Radiola Toshiba Philippines Inc. vs.

The Intermediate Apellate Court

Facts:

The petitioner obtained a levy on the attachment against the properties of Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita
Gatmaytan un Civil case o. 35946 for collection of sum of money before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II,
Pasig, Metro Manila. A few months later three creditors filed another petition against Gatmaytan and Teresita
Gatmaytan for involuntary insolvency, docketed as special proceedings No. 1548 of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga and Angeles city.

A favorable judgment was obtained of by the petitioner in Civil case No. 35946. The court ordered for the
consolidation of ownership of petitioner over said property but respondent sheriff of Angeles City refused to issue a final
ceritificate of sale because of the pending insolvency proceedings.

Court of First Instance of Angeles City and Intermediate Appellate Court rules against petitioner

Issue:

Whether or not the levy on attachment in favor of petitioner in dissolved by the insolvency proceedings against
respondents commenced for months after the said attachment.

Held:

Section 32 (of the Insolvency Law). As soon as an assignee is elected or appointed and qualified, the clerk of court
shall, by an instrument under his hand and seal of the court, assign and convey to the assignee all the real and personal
property, estate and effects of the debtor with all his deeds, books and papers relating thereto, and such assignment
shall relate back to the commencement of the proceedings in insolvency, and shall relate back to the acts upon the
adjudication was founded, and by operation of law shall vest the title to all such property, estate and effects in the
assignee, although the same is then attached in mesne process, as the property of debtor. Such assignment shall
operate to vest in the assignee all of the estate of the insolvent debtor not exempt by law from execution. It shall
dissolved any attachment levied within one month next preceding the commencement of the insolvency proceedings
and vacate and set aside any judgment entered in any action commenced within thirty days immediately prior to the
commencement of insolvency proceedings and shall set aside any judgment entered by default or consent of the debtor
within thirty days immediately prior to the commencement of insolvency proceedings.

Section 79. When an attachment has been made and is not dissolved before the commencement of proceedings
in insolvency, or is dissolved by an undertaking given by the defendant, if the claim upon which attachment suit was
commenced is proved against the estate of the debtor, the plaintiff may prove the legal costs and disbursements of the
suit, and in keeping of the property, and the amount thereof shall be a preferred debt.

There is no conflicts between the two provisions.

Statutory Construction; where a statute is susceptible of more than one interpretation, court should adopt such
reasonable and beneficial construction as will render the provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with
each other. – but even granting that such conflicts exists, it may be stated that in construing a statute, courts should
adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of the statute, if at all possible. This rule is expressed in the
maxim, ut magis valeat quam pereat or that construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute –
its every word, hence when a statute is susceptible of more than one interpretation, the court should adopt such
reasonable and beneficial construction as will render the provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with
each other.
Hannah Eunice serana vs sandiganbayan and POP

Fact:
Petitioner was a senior student of the University of the Philippines-Cebu was appointed by then President Joseph
Estrada as a student regent of UP. petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in
UP Diliman. petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the
Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI). One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the
Vinzons Hall Annex. President Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance
for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds, according to the information, was the Office of the President. The
renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. The succeeding student regent, consequently filed a complaint
for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman who after due investigation, found
probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother for estafa in the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the
offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent, enumerates the crimes or offenses over which
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. It has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa that It only has jurisdiction over crimes
covered by Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction. Petitioner likewise posited that as a student regent, she was not a public officer since she merely
represented her peers, She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or funds. The
Ombudsman opposed the motion. The Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for lack of merit. The Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration which was also denied with finality, hence this case.

Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan has Jurisdiction over the Petitioner who is not Salary Grade 27, not compensated and
merely represented her peers in the Board of Regent, and the crime committed was not within the its Jurisdiction.

Held: Yes, The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible construction so as to
avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et
absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted.
Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their office.
We see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No.
1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the
offense is committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and
that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.

