Republic of the Philippines (25) meters, he saw Moronia walking along a human trail in barangay

SUPREME COURT Amguhan, with his hands tied by a rope behind his back. Moronia was
Manila followed by accused Roluna, Carlos Daguing and five (5) other persons
whom he did not recognize. Accused Roluna was carrying an armalite
while Carlos Daguing was armed with a pistol. Frightened, Nogalada
SECOND DIVISION
immediately left the place. 3

G.R. No. 101797 March 24, 1994

From that time on, both witnesses testified that Moronia was never seen
or heard from.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
At the trial, accused Roluna hoisted the defense of denial and alibi. Roluna
ABUNDIO ROLUNA, accused-appellant.
claimed that on May 24, 1984, Danilo Noroño, a cousin of his wife, went to
their house in barangay Amguhan. They were informed by Danilo that
CARLOS DAGUING, PATERNO DAGUING, MAMERTO ASMOLO, Iluminada Cortines y Noroño, his wife's grandmother, was bedridden and
TEODULFO DAGUING, FEDERICO SIMPRON, BIENVENIDO SIMPRON seriously ill. He and his wife immediately proceeded to Iluminada's house
and DIDOC BONGCALOS (all at large), accused. in barangay Banahaw, Baybay, Leyte. As soon as they arrived, he gathered
some herbal plants for Iluminada. He boiled these plants and regularly
applied them on Iluminada's body. He and his wife attended to Iluminada
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
for three (3) weeks. After Iluminada recuperated from her illness, they
returned to their home in barangay Amguhan. 4 His testimony was
Ernesto D. Labastida, Sr. for accused-appellant. corroborated in substance by his wife, Teresita Roluna and his
grandmother-in-law, Iluminada Cortines de Noroño.

Accused Roluna charged that prosecution witnesses Sombilon and

Nogalada, harboring ill-feelings against him, testified falsely and
PUNO, J.:
implicated him in the disappearance of Anatalio Moronia. He claimed that
in 1983, he and Sombilon had a dispute over a cara y cruz game held in
In an Information dated June 26, 1990, eight (8) persons were charged their barangay. Sombilon was then drunk and he, as chairman of the
with the crime of Kidnapping with Murder before the Regional Trial Court, Kabataang Barangay, tried to pacify Sombilon but the latter got mad at him.
Branch 14, Baybay, Leyte. 1 They were Abundio Roluna, Carlos Daguing, Since then, they have not talked with each other. Nogalada on the other
Paterno Daguing, Mamerto Asmolo, Teodulfo Daguing, Federico Simpron, hand, also had a grudge against him. In 1982, they had an altercation
Bienvenido Simpron and Didoc Bongcalos. The Information against them during a volleyball game held during the barangay fiesta. 5
reads:
After the trial, the court a quo promulgated its decision, 6 the dispositive
That on or about the 27th day of May, 1984, in the portion of which reads:
municipality of Baybay, Province of Leyte,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused Abundio
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
Roluna y Elhig guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with
complex crime of Kidnapping With Murder. As
(sic) one another, with the use of firearms and taking
kidnapping (and serious illegal detention) is
advantage of superior strength, did then and there
penalized with reclusion perpetua to death and
wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously hogtie and
murder with reclusion temporal in its maximum
kidnap one Anatalio Moronia and take him away to a
period to death, under Article 48 of the Code, the
place unknown up (to) this time whereat said victim
herein accused should be punished with the
was killed.
maximum of the more serious crime, hereat the
supreme penalty of death. Considering that the
CONTRARY TO LAW. Constitution of 1987 does not allow the imposition of
the death penalty, however, herein accused is hereby
sentenced to life imprisonment or reclusion
Only accused Abundio Roluna was arrested, tried and convicted. The other
perpetua, with the accessory penalties of the law, and
seven (7) accused remain at large.
to indemnify the heirs of Anatalio Moronia the sum of
P30,000.00. He is credited with the full period of his
The prosecution presented two (2) witnesses, namely, Conrado Sombilon detention in accordance with Article 29 of the
and Buenaventura Nogalada, both of whom were residents of barangay Revised Penal Code, as amended, except if he did not
Amguhan, Baybay, Leyte. sign an agreement to obey the prison laws, rules and
regulations at the inception.
CONRADO SOMBILON testified that on May 27, 1984, at around seven
o'clock in the morning, he was on his way to sitio Bungabungan in barangay SO ORDERED.
Amguhan to attend to the pasture of his carabao. At a distance of thirty (30)
meters, he saw his neighbor, Anatalio Moronia, stopped in his tracks and
Hence this appeal.
taken captive by accused Abundio Roluna. Roluna was then accompanied
by seven (7) other persons. viz: Didoc Bongcalos, Federico Simpron,
Bienvenido Simpron, Teodulfo Daguing, Carlos Daguing, Mamerto Asmolo In his brief, accused-appellant charges that the trial court erred in finding
and Paterno Daguing. Accused Roluna was armed with an armalite while him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping with
his companions were carrying short firearms. Using an abaca strip, he saw Murder. Accused-appellant points and stresses that the corpus delicti was
Carlos Daguing tie up the hands of Moronia at the back. Frightened, he did not duly proved by the prosecution. He submits, inter alia, that considering
not shout for help and proceeded on his way. With the exception of his wife, that the body of Anatalio Moronia was never found, Moronia's
he did not inform anyone about what he saw that fateful day. 2 questionable and unexplained absence and disappearance should not be
blamed on him for the alleged victim, in all probability, may still be alive.
BUENAVENTURA NOGALADA corroborated in substance the testimony of
Sombilon. He testified that on said day, at around nine o'clock in the In its brief, the People contends that the fact of Moronia's death and the
morning, he came from his farm in barangay Monterico, Baybay and was culpability of accused-appellant were sufficiently established by the
on his way home to barangay Amguhan. At a distance of about twenty-five
evidence. The People relies on the disputable presumption provided under him up all the way to the boat. While sailing, the accused continued ill-
Section 5 (x) (3), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, viz.: treating the victim until the latter died. The body of the victim was never
found.
The following shall be presumed dead for all
purposes, including the division of the estate among In this case, however, the prosecution witnesses testified that they merely
the heirs: saw one of the accused, Carlos Daguing, tie up the hands of Moronia. He
was then taken in the direction of barangay Monterico and was never seen
or heard from since. At no point during the trial was it ever established that
xxx xxx xxx
any of the eight (8) accused beat up Moronia or in any way laid a violent
hand on him. Nogalada even testified that he did not hear any shot fired by
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under any of the eight (8) armed accused 10 so as to warrant a reasonable
other circumstances and his existence has not been conclusion that Moronia was killed by accused-appellant or any of his co-
known for four (4) years. conspirators. Indeed, even the possible motive of accused-appellant and
his group for abducting Moronia was not definitively established. To be
sure, the circumstances proved are insufficient to produce a conviction
Undoubtedly, the victim, Moronia, was last seen on that fateful day of May
beyond reasonable doubt for the serious crime of kidnapping with murder.
27, 1984. During this time, Moronia, with his hands tied at the back, was
accompanied by eight (8) armed men. Clearly, he was then in danger of
death. Since that day until the date of the trial (or for a span of six years), There being no evidence to the contrary, the disputable presumption
Moronia has not been seen or heard from. The People urges that these under Section 5 (x) (3), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court would apply, but only
circumstances raised a presumption that Moronia has been killed by insofar as to establish the presumptive death of Moronia. Whether accused-
accused-appellant and his companions. appellant is responsible for the death of Moronia is a different matter. The
Rules did not authorize that from this disputable presumption of death, it
should be further presumed that the person with whom the absentee was
The pivotal issues are: (a) whether or not the circumstances proved by the
last seen shall be responsible for the subsequent unexplained
prosecution are sufficient to establish the death of Anatalio Moronia, and;
absence/disappearance of the latter. The conviction of accused-appellant
(b) if in the affirmative, whether or not accused-appellants and his
for the serious crime of kidnapping with murder cannot be allowed to rest
companions could be held liable therefor.
on the vague and nebulous facts established by the prosecution. As
discussed earlier, the evidence presented by the prosecution surrounding
Corpus delicti has been defined as the body or substance of the crime and, the events of that fateful day are grossly insufficient to establish the alleged
in its primary sense, refers to the fact that a crime has been actually liability of accused-appellant for the death of Moronia.
committed. As applied to a particular offense, it means the actual
commission by someone of the particular crime charged. 7 The corpus
It is a well-entrenched principle in criminal law that an accused is
delicti is a compound fact made up of two (2) things, viz: the existence of a
presumed innocent until proven otherwise. No less than proof beyond
certain act or result forming the basis of the criminal charge, and the
reasonable doubt is required to convict him. On the whole, the evidence
existence of a criminal agency as the cause of this act or result. 8
adduced by the prosecution would not prove beyond a shadow of a doubt
that accused-appellant should be convicted for the serious crime of
Were the two (2) aspects of the corpus delicti proved in this case? kidnapping with murder.

Insofar as the death of Moronia is concerned, the fact that he was last seen Since none of the circumstances mentioned in Article 267 of the Revised
on May 27, 1984 with his hands tied at the back and accompanied by eight Penal Code (kidnapping with serious illegal detention) was proved and
(8) armed men undoubtedly shows that his life was then in danger or peril. only the fact of kidnapping of Anatalio Moronia was established, we find
Coupled with the fact that Moronia has been absent and unheard from that the crime committed is slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the
since that time until the trial of this case (or a total of six years), a Revised Penal Code. In the execution of the crime, more than three (3)
presumption of death was sufficiently raised. This is in consonance with armed malefactors acted together in its commission. Thus, since the
Section 5 (x) (3), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, viz.: generic aggravating circumstance of band 11 attended the commission of
the crime and there being no mitigating circumstance present, the penalty
of reclusion temporal in its maximum period as maximum and prision
The following shall be presumed dead for all
mayor as minimum should be imposed on accused-appellant. 12
purposes, including the division of the estate among
the heirs:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appealed decision is hereby MODIFIED.
Accused-appellant Abundio Roluna is found guilty of slight illegal
xxx xxx xxx
detention and is meted an indeterminate sentence from twelve (12) years
of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under maximum. 13Costs against accused-appellant.
other circumstances and his existence has not been
known for four (4) years.
SO ORDERED.

However, the circumstances presented by the prosecution would not be

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
enough to hold accused-appellant responsible for the death of Moronia.

In the early case of People v. Sasota, 9 the Court affirmed the conviction of
the accused for murder although the body of the victim was not found or
recovered. In said case, we ruled that in case of murder or homicide, it is
not necessary to recover the body of the victim or show where it can be
found. It is enough that the death and the criminal agency causing death is
proven. The Court recognized that there are cases where the death and
intervention of the criminal agency that caused it may be presumed or
established by circumstantial evidence.

However, the ruling in the Sasota case cannot be applied to the case at
bench. In the Sasota case, the prosecution witnesses saw the four (4)
armed accused forcibly take the victim from his house to a lake, beating
 SECOND DIVISION was included as one of the accused because he refused to testify in favor
of the prosecution.[9]
[ G.R. No. 133541, April 14, 2004 ]
Alfredo Rellesiva, then Barangay Chairman of Barangay Patag, Burauen,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. RICKY QUIMZON, Leyte; and Mauro Lobriquinto, then second Barangay Councilor of
APPELLANT. Barangay Candag-on, corroborated appellant’s alibi.[10]
DECISION After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: portion of which reads as follows:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules WHEREFORE, premises considered, the evidence of the prosecution
of Court assailing the decision[1] dated December 17, 1997 of the Regional having proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the
Trial Court of Tacloban City, Branch 16, in Criminal Case No. Bn-92-7-2924, Court hereby renders the conviction of the accused Ricky Quimzon of the
finding appellant Ricky Quimzon[2] guilty of murder and imposing upon crime of Murder punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The crime currently is punishable by RA 7659 classifying Murder as
heinous crime to which the death penalty is to be imposed.
In an Information dated July 28, 1992, appellant and three other persons,
namely Salvacion Lacsarom, Canoto Cabero[3] and Edgardo Detona[4] were However, the crime was committed on March 7, 1992 and the effectivity
charged with the crime of murder allegedly committed as follows: of RA 7659 is January 1994. This act therefore cannot apply in the case at
That on or about the 7th day of March, 1992, in the Municipality of Burauen, bench.
Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping Two qualifying circumstances are alleged in the Information; namely,
one another with treachery and abuse of superior strength, with intent to treachery and abuse of superior strength. However, the latter
kill, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, circumstance is absorbed by the former.
strike, stab and wound one Marlo Casiong with short bolos locally known
as ‘pisao’ which accused provided themselves for the purpose, thereby There is no other aggravating nor mitigating circumstance. The penalty
hitting and inflicting upon the said Marlo Casiong with fatal wounds on the therefore to be applied is reclusion perpetuabeing the medium of the
different parts of his body which caused his death shortly thereafter. penalty from minimum which is the maximum of reclusion temporal to
death.
Contrary to law.[5]
Appellant “surrendered” to the police authorities on August 18, The accused is therefore sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of
1994[6] while his other co-accused remain at-large. When arraigned on Reclusion Perpetua.
September 28, 1994, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, entered a
plea of not guilty to the crime charged.[7] Thereafter, trial ensued. On the civil aspect, the defense admitted the expenses incurred for the
wake and burial of the victim and neither did he controvert the moral
The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts: damages suffered by the mother of the victim. The accused is ordered to
pay the sum of P53,000.00 as actual expenses for the wake and burial,
On the night of March 7, 1992, victim Marlo Casiong, his sister Emolyn and P75,000.00 as moral damages payable to the mother of the victim
Casiong, and one Rommel Redoña were at the social hall of Burauen, Erlinda Casiong.
Leyte attending a benefit dance. Around 11:30 of the same evening, while
dancing with one Salvacion Lacsarom, Marlo accidentally bumped his The Philippine National Police and the NBI are urged to exert efforts to
cousin, herein appellant Ricky Quimzon. Emolyn and Rommel, who were bring the at large co-accused to justice for their complicity in the crime.
then dancing with each other and were about one meter away from Marlo Furnish them a copy. Meanwhile, until they are placed under the custody
and Salvacion, witnessed the incident. Thereafter, while the dance of the law, archived the case.
continued, Salvacion held Marlo’s hand and invited him to go outside the
dance hall as she had something important to tell him. Thereupon, Marlo SO ORDERED.[11]
asked Emolyn to stay put because he was coming back. Feeling Hence, the present petition with the following Assignment of Errors.
apprehensions about it, Emolyn and Rommel followed Salvacion and I
Marlo as they went out of the dance hall. Emolyn noticed that Canoto
Cabero, Edgardo Detona and appellant Ricky also went out of the hall in a IT IS SUBMITTED BY THE APPELLANT THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL
hurried manner thereby overtaking them (Emolyn and Rommel). Outside COURT OF BURAUEN, LEYTE ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY
the social hall, Emolyn heard Salvacion say “ito na” then saw her push OF THE CRIME OF MURDER WITHOUT A CORPUS DELICTI.
Marlo towards the group of Canoto, Edgardo and Ricky. Canoto then
grabbed Marlo by the wrist and repeatedly stabbed him with a short bolo II
locally known as pisao. Edgardo followed suit by stabbing Marlo twice at
the back. Despite being wounded, Marlo was able to get away from IT IS SUBMITTED BY THE APPELLANT THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL
Canoto and Edgardo and walked fast towards the nearby health center. COURT OF BURAUEN, LEYTE ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
Marlo was about to reach the gate of the health center when Ricky, who TESTIMONY OF EMOLYN CASIONG THE LONE PROSECUTION EYE
was behind Marlo, held the latter’s hands. Marlo tried to free himself from WITNESS, LEADING TO THE CONVICTION OF APPELLANT ON THE CRIME
the clutches of Ricky but in the course of his struggle he fell down. CHARGED IN THE ABOVE ENTITLED CASE.[12]
Thereupon, Ricky rode on the back of Marlo and repeatedly stabbed him In support of his first assigned error, appellant contends that the testimony
on his back. Emolyn and Rommel shouted for help prompting an of prosecution witness Dr. Adelaida Asperin on the report of the autopsy
unidentified person to throw stones and utter, “that is enough”. conducted on the body of the victim Marlo Casiong was designed to prove
Thereafter, Canoto, Edgardo and Ricky fled. With the help of some the corpus delicti. Appellant, however, claims that Dr. Asperin is
persons, Emolyn brought Marlo to the Burauen General Hospital but incompetent to testify, as she was not the one who personally examined
Marlo died before reaching the hospital.[8] the body. Instead, it was a certain Dr. Amparo Villanueva who conducted
the autopsy on the body of Marlo Casiong. Appellant asserts that the trial
In denying criminal liability, appellant interposed the defense of alibi. He court should have regarded the testimony of Dr. Asperin as inadmissible
claims that he does not know Salvacion Lacsarom, Canoto Cabero and for being hearsay; and, in the absence of such testimony, the prosecution
Edgardo Detona. He denies that he stabbed Marlo Casiong. Appellant would not have been able to prove the corpus delicti.
testified, as follows: He could not have been at the scene of the crime
when the incident happened as he was in Barangay Patag attending A review of the oral and documentary evidence presented before the trial
another benefit dance. He arrived at Barangay Patag around 7 o’clock in court reveals that it was indeed Dr. Amparo Villanueva, not Dr. Adelaida
the evening of March 7, 1992 and stayed there until 7 o’clock of the Asperin, who conducted the autopsy taken on the body of Marlo Casiong.
following morning. Barangay Patag is 18 kilometers away from the As the attending physician, Dr. Villanueva was the one who signed the
poblacion of Burauen where Marlo was killed and can only be reached by autopsy report.[13] In fact, Dr. Asperin herself admitted in her testimony
riding a horse or a carabao or by hiking for five hours. He only came to that she never saw the victim, Marlo Casiong, and that it was Dr. Villanueva
know of the death of Marlo when he went to the poblacion of Burauen. He
who conducted the autopsy and was the one who prepared the autopsy Q Now, shortly after the killing of your brother
report.[14] However, Dr. Villanueva died before the prosecution was able to were you investigated by the police in
present her as witness. connection with the killing of your brother?
A We were investigated by the Chief of Police of
Nonetheless, even if Dr. Asperin is an incompetent witness as to the Burauen, Leyte.
autopsy report and her testimony could not have probative value for being
hearsay, we still find that the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish
by competent evidence the corpus delicti in the instant case.
Q When you said ‘we’, to whom are you referring?
Corpus delicti is defined as the body, foundation or substance upon which
a crime has been committed, e.g. the corpse of a murdered man.[15] It refers A Me and Rommel Redoña because we were the
to the fact that a crime has been actually committed.[16] Corpus delicti does companions of my brother Marlo Casiong.
not refer to the autopsy report evidencing the nature of the wounds
sustained by the victim nor the testimony of the physician who conducted
the autopsy or medical examination.[17] It is made up of two elements: (a)
that a certain result has been proved, for example, a man has died and (b) Q It is clear now that only you and Rommel
that some person is criminally responsible for the act.[18] Redoña were the companions of Marlo Casiong
on that fateful evening?
Proof of corpus delicti is indispensable in prosecutions for felonies and A Yes sir.
offenses.[19] While the autopsy report of a medico legal expert in cases of
murder or homicide is preferably accepted to show the extent of the
injuries suffered by the victim, it is not the only competent evidence to
prove the injuries and the fact of death.[20] It may be proved by the
testimonies of credible witnesses. Even a single witness’ uncorroborated Q In the course of your investigation by the Chief
testimony, if credible, may suffice to prove it and warrant a conviction of Police of Burauen relative to the killing of
therefor. [21] your brother, was that investigation conducted
on your person reduced into writing?
Based on the foregoing jurisprudence, it is clear that the testimony of Dr. A The Chief of Police told me that when needed I
Asperin is not indispensable in proving the corpus delicti. Even without her might be investigated by the Court, I was not
testimony, the prosecution was still be able to prove the corpus delicti by asked to execute an affidavit, it was only
establishing the fact that the victim died and that such death occurred after Rommel Redoña who executed an affidavit.
he was stabbed by appellant and his co-accused. These facts were
established by the testimony of prosecution witness Emolyn Casiong.[22]
Q So no affidavit was made by the police when
The question that remains, therefore, is whether the trial court erred in you were investigated?
giving credence to Emolyn’s testimony over and above the testimonies of
the defense witnesses. A None because the Chief of Police informed me
that Rommel Redoña would only be the one to
In his second assigned error, appellant questions Emolyn’s credibility as a execute an affidavit but if the Court would need
witness by pointing out that Emolyn did not execute an affidavit regarding me then I will execute an affidavit because I am
the events that she allegedly witnessed on March 7, 1992; that she did not a sister of the victim and I may not be
present herself as a witness during the preliminary investigation allowed.[25]
conducted by the Municipal Trial Court of Burauen, and that she only
appeared as a witness when the case was already being tried before the And on her cross-examination, to wit:
trial court. Appellant posits that Emolyn’s delay, which consisted in her
failure to execute an affidavit and her belated appearance as a witness, puts Q Being the witness will you tell us were you the
the trustworthiness of her testimony in serious doubt. one who reported this incident to the police?
A My mother.
We are not persuaded by appellant’s arguments.

When the credibility of witnesses is in issue, appellatte courts generally

defer to the findings of the trial court, considering that the latter is in a
better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses Q Being an alleged eye witness did you submit
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying yourself for investigation by the police?
during the trial.[23]
A My affidavit was not prepared because
according to the chief of police of Burauen,
It is doctrinally settled that the assessment of the credibility of a witness is
Leyte I cannot have my affidavit because I am
a function that is best discharged by the trial judge whose conclusion
the sister of the victim and only Rommel
thereon is accorded much weight and respect that will not be disturbed on
Redoña was prepared.
appeal unless a material or substantial fact has been overlooked or
misappreciated which if properly taken into account could alter the
outcome of the case.[24]
Q Sister of whom?
After going over the records of the case, we find no compelling reason to
disturb the findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility of A Marlo Casiong.
Emolyn. Contrary to appellant’s assertion, we find that she took no delay
in relating the killing of her brother to the police authorities. Emolyn
testified that shortly after the killing of her brother, she submitted herself
for investigation before the police authorities of Burauen, Leyte. However,
the chief of police informed her that she could not execute an affidavit ....
because she is a sister of the victim, but if the court would need her, then
she can execute an affidavit. Unschooled on the rules on evidence, it is but
natural for Emolyn to have readily accepted the explanation of the chief of
police. In her direct examination, she testified, thus:
COURT:
 Q Do you know the reason why he went to Manila
despite the fact that he is one of the witnesses
Q Who is the police who said because you are the in this case?
sister of the victim you cannot have an A When I went to Manila I met him and he told me
affidavit? Molin I really cannot testify because I have been
A The Chief of Police Nuevarez, the one who threatened by Ricky and company.
prepared the affidavit of Rommel was sir
Juanico.
...

ATTY SAY:

RE-CROSS BY ATTY. SAY:

Q Will you still insist that Nuevarez refused to

take your affidavit because you are a sister of
the victim? Q Now since Rommel Redoña refused to testify
A Yes, sir. you have to testify despite the fact that you
were told by the chief of police Nuevarez that
you cannot testify in this case being a sister of
the victim?
Q Even if we present Nuevarez in the witness A The chief of police there Nuevarez told me that
stand you will still insist? if ever I will be needed by this Court I could
testify but only, my affidavit cannot be
A Yes, sir. prepared then because I was the sister.

Q Then how did you know that the court needed

Q Is it not a fact that your affidavit could not be your testimony?
taken because you were still in Manila?
A I was in Burauen, Leyte when that incident
occurred. COURT:

Q But one thing is you have been in Manila?

Q Were you subpoenaed by the Court?
A I went to Manila in 1994 already I went after
Rommel Redoña. A No.

Q The deceased Marlo Casiong was a very close,

aside from being your brother you were very ATTY. SAY:
closely associated with him?
A Yes, sir.

Q So it was not the court actually required your

testimony because you did not receive
Q And you want to do anything for him? subpoena?
A I did not receive any subpoena but Rommel
A I will do everything because I was there when Redoña whom I met many times was firm that
the incident took place.[26] he cannot testify because he would be killed by
the accused and because it was only the three of
us, Rommel, myself and the victim who went to
As to her apparent delay in testifying, Emolyn explained that she would not the dance.
have appeared as a witness if Rommel Redoña testified. However, she
clarified that she only appeared as a witness when the case was being tried
by the trial court because she was left with no choice but to testify in place
of Rommel Redoña who told her that he no longer wanted to be a witness Q It is only reason why you testified in this case
because he was being threatened by appellant, to wit: because Rommel Redoña has manifested that
he will not testify?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was your purpose in going after Rommel
Redoña in Manila?
A Because a subpoena reached us informing us
that the one who killed my brother had already
been apprehended and because he was one of COURT:
the eye witness I have to fetch him in Manila
and I even went there twice and my mother
went there third time, only last November.
 Q So if Rommel Redoña would have testified in Q How about Canuto Cavero when he went out
Court you do not need to testify? together with Ricky Quimson, Edgardo Detuna,
A I will not anymore because I have no affidavit. did Canuto Cavero also leave his partner?
A He told his partner to wait for a while because
he will be going out.

Q It was your lawyer Atty. Adaza who adviced you

to testify in this case? Q How about Edgardo Detuna he also left his
partner when he went out?
A He did not, because we could not find any other
witness I have to testify. A He also told his partner to wait for a while
because he will be going out.

Q Your lawyer did not advice you to testify?

Q And likewise, Ricky Quimson also told his
partner to wait for a while because he will be
A No, Your Honor. going out?
A Yes.

Q Your lawyer did not say that you are not

qualified to testify in this case because you are Q So, in other words the three gentlemen Canuto
a sister? Cavero, Edgardo Detuna and Ricky Quimson
A No, Your Honor. left their partners because they will be going
out for a while?
A Yes.

Q So you are testifying to substitute only the

testimony of Rommel Redoña?
Q You are sure of that, you cannot be mistaken?

A Yes, your Honor, because Rommel Redoña did A I will not be mistaken.
not want to testify anymore and we could not
find any other witness and since I was with
them when the incident occurred, I testified
here. [27]
Q You are very sure because you heard each one
Moreover, we agree with the observation of the Office of the Solicitor of them, Canuto Cavero, Edgardo Detuna, and
General (OSG) that the apparent delay in Emolyn’s appearance as a witness Ricky Quimson left their respective partners
is explained by the fact that while a complaint against appellant and his co- and told them, ‘Wait because I am going out for
accused was filed as early as May 7, 1992, the case was archived because a while’, you cannot be mistaken.
all the accused remained at-large.[28] It was only on August 18, 1994 that
appellant was arrested, which sufficiently explains why Emolyn was only
able to appear as a witness on February 21, 1995. Appellant further attacks A Yes because we were close to each other.[29]
the veracity of Emolyn’s testimony by calling our attention to some
purported inconsistencies and improbabilities in her account of the events
that took place prior to and during the stabbing of Marlo. Appellant As to who went ahead of whom, Emolyn satisfactorily explained as follows:
contends: It could not have been possible for Emolyn to overhear the
conversation that took place between Salvacion and Marlo while they were
dancing because the music was loud, the beat was fast and furious, and Q In other words it is very clear that after
Emolyn was engrossed in her dancing. It was impossible for Emolyn to Salvacion Lacsarom and your brother left you
hear Edgardo Detona, Canoto Cabero and appellant ask permission from immediately followed because you were were
their respective dancing partners before going out of the dance hall deeply alarmed leaving inside the hall Edgardo
because Emolyn went out of the dance hall ahead of them. Emolyn failed to Detuna, Canuto Cavero and Ricky Quimson?
accurately recall the sequence of events that led to the stabbing of Marlo. A Edgardo Detuna and Canuto Cavero were
She could not have witnessed Marlo’s stabbing as she admitted that it was already outside ahead of us.
dark where the incident took place. We are not convinced by appellant’s
contentions. First, it is not improbable for Emolyn to overhear the
conversation between Salvacion and Marlo while they were dancing
Q Do you mean to tell us that Edgardo Detuna and
because she (Emolyn) testified that she was just one meter away from
Canuto Cavero left the hall ahead of Salvacion
Salvacion and Marlo at that time. The fact that they were dancing, that the
Lacsarom and Marlo Casiong?
music is loud and that there is another couple between them and her does
A The two, Canuto Cavero and Edgardo Detuna
not discount the possibility that she could have heard them talking. Given
were able to reach outside ahead of Marlo
the above circumstances, it is expected of Salvacion and Marlo to have
Casiong and Salvacion Lacsarom because they
raised their voices in order to hear each other, which then enabled Emolyn
walked fast.
to hear their conversation. Second, while Emolyn admitted that she and
Rommel started to go out of the dance hall ahead of Edgardo, Canoto and
appellant, she sufficiently explained that she was able to hear the three
men talk to their respective partners because she was still near them when Q But the fact is, Salvacion Lacsarom and Marlo
they asked permission from their partners. Emolyn explained thus: Casiong left the dancing hall ahead of
everybody?
A They went out ahead but they were overtaken
by Canuto Cavero and Edgardo Detuna.
 Q And it happened while the dance was going on?

