Colonel Robert D.

Hyde,
Colonel Mark D. Kelly, and
Colonel William F. Andrews, U.S. Air Force

Counterfactual: pertaining to, or expressing, what has not in fact happened,

but might, could, or would, in different conditions.
—Oxford English Dictionary

Colonel Robert D. Hyde, U.S. Air

Force, is the vice commander of the
Air Force Inspection Agency at Kirtland
T HIS ARTICLE IS COUNTERFACTUAL, but is based on accounts of
Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan. Although intended to last only
72 hours, Operation Anaconda took place from 2 to 16 March 2002. It was
Air Force Base, New Mexico. He has a a coalition attempt to clear Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces from the Khowst-
B.S. from the U.S. Air Force Academy,
an M.A.S. from Emery Riddle Aero- Gardez region in Afghanistan before they could organize a spring offensive
nautical University, and M.S. degrees against the interim Afghan government of Hamid Karzai. Anaconda involved
from the Air Command and Staff Col- special operations forces (SOF) from the United States and six other nations
lege and the National War College.
He has served in various command fighting alongside about 1,400 conventional U.S. ground troops in a com-
and staff positions in the continental plex, high altitude, non-linear battlefield. The battle between U.S. troops and
United States and in Operations Iraqi
Freedom and Enduring Freedom.
Taliban/Al-Qaeda was the largest ground engagement of Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF) and took place at elevations over 10,000 feet.
Colonel Mark D. Kelley, U.S. Air Force,
is the vice commander of the 366th This article describes how an Anaconda-like operation might have occurred
Fighter Wing at Mountain Home Air by applying employment lessons from earlier phases of OEF as well as les-
Force Base, Idaho. He holds a B.A. sons from the actual event. This narrative is one of many possible versions
from Southwest Texas State Univer-
sity, a Master of National Security and benefits from the clarity of hindsight and the clarifying direction of joint
Studies degree from the National War and service doctrine. The lessons of Operation Anaconda are not merely aca-
College, and an M.S. from the Air
Command and Staff College.
demic. The U.S. lost eight brave warriors and numerous others were wounded
during more than two weeks of intense fighting. The authors hope this story
Colonel William F. Andrews, U.S. Air
Force, is on the faculty of the National and its approach to learning honor the brave Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and
War College at Fort McNair, Wash- Marines who fought heroically in the Shah-i-Kot Valley in March 2002.
ington, D.C. He holds a B.S. from the
U.S. Air Force Academy and an M.S.
from the University of Alabama and is December 2001:
a graduate of the Air Command and OEF Lessons Learned Conference
Staff College, the School of Advanced
Airpower Studies, and the Industrial
In December 2001, U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Army personnel from bases,
College of the Armed Forces. ships, and command centers throughout the Middle East met at the U.S.
_____________ Navy’s 5th Fleet headquarters in Bahrain for a lessons-learned conference.
(This is counterfactual. In reality, although U.S. Air Forces, Central Com-
PHOTO: U.S. Marine Corps (USMC)
CPL Jose A. Aguilera, 13th Marine mand hosted a Tactics Review Board, there was no Joint Forces Command-
Expeditionary Unit, Special Opera- wide hotwash of OEF ops.)
tions Capable, provides security as
a USMC CH-53E Super Stallion
The attendees had just completed months of planning, controlling, and
helicopter prepares for a mission in fighting in OEF, a SOF and air-centric offensive to take down Osama Bin
support of Operation Anaconda, in Laden’s Al-Qaeda network and culpable Taliban theocracy in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan, as part of Operation
Enduring Freedom, 10 March 2002. The campaign had been a swift and overwhelming success, but like every
(USMC, SGT Nathan J. Ferbert) military operation, there were lessons to be learned. These Soldiers, Sailors,

68 September-October 2008  MILITARY REVIEW

 SHAH-I-KOT

ACRONYMS
ACCE air component coordinating element
Aco airspace control order
ASOC air support operations center
AAGS Army Air-Ground System
A2C2 Army airspace command and control
BCD battlefield coordination detachment

U.S. Army, SPC David Marck Jr.

