me of my
and how Cruz shifted from complete confusion to absolute Recall that both prosecution witnesses Cruz and Perez
[untolerable] disciplinary actions of some individuals who had a
certainty. Instead, they merely took her and Perez's subsequent acknowledged the extreme stress and fright that they experienced
personal grudge against me.
identification as unassailable and trustworthy because of a on the evening of June 22, 2000.1âwphi1 As both Cruz and Perez
demeanor apparently indicating certitude. …. recalled, it was enough for them to run and seek refuge in a
computer shop. Their tension was so palpable that even Cruz's
The conviction of an accused must hinge less on the certainty 9). That, with all due respect, I ha[ve] nothing to do with the and Perez's recollections of what transpired and of how Nuñez
displayed by a witness when he or she has already taken the stand offensed (sic) charged and it is not true that the case was done supposedly participated in the crime are so glaringly different:
but more on the certainty he or she displayed and the accuracy he was charged against me it is Paul Borbe y Pipano it was wrong
or she manifested at the initial and original opportunity to identify person pick-up by the police officer, because the said Paul Borbe y According to Cruz, two (2) other persons initiated the robbery, by
the perpetrator. Cruz had originally admitted to not having an iota [P]ipano was charged of several crimes, while me my record has pointing guns at Regencia and Diaz inside the gasoline station's
of certainty, only to make an unexplained complete reversal and no single offense against me. office. It was supposedly only later, when Diaz shouted, that a
implicate Nunez as among the perpetrators. She jeopardized her third robber, Marciales, and a fourth robber, allegedly Nunez, ran
own credibility. 10). That, with due respect, there was no truthfulness that I was in, to assist the first two (2) robbers. In contrast, Perez claimed
the one who committed the said crime, it was a big mistake that Nuñez was one (1) of the two (2) robbers who were initially
Cruz's and Perez's predicaments are not aided by the sheer length because we have the [same 1 family name they just pick up the already in the office. Nunez was then supposedly pointing a gun at
of time that had lapsed from the criminal incident until the time wrong person which is innocent to the said crime. Diaz while the other robber was pointing a gun at Regencia.
they made their identifications. By the time Cruz made the
identification, seven (7) years and eight (8) months had lapsed 11). That, with all due respect, it was not true, also that it was me They both claim that after Diaz shouted, the first two (2) robbers
since June 22, 2000. As for Perez, eight (8) years and nine (9) who committed the said crime, it was Paul Borbe y Pipano is the received assistance. Cruz, however, claims that two (2) additional
months had already lapsed. one because he was habitual in doing crime in our community, in robbers came to the aid of the first two (2), while Perez claims
fact my record is clean never been committed any crime in my that there was only one (1) additional robber.
In People v. Rodrigo, 107 this Court considered a lapse of five and a life, I am a concern citizen who can help our community
half (5 1/2) months as unreliable. Hence, there is greater reason well.109 (Emphasis supplied) In the scuffle that ensued in the office, Cruz claims that Marciales
that this Court must exercise extreme caution for identifications shot Dimatulac while Nunez shot Diaz. For her part, Perez claims
made many years later. This is consistent with the healthy sense The identification made during Nunez's trial, where eyewitnesses that Marciales was the only one who fired shots at Regencia, Diaz,
of incredulity expected of courts in criminal cases, where the vaunted certainty, was but an offshoot of tainted processes that and Dimatulac.
prosecution is tasked with surmounting the utmost threshold of preceded his trial. This Court finds Nunez's identification prior to
proof beyond reasonable doubt. trial bothersome and his subsequent and contingent identification Jurisprudence holds that inconsistencies in the testimonies of
on the stand more problematic. prosecution witnesses do not necessarily jeopardize the
It is not disputed that Nunez's identification by Cruz and Perez prosecution's case.110 This, however, is on1 y true o f mm. or m.
was borne only by Nunez's arrest on July 2, 2006. The prosecution Nunez's identification, therefore, fails to withstand the rigors of consistencies that are ultimately inconsequential or merely
even acknowledged that his identification was initially done only the totality of circumstances test. First, the witnesses failed to incidental to the overarching narrative of what crime was
to defeat his motion to have the case against him even give any prior description of him. Second, a prosecution committed; how, when, and where it was committed; and who
dismissed.108 Evidently, Nuñez's identification before trial proper witness failed to exhibit even the slightest degree of certainty
committed it. "It is well-settled that inconsistencies on minor This Court is unable to come to a conscientious satisfaction as to
details do not affect credibility as they only refer to collateral Nuñez's guilt. On the contrary, this Court finds it bothersome that
matters which do not touch upon the commission of the crime a man of humble means appears to have been wrongly
itself."111 implicated, not least because of lackadaisical law enforcement
tactics, and has been made to suffer the severity and ignominy of
The inconsistencies here between Cruz and Perez are far from protracted prosecution, intervening detention, and potential
trivial. At issue is precisely the participation of an alleged conviction. Here, this Court puts an end to this travesty of justice.
conspirator whose name the prosecution did not even know for This Court acquits accused-appellant.
proper indictment. Yet, where the prosecution witnesses cannot
agree is also precisely how the person who now stands accused WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated June 26,
actually participated in the commission of the offense. Their 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04474 is
divergences are so glaring that they demonstrate the REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Crisente Pepaño
prosecution's failure to establish Nunez's complicity. Nuñez is ACQUITTED for reasonable doubt. He is ordered
immediately RELEASED from detention, unless confined for any
VIII other lawful cause.

These failings by the prosecution vis-a-vis the totality of Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the
circumstances test are also indicative of many of the 12 danger Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for immediate
signals identified in People v. Pineda12 to be present in this case. implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
On the first, fifth, and twelfth danger signals, prosecution witness directed to report to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of
Cruz originally made an unqualified admission that she could not this Decision the action he has taken. A copy shall also be
identify the fourth robber. On the third danger signal, there is not furnished to the Director General of Philippine National Police for
even an initial description ·with which to match or counter-check his information.
Nuñez. On the tenth danger signal, a considerable amount of time
had passed since Cruz and Perez witnessed the crime and their Let entry of judgment be issued immediately.
identification of Nunez. On the eleventh danger signal, several
perpetrators committed the crime. SO ORERED.