Q So it is not correct to say that you were the one A The dance was in progress but the four of them
who immediately followed Salvacion Lacsarom went out.[33]
and Marlo Casiong because according to you
Edgardo Detuna and Canuto Cavero followed Emolyn testified further:
Salvacion Lacsarom and Marlo Casiong, you
were not the one who immediately followed the
pair but Edgardo Detuna and Canuto Cavero, is Q What kind of light was illuminating the dancing
that correct? hall?
A No because Edgardo Detuna and Canuto Cavero A Fluorescent bulbs.
were faster and they went out the shorter way
while I followed Marlo Casiong and Salvacion
Lacsarom who took a little slower in going out.

Q How many fluorescent lamps were there?

...
A There were two outside and one was at the gate
of the health center and one at the gate of the
dancing hall.

Q How about Ricky Quimson, was he still dancing

when you immediately followed Salvacion
Q How far was the nearest fluorescent lamp
Lacsarom and Marlo Casiong outside?
where the first stabbing of the victim was
A He was already outside the dancing hall
made?
because he followed Canuto Cavero and
A Witness points to a distance which indicated 4
Edgardo Detuna.
meters when measured.

Q But he was behind Edgardo Detuna and Canuto

Cavero? Q How high was the fluorescent lamp from the
ground?
A Yes.[30]
A About 2 meters and 35 cms. high from the floor.

Third, we find that the alleged probabilities and inaccuracies committed by

Emolyn in recounting the events that took place prior to and during the
stabbing of Marlo refers to trivial matters that do not refer to material Q At the health center where Marlo Casiong was
points and do not detract from Emolyn’s clear and positive testimony that attacked by Ricky Quimson, how far was the
she saw appellant and the other accused stab and kill her brother. fluorescent light?
A Witness points to a distance which indicated 4
Settled is the rule that inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution meters when measured.
witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect
either the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of
their testimony.[31] In fact, such minor flaws may even enhance the worth
of a testimony, for they guard against memorized falsities.[32] Q How about the lamp from the ground, how
high?
Fourth, while Emolyn testified that it was dark inside the dance hall, it is
A The same height, about 2 meters and 35 cms.
also clear from her testimony that the stabbing took place outside the hall
from the ground.[34]
and there were fluorescent bulbs near the places where Marlo was stabbed
by Canoto, Edgardo and appellant. When cross-examined, she testified as
follows: We have held that kerosene lamp, flashlight, even moonlight or starlight
may, in proper situations, be considered sufficient illumination.[35] In the
Q How many times did you meet the accused in instant case, the fluorescent bulbs situated near the places where appellant
dances? and his companions attacked Marlo enabled Emolyn to witness the killing
of her brother.
A Several times because we meet at dances
whenever there is one. Thus, we reiterate the well-entrenched rule that in assessing the credibility
of witnesses, the factual findings of the trial court should be respected. The
judge a quo was in a better position to pass judgment on the credibility of
witnesses, having personally heard them when they testified and observed
Q This incident happened outside the dancing their deportment and manner of testifying.[36]
hall, is that correct?
A Yes. Appellant interposes the defense of alibi. However, alibi, like denial, is an
inherently weak defense as it is easy to concoct and difficult to
prove.[37] While appellant’s testimony is corroborated by defense witness
Rellesiva and Lobriquito, the trial court correctly gave more probative
weight to the lone testimony of prosecution witness Emolyn who
Q But the alleged bumping of Ricky Quimson by positively identified appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime.
Marlo Casiong happened inside the dancing
hall? Appellant’s defense of alibi fails in the face of Emolyn’s positive
A Yes. identification of him as one of her brother’s killers. Positive identification
destroys the defense of alibi and renders it impotent, especially where such
identification is credible and categorical.[38] The defense of denial is
unavailing when placed astride the undisputed fact that there is positive
identification of the felon.[39]
 subsequent act of surrendering from being considered as a mitigating
We affirm the trial court’s finding that there was treachery in the killing of circumstance.
Marlo. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution Moreover, we noted in the Motion to Fix Bail Bond, filed on July 9, 1992,
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without that counsel for appellant alleged that appellant “is barely 15 years of age”.
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might When appellant was called to the witness stand on August 2, 1996, or four
make.[40] The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by years thereafter, appellant asserted that he was 21 years old. The stabbing
an aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real incident took place on March 7, 1992, thus placing appellant to be 17 years
chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission with no risk old, a minor, when he committed the crime. The records do not show that
to the aggressor.[41] In the present case, Marlo accepted Salvacion’s the prosecution refuted appellant’s minority; and absent any evidence to
invitation for them to go outside the dance hall on the impression that the the contrary, the trial court should have applied in favor of appellant the
latter has something important to tell him. He has no inkling of any benefits under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
impending danger on his life as he even told his sister, Emolyn, to wait for
him because he will be coming back.[42] Outside the dance hall, as soon as
Salvacion pushed Marlo towards them, Canoto and Edgardo immediately Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. –
attacked him without warning, inflicting wounds on the front and back
portions of his body with the use of bolos. Although this initial assault on ...
Marlo was frontal it may still be considered treacherous because the attack
was sudden and unprovoked. There is no evidence showing that the attack 2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty
was preceded by any exchange of words or any untoward incident next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in
between the assailants and Marlo, sufficient to warn Marlo of the the proper period. (Emphasis supplied)
impending attack on him. The mode of execution was in such a manner that Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the perpetrator of the crime
Marlo was left with no opportunity to repel the attack or avoid it. of Murder shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Applying the
Moreover, he was unarmed while all three assailants were carrying deadly express provision of the aforequoted Article 68 and pursuant to Article 61,
weapons. The treachery continued when appellant held the hands of Marlo paragraph 2, of the same Code, to wit:
as the latter was running away from the initial stabbings of Canoto and Art. 61. Rules of graduating penalties. - . . .
Edgardo, rode on Marlo’s back when the latter fell down and repeatedly 1. When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible,
stabbed Marlo who had already been rendered weak by the multiple stab the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following
wounds inflicted by Edgardo and Canoto. Appellant attacked Marlo from that indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in
behind and repeatedly stabbed Marlo when he was already in a defenseless Article 71 of this Code.
position.
...
In any criminal prosecution, the only requisite is that the prosecution the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal or 12 years and 1 day to 20
proves the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond years.
reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof that, excluding the
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is Considering the actual penalty to be imposed upon appellant, as prescribed
required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an by law, is not reclusion perpetua or death, appellant is entitled to the
unprejudiced mind.[43] application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.[50] Thus, from the penalty
of reclusion temporal, one degree lower is prision mayor or 6 years and 1
Hence, we uphold the trial court’s judgment declaring appellant guilty of day to 12 years from which will be drawn the MINIMUM period of the
murder beyond reasonable doubt. The attendant circumstance of indeterminate sentence; while pursuant to paragraph 2, Article 64 of the
treachery qualified the killing to murder as defined under paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code, in the absence of any modifying circumstance, the
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Since treachery attended the killing, penalty prescribed by law should be imposed in its medium period, or
abuse of superior strength alleged in the Information is absorbed by said anywhere between 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months,
circumstance.[44] as the MAXIMUM period of the indeterminate sentence.

Aside from abuse of superior strength, no other aggravating circumstance We now come to the civil liability of appellant.
was alleged and proved by the prosecution.
As to actual damages, we find that the evidence presented by the
In a criminal case, an appeal throws open the entire case wide open for prosecution do not adequately provide a concrete basis for the amount of
review, and the appellate court can correct errors, though unassigned, that P53,000.00 awarded by the trial court to the victim’s mother, Erlinda
may be found in the appealed judgment.[45] Casiong. She testified that her family incurred expenses amounting to
P50,206.00, during the wake and burial of her son. As proof, she presented
It appears in the Commitment Order, dated August 14, 1994, issued by the seven official receipts amounting to P4,490.00 only.[51] Other evidence
Municipal Trial Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Burauen, Leyte, that consisting of small pieces of paper which were properly identified by
appellant “voluntarily surrendered to SPO1 Josefino Agustin of PNP Erlinda as having been signed by the persons from whom she bought the
Burauen, Leyte on August 18, 1994”.[46] An examination of the records merchandise that were used or consumed during Marlo’s wake and burial,
reveals that it can not be considered as a mitigating circumstance. For the amounting to P4,020.00[52] may be considered competent evidence and
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the admitted under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.[53] Thus, the
accused must satisfactorily comply with three requisites: (1) he has not prosecution was able to prove only a total of P8,510.00. The other receipts
been actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority presented were not properly identified and therefore inadmissible under
or the latter’s agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary. There must be a the Rules of Court.
showing of spontaneity and an intent to surrender unconditionally to the
authorities, either because the accused acknowledges his guilt or he wishes Nonetheless, in our recent rulings, we have held that in cases where the
to spare them the trouble and expense concomitant to his capture. [47] heirs of the victim failed to prove their claim for actual damages, but have
shown that they have suffered pecuniary loss by reason of the death of the
The “surrender” of appellant was far from being spontaneous and victim, an award of P25,000.00 by way of temperate damages is justified in
unconditional. The warrant of arrest is dated June 17, 1992 and all the lieu of an award of actual or compensatory damages. [54] In People vs.
accused, including appellant, remained at-large, which prompted the Villanueva,[55] we held that in cases where actual damages was proven by
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte to archive the receipts during the trial but said damages amounted to less than
case.[48] It took appellant two years before he finally “surrendered” to the P25,000.00, as in the present case, the award of temperate damages in the
police. In between said period, appellant, through counsel, filed a Motion amount of P25,000.00 is justified in lieu of said actual damages. The
to Fix Bail Bond[49] without surrendering his person to the jurisdiction of rationale for such an award of temperate damages is that it would be
the trial court. Records do not reveal that the motion had been acted upon anomalous and unfair for the heirs of the victim, who by presenting
by the trial court. This act of appellant may be considered as a condition receipts, tried and succeeded in proving actual damages but in an amount
set by him before he surrenders to proper authorities, thus preventing his less than P25,000.00, to be placed in a worse situation than those who
might not have presented any receipts at all but would be entitled to
P25,000.00 for temperate damages.[56]

Erlinda Casiong testified that her son was single when he died; [57] that she
felt sad when her son was killed.[58] We find her testimony sufficient to
sustain the trial court’s award of moral damages but we reduce the amount
of P75,000.00 to P50,000.00 in line with current jurisprudence.[59]

Erlinda Casiong further testified that her son was working as a helper in a
passenger bus.[60] The indemnification for loss of earning capacity partakes
of the nature of actual damages which must be duly proved.[61] In the
absence of competent evidence to prove how much the victim was earning,
the heirs of the victim are not entitled thereto.

The trial court did not award civil indemnity. In consonance with
prevailing jurisprudence, we award the amount of P50,000.00 to the heirs
of Marlo Casiong as civil indemnity for his death. The amount is awarded
without need of proof other than appellant’s commission of the crime
which resulted in the death of the victim.[62]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City

(Branch 15) is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant Ricky Quimzon
is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and
after applying The Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being no
modifying circumstance, he is sentenced to suffer imprisonment, from
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as MINIMUM up to
fourteen (14) years and ten (10) months of reclusion temporal as
MAXIMUM. He is ordered to pay Erlinda Casiong, the mother of the
deceased Marlo Casiong, the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for
the victim’s death; P25,000.00 as temperate damages; and P50,000.00 as
moral damages.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually
SUPREME COURT indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be
Manila prostitutes.

THIRD DIVISION Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this articles shall
be punished by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, and in
case of recidivism, by arresto mayor in its medium period to prision
G.R. No. 169364 September 18, 2009
correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000
pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
Instead of submitting their counter-affidavits as directed, respondents
EVANGELINE SITON y SACIL and KRYSTEL KATE SAGARANO y
filed separate Motions to Quash3 on the ground that Article 202 (2) is
MEFANIA, Respondents.
unconstitutional for being vague and overbroad.

DECISION
In an Order4 dated April 28, 2004, the municipal trial court denied the
motions and directed respondents anew to file their respective counter-
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: affidavits. The municipal trial court also declared that the law on vagrancy
was enacted pursuant to the State’s police power and justified by the Latin
maxim "salus populi est suprem(a) lex," which calls for the subordination of
If a man is called to be a street sweeper, he should sweep streets even as
individual benefit to the interest of the greater number, thus:
Michelangelo painted, or Beethoven composed music, or Shakespeare
wrote poetry. He should sweep streets so well that all the hosts of Heaven
and Earth will pause to say, here lived a great street sweeper who did his Our law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the police power of the State.
job well. An authority on police power, Professor Freund describes laconically
police power "as the power of promoting public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property." (Citations omitted). In fact the
– Martin Luther King, Jr.
person’s acts and acquisitions are hemmed in by the police power of the
state. The justification found in the Latin maxim, salus populi est supreme
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the July 29, 2005 (sic) lex" (the god of the people is the Supreme Law). This calls for the
Order1 of Branch 11, Davao City Regional Trial Court in Special Civil Case subordination of individual benefit to the interests of the greater
No. 30-500-2004 granting respondents’ Petition for Certiorari and number.In the case at bar the affidavit of the arresting police officer, SPO1
declaring paragraph 2 of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code JAY PLAZA with Annex "A" lucidly shows that there was a prior
unconstitutional. surveillance conducted in view of the reports that vagrants and prostitutes
proliferate in the place where the two accused (among other women) were
wandering and in the wee hours of night and soliciting male customer.
Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged
Thus, on that basis the prosecution should be given a leeway to prove its
with vagrancy pursuant to Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code in two
case. Thus, in the interest of substantial justice, both prosecution and
separate Informations dated November 18, 2003, docketed as Criminal
defense must be given their day in Court: the prosecution proof of the
Case Nos. 115,716-C-2003 and 115,717-C-2003 and raffled to Branch 3 of
crime, and the author thereof; the defense, to show that the acts of the
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Davao City. The Informations, read:
accused in the indictment can’t be categorized as a crime.5

That on or about November 14, 2003, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and
The municipal trial court also noted that in the affidavit of the arresting
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned
police officer, SPO1 Jay Plaza, it was stated that there was a prior
accused, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously wandered and loitered
surveillance conducted on the two accused in an area reported to be
around San Pedro and Legaspi Streets, this City, without any visible means
frequented by vagrants and prostitutes who solicited sexual favors. Hence,
to support herself nor lawful and justifiable purpose. 2
the prosecution should be given the opportunity to prove the crime, and
the defense to rebut the evidence.1avvphi1
Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Respondents thus filed an original petition for certiorari and prohibition
Art. 202. Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty. — The following are vagrants: with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, 6directly challenging the
constitutionality of the anti-vagrancy law, claiming that the definition of
the crime of vagrancy under Article 202 (2), apart from being vague,
1. Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, who
results as well in an arbitrary identification of violators, since the definition
has the physical ability to work and who neglects to apply
of the crime includes in its coverage persons who are otherwise
himself or herself to some lawful calling;
performing ordinary peaceful acts. They likewise claimed that Article 202
(2) violated the equal protection clause under the Constitution because it
2. Any person found loitering about public or semi-public discriminates against the poor and unemployed, thus permitting an
buildings or places or tramping or wandering about the country arbitrary and unreasonable classification.
or the streets without visible means of support;
The State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that pursuant
3. Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of ill fame; to the Court’s ruling in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,7 the overbreadth and
ruffians or pimps and those who habitually associate with vagueness doctrines apply only to free speech cases and not to penal
prostitutes; statutes. It also asserted that Article 202 (2) must be presumed valid and
constitutional, since the respondents failed to overcome this presumption.
4. Any person who, not being included in the provisions of other
articles of this Code, shall be found loitering in any inhabited or On July 29, 2005, the Regional Trial Court issued the assailed Order
uninhabited place belonging to another without any lawful or granting the petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:
justifiable purpose;
WHEREFORE, PRESCINDING FROM THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition
5. Prostitutes. is hereby GRANTED. Paragraph 2 of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code
is hereby declared unconstitutional and the Order of the court a quo, dated
April 28, 2004, denying the petitioners’ Motion to Quash is set aside and
the said court is ordered to dismiss the subject criminal cases against the its face violates the constitutionally-guaranteed rights to due process and
petitioners pending before it. the equal protection of the laws; that the due process vagueness standard,
as distinguished from the free speech vagueness doctrine, is adequate to
declare Article 202 (2) unconstitutional and void on its face; and that the
SO ORDERED.8
presumption of constitutionality was adequately overthrown.

In declaring Article 202 (2) unconstitutional, the trial court opined that the
The Court finds for petitioner.
law is vague and it violated the equal protection clause. It held that the
"void for vagueness" doctrine is equally applicable in testing the validity of
penal statutes. Citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,9 where an anti The power to define crimes and prescribe their corresponding penalties is
vagrancy ordinance was struck down as unconstitutional by the Supreme legislative in nature and inherent in the sovereign power of the state to
Court of the United States, the trial court ruled: maintain social order as an aspect of police power. The legislature may
even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful
provided that no constitutional rights have been abridged.14 However, in
The U.S. Supreme Court’s justifications for striking down the Jacksonville
exercising its power to declare what acts constitute a crime, the legislature
Vagrancy Ordinance are equally applicable to paragraph 2 of Article 202 of
must inform the citizen with reasonable precision what acts it intends to
the Revised Penal Code.
prohibit so that he may have a certain understandable rule of conduct and
know what acts it is his duty to avoid.15 This requirement has come to be
Indeed, to authorize a police officer to arrest a person for being "found known as the void-for-vagueness doctrine which states that "a statute
loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places or tramping or which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that
wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
support" offers too wide a latitude for arbitrary determinations as to who differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of
should be arrested and who should not. law."16

Loitering about and wandering have become national pastimes In Spouses Romualdez v. COMELEC,17 the Court recognized the application
particularly in these times of recession when there are many who are of the void-for-vagueness doctrine to criminal statutes in appropriate
"without visible means of support" not by reason of choice but by force of cases. The Court therein held:
circumstance as borne out by the high unemployment rate in the entire
country.
At the outset, we declare that under these terms, the opinions of the dissent
which seek to bring to the fore the purported ambiguities of a long list of
To authorize law enforcement authorities to arrest someone for nearly no provisions in Republic Act No. 8189 can be deemed as a facial challenge.
other reason than the fact that he cannot find gainful employment would An appropriate "as applied" challenge in the instant Petition should be
indeed be adding insult to injury.10 limited only to Section 45 (j) in relation to Sections 10 (g) and (j) of
Republic Act No. 8189 – the provisions upon which petitioners are
charged. An expanded examination of the law covering provisions which
On its pronouncement that Article 202 (2) violated the equal protection
are alien to petitioners’ case would be antagonistic to the rudiment that for
clause of the Constitution, the trial court declared:
judicial review to be exercised, there must be an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, and not
The application of the Anti-Vagrancy Law, crafted in the 1930s, to our conjectural or anticipatory.18
situation at present runs afoul of the equal protection clause of the
constitution as it offers no reasonable classification between those covered
The first statute punishing vagrancy – Act No. 519 – was modeled after
by the law and those who are not.
American vagrancy statutes and passed by the Philippine Commission in
1902. The Penal Code of Spain of 1870 which was in force in this country
Class legislation is such legislation which denies rights to one which are up to December 31, 1931 did not contain a provision on vagrancy. 19 While
accorded to others, or inflicts upon one individual a more severe penalty historically an Anglo-American concept of crime prevention, the law on
than is imposed upon another in like case offending. vagrancy was included by the Philippine legislature as a permanent feature
of the Revised Penal Code in Article 202 thereof which, to repeat, provides:
Applying this to the case at bar, since the definition of Vagrancy under
Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code offers no guidelines or any other ART. 202. Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty. – The following are vagrants:
reasonable indicators to differentiate those who have no visible means of
support by force of circumstance and those who choose to loiter about and
1. Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, who
bum around, who are the proper subjects of vagrancy legislation, it cannot
has the physical ability to work and who neglects to apply
pass a judicial scrutiny of its constitutionality. 11
himself or herself to some lawful calling;

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari raising the sole issue of:
2. Any person found loitering about public or semi-public
buildings or places, or tramping or wandering about the country
WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE or the streets without visible means of support;
ERROR IN DECLARING UNCONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLE 202 (2) OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE12
3. Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of ill-fame;
ruffians or pimps and those who habitually associate with
Petitioner argues that every statute is presumed valid and all reasonable prostitutes;
doubts should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality; that,
citing Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,13 the overbreadth and vagueness
4. Any person who, not being included in the provisions of other
doctrines have special application to free-speech cases only and are not
articles of this Code, shall be found loitering in any inhabited or
appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes; that respondents
uninhabited place belonging to another without any lawful or
failed to overcome the presumed validity of the statute, failing to prove
justifiable purpose;
that it was vague under the standards set out by the Courts; and that the
State may regulate individual conduct for the promotion of public welfare
in the exercise of its police power. 5. Prostitutes.

On the other hand, respondents argue against the limited application of the
overbreadth and vagueness doctrines. They insist that Article 202 (2) on
For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually concern to the police. Yet it may, of course, be the setting for numerous
indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be crimes.
prostitutes.
The difficulty is that these activities are historically part of the amenities
Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this article shall of life as we have known them. They are not mentioned in the Constitution
be punished by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, and in or in the Bill of Rights. These unwritten amenities have been, in part,
case of recidivism, by arresto mayor in its medium period to prision responsible for giving our people the feeling of independence and self-
correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 confidence, the feeling of creativity. These amenities have dignified the
pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court. right of dissent, and have honored the right to be nonconformists and the
right to defy submissiveness. They have encouraged lives of high spirits,
rather than hushed, suffocating silence.
In the instant case, the assailed provision is paragraph (2), which defines a
vagrant as any person found loitering about public or semi-public
buildings or places, or tramping or wandering about the country or the xxxx
streets without visible means of support. This provision was based on the
second clause of Section 1 of Act No. 519 which defined "vagrant" as "every
Where the list of crimes is so all-inclusive and generalized as the one in this
person found loitering about saloons or dramshops or gambling houses, or
ordinance, those convicted may be punished for no more than vindicating
tramping or straying through the country without visible means of support."
affronts to police authority:
The second clause was essentially retained with the modification that the
places under which the offense might be committed is now expressed in
general terms – public or semi-public places. "The common ground which brings such a motley assortment of human
troubles before the magistrates in vagrancy-type proceedings is the
procedural laxity which permits 'conviction' for almost any kind of conduct
The Regional Trial Court, in asserting the unconstitutionality of Article 202
and the existence of the House of Correction as an easy and convenient
(2), take support mainly from the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in
dumping-ground for problems that appear to have no other immediate
the Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville20 case, which in essence declares:
solution." Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104
U.Pa.L.Rev. 603, 631.
Living under a rule of law entails various suppositions, one of which is that
"[all persons] are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands
xxxx
or forbids." Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 306 U. S. 453.

Another aspect of the ordinance's vagueness appears when we focus not

Lanzetta is one of a well recognized group of cases insisting that the law
on the lack of notice given a potential offender, but on the effect of the
give fair notice of the offending conduct. See Connally v. General
unfettered discretion it places in the hands of the Jacksonville police. Caleb
Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 269 U. S. 391; Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274
Foote, an early student of this subject, has called the vagrancy-type law as
U. S. 445; United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81. In the field of
offering "punishment by analogy." Such crimes, though long common in
regulatory statutes governing business activities, where the acts limited
Russia, are not compatible with our constitutional system.
are in a narrow category, greater leeway is allowed. Boyce Motor Lines, Inc.
v. United States, 342 U. S. 337; United States v. National Dairy Products
Corp., 372 U. S. 29; United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1. xxxx

The poor among us, the minorities, the average householder, are not in A presumption that people who might walk or loaf or loiter or stroll or
business and not alerted to the regulatory schemes of vagrancy laws; and frequent houses where liquor is sold, or who are supported by their wives
we assume they would have no understanding of their meaning and impact or who look suspicious to the police are to become future criminals is too
if they read them. Nor are they protected from being caught in the vagrancy precarious for a rule of law. The implicit presumption in these generalized
net by the necessity of having a specific intent to commit an unlawful act. vagrancy standards -- that crime is being nipped in the bud -- is too
See Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91; Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United extravagant to deserve extended treatment. Of course, vagrancy statutes
States, supra. are useful to the police. Of course, they are nets making easy the roundup
of so-called undesirables. But the rule of law implies equality and justice in
its application. Vagrancy laws of the Jacksonville type teach that the scales
The Jacksonville ordinance makes criminal activities which, by modern
of justice are so tipped that even-handed administration of the law is not
standards, are normally innocent. "Nightwalking" is one. Florida construes
possible. The rule of law, evenly applied to minorities as well as majorities,
the ordinance not to make criminal one night's wandering, Johnson v. State,
to the poor as well as the rich, is the great mucilage that holds society
202 So.2d at 855, only the "habitual" wanderer or, as the ordinance
together.21
describes it, "common night walkers." We know, however, from experience
that sleepless people often walk at night, perhaps hopeful that sleep-
inducing relaxation will result. The underlying principles in Papachristou are that: 1) the assailed
Jacksonville ordinance "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair
notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute;" and 2) it
Luis Munoz-Marin, former Governor of Puerto Rico, commented once that
encourages or promotes opportunities for the application of
"loafing" was a national virtue in his Commonwealth, and that it should be
discriminatory law enforcement.
encouraged. It is, however, a crime in Jacksonville.