BP blocking positions
C2 command and control
CAOC combined air operations center
CAS close air support
CFACC coalition forces air component commander
CFLCC coalition forces land component commander
CJTF Combined Joint Task Force
CSAR combat search and rescue
FAC-A forward air controllers-airborne
HUMINT human intelligence Soldiers with 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment,
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 101st Airborne Division, scan a ridgeline for enemy move-
JFC Joint Forces Command ment during Operation Anaconda in March 2002.
JIC joint intelligence cell
JSOA joint special operations area
LZ landing zone it was needed. Attaching a USAF combat controller
QRF quick reaction forces to every OEF SOF A-Team had enabled close coor-
SOCC special operations component commander dination across a dynamic, nonlinear battlefield.
SOLE special operations liaison elements
TACP tactical air control party With their in-depth knowledge of both airpower
TAD tactical air direction and special operations, these combat controllers
TAC terminal air controller
TACS Theater Air Control System
ensured air support during the first months of OEF.
TAGS Theater Air-Ground System However, the coalition forces air component com-
TOT time-on-target mander (CFACC), land component commander
(CFLCC) and special operations component com-
mander (CFSOCC) all agreed that upcoming OEF
Airmen, and Marines spent four days in Bahrain stabilization operations would use more conven-
assessing OEF operations from Mazar-i-Sharif to tional ground forces. In the event that these forces
Kabul and Kandahar and identifying key areas for were challenged, they would need an increased
improvement in planning and execution. They also level of air support and thus a more robust Theater
debriefed recent operations from the Spin Ghar and Air-Ground System (TAGS). Both the CFLCC and
White Mountain ranges, better known as Tora Bora. the CFACC directed their staffs to build plans for
The warfighters identified two primary lessons from bringing the Army Air-Ground System (AAGS) and
the first few months of OEF: 1) the importance the Air Force Theater Air Control System (TACS)
of joint component coordination in planning and to full capability in the near future. (This is coun-
execution; and 2) the necessity of dedicated and terfactual. There was no evidence of a perception
capable ground troops to block Taliban/Al-Qaeda that future operations would require full TAGS
egress routes. capability. On 23 February 2002 when the CFACC
The ground component of SOF and Marines in was first briefed on Anaconda five days before the
close coordination with the air component had per- operation’s planned start date, the CFACC began to
formed spectacularly in OEF. One of their success piece together the Air Force’s portion of the TAGS,
enablers was the use of first-rate communications called the Theater Air Control System).
systems, laser designators, and precise coordinate-
generating equipment for targeting. These lessons Late December 2001:
were not lost on the Army’s conventional ground- Focus on Shah-i-Kot
force planners attending the Bahrain conference. While the Bahrain conference progressed, the
The conference also highlighted the importance Joint Force Commander’s (JFC’s) multi-spectral
of having highly trained Airmen work closely with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
ground forces to deliver airpower where and when assets persistently stared down on Afghanistan,