It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The court held that while the first
part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other
executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law
placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is
placed there by express provision of law. Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with
jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed
out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation By express mandate
of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
Elena Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas, Petitioners
Vs.
Hon. Court of Appeals and Hon. Raymundo Seva, Judge of Branch 38 of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Norte and
William Guerra, Respondents
G.R. No. 78687, January 31, 1989

Facts:

Florencia H. De Enciso and Miguel Enciso owned a property which was formerly covered by Original Certificate Title
(OCT) No. P-1248, issued by virtue of Free Patent Application No. 192765. The Original Certificate of Title was inscribed
in the registration book for the province of Camarines Norte on December 10, 1961.

On February 28, 1970, the patentees, the Enciso spouses, by an Absolute Deed of Sale, sold the property in favor of the
petitioners, the spouses, Elena Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas for a consideration of P900. Petitioner Elena is a
daughter of the Encisos.

Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8104 of the Register of Deeds of Camarines Norte was issued in the name of the
Salenillas, cancelling the OCT in the name of the Enciso.

On June 30, 1971, the petitioners mortgaged the property with the Rural Bank of Daet, Inc. the petitioner was able to
pay the loan for the amount of P1000. Later on, December 4, 1975, the petitioners mortgaged the property in PNB as a
security for the loan of P2500.

However, petitioners failed to pay the loan. Extrajudicial Foreclosure of the mortgage was instituted by PNB and the
property was sold at a public auction. Private respondent William Guerra emerged as the highest bidder.

On August 17, 1983, PNB filed with RTC of Camarines Norte at Daet. A motion for writ of attachment in favor of the
private respondent. However, petitioners refused to vacate the land and instead offered to repurchase the property by
virtue of Section 119 of the Public Land Act.

Trial Court issued an alias writ of attachment. The petitioners moved for a motion of consideration but were denied.

The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. The respondent Trial Court Judge, according to petitioner, acted with
grave abuse of discretion. Court of Appeals dismissed the case for lack of merit. According to Court of Appeals, the
transfer of property from the parent to the child for a nominal sum was not the conveyance contemplated by the law.

Issue:

Whether or Not the petitioners have the right to repurchase the contested property under Section 119 of the Public
Land Act.

Held:

Yes. The Petitioners have the right to repurchase the property under "Section 119 of the Public Land Act. Every
conveyance of land acquired under the free patent of homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to
repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs within a period of 5 years from the date of re conveyance."

It is clear that only three types of persons are bestowed the right to repurchase that is the applicant, his widow and legal
heirs. Elena Salenillas is a legal heir of the Enciso being their daughter.

The provision makes no distinction between the legal heirs. The distinction made by respondent contravenes the very
purpose of the act. Between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law shall prevail.
B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR v. GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, (G)

G.R. No. 93177, August 2, 1991

FACTS:

The petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged participation in
the failed coup d' etat that took place on December 1 to 9, 1989.

January 14, 1990, a Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel had been constituted pursuant to Office Order No. 16 to
investigate the petitioners.

January 30, 1990, the PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena individually addressed to the petitioners. The petitioners
acknowledged receipt of a copy of the charge sheet, sworn statements of witnesses, and death and medical certificates
of victims of the rebellion. At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the proceedings on various grounds,
prompting the PTI Panel to grant them 10 days to file their objections in writing through a Motion for Summary
Dismissal.

February 27,1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the petitioners 5 days to submit their respective counter-
affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses.

May 15, 1990, the petitioners manifested that they were exercising their right to raise peremptory challenges against
the president and members of GCM No.14 by invoking Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408. GCM No. 14 ruled, however, that
peremptory challenges had been discontinued under P.D. No.39.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners can manifest the right to peremptory challenge.

HELD:

Yes, the petitioners have the right to peremptory challenge. The right to peremptory challenge was originally provided
under Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War).

November 7,1972, when President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing the Creation, Composition, Jurisdiction,
Procedure, and other matters relevant to military Tribunals). This decree disallowed the peremptory challenge.

January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the termination of the state of martial law
throughout the Philippines. With the termination of martial law and the dissolution of the military tribunals created
there under, the reason for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically.

It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante
rationelegis, cessat ipsa lex. Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in
P.D. No. 39 became ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of Proclamation
No.2045, As a result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now again
allows the right to peremptory challenge.