IX

Conviction in criminal cases demands proof beyond reasonable

doubt. While this does not require absolute certainty, it calls for
moral certainty.1âwphi1 It is the degree of proof that appeals to a
magistrate's conscience:

An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which

the Bill of Rights guarantees. Unless his guilt is shown beyond
reasonable doubt, he must be acquitted. This reasonable doubt
standard is demanded by the due process clause of the
Constitution which protects the accused from conviction except
upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged. The burden of
proof is on the prosecution, and unless it discharges that burden
the accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf, and he
would be entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
does not, of course, mean such degree of proof as excluding
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty
only is required, or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The conscience must be
satisfied that the accused is responsible for the offense
charged.113
G.R. No. L-61323-24 June 29, 1984 Raul Leveriza, Jr. and Henry Unson. Jr. were officers of Manotoc dismissal of the cases and causing the continuation of the trial on
Securities Inc. That Raul Leveriza, Jr. had diverted and converted the merits. " (p. 5, Rollo)
RICHARD C. HOEY, petitioner, the public funds entrusted to the corporation by the public as
vs. Manotoc Securities was engaged in the business of soliciting Section 4, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, specifically
THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF RIZAL, and THE MINISTER OF money from the public to finance client accounts in their provides that "all criminal actions either commenced by complaint
JUSTICE, respondents. stockmarket operations who wanted to buy or margin viable or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
securities. That through his position as Executive Vice- President, control of the fiscal." Thus, it is clear that the question of
Carlos Vergabera and Richard C. Hoey, Jr. for petitioner. instituting a criminal charge in court is one addressed to the
he was able to divert those funds to the amount of
P10,422,573.00 to finance his own, his family's and sound discretion of the investigating fiscal; and, the assumption is,
The Solicitor General for respondents.
friends/projects and or corporations to the prejudice and damage the information he lodges in court is supported by facts brought
of the public investors such as RICHARD C. HOEY the complainant about by an inquiry made by him. On the other hand, this Court
herein. has ruled in Alberto vs. de la Cruz, 98 SCRA 406, that "a fiscal by
RELOVA, J.: the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a particular
That as part of his scheme he and accused Henry Unson caused to criminal information where he is not convinced that he has
In October 1980 and November 1980, petitioner Richard C. Hoey issue and signed two (2) checks to the order of the complainant evidence to support the allegations thereof. Although this power
filed complaints with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal herein which bounced due to a "closed account." and prerogative of the Fiscal, to determine whether or not the
against Raul Leveriza, Jr., and Henry Unson, Jr., officers of evidence at hand is sufficient to form a reasonable belief that a
Manotoc Securities, for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, That IBAA Check No. HO-01293423 dated 6 November 1979 for person committed an offense, is not absolute and subject to
otherwise known as the Bouncing Check Law. After preliminary the amount of P59,508.00 bounced due to a closed account as judicial review, it would be embarrassing for the prosecuting
investigation, the investigating fiscal found probable cause and well as IBAA Check No. attorney to be compelled to prosecute a case when he is in no
filed the informations in the then Court of First Instance of Rizal in HO-01293422 dated November 14, 1979 for the amount of position to do so, because in his opinion, he does not have the
Pasig, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 44548 and 44549. P82,634.20. necessary evidence to secure a conviction, or he is not convinced
of the merits of the case. The better procedure would be to
Accused Raul Leveriza, Jr. filed a Motion for Reconsideration in The signatories were Raul Leveriza, Jr. and Henry Unson, Jr. for
appeal the Fiscal's decision to the Ministry of Justice and/or ask
both cases with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal which, after a both checks files as Criminal Cases Nos. 44548 and 44549.
for a special prosecutor."
reinvestigation of the two (2) cases was made, corresponding
Motions to Dismiss, dated June 7, 1982, were presented in court Though the accused Raul Leveriza Jr. suddenly moved out of his
However, in cases where informations have already been filed in
for the reason that — known residence at Marbella I Condominium, Roxas Blvd., without
court, the latter acquires jurisdiction over them. Otherwise stated,
leaving a forwarding address in order not to be found, his lawyers
the jurisdiction of the court became vested upon the filing of the
xxx xxx xxx were furnished copies as to the Rejoinder- Affidavits of the
information and, once acquired, its jurisdiction continues until the
complainant during the preliminary investigation. The accused
4. After analyzing all the allegations of the accused in the Motion termination of the case.
Raul Leveriza, Jr. chose to remain unrepresented in that
for Reconsideration and the oppositions filed thereto by the proceeding In the two (2) criminal cases in question, it is a fact that the
offended party, the undersigned finds that the subject matter in
informations have already been filed in court. It should therefore
this case is a guarantee check and as such is not covered by Batas Upon termination of the preliminary investigation and after the
dispose of them, one way or the other, resolving all motions
Pambansa Bilang 22, hence the Information filed in this case does filing of the information, in order to delay proceedings, his lawyers
brought before it including the Motions to Dismiss, dated June 7,
not charge an offense and should therefore be dismissed, a copy suddenly appeared and filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
1982, filed by the Fiscal, or deciding the cases on the merit. The
of the Resolution of the undersigned dated May 31, 1982 duly was granted.
prosecuting fiscal has no more control over said cases, the same
approved by Provincial Fiscal B. Jose Castillo recommending for
That there were two issues raised in the re-investigation namely: having been transferred to the court. We have a situation where,
the dismissal of this case is hereto attached as Annex "A" and
akin to the pronouncement made by the present Chief Justice in
made an integral part hereof;
1. Whether or not a crossed check is a check; Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 452, whenever a formal complaint is
5. Although it was only accused Raul Leveriza, Jr. who filed the presented in court against an individual, the court steps in and
2. Whether or not a check issued for guarantee is punishable takes control thereof until the same is finally disposed of.
instant Motion for Reconsideration since the Information filed in
under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. (pp. 30-30-A. Rollo)
this case does not charge an offense the Information should be
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
dismissed not only against Raul Leveriza, Jr. but also against his Before the lower court could act on the Motion to Dismiss, Mr.
co-accused Enrique Unson, Jr. (p. 24, Rollo) Richard C. Hoey filed this petition with prayer that a writ of SO ORDERED.
mandamus with prohibition be issued ordering the Honorable
Petitioner Richard C. Hoey, complainant in the two (2) Criminal Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Melencio-
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to prosecute the two cases for violation of
Cases Nos. 44548 and 44549, opposed the Motion to Dismiss, Herrera, Plana, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
the Bouncing Check Law and to desist from pursuing or "to
stating among others that —
withdraw the two Motions to Dismiss thereby preventing the
Abad Santos, J., concur in the result.
Escolin and Aquino, JJ., took no part.
G.R. No. 113930 March 5, 1996 The Department of Justice "349" Committee acted with grave Winefreda O. Madarang, Jack Gravey, Les G. Ham, Corazon
abuse of discretion when it refused to review the City Prosecutor's Pineda, Edward S. Serapio, Alex O. Caballes, Sandy Sytangco, Jorge
PAUL G. ROBERTS, JR., RODOLFO C. SALAZAR, LUIS LORENZO, Joint Resolution and dismissed petitioner's appeal therefrom. W. Drysdale, Richard Blossom, Pablo de Borja, Edmundo L. Tan,
SR., LUIS LORENZO, JR., AMAURY R. GUTIERREZ, BAYANI N. Joseph T. Cohen, Delfin Dator, Zosimo B. San Juan, Joaquin Franco,
FABIC, JOSE YULO, JR., ESTEBAN B. PALANNUAYAN, and WONG III Primitivo S. Javier, Jr., Luisito Guevarra, Asif H. Adil, Eugenio
FONG FUI, petitioners, Muniosguren, James Ditkoff and Timothy Lane be dismissed;
vs. The Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. MAXIMIANO ASUNCION, in upheld the subject order directing the issuance of the warrants of 2. The complaints against all respondents for violation of R.A.
his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, arrest without assessing for itself whether based on such records 7394 otherwise known as the Consumer Act of the Philippines and
Quezon City, Branch 104, HON. APOLINARIO G. EXEVEA, HON. there is probable cause against petitioners. violation of Act 2333 as amended by Act 3740 and E.O. 913 be
HENRICK F. GINGOYON, and HON. PHILIP A. AGUINALDO, in their also dismissed for insufficiency of evidence, and
IV
capacities as Members of the Department of Justice "349"
Committee, and the CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY, 3. I.S. Nos. 92-7833; 92-8710 and 92-P-1065 involving Crowns Nos.
The facts on record do not establish prima facie probable cause
respondents. 173; 401; and 117, 425, 703 and 373, respectively, alleged to be
and Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198 should have been dismissed.5
likewise winning ones be further investigated to afford
J. ROBERT DELGADO, petitioner-Intervenor. The antecedents of this petition are not disputed. respondents a chance to submit their counter-evidence.11