MILITARY REVIEW  September-October 2008 69

making it the most imaged piece of real estate on 6 January 2002:
the planet. National assets, E-8 JSTARS, RC-135s, Operation Boa Planning Begins
U-2s, EP-3s and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) CJTF Pinnacle set up operations at Bagram
combed the valleys and roadways near Tora Bora. Air Base, Afghanistan. The move from Karshi-
They revealed, and human intelligence (HUMINT) Khanabad Air Base, Uzbekistan, not only moved the
confirmed, numerous Taliban and Al-Qaeda survi- CJTF staff closer to the operation, but also avoided
vors of Tora Bora moving towards Gardez in the the problems of mounting political tension between
Paktia province. The JFC’s chief of intelligence, the the Uzbek and American governments. Each of the
Central Command J2, estimated that approximately force components sent personnel to Bagram to form
1,500 to 1,800 enemy fighters were converging on CJTF Pinnacle’s joint staff. CFSOCC, now the CJTF
the Shah-i-Kot valley in the Arma Mountain range Pinnacle commander, sent experienced O-6s and
in the same terrain that stymied Alexander the small staffs as Special Operations Liaison Elements
Great, the British, and most recently, the Soviets. It (SOLEs) to both the Combined Air Operations
appeared Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters intended to Center (CAOC) and the CFLCC’s headquarters.
stave off the American military from these moun- (This is counterfactual. Contrary to joint doc-
tains as well. That estimate was more than enough trine, the CFLCC established CJTF Mountain on 13
to spur the JFC to action. February 2002, commanded by the 10th Mountain
Division Commander. Contrary to joint doctrine,
5 January 2002: there was no J-staff for the JTF. There was also no
JFC Established CJTF Pinnacle significant change in liaison officer manning until
With President Karzai leading a new Afghan a few days prior to execution).
government and with the enemy on the run, the CJTF Pinnacle’s second order of business was to
JFC saw a tremendous opportunity to kill or capture resolve the disparity between varying enemy force
large numbers of Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters, and estimates and intentions. The CJTF/J-2 stood up a
perhaps even a few high value targets, at Shah-i- joint intelligence cell (JIC) at Bagram and, working
Kot. At the same time the JFC and his staff were closely with the entire joint force intelligence com-
in the initial stages of political, operational, and munity, built a collection and analysis plan to focus
logistical planning for a possible Iraq campaign. ISR forces on a 70-square-mile area. On 23 Janu-
The JFC wanted to keep significant pressure, ary 2002, the refined JIC estimate confirmed the
focus, and resources on Afghanistan and knew any earlier highest estimate of 1,500 to 1,800 fighters.
operation into the Arma Mountains would be led by Additionally, HUMINT sources believed Al-Qaeda
SOF and supported by air and conventional ground and Taliban forces intended to stay and fight for the
forces. With this in mind, the JFC established Shah-i-Kot valley by holding key high ground and
Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Pinnacle under transit routes to their bases in Pakistan’s Federally
the command of CFSOCC to focus specifically on Administered Tribal Area. The high enemy estimate
the mission at Shah-i-Kot. The JFC’s initial order and its intention to stay and fight were catalysts for
established CJTF Pinnacle’s mission and a joint Pinnacle planners to choose the “heavy” option
special operations area (JSOA), assigned forces, for their nascent campaign plan, taking shape as
and defined supported and supporting relationships Operation Boa. (Counterfactual. In reality, the
with the other component commanders. CJTF Pin- discrepancy between enemy force estimates was
nacle was now the primary focus of the OEF forces. never resolved and little work was done to build a
(This is counterfactual. The JFC’s 5 January 2002 plan if the enemy chose the most dangerous course
FRAGO directed the CFLCC—not CFSOCC—to of action—staying and fighting.)
develop a concept of operations to kill/capture the By 1 February 2002, planners saw Operation
forces believed to be gathering near Gardez. The Boa as a large force operation requiring significant
FRAGO did not establish a CJTF or define the area coordination, integration and synchronization of the
of operations (AO). Most important, the FRAGO unique capabilities of each combined force compo-
did not establish clear supported or supporting nent. Most important, with the first large-scale use
relationships with the component commanders.) of conventional ground forces, CJTF Pinnacle and

70 September-October 2008  MILITARY REVIEW

 SHAH-I-KOT

the component commanders clearly understood the

need for comprehensive joint planning and execu-
tion, the likes of which had not yet been required
in OEF. The first step was to identify requirements.
(Counterfactual. 23 February 2002 was the first
time the CFACC was briefed on the extent of the air
component support required for Anaconda, sched-
uled to begin five days later on 28 February 2002.)
Two narratives influenced CJTF planners in the
requirements phase. First, allied Afghan ground
commanders relayed stories about the Soviet
Union’s experience in Shah-i-Kot, where the muja-
hedeen drew 200 to 250 Russian soldiers into close
combat and stoned them to death. To avoid this sce-