The said underlying principle in Papachristou that the Jacksonville

xxxx
ordinance, or Article 202 (2) in this case, fails to give fair notice of what
constitutes forbidden conduct, finds no application here because under our
Persons "wandering or strolling" from place to place have been extolled by legal system, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
Walt Whitman and Vachel Lindsay. The qualification "without any lawful therewith.22 This principle is of Spanish origin, and we adopted it to govern
purpose or object" may be a trap for innocent acts. Persons "neglecting all and limit legal conduct in this jurisdiction. Under American law, ignorance
lawful business and habitually spending their time by frequenting . . . of the law is merely a traditional rule that admits of exceptions. 23
places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served" would literally
embrace many members of golf clubs and city clubs.
Moreover, the Jacksonville ordinance was declared unconstitutional on
account of specific provisions thereof, which are not found in Article 202
Walkers and strollers and wanderers may be going to or coming from a (2). The ordinance (Jacksonville Ordinance Code § 257) provided, as
burglary. Loafers or loiterers may be "casing" a place for a holdup. Letting follows:
one's wife support him is an intra-family matter, and normally of no
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging; Since the Revised Penal Code took effect in 1932, no challenge has ever
common gamblers, persons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays, been made upon the constitutionality of Article 202 except now. Instead,
common drunkards, common night walkers, thieves, pilferers or throughout the years, we have witnessed the streets and parks become
pickpockets, traders in stolen property, lewd, wanton and lascivious dangerous and unsafe, a haven for beggars, harassing "watch-your-car"
persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers and brawlers, boys, petty thieves and robbers, pickpockets, swindlers, gangs, prostitutes,
persons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any and individuals performing acts that go beyond decency and morality, if
lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers, disorderly persons, persons not basic humanity. The streets and parks have become the training
neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending their time by ground for petty offenders who graduate into hardened and battle-scarred
frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or places where alcoholic criminals. Everyday, the news is rife with reports of innocent and
beverages are sold or served, persons able to work but habitually living hardworking people being robbed, swindled, harassed or mauled – if not
upon the earnings of their wives or minor children shall be deemed killed – by the scourge of the streets. Blue collar workers are robbed
vagrants and, upon conviction in the Municipal Court shall be punished as straight from withdrawing hard-earned money from the ATMs (automated
provided for Class D offenses. teller machines); students are held up for having to use and thus exhibit
publicly their mobile phones; frail and helpless men are mauled by thrill-
seeking gangs; innocent passers-by are stabbed to death by rowdy
Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court in Jacksonville declared the ordinance
drunken men walking the streets; fair-looking or pretty women are stalked
unconstitutional, because such activities or habits as nightwalking,
and harassed, if not abducted, raped and then killed; robbers, thieves,
wandering or strolling around without any lawful purpose or object,
pickpockets and snatchers case streets and parks for possible victims; the
habitual loafing, habitual spending of time at places where alcoholic
old are swindled of their life savings by conniving streetsmart bilkers and
beverages are sold or served, and living upon the earnings of wives or
con artists on the prowl; beggars endlessly pester and panhandle
minor children, which are otherwise common and normal, were declared
pedestrians and commuters, posing a health threat and putting law-
illegal. But these are specific acts or activities not found in Article 202
abiding drivers and citizens at risk of running them over. All these happen
(2). The closest to Article 202 (2) – "any person found loitering about
on the streets and in public places, day or night.
public or semi-public buildings or places, or tramping or wandering about
the country or the streets without visible means of support" – from the
Jacksonville ordinance, would be "persons wandering or strolling around The streets must be protected. Our people should never dread having to
from place to place without any lawful purpose or object." But these two ply them each day, or else we can never say that we have performed our
acts are still not the same: Article 202 (2) is qualified by "without visible task to our brothers and sisters. We must rid the streets of the scourge of
means of support" while the Jacksonville ordinance prohibits wandering humanity, and restore order, peace, civility, decency and morality in them.
or strolling "without any lawful purpose or object," which was held by the
U.S. Supreme Court to constitute a "trap for innocent acts."
This is exactly why we have public order laws, to which Article 202 (2)
belongs. These laws were crafted to maintain minimum standards of
Under the Constitution, the people are guaranteed the right to be secure in decency, morality and civility in human society. These laws may be
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches traced all the way back to ancient times, and today, they have also come to
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, and no search be associated with the struggle to improve the citizens’ quality of life,
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be which is guaranteed by our Constitution.28 Civilly, they are covered by the
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or "abuse of rights" doctrine embodied in the preliminary articles of the Civil
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and Code concerning Human Relations, to the end, in part, that any person who
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
to be seized.24 Thus, as with any other act or offense, the requirement morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
of probable cause provides an acceptable limit on police or executive damage.29 This provision is, together with the succeeding articles on
authority that may otherwise be abused in relation to the search or arrest human relations, intended to embody certain basic principles "that are to
of persons found to be violating Article 202 (2). The fear exhibited by the be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for
respondents, echoing Jacksonville, that unfettered discretion is placed in the stability of the social order."30
the hands of the police to make an arrest or search, is therefore assuaged
by the constitutional requirement of probable cause, which is one less than
In civil law, for example, the summary remedy of ejectment is intended to
certainty or proof, but more than suspicion or possibility. 25
prevent criminal disorder and breaches of the peace and to discourage
those who, believing themselves entitled to the possession of the property,
Evidently, the requirement of probable cause cannot be done away with resort to force rather than to some appropriate action in court to assert
arbitrarily without pain of punishment, for, absent this requirement, the their claims.31 Any private person may abate a public nuisance which is
authorities are necessarily guilty of abuse. The grounds of suspicion are specially injurious to him by removing, or if necessary, by destroying the
reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, thing which constitutes the same, without committing a breach of the
the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of peace, or doing unnecessary injury.32
committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable
Criminally, public order laws encompass a whole range of acts – from
cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore
public indecencies and immoralities, to public nuisances, to disorderly
must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith of the peace
conduct. The acts punished are made illegal by their offensiveness to
officers making the arrest.26
society’s basic sensibilities and their adverse effect on the quality of life of
the people of society. For example, the issuance or making of a bouncing
The State cannot in a cavalier fashion intrude into the persons of its citizens check is deemed a public nuisance, a crime against public order that must
as well as into their houses, papers and effects. The constitutional be abated.33 As a matter of public policy, the failure to turn over the
provision sheathes the private individual with an impenetrable armor proceeds of the sale of the goods covered by a trust receipt or to return
against unreasonable searches and seizures. It protects the privacy and said goods, if not sold, is a public nuisance to be abated by the imposition
sanctity of the person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of of penal sanctions.34 Thus, public nuisances must be abated because they
restraint, and prevents him from being irreversibly cut off from that have the effect of interfering with the comfortable enjoyment of life or
domestic security which renders the lives of the most unhappy in some property by members of a community.
measure agreeable.27
Article 202 (2) does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does it
As applied to the instant case, it appears that the police authorities have discriminate against the poor and the unemployed. Offenders of public
been conducting previous surveillance operations on respondents prior to order laws are punished not for their status, as for being poor or
their arrest. On the surface, this satisfies the probable cause requirement unemployed, but for conducting themselves under such circumstances as
under our Constitution. For this reason, we are not moved by respondents’ to endanger the public peace or cause alarm and apprehension in the
trepidation that Article 202 (2) could have been a source of police abuse in community. Being poor or unemployed is not a license or a justification to
their case. act indecently or to engage in immoral conduct.
Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as to be considered constitutionally WE CONCUR:
offensive. It is a public order crime which punishes persons for conducting
themselves, at a certain place and time which orderly society finds unusual,
under such conditions that are repugnant and outrageous to the common
standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and
ordered society, as would engender a justifiable concern for the safety and MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
well-being of members of the community. Associate Justice

Instead of taking an active position declaring public order laws PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
unconstitutional, the State should train its eye on their effective Associate Justice Associate Justice
implementation, because it is in this area that the Court perceives
difficulties. Red light districts abound, gangs work the streets in the wee
hours of the morning, dangerous robbers and thieves ply their trade in the LUCAS P. BERSAMIN*
trains stations, drunken men terrorize law-abiding citizens late at night Associate Justice
and urinate on otherwise decent corners of our streets. Rugby-sniffing
individuals crowd our national parks and busy intersections. Prostitutes
ATTESTATION
wait for customers by the roadside all around the metropolis, some even
venture in bars and restaurants. Drug-crazed men loiter around dark
avenues waiting to pounce on helpless citizens. Dangerous groups wander I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in
around, casing homes and establishments for their next hit. The streets consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
must be made safe once more. Though a man’s house is his castle,35 outside the Court’s Division.
on the streets, the king is fair game.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
The dangerous streets must surrender to orderly society. Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
Finally, we agree with the position of the State that first and foremost,
Article 202 (2) should be presumed valid and constitutional. When CERTIFICATION
confronted with a constitutional question, it is elementary that every court
must approach it with grave care and considerable caution bearing in mind
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
that every statute is presumed valid and every reasonable doubt should be
Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
resolved in favor of its constitutionality.36 The policy of our courts is to
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable
showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain, this presumption is based
on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each REYNATO S. PUNO
department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The Chief Justice
theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the
Philippines, a law has been carefully studied, crafted and determined to be
in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted. 37

It must not be forgotten that police power is an inherent attribute of

sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by the Constitution in
the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without,
not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The power
is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying
measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general
welfare.38 As an obvious police power measure, Article 202 (2) must
therefore be viewed in a constitutional light.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of Branch 11 of the

Regional Trial Court of Davao City in Special Civil Case No. 30-500-2004
declaring Article 202, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code
UNCONSTITUTIONAL is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Let the proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 115,716-C-2003 and 115,717-

C-2003 thus continue.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines a) Suspension of the business permit for sixty (60)
SUPREME COURT days for the first offense and a fine of P1,000.00/day
Manila
b) Suspension of the business permit for Six (6)
EN BANC months for the second offense, and a fine of
P3,000.00/day
G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994
c) Permanent revocation of the business permit and
imprisonment of One (1) year, for the third and
MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE
subsequent offenses.
ORO, petitioners,
vs.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT Sec. 4. — This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10)
AND GAMING CORPORATION, respondents. days from publication thereof.

Aquilino G. Pimentel, Jr. and Associates for petitioners. Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No.
3375-93 reading as follows:
R.R. Torralba & Associates for private respondent.
ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF

CASINO AND PROVIDING PENALTY FOR VIOLATION
CRUZ, J.:
THEREFOR.

There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a

WHEREAS, the City Council established a policy as
casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the
early as 1990 against CASINO under its Resolution
project. The religious elements echoed the objection and so did the
No. 2295;
women's groups and the youth. Demonstrations were led by the mayor and
the city legislators. The media trumpeted the protest, describing the casino
as an affront to the welfare of the city. WHEREAS, on October 14, 1992, the City Council
passed another Resolution No. 2673, reiterating its
policy against the establishment of CASINO;
The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in
several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro
City. To this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce WHEREAS, subsequently, thereafter, it likewise
Properties Corporation, Inc., one of the herein private respondents, passed Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance
renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino of Business Permit and to cancel existing Business
there during the Christmas season. Permit to any establishment for the using and
allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof
for the operation of CASINO;
The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was
swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353
reading as follows: WHEREAS, under Art. 3, section 458, No. (4), sub
paragraph VI of the Local Government Code of 1991
(Rep. Act 7160) and under Art. 99, No. (4), Paragraph
ORDINANCE NO. 3353
VI of the implementing rules of the Local Government
Code, the City Council as the Legislative Body shall
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF enact measure to suppress any activity inimical to
BUSINESS PERMIT AND CANCELLING EXISTING public morals and general welfare of the people
BUSINESS PERMIT TO ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR and/or regulate or prohibit such activity pertaining
THE USING AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS to amusement or entertainment in order to protect
PREMISES OR PORTION THEREOF FOR THE social and moral welfare of the community;
OPERATION OF CASINO.
NOW THEREFORE,
BE IT ORDAINED by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
the City of Cagayan de Oro, in session assembled that:
BE IT ORDAINED by the City Council in session duly
assembled that:
Sec. 1. — That pursuant to the policy of the city
banning the operation of casino within its territorial
Sec. 1. — The operation of gambling CASINO in the
jurisdiction, no business permit shall be issued to any
City of Cagayan de Oro is hereby prohibited.
person, partnership or corporation for the operation
of casino within the city limits.
Sec. 2. — Any violation of this Ordinance shall be
subject to the following penalties:
Sec. 2. — That it shall be a violation of existing
business permit by any persons, partnership or
corporation to use its business establishment or a) Administrative fine of P5,000.00 shall be imposed
portion thereof, or allow the use thereof by others for against the proprietor, partnership or corporation
casino operation and other gambling activities. undertaking the operation, conduct, maintenance of
gambling CASINO in the City and closure thereof;
Sec. 3. — PENALTIES. — Any violation of such
existing business permit as defined in the preceding b) Imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor
section shall suffer the following penalties, to wit: more than one (1) year or a fine in the amount of
P5,000.00 or both at the discretion of the court
 against the manager, supervisor, and/or any person encourage and support the development of
responsible in the establishment, conduct and appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
maintenance of gambling CASINO. technological capabilities, improve public morals,
enhance economic prosperity and social justice,
promote full employment among their residents,
Sec. 3. — This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10)
maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort
days after its publication in a local newspaper of
and convenience of their inhabitants.
general circulation.

In addition, Section 458 of the said Code specifically declares that:

Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was
joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their
challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the Sec. 458. — Powers, Duties, Functions and
ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their Compensation. — (a) The Sangguniang Panlungsod,
enforcement. 1 Reconsideration of this decision was denied on July 13, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact
1993. 2 ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for the general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in
Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor are now before us in this petition for
the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 3 They aver that the respondent
city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and
Court of Appeals erred in holding that:
shall:

1. Under existing laws, the Sangguniang Panlungsod

(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions
of the City of Cagayan de Oro does not have the power
necessary for an efficient and effective city
and authority to prohibit the establishment and
government, and in this connection, shall:
operation of a PAGCOR gambling casino within the
City's territorial limits.
xxx xxx xxx
2. The phrase "gambling and other prohibited games
of chance" found in Sec. 458, par. (a), sub-par. (1) — (v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose
(v) of R.A. 7160 could only mean "illegal gambling." appropriate penalties for habitual drunkenness in public places, vagrancy,
mendicancy, prostitution, establishment and maintenance of houses of ill
repute, gamblingand other prohibited games of chance, fraudulent devices
3. The questioned Ordinances in effect annul P.D.
and ways to obtain money or property, drug addiction, maintenance of
1869 and are therefore invalid on that point.
drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile delinquency, the printing, distribution or
exhibition of obscene or pornographic materials or publications, and such
4. The questioned Ordinances are discriminatory to other activities inimical to the welfare and morals of the inhabitants of the
casino and partial to cockfighting and are therefore city;
invalid on that point.
This section also authorizes the local government units to regulate
5. The questioned Ordinances are not reasonable, not properties and businesses within their territorial limits in the interest of
consonant with the general powers and purposes of the general welfare. 5
the instrumentality concerned and inconsistent with
the laws or policy of the State.
The petitioners argue that by virtue of these provisions, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos because they involve
6. It had no option but to follow the ruling in the case games of chance, which are detrimental to the people. Gambling is not
of Basco, et al. v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, allowed by general law and even by the Constitution itself. The legislative
1991, 197 SCRA 53 in disposing of the issues power conferred upon local government units may be exercised over all
presented in this present case. kinds of gambling and not only over "illegal gambling" as the respondents
erroneously argue. Even if the operation of casinos may have been
permitted under P.D. 1869, the government of Cagayan de Oro City has the
PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize
authority to prohibit them within its territory pursuant to the authority
and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within
entrusted to it by the Local Government Code.
the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. In Basco v. Philippine
Amusements and Gaming Corporation, 4 this Court sustained the
constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits of the entity to It is submitted that this interpretation is consonant with the policy of local
the national economy as the third highest revenue-earner in the autonomy as mandated in Article II, Section 25, and Article X of the
government, next only to the BIR and the Bureau of Customs. Constitution, as well as various other provisions therein seeking to
strengthen the character of the nation. In giving the local government units
the power to prevent or suppress gambling and other social problems, the
Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered
Local Government Code has recognized the competence of such
to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government
communities to determine and adopt the measures best expected to
Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under what is known as
promote the general welfare of their inhabitants in line with the policies of
the General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16 as follows:
the State.

Sec. 16. — General Welfare. — Every local

The petitioners also stress that when the Code expressly authorized the
government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
local government units to prevent and suppress gambling and other
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well
prohibited games of chance, like craps, baccarat, blackjack and roulette, it
as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for
meant allforms of gambling without distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec
its efficient and effective governance, and those
nos distinguere debemos. 6 Otherwise, it would have expressly excluded
which are essential to the promotion of the general
from the scope of their power casinos and other forms of gambling
welfare. Within their respective territorial
authorized by special law, as it could have easily done. The fact that it did
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and
not do so simply means that the local government units are permitted to
support, among other things, the preservation and
prohibit all kinds of gambling within their territories, including the
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety,
operation of casinos.
enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology,
The adoption of the Local Government Code, it is pointed out, had the effect and the constituents who will ultimately judge their acts, and not to the
of modifying the charter of the PAGCOR. The Code is not only a later courts of justice.
enactment than P.D. 1869 and so is deemed to prevail in case of
inconsistencies between them. More than this, the powers of the PAGCOR
The only question we can and shall resolve in this petition is the validity of
under the decree are expressly discontinued by the Code insofar as they do
Ordinance No. 3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the
not conform to its philosophy and provisions, pursuant to Par. (f) of its
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City. And we shall do so only
repealing clause reading as follows:
by the criteria laid down by law and not by our own convictions on the
propriety of gambling.
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters,
decrees, executive orders, proclamations and
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of
administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof
decisions 9 has held that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the
which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of
following substantive requirements:
this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any
statute.
It is also maintained that assuming there is doubt regarding the effect of
the Local Government Code on P.D. 1869, the doubt must be resolved in
favor of the petitioners, in accordance with the direction in the Code calling 2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
for its liberal interpretation in favor of the local government units. Section
5 of the Code specifically provides:
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.

Sec. 5. Rules of Interpretation. — In the

4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the
following rules shall apply:
5) It must be general and consistent with public
policy.
(a) Any provision on a power of a local government
unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in
case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in 6) It must not be unreasonable.
favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local
government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to
We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code,
the existence of the power shall be interpreted in
local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among
favor of the local government unit concerned;
others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this
provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in
xxx xxx xxx fact permitted by law. The petitioners are less than accurate in claiming
that the Code could have excluded such games of chance but did not. In fact
it does. The language of the section is clear and unmistakable. Under the
(c) The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be
rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be interpreted in relation
liberally interpreted to give more powers to local
to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it is associated.
government units in accelerating economic
Accordingly, we conclude that since the word "gambling" is associated with
development and upgrading the quality of life for the
"and other prohibited games of chance," the word should be read as
people in the community; . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
referring to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of
chance, must be prevented or suppressed.
Finally, the petitioners also attack gambling as intrinsically harmful and
cite various provisions of the Constitution and several decisions of this
We could stop here as this interpretation should settle the problem quite
Court expressive of the general and official disapprobation of the vice. They
conclusively. But we will not. The vigorous efforts of the petitioners on
invoke the State policies on the family and the proper upbringing of the
behalf of the inhabitants of Cagayan de Oro City, and the earnestness of
youth and, as might be expected, call attention to the old case of U.S. v.
their advocacy, deserve more than short shrift from this Court.
Salaveria,7 which sustained a municipal ordinance prohibiting the playing
of panguingue. The petitioners decry the immorality of gambling. They also
impugn the wisdom of P.D. 1869 (which they describe as "a martial law The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene
instrument") in creating PAGCOR and authorizing it to operate casinos "on P.D. 1869 and the public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent
land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines." PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to operate a casino in
Cagayan de Oro City. The petitioners have an ingenious answer to this
misgiving. They deny that it is the ordinances that have changed P.D. 1869
This is the opportune time to stress an important point.
for an ordinance admittedly cannot prevail against a statute. Their theory
is that the change has been made by the Local Government Code itself,
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not which was also enacted by the national lawmaking authority. In their view,
illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the the decree has been, not really repealed by the Code, but merely
people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or "modified pro tanto" in the sense that PAGCOR cannot now operate a
penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left casino over the objection of the local government unit concerned. This
to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own modification of P.D. 1869 by the Local Government Code is permissible
discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it because one law can change or repeal another law.
without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow
others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has
It seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words. While insisting
prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and
that the decree has only been "modifiedpro tanto," they are actually
horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own
arguing that it is already dead, repealed and useless for all intents and
wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse.
purposes because the Code has shorn PAGCOR of all power to centralize
Well has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of
and regulate casinos. Strictly speaking, its operations may now be not only
conflicting theories. 8 That is the prerogative of the political departments.
prohibited by the local government unit; in fact, the prohibition is not only
It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicibility
discretionary but mandated by Section 458 of the Code if the word "shall"
of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by
as used therein is to be given its accepted meaning. Local government units
the legislative and executive departments, to which the function belongs in
have now no choice but to prevent and suppress gambling, which in the
our scheme of government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way
petitioners' view includes both legal and illegal gambling. Under this
these branches decide, they are answerable only to their own conscience
construction, PAGCOR will have no more games of chance to regulate or There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of P.D. 1869. On the
centralize as they must all be prohibited by the local government units contrary, as the private respondent points out, PAGCOR is mentioned as
pursuant to the mandatory duty imposed upon them by the Code. In this the source of funding in two later enactments of Congress, to wit, R.A. 7309,
situation, PAGCOR cannot continue to exist except only as a toothless tiger creating a Board of Claims under the Department of Justice for the benefit
or a white elephant and will no longer be able to exercise its powers as a of victims of unjust punishment or detention or of violent crimes, and R.A.
prime source of government revenue through the operation of casinos. 7648, providing for measures for the solution of the power crisis. PAGCOR
revenues are tapped by these two statutes. This would show that the
PAGCOR charter has not been repealed by the Local Government Code but
It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. (f) of the repealing
has in fact been improved as it were to make the entity more responsive to
clause, conveniently discarding the rest of the provision which
the fiscal problems of the government.
painstakingly mentions the specific laws or the parts thereof which are
repealed (or modified) by the Code. Significantly, P.D. 1869 is not one of
them. A reading of the entire repealing clause, which is reproduced below, It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against
will disclose the omission: another in an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must exert every
effort to reconcile them, remembering that both laws deserve a becoming
respect as the handiwork of a coordinate branch of the government. On the
Sec. 534. Repealing Clause. — (a) Batas Pambansa
assumption of a conflict between P.D. 1869 and the Code, the proper action
Blg. 337, otherwise known as the "Local Government
is not to uphold one and annul the other but to give effect to both by
Code," Executive Order No. 112 (1987), and
harmonizing them if possible. This is possible in the case before us. The
Executive Order No. 319 (1988) are hereby repealed.
proper resolution of the problem at hand is to hold that under the Local
Government Code, local government units may (and indeed must) prevent
(b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and and suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories except only
such other decrees, orders, instructions, memoranda those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869. The exception reserved in such
and issuances related to or concerning the barangay laws must be read into the Code, to make both the Code and such laws
are hereby repealed. equally effective and mutually complementary.

(c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic This approach would also affirm that there are indeed two kinds of
Act No. 1939 regarding hospital fund; Section 3, a (3) gambling, to wit, the illegal and those authorized by law. Legalized
and b (2) of Republic Act. No. 5447 regarding the gambling is not a modern concept; it is probably as old as illegal gambling,
Special Education Fund; Presidential Decree No. 144 if not indeed more so. The petitioners' suggestion that the Code authorizes
as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 559 and them to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the distinction between
1741; Presidential Decree No. 231 as amended; these two forms of gambling without a clear indication that this is the will
Presidential Decree No. 436 as amended by of the legislature. Plausibly, following this theory, the City of Manila could,
Presidential Decree No. 558; and Presidential Decree by mere ordinance, prohibit the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477, 526, 632, 752, and 1136 are from conducting a lottery as authorized by R.A. 1169 and B.P. 42 or stop
hereby repealed and rendered of no force and effect. the races at the San Lazaro Hippodrome as authorized by R.A. 309 and R.A.
983.
(d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed
insofar as it governs locally-funded projects. In light of all the above considerations, we see no way of arriving at the
conclusion urged on us by the petitioners that the ordinances in question
are valid. On the contrary, we find that the ordinances violate P.D. 1869,
(e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or
which has the character and force of a statute, as well as the public policy
amended insofar as they are inconsistent with the
expressed in the decree allowing the playing of certain games of chance
provisions of this Code: Sections 2, 16, and 29 of
despite the prohibition of gambling in general.
Presidential Decree No. 704; Sections 12 of
Presidential Decree No. 87, as amended; Sections 52,
53, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 of Presidential The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not
Decree No. 463, as amended; and Section 16 of contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of
Presidential Decree No. 972, as amended, and the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative
powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body.
The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters,
than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government
decrees, executive orders, proclamations and
units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their
administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof
power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the
which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of
statute.
this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and
derive their powers and rights wholly from the
Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not lightly
legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life,
presumed in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such
without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it
intention. In Lichauco & Co. v. Apostol, 10 this Court explained:
may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and
control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation
The cases relating to the subject of repeal by on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and
implication all proceed on the assumption that if the if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so
act of later date clearly reveals an intention on the great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the
part of the lawmaking power to abrogate the prior municipal corporations in the State, and the
law, this intention must be given effect; but there corporation could not prevent it. We know of no
must always be a sufficient revelation of this limitation on the right so far as to the corporation
intention, and it has become an unbending rule of themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it,
statutory construction that the intention to repeal a the mere tenants at will of the legislature. 11
former law will not be imputed to the Legislature
when it appears that the two statutes, or provisions,
This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local
with reference to which the question arises bear to
government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the
each other the relation of general to special.
Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning
to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control
of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now However, despite the legality of the opening and operation of a casino in
than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes Cagayan de Oro City by respondent PAGCOR, I wish to reiterate my view
the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to that gambling in any form runs counter to the government's own efforts to
withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the re-establish and resurrect the Filipino moral character which is generally
Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government units of perceived to be in a state of continuing erosion.
the power to tax, 12 which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By
and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local
It is in the light of this alarming perspective that I call upon government to
government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.
carefully weigh the advantages and disadvantages of setting up more
gambling facilities in the country.
The Court understands and admires the concern of the petitioners for the
welfare of their constituents and their apprehensions that the welfare of
That the PAGCOR contributes greatly to the coffers of the government is
Cagayan de Oro City will be endangered by the opening of the casino. We
not enough reason for setting up more gambling casinos because,
share the view that "the hope of large or easy gain, obtained without
undoubtedly, this will not help improve, but will cause a further
special effort, turns the head of the workman" 13 and that "habitual
deterioration in the Filipino moral character.
gambling is a cause of laziness and ruin." 14 In People v. Gorostiza, 15 we
declared: "The social scourge of gambling must be stamped out. The laws
against gambling must be enforced to the limit." George Washington called It is worth remembering in this regard that, 1) what is legal is not always
gambling "the child of avarice, the brother of iniquity and the father of moral and 2) the ends do not always justify the means.
mischief." Nevertheless, we must recognize the power of the legislature to
decide, in its own wisdom, to legalize certain forms of gambling, as was
As in Basco, I can easily visualize prostitution at par with gambling. And
done in P.D. 1869 and impliedly affirmed in the Local Government Code.
yet, legalization of the former will not render it any less reprehensible even
That decision can be revoked by this Court only if it contravenes the
if substantial revenue for the government can be realized from it. The same
Constitution as the touchstone of all official acts. We do not find such
is true of gambling.
contravention here.

In the present case, it is my considered view that the national government

We hold that the power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games of
(through PAGCOR) should re-examine and re-evaluate its decision
chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction
of imposing the gambling casino on the residents of Cagayan de Oro City;
of the Philippines, remains unimpaired. P.D. 1869 has not been modified
for it is abundantly clear that public opinion in the city is very much against
by the Local Government Code, which empowers the local government
it, and again the question must be seriously deliberated: will the prospects
units to prevent or suppress only those forms of gambling prohibited by
of revenue to be realized from the casino outweigh the further destruction
law.
of the Filipino sense of values?

Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a
statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it
was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City
to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:
operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation
of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are
While I concur in part with the majority, I wish, however, to express my
contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are
views on certain aspects of this case.
therefore ultra vires and void.