Several thousand holders6 of "349" Pepsi crowns in connection On 6 April 1993, City Prosecutor Candido V. Rivera approved the
with the Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc.'s (PEPSI's) Number Fever recommendation with the modification that Rosemarie Vera,
DAVIDE, JR., J.:p Quintin Gomez, Jr., and Chito Gonzales be excluded from the
Promotion7 filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City complaints against the petitioner's in their respective charge on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.12
We are urged in this petition to set aside (a) the decision of the
Court of Appeals of 28 September 1993 in CA-G.R. SP No. capacities as Presidents or Chief Executive Officers, Chairman of
The information for estafa attached to the Joint Resolution was
31226,1 which dismissed the petition therein on the ground that it the Board, Vice-Chairman of the Board, and Directors of PEPSI,
approved (on 7 April 1993) by Ismael P. Casabar, Chief of the
has been "mooted with the release by the Department of Justice and also against other officials of PEPSI. The complaints
Prosecution Division, upon authority of the City Prosecutor of
of its decision . . . dismissing petitioners' petition for review"; (b) respectively accuse the petitioners and the other PEPSI officials of
Quezon City, and was filed with the RTC of Quezon City on 12 April
the resolution of the said court of 9 February 19942 denying the the following crimes: (a) estafa; (b) violation of R.A. No. 7394,
1993. It was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198.13 The
petitioners' motion to reconsider the decision; (c) the order of 17 otherwise known as the Consumer Act of the Philippines; (c)
information reads as follows:
May 19933 of respondent Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion of Branch violation of E.O. No. 913;8 and (d) violation of Act No. 2333,
104 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City in Criminal entitled "An Act Relative to Untrue, Deceptive and Misleading The undersigned 1st Assistant City Prosecutor accuses PAUL G.
Case No. Q-93-43198 denying petitioners' motion to suspend Advertisements," as amended by Act No. 3740.9 ROBERTS, JR. RODOLFO C. SALAZAR, LUIS F. LORENZO, SR., LUIS P.
proceedings and to hold in abeyance the issuance of the warrants LORENZO, JR., J. ROBERTO DELGADO, AMAURY R. GUTIERREZ,
After appropriate proceedings, the investigating prosecutor,
of arrest and the public prosecutor's motion to defer arraignment; BAYANI N. FABIC, JOSE YULO, JR., ESTEBAN B. PACANNUAYAN, JR.
Ramon M. Gerona, released on 23 March 1993 a Joint
and (d) the resolutions of 23 July 1993 and 3 February 19944 of and WONG FONG FUI, of the crime of ESTAFA, committed as
Resolution10 where he recommended the filing of an information
the Department of Justice (DOJ) dismissing petitioners' petition follows:
against the petitioners and others for the violation of Article 318
for the review of the Joint Resolution of the Assistant City
of the Revised Penal Code and the dismissal of the complaints for That in the month of February, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines
Prosecutor of Quezon City and denying the motion to reconsider
the violation of Article 315, 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code; R.A. and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, the above-
the dismissal, respectively.
No. 7394; Act No. 2333, as amended by Act No. 3740; and E.O. named
The petitioners rely on the following grounds for the grant of the No. 913. The dispositive portion thereof reads as follows: accused —
reliefs prayed for in this petition:
In view of all the foregoing, it is recommended that: Paul G. Roberts, Jr. ) being then the Presidents
I
1. The attached information be filed against respondents Paul G. Rodolfo G. Salazar ) and Executive Officers
Respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he Roberts, Jr., Rodolfo C. Salazar, Rosemarie R. Vera, Luis F. Lorenzo,
ordered the arrest of the petitioners without examining the Sr., Luis P. Lorenzo, Jr., J. Roberto Delgado, Amaury R. Gutierrez, Luis F. Lorenzo, Sr. ) being then the Chairman
record of the preliminary investigation and in determining for Bayani N. Fabic, Jose Yulo, Jr., Esteban B. Pacannuayan, Jr., Wong
Fong Fui, Quintin J. Gomez, Jr. and Chito V. Gutierrez for estafa of the Board of Directors
himself on the basis thereof the existence of probable cause.
under Article 318, Revised Penal Code, while the complaint for
Luis P. Lorenzo, Jr. ) being then the Vice
II violation of Article 315, 2(d), Revised Penal Code against same
respondents Juanito R. Ignacio, R. Sobong, R.O. Sinsuan, M.P. Chairman of the Board
Zarsadias, L.G. Dabao, Jr., R.L. Domingo, N.N. Bacsal, Jesus M.
Manalastas, Janette P. Pio de Roda, Joaquin W. Sampaico, J. Roberto Delgado )
Amaury R. Gutierrez ) being then Members of On 14 April 1993, the petitioners filed with the Office of the City directing the City Prosecutor to elevate the records of I.S. No. P-
Prosecutor a motion for the reconsideration of the Joint 4401 and its related cases and asserted that the petition for
Bayani N. Fabic ) the Board Resolution14 alleging therein that (a) there was neither fraud in review was an essential part of the petitioners' right to a
the Number Fever Promotion nor deviation from or modification preliminary investigation.
Jose Yulo, Jr. )
of the promotional rules approved by the Department of Trade
and Industry (DTI), for from the start of the promotion, it had The next day, respondent Judge Asuncion, Presiding Judge of
Esteban B. Pacannuayan, )
always been clearly explained to the public that for one to be Branch 104 of the RTC of Quezon City, issued an order advising
Jr. and entitled to the cash prize his crown must bear both the winning the parties that his court would "be guided by the doctrine laid
number and the correct security code as they appear in the DTI down by the Supreme Court in the case of Crespo vs. Mogul, 151
Wong Fong Fui ) list; (b) the complainants failed to allege, much less prove SCRA 462 and not by the resolution of the Department of Justice
with prima facie evidence, the specific overt criminal acts or on the petition for review undertaken by the accused."21
OF THE PEPSI COLA PRODUCTS PHILIPPINES, INC., CONSPIRING
omissions purportedly committed by each of the petitioners; (c)
with one another, with intent of gain, by means of deceit, On 30 April 1993, Assistant City Prosecutor Tirso M. Gavero filed
the compromise agreement entered into by PEPSI is not an
fraudulent acts or false pretenses, executed prior to or with the trial court a Motion to Defer Arraignment wherein he
admission of guilt; and (d) the evidence establishes that the
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, did then and also prayed that "further proceedings be held in abeyance
promo was carried out with utmost good faith and without
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the private pending final disposition by the Department of Justice."22
malicious intent.
complainants whose names with their prizes claimed appear in
the attached lists marked as Annexes "A" to "A-46"; "B" to "-33"; On 4 May 1993, Gavero filed an Amended
On 15 April 1993, the petitioners filed with the DOJ a Petition for
"C" to "C-281"; "D" to "D-238"; "E" to "E-30" and "F" to "F-244" in Information, 23 accompanied by a corresponding motion 24 to
Review15 wherein, for the same grounds adduced in the
the following manner: on the date and in the place admit it. The amendments merely consist in the statement that
aforementioned motion for reconsideration, they prayed that the
aforementioned, said accused pursuant to their conspiracy, the complainants therein were only "among others" who were
Joint Resolution be reversed and the complaints dismissed. They
launched the Pepsi Cola Products Philippines, Inc. "Number Fever defrauded by the accused and that the damage or prejudice
further stated that the approval of the Joint Resolution by the City
Promotion" from February 17 to May 8, 1992 later extended to caused amounted "to several billions of pesos, representing the
Prosecutor was not the result of a careful scrutiny and
May 11-June 12, 1992 and announced and advertised in the amounts due them from their winning '349' crowns/caps." The
independent evaluation of the relevant facts and the applicable
media that "all holders of crowns and/or caps of Pepsi, Mirinda, trial court admitted the amended information on the same date.25
law but of the grave threats, intimidation, and actual violence
Mountain Dew and Seven-up bearing the winning 3-digit number which the complainants had inflicted on him and his assistant Later, the attorneys for the different private complainants filed,
will win the full amount of the prize printed on the crowns/caps prosecutors. respectively, an Opposition to Motion to Defer Arraignment,26 and
which are marked with a seven-digit security code as a measure
Objection and Opposition to Motion to Suspend Proceedings and
against tampering or faking of crowns and each and every number On that same date, the petitioners filed in Criminal Case No. Q-93-
to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest.27
has its own unique matching security code", enticing the public to 43198 Motions to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance
buy Pepsi softdrinks with aforestated alluring and attractive Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground that they had filed On 14 May 1993, the petitioners filed a Memorandum in Support
advertisements to become millionaires, and by virtue of such the aforesaid Petition for Review.16 of their Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance
representations made by the accused, the said complainants the Issuance of the Warrants of Arrest.28
bought Pepsi softdrinks, but, the said accused after their TV On 21 April 1993, acting on the Petition for Review, Chief State
announcement on May 25, 1992 that the winning number for the Prosecutor Zenon L. de Guia issued a 1st Indorsement,17 directing On 17 May 1993, respondent Judge Asuncion issued the
next day was "349", in violation of their aforecited mechanics, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to inform the DOJ whether the challenged order (1) denying the petitioners' Motion to Suspend
refused as they still refuse to redeem/pay the said Pepsi crowns petitioners have already been arraigned, and if not, to move in Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of