U.S. Air Force

nario, planners wanted to use overwhelming force
from air and ground forces. CJTF Pinnacle planners
estimated that 200 SOF, 1,600 conventional ground A U.S. Air Force controller during Operation Anaconda.
troops, and 1,000 allied Afghan troops supported
by 24/7 close air support (CAS) coverage were AAGS meant ensuring the command and control,
needed for Boa. The introduction of 12 A-10s and air traffic control, airspace management, and fire
24 AH-64s, along with 1600 conventional troops support coordination pieces of Army airspace com-
would strain the old Soviet base and its support mand and control activities were fully functional.
structure to the limit. (Counterfactual. The eight (See Army FM 3-52, Army Airspace Command and
available AH-64s were actually tasked by CJTF Control in a Combat Zone, 1 August 2002, Chapter
Mountain as emergency CAS only. Also, A-10s were 2.) The CFLCC ensured that the assigned division
initially based in Kuwait and then forward deployed and brigade Tactical Air Control Parties (TACPs)
to Bagram four days into the operation.) were in theater and ready for Boa and that the
Bagram’s precious ramp space would also be Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) at the
needed to support the airlift cycles required to CAOC was correctly sized and trained.
deliver personnel, ordnance, equipment, and fuel Although many parts of the TACS were fully
for Boa. (Counterfactual. Because there was inad- functional during the first months of OEF, the
equate joint component coordination and plan- CFACC’s part of the robust TAGS plan required
ning, the logistics requirements to support the air three key changes. First, the CFACC established
operation were not planned for. Only the ingenuity an air support operations center (ASOC) at Bagram
and flexibility of the joint warfighters made the to coordinate air support requests and conduct
operation possible.) time-sensitive targeting within the joint special
The second narrative that heavily influenced operations area (JSOA). (See Air Force Doctrine
CJTF Pinnacle planners was the success of SOF and Document 2-1.7, Airspace Control in the Combat
airpower during the first months of OEF. SOF teams Zone, 13 July 2005, 37.)
had refined this working relationship to a deadly art Second, the CFACC sent an Air Force general
but lacked the blocking power to cover the Shah-i- officer to CJTF Pinnacle’s headquarters as the head
Kot escape routes. The conventional ground force of an air component coordinating element (ACCE)
had the manpower and firepower to block the escape tasked with integrating air and space operations
routes but needed to resolve several coordination within the CJTF and the overall joint force. The
and equipment issues to fully integrate with the AACE focused on exchanging current intelligence,
air assets. The component commander’s plan for a operational data, and support requirements with the
robust TAGS now paid off. Using that plan, CJTF CJTF staff, and on coordinating CFACC require-
Pinnacle requested additional personnel and equip- ments for airspace coordinating measures, joint
ment from the JFC. For the Army, building up the fire support coordinating measures, and close air