I.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against the
petitioners. It is so ordered. It must at once be noted that private respondent Pryce Properties
Corporation (PRYCE) directly filed with the Court of Appeals its so-called
petition for prohibition, thereby invoking the said court's original
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
jurisdiction to issue writs of prohibition under Section 9(1) of B.P. Blg. 129.
Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
As I see it, however, the principal cause of action therein is one for
declaratory relief: to declare null and unconstitutional — for, inter alia,
Separate Opinions having been enacted without or in excess of jurisdiction, for impairing the
obligation of contracts, and for being inconsistent with public policy — the
challenged ordinances enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of the
City of Cagayan de Oro. The intervention therein of public respondent
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) further
PADILLA, J., concurring: underscores the "declaratory relief" nature of the action. PAGCOR assails
the ordinances for being contrary to the non-impairment and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution, violative of the Local Government
I concur with the majority holding that the city ordinances in question
Code, and against the State's national policy declared in P.D. No. 1869.
cannot modify much less repeal PAGCOR's general authority to establish
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction over the
and maintain gambling casinos anywhere in the Philippines under
nature of the action. Even assuming arguendo that the case is one
Presidential Decree No. 1869.
for prohibition, then, under this Court's established policy relative to the
hierarchy of courts, the petition should have been filed with the Regional
In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), 197 Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. I find no special or compelling reason
SCRA 52, I stated in a separate opinion that: why it was not filed with the said court. I do not wish to entertain the
thought that PRYCE doubted a favorable verdict therefrom, in which case
the filing of the petition with the Court of Appeals may have been impelled
. . . I agree with the decision insofar as it holds that the
by tactical considerations. A dismissal of the petition by the Court of
prohibition, control, and regulation of the entire activity known
Appeals would have been in order pursuant to our decisions in People vs.
as gambling properly pertain to "state policy". It is, therefore, the
Cuaresma (172 SCRA 415, [1989]) and Defensor-Santiago vs. Vasquez (217
political departments of government, namely, the legislative and
SCRA 633 [1993]). In Cuaresma, this Court stated:
the executive that should decide on what government should do
in the entire area of gambling, and assume full responsibility to
the people for such policy." (Emphasis supplied) A last word. This court's original jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is
 shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly Gambling Casino in the City of Cagayan de Oro," which was promulgated on
Courts of First Instance), which may issue the writ, 19 November 1990 — nearly two years before PRYCE and PAGCOR
enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also entered into a contract of lease under which the latter leased a portion of
shared by this court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the the former's Pryce Plaza Hotel for the operation of a gambling casino —
Court of Appeals (formerly, Intermediate Appellate Court), which resolution was vigorously reiterated in Resolution No. 2673 of 19
although prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang October 1992.
129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's competence to issue the
extraordinary writs was restricted by those "in aid of its
The challenged ordinances were enacted pursuant to the Sangguniang
appellate jurisdiction." This concurrence of jurisdiction is
Panglungsod's express powers conferred by Section 458, paragraph (a),
not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any
subparagraphs (1)-(v), (3)-(ii), and (4)-(i), (iv), and (vii), Local
of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of
Government Code, and pursuant to its implied power under Section 16
the court to which application therefor will be directed. There
thereof (the general welfare clause) which reads:
is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
determinative of the revenue of appeals, and should also
serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for Sec. 16. General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall
petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental
for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their
Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall
A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and
jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right
there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the
specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment
to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the
prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket. Indeed, comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
the removal of the restriction of the jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals in this regard, supra — resulting from the deletion
The issue that necessarily arises is whether in granting local governments
of the qualifying phrase, "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction"
(such as the City of Cagayan de Oro) the above powers and functions, the
— was evidently intended precisely to relieve this Court pro
Local Government Code has, pro tanto, repealed P.D. No. 1869 insofar as
tanto of the burden of dealing with applications for
PAGCOR's general authority to establish and maintain gambling casinos
extraordinary writs which, but for the expansion of the
anywhere in the Philippines is concerned.
Appellate Court's corresponding jurisdiction, would have had
to be filed with it. (citations omitted)
I join the majority in holding that the ordinances cannot repeal P.D. No.
1869.
And in Vasquez, this Court said:

III.
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings
in this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and,
for that matter, the same may be said of a number of The nullification by the Court of Appeals of the challenged ordinances
litigants who initiate recourses before us, to as unconstitutional primarily because it is in contravention to P.D. No.
disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial 1869 is unwarranted. A contravention of a law is not necessarily a
system by seeking relief directly from this Court contravention of the constitution. In any case, the ordinances can still stand
despite the fact that the same is available in the lower even if they be conceded as offending P.D. No. 1869. They can be
courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent reconciled, which is not impossible to do. So reconciled, the ordinances
jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought should be construed as not applying to PAGCOR.
therein. This practice must be stopped, not only
because of the imposition upon the previous time of
IV.
this Court but also because of the inevitable and
resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the
adjudication of the case which often has to be From the pleadings, it is obvious that the government and the people of
remanded or referred to the lower court as the Cagayan de Oro City are, for obvious reasons, strongly against the opening
proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as of the gambling casino in their city. Gambling, even if legalized, would be
better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court inimical to the general welfare of the inhabitants of the City, or of any place
is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the for that matter. The PAGCOR, as a government-owned corporation, must
judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct consider the valid concerns of the people of the City of Cagayan de Oro and
resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be should not impose its will upon them in an arbitrary, if not despotic,
obtained in the appropriate courts or where manner.
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify
availment of a remedy within and calling for the
exercise of our primary jurisdiction.

# Separate Opinions
II.

PADILLA, J., concurring:

The challenged ordinances are (a) Ordinance No. 3353 entitled, "An
Ordinance Prohibiting the Issuance of Business Permit and Canceling
Existing Business Permit To Any Establishment for the Using and Allowing to I concur with the majority holding that the city ordinances in question
be Used Its Premises or Portion Thereof for the Operation of Casino," and (b) cannot modify much less repeal PAGCOR's general authority to establish
Ordinance No. 3375-93 entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting the Operation and maintain gambling casinos anywhere in the Philippines under
of Casino and Providing Penalty for Violation Therefor." They were enacted Presidential Decree No. 1869.
to implement Resolution No. 2295 entitled, "Resolution Declaring As a
Matter of Policy to Prohibit and/or Not to Allow the Establishment of the
In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), 197 why it was not filed with the said court. I do not wish to entertain the
SCRA 52, I stated in a separate opinion that: thought that PRYCE doubted a favorable verdict therefrom, in which case
the filing of the petition with the Court of Appeals may have been impelled
by tactical considerations. A dismissal of the petition by the Court of
. . . I agree with the decision insofar as it holds that the
Appeals would have been in order pursuant to our decisions in People vs.
prohibition, control, and regulation of the entire
Cuaresma (172 SCRA 415, [1989]) and Defensor-Santiago vs. Vasquez (217
activity known as gambling properly pertain to "state
SCRA 633 [1993]). In Cuaresma, this Court stated:
policy". It is, therefore, the political departments of
government, namely, the legislative and the executive
that should decide on what government should do in A last word. This court's original jurisdiction to issue writs
the entire area of gambling, and assume full of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
responsibility to the people for such policy. (emphasis corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with
supplied) Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance), which may
issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is
also shared by this court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the
However, despite the legality of the opening and operation of a casino in
Court of Appeals (formerly, Intermediate Appellate Court), although
Cagayan de Oro City by respondent PAGCOR, I wish to reiterate my view
prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14,
that gambling in any form runs counter to the government's own efforts to
1981, the latter's competence to issue the extraordinary writs was
re-establish and resurrect the Filipino moral character which is generally
restricted by those "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This
perceived to be in a state of continuing erosion.
concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to
parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of
It is in the light of this alarming perspective that I call upon government to choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There
carefully weigh the advantages and disadvantages of setting up more is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the
gambling facilities in the country. revenue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of
the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A
becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates
That the PAGCOR contributes greatly to the coffers of the government is
that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level
not enough reason for setting up more gambling casinos because,
("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and
undoubtedly, this will not help improve, but will cause a further
those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation
deterioration in the Filipino moral character.
of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should
be allowed only when there are special and important reasons
It is worth remembering in this regard that, 1) what is legal is not always therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is
moral and 2) the ends do not always justify the means. established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate
demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted
to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent
As in Basco, I can easily visualize prostitution at par with gambling. And
further over-crowding of the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the
yet, legalization of the former will not render it any less reprehensible even
restriction of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this
if substantial revenue for the government can be realized from it. The same
regard, supra — resulting from the deletion of the qualifying phrase,
is true of gambling.
"in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" — was evidently intended precisely
to relieve this Court pro tanto of the burden of dealing with
In the present case, it is my considered view that the national government applications for extraordinary writs which, but for the expansion of the
(through PAGCOR) should re-examine and re-evaluate its decision Appellate Court's corresponding jurisdiction, would have had to be
of imposing the gambling casino on the residents of Cagayan de Oro City; filed with it. (citations omitted)
for it is abundantly clear that public opinion in the city is very much against
it, and again the question must be seriously deliberated: will the prospects
And in Vasquez, this Court said:
of revenue to be realized from the casino outweigh the further destruction
of the Filipino sense of values?
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a
propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:
may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us,
to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking
While I concur in part with the majority, I wish, however, to express my relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is
views on certain aspects of this case. available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or
concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought
therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the
I.
imposition upon the previous time of this Court but also because of
the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the
It must at once be noted that private respondent Pryce Properties adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred
Corporation (PRYCE) directly filed with the Court of Appeals its so-called to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure,
petition for prohibition, thereby invoking the said court's original or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a
jurisdiction to issue writs of prohibition under Section 9(1) of B.P. Blg. 129. trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court
As I see it, however, the principal cause of action therein is one for will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot
declaratory relief: to declare null and unconstitutional — for, inter alia, be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and
having been enacted without or in excess of jurisdiction, for impairing the compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and
obligation of contracts, and for being inconsistent with public policy — the calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
challenged ordinances enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of the City
of Cagayan de Oro. The intervention therein of public respondent
II.
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) further
underscores the "declaratory relief" nature of the action. PAGCOR assails
the ordinances for being contrary to the non-impairment and equal The challenged ordinances are (a) Ordinance No. 3353 entitled, "An
protection clauses of the Constitution, violative of the Local Government Ordinance Prohibiting the Issuance of Business Permit and Canceling
Code, and against the State's national policy declared in P.D. No. 1869. Existing Business Permit To Any Establishment for the Using and Allowing to
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction over the be Used Its Premises or Portion Thereof for the Operation of Casino," and (b)
nature of the action. Even assuming arguendo that the case is one Ordinance No. 3375-93 entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting the Operation
for prohibition, then, under this Court's established policy relative to the of Casino and Providing Penalty for Violation Therefor." They were enacted
hierarchy of courts, the petition should have been filed with the Regional to implement Resolution No. 2295 entitled, "Resolution Declaring As a
Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. I find no special or compelling reason Matter of Policy to Prohibit and/or Not to Allow the Establishment of the
Gambling Casino in the City of Cagayan de Oro," which was promulgated on
19 November 1990 — nearly two years before PRYCE and PAGCOR
entered into a contract of lease under which the latter leased a portion of
the former's Pryce Plaza Hotel for the operation of a gambling casino —
which resolution was vigorously reiterated in Resolution No. 2673 of 19
October 1992.

The challenged ordinances were enacted pursuant to the Sangguniang

Panglungsod's express powers conferred by Section 458, paragraph (a),
subparagraphs (1)-(v), (3)-(ii), and (4)-(i), (iv), and (vii), Local
Government Code, and pursuant to its implied power under Section 16
thereof (the general welfare clause) which reads:

Sec. 16. General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall

exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental
for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall
ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the
right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support
the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment
among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the
comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

The issue that necessarily arises is whether in granting local governments

(such as the City of Cagayan de Oro) the above powers and functions, the
Local Government Code has, pro tanto, repealed P.D. No. 1869 insofar as
PAGCOR's general authority to establish and maintain gambling casinos
anywhere in the Philippines is concerned.

I join the majority in holding that the ordinances cannot repeal P.D. No.
1869.

III.

The nullification by the Court of Appeals of the challenged ordinances

as unconstitutional primarily because it is in contravention to P.D. No.
1869 is unwarranted. A contravention of a law is not necessarily a
contravention of the constitution. In any case, the ordinances can still stand
even if they be conceded as offending P.D. No. 1869. They can be
reconciled, which is not impossible to do. So reconciled, the ordinances
should be construed as not applying to PAGCOR.

IV.

From the pleadings, it is obvious that the government and the people of
Cagayan de Oro City are, for obvious reasons, strongly against the opening
of the gambling casino in their city. Gambling, even if legalized, would be
inimical to the general welfare of the inhabitants of the City, or of any place
for that matter. The PAGCOR, as a government-owned corporation, must
consider the valid concerns of the people of the City of Cagayan de Oro and
should not impose its will upon them in an arbitrary, if not despotic,
manner.
 August 8, 2017 or detailed standards on how law enforcers should apprehend and
properly determine the age of the alleged curfew violators. 13 They further
argue that the law enforcer's apprehension depends only on his physical
G.R. No. 225442
assessment, and, thus, subjective and based only on the law enforcer's
visual assessment of the alleged curfew violator.14
SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN (SPARK),* JOANNE
ROSE SACE LIM, JOHN ARVIN NAVARRO BUENAAGUA, RONEL
While petitioners recognize that the Curfew Ordinances contain provisions
BACCUTAN, MARK LEO DELOS REYES, and CLARISSA JOYCE VILLEGAS,
indicating the activities exempted from the operation of the imposed
minor, for herself and as represented by her father, JULIAN VILLEGAS,
curfews, i.e., exemption of working students or students with evening
JR., Petitioners,
class, they contend that the lists of exemptions do not cover the range and
vs.
breadth of legitimate activities or reasons as to why minors would be out
QUEZON CITY, as represented by MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY
at night, and, hence, proscribe or impair the legitimate activities of minors
OF MANILA, as represented by MAYOR JOSEPH ESTRADA, and
during curfew hours.15
NAVOTAS CITY, as represented by MAYOR JOHN REY TIANGCO,,
Respondents,
Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a) are
unconstitutional as they deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right
DECISION
to travel without substantive due process;16 and (b) fail to pass the strict
scrutiny test, for not being narrowly tailored and for employing means that
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: bear no reasonable relation to their purpose.17 They argue that the
prohibition of minors on streets during curfew hours will not per
se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of children of the
This petition for certiorari and prohibition1 assails the constitutionality of
community.18
the curfew ordinances issued by the local governments of Quezon City,
Manila, and Navotas. The petition prays that a temporary restraining order
(TRO) be issued ordering respondents Herbert Bautista, Joseph Estrada, Furthermore, petitioners claim that the Manila Ordinance, particularly
and John Rey Tiangco, as Mayors of their respective local governments, to Section 419 thereof, contravenes Section 57-A20 of RA 9344, as amended,
prohibit, refrain, and desist from implementing and enforcing these given that the cited curfew provision imposes on minors the penalties of
issuances, pending resolution of this case, and eventually, declare the City imprisonment, reprimand, and admonition. They contend that the
of Manila's ordinance as ultra vires for being contrary to Republic Act No. imposition of penalties contravenes RA 9344's express command that no
(RA) 9344,2 or the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act," as amended, and all penalty shall be imposed on minors for curfew violations. 21
curfew ordinances as unconstitutional for violating the constitutional right
of minors to travel, as well as the right of parents to rear their children.
Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no compelling State interest to
impose curfews contrary to the parents' prerogative to impose them in the
The Facts exercise of their natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth, and
that even if a compelling interest exists, less restrictive means are available
to achieve the same. In this regard, they suggest massive street lighting
Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a
programs, installation of CCTV s (closed-circuit televisions) in public
nationwide curfew for minors, several local governments in Metro Manila
streets, and regular visible patrols by law enforcers as other viable means
started to strictly implement their curfew ordinances on minors through
of protecting children and preventing crimes at night. They further opine
police operations which were publicly known as part of "Oplan Rody."3
that the government can impose more reasonable
sanctions, i.e., mandatory parental counseling and education seminars
Among those local governments that implemented curfew ordinances informing the parents of the reasons behind the curfew, and that
were respondents: (a) Navotas City, through Pambayang Ordinansa imprisonment is too harsh a penalty for parents who allowed their
Blg. 99- 02,4 dated August 26, 1999, entitled "Nagtatakdang 'Curfew' ng children to be out during curfew hours.22
mga Kabataan na Wala Pang Labing Walong (18) Taong Gulang sa Bayan
ng Navotas, Kalakhang Maynila," as amended by Pambayang Ordinansa
The Issue Before the Court
Blg. 2002-13,5 dated June 6, 2002 (Navotas Ordinance); (b) City of Manila,
through Ordinance No. 80466 entitled "An Ordinance Declaring the Hours
from 10:00 P.M. to 4:00 A.M. of the Following Day as 'Barangay Curfew The primordial issue for the Court's resolution in this case is whether or
Hours' for Children and Youths Below Eighteen (18) Years of Age; not the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional.
Prescribing Penalties Therefor; and for Other Purposes" dated October 14,
2002 (Manila Ordinance); and (c) Quezon City, through Ordinance No. SP-
The Court's Ruling
2301,7 Series of 2014, entitled "An Ordinance Setting for a [sic]
Disciplinary Hours in Quezon City for Minors from 10:00 P.M. to 5:00 A.M.,
Providing Penalties for Parent/Guardian, for Violation Thereof and for The petition is partly granted.
Other Purposes" dated July 31, 2014 (Quezon City Ordinance; collectively,
Curfew Ordinances).8
I.

Petitioners,9 spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong

At the onset, the Court addresses the procedural issues raised in this case.
Kabataan (SPARK) - an association of young adults and minors that aims
Respondents seek the dismissal of the petition, questioning: (a) the
to forward a free and just society, in particular the protection of the rights
propriety of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
and welfare of the youth and minors10 - filed this present petition, arguing
to assail the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances; (b) petitioners'
that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they: (a) result in
direct resort to the Court, contrary to the hierarchy of courts doctrine;
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and thus, fall under the void for
and (c) the lack of actual controversy and standing to warrant judicial
vagueness doctrine; (b)suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or
review.23
impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours; (c) deprive
minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive
due process; and (d) deprive parents of their natural and primary right in A. Propriety of the Petition for
rearing the youth without substantive due process. 11 In addition, Certiorari and Prohibition.
petitioners assert that the Manila Ordinance contravenes RA 9344, as
amended by RA 10630.12
Under the 1987 Constitution, judicial power includes the duty of the courts
of justice not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
More specifically, petitioners posit that the Curfew Ordinances encourage legally demandable and enforceable," but also "to determine whether or
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement as there are no clear provisions not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the higher court. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions
Government."24 Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads: for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus. While this jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals [(CA)]
and the [Regional Trial Courts], a direct invocation of this Court's
ARTICLE VIII
jurisdiction is allowed when there are special and important reasons
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
therefor, clearly and especially set out in the petition[.]"32 This Court
is tasked to resolve "the issue of constitutionality of a law or regulation
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in at the first instance [if it] is of paramount importance and
such lower courts as may be established by law. immediately affects the social, economic, and moral well-being of the
people,"33 as in this case. Hence, petitioners' direct resort to the Court is
justified.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave C. Requisites of Judicial Review.
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis
"The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question
and underscoring supplied)
involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may
be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal
Case law explains that the present Constitution has "expanded the concept requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or
of judicial power, which up to then was confined to its traditional ambit of controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person
settling actual controversies involving rights that were legally demandable challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
and enforceable."25 subject act or issuance; (c)the question of constitutionality must be raised
at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case."34 In this case, respondents assail the
In Araullo v. Aquino III,26 it was held that petitions for certiorari and
existence of the first two (2) requisites.
prohibition filed before the Court "are the remedies by which the grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government may be determined 1. Actual Case or Controversy.
under the Constitution."27 It was explained that "[w]ith respect to the
Court, x x x the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily
"Basic in the exercise of judicial power - whether under the traditional or
broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may
in the expanded setting - is the presence of an actual case or
be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal,
controversy."35 "[A]n actual case or controversy is one which 'involves a
corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of
ministerial functions, but also to set right, undo[,] and restrain any act
judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
difference or dispute.' In other words, 'there must be a contrariety of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of
Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial
existing law and jurisprudence."36 According to recent jurisprudence, in
or ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized by the
the Court's exercise of its expanded jurisdiction under the 1987
text of the second paragraph of Section 1, [Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution, this requirement is simplified "by merely requiring
Constitution cited above]."28
a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion in the assailed
governmental act."37
In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved
Medical Centers Association, Inc.,29 it was expounded that "[ m ]eanwhile
"Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
that no specific procedural rule has been promulgated to enforce [the]
requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act
'expanded' constitutional definition of judicial power and because of the
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
commonality of 'grave abuse of discretion' as a ground for review under
challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
Rule 65 and the courts' expanded jurisdiction, the Supreme Court - based
prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or
on its power to relax its rules - allowed Rule 65 to be used as the medium
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture,
for petitions invoking the courts' expanded jurisdiction[. ]"30
and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He
In this case, petitioners question the issuance of the Curfew Ordinances by must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining
the legislative councils of Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas in the exercise some direct injury as a result of the act complained of."38
of their delegated legislative powers on the ground that these ordinances
violate the Constitution, specifically, the provisions pertaining to the right
Applying these precepts, this Court finds that there exists an actual
to travel of minors, and the right of parents to rear their children. They also
justiciable controversy in this case given the evident clash of the parties'
claim that the Manila Ordinance, by imposing penalties against minors,
legal claims, particularly on whether the Curfew Ordinances impair the
conflicts with RA 9344, as amended, which prohibits the imposition of
minors' and parents' constitutional rights, and whether the Manila
penalties on minors for status offenses. It has been held that "[t]here is
Ordinance goes against the provisions of RA 9344. Based on their
grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to the
asseverations, petitioners have - as will be gleaned from the substantive
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically,
discussions below - conveyed a prima facie case of grave abuse of
capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias. "31 In light
discretion, which perforce impels this Court to exercise its expanded
of the foregoing, petitioners correctly availed of the remedies
jurisdiction. The case is likewise ripe for adjudication, considering that the
of certiorari and prohibition, although these governmental actions were
Curfew Ordinances were being implemented until the Court issued the
not made pursuant to any judicial or quasi-judicial function.
TRO39 enjoining their enforcement. The purported threat or incidence of
injury is, therefore, not merely speculative or hypothetical but rather, real
B. Direct Resort to the Court. and apparent.

Since petitions for certiorari and prohibition are allowed as remedies to 2. Legal Standing.
assail the constitutionality of legislative and executive enactments, the
next question to be resolved is whether or not petitioners' direct resort to
"The question of locus standi or legal standing focuses on the
this Court is justified.
determination of whether those assailing the governmental act have the
right of appearance to bring the matter to the court for adjudication.
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts "[r]equires that recourse must first be [Petitioners] must show that they have a personal and substantial
made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a interest in the case, such that they have sustained or are in immediate
danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a consequence of the significance to the public, which, therefore, impels a relaxation of
enforcement of the challenged governmental act."40 "' [I]nterest' in the procedural rules, including, among others, the standing requirement.
question involved must be material - an interest that is in issue and will be
affected by the official act- as distinguished from being merely incidental
That being said, this Court now proceeds to the substantive aspect of this
or general."41
case.

"The gist of the question of [legal] standing is whether a party alleges such
II.
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult A. Void for Vagueness.
constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of
his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no
Before resolving the issues pertaining to the rights of minors to travel and
standing."42
of parents to rear their children, this Court must first tackle petitioners'
contention that the Curfew Ordinances are void for vagueness.
As abovementioned, the petition is anchored on the alleged breach of two
(2) constitutional rights, namely: (1) the right of minors to freely travel
In particular, petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are void for
within their respective localities; and (2) the primary right of parents to
not containing sufficient enforcement parameters, which leaves the
rear their children. Related to the first is the purported conflict between
enforcing authorities with unbridled discretion to carry out their
RA 9344, as amended, and the penal provisions of the Manila Ordinance.
provisions. They claim that the lack of procedural guidelines in these
issuances led to the questioning of petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, even
Among the five (5) individual petitioners, only Clarissa Joyce Villegas though they were already of legal age. They maintain that the enforcing
(Clarissa) has legal standing to raise the issue affecting the minor's right to authorities apprehended the suspected curfew offenders based only on
travel,43 because: (a) she was still a minor at the time the petition was filed their physical appearances and, thus, acted arbitrarily. Meanwhile,
before this Court,44 and, hence, a proper subject of the Curfew Ordinances; although they conceded that the Quezon City Ordinance requires enforcers
and (b) as alleged, she travels from Manila to Quezon City at night after to determine the age of the child, they submit that nowhere does the said
school and is, thus, in imminent danger of apprehension by virtue of the ordinance require the law enforcers to ask for proof or identification of the
Curfew Ordinances. On the other hand, petitioners Joanne Rose Sace Lim, child to show his age.47
John Arvin Navarro Buenaagua, Ronel Baccutan (Ronel), and Mark Leo
Delos Reyes (Mark Leo) admitted in the petition that they are all of legal
The arguments are untenable.
age, and therefore, beyond the ordinances' coverage. Thus, they are not
proper subjects of the Curfew Ordinances, for which they could base any
direct injury as a consequence thereof. "A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
None of them, however, has standing to raise the issue of whether the
repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due
Curfew Ordinances violate the parents' right to rear their children as they
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted
have not shown that they stand before this Court as parent/s and/or
by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
guardian/s whose constitutional parental right has been infringed. It
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
should be noted that Clarissa is represented by her father, Julian Villegas,
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."48
Jr. (Mr. Villegas), who could have properly filed the petition for himself for
the alleged violation of his parental right. But Mr. Villegas did not question
the Curfew Ordinances based on his primary right as a parent as he only In this case, petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is
stands as the representative of his minor child, Clarissa, whose right to improper, considering that they do not properly identify any provision in
travel was supposedly infringed. any of the Curfew Ordinances, which, because of its vague terminology,
fails to provide fair warning and notice to the public of what is prohibited
or required so that one may act accordingly.49 The void for vagueness
As for SPARK, it is an unincorporated association and, consequently, has
doctrine is premised on due process considerations, which are absent
no legal personality to bring an action in court. 45 Even assuming that it has
from this particular claim. In one case, it was opined that:
the capacity to sue, SPARK still has no standing as it failed to allege that it
was authorized by its members who were affected by the Curfew
Ordinances, i.e., the minors, to file this case on their behalf. [T]he vagueness doctrine is a specie of "unconstitutional uncertainty,"
which may involve "procedural due process uncertainty cases" and
"substantive due process uncertainty cases." "Procedural due process
Hence, save for Clarissa, petitioners do not have the required personal
uncertainty" involves cases where the statutory language was so obscure
interest in the controversy. More particularly, Clarissa has standing only
that it failed to give adequate warning to those subject to its prohibitions
on the issue of the alleged violation of the minors' right to travel, but not
as well as to provide proper standards for adjudication. Such a definition
on the alleged violation of the parents' right.
encompasses the vagueness doctrine. This perspective rightly integrates
the vagueness doctrine with the due process clause, a necessary
These notwithstanding, this Court finds it proper to relax the standing interrelation since there is no constitutional provision that explicitly bars
requirement insofar as all the petitioners are concerned, in view of the statutes that are "void-for-vagueness."50
transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case. "In a number
of cases, this Court has taken a liberal stance towards the requirement of
Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement parameters to
legal standing, especially when paramount interest is involved. Indeed,
guide the local authorities in the proper apprehension of suspected curfew
when those who challenge the official act are able to craft an issue of
offenders. They do not assert any confusion as to what conduct the
transcendental significance to the people, the Court may exercise its
subject ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only point to the
sound discretion and take cognizance of the suit. It may do so in spite
ordinances' lack of enforcement guidelines. The mechanisms related to
of the inability of the petitioners to show that they have been personally
the implementation of the Curfew Ordinances are, however, matters of
injured by the operation of a law or any other government act." 46
policy that are best left for the political branches of government to resolve.
Verily, the objective of curbing unbridled enforcement is not the sole
This is a case of first impression in which the constitutionality of juvenile consideration in a void for vagueness analysis; rather, petitioners must
curfew ordinances is placed under judicial review. Not only is this Court show that this perceived danger of unbridled enforcement stems from an
asked to determine the impact of these issuances on the right of parents to ambiguous provision in the law that allows enforcement authorities to
rear their children and the right of minors to travel, it is also requested to second-guess if a particular conduct is prohibited or not prohibited. In this
determine the extent of the State's authority to regulate these rights in the regard, that ambiguous provision of law contravenes due process because
interest of general welfare. Accordingly, this case is of overarching agents of the government cannot reasonably decipher what conduct the
law permits and/or forbids. In Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 51 it was Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect
ratiocinated that: and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall
equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen,
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
judges, and juries for resolution on ad hoc and subjective basis, and vague
character shall receive the support of the Government. (Emphasis and
standards result in erratic and arbitrary application based on individual
underscoring supplied.)
impressions and personal predilections.52