and/or caps presented to them by the complainants, who, among court for the deferment of further proceedings in the case and to Arrest and the public prosecutor's Motion to Defer Arraignment
others, were able to buy Pepsi softdrinks with crowns/caps elevate to the DOJ the entire records of the case, for the case is and (2) directing the issuance of the warrants of arrest "after June
bearing number "349" with security codes L-2560-FQ and L-3560- being treated as an exception pursuant to Section 4 of 1993" and setting the arraignment on 28 June 1993.29 Pertinent
FQ, despite repeated demands made by the complainants, to their Department Circular No. 7 dated 25 January 1990. portions of the order read as follows:
damage and prejudice to the extent of the amount of the prizes
On 22 April 1993, Criminal Case No. Q-93-41398 was raffle to In the Motion filed by the accused, it is alleged that on April 15,
respectively due them from their winning "349" crowns/caps,
Branch 104 of the RTC of Quezon City.18 1993, they filed a petition for review seeking the reversal of the
together with such amounts they spent in going to and from the
Office of Pepsi to claim their prizes and such other amounts used resolution of City Prosecutor of Quezon City approving the filing of
In the morning of 27 April 1993, private prosecutor Julio Contreras
in buying Pepsi softdrinks which the complainants normally would the case against the accused, claiming that:
filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Warrants of Arrest. 19
not have done were it not for the false, fraudulent and deceitful
1. The resolution constituting [sic] force and duress;
posters of Pepsi Cola Products Philippines, Inc. In the afternoon of that same day, petitioner Paul Roberts, Jr.,
filed a Supplemental Urgent Motion to Hold in Abeyance Issuance 2. There was no fraud or deceit therefore there can be no estafa;
CONTRARY TO LAW. of Warrant of Arrest and to Suspend Proceedings.20 He stressed
that the DOJ had taken cognizance of the Petition for Review by 3. No criminal overt acts by respondents were proved;
4. Pepsi nor the accused herein made no admission of guilt before III. THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED You questioned the said order of the RTC before the Court of
the Department of Trade and Industry; TO AWAIT THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE'S RESOLUTION OF Appeals and prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
PETITIONERS' APPEAL, AND injunction to restrain the Trial Judge from issuing any warrant of
5. The evidence presented clearly showed no malicious intent on arrest and from proceeding with the arraignment of the accused.
the part of the accused. IV. THERE IS NO OTHER PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY The appellate court in a resolution dated July 1, 1993, denied your
IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW. petition.
Trial Prosecutor Tirso M. Gavero in his Motion to Defer
Arraignment averred that there is a pending petition for review On 15 June 1993, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary In view of the said developments, it would be an exercise in
with the Department of Justice filed by the accused and the Office restraining order to maintain the status quo.31 In view thereof; futility to continue reviewing the instant cases for any further
of the City Prosecutor was directed, among other things, to cause respondent Judge Asuncion issued an order on 28 June action on the part of the Department would depend on the sound
for the deferment of further proceedings pending final disposition 199332 postponing indefinitely the arraignment of the petitioners discretion of the Trial Court. The denial by the said court of the
of said Petition by the Department of Justice. which was earlier scheduled on that date. motion to defer arraignment filed at our instance was clearly an
exercise of its discretion. With the issuance of the order dated
The motions filed by the accused and the Trial Prosecutor are On 28 June 1993, the Court of Appeals heard the petitioners'
May 17, 1993, Trial Court was in effect sending a signal to this
hereby DENIED. application for a writ of preliminary injunction, granted the
Department that "the determination of the case is within its
motion for leave to intervene filed by J. Roberto Delgado, and
This case is already pending in this Court for trial. To follow exclusive jurisdiction and competence." The rule is that ". . . once
directed the Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC of Quezon City to
whatever opinion the Secretary of Justice may have on the matter a complaint or information is filed in Court, any disposition of the
elevate the original records of Criminal Case No. 4-93-43198.33
would undermine the independence and integrity of this Court. case as to dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused
This Court is still capable of administering justice. Upon receipt of the original records of the criminal case, the Court rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal
of Appeals found that a copy of the Joint Resolution had in fact retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal
The Supreme Court in the case of Crespo vs. Mogul (SCRA 151, pp. been forwarded to, and received by, the trial court on 22 April cases even while the case is already in Court, he cannot impose
471-472) stated as follows: 1993, which fact belied the petitioners' claim that the respondent his opinion on the trial court. The court is the best and sole judge
Judge had not the slightest basis at all for determining probable on what to do with the case before it. . . ." (Crespo vs. Mogul, 151
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of SCRA 462).40
cause when he ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest. It ruled
the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may
that the Joint Resolution "was sufficient in itself to have been
be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, On 28 September 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated a
relied upon by respondent Judge in convincing himself that
as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for decision 41 dismissing the petition because it had been "mooted
probable cause indeed exists for the purpose of issuing the
review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint with the release by the Department of Justice of its decision . . .
corresponding warrants of arrest"; and that the "mere silence of
or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should dismissing petitioners' petition for review by inerrantly upholding
the records or the absence of any express declaration" in the
be left entirely for the determination of the Court. the criminal court's exclusive and unsupplantable authority to
questioned order as to the basis of such finding does not give rise
control the entire course of the case brought against petitioners,
WHEREFORE, let warrant of arrest be issued after June 21, 1993, to an adverse inference, for the respondent Judge enjoys in his
reiterating with approval the dictum laid down in the 'Crespo'
and arraignment be set on June 28, 1993, at 9:30 in the morning. favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of his
case."
official duty. The Court of Appeals then issued a
On 7 June 1993, the petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a resolution34 denying the application for a writ of preliminary The petitioners filed a motion to reconsider the DOJ's dismissal of
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with application injunction. the petition citing therein its resolutions in other similar cases
for a temporary restraining order,30 which was docketed as CA- which were favorable to the petitioners and adverse to other
G.R. SP No. 31226. They contended therein that respondent Judge On 8 June 1993, the petitioners filed a motion to reconsider35 the
"349" Pepsi crowns holders.
Asuncion had acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with aforesaid resolution. The Court of Appeals required the
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the aforementioned order of respondents therein to comment on the said motion.36 In its resolution of 3 February 1994, the DOJ, through its "349"
17 May 1993 because Committee, denied the motion and stated: "The instant petition is
On 3 August 1993, the counsel for the private complainants filed
different from the other petitions resolved by this Department in
I. RESPONDENT JUDGE FAILED TO EXAMINE THE RECORD OF in CA-G.R. SP No. 31226 a Manifestation3 7informing the court
similar cases from
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION BEFORE ORDERING THE ARREST OF that the petitioners' petition for review filed with the DOJ was
the provinces. In the latter petitions, the complaints against
PETITIONERS. dismissed in a resolution dated 23 July 1993. A copy 38 of the
herein respondents [sic]42 were dismissed inasmuch as the
resolution was attached to the Manifestation.
informations have not yet been filed or even if already filed in
II. THERE IS NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO HOLD PETITIONERS
On 21 September 1993, the public respondents filed in CA-G.R. SP court, the proceedings have been suspended by the courts to
CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR ESTAFA, OTHER DECEITS, OR ANY OTHER
No. 31226 a motion to dismiss the petition39 on the ground that it await the outcome of the appeal pending with this Department."43
OFFENSE.
has become moot and academic in view of the dismissal by the
The petitioners likewise filed a motion to reconsider44 the
DOJ of the petitioners' petition to review the Joint Resolution. The
aforesaid Court of Appeals' decision, which the said court denied
dismissal by the DOJ is founded on the following exposition:
in its resolution 45 of 9 February 1994. Hence, the instant petition.
The First Division of this Court denied due course to this petition of the investigating prosecutor when he ordered the issuance of Pursuant to the said provision, the Secretary of Justice had
in its resolution of 19 September 1994.46 the warrants of arrest, and (b) in ultimately dismissing the petition promulgated the rules on appeals from resolutions in preliminary
on the ground of mootness since the DOJ had dismissed the investigation. At the time the petitioners filed their petition for
On 7 October 1994, the petitioners filed a motion for the petition for review. the review of the Joint Resolution of the investigating prosecutor,