MILITARY REVIEW  September-October 2008 71

support. (See Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.7, enemy concentrations, mortar positions, and likely
Airspace Control in the Combat Zone, 13 July escape routes. Using this information, planners
2005, 31.) determine the best SOF insertion points and task
The final requirement for the TACS was a fully ISR assets to monitor for enemy activity prior to
functional air request network integrated with the the insertion. UAVs form an outer cordon to search
components of the Air Force TACS and Army AAGS. for leakers heading east from Shah-i-Kot.
The CFACC worked closely with the CFLCC and “The SOF insertion takes place 24 hours prior to
CJTF Pinnacle to ensure TAGS organization. Person- initial airstrikes at H-Hour. SOF teams observe the
nel and communications infrastructures were in place entire list of preplanned targets Shah-i-Kot valley
by 17 February 2002. (Counterfactual. The CFACC and relay any additional targets to JSTARS, ASOC,
did work closely with CFLCC and CJTF Mountain to and CAOC. CAS assets are airborne during the
get the best TAGS possible after 23 February 2002). SOF infil and CSAR forces are on alert at Bagram.
The air-ground concept of operations, while not After insertion, AC-130s remain over the objec-
new to CJTF Pinnacle, called for ground command- tive at night then pass the mission to A-10s before
ers to submit air support requests through their sunrise to keep CAS firepower over SOF teams in
assigned tactical air control parties to the air support the Boa JSOA.
operations center at Bagram, which would prioritize “At H-Hour, air interdiction strikes begin on 53
and coordinate with the CAOC in Saudi Arabia to JFC-approved targets to reduce the risk to U.S.
provide airpower. Due to the high terrain in the troops if the enemy chooses a defense in depth,
JSOA, the ASOC would need help from JSTARS the most dangerous enemy course of action. . . .”
for C3 and air request relay. Terminal air control- (Counterfactual. Only seven of 66 approved tar-
lers and forward air controllers-airborne (FAC-As) gets were approved for pre-infil airstrike due to the
would control assigned aircraft and give weapons CFLCC’s desire to conduct sensitive site exploita-
release authority within the JSOA for CAS and tion. Half of the planned pre-infil airstrikes did not
defensive fires. Preplanned strikes for air interdiction occur because un-briefed ground forces directed the
targets would be cleared through the CENTCOM aircrews to abort their bomb runs.)
target approval board. (Counterfactual. CAS C2 and “Although the JFC approved 66 targets for
weapons release procedures were not thoroughly pre-infil bombing, CJTF Pinnacle will conduct
understood by all Anaconda players and had not sensitive site exploitation on 13 of the 66 targets.
been tested in such a robust combat environment The targets include enemy encampments spread
prior to Anaconda.) over a large area, pinpoint firing positions, cave
By early February 2002, CJTF Pinnacle and the entrances, and landing zones. GBU-31 joint direct
component commanders had refined the enemy esti- attack munitions (JDAMs) can strike most of them.
mate, determined force and logistics requirements, Some can be destroyed by airburst M117s and
drafted a new airspace control order and started dispenser munitions, but a few require the greater
augmentation of the TAGS. (Counterfactual. None penetration of the 5,000‑pound GBU-28 or the near-
of this was done by early February 2002.) horizontal entry provided by laser-guided GBU-24s.
With this critical planning and C2 infrastructure To safely accomplish the strikes in minimal time,
in place, CJTF Pinnacle planners turned their atten- aircraft comply with strict time-on-target (TOT)
tion to the detailed concept of operations (CONOP) windows, operating altitudes, and egress routes.
for Operation Boa. Strike aircraft check-in with AWACS to get major
situation updates (e.g., weather delay, aircraft fall-
Boa CONOP Refinement out, target changes) then get pushed to JSTARS
CJTF Pinnacle planners, working closely with for the real-time Boa JSOA update immediately
component staffs, developed the following CONOP prior to their attack runs on the interdiction targets.
for Boa: If SOF teams are not in pre-briefed positions, or
“Seven days prior to Boa’s H-Hour, ISR assets need to add or remove a target, SOF representa-
conduct intelligence preparation of the battlefield, tives onboard JSTARS inform the CAOC and the
combing the Shah-i-Kot Mountains to find and fix ASOC via the SOLE. The CAOC retains control of

72 September-October 2008  MILITARY REVIEW

 SHAH-I-KOT

the strike aircraft until the end of the

TOT window.
“The next movement in Operation
Boa is the Afghan army force’s move
to Phase Line Emerald west of “the