As may be gleaned from this provision, the rearing of children (i.e., referred
As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any ambiguous standard
to as the "youth") for civic efficiency and the development of their moral
in any of the provisions of the Curfew Ordinances, but rather, lament the
character are characterized not only as parental rights, but also as parental
lack of detail on how the age of a suspected minor would be determined.
duties. This means that parents are not only given the privilege of
Thus, without any correlation to any vague legal provision, the Curfew
exercising their authority over their children; they are equally obliged to
Ordinances cannot be stricken down under the void for vagueness
exercise this authority conscientiously. The duty aspect of this provision is
doctrine.
a reflection of the State's independent interest to ensure that the youth
would eventually grow into free, independent, and well-developed citizens
Besides, petitioners are mistaken in claiming that there are no sufficient of this nation. For indeed, it is during childhood that minors are prepared
standards to identify suspected curfew violators. While it is true that the for additional obligations to society. "[T]he duty to prepare the child for
Curfew Ordinances do not explicitly state these parameters, law these [obligations] must be read to include the inculcation of moral
enforcement agents are still bound to follow the prescribed measures standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship."58 "This
found in statutory law when implementing ordinances. Specifically, RA affirmative process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and
9344, as amended, provides: example is essential to the growth of young people into mature, socially
responsible citizens."59
Section 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child may be
determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate or By history and tradition, "the parental role implies a substantial measure
any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age of authority over one's children."60 In Ginsberg v. New York,61 the Supreme
may be based on information from the child himself/herself, Court of the United States (US) remarked that "constitutional
testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to
other relevant evidence. (Emphases supplied) authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children
is basic in the structure of our society."62 As in our Constitution, the right
and duty of parents to rear their children is not only described as "natural,"
This provision should be read in conjunction with · the Curfew Ordinances
but also as "primary." The qualifier "primary" connotes the parents'
because RA 10630 (the law that amended RA 9344) repeals all ordinances
superior right over the State in the upbringing of their children.63 The
inconsistent with statutory law.53 Pursuant to Section 57-A of RA 9344, as
rationale for the State's deference to parental control over their children
amended by RA 10630,54 minors caught in violation of curfew
was explained by the US Supreme Court in Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti),64 as
ordinances are children at risk and, therefore, covered by its
follows:
provisions.55 It is a long-standing principle that "[c]onformity with law is
one of the essential requisites for the validity of a municipal
ordinance."56 Hence, by necessary implication, ordinances should be read [T]he guiding role of parents in their upbringing of their children justifies
and implemented in conjunction with related statutory law. limitations on the freedoms of minors. The State commonly protects its
youth from adverse governmental action and from their own immaturity
by requiring parental consent to or involvement in important decisions by
Applying the foregoing, any person, such as petitioners Ronel and Mark
minors. But an additional and more important justification for state
Leo, who was perceived to be a minor violating the curfew, may therefore
deference to parental control over children is that "the child is not [a)
prove that he is beyond the application of the Curfew Ordinances by simply
mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his
presenting any competent proof of identification establishing their
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
majority age. In the absence of such proof, the law authorizes enforcement
prepare him for additional obligations."65 (Emphasis and underscoring
authorities to conduct a visual assessment of the suspect, which - needless
supplied)
to state - should be done ethically and judiciously under the circumstances.
Should law enforcers disregard these rules, the remedy is to pursue the
appropriate action against the erring enforcing authority, and not to have While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be stressed
the ordinances invalidated. that "when actions concerning the child have a relation to the public
welfare or the well-being of the child, the [Sltate may act to promote
these legitimate interests."66 Thus, "[i]n cases in which harm to the
All told, petitioners' prayer to declare the Curfew Ordinances as void for
physical or mental health of the child or to public safety, peace, order,
vagueness is denied.
or welfare is demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may
override the parents' qualified right to control the upbringing of their
B. Right of Parents to Rear their children."67
Children.
As our Constitution itself provides, the State is mandated
Petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional to support parents in the exercise of these rights and duties. State
because they deprive parents of their natural and primary right in the authority is therefore, not exclusive of, but rather, complementary to
rearing of the youth without substantive due process. In this regard, they parental supervision. In Nery v. Lorenzo,68 this Court acknowledged the
assert that this right includes the right to determine whether minors will State's role as parens patriae in protecting minors, viz. :
be required to go home at a certain time or will be allowed to stay late
outdoors. Given that the right to impose curfews is primarily with parents
[Where minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it is
and not with the State, the latter's interest in imposing curfews cannot
cast the duty of protecting the rights of persons or individual who
logically be compelling.57
because of age or incapacity are in an unfavorable position, vis-a-
vis other parties. Unable as they are to take due care of what concerns
Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained. them, they have the political community to look after their welfare. This
obligation the state must live up to. It cannot be recreant to such a trust. As
was set forth in an opinion of the United States Supreme Court: "This
Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's policy
prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of
relative to the rights of parents in the rearing of their children:
every State, x x x."69(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners' invocation of the overbreadth
parents in the moral development of their children, 70 and, thus, doctrine, considering that petitioners have not claimed any transgression
assumes a supporting role for parents to fulfill their parental obligations. of their rights to free speech or any inhibition of speech-related conduct.
In Bellotti, it was held that "[I]egal restriction on minors, especially those In Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. AntiTerrorism
supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's chances for Council(Southern Hemisphere),80 this Court explained that "the application
the full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and,
society meaningful and rewarding. Under the Constitution, the State can owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free
properly conclude that parents and others, teachers for example, who speech cases,"81 viz.:
have the primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled
to the support of the laws designed to aid discharge of that
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a
responsibility."71
facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected
speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the court,
The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions designed to that are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation.
aid parents in their role of promoting their children's well-being. As will be Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being
later discussed at greater length, these ordinances further compelling State substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied
interests (particularly, the promotion of juvenile safety and the prevention to the litigants.
of juvenile crime), which necessarily entail limitations on the primary right
of parents to rear their children. Minors, because of their peculiar
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks
vulnerability and lack of experience, are not only more exposed to
an exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation.
potential physical harm by criminal elements that operate during the
Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as
night; their moral well-being is likewise imperiled as minor children are
applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the
prone to making detrimental decisions during this time.72
unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper
applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not
At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances apply permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own
only when the minors are not - whether actually or constructively (as will interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are
be later discussed) - accompanied by their parents. This serves as an permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the
explicit recognition of the State's deference to the primary nature of entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the
parental authority and the importance of parents' role in child-rearing. overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court
Parents are effectively given unfettered authority over their children's construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart
conduct during curfew hours when they are able to supervise them. Thus, from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;"
in all actuality, the only aspect of parenting that the Curfew Ordinances deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not
affects is the parents' prerogative to allow minors to remain in public courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad
places without parental accompaniment during the curfew law's "very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
hours. 73 In this respect, the ordinances neither dictate an over-all constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling
plan of discipline for the parents to apply to their minors nor force is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those
parents to abdicate their authority to influence or control their third parties.82 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
minors' activities.74 As such, the Curfew Ordinances only amount to a
minimal - albeit reasonable - infringement upon a parent's right to bring
In the same case, it was further pointed out that "[i]n restricting the
up his or her child.
overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least two [(2)]
cases, observed that the US Supreme Court has not recognized an
Finally, it may be well to point out that the Curfew Ordinances positively overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First
influence children to spend more time at home. Consequently, this Amendment,83 and that claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained
situation provides parents with better opportunities to take a more active in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
role in their children's upbringing. In Schleifer v. City of spoken words. In Virginia v. Hicks,84 it was held that rarely, if ever, will an
Charlottesvillle (Schleifer),75 the US court observed that the city overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not
government "was entitled to believe x x x that a nocturnal curfew would specifically addressed to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on
promote parental involvement in a child's upbringing. A curfew aids the overly broad statutes are justified by the 'transcendent value to all society
efforts of parents who desire to protect their children from the perils of the of constitutionally protected expression. "'85
street but are unable to control the nocturnal behavior of those
children."76 Curfews may also aid the "efforts of parents who prefer their
In the more recent case of SpousesImbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,86 it was opined
children to spend time on their studies than on the streets."77 Reason
that "[f]acial challenges can only be raised on the basis of
dictates that these realities observed in Schleifer are no less applicable to
overbreadth and not on vagueness. Southern Hemisphere demonstrated
our local context. Hence, these are additional reasons which justify the
how vagueness relates to violations of due process rights, whereas facial
impact of the nocturnal curfews on parental rights.
challenges are raised on the basis of overbreadth and limited to the
realm of freedom of expression."87
In fine, the Curfew Ordinances should not be declared unconstitutional for
violating the parents' right to rear their children.
That being said, this Court finds it improper to undertake an overbreadth
analysis in this case, there being no claimed curtailment of free speech. On
C. Right to Travel. the contrary, however, this Court finds proper to examine the assailed
regulations under the strict scrutiny test.
Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances
based on the minors' right to travel. They claim that the liberty to travel is The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a fundamental right88
a fundamental right, which, therefore, necessitates the application of the under Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
strict scrutiny test. Further, they submit that even if there exists a
compelling State interest, such as the prevention of juvenile crime and the
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
protection of minors from crime, there are other less restrictive means for
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
achieving the government's interest.78 In addition, they posit that the
court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the
Curfew Ordinances suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing
interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be
legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours.79
provided by law. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner's submissions are partly meritorious.

Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to move freely
from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. 89 It is a
right embraced within the general concept of liberty. 90 Liberty - a recognizes that minors do possess and enjoy constitutional rights, 108 but
birthright of every person - includes the power of locomotion91 and the the exercise of these rights is not co-extensive as those of
right of citizens to be free to use their faculties in lawful ways and to live adults.109 They are always subject to the authority or custody of another,
and work where they desire or where they can best pursue the ends of such as their parent/s and/or guardian/s, and the State.110 As parens
life.92 patriae, the State regulates and, to a certain extent, restricts the minors'
exercise of their rights, such as in their affairs concerning the right to
vote,111 the right to execute contracts,112 and the right to engage in gainful
The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to access and
employment.113 With respect to the right to travel, minors are required by
exercise their other rights, such as the rights to education, free expression,
law to obtain a clearance from the Department of Social Welfare and
assembly, association, and religion.93 The inter-relation of the right to
Development before they can travel to a foreign country by themselves or
travel with other fundamental rights was briefly rationalized in City of
with a person other than their parents.114 These limitations demonstrate
Maquoketa v. Russell,94 as follows:
that the State has broader authority over the minors' activities than over
similar actions of adults,115 and overall, reflect the State's general interest
Whenever the First Amendment rights of freedom of religion, speech, in the well-being of minors.116 Thus, the State may impose limitations on
assembly, and association require one to move about, such movement the minors' exercise of rights even though these limitations do not
must necessarily be protected under the First Amendment. generally apply to adults.

Restricting movement in those circumstances to the extent that First In Bellotti,117the US Supreme Court identified three (3) justifications for the
Amendment Rights cannot be exercised without violating the law is differential treatment of the minors' constitutional rights. These are: first,
equivalent to a denial of those rights. One court has eloquently pointed the peculiar vulnerability of children; second, their inability to make
this out: critical decisions in an informed and mature manner; and third, the
importance of the parental role in child rearing:118
We would not deny the relatedness of the rights guaranteed by the
First Amendment to freedom of travel and movement. If, for any [On the first reason,] our cases show that although children generally are
reason, people cannot walk or drive to their church, their freedom to protected by the same constitutional guarantees against governmental
worship is impaired. If, for any reason, people cannot walk or drive to the deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system
meeting hall, freedom of assembly is effectively blocked. If, for any reason, to account for children's vulnerability and their needs for 'concern, ...
people cannot safely walk the sidewalks or drive the streets of a sympathy, and ... paternal attention.x x x.
community, opportunities for freedom of speech are sharply
limited. Freedom of movement is inextricably involved with freedoms
[On the second reason, this Court's rulings are] grounded [on] the
set forth in the First Amendment. (Emphases supplied)
recognition that, during the formative years of childhood and
adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and
Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to
restrictions even if made against fundamental rights. Specifically on the them. x x x.
freedom to move from one place to another, jurisprudence provides that
this right is not absolute.95 As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the
xxxx
State96 may impose limitations on the exercise of this right, provided that
they: (1) serve the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health; and (2) are provided by law.97 [On the third reason,] the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their
children justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors. The State
commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental action and from
The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the promotion
their own immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in
of juvenile safety and prevention of juvenile crime, inarguably serve the
important decisions by minors. x x x.
interest of public safety. The restriction on the minor's movement and
activities within the confines of their residences and their immediate
vicinity during the curfew period is perceived to reduce the probability of xxxx
the minor becoming victims of or getting involved in crimes and criminal
activities. As to the second requirement, i.e., that the limitation "be
x x x Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the
provided by law," our legal system is replete with laws emphasizing the
parental role, may be important to the child's chances for the full
State's duty to afford special protection to children, i.e., RA 7610,98 as
growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free society
amended, RA 977599 RA 9262100 RA 9851101RA 9344102 RA 10364103 RA
meaningful and rewarding.119 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
9211104 RA8980,105 RA9288,106 and Presidential Decree (PD) 603,107 as
amended.
Moreover, in Prince v. Massachusetts,120 the US Supreme Court
acknowledged the heightened dangers on the streets to minors, as
Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603, which explicitly
compared to adults:
authorizes local government units, through their city or municipal
councils, to set curfew hours for children. It reads:
A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-
rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that
Article 139. Curfew Hours for Children. - City or municipal councils may
implies. It may secure this against impeding restraints and dangers within
prescribe such curfew hours for children as may be warranted by
a broad range of selection. Among evils most appropriate for such action
local conditions. The duty to enforce curfew ordinances shall
are the crippling effects of child employment, more especially in public
devolve upon the parents or guardians and the local authorities.
places, and the possible harms arising from other activities subject to
all the diverse influences of the [streets]. It is too late now to doubt that
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) legislation appropriately designed to reach such evils is within the state's
police power, whether against the parent's claim to control of the child or
one that religious scruples dictate contrary action.
As explicitly worded, city councils are authorized to enact curfew
ordinances (as what respondents have done in this case) and enforce the
same through their local officials. In other words, PD 603 provides It is true children have rights, in common with older people, in the primary
sufficient statutory basis - as required by the Constitution - to restrict the use of highways. But even in such use streets afford dangers for them
minors' exercise of the right to travel. not affecting adults. And in other uses, whether in work or in other
things, this difference may be magnified.121 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to minors
are likewise constitutionally permissible. In this relation, this Court
For these reasons, the State is justified in setting restrictions on the minors' as parenspatriaeconstitute compelling interests to justify regulations
exercise of their travel rights, provided, they are singled out on reasonable by the State.134 It is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which
grounds. some individual liberties must give way.135 As explained in Nunez,
the Bellotti framework shows that the State has a compelling interest in
imposing greater restrictions on minors than on adults. The limitations on
Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of judicial scrutiny
minors under Philippine laws also highlight this compelling interest of the
to determine the reasonableness of classifications.122 The strict scrutiny
State to protect and care for their welfare.
test applies when a classification either (i) interferes with the exercise of
fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes.123 The intermediate In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that the ultimate
scrutiny test applies when a classification does not involve suspect classes objective of the Curfew Ordinances is to keep unsupervised minors during
or fundamental rights, but requires heightened scrutiny, such as in the late hours of night time off of public areas, so as to reduce - if not totally
classifications based on gender and legitimacy.124Lastly, the rational basis eliminate - their exposure to potential harm, and to insulate them against
test applies to all other subjects not covered by the first two tests. 125 criminal pressure and influences which may even include themselves. As
denoted in the "whereas clauses" of the Quezon City Ordinance, the State,
in imposing nocturnal curfews on minors, recognizes that:
Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in our legal
system guaranteed no less by our Constitution, the strict scrutiny test 126 is
the applicable test.127 At this juncture, it should be emphasized that minors [b] x x x children, particularly the minors, appear to be neglected of their
enjoy the same constitutional rights as adults; the fact that the State has proper care and guidance, education, and moral development, which [lead]
broader authority over minors than over adults does not trigger the them into exploitation, drug addiction, and become vulnerable to and at
application of a lower level of scrutiny.128 In Nunez v. City of San Diego the risk of committing criminal offenses;
(Nunez),129 the US court illumined that:
xxxx
Although many federal courts have recognized that juvenile curfews
implicate the fundamental rights of minors, the parties dispute whether
[d] as a consequence, most of minor children become out-of-school youth,
strict scrutiny review is necessary. The Supreme Court teaches that
unproductive by-standers, street children, and member of notorious gangs
rights are no less "fundamental" for minors than adults, but that the
who stay, roam around or meander in public or private roads, streets or
analysis of those rights may differ:
other public places, whether singly or in groups without lawful purpose or
justification;
Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically
only when one attains the state-defined age of
xxxx
majority.1âwphi1 Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the
Constitution and possess constitutional rights. The Court[,] indeed,
however, [has long] recognized that the State has somewhat broader [f] reports of barangay officials and law enforcement agencies reveal that
authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults. xxx. Thus, minor children roaming around, loitering or wandering in the evening are
minors' rights are not coextensive with the rights of adults because the frequent personalities involved in various infractions of city
the state has a greater range of interests that justify the infringement ordinances and national laws;
of minors' rights.
[g] it is necessary in the interest of public order and safety to regulate the
The Supreme Court has articulated three specific factors that, when movement of minor children during night time by setting disciplinary
applicable, warrant differential analysis of the constitutional rights of hours, protect them from neglect, abuse or cruelty and exploitation, and
minors and adults: x x x. The Bellotti test [however] does not establish other conditions prejudicial or detrimental to their development;
a lower level of scrutiny for the constitutional rights of minors in the
context of a juvenile curfew. Rather, the Bellottiframework enables
[h] to strengthen and support parental control on these minor children,
courts to determine whether the state has a compelling state interest
there is a need to put a restraint on the tendency of growing number of
justifying greater restrictions on minors than on adults. x x x.
youth spending their nocturnal activities wastefully, especially in the face
of the unabated rise of criminality and to ensure that the dissident
x x x Although the state may have a compelling interest in regulating elements of society are not provided with potent avenues for furthering
minors differently than adults, we do not believe that [a] lesser their nefarious activities[.]136
degree of scrutiny is appropriate to review burdens on minors'
fundamental rights. x x x.
The US court's judicial demeanor in Schleifer,137 as regards the information
gathered by the City Council to support its passage of the curfew ordinance
According, we apply strict scrutiny to our review of the ordinance. x x subject of that case, may serve as a guidepost to our own eatment of the
x.130 (Emphases supplied) present case. Significantly, in Schleifer, the US court recognized the
entitlement of elected bodies to implement policies for a safer community,
in relation to the proclivity of children to make dangerous and potentially
The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors entails a consideration of
life-shaping decisions when left unsupervised during the late hours of
the peculiar circumstances of minors as enumerated in Bellotti vis-a-vis
night:
the State's duty as parenspatriae to protect and preserve their well-being
with the compelling State interests justifying the assailed government act.
Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative classification that interferes with Charlottesville was constitutionally justified in believing that its curfew
the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the disadvantage of a would materially assist its first stated interest-that of reducing juvenile
suspect class is presumed unconstitutional.131 Thus, the government has violence and crime. The City Council acted on the basis of information from
the burden of proving that the classification (1) is necessary to many sources, including records from Charlottesville's police department,
achieve a compelling State interest, and (i1) is the least restrictive a survey of public opinion, news reports, data from the United States
means to protect such interest or the means chosen is narrowly Department of Justice, national crime reports, and police reports from
tailored to accomplish the interest.132 other localities. On the basis of such evidence, elected bodies are
entitled to conclude that keeping unsupervised juveniles off the
streets late at night will make for a safer community. The same streets
a. Compelling State Interest.
may have a more volatile and less wholesome character at night than
during the day. Alone on the streets at night children face a series of
Jurisprudence holds that compelling State interests include dangerous and potentially life-shaping decisions. Drug dealers may
constitutionally declared policies.133 This Court has ruled that children's lure them to use narcotics or aid in their sale. Gangs may pressure them
welfare and the State's mandate to protect and care for them into membership or participation in violence. "[D]uring the formative
years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, [In contrast, the ordinance in Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown (supra
perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be note 52)] was [a] very narrowly drawn ordinance of many pages with
detrimental to them." Those who succumb to these criminal influences eleven exceptions and was very carefully drafted in an attempt to pass
at an early age may persist in their criminal conduct as constitutional muster. It specifically excepted [the] exercise of First
adults. Whether we as judges subscribe to these theories is beside the Amendment rights, travel in a motor vehicle and returning home by
point. Those elected officials with their finger on the pulse of their home a direct route from religious, school, or voluntary association
community clearly did. In attempting to reduce through its curfew the activities. (Emphases supplied)
opportunities for children to come into contact with criminal
influences, the City was directly advancing its first objective of
After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective provisions, this
reducing juvenile violence and crime.138 (Emphases and underscoring
Court finds that only the Quezon City Ordinance meets the above-discussed
supplied; citations omitted)
requirement, while the Manila and Navotas Ordinances do not.

Similar to the City of Charlottesville in Schleifer, the local governments of

The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the coverage of
Quezon City and Manila presented statistical data in their respective
the curfew, namely: (a) minors accompanied by their parents, family
pleadings showing the alarming prevalence of crimes involving juveniles,
members of legal age, or guardian; (b) those running lawful errands such
either as victims or perpetrators, in their respective localities. 139
as buying of medicines, using of telecommunication facilities for
emergency purposes and the like; (c) night school students and those who,
Based on these findings, their city councils found it necessary to enact by virtue of their employment, are required in the streets or outside their
curfew ordinances pursuant to their police power under the general residence after 10:00 p.m.; and (d) those working at night.146
welfare clause.140 In this light, the Court thus finds that the local
governments have not only conveyed but, in fact, attempted to
For its part, the Navotas Ordinance provides more exceptions, to wit: (a)
substantiate legitimate concerns on public welfare, especially with
minors with night classes; (b) those working at night; (c) those who
respect to minors. As such, a compelling State interest exists for the
attended a school or church activity, in coordination with a specific
enactment and enforcement of the Curfew Ordinances.
barangay office; (d) those traveling towards home during the curfew
hours; (e) those running errands under the supervision of their parents,
With the first requirement of the strict scrutiny test satisfied, the Court guardians, or persons of legal age having authority over them; (j) those
now proceeds to determine if the restrictions set forth in· the Curfew involved in accidents, calamities, and the like. It also exempts minors from
Ordinances are narrowly tailored or provide the least restrictive means to the curfew during these specific occasions: Christmas eve, Christmas day,
address the cited compelling State interest - the second requirement of the New Year's eve, New Year's day, the night before the barangay fiesta, the
strict scrutiny test. day of the fiesta, All Saints' and All Souls' Day, Holy Thursday, Good Friday,
Black Saturday, and Easter Sunday.147
b. Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn.
This Court observes that these two ordinances are not narrowly drawn in
that their exceptions are inadequate and therefore, run the risk of overly
The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from the
restricting the minors' fundamental freedoms. To be fair, both ordinances
fundamental premise that citizens should not be hampered from pursuing
protect the rights to education, to gainful employment, and to travel at
legitimate activities in the exercise of their constitutional rights. While
night from school or work.148 However, even with those safeguards, the
rights may be restricted, the restrictions must be minimal or only to the
Navotas Ordinance and, to a greater extent, the Manila Ordinance still do
extent necessary to achieve the purpose or to address the State's
not account for the reasonable exercise of the minors' rights of association,
compelling interest. When it is possible for governmental regulations
free exercise of religion, rights to peaceably assemble, and of free
to be more narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts with constitutional
expression, among others.
rights, then they must be so narrowly drawn. 141

The exceptions under the Manila Ordinance are too limited, and thus,
Although treated differently from adults, the foregoing standard applies to
unduly trample upon protected liberties. The Navotas Ordinance is
regulations on minors as they are still accorded the freedom to participate
apparently more protective of constitutional rights than the Manila
in any legitimate activity, whether it be social, religious, or civic.142 Thus, in
Ordinance; nonetheless, it still provides insufficient safeguards as
the present case, each of the ordinances must be narrowly tailored as to
discussed in detail below:
ensure minimal constraint not only on the minors' right to travel but also
on their other constitutional rights.143
First, although it allows minors to engage in school or church activities, it
hinders them from engaging in legitimate non-school or nonchurch
In In Re Mosier,144 a US court declared a curfew ordinance unconstitutional
activities in the streets or going to and from such activities; thus, their
impliedly for not being narrowly drawn, resulting in unnecessary
freedom of association is effectively curtailed. It bears stressing that
curtailment of minors' rights to freely exercise their religion and to free
participation in legitimate activities of organizations, other than school or
speech.145 It observed that:
church, also contributes to the minors' social, emotional, and intellectual
development, yet, such participation is not exempted under the Navotas
The ordinance prohibits the older minor from attending alone Ordinance.
Christmas Eve Midnight Mass at the local Roman Catholic Church or
Christmas Eve services at the various local Protestant Churches. It
Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose the curfew
would likewise prohibit them from attending the New [Year's] Eve watch
during Christmas Eve and Christmas day, it effectively prohibits minors
services at the various churches. Likewise it would prohibit grandparents,
from attending traditional religious activities (such as simbang gabi) at
uncles, aunts or adult brothers and sisters from taking their minor
night without accompanying adults, similar to the scenario depicted
relatives of any age to the above mentioned services. x x x.
in Mosier.149 This legitimate activity done pursuant to the minors' right to
freely exercise their religion is therefore effectively curtailed.
xxxx
Third, the Navotas Ordinance does not accommodate avenues for minors
Under the ordinance, during nine months of the year a minor could not to engage in political rallies or attend city council meetings to voice out
even attend the city council meetings if they ran past 10:30 (which they their concerns in line with their right to peaceably assemble and to free
frequently do) to express his views on the necessity to repeal the curfew expression.
ordinance, clearly a deprivation of his First Amendment right to
freedom of speech.
Certainly, minors are allowed under the Navotas Ordinance to engage in
these activities outside curfew hours, but the Court finds no reason to
xxxx prohibit them from participating in these legitimate activities during
curfew hours. Such proscription does not advance the State's compelling peaceably assemble and of free expression are also covered by these
interest to protect minors from the dangers of the streets at night, such as items given that the minors' attendance in the official activities of
becoming prey or instruments of criminal activity. These legitimate civic or religious organizations are allowed during the curfew
activities are merely hindered without any reasonable relation to the hours. Unlike in the Navotas Ordinance, the right to the free exercise of
State's interest; hence, the Navotas Ordinance is not narrowly drawn. More religion is sufficiently safeguarded in the Quezon City Ordinance by
so, the Manila Ordinance, with its limited exceptions, is also not narrowly exempting attendance at religious masses even during curfew hours. In
drawn. relation to their right to ravel, the ordinance allows the minor-
participants to move to and from the places where these activities are
held. Thus, with these numerous exceptions, the Quezon City Ordinance,
In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be completely stricken
in truth, only prohibits unsupervised activities that hardly contribute
down since their exceptions, which are essentially determinative of the
to the well-being of minors who publicly loaf and loiter within the
scope and breadth of the curfew regulations, are inadequate to ensure
locality at a time where danger is perceivably more prominent.
protection of the above-mentioned fundamental rights. While some
provisions may be valid, the same are merely ancillary thereto; as such,
they cannot subsist independently despite the presence 150 of any To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly authorizes
separability clause.151 his/her minor child to run lawful errands or engage in legitimate activities
during the night, notwithstanding curfew hours. As astutely observed by
Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate Justice Marvic
The Quezon City Ordinance stands in stark contrast to the first two (2)
M.V.F. Leonen during the deliberations on this case, parental permission is
ordinances as it sufficiently safeguards the minors' constitutional rights. It
implicitly considered as an exception found in Section 4, item (a) of the
provides the following exceptions:
Quezon City Ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or
guardian", as accompaniment should be understood not only in its actual
Section 4. EXEMPTIONS - Minor children under the following but also in its constructive sense. As the Court sees it, this should be the
circumstances shall not be covered by the provisions of this ordinance; reasonable construction of this exception so as to reconcile the juvenile
curfew measure with the basic premise that State interference is not
superior but only complementary to parental supervision. After all, as the
(a) Those accompanied by their parents or guardian;
Constitution itself prescribes, the parents' right to rear their children is not
only natural but primary.
(b) Those on their way to or from a party, graduation
ceremony, religious mass, and/or other extra-curricular
Ultimately, it is important to highlight that this Court, in passing judgment
activities of their school or organization wherein their
on these ordinances, is dealing with the welfare of minors who are
attendance are required or otherwise indispensable, or
presumed by law to be incapable of giving proper consent due to their
when such minors are out and unable to go home early due
incapability to fully understand the import and consequences of their
to circumstances beyond their control as verified by the
actions. In one case it was observed that:
proper authorities concerned; and