reconsideration 4 7 of the aforesaid resolution. Acting thereon, the governing rule was Circular No. 7, dated 25 January 1990.
the First Division required the respondents to comment thereon. 5. Whether this Court may determine in this proceedings the Section 2 thereof provided that only resolutions dismissing a
existence of probable cause either for the issuance of warrants of criminal complaint may be appealed to the Secretary of Justice. Its
Later, the petitioners filed a supplemental motion for arrest against the petitioners or for their prosecution for the Section 4, 55however, provided an exception, thus allowing, upon
reconsideration48 and a motion to refer this case to the Court en crime of estafa. a showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion, appeals
banc. 49 In its resolution of 14 November 1994,50 the First Division
from resolutions finding probable cause, provided that the
granted the latter motion and required the respondents to We resolve the first four issues in the affirmative and the fifth, in
accused has not been arraigned.
comment on the supplemental motion for reconsideration. the negative.
The DOJ gave due course to the petitioners' petition for review as
In the resolution of 24 November 1994, the Court en I.
an exception pursuant to Section 4 of Circular No. 7.
banc accepted the referral.
There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul51 which bars the DOJ from
Meanwhile, the DOJ promulgated on 30 June 1993 Department
On 10 October 1995, after deliberating on the motion for taking cognizance of an appeal, by way 'of a petition for review, by
Order No. 22356 which superseded Circular No. 7. This Order,
reconsideration and the subsequent pleadings in relation thereto, an accused in a criminal case from an unfavorable ruling of the
however, retained the provisions of Section 1 of the Circular on
the Court en banc granted the motion for reconsideration; investigating prosecutor. It merely advised the DOJ to, "as far as
appealable cases and Section 4 on the non-appealable cases and
reconsidered and set aside the resolution of 19 September 1994; practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or
the exceptions thereto.
and reinstated the petition. It then considered the case submitted appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or
for decision, "since the parties have exhaustively discussed the information has already been filed in Court." More specifically, it There is nothing in Department Order No. 223 which would
issues in their pleadings, the original records of Criminal Case No. stated: warrant a recall of the previous action of the DOJ giving due
Q-93-43198 and of CA-G.R. SP No. 31226 had been elevated to course to the petitioners' petition for review. But whether the DOJ
this Court, and both the petitioners and the Office of the Solicitor In order therefore to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion
would affirm or reverse the challenged Joint Resolution is still a
General pray, in effect, that this Court resolve the issue of of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal
matter of guesswork. Accordingly, it was premature for
probable cause on the basis thereof." may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice
respondent Judge Asuncion to deny the motions to suspend
should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition
proceedings and to defer arraignment on the following grounds:
The pleadings of the parties suggest for this Court's resolution the for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the
following key issues: complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The This case is already pending in this Court for trial. To follow
matter should, be left entirely for the determination of the whatever opinion the Secretary of Justice may have on the matter
1. Whether public respondent Judge Asuncion committed grave Court.52 would undermine the independence and integrity of this Court.
abuse of discretion in denying, on the basis of Crespo vs. Mogul,
This Court is still capable of administering justice.
the motions to suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance the In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals,53 this Court explicitly declared:
issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment until after The real and ultimate test of the independence and integrity of his
the petition for review filed with the DOJ shall have been Nothing in the said ruling forecloses the power or authority of the
court is not the filing of the aforementioned motions at that stage
resolved. Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates in
of the proceedings but the filing of a motion to dismiss or to
criminal cases. The Secretary of Justice is only enjoined to refrain
withdraw the information on the basis of a resolution of the
2. Whether public respondent Judge Asuncion committed grave as far as practicable from entertaining a petition for review or
petition for review reversing the Joint Resolution of the
abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest appeal from the action of the prosecutor once a complaint or
investigating prosecutor. Before that time, the following
without examining the records of the preliminary investigation. information is filed in court. In any case, the grant of a motion to
pronouncement in Crespo did not yet truly become relevant or
dismiss, which the prosecution may file after the Secretary of
3. Whether the DOJ, through its "349" Committee, gravely abused applicable:
Justice reverses an appealed resolution, is subject to the
its discretion in dismissing the petition for review on the following discretion of the court. The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or
bases: (a) the resolution of public respondent Court of Appeals
information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its
denying the application for a writ of preliminary injunction and (b) Crespo could not have intended otherwise without doing violence
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
of public respondent Asuncion's denial of the abovementioned to, or repealing, the last paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112 of the
sound discretion of the court. Although the fiscal retains the
motions. Rules of Court54 which recognizes the authority of the Secretary of
direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even
Justice to reverse the resolution of the provincial or city
4. Whether public respondent Court of Appeals committed grave while the case is already in court he cannot impose his opinion on
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor upon petition by a proper
abuse of discretion (a) in denying the motion for a writ of the trial court. The court is the best and sole judge on what to do
party.
preliminary injunction solely on the ground that public with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its
respondent Asuncion had already before him the Joint Resolution exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the
case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has by officers authorized to do so other than judges of MeTCs, MTCs We emphasize the important features of the constitutional
the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is and MCTCs.62 mandate that ". . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the As to the first, a warrant can issue only if the judge is satisfied the judge . . ." (Article III, Section 2, Constitution).
Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant
investigation.57 and the witnesses, in the form of searching questions and First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the
answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor the
However, once a motion to dismiss or withdraw the information is of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge
filed the trial judge may grant or deny it, not out of subservience to frustrate the ends of justice. alone makes this determination.
to the Secretary of Justice, but in faithful exercise of judicial
prerogative. This Court pertinently stated so in Martinez vs. Court As to the second, this Court held in Soliven vs. Makasiar 63 that the Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not
of Appeals:58 judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and bind the Judge. It merely assists him to make the determination of
the witnesses, but probable cause. The Judge does not have to follow what the
Whether to approve or disapprove the stand taken by the Prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the Prosecutor's certification
prosecution is not the exercise of discretion required in cases like [f]ollowing established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the
this. The trial judge must himself be convinced that there was personally evaluate the report and supporting documents transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting
indeed no sufficient evidence against the accused, and this submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause documents behind the Prosecutor's certification which are
conclusion can be arrived at only after an assessment of the and, on the basis thereof; issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the material in assisting the Judge to make his determination.
evidence in the possession of the prosecution. What was basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
imperatively required was the trial judge's own assessment of fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits In adverting to a statement in People vs. Delgado66 that the judge
such evidence, it not being sufficient for the valid and proper of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the may rely on the resolution of the Commission on Elections
exercise of judicial discretion merely to accept the prosecution's existence of probable cause.64 (COMELEC) to file the information by the same token that it may
word for its supposed insufficiency. rely on the certification made by the prosecutor who conducted
Sound policy supports this procedure, "otherwise judges would be the preliminary investigation in the issuance of the warrant of
As aptly observed the Office of the Solicitor General, in failing to unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation arrest, this Court stressed in Lim vs. Felix67 that
make an independent finding of the merits of the case and merely of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and