U.S. Marine Corps, CWO2 William D. Crow

Whale,” the western boundary of
the Shah-i-Kot Valley. The Afghan
hammer force, accompanied by U.S.
SOF with TACPs, is the main effort
of Operation Boa. The hammer force
separates into a north and a south
component and holds at Phase Line
Emerald until the air interdiction
strikes are complete. A Minnesota Air National Guard C-130 Hercules aircraft waits to be unloaded on
the airfield at Bagram, Afghanistan in support of Operation Anaconda, 11 March
“The first weapons are laser- 2002. A U.S. Air Force C-17A Globemaster III is parked in the background.
guided bombs from F-15Es on 12
mountainside caves to kill Al-Qaeda/Taliban fight- enemy encampments in the valley. This main attack
ers and close the entrances with laser-guided bombs. will force the enemy to stay, fight, and die, or attempt
AC-130s monitor the cave strikes and engage escape into the deadly fire of the BP forces and CAS.
enemy leakers attempting to escape. B‑52s destroy “U.S. and coalition SOF will form an outer
enemy encampment areas with airburst JDAMs, cordon along choke points to the east of Shah-i-
Wind-Corrected Munitions Dispensers, and strings Kot valley and the seven BPs. Paired with terminal
of M117s. U.S. Navy fighters and USAF F-16s air controllers, these forces will engage enemy
employ JDAMs on enemy fighting positions and forces who escape the main effort and bypass BPs.
airburst JDAMs on insertion LZs immediately prior Combat operations will terminate when the Shah-i-
to the air assault. At the end of the 30‑minute TOT Kot valley is cleared of enemy fighters and secure.
window, the strike force moves out of the immediate Operation Boa should last no more than one week.”
area to refuel and await follow-on CAS tasking from
the forward air controllers (FACs). Ground com- Deception Plan:
manders assume weapons release authority and the Operation Python
ASOC gains control of the CAS aircraft marshaled With a new TAGS system established for CJTF
in the JSOA after the air interdiction TOT window. Pinnacle, new U.S. conventional ground troops oper-
“After 30 minutes of airstrikes, blocking forces ating new equipment in an extremely tight airspace
from the 101st Airborne Division and 10th Mountain structure and a new aircraft carrier on station, com-
Division air assault into seven landing zones on the mencing Operation Boa from a “cold start” was an
eastern upslope of the Shah-i‑Kot valley and move operational risk that CJTF Pinnacle and the compo-
to designated blocking positions (BPs). A-10s and nent commanders wanted to mitigate. They needed a
AH-64s escort the force to the LZs and, along with mission rehearsal for their significantly more capable
AC-130s, provide CAS. The AH-64 Apaches remain and complex joint fighting force prior to facing 1,500
in radio and visual contact with the insertion heli- seasoned fighters at Shah-i-Kot. (Counterfactual.
copter force until they egress clear of the JSOA. The There was no mission rehearsal and no deception
AC-130s remain overhead the SOF forces while the plan. Operation Python is purely fictional.)
A-10s assume FAC-A  responsibilities and establish They also realized this rehearsal presented them
communications with the terminal air controllers at with a triple opportunity. First, the rehearsal would
each BP. With the “anvil” force in place and with use the exact personnel, equipment, timeline, air-
airspace, communications, and FAC-A control estab- space, and TAGS structure as Boa. It would expose
lished, the Afghan “hammer” force executes a pincer the task force to mountainous operations and allow
tactic around the north and south ends of the whale evaluation of the Afghan ally’s responsiveness and
and moves to contact in the vicinity of three known the overall soundness of the Boa plan. Second, the