A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the
(c) Those attending to, or in experience of, an emergency
rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of
situation such as conflagration, earthquake, hospitalization,
fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The
road accident, law enforcers encounter, and similar incidents[;]
State, as parenspatriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm
to those who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of
(d) When the minor is engaged in an authorized employment themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its protection.153
activity, or going to or returning home from the same place of
employment activity without any detour or stop;
Under our legal system's own recognition of a minor's inherent lack of full
rational capacity, and balancing the same against the State's compelling
(e) When the minor is in [a] motor vehicle or other travel interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime, this Court
accompanied by an adult in no violation of this Ordinance; finds that the curfew imposed under the Quezon City Ordinance is
reasonably justified with its narrowly drawn exceptions and hence,
constitutional. Needless to say, these exceptions are in no way limited or
(f) When the minor is involved in an emergency;
restricted, as the State, in accordance with the lawful exercise of its police
power, is not precluded from crafting, adding, or modifying exceptions in
(g) When the minor is out of his/her residence attending an similar laws/ordinances for as long as the regulation, overall, passes the
official school, religious, recreational, educational, social, parameters of scrutiny as applied in this case.
community or other similar private activity sponsored by
the city, barangay, school, or other similar private
D. Penal Provisions of the Manila Ordinance.
civic/religious organization/group (recognized by the
community) that supervises the activity or when the minor
is going to or returning home from such activity, without Going back to the Manila Ordinance, this Court deems it proper - as it was
any detour or stop; and raised - to further discuss the validity of its penal provisions in relation to
RA 9344, as amended.
(h) When the minor can present papers certifying that he/she is
a student and was dismissed from his/her class/es in the To recount, the Quezon City Ordinance, while penalizing the parent/s or
evening or that he/she is a working student.152 (Emphases and guardian under Section 8 thereof,154 does not impose any penalty on the
underscoring supplied) minors. For its part, the Navotas Ordinance requires the minor, along with
his or her parent/s or guardian/s, to render social civic duty and
community service either in lieu of - should the parent/s or guardian/s of
As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions under
the minor be unable to pay the fine imposed - or in addition to the fine
the Quezon City Ordinance is more narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect
imposed therein.155 Meanwhile, the Manila Ordinance imposed various
the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, travel, to
sanctions to the minor based on the age and frequency of violations,
peaceably assemble, and of free expression.
to wit:

Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of exceptions
SEC. 4. Sanctions and Penalties for Violation. Any child or youth violating
guarantees the protection of these aforementioned rights. These items
this ordinance shall be sanctioned/punished as follows:
uphold the right of association by enabling minors to attend both
official and extra-curricular activities not only of their school or
church but also of other legitimate organizations. The rights to
 (a) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and below, the In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community service is a valid
sanction shall consist of a REPRIMAND for the youth form of intervention program that a local government (such as Navotas
offender and ADMONITION to the offender's parent, guardian City in this case) could appropriately adopt in an ordinance to promote the
or person exercising parental authority. welfare of minors. For one, the community service programs provide
minors an alternative mode of rehabilitation as they promote
accountability for their delinquent acts without the moral and social
(b) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and under
stigma caused by jail detention.
Eighteen (18) years of age, the sanction/penalty shall be:

In the same light, these programs help inculcate discipline and compliance
1. For the FIRST OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition;
with the law and legal orders. More importantly, they give them the
opportunity to become productive members of society and thereby
2. For the SECOND OFFENSE, Reprimand and promote their integration to and solidarity with their community.
Admonition, and a warning about the legal impostitions in case
of a third and subsequent violation; and
The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is likewise
consistent with Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344 as it is merely a formal
3. For the THIRD AND SUBSEQUENT way of giving warnings and expressing disapproval to the minor's
OFFENSES, Imprisonment of one (1) day to ten (10) days, or misdemeanor. Admonition is generally defined as a "gentle or friendly
a Fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (Php2,000.00), or both at reproof' or "counsel or warning against fault or oversight."163The Black's
the discretion of the Court, PROVIDED, That the complaint Law Dictionary defines admonition as "[a]n authoritatively issued warning
shall be filed by the PunongBarangay with the office of the City or censure";164 while the Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a "gentle
Prosecutor.156 (Emphases and underscoring supplied). or friendly reproof, a mild rebuke, warning or reminder, [counseling], on a
fault, error or oversight, an expression of authoritative advice or
warning."165 Notably, the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Thus springs the question of whether local governments could validly
Civil Service (RRACCS) and our jurisprudence in administrative cases
impose on minors these sanctions - i.e., (a) community . service; (b)
explicitly declare that "a warning or admonition shall not be considered a
reprimand and admonition; (c) fine; and (d) imprisonment. Pertinently,
penalty."166
Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, prohibit the imposition
of penalties on minors for status offenses such as curfew
violations, viz.: In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-based programs
and admonition are clearly not penalties - as they are not punitive in nature
- and are generally less intrusive on the rights and conduct of the minor.
SEC. 57. Status Offenses. - Any conduct not considered an offense or not
To be clear, their objectives are to formally inform and educate the minor,
penalized if committed by an adult shall not be considered an offense
and for the latter to understand, what actions must be avoided so as to aid
and shall not be punished if committed by a child.
him in his future conduct.

SEC. 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. - Ordinances enacted by local

A different conclusion, however, is reached with regard to reprimand and
governments concerning juvenile status offenses such as but not
fines and/or imprisonment imposed by the City of Manila on the minor.
limited to, curfew violations, truancy, parental disobedience, anti-
Reprimand is generally defined as "a severe or formal reproof."167 The
smoking and anti-drinking laws, as well as light offenses and
Black's Law Dictionary defines it as "a mild form of lawyer discipline that
misdemeanors against public order or safety such as, but not limited to,
does not restrict the lawyer's ability to practice law"; 168while the
disorderly conduct, public scandal, harassment, drunkenness, public
Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a "public and formal censure or
intoxication, criminal nuisance, vandalism, gambling, mendicancy,
severe reproof, administered to a person in fault by his superior officer or
littering, public urination, and trespassing, shall be for the protection of
body to which he belongs. It is more than just a warning or
children. No penalty shall be imposed on children for said
admonition."169 In other words, reprimand is a formal and public
violations, and they shall instead be brought to their residence or to any
pronouncement made to denounce the error or violation committed, to
barangay official at the barangay hall to be released to the custody of their
sharply criticize and rebuke the erring individual, and to sternly warn the
parents. Appropriate intervention programs shall be provided for in
erring individual including the public against repeating or committing the
such ordinances. The child shall also be recorded as a "child at risk" and
same, and thus, may unwittingly subject the erring individual or violator to
not as a "child in conflict with the law." The ordinance shall also provide
unwarranted censure or sharp disapproval from others. In fact, the
for intervention programs, such as counseling, attendance in group
RRACCS and our jurisprudence explicitly indicate that reprimand is a
activities for children, and for the parents, attendance in parenting
penalty,170 hence, prohibited by Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended.
education seminars. (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand, undeniably constitute

To clarify, these provisions do not prohibit the enactment
penalties - as provided in our various criminal and administrative laws and
of regulations that curtail the conduct of minors, when the similar conduct
jurisprudence - that Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, evidently
of adults are not considered as an offense or penalized (i.e., status
prohibits.
offenses). Instead, what they prohibit is the imposition of penalties on
minors for violations of these regulations. Consequently, the enactment of
curfew ordinances on minors, without penalizing them for violations As worded, the prohibition in Section 57-A is clear, categorical, and
thereof, is not violative of Section 57-A. unambiguous. It states that "[n]o penalty shall be imposed on children
for x x x violations [of] juvenile status offenses]." Thus, for imposing the
sanctions of reprimand, fine, and/or imprisonment on minors for curfew
"Penalty"157 is defined as "[p]unishment imposed on a wrongdoer usually
violations, portions of Section 4 of the Manila Ordinance directly and
in the form of imprisonment or fine";158 "[p ]unishment imposed by lawful
irreconcilably conflict with the clear language of Section 57-A of RA 9344,
authority upon a person who commits a deliberate or negligent
as amended, and hence, invalid. On the other hand, the impositions of
act."159 Punishment, in tum, is defined as "[a] sanction - such as fine,
community service programs and admonition on the minors are allowed
penalty, confinement, or loss of property, right, or privilege - assessed
as they do not constitute penalties.
against a person who has violated the law."160

CONCLUSION
The provisions of RA 9344, as amended, should not be read to mean that
all the actions of the minor in violation of the regulations are without legal
consequences. Section 57-A thereof empowers local governments to adopt In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances have passed
appropriate intervention programs, such as community-based the first prong of the strict scrutiny test - that is, that the State has
programs161 recognized under Section 54162 of the same law. sufficiently shown a compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and
prevent juvenile crime in the concerned localities, only the Quezon City
Ordinance has passed the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, as it is
the only issuance out of the three which provides for the least restrictive Associate Justice
means to achieve this interest. In particular, the Quezon City Ordinance
provides for adequate exceptions that enable minors to freely exercise
CERTIFICATION
their fundamental rights during the prescribed curfew hours, and
therefore, narrowly drawn to achieve the State's purpose. Section 4 (a) of
the said ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the
guardian", has also been construed to include parental permission as a Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
constructive form of accompaniment and hence, an allowable exception to above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
the curfew measure; the manner of enforcement, however, is left to the assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
discretion of the local government unit.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
In fine, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared unconstitutional Chief Justice
and thus, null and void, while the Quezon City Ordinance is declared as
constitutional and thus, valid in accordance with this Decision.

For another, the Court has determined that the Manila Ordinance's penal
provisions imposing reprimand and fines/imprisonment on minors
conflict with Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended. Hence, following the
rule that ordinances should always conform with the law, these provisions
must be struck down as invalid.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLYGRANTED. The Court hereby

declares Ordinance No. 8046, issued by the local government of the City of
Manila, and Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. No. 99-02, as amended
by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13 issued by the local government of
Navotas City, UNCONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, NULLand VOID; while
Ordinance No. SP-2301, Series of 2014, issued by the local government of
the Quezon City is declared CONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, VALID in
accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

See separate opinion

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ALFREDO BENJAMIN S.
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
CAGUIOA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES NOEL G. TIJAM

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANDRES B. REYES, JR.

EN BANC Upon the foregoing considerations, the present petition is dismissed with
costs against the petitioner.
G.R. No. L-2068 October 20, 1948
Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, and Briones, JJ., concur.
DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS, Petitioner, vs. ANTONIO G. LUCERO, Judge of
First Instance of Pampanga, Respondent. Separate Opinions

E. M. Banzali for petitioner. FERIA, J., dissenting:chanrobles virtual law library

Acting Provincial Fiscal Albino L. Figueroa and Assistant Provincial Fiscal
Marcelo L. Mallari for respondent
I am sorry to dissent from the
decision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
TUASON, J.: chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioner in the present case appeared at the preliminary
The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the investigation before the Justice of the Peace of Masantol, Pampanga, and
Court of First Instance of Pampanga after he had been bound over to that after being informed of the criminal charges against him and asked if he
court for trial, praying that the record of the case be remanded to the pleaded guilty or not guilty, pleaded not guilty. "Then the counsel for the
justice of the peace court of Masantol, the court of origin, in order that the petitioner moved that the complainant present her evidence so that her
petitioner might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the manner and form
connection with their testimony, on the strength of which warrant was provided by law." The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected to
issued for the arrest of the accused. The motion was denied and that denial petitioner's motion invoking section 11, Rule 108, and the objection was
is the subject matter of this sustained. In view thereof, the accused refused to present his evidence, and
proceeding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library the case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
According to the memorandum submitted by the petitioner's attorney to
the Court of First Instance in support of his motion, the accused, assisted The counsel for the accused petitioner filed a motion with the Court of First
by counsel, appeared at the preliminary investigation. In that investigation, Instance praying that the record of the case be remanded to the justice of
the justice of the peace informed him of the charges and asked him if he the peace of Masantol, in order that the petitioner might cross-examine the
pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not guilty. complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony. The
"Then his counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence so that motion was denied, and for that reason the present special civil action
she and her witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the of mandamus was instituted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
manner and form provided by law." The fiscal and the private prosecutor virtual law library
objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the objection was sustained.
"In view thereof, the accused's counsel announced his intention to
It is evident that the refusal or waiver of the petitioner to present his
renounce his right to present evidence," and the justice of the peace
evidence during the investigation in the justice of the peace, was not a
forwarded the case to the court of first
waiver of his alleged right to be confronted with and cross-examine the
instance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
witnesses for the prosecution, that is, of the preliminary investigation
provided for in General Order No. 58 and Act No. 194, to which he claims
Leaving aside the question whether the accused, after renouncing his right to be entitled, as shown by the fact that, as soon as the case was forwarded
to present evidence, and by reason of that waiver he was committed to the to the Court of First Instance, counsel for the petitioner filed a motion with
corresponding court for trial, is estopped, we are of the opinion that the said court to remand the case to the Justice of the Peace of Masantol
respondent judge did not act in excess of his jurisdiction or in abuse of ordering the latter to make said preliminary investigation. His motion
discretion in refusing to grant the accused's motion to return the record having been denied, the petitioner has filed the present action in which he
for the purpose set out therein. In Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, squarely attacks the validity of the provision of section 11, Rule 108, on the
G.R. No. L-1336, recently promulgated, in which case the respondent ground that it deprives him of the right to be confronted with and cross-
justice of the peace had allowed the accused, over the complaint's examine the witnesses for the prosecution, contrary to the provision of
objection, to recall the complainant and her witnesses at the preliminary section 13, Article VIII, of the
investigation so that they might be cross-examined, we sustained the Constitution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
justice of the peace's order. We said that section 11 of Rule 108 does not
curtail the sound discretion of the justice of the peace on the matter. We
In the case of Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, No. L-1336, we did not
said that "while section 11 of Rule 108 defines the bounds of the
discuss and decide the question of validity or constitutionality of said
defendant's right in the preliminary investigation, there is nothing in it or
section 11 in connection with section 1 of Rule 108, because that question
any other law restricting the authority, inherent in a court of justice, to
was not raised therein, and we merely construed the provisions on
pursue a course of action reasonably calculated to bring out the
preliminary investigation or Rule 108. In said case the writer of this
truth."chanrobles virtual law library
dissenting opinion said:

But we made it clear that the "defendant can not, as a matter of right,
It may not be amiss to state that, modesty aside, the writer of this
compel the complaint and his witnesses to repeat in his presence what they
dissenting opinion, then a practising attorney, was the one who prepared
had said at the preliminary examination before the issuance of the order of
the draft of the Rules of Court relating to criminal procedure, and the
arrest." We called attention to the fact that "the constitutional right of an
provisions on preliminary investigation in the draft were the same as those
accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him does not apply to
of the old law, which gave the defendant the right to be confronted with
preliminary hearings' nor will the absence of a preliminary examination be
and to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution. But the Supreme
an infringement of his right to confront witnesses." As a matter of fact,
Court approved and adopted in toto the draft, except the part referring to
preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without
preliminary investigation which it modified, by suppressing said right and
infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the due process
enacting, in its stead, the provisions of section 11 of Rule 108 in its present
clause to a fair trial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
form. I prefer the old to the new procedure. But I can not subscribe to the
library
majority decision, which is a judicial legislation and makes the exercise of
the right of a defendant to be confronted, with and cross-examine the
The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. The minority witnesses against him, to depend entirely upon the whim or caprice of a
went farther than the majority and denied even any discretion on the part judge or officer conducting the preliminary investigation.
of the justice of the peace or judge holding the preliminary investigation to
compel the complainant and his witnesses to testify
anew.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
But now the question of the validity of said section 11, Rule 108, is squarely guaranteeing to all accused the right "to meet the witnesses face to face."
presented to this Court for decision, we have perforce to pass upon (Section 1 [17], Article III.)chanrobles virtual law library
it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Consequently, at the preliminary hearing contemplated by said
Section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution prescribes that "the Supreme reglementary section, the defendant is entitled as a matter of fundamental
Court shall have power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice right to her the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution and to cross-
and procedure in all courts, but said rules shall not diminish, increase or examine them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
modify substantive rights." The constitution added the last part of the
above-quoted constitutional precept in order to emphasize that the
Although in such preliminary hearing the accused cannot finally be
Supreme Court is not empowered, and therefore can not enact or
convicted, he is liable to endure the ordeal eloquently depicted in the
promulgate substantive laws or rules, for it is obvious that rules which
decision, and the constitutional guarantee protects defendants, not only
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights, are substantive and not
from the jeopardy of being finally convicted and punished, but also from
adjective laws or rules concerning pleading, practice and
the physical, mental and moral sufferings that may unjustly be visited upon
procedure.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
him in any one of the stages of the criminal process instituted against him.
He must be afforded the opportunities to have the charges against him
It does not require an elaborate arguments to show that the right granted quashed, not only at the final hearing, but also at the preliminary
by law upon a defendant to be confronted with and cross-examine the investigation, if by confronting the witnesses for the prosecution he can
witnesses for the prosecuted in preliminary investigation as well as in the convince the court that the charges are groundless. There is no justice in
trial of the case is a substantive right. It is based on human experience, compelling him to undergo the troubles of a final hearing if at the
according to which a person is not prone to tell a lie against another in his preliminary hearing the case can be terminated in his favor. Otherwise, the
presence, knowing fully well that the latter may easily contradict him, and preliminary investigation or hearing will be an empty gesture that should
that the credibility of a person or veracity of his testimony may be not have a place within the framework of dignified and solemn judicial
efficaciously tested by a cross-examination. It is substantive right because proceedings.
by exercising it, an accused person may show, even if he has no evidence
in his favor, that the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution are
On the strength of the above quoted opinion the opinion should be granted
not sufficient to indicate that there is a probability that a crime has been
and so we vote.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
committed and he is guilty thereof, and therefore the accused is entitled to
be released and not committed to prison, and thus avoid an open and
public accusation of crime, the trouble, expense, and anxiety of a public Petition dismissed.
trial, and the corresponding anxiety or moral suffering which a criminal
prosecution always entails.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
RESOLUTION
law library

March 8, 1949
This right is not a constitutional but a statutory right granted by law to an
accused outside of the City of Manila because of the usual delay in the final
disposition of criminal cases in provinces. The law does not grant such TUASON, J.: chanrobles virtual law library
right to a person charged with offenses triable by the Court of First
Instance in the City of Manila, because of the promptness, actual or
This cause is now before us on a motion for
presumptive, with which criminal cases are tried and disposed of in the
reconsideration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Court of First Instance of said city. But this right, though not a
constitutional one, can not be modified, abridged, or diminished by the
Supreme Court, by virtue of the rule making power conferred upon this In the decision sought to be reconsidered, we said, citing Dequito and
Court by the Constitution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, G.R. No. L-1336: "The constitutional right of an
law library accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him does not apply to
preliminary hearings; nor will the absence of a preliminary examination be
an infringement of his right to confront witness. As a matter of fact,
Since the provisions of section 11 of Rule 108 as construed by this Court in
preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without
several cases, (in which the question of constitutionality or validity of said
infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the due process
section had not been squarely raised) do away with the defendant's right
clause to a fair trial." We took this ruling to be ample enough to dispose the
under discussion, it follows that said section 11 diminishes the substantive
constitutional question pleaded in the application for certiorari. Heeding
right of the defendant in criminal case, and this Court has no power or
the wishes of the petitioner, we shall enlarge upon the
authority to promulgate it and therefore is null and
subject.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
void.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is contended that section 11 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court 1infringes

The fact that the majority of this Court has ruled in the above cited case
section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution. 2 It is said that the rule in
of Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, that the inferior or justice of the
question deals with substantive matters and impairs substantive
peace courts have discretion to grant a defendant's request to have the
rights.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
witnesses for the prosecution recalled to testify again in the presence of
the defendant and be cross-examined by the latter, does not validate said
provision; because to make the exercise of an absolute right discretionary We can not agree with this view. We are of the opinion that section 11 of
or dependent upon the will or discretion of the court or officer making the Rule 108, like its predecessors, is an adjective law and not a substantive
preliminary investigation, is evidently to diminish or modify law or substantive right. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the
it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library two terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights
is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal
system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. (60 C.J., 980.)
Petition is therefore granted.
Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates
rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:chanrobles virtual law library of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer;
as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of
enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion. (36 C. J., 27; 52 C. J.
In our concurring and dissenting opinion in the case of Dequito and Saling
S., 1026.)chanrobles virtual law library
Buhay vs. Arellano, No. L-1336, we said:

As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts
In our opinion, section 11 of Rule 108 must be read, interpreted, and
are crimes and prescribes the punishment for committing them, as
applied in a way that will not contravene the constitutional provision
distinguished from the procedural law which provides or regulates the rights of parties affected, as it is impossible to fix that boundary by general
steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished. (22 C. J. S., 49.) condition. (State vs. Pavelick, 279 P., 1102.) This being so, it is inevitable
Preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially remedial; it is the that the Supreme Court in making rules should step on substantive rights,
first step taken in a criminal and the Constitution must be presumed to tolerate if not to expect such
prosecution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library incursion as does not affect the accused in a harsh and arbitrary manner
or deprive him of a defense, but operates only in a limited and
unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage. For the Court's power is not
As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural. Evidence -
merely to compile, revise or codify the rules of procedure existing at the
which is the "the mode and manner of proving the competent facts and
time of the Constitution's approval. This power is "to promulgate rules
circumstances on which a party relies to establish the fact in dispute in
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts," which is a
judicial proceedings" - is identified with and forms part of the method by
power to adopt a general, complete and comprehensive system of
which, in private law, rights are enforced and redress obtained, and, in
procedure, adding new and different rules without regard to their source
criminal law, a law transgressor is punished. Criminal procedure refers to
and discarding old ones.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
pleading, evidence and practice. (State vs. Capaci, 154 So., 419; 179 La.,
law library
462.) the entire rules of evidence have been incorporated into the Rules of
Court. We can not tear down section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional
grounds without throwing out the whole code of evidence embodied in The motion is denied.
these Rules.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, and Montemayor, JJ., concur.
In Beazell vs. Ohio, 269 U. S., 167, 70 Law. ed., 216, the United States
Supreme Court said:
FERIA, J., dissenting:chanrobles virtual law library

Expressions are to be found in earlier judicial opinions to the effect that the
I dissent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
constitutional limitation may be transgressed by alterations in the rules of
evidence or procedure. See Calder vs. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390, 1 L. ed., 648,
650; Cummings vs. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 326, 18 L. ed., 356, 364; Kring vs. The motion for reconsideration must be
Missouri, 107 U. S. 221, 228, 232, 27 L. ed., 507, 508, 510, 2 Ct. Rep., 443. granted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
And there may be procedural changes which operate to deny to the
accused a defense available under the laws in force at the time of the
According to the resolution, the right of a defendant to be confronted with
commission of his offense, or which otherwise affect him in such a harsh
and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution in a preliminary
and arbitrary manner as to fall within the constitutional prohibition.
investigation granted by law or provided for in General Orders, No. 58, as
Kring vs. Missouri, 107 U. S., 221, 27 L. ed., 507, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep., 443;
amended, in force prior to the promulgation of the Rules of Court, is not a
Thompson vs. Utah, 170 U. S., 343, 42 L. ed., 1061, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 620. But
substantive right but a mere matter of procedure, and therefore this Court
it is not well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules
can suppress it in section 11, Rule 108, of the Rules of Court, for the
of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which
following reasons:chanrobles virtual law library
operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage,
are not prohibited. A statute which, after indictment, enlarges the class of
persons who may be witnesses at the trial, by removing the disqualification First. Because "preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially
of persons convicted of felony, is not an ex post facto law. Hopt vs. Utah, 110 remedial; it is the first step taken in a criminal prosecution." . . . "As a rule
U. S., 575, 28 L. ed., 263, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep., 202, 4 Am. Crim. Rep. 417. Nor is a of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural." . . . "The entire rules
statute which changes the rules of evidence after the indictment so as to of evidence have been incorporated into the Rules of Court." And therefore
render admissible against the accused evidence previously held "we can not tear down section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds
inadmissible, Thompson vs. Missouri, 171 U. S., 380, 43 L. ed., 204, 18 Sup. without throwing out the whole Code of evidence embodied in these
Ct. Rep., 922; or which changes the place of trial, Gut. vs. Minnesota, 9 Wall. rules."chanrobles virtual law library
35, 19 L. ed., 573; or which abolishes a court for hearing criminal appeals,
creating a new one in its stead. See Duncan vs. Missouri, 152 U. S., 377, 382,
Secondly. Because, "preliminary investigation is not an essential part of
38 L. ed., 485, 487, 14 sup. Ct. Rep., 570.
due process of law. It may be suppressed entirely, and if this may be done,
mere restriction of the privilege formerly enjoyed thereunder can not be
Tested by this standard, we do not believe that the curtailment of the right held to fall within the constitutional prohibition."chanrobles virtual law
of an accused in a preliminary investigation to cross-examine the library
witnesses who had given evidence for his arrest is of such importance as
to offend against the constitutional inhibition. As we have said in the
Lastly. Because, "the distinction between remedy and 'substantive right' is
beginning, preliminary investigation is not an essential part of due process
incapable of exact definition. The difference is somewhat a question of
of law. It may be suppressed entirely, and if this may be done, mere
degree" . . . It is difficult to draw a line in any particular case beyond which
restriction of the privilege formerly enjoyed thereunder can not be held to
legislative power over remedy and procedure can pass without touching
fall within the constitutional
upon the substantive rights of parties affected, as it is impossible to fix that
prohibition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
boundary by general condition. . . . "This being so, it is inevitable that the
Supreme Court in making rules should step on substantive rights, and the
While section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the defendant the right to cross- Constitution must be presumed to tolerate if not to expect such incursion
examine witnesses in a preliminary investigation, his right to present his as does not affect the accused in a harsh and arbitrary manner or deprive
witnesses remains unaffected, and his constitutional right to be informed him of a defense, but operates only in a limited and unsubstantial manner
of the charges against him both at such investigation and at the trial is to his disadvantage."chanrobles virtual law library
unchanged. In the latter stage of the proceedings, the only stage where the
guaranty of due process comes into play, he still enjoys to the full extent
Before proceeding it is necessary to distinguish substantive law from
the right to be confronted by and to cross-examine the witnesses against
procedure, for the distinction is not always well understood. Substantive
him. The degree of importance of a preliminary investigation to an accused
law is that part of the law which creates, defines, and regulates rights as
may be gauged by the fact that this formality is frequently
opposed to objective or procedural law which prescribes the method of
waived.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
enforcing rights. What constitutes practice and procedure in the law is the
mode or proceeding by which a legal right is enforced, "that which
The distinction between "remedy" and "substantive right" is incapable of regulates the formal steps in an action or judicial proceedings; the course
exact definition. The difference is somewhat a question of degree. of procedure in courts; the form, manner and order in which proceedings
(Dexter vs. Edmands, 89 F., 467; Beazell vs. Ohio, supra.) It is difficult to have been, and are accustomed to be had; the form, manner and order of
draw a line in any particular case beyond which legislative power over carrying on and conducting suits or prosecutions in the courts through
remedy and procedure can pass without touching upon the substantive their various sages according to the principles of law and the rules laid
down by the respective courts." 31 Cyc. Law and Procedure, p. 1153; id., the witness against him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
32, section 405; Rapalje & Lawrence's Law Dictionary; Anderson Law law library
Dictionary; Bouvier's Law
Dictionary.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
(2) With respect to the second argument or reason, it is true that the
preliminary investigation as provided for in the General Orders, No. 58, as
Substantive rights may be created or granted either in the Constitution or amended, is not an essential part of due process of law, because "due
in any branch of the law, civil, criminal, administrative or procedural law. process of law" is not iron clad in its meaning; its does not necessarily
In our old Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, as amended, there are mean a particular procedure. Due process of law simply requires a
provisions which create, define and regulate substantive rights, and many procedure that fully protects the life, liberty and property. For that reason
of those provisions such as those relating to guardianship, adoption, the investigation to be made by the City Fiscal of the City of Manila under
evidence and many others are incorporated in the Rules of Court for the Act No. 612, now section 2465 of the Administrative Code, before filing an
sake of convenience and not because this Court is empowered to information, was considered by this Court as sufficient to satisfy the due
promulgate them as rules of court. And our old law of Criminal Procedure process of law constitutional requirement (U. S. vs. Ocampo, 18 Phil., 1; U.
General Orders No. 58 grants the offended party the right to commence a S. vs. Grant and Kennedy, 18 Phil., 122). But it is also true that we have
criminal action or file a complaint against the offender and to intervene in already and correctly held that: "The law having explicitly recognized and
the criminal prosecution against him, and grants the defendant in the Court established that no person charged with the commission of a crime shall
of First Instance (except in the City of Manila) the right to bail, and to a be deprived of his liberty or subjected to trial without prior preliminary
preliminary investigation including his rights during said investigation, investigation (provided for in General orders, No. 58, as amended) that
and the rights at the trial, which are now reproduced or incorporated in shall show that there are reasonable grounds to believe him guilty, there
Rules 106, 108, 110, and 111 of the Rules of Court, except the rights now can be no doubt that the accused who is deprived of his liberty, tried and
in question. And all these, and others not necessary for us to mention, are sentenced without the proper preliminary investigation having been made
obviously substantive rights.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles in his regard, is convicted without the process of law," (United States vs.
virtual law library Banzuela, 31 Phil., 564).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
(1) As to the first argument, the premise "the preliminary investigation is
eminently and essentially remedial is not correct. Undoubtedly the The ruling in Beazell vs. Ohio, 269 U. S. 167, 70 Law. ed., 216, quoted in the
majority means to say procedural, in line with the conclusion in the resolution, has no application to the present case, for the question involved
resolution, because remedial law is one thing, and procedural law is therein was the power of Congress to alter the rules of evidence and
another. Obviously they are different branches of the law. "Remedial procedure without violating the constitutional precept that prohibits the
statute" is "a statute providing a remedy for an injury as distinguished from passing of ex post facto law, while the question herein involved is the
a penal statute. A statute giving a party a mode of remedy for a wrong power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
where he had none or a different one before. . . . Remedial statutes are those procedure, which diminish the substantive right of a defendant, expressly
which are made to supply such defects, and abridge such superfluities in prohibited by the same provision of the Constitution that confers upon this
the common law, as arise either from the general imperfections of all Court the power to promulgate said
human law, from change of time and circumstances, from the mistakes and rules.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
unadvised determination of unlearned (or even learned) judges, or from
any other cause whatsoever." (Black's Law Dictionary, third edition, pp.
(3) The last reason or argument premised on the conclusion that "the
1525, 1526.)chanrobles virtual law library
distinction between remedy and 'substantive right' is incapable of exact
definition;" indeed "the difference is somewhat a question of degree,"
It is also not correct to affirm that section 11 of Rule 108 relating to right (Dexter vs. Edmonds, 89 F 487), is immaterial, because, as we have already
of defendant after arrest "is a rule of evidence and therefore is also said in refuting the majority's first reason, remedy and procedure are two
procedural." In the first place, the provisions of said section to the effect completely different things.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
that "the defendant, after the arrest and his delivery to the court has the law library
right to be informed of the complaint or information filed against him, and
also to be informed of the testimony and evidence presented against him,
As above defined, substantive law is clearly differentiated from procedural
and may be allowed to testify and present witnesses or evidence for him if
law and practice. But even assuming arguendo that it is difficult to draw
he so desires," are not rules of evidence; and in the second place, it is
the line in any particular case beyond which the power of the court over
evident that most of the rules of evidence, if not all, are substantive laws
procedure can not pass without touching upon the substantial right of the
that define, create or regulate rights, and not procedural. "Rules of
parties, what this Court should do in that case would be to abstain from
evidence are substantive rights found in common law chiefly and growing
promulgating such rule of procedure which many increase, diminish or
out of reasoning, experience and common sense of lawyers and courts."
modify substantive right in order to avoid violating the constitutional
(State vs. Pavelich, et al., 279 P., 1102.) "It is true that weighing of evidence
prohibition above referred to. Because as this Supreme Court is not
and the rules of practice with respect thereto form part of the law of
empowered by the Constitution to legislate on or abrogate substantive
procedure, but the classification of proofs is sometime determined by the
rights, but only to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure
substantive law." (U. S. vs. Genato, 15 Phil., 170, 176.) How can the law on
which "shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights," this
judicial notice, conclusive as well as juris tantum presumption, hearsay
Court can not step on them in making the rules, and the Constitution must
and best evidence rule, parol evidence rule, interpretation of documents,
be presumed not to tolerate nor expect such incursion as would affect the
competency of a person to testify as a witness be considered
substantive rights of the accused in any
procedural?chanrobles virtual law library
manner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Therefore, the argumentative conclusion that "we can not tear down
Besides, depriving an accused of his right to be confronted and cross-
section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without throwing out the
examine the witness against him in a preliminary investigation would
whole code of evidence embodied in these Rules," is evidently wrong, not
affect the accused not in a limited and unsubstantial but in a harsh and
only for the reason just stated, but because our contention that the
arbitrary manner. The testimony of a witness given in the absence of the
defendant can not be deprived of his right to be confronted with and cross-
defendant and without an opportunity on the part of the latter to cross-
examine the witness of the prosecution is a preliminary investigation
examine him is a hearsay evidence, and it should not be admitted against
under consideration would not, if upheld, necessarily tear down said
the defendant in a preliminary investigation that is granted to the latter as
section. Our theory, is that said section 11 should be so construed as to be
a protection against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions (U. S. vs.
valid and effective, that is, that if the defendant asks the court to recall the
Grant and Kennedy, supra). Otherwise, an accused who is innocent and
witness or witnesses for the prosecution to testify again in his presence,
should not be arrested, or if arrested should be released immediately a
and to allow the former to cross-examine the latter, the court or officer
short time after his arrest after the preliminary investigation, would have
making the preliminary investigation is under obligation to grant the
to be held for trial and wait for a considerable period of time until the case
request. But if the defendant does not so ask the court, he should be
is tried and acquitted after trial by the Courts of First Instance in provinces
considered as waiving his right to be confronted with and cross-examine
on account of the admission of such evidence in the preliminary
investigation, evidence not admissible at the
trial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Therefore, the motion for reconsideration is granted, and after the