anchoring the dismissal on the revised position of the prosecution, deciding cases filed before their courts." It must be emphasized Reliance on the COMELEC resolution or the Prosecutor's
the trial judge relinquished the discretion he was duty bound to that judges must not rely solely on the report or resolution of the certification presupposes that the records of either the COMELEC
exercise. In effect, it was the prosecution, through the fiscal (now prosecutor); they must evaluate the report and the or the Prosecutor have been submitted to the Judge and he relies
Department of Justice which decided what to do and not the court supporting document. In this sense, the aforementioned on the certification or resolution because the records of the
which was reduced to a mere rubber stamp in violation of the requirement has modified paragraph 4(a) of Circular No. 12 issued investigation sustain the recommendation. The warrant issues not
ruling in Crespo vs. Mogul. by this Court on 30 June 1987 prescribing the Guidelines on on the strength of the certification standing alone but because of
Issuance of Warrants of Arrest under Section 2, Article III of the the records which sustain it.
II. 1987 Constitution, which provided in part as follows:
And noting that judges still suffer from the inertia of decisions and
Section 2, Article III of the present Constitution provides that no 4. In satisfying himself of the existence of a probable cause for the practice under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, this Court found
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge, following established it necessary to restate the rule "in greater detail and hopefully
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after doctrine and procedure, may either: clearer terms." It then proceeded to do so, thus:
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce. (a) Rely upon the fiscal's certification of the existence of probable We reiterate the ruling in Soliven vs. Makasiar that the Judge does
cause whether or not the case is cognizable only by the Regional not have to personally examine the complainant and his
Under existing laws, warrants of arrest may be issued (1) by the Trial Court and on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. . . . witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a
Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs) except those in the National commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there
Capital Region, Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and Municipal This requirement of evaluation not only of the report or should be a report and necessary documents supporting the
Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) in cases falling within their exclusive certification of the fiscal but also of the supporting documents Fiscal's bare certification. All of these should be before the Judge.
original jurisdiction;59 in cases covered by the rule on summary was further explained in People vs. Inting,65 where this Court
procedure where the accused fails to appear when required;60 and specified what the documents may consist of, viz., "the affidavits, The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the report and
in cases filed with them which are cognizable by the Regional Trial the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other its annexes depends on the circumstances of each case. We
Courts (RTCs);61 and (2) by the Metropolitan Trial Courts in the supporting documents behind the Prosecutor's certification which cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the
National Capital Region (MeTCs-NCR) and the RTCs in cases filed are material in assisting the Judge to make his determination" of Judge's examination should be. The Judge has to exercise sound
with them after appropriate preliminary investigations conducted probable cause. Thus: discretion for, after all, the personal determination is vested in the
Judge by the Constitution. It can be as brief as or detailed as the
circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the Judge must go Panel does not mean they made no personal evaluation of the filed by the prosecution either as a consequence of a
beyond the Prosecutor's certification and investigation report evidence attached to the records of the case. (emphasis supplied) reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice
whenever necessary. He should call for the complainant and after a review of the records of the investigation is addressed to
witnesses themselves to answer the court's probing questions The teachings then of Soliven, Inting, Lim, Allado, and Webb reject the trial court, which has the option to grant or to deny it. Also, it
when the circumstances of the case so require. the proposition that the investigating prosecutor's certification in must have been still fresh in its mind that a few months back it
an information or his resolution which is made the basis for the had dismissed for lack of probable cause other similar complaints
This Court then set aside for being null and void the challenged filing of the information, or both, would suffice in the judicial of holders of "349" Pepsi crowns.72 Thus, its decision to give due
order of respondent Judge Felix directing the issuance of the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of course to the petition must have been prompted by nothing less
warrants of arrest against petitioners Lim, et al., solely on the arrest. In Webb, this Court assumed that since the respondent than an honest conviction that a review of the Joint Resolution
basis of the prosecutor's certification in the informations that Judges had before them not only the 26-page resolution of the was necessary in the highest interest of justice in the light of the
there existed probable cause "without having before him any investigating panel but also the affidavits of the prosecution special circumstances of the case. That decision was permissible
other basis for his personal determination of the existence of a witnesses and even the counter-affidavits of the respondents, within the "as far as practicable" criterion in Crespo.
probable cause." they (judges) made personal evaluation of the evidence attached
to the records of the case. Hence, the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion when it
In Allado vs. Diokno,68 this Court also ruled that "before issuing a executed on 23 July 1993 a unilateral volte-face, which was even
warrant of arrest, the judge must satisfy himself that based on the Unfortunately, in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198, nothing unprovoked by a formal pleading to accomplish the same end, by
evidence submitted there is sufficient proof that a crime has been accompanied the information upon its filing on 12 April 1993 with dismissing the petition for review. It dismissed the petition simply
committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty the trial court. As found by the Court of Appeals in its resolution because it thought that a review of the Joint Resolution would be
thereof." of 1 July 1993, a copy of the Joint Resolution was forwarded to, an exercise in futility in that any further action on the part of the
and received by, the trial court only on 22 April 1993. And as Department would depend on the sound discretion of the trial
In the recent case of Webb vs. De Leon,69 this Court rejected the revealed by the certification71 of Branch Clerk of Court Gibson court, and that the latter's denial of the motion to defer
thesis of the petitioners of absence of probable cause and Araula, Jr., no affidavits of the witnesses, transcripts of arraignment filed at the instance of the DOJ was clearly an
sustained the investigating panel's and the respondent Judge's stenographic notes of the proceedings during the preliminary exercise of that discretion or was, in effect, a signal to the
findings of probable cause. After quoting extensively from Soliven investigation, or other documents submitted in the course thereof Department that the determination of the case is within the
vs. Makasiar,70 this Court explicitly pointed out: were found in the records of Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198 as of court's exclusive jurisdiction and competence. This infirmity
19 May 1993. Clearly, when respondent Judge Asuncion issued becomes more pronounced because the reason adduced by the
Clearly then, the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and our case
the assailed order of 17 May 1993 directing, among other things, respondent Judge for his denial of the motions to suspend
law repudiate the submission of petitioners that respondent
the issuance of warrants of arrest, he had only the information, proceedings and hold in abeyance issuance of warrants of arrest
judges should have conducted "searching examination of
amended information, and Joint Resolution as bases thereof. He and to defer arraignment finds, as yet, no support in Crespo.
witnesses" before issuing warrants of arrest against them. They
did not have the records or evidence supporting the prosecutor's
also reject petitioners' contention that a judge must first issue an
finding of probable cause. And strangely enough, he made no IV.
order of arrest before issuing a warrant of arrest. There is no law
specific finding of probable cause; he merely directed the issuance
or rule requiring the issuance of an Order of Arrest prior to a If the only issue before the Court of Appeals were the denial of
of warrants of arrest "after June 21, 1993." It may, however, be
warrant of arrest. the petitioners' Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in
argued that the directive presupposes a finding of probable cause.
But then compliance with a constitutional requirement for the Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest and the public
In the case at bar, the DOJ Panel submitted to the trial court its 26-
protection of individual liberty cannot be left to presupposition, prosecutor's Motion to Defer Arraignment, which were both
page report, the two (2) sworn statements of Alfaro and the sworn
conjecture, or even convincing logic. based on the pendency before the DOJ of the petition for the
statements of Carlos Cristobal and Lolita Birrer as well as the
review of the Joint Resolution, the dismissal of CA-G.R. SP No.
counter-affidavits of the petitioners. Apparently, the painstaking
III. 31226 on the basis of the dismissal by the DOJ of the petition for