MILITARY REVIEW  September-October 2008 73

rehearsal would be part of a comprehensive decep- ler (JTAC) communications were established with
tion plan designed to inject ambiguity about the time A-10 FAC-As and the ASOC pushed strike aircraft
and location of Operation Boa. The purpose of the to cycle through the different FAC-As and JTACs
plan was to draw forces and focus away from Shah- through the Python AO on simulated, and a few
i-Kot, induce a false sense of security at Shah-i-Kot, real-world, 9-line CAS attacks. The A-10s and
and shorten the enemy’s reaction time when the JTACs had to sort through several instances of “who
real operation was discovered. Third, the rehearsal owned which aircraft when” but the air control plan
would be a real-world operation north of Jalalabad worked well through the day.
on Afghanistan’s eastern border with Pakistan to look After an hour of air control, the SF-supported
for small pockets of Taliban/Al-Qaeda. The Jalalabad Afghan force began their move southward. The
operation would be called Operation Python. SF officers assigned to the Afghan force knew
that Python was a prelude to Boa and a post-Tora
18 February 2002: Bora evaluation of the Afghan force. AC-130s
Operation Python Execution established contact with the Afghan force as it
The pre-infil ISR results for Python resulted in moved into the Jalalabad valley. After two days of
two changes to the plan. First, the air assault landing movement-to-contact and additional air control,
zone was moved due to increased activity detected the Python force was extracted back to Bagram.
in a nearby village. Several cave entrances were also Lessons would be rolled into the Boa plan that was
marked for exploitation due to infrared signature and scheduled in less than two weeks.
detection of communication signals. High mountain Operation Python resulted in some sporadic
wind turbulence delayed the SOF insertion for five engagements with Taliban who had uncharacteris-
hours but proceeded well after the delay. However, tically fled north to Jalalabad after Tora Bora. The
the pair of AC-130s assigned to cover the SOF infil operation enabled all players to build their situa-
were already airborne on a normal OEF air traffic tional awareness about Operation Boa’s operational
operations (ATO) cycle, resulting in a requirement to timeline and relative position of friendly forces in
hand off the infil coverage to other AC-130s and to the JSOA. (This is counterfactual. These lessons
conduct extensive airborne coordination between the were learned during and after Anaconda.)
aircraft and C3 nodes. The new AC-130s established More importantly, Operation Python had veri-
communications with the SOF teams and then handed fied the basic logistics and coordination of the Boa
off coverage to A-10s out of Bagram before daybreak. plan and highlighted stress points within the tight
The Python airspace structure was specifically airspace and C3. Several problems with the TAGS
designed to constrain strike aircraft in prepara- were identified and fixed, including adding tactical
tion for Boa. Interdiction targets for Python were air direction (TAD) frequencies so each JTAC had
limited to the air assault LZs, which were easily a discreet TAD; clarifying rules of engagement for
hit. Although not planning to engage other targets, air interdiction strikes with SOF in close proximity;
remaining strike aircraft flowed into the Python refining the roles and responsibilities of the AWACS,
AO on assigned timelines and altitudes to exercise JSTARS, ASOC, and CAOC during mission execu-
airspace control measures. While deconfliction tion; and specifying how CSAR and quick reaction
issues arose due to strike platforms’ varying turn forces would be tasked and controlled.
performance in tight airspace close to the Pakistan
border, these issues were resolved quickly. 2 March 2002:
The CH-47 troop carriers departed Bagram with Operation Boa Execution
their escorting AH-64s to the Python AO. A-10s CJTF Pinnacle and component commanders were
waited over the Python AO for the conventional ready to execute Operation Boa on 28 February
force as Predator drones and AC‑130s focused their 2002. The ISR force had intensely imaged the JSOA
sensors on the LZs. Unfortunately, one soldier was for the preceding seven days, focusing on target
injured at the second LZ and required extraction and LZ locations. The intelligence preparation of
from the area by combat search and rescue (CSAR) the battlefield confirmed the enemy estimate and
and Medevac forces. All joint tactical air control- gave planners high confidence in the location of