necessary proceedings the decision of the majority reversed or modified in
accordance with my dissenting opinion.

PERFECTO, J.: chanrobles virtual law library

We dissent. Our opinion in the Dequito case still stands. The motion for
reconsideration should be granted.

Endnotes:

TUASON, J.:

1 Rights of defendant after arrest. - After the arrest of the defendant

and his delivery to the court, he shall be informed of the complaint or

information filed against him. He shall also be informed of the substance of
the testimony and evidence presented against him, and, if he desires to
testify or to present witnesses or evidence in his favor, he may be allowed
to do so. The testimony of the witnesses need not be reduced to writing but
that of the defendant shall be taken in writing and subscribed by
him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

2 The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules

concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the

admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Courts, subject to the power
of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The National Assembly
shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law
in the Philippines.
G.R. No. 80762 March 19, 1990 conducting their own investigation. Patrolman Centeno continued with his
sketch; photographs of the scene were likewise taken. The body of the
victim was then brought to the Municipal Hall of Ajuy for autopsy.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FAUSTA GONZALES, AUGUSTO GONZALES, CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR., The autopsy of Lloyd Peñacerrada's cadaver was performed at about 11:20
CUSTODIO GONZALES, JR., NERIO GONZALES and ROGELIO LANIDA, a.m. on February 22, 1981; after completed, a report was made with the
accused, CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR., accused-appellant. following findings:

PHYSICAL FINDINGS

SARMIENTO, J.: 1. Deceased is about 5 ft. and 4 inches in height, body moderately
built and on cadaveric rigidity.
In a decision 1 dated October 31, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo,
Branch XXXVIII (38), in Criminal Case No. 13661, entitled "People of the EXTERNAL FINDINGS
Philippines vs. Fausta Gonzales, Augusto Gonzales, Custodia Gonzales,
Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales and Rogelio Lanida," found all the
1. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 9 cm. in length, located at the
accused, except Rogelio Lanida who eluded arrest and up to now has
lower 3rd anterior aspect of the arm, right, directed upward to the
remain at large and not yet arrained, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
right axillary pit.
crime of murder as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
They were sentenced "to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months 2. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the proximal 3rd, forearm
of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim in the right, posterior aspect with an entrance of 5 cm. in width and 9 cm.
amount of P40,000.00, plus moral damages in the sum of P14,000.00 and in length with an exit at the middle 3rd, posterior aspect of the
to pay the costs." 2 The victim was Lloyd Peñacerrada, 44, landowner, and forearm, right, with 1 cm. wound exit.
a resident of Barangay Aspera, Sara, Iloilo.
3. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the middle 3rd, posterior
Through their counsel, all the accused, except of course Rogelio Lanida, aspect of the forearm right, 1 cm. in width.
filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's decision. During the pendency
of their appeal and before judgment thereon could be rendered by the
4. Incised wound, 4 cm. long, depth visualizing the right lateral
Court of Appeals, however, all the accused-appellants, except Custodio
border of the sternum, 6th and 7th ribs, right located 1.5 inches
Gonzales, Sr., withdrew their appeal and chose instead to pursue their
below the right nipple.
respective applications for parole before the then Ministry, now
Department, of Justice, Parole Division. 3
5. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 10.5 cm. in depth, directed inward to
the thoracic cavity right, located at the left midclavicular line at the
On October 27, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 4 on the
level of the 5th rib left.
appeal of Custodio Gonzales, Sr. It modified the appealed decision in that
the lone appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify
the heirs of Lloyd Peñacerrada in the amount of P30,000.00. In all other 6. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 9.5 cm. in depth directed toward the
respect, the decision of the trial court was affirmed. Further, on the basis right thoracic cavity, located at the mid left scapular line at the level
of our ruling in People vs. Ramos, 5 the appellate court certified this case to of the 8th intercostal space.
us for review.6
7. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, located at the base of the left
The antecedent facts are as follows: armpit directed toward the left thoracic cavity.

At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February 21, 1981, Bartolome 8. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 11 cm. in length, directed toward
Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was awakened the left deltoid muscle, located at the upper 3rd axilla left.
from his sleep by the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. Augusto
informed Paja that his wife had just killed their landlord, Lloyd
9. Puncture wound, 3 cm in width, 11.5 cm in length, located at the
Peñacerrada, and thus would like to surrender to the authorities. Seeing
anterior aspect, proximal 3rd arm left, directed downward.
Augusto still holding the knife allegedly used in the killing and Fausta with
her dress smeared with blood, Paja immediately ordered a nephew of his
to take the spouses to the police authorities at the Municipal Hall in 10. Stab wound, thru and thru, 2.5 cm. in width, and 5 cm. in length,
Poblacion, Ajuy. As instructed, Paja's nephew brought the Gonzales medial aspect, palm right.
spouses, who "backrode" on his motorcycle, to the municipal
building. 7 Upon reaching the Ajuy Police sub-station, the couple informed
11. Stabwound, 4 cm.in width, iliac area, right, directed inward with
the police on duty of the incident. That same night, Patrolman Salvador
portion of large intestine and mysentery coming out.
Centeno of the Ajuy Police Force and the Gonzales spouses went back to
Barangay Tipacla. Reaching Barangay Tipacla the group went to Paja's
residence where Fausta was made to stay, while Paja, Patrolman Centeno, 12. Stab wound, 4 cm. in width, located at the posterior portion of
and Augusto proceeded to the latter's residence at Sitio Nabitasan where the shoulder, right, directed downward to the aspex of the light
the killing incident allegedly occurred. 8 There they saw the lifeless body of thoracic cavity.
Lloyd Peñacerrada, clad only in an underwear, sprawled face down inside
the bedroom. 9 The group stayed for about an hour during which time
13. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 10 cm. in length, located at the
Patrolman Centeno inspected the scene and started to make a rough sketch medial portion of the medial border of the right scapula.
thereof and the immediate surroundings. 10 The next day, February 22,
1981, at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning, Patrolman Centeno,
accompanied by a photographer, went back to the scene of the killing to 14. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 4.5 cm. in length, located at the
conduct further investigations. Fausta Gonzales, on the other hand, was posterior aspect of the right elbow.
brought back that same day by Barangay Captain Paja to the police
substation in Ajuy. When Patrolman Centeno and his companion arrived at 15. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 2 cm. in length, located at the
Sitio Nabitasan, two members of the 321st P.C. Company stationed in Sara, posterior portion, middle 3rd, forearm, right.
Iloilo, who had likewise been informed of the incident, were already there
 16. Lacerated wound at the anterior tantanelle with fissural fracture Nanie Peñacerrada, the victim's widow, on October 6, 1981, and
of the skull. volunteered to testify for the prosecution. A reinvestigation of the case was
therefore conducted by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo on the basis of which
an Amended Information, 16 dated March 3, 1982, naming as additional
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
accused Custodio Gonzales, Sr. (the herein appellant), Custodio Gonzales,
Jr., Nerio Gonzales, and Rogelio Lanida, was filed. Again, all the accused
1. Stab wound No. 5, injuring the left ventricle of the heart. except as earlier explained, Lanida, pleaded not guilty to the crime.

2. Stab wound No. 6, severely injuring the right lower lobe of the At the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Jesus Rojas, the Rural Health
lungs. physician of Ajuy who conducted the autopsy on the body of the victim;
Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla; Patrolman
Salvador Centeno and Corporal Ben Sazon of the Ajuy Police Force; Sgt.
3. Stab wound No. 7, injuring the right middle lobe of the lungs.
(ret) Nicolas Belicanao and Sgt. Reynaldo Palomo of the 321st P.C.
Company based in Sara, Iloilo; Jose Huntoria; and Nanie Peñacerrada, the
4. Stab wound No. 11, injuring the descending colon of the large widow.
intestine, thru and thru.
Dr. Jesus Rojas testified that he performed the autopsy on the body of the
5. Stab wound No. 12, severely injuring the apex of the right deceased Lloyd Penacerrada at around 11:20 a.m. on February 22, 1981
lungs (sic). after it was taken to the municipal hall of Ajuy. 17 His findings revealed that
the victim suffered from 16 wounds comprising of four (4) punctured
wounds, seven (7) stab wounds, four (4) incised wounds, and one (1)
CAUSE OF DEATH:
lacerated wound. In his testimony, Dr. Rojas, while admitting the
possibility that only one weapon might have caused all the wounds (except
MASSIVE HEMMORRHAGE DUE TO MULTIPLE the lacerated wound) inflicted on the victim, nevertheless opined that due
LACERATED, STABBED (sic), INCISED AND to the number and different characteristics of the wounds, the probability
PUNCTURED WOUNDS. that at least two instruments were used is high. 18 The police authorities
and the P.C. operatives for their part testified on the aspect of the
investigation they respectively conducted in relation to the incident. Nanie
The autopsy report thus showed that Dr. Rojas "found sixteen (16)
Peñacerrada testified mainly on the expenses she incurred by reason of the
wounds, five (5) of which are fatal because they penetrated the internal
death of her husband while Barangay Captain Bartolome Paja related the
organs, heart, lungs and intestines of the deceased." 12
events surrounding the surrender of the spouses Augusto and Fausta
Gonzales to him, the location of the houses of the accused, as well as on
On February 23, two days after the incident, Augusto Gonzales appeared other matters.
before the police sub-station in the poblacion of Ajuy and voluntarily
surrendered to Police Corporal Ben Sazon for detention and protective
By and large, the prosecution's case rested on Huntoria's alleged
custody for "having been involved" in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada. He
eyewitness account of the incident. According to Huntoria, who gave his
requested that he be taken to the P.C. headquarters in Sara, Iloilo where his
age as 30 when he testified on July 27, 1982, 19 at 5:00 o'clock in the
wife, Fausta, was already detained having been indorsed thereat by the
afternoon on February 21, 1981, he left his work at Barangay Central, in
Ajuy police force. 13
Ajuy, Iloilo where he was employed as a tractor driver by one Mr. Piccio,
and walked home; 20 he took a short-cut route. 21 While passing at the
Based on the foregoing and on the investigations conducted by the Ajuy vicinity of the Gonzales spouses' house at around 8:00 o'clock in the
police force and the 321st P.C. Company, an information for murder dated evening, he heard cries for help. 22 Curiosity prompted him to approach the
August 26, 1981, was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo against the place where the shouts were emanating. When he was some 15 to 20
spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. The information read as follows: meters away, he hid himself behind a clump of banana
trees. 23 From where he stood, he allegedly saw all the accused ganging
upon and takings turns in stabbing and hacking the victim Lloyd
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses FAUSTA
Peñacerrada, near a "linasan" or threshing platform. He said he clearly
GONZALES and AUGUSTO GONZALES of the crime of
MURDER committed as follows: recognized all the accused as the place was then awash in
moonlight. 24 Huntoria further recounted that after the accused were
through in stabbing and hacking the victim, they then lifted his body and
That on or about the 21st day of February, 1981, in the Municipality carried it into the house of the Gonzales spouses which was situated some
of Ajuy, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of 20 to 25 meters away from the "linasan". 25 Huntoria then proceeded on
this Court, the above-named accused with four other companions his way home. Upon reaching his house, he related what he saw to his
whose identities are still unknown and are still at large, armed with mother and to his wife 26 before he went to sleep. 27Huntoria explained that
sharp-pointed and deadly weapons, conspiring, confederating and he did not immediately report to the police authorities what he witnessed
helping each other, with treachery and evident premeditation, with for fear of his life. 28 In October 1981 however, eight months after the
deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, and taking advantage extraordinary incident he allegedly witnessed, bothered by his conscience
of their superior strength and number, did then and there wilfully, plus the fact that his father was formerly a tenant of the victim which, to
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab, hack, hit and wound his mind, made him likewise a tenant of the latter, he thought of helping
Lloyd D. Peñacerrada, with the weapons with which said accused the victim's widow, Nanie Peñacerrada. Hence, out of his volition, he
were provided at the time, thereby inflicting upon said Lloyd D. travelled from his place at Sitio Nabitasan, in Barangay Tipacla
Peñacerrada multiple wounds on different parts of his body as Municipality of Ajuy, to Sara, Iloilo where Mrs. Peñacerrada lived, and
shown by autopsy report attached to the record of this case which related to her what he saw on February 21, 1981. 29
multifarious wounds caused the immediate death of said Lloyd D.
Peñacerrada.
Except Fausta who admitted killing Lloyd Peñacerrada in defense of her
honor as the deceased attempted to rape her, all the accused denied
CONTRARY TO LAW. participation in the crime. The herein accused-appellant, Custodio
Gonzales, Sr., claimed that he was asleep 30 in his house which was located
Iloilo City, August 26, 1981. 14 some one kilometer away from the scene of the crime 31 when the incident
happened. He asserted that he only came to know of it after his
grandchildren by Augusto and Fausta Gonzales went to his house that night
When arraigned on September 16, 1981, Augusto and Fausta both entered of February 21, 1981 to inform him. 32
a plea of not guilty. Before trial, however, Jose Huntoria 15 who claimed to
have witnessed the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, presented himself to
The trial court disregarded the version of the defense; it believed the have provided a more definite clue as to which version is more credible. If,
testimony of Huntoria. as the version of the defense puts it, the killing transpired inside the
bedroom of the Gonzales spouses, there would have been more blood
stains inside the couple's bedroom or even on the ground directly under it.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Custodia Gonzales, Sr., the lone
And this circumstance would provide an additional mooring to the claim
appellant, contended that the trial court erred in convicting him on the
of attempted rape asseverated by Fausta. On the other hand, if the
basis of the testimony of Jose Huntoria, the lone alleged eyewitness, and in
prosecution's version that the killing was committed in the field near the
not appreciating his defense of alibi.
linasan is the truth, then blood stains in that place would have been more
than in any other place.
The Court of Appeals found no merit in both assigned errors. In upholding
Huntoria's testimony, the appellate court held that:
The same sloppiness characterizes the investigation conducted by the
other authorities. Police Corporal Ben Sazon who claimed that accused
. . . Huntoria positively identified all the accused, including the Augusto Gonzales surrendered to him on February 23, 1981 failed to state
herein accused-appellant, as the assailants of Peñacerrada. clearly the reason for the "surrender." It would even appear that Augusto
(TSN, p. 43, July 27, 1982) The claim that Huntoria would "surrendered" just so he could be safe from possible revenge by the
have difficulty recognizing the assailant at a distance of 15 to victim's kins. Corporal Sazon likewise admitted that Augusto never
20 meters is without merit, considering that Huntoria knew mentioned to him the participation of other persons in the killing of the
all the accused. (Id., pp. 37-39) If Huntoria could not say who victim. Finally, without any evidence on that point, P.C. investigators of the
was hacking and who was stabbing the deceased, it was only 321st P.C. Company who likewise conducted an investigation of the killing
because the assailant were moving around the victim. mentioned in their criminal complaint 38 four other unnamed persons,
aside from the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales, to have conspired in
killing Lloyd Peñacerrada.
As for the delay in reporting the incident to the authorities,
we think that Huntoria's explanation is satisfactory. He said
he feared for his life. (Id., pp. 50-51, 65) As stated in People Now on the medical evidence. Dr. Rojas opined that it is possible that the
vs. Realon, 99 SCRA 442, 450 (1980): "The natural reticence sixteen wounds described in the autopsy report were caused by two or
of most people to get involved in a criminal case is of judicial more bladed instruments. Nonetheless, he admitted the possibility that
notice. As held in People v. Delfin, '. . . the initial reluctance of one bladed instrument might have caused all. Thus, insofar as Dr. Rojas'
witnesses in this country to volunteer information about a testimony and the autopsy report are concerned, Fausta Gonzales'
criminal case and their unwillingness to be involved in or admission that she alone was responsible for the killing appears not at all
dragged into criminal investigations is common, and has been too impossible. And then there is the positive testimony of Dr. Rojas that
judicially declared not to affect credibility.'" there were only five wounds that could be fatal out of the sixteen described
in the autopsy report. We shall discuss more the significance of these
wounds later.
It is noteworthy that the accused-appellant self admitted that
he had known Huntoria for about 10 years and that he and
Huntoria were in good terms and had no misunderstanding It is thus clear from the foregoing that if the conviction of the appellant by
whatsoever. (TSN, p. 33, July 18, 1984) He said that he could the lower courts is to be sustained, it can only be on the basis of the
not think of any reason why Huntoria should implicate him. testimony of Huntoria, the self-proclaimed eyewitness. Hence, a
(Id., p. 34) Thus, Huntoria's credibility. is beyond question. 33 meticulous scrutiny of Huntoria's testimony is compelling.

The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the appellant's defense of To recollect, Huntoria testified that he clearly saw all the accused, including
alibi. 34 The appellate court, however, found the sentence imposed by the the appellant, take turns in hacking and stabbing Lloyd Peñacerrada, at
trial court on the accused-appellant erroneous. Said the appellate court: about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, on February 21, 1981, in the field near a
"linasan" while he (Huntoria) stood concealed behind a clump of banana
trees some 15 to 20 meters away from where the crime was being
Finally, we find that the trial court erroneously sentenced the
committed. According to him, he recognized the six accused as the
accused-appellant to 12 years and 1 day to 17 years and 4
malefactors because the scene was then illuminated by the moon. He
months of reclusion temporal. The penalty for murder under
further stated that the stabbing and hacking took about an hour. But on
Article 248 is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
cross-examination, Huntoria admitted that he could not determine who
death. As there was no mitigating or aggravating
among the six accused did the stabbing and/or hacking and what particular
circumstance, the imposible penalty should be reclusion
weapon was used by each of them.
perpetua. Consequently, the appeal should have been brought
to the Supreme Court. With regard to the indemnity for death,
the award of P40,000.00 should be reduced to P30,000.00, in ATTY. GATON (defense counsel on cross-examination):
accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Court. (E.g.,
People v. De la Fuente, 126 SCRA 518 (1983); People v.
Q And you said that the moon was bright, is it correct?
Atanacio, 128 SCRA 31 (1984); People v. Rado, 128 SCRA 43
(1984); People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 68731, Feb. 27, 1987). 35
A Yes, Sir.
The case, as mentioned earlier, is now before us upon certification by the
Court of Appeals, the penalty imposed being reclusion perpetua. Q And you would like us to understand that you saw the hacking
and the stabbing, at that distance by the herein accused as
identified by you?
After a careful review of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, we find
the same insufficient to convict the appellant of the crime charged.
A Yes, sir, because the moon was brightly shining.
To begin with, the investigation conducted by the police authorities leave
much to be desired. Patrolman Centeno of the Ajuy police force in his Q If you saw the stabbing and the hacking, will you please tell this
sworn statements 36 even gave the date of the commission of the crime as Honorable Court who was hacking the victim?
"March 21, 1981." Moreover, the sketch 37 he made of the scene is of little
help. While indicated thereon are the alleged various blood stains and their
A Because they were surrounding Peñacerrada and were in constant
locations relative to the scene of the crime, there was however no
movement, I could not determine who did the hacking.
indication as to their quantity. This is rather unfortunate for the
prosecution because, considering that there are two versions proferred on
where the killing was carried out, the extent of blood stains found would ATTY. GATON:
 The interpretation is not clear. Art. 3. Definition — Acts and omissions punishable by
law are felonies (delitos).
COURT:
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit
(dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa).
They were doing it rapidly.

There is deceit when the act is performed with

A The moving around or the hacking or the "labu" or "bunu" is
deliberate intent; and there is fault when the wrongful
rapid. I only saw the rapid movement of their arms, Your Honor, and
act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of
I cannot determine who was hacking and who was stabbing. But I
foresight, or lack of skill.
saw the hacking and the stabbing blow.

(Emphasis supplied.)
ATTY. GATON:

Thus, the elements of felonies in general are: (1) there must be an act or
Q You cannot positively identify before this Court who really hacked
omission; (2) the act or omission must be punishable under the Revised
Lloyd Peñacerrada?
Penal Code; and (3) the act is performed or the omission incurred by
means of deceit or fault.
A Yes sir, I cannot positively tell who did the hacking.
Here, while the prosecution accuses, and the two lower courts both found,
Q And likewise you cannot positively tell this Honorable Court who that the appellant has committed a felony in the killing of Lloyd
did the stabbing? Peñacerrada, forsooth there is paucity of proof as to what act was
performed by the appellant. It has been said that "act," as used in Article 3
of the Revised Penal Code, must be understood as "any bodily movement
A Yes sir, and because of the rapid movements.
tending to produce some effect in the external world." 40 In this instance,
there must therefore be shown an "act" committed by the appellant which
Q I noticed in your direct testimony that you could not even identify would have inflicted any harm to the body of the victim that produced his
the weapons used because according to you it was just flashing? death.

A Yes, sir.39 Yet, even Huntoria, as earlier emphasized, admitted quite candidly that he
did not see who "stabbed" or who "hacked" the victim. Thus this principal
witness did not say, because he could not whether the appellant "hacked
(Emphasis supplied)
or "stabbed" victim. In fact, Huntoria does not know what specific act was
performed by the appellant. This lack of specificity then makes the case fall
From his very testimony, Huntoria failed to impute a definite and specific short of the test laid down by Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code previously
act committed, or contributed, by the appellant in the killing of Lloyd discussed. Furthermore, the fact that the victim sustained only five fatal
Peñacerrada. wounds out of the total of sixteen inflicted, as adverted to above, while
there are six accused charged as principals, it follows to reason that one of
the six accused could not have caused or dealt a fatal wound. And this one
It also bears stressing that there is nothing in the findings of the trial court
could as well be the appellant, granted ex gratia argumenti that he took
and of the Court of Appeals which would categorize the criminal liability of
part in the hacking and stabbing alleged by Huntoria. And why not him? Is
the appellant as a principal by direct participation under Article 17,
he not after all the oldest (already sexagenarian at that time) and
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, there is nothing in the
practically the father of the five accused? And pursuing this argument to
evidence for the prosecution that inculpates him by inducement, under
the limits of its logic, it is possible, nay even probable, that only four, or
paragraph 2 of the same Article 17, or by indispensable cooperation under
three, or two of the accused could have inflicted all the five fatal wounds to
paragraph 3 thereof. What then was the direct part in the killing did the
the exclusion of two, three, or four of them. And stretching the logic further,
appellant perform to support the ultimate punishment imposed by the
it is possible, nay probable, that all the fatal wounds, including even all the
Court of Appeals on him?
non-fatal wounds, could have been dealt by Fausta in rage against the
assault on her womanhood and honor. But more importantly, there being
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides how criminal liability is not an iota of evidence that the appellant caused any of the said five fatal
incurred. wounds, coupled with the prosecution's failure to prove the presence of
conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt, the appellant's conviction can not be
sustained.
Art. 4. Criminal liability — Criminal liability shall be
incurred:
Additionally, Huntoria's credibility as a witness is likewise tarnished by the
fact that he only came out to testify in October 1981, or eight long months
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although
since he allegedly saw the killing on February 21, 1981. While ordinarily
the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended. the failure of a witness to report at once to the police authorities the crime
he
had witnessed should not be taken against him and should not affect his
2. By any person performing an act which would be credibility,41 here, the unreasonable delay in Huntoria's coming out
an offense against persons or property, were it not engenders doubt on his veracity. 42 If the silence of coming out an alleged
for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment eyewitness for several weeks renders his credibility doubtful, 43 the more
or on account of the employment of inadequate or it should be for one who was mute for eight months. Further, Huntoria's
ineffectual means. long delay in reveiling what he allegedly witnessed, has not been
satisfactorily explained. His lame excuse that he feared his life would be
(Emphasis supplied.) endangered is too pat to be believed. There is no showing that he was
threatened by the accused or by anybody. And if it were true that he feared
a possible retaliation from the accused, 44 why did he finally volunteer to
Thus, one of the means by which criminal liability is incurred is through testify considering that except for the spouses Augusto and Fausta
the commission of a felony. Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other Gonzales who were already under police custody, the rest of the accused
hand, provides how felonies are committed. were then still free and around; they were not yet named in the original
information, 45 thus the supposed danger on Huntoria's life would still be
clear and present when he testified.
Moreover, Huntoria is not exactly a disinterested witness as portrayed by SO ORDERED.
the prosecution. He admitted that he was a tenant of the deceased. In fact,
he stated that one of the principal reasons why he testified was because
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
the victim was also his landlord.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Now, Mr. Huntoria, why did it take you so long

from the time you saw the stabbing and hacking of
Lloyd Peñacerrada when you told Mrs.
Peñacerrada about what happened to her
husband?