recital and analysis of the parties' evidence made in the DOJ Panel
review might have been correct. However, the petition likewise
Report satisfied both judges that there is probable cause to issue As earlier stated, per its 1st Indorsement of 21 April 1993, the DOJ involved the issue of whether respondent Judge Asuncion gravely
warrants of arrest against petitioners. Again, we stress that before gave due course to the petitioners' petition for review pursuant to abused his discretion in ordering the issuance of warrants of
issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the the exception provided for in Section 4 of Circular No. 7, and arrest despite want of basis. The DOJ's dismissal of the petition for
probability, not the certainty of the guilt of an accused. In doing directed the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to review did not render moot and academic the latter issue.
so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the forward to the Department the records of the cases and to file in
existence of probable cause. They just personally review the initial court a motion for the deferment of the proceedings. At the time In denying in its resolution of 1 July 1993 the petitioners'
determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it issued the indorsement, the DOJ already knew that the application for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain
it is supported by substantial evidence. The sufficiency of the information had been filed in court, for which reason it directed respondent Judge Asuncion from issuing warrants of arrest, the
review process cannot be measured by merely counting minutes the City Prosecutor to inform the Department whether the Court of Appeals justified its action in this wise:
and hours. The fact that it took the respondent judges a few hours accused have already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to
to review and affirm the probable cause determination of the DOJ move to defer further proceedings. It must have been fully aware The Joint Resolution was sufficient in itself to have been relied
that, pursuant to Crespo vs. Mogul, a motion to dismiss a case upon by respondent judge in convincing himself that probable
cause indeed exists for the purpose of issuing the corresponding Joint Resolution can validly serve as sufficient basis for Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez vs. Albano, supra; Fortun vs.
warrants of arrest. The mere silence of the records or the absence determining probable cause. As stated above, it is not. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607);
of any express declaration in the questioned Order of May 17,
1993 as to where the respondent Judge based his finding of V. c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice (De
probable cause does not give rise to any adverse inference on his Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202);
In criminal prosecutions, the determination of probable cause
part. The fact remains that the Joint Resolution was at respondent
may either be an executive or a judicial prerogative. In People d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of
Judge's disposal at the time he issued the Order for the issuance
vs. Inting,73 this Court aptly stated: authority (Planas vs. Oil, 67 Phil. 62);
of the warrants of arrest. After all, respondent Judge enjoys in his
favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of official And third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or
actuations. And this presumption prevails until it is overcome by preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the regulation (Young vs. Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng vs.
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Every reasonable issuance of a warrant of arrest from a preliminary investigation Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);
intendment will be made in support of the presumption, and in proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for
case of doubt as to an officer's act being lawful or unlawful it trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People
should be construed to be lawful. (31 C.J.S., 808-810. See course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no and Avendia, 109 Phil. 1140);
also Mahilum, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, 17 SCRA 482; People vs. confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable
Cortez, 21 SCRA 1228; Government of the P.I. vs. Galarosa, 36 g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs.
cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The
Phil. 338). City Judge, L-25795, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616);
preliminary investigation proper — whether or not there is
reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution
We are unable to agree with this disquisition, for it merely
offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be (Rustia vs. Ocampo, CA-G.R. No. 4760, March 25, 1960);
assumes at least two things: (1) that respondent Judge Asuncion
subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of
had read and relied on the Joint Resolution and (2) he was
trial — is the function of the Prosecutor. i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the
convinced that probable cause exists for the issuance of the
lust for vengeance (Recto vs. Castelo, 18 L.J. [1953], cited in Rañoa
warrants of arrest against the petitioners. Nothing in the records .... vs. Alvendia, CA-G.R. No. 30720-R, October 8, 1962; Cf. Guingona,
provides reasonable basis for these assumptions. In his assailed
et al. vs. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA 577); and
order, the respondent Judge made no mention of the Joint We reiterate that preliminary investigation should be
Resolution, which was attached to the records of Criminal Case distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused
No. Q-93-43198 on 22 April 1993. Neither did he state that he determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied (Salonga
found probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. And, information or it is an investigation for the determination of a vs. Paño, et al., L- 59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438).
for an undivinable reason, he directed the issuance of warrants of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first
arrest only "after June 21, 1993." If he did read the Joint kind of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is part of 7. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to
Resolution and, in so reading, found probable cause, there was the prosecution's job. The second kind of preliminary investigation prevent to threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners (Rodriguez
absolutely no reason at all to delay for more than one month the which is more properly called preliminary examination is judicial vs. Castelo, L- 6374, August 1, 1953). (cited in Regalado, Remedial
issuance of warrants of arrest. The most probable explanation for in nature and is lodged with the judge. . . . Law Compendium, p. 188, 1988 Ed.)
such delay could be that the respondent Judge had actually
wanted to wait for a little while for the DOJ to resolve the petition Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with In these exceptional cases, this Court may ultimately resolve the
for review. this Court. Its duty in an appropriate case is confined to the issue existence or non-existence of probable cause by examining the
of whether the executive or judicial determination, as the case records of the preliminary investigation, as it did in Salonga
It is, nevertheless, contended in the dissenting opinion of Mr. may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of vs. Paño,75 Allado, and Webb.
Justice Reynato S. Puno that whatever doubts may have lingered jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want
on the issue of probable cause was dissolved when no less than of jurisdiction. This is consistent with the general rule that There can be no doubt that, in light of the several thousand
the Court of Appeals sustained the finding of probable cause criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by private complainants in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198 and several
made by the respondent Judge after an evaluation of the Joint injunction, preliminary or final. There are, however, exceptions to thousands more in different parts of the country who are similarly
Resolution. We are not persuaded with that opinion. It is this rule. Among the exceptions are enumerated in Brocka situated as the former for being holders of "349" Pepsi crowns,
anchored on erroneous premises. In its 1 July 1993 resolution, the vs. Enrile74 as follows: any affirmative holding of probable cause in the said case may
Court of Appeals does not at all state that it either sustained cause or provoke, as justly feared by the petitioners, the filing of
respondent Judge Asuncion's finding of probable cause, or found a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the several thousand cases in various courts throughout the country.
by itself probable cause. As discussed above, it merely presumed accused (Hernandez vs. Albano, et al., L-19272, January 25, 1967, Inevitably, the petitioners would be exposed to the harassments
that Judge Asuncion might have read the Joint Resolution and 19 SCRA 95); of warrants of arrest issued by such courts and to huge
found probable cause from a reading thereof. Then too, that expenditures for premiums on bailbonds and for travels from one
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to court to another throughout the length and breadth of the
statement in the dissenting opinion erroneously assumes that the
avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga, et al. vs. archipelago for their arraignments and trials in such cases. Worse,
the filing of these staggering number of cases would necessarily
affect the trial calendar of our overburdened judges and take
much of their attention, time, and energy, which they could
devote to other equally, if not more, important cases. Such a
frightful scenario would seriously affect the orderly administration
of justice, or cause oppression or multiplicity of actions — a
situation already long conceded by this Court to be an exception
to the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be
restrained or stayed by injunction.76