74 September-October 2008  MILITARY REVIEW

 SHAH-I-KOT

enemy forces, likely escape routes, firing positions, blocking positions. Those that reached the block-
and cave entrances. Operation Boa was delayed ing forces along the exit routes were captured or
two days due to adverse weather in the Shah-i- killed. A few enemy troops who knew the terrain
Kot Mountains. SOF team infiltration proceeded well attempted to escape via remote donkey trails
on schedule with AC-130 coverage. The teams or “rat lines” leading through the valley. With SOF
observed the area and the 53 interdiction targets, eyes and an ISR umbrella scanning every square
and reported back to JSTARS that all targets were foot of the Shah-i-Kot valley, these fighters were
cleared for interdiction strike. The SOF-supported spotted and engaged by the outer cordon of SOF and
Afghan hammer force moved as planned and held CAS airstrikes. In one instance, a B-52 aborted its
at Phase Line Emerald. bomb run 10 seconds prior to release when a civilian
At H-30 minutes, F‑15Es hit all 12 caves with airliner flew directly under its bomb release point.
one requiring immediate restrike due to a weapon The CAOC staff worked with civilian air traffic
malfunction. All pre-planned LZs, enemy encamp- control authorities to re-route traffic around the
ments, and fixed fighting positions were hit as well. JSOA enabling the bomber to reattack the enemy
However, one of the airburst JDAMs failed to fighters after a 10-minute delay.
detonate on an LZ, forcing the use of an alternate
LZ due to unexploded ordnance. 4 March 2002: Objective Gilligan
At H-Hour, the strike force flowed out of the area As the Afghan hammer force was mopping up
as the blocking force infil began. AH-64s swept the last fighters in the three valley villages, and
over the LZs in front of the Chinooks while Predator the outer cordon SOF were killing and capturing
UAVs, A-10s, and AC-130s monitored the infil from leakers, a SOF team was inserted at Objective Gil-
directly overhead. One CH-47 aborted a landing ligan, a southern Shah-i-Kot BP. (This part of the
due to unexpected ground fire. Fortunately, both narrative is loosely based on the actual events on
the Predator and AC-130 located the firing position, Robert’s Ridge, also known as Objective Ginger
which was neutralized by the AC-130 and AH-64s. or Takur Ghar.)
After a 10-minute delay, the CH-47 returned to Several cave entrances on this mountain were
the LZ and uneventfully disembarked troops. At in the group of 13 reserved targets because intel-
another LZ, a ranger was injured fast-roping into ligence sources believed there was a high prob-
rough terrain. As in Python, a Medevac team was ability of high-value Al-Qaeda leadership hiding
called to extract the Soldier. A-10s escorted the there. Twenty-four hours of persistent ISR coverage
Medevac H-60 into the LZ and monitored the showed significant enemy activity near the planned
extraction. infil point so the SOF team inserted lower on the
Although all JTACs established radio contact ridge and moved by foot. (The initial SOF team
with the A-10 FAC-As, one JTAC radio lost its landed high on the ridge, unaware of intel given
crypto load, requiring calls in the clear using pre- to the CJTF Mountain HQ hours earlier showing
briefed code words. Several A-10s responded to significant enemy activity in the area.)
calls for suppressing fire and the ASOC pushed Throughout the night, moderate-to-heavy fire
Navy attack aircraft and a B-52 to work with from small arms, Dishka machine guns, and mortar
FAC-As and JTACS. Most targets were enemy attacks was quelled by the bravery and effective tac-
mortar tubes, which were quickly located through tics of the SOF team, an embedded JTAC, a ranger
night vision goggles and infrared sensors and quick reaction team and Army, Navy, Air Force,
engaged by air assets. and Marines air assets that provided CAS around
With the anvil force in place, the Afghan hammer the clock. By noon on 5 March 2002, Objective
force executed the double-envelopment. During Gilligan was secured, dozens of the enemy were
this maneuver, they called for fires from airstrikes. killed, and several were captured. Unfortunately,
Pressured from both the north and south, many one U.S. SOF Soldier was killed in action and eight
Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces attempted to flee other U.S. Soldiers were injured.
eastward out of the valley. Airstrikes engaged Operation Boa continued for two more days as
and killed scores of them before they reached the small pockets of fighters were killed or captured,

MILITARY REVIEW  September-October 2008 75

and sensitive site exploitation was conducted. Heli- BCD, etc.) at the JTF and component headquarters
copters extracted the anvil force back to Bagram. ensured clear communication and unity of effort
The Afghan hammer force left a small company for both planning and execution. Standing up a JIC
to hold the valley as the rest of the Afghan forces and focusing ISR ensured refinement of disparate
returned to Gardez. intelligence assessments and established accurate
estimates of enemy strength and intentions.
Conclusion The combined planning effort built a universally
Operation Boa was a tactical and operational understood CONOP, utilizing overwhelming force
success. The commander’s objective was attained: to engage worst-case enemy strength, tactics, and
hundreds of Al-Qaeda and Taliban troops, includ- intentions. By employing a new theater air ground
ing several top lieutenants, were killed and scores system with a new conventional ground force in
were taken prisoner. Although no high-value targets a constrained airspace structure, the Operation
were discovered, several key pieces of intelligence Python mission rehearsal increased JTF command
were gathered that aided CJTF Pinnacle in follow- and control capabilities, interoperability, situational
on operations. awareness, and confidence while also serving as a
The initial key to success was the establishment key part of an integrated deception plan. In the end,
a Joint Task Force with a clear command structure weeks of JTF planning, close coordination, and
and well defined supported/supporting relationships employment had developed a confident, capable,
that ensured unity of command. Establishing liaison and synergistic joint air and ground team for Opera-
and coordination elements (SOLE, ACCE, ASOC, tion Boa. MR

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76 September-October 2008  MILITARY REVIEW