We shall not, however, reevaluate the evidence to determine if

indeed there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants of
arrest in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43298. For, as earlier stated, the
respondent Judge did not, in fact, find that probable cause exists,
and if he did he did not have the basis therefor as mandated
by Soliven, Inting, Lim, Allado, and even Webb. Moreover, the
records of the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. Q-93-
43198 are not with this Court. They were forwarded by the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to the DOJ in compliance
with the latter's 1st Indorsement of 21 April 1993. The trial court
and the DOJ must be required to perform their duty.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the following

are hereby SET ASIDE:

(a) Decision of 28 September 1993 and Resolution of 9 February

1994 of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 31226;

(b) The Resolutions of the "349" Committee of the Department of

Justice of 23 July 1993 dismissing the petitioners' petition for
review and of 3 February 1994 denying the motion to reconsider
the dismissal; and

(c) The Order of respondent Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion of 17

May 1993 in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198.

The Department of Justice is DIRECTED to resolve on the merits,

within sixty (60) days from notice of this decision, the petitioners'
petition for the review of the Joint Resolution of Investigating
Prosecutor Ramon Gerona and thereafter to file the appropriate
motion or pleading in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198, which
respondent Judge Asuncion shall then resolve in light of Crespo vs.
Mogul, Soliven vs. Makasiar, People vs. Inting, Lim vs. Felix,Allado
vs. Diokno, and Webb vs. De Leon.

In the meantime, respondent Judge Asuncion is DIRECTED to

cease and desist from further proceeding with Criminal Case No.
Q-93-43198 and to defer the issuances of warrants of arrest
against the petitioners.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.