A At first I was then afraid to tell anybody else but

because I was haunted by my conscience
and secondly the victim was also my landlord I
revealed what I saw to the wife of the victim.46

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis ours.)

At this juncture, it may be relevant to remind that under our socioeconomic

set-up, a tenant owes the very source of his livelihood, if not existence
itself, from his landlord who provides him with the land to till. In this
milieu, tenants like Huntoria are naturally beholden to their landlords and
seek ways and means to ingratiate themselves with the latter. In this
instance, volunteering his services as a purported eyewitness and
providing that material testimony which would lead to the conviction of
the entire family of Augusto Gonzales whose wife, Fausta, has confessed to
the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, would, in a perverted sense, be a way by
which Huntoria sought to ingratiate himself with the surviving family of
his deceased landlord. This is especially so because the need to get into the
good graces of his landlord's family assumed a greater urgency considering
that he ceased to be employed as early as May 1981. 47 Volunteering his
services would alleviate the financial distress he was in. And Huntoria
proved quite sagacious in his choice of action for shortly after he
volunteered and presented himself to the victim's widow, he was taken
under the protective wings of the victim's uncle, one Dr. Biclar, who gave
him employment and provided lodging for his family. 48 Given all the
foregoing circumstances, we can not help but dismiss Huntoria as an
unreliable witness, to say the least.

At any rate, there is another reason why we find the alleged participation
of the appellant in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada doubtful — it is
contrary to our customs and traditions. Under the Filipino family tradition
and culture, aging parents are sheltered and insulated by their adult
children from any possible physical and emotional harm. It is therefore
improbable for the other accused who are much younger and at the prime
of their manhood, to summon the aid or allow the participation of their 65-
year old 49 father, the appellant, in the killing of their lone adversary,
granting that the victim was indeed an adversary. And considering that the
appellant's residence was about one kilometer from the scene of the
crime, 50 we seriously doubt that the appellant went there just for the
purpose of aiding his three robust male sons (Custodia Jr., Nerio, and
Augusta), not to mention the brother and sister, Rogelio and Fausta, in the
killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, even if the latter were a perceived enemy.

Finally, while indeed alibi is a weak defense, 51 under appropriate

circumstances, like in the instant case in which the participation of the
appellant is not beyond cavil it may be considered as exculpatory. Courts
should not at once look with disfavor at the defense of alibi for if taken in
the light of the other evidence on record, it may be sufficient to acquit the
accused. 52

In fine, the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET

ASIDE and the appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. Costs de oficio
 Republic of the Philippines receipts submitted by Tanduay were actually paid to the BIR as ad
SUPREME COURT valorem taxes.
Manila
Larin's a Memorandum was received by the Records and Administrative
FIRST DIVISION Section (RAS), a unit under RAD, on September 24, 1987. In due course,
RAS made the necessary verification on the basis of its records and
prepared the corresponding verification 2 in the form of a 1st Indorsement
to the Specific Tax Office on September 25, 1987. The indorsement, which
was signed by petitioner Evangelista, contained a listing of two hundred
G.R. Nos. 108135-36 September 30, 1999 thirty seven (237) confirmation receipts in various amounts under two
categories designated with Tax Numeric Code (TNC) 3011-0011 and TNC
0000-0000. A total of 149 confirmation receipts covering P102,519,100.00
POTENCIANA M. EVANGELISTA, petitioner,
were listed as tax payments under TNC 3011-0011 and a total of 88
vs.
confirmation receipts covering P78,182,582.00 were listed as tax receipts
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE
under TNC 0000-0000.
SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), respondents.

A memorandum was thereafter prepared by Galban as Chief of the

Compounders and Rectifier's Section addressed to Pareño describing the
technical aspects of Tanduay's manufacturing process. Galban made no
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: recommendation, however, as to the validity of Tanduay's claim. On
October 13, 1987, Pareño sent a memorandum to Larin recommending
that the request for tax credit of Tanduay Distillery, Inc. be given due
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the
course on the ground that Tanduay as a rectifier is an extension of the
Sandiganbayan dated September 11, 1992 in Criminal Case Nos. 14208-
distiller and its products are subject of the payment of specific tax and
14209 finding petitioner Potenciana M. Evangelista guilty beyond
not ad valorem tax. On same date, Larin signed a memorandum for the
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 268, paragraph 4 of the National
Deputy Commissioner of the BIR recommending that the claim of Tanduay
Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) and Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise
Distillery Inc., for the alleged erroneous payment of ad valorem taxes in the
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
amount of P180,701,682.00 be tax credited as in the case of Distilleria
Limtuaco and Co. Inc.
Tanduay Distillery Inc., is a company engaged in the manufacture and sale
of rum, gin, vodka and other spirits. On September 17, 1987, Tanduay filed
On October 13, 1987, Eufracio D. Santos, Deputy Commissioner of the BIR,
with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) an application for tax credit in
approved the recommendation made by Larin in his memorandum and
the sum of P180,701,682.00 representing alleged erroneous payments
thereafter signed Tax Credit Memo No. 5177 in the amount of
for ad valorem taxes covering the period January 1, 1986 to August 31,
P180,701,682.00 in favor of Tanduay Distillery, Inc. The approval was
1987. Attached to the application was a schedule of ad
based on the following:
valorem taxes 1 allegedly paid by Tanduay with supporting confirmation
receipts. The application was filed with the Specific Tax Office of the BIR
headed by Aquilino T. Larin. 1. The memorandum of the Assistant Commissioner for Specific
Tax Office, Aquilino T. Larin;
Tanduay anchored its claim for tax credit on the ground that it is a rectifier
which is liable for specific taxes and not ad valorem taxes, citing a BIR 2. The memorandum of the Chief of Alcohol Division, Teodoro D.
ruling in a case involving Distilleria Limtuaco and Co. Inc. The ruling states Pareño; and
that rectifiers are considered as extensions of distillers inasmuch as they
purchase alcohol from distillers without prepayment of the specific tax.
3. The 1st indorsement/certification issued by Chief of Revenue
Since specific tax should be paid by the distiller before its removal from the
Accounting Division, herein petitioner Potenciano M. Evangelista. 3
place of production, the burden of payment therefor is shifted to and
assumed by the rectifier.
Immediately after the approval of Tax Credit Memo No. 5177, Tanduay
availed of the tax credit on various dates covering the period from October
In its application for tax credit, Tanduay stated that it is a rectifier with
19, 1987 to June 20, 1988. 4 However, on June 22, 1988, a certain Ruperto
Assessment No. A-1-8 and a compounder with Assessment No. A-1-8-A,
Lim wrote a letter-complaint to BIR Commissioner Bienvenido Tan, Jr.
although compounding is only incidental to rectification of its products.
alleging that the grant of Tax Credit Memo No. 5177 in favor of Tanduay
Consequently, before the tax credit being sought by Tanduay could be
was irregular and anomalous. More specifically, Lim pointed out that
granted, the BIR's Tax and Alcohol Division, headed by Teodoro D. Pareño,
Tanduay had paid only P73,614,287.20 5 by way of ad valorem taxes to the
had to verify first whether Tanduay's products are distilled spirits or
BIR from January 1, 1986 to August 31, 1987 and not P180,701,682.00 as
compounded liquor based on how they are manufactured. To do this,
claimed. Deputy Commissioner Santos, in approving TCM No. 5177, failed
Justino Galban, Head of the Compounders, Rectifiers and Repackers
to notice that petitioner's 1st indorsement contained a listing of TNC
Section under the Alcohol and Tax Division, had to look into the technical
indicating tax payments received from Tanduay under two categories, i.e.,
process for the manufacture of rum, gin, vodka and other intoxicating
TNC 3011-0011 and TNC 0000-0000. As earlier mentioned, a total of 149
beverages of Tanduay. If it is determined that the products can be properly
confirmation receipts were listed as tax payments under TNC 3011-0011
classified as distilled spirits based on how they are manufactured, then
while a total of 88 confirmation receipts were listed as tax payments under
Tanduay could properly claim for a tax credit on its payments of ad
TNC 0000-0000. Deputy Commissioner Santos admitted that while he
valorem taxes in accordance with Section 121 of the NIRC and the Limtuaco
knew that there was a tax numeric code for the kind of tax paid, he did not
ruling that rectifiers, as an extension of distillers, are subject to specific and
know which particular numbers corresponded to a particular tax revenue.
not ad valorem taxes. Finally, it had to be verified by the Revenue
These codes are contained in the "Handbook of Tax Numeric Code of the
Accounting Division (RAD) headed by petitioner Potenciana M. Evangelista
Revenue Sources," wherein it is stated that TNC No. 3011-0011 stands for
whether Tanduay actually paid the P180,701,682.00 as ad valorem taxes
specific tax on domestic and distilled spirits, TNC No. 3023-2001 for ad
to the BIR which it claims it paid.1âwphi1.nêt
valorem on compounded liquors and TNC No. 0000-0000 for unclassified
taxes. Had Deputy Commissioner Santos looked these up in the Handbook,
On September 23, 1987, Larin, in a marginal handwritten note, directed he would have known that Tanduay was not entitled to the whole sum of
Pareño to prepare a request to the Revenue Accounting Division (RAD) for P180,701,682.00. Santos, however, contended that the practice of using
the authentication of the confirmation receipts covering the tax payments numeric tax codes is for the purpose of checking remittances of payments
sought to be credited. Accordingly, a memorandum, signed by Larin, was by the banks which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the RAD. He
sent to the RAD headed by petitioner Evangelista requesting verification claimed that he merely relied on the certification of his subordinates,
and authentication whether the amounts reflected in the confirmation inasmuch as his work was merely confirmational.
On January 3, 1990, two informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan In the case of Tanduay Distillery. I did not know at the
against Aquilino T. Larin, Teodoro D. Pareño, Justino E. Galban, Jr. and time I signed the indorsement what the TNC therein
petitioner Potenciana M. Evangelista for violation of Section 268, Par. 4 of stand for because I was informing (sic) was that
the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), docketed as Criminal Case No. payments were received by BIR. I just became
14208, and for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 of the Anti-Graft curious to know its meaning and verify the same from
and Corrupt Practices Act, docketed as Criminal Case No. 14209. the Handbook of Tax Numeric Codes of Revenue
Sources, 1985 when a certain Atty. Villavicencio
called me up to his Office at the Internal Security
Sec. 268, par. 4 of the NIRC reads:
Division some two weeks ago to ask questions on the
subject indorsement.
Sec. 268. Violations committed by government
enforcement officers — Every official agent or
In her letter, petitioner also categorically stated that, "Upon signing of this
employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue or any
indorsement/certification I or whoever is head of this Division, for that
other agency of the government charged with the
matter, do not know what TNC stands for." 6
enforcement of the provisions of this Code, who is
guilty of any of the offenses herein below specified,
shall upon conviction for each act or omission, be On September 18, 1992, Aquilino T. Larin, Teodoro D. Pareño and
fined in the sum of not less than five thousand pesos petitioner Potenciana M. Evangelista were convicted and sentenced to
but not more than fifty thousand pesos or imprisoned suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of 4 years,
for a term of not less than one year but not more than 8 months and 1 day by way of minimum to 6 years and 8 months by way of
ten years or both; maximum, and a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) each in
Criminal Case No. 14208; while in Criminal Case No. 124209, Aquilino T.
Larin, Teodoro D. Pareño and petitioner Potenciana M. Evangelista were
xxx xxx xxx
convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for an indeterminate
period ranging from a minimum of 9 years and 1 month to a maximum of
4. Those who conspire or collude with one another or 12 years. The penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office was
others to defraud the revenues or otherwise violate likewise imposed upon the three accused. Justino Galban was acquitted
the provisions of this Code. inasmuch as his only participation was the preparation of the
memorandum describing Tanduay's manufacturing process as rectifier
and compounder of liquors.
On the other hand, Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act states:
Petitioner Evangelista was convicted on the basis of the 1st indorsement
issued by her which the Sandiganbayan condemned as a "studied non-
Sec. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers — in
response" to Larin's query as to how much the BIR actually received as
addition to acts or omissions of public officers
payment for ad valorem taxes from Tanduay. The Sandiganbayan held that
already penalized by existing law, the following shall
Evangelista's indorsement could have been explicitly and directly
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and
responsive because Larin's memo was clear and the purpose for his query
are hereby declared to be unlawful;
was specific: How much was paid by Tanduay to the BIR by way of ad
valorem taxes for the purpose of computing the amount properly
xxx xxx xxx creditable to Tanduay for refund? However, Evangelista's response merely
enumerated a set of confirmation receipts with the corresponding TNC
numbers despite the fact that several employees of the Bureau were not
e. Causing any undue injury to any party including the
well acquainted with the use and meaning of TNCs. Petitioner's ambiguous
government, or giving any private party any
reply, according to the Sandiganbayan, permitted her superiors to
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the
equivocate as to its meaning which resulted in the improper grant of tax
discharge of his official administrative or judicial
credits to Tanduay. The Sandiganbayan thus concluded that the gross
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad
negligence of the petitioner and its confluence with the acts of accused
faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
Larin and Pareño in recommending the approval of Tanduay's application
for tax credit adequately proved conspiracy among them.
Upon arraignment, all the accused including petitioner Evangelista
pleaded not guilty. They raised the defense that no undue injury had been
Her motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Sandiganbayan,
caused to the government and no unwarranted benefits had been accorded
Evangelista filed the instant petition contending that the 1st indorsement
to Tanduay inasmuch as Tanduay had already fully reimbursed the BIR of
was issued after proper verification of the data given to the RAD against
the availments found to have been unjustified or improper in the amount
available records of the division. Petitioner claims the certification issued
of P73,000,000.00 and had, additionally paid P11,000,000.00 by way of
was patterned after the prescribed format as a routine response to an
penalties, or a total of P84,000,000.00.
official request of the Assistant Commissioner for Excise Tax Office.
Petitioner insists that she could not be held liable because there was no
Petitioner Evangelista, for her part, did not deny having issued the 1st mention in the 1st indorsement that the payments made by Tanduay
indorsement. However, instead of taking the witness stand, she, like her Distillery Inc. were actually for ad valorem taxes for which it could claim
three co-accused, refused to testify and opted to present as evidence in her tax credit in the sum of P180,701,682.00.
behalf the following paragraphs from her letter of explanation dated
November 21, 1988 to BIR Commissioner Bienvenido Tan which read as
On November 29, 1993, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a
follows:
manifestation and motion in lieu of comment recommending the acquittal
of petitioner. The Manifestation stated that: "Although petitioner herself
Confirmation receipts do not contain any information may not have known the exact kind of taxes covered by the TNC reflected
as to the kind of tax or TNC. Thus, there can never be in her 1st Indorsement, this does not in any way make her guilty of gross
any verification and certification as to kind of tax. negligence. Her duty was purely ministerial in nature, that is, to report all
What can only be verified/certified by this Division as data pertinent to Tanduay's tax payments on file with RAD. She was not
required in existing orders is the fact that the total duty-bound to report her personal perception, understanding or
amount of each CR were remitted to the BIR by the conclusion regarding the significance or meaning of the data she had
collecting bank on the given date. reported. It was Larin and Pareño's duty to do so." 7

xxx xxx xxx In view of the position taken by the Office of the Solicitor General, the
Ombudsman and the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed a motion for
leave of court to file comment which was granted. In its comment, the PO/CR Monitoring Division. Petitioner's immediate superior added that
Office of the Ombudsman and the Office of the Special Prosecutor sought these records contain the TNC of every receipt listed therein and thus it
petitioner's conviction on the ground that the decision of the would be very easy to identify the kind of tax paid by the taxpayer by
Sandiganbayan on the two cases filed against her is in accord with simply referring to the Handbook on Numeric Tax Code. 12
applicable jurisprudence and supported by factual evidence.
Clearly, petitioner's alleged lack of knowledge as to what TNC meant was
We find no reason to overturn petitioner's conviction for gross negligence. grossly inexcusable if not improbable considering that the use of TNC to
record tax payments received by the Bureau is directly connected with the
duties of her office. If there is anyone in the. Bureau who was expected to
Before 1969, internal revenue taxes were designated by descriptive words.
have a working knowledge of the TNC, it should have been petitioner
This, however, proved to be unsatisfactory inasmuch as tax data could not
because the use of TNC was precisely meant to facilitate the recording of
easily be stored and processed by the computer, resulting in delayed
the tax payments received by the Bureau for verification purposes.
compilation and retrieval of the data.
Petitioner as head of the Revenue Accounting Division was called upon to
verify whether the schedule of payments submitted by Tanduay in support
To facilitate the preparation of statistical and other management reports, of its application for tax credit were payments for ad valorem taxes.
the BIR adopted the Tax Numeric Code System under which a numeric Petitioner had submitted a list of payments made by Tanduay with the
code stands for kinds or classes of tax and their applicable rate. For this corresponding bank account nos., amounts and TNC Nos., as required by
purpose, a "Handbook on Tax Numeric Codes of the Revenue Sources," was the Memorandum Circular. But, as admitted by petitioner herself, she had
issued for BIR use. 8 Under this system, TNC No. 3011-0011 was made to not the slightest idea what TNC meant, despite the fact that they are
stand for "specific tax on domestic distilled spirits," 9 TNC No. 3023-2001 mandated by the Bureau to use it accordingly in identifying and recording
for ad valorem on compounded liquors, 10 and TNC No. 0000-0000 for tax payments.
unclassified taxes. Under various BIR Revenue Memorandum Orders and
Circulars, the use of TNC instead of word descriptions to identify and
We have a situation where the Head of the Division, which is in charge of
record tax payments was made mandatory. 11 It may not be amiss to note
recording tax payments received by the Bureau and whose certification is
at this point however that despite the fact that the use of TNC to identify
relied upon by the Bureau in the granting of tax credits, does not even
and record tax payments was made mandatory, it had become obvious
know or care to know what are the kind of tax payments received by the
during trial that not all employees of the BIR were well acquainted with the
Bureau. For all intents and purposes, petitioner issued an indorsement
meanings of the TNC. Even Deputy Commissioner Santos who approved
certifying a whole schedule of payments made by the taxpayer without a
the Tax Credit Memo and the BIR Commissioner himself, Bienvenido Tan,
specification of the kinds of taxes since she did not have any idea what TNC
were not familiar with the corresponding TNC numbers for a particular
meant. It could not even be said that petitioner made an error of judgment
revenue. Not surprisingly, petitioner and the three other accused claimed
in answering Larin's query with an enumeration of TNCs instead of opting
they too were unaware of the meaning of TNC.
for a more explicit response since petitioner, not having any idea as to what
the TNCs meant, could not have couched the statement of her 1st
In the case at bar, petitioner is the head of the Revenue Accounting Division Indorsement in any other way. She could not have made a more explicit
(RAD). Under Revenue Administrative Order No. 5-84, one of the functions answer to the query of Larin inasmuch as she did not even know or care to
of the said division is to "Confirm and certify as to the correctness of find out whether the BIR actually received payments for ad valoremtaxes
payment and other informations verified from accounting records and from Tanduay. Clearly, there is no doubt that petitioner was grossly
documents." As head of the RAD, petitioner holds an extremely sensitive negligent in discharging her duties. As defined in the case of Alejandro
position, whose certification to the payments received by the Bureau from v. People, 13 gross negligence is "negligence characterized by want of even
taxpayers determines whether the taxpayer is entitled to a refund or a tax slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to
credit. Despite her sensitive position, however, and despite her own act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious
admission from the pleadings that the use of TNC instead of word indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. It
descriptions to identify and record tax payments were made mandatory is the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men
since 1969, petitioner claims that she practically had no idea what the TNC never fail to take on their own property." The test to determine the
meant until a year after having issued the 1st indorsement, when existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated in this wise: "Did
investigation regarding the tax credits given to Tanduay was well under the defendant in doing the negligent act use that reasonable care and
way. Petitioner further claims that there was no way she could have caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
verified whether the payments made by Tanduay were for ad situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect
valorem taxes because the confirmation receipts do not contain any adopts the standard supposed to be exercised by the discreet paterfamilias
information as to the kind of tax paid by the taxpayer nor the requisite TNC. of Roman Law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not
determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the
situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless,
We are not impressed.
blameworthy or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and
prudence and determines liability by that." 14
A payment order, which contains the particular kind of tax to be paid and
the corresponding TNC, is issued to a taxpayer to be presented by him to
Petitioner asserts that there was nothing untruthful in the certification she
the bank where he pays his taxes. When the payment order is presented, a
issued regarding the tax payments received by the BIR from Tanduay.
confirmation receipt is issued by the bank evidencing payment of the tax.
Petitioner further claims that the first endorsement was patterned after
Although it is not stated in the confirmation receipts what kind of tax is
the standard format used by the division whenever a request is made for
being paid by the taxpayer nor the TNC, the BIR's copy of the confirmation
verification of payments and she could not be faulted for adhering to the
receipt is usually attached to the original copy of the Payment Order (PO)
mandate of the various memoranda issued regarding the use of TNCs.
which in turn specifies the kind of tax paid and the TNC. Since petitioner's
division is the repository of all accounting records of the Bureau, it should
have copies of the payment orders for the corresponding confirmation Admittedly, the use of TNCs to record tax payments is mandated by various
receipts and therefore petitioner could have easily verified what kind of memoranda issued by the Bureau. Petitioner, however, as previously
taxes were covered by the payments made by Tanduay from January 1, stated, never exerted any effort to find out what the TNCs meant. Had she
1986 to August 31, 1987. Moreover, petitioner's claim that there were no been more circumspect, she would have appreciated the significance of her
pertinent records, codes and references that could be used to distinguish certification. She would have known that Tanduay was not entitled to the
the confirmation receipts as either for ad valorem or specific tax is belied whole amount of P180,701,682.00 it was claiming as tax credit. She would
by the denial of her immediate superior, Melchor Ramos, who stated that have been forewarned of the implied consequences of her certification and
the RAD has in its possession the monthly Alpha List of Taxpayers issued could have accordingly informed her superiors and her co-accused
in 1986 as well as the collection report by agent banks (Abstract of whether Tanduay was really entitled to a tax credit at all or not. That her
Collection thru Banks) for the same year which were prepared by the co-accused were mandated to know what TNC meant is beside the point.
Revenue Information System Service, Inc. (RISSI) based on the Petitioner, by the position she occupies, is mandated to know the kind of
confirmation receipts transmitted to them by the field offices and the taxes for which payment is made by the taxpayer claiming a refund before
she issues a certification because it is on the basis of this certification that
it is determined whether tax credits should be granted at all. Certainly, the
petitioner held a sensitive position with a function that could hardly be
classified as ministerial. As head of the division which is supposedly in
charge of encoding payment received by the Bureau from taxpayers and
who is supposedly expected more than anyone to know the meaning of the
TNC, petitioner issued an indorsement containing cryptic codes which she
admittedly did not know the meaning of and expecting her superiors, who
were not even in charge of recording tax payments and who relied on her
certification, to be familiar with.

Petitioner cannot take refuge in the claim that the 1st indorsement was
issued in the usual format as a routine response to an official request of the
Commissioner of Excise Tax after it has verified the data given to them
against available records of the division. We fully concur with the
observation of the Sandiganbayan that —

to begin with, nobody has demonstrated that the text

of the first indorsement of the Tanduay matter and on
the Limtuaco matter were the correct responses to
the query made by Larin. As aforesaid, nobody,
whether for or from the accused, testified.

And since nobody actually testified on any of the

documents of the accused — not even her boss,
Assistant Commissioner Melchor S. Ramos — so that
a full clarification could be had thereon, this court
cannot be deemed to accept his written statements
unqualifiedly.

While petitioner was grossly negligent in her duties for which she could be
held liable under R.A. No. 3019 (e), petitioner may not be held liable for
violation of Section 268(4) of the National Internal Revenue Code
inasmuch as it has not been proven that there was an actual agreement
between her and her co-accused to grant unwarranted tax credits to
Tanduay. What is punished in said Sec. 268(4) is the act of conspiring and
colluding to defraud the government of revenues. It is well entrenched in
our jurisprudence that conspiracy must be shown to exist as clearly and as
convincingly as the commission of the offense itself. Absent any act or
circumstance from which may be logically inferred the existence of a
common design among the accused to commit the crime, the theory of
conspiracy remains a speculation not a fact. 15

Significantly, in the separate appeal of petitioner's two other co-accused to

this Court, entitled Pareño vs. Sandiganbayan and the People of the
Philippines, 16 we ruled that "the acts of petitioners and that of Evangelista
may be considered concerted only because they performed interrelated
functions but there is no actual proof that conspiracy existed between the
parties."

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.

14208 convicting petitioner Potenciana M. Evangelista of violation of
Section 268 (4) of the National Internal Revenue Code is REVERSED and
petitioner is accordingly ACQUITTED. The decision of the Sandiganbayan
in Criminal Case No. 14209 convicting petitioner of violation of R.A. 3019
(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one month as minimum to
twelve (12) years as maximum. The penalty of perpetual disqualification
from public office is likewise imposed on her. No costs.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.

PEOPLE V CABURAL G.R NO. 34105, FEB 4 1983 Chief Justice, concurred in the separate opinion of the late Chief Justice
Castro. Less than a year before, however, in September of 1972, Carandang
being a 1973 decision, he penned the unanimous opinion in People v.
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
Olden 17 affirming the joint judgment of a Court of First Instance of Davao
in two cases, one of which was robbery in band with multiple rape. It was
My concurrence in the opinion of the Court penned by Justice Relova is full, not the death sentence that was imposed but reclusion perpetua. 18 That
entire, and complete. Nonetheless, I wish to express my gratification that case is certainly later than People v. Obtinalia 19 decided in April of 1971,
this Court by a decisive vote 1 sustains the basic postulate in both civil law where, in a per curiam opinion, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code was
and common law jurisdictions, expressed in the maximum Nullum crimen applied, although the offense for which the accused were found guilty was
nulla poena sine lege. It is undoubted, therefore, that unless there be a robbery with rape. It is, therefore, re-assuring that with the decision of this
radical change in the thinking of the Court, it is Article 294(2) not Article case, the uncertainty which has beclouded the issue of the appropriate
335 of the Revised Penal Code that calls for application in the crime of imposable penalty has been removed.
robbery with rape. 2 As noted in the opinion of the Court penned by Justice
Aquino in People v. Perello: 3 "Effective August 15, 1975 (or subsequent to
One last word. The maximum Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege has its
this case) Presidential Decree No. 767 imposes the penalty of reclusion
roots in history. It is in accordance with both centuries of civil law and
perpetua to death 'when the robbery accompanied with rape is committed
common law tradition. Moreover, it is an indispensable coronary to a
with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons.' That increased
regime of liberty enshrined in our Constitution. It is of the essence then
penalty cannot be retroactively applied to this case. 4 As such offense of
that while anti-social acts should be penalized, there must be a clear
robbery was committed before that date, it is Article 294(2), before its
definition of the punishable offense as well as the penalty that may be
amendment, that supplies the governing rule. The applicable law then is
imposed a penalty, to repeat, that can be fixed by the legislative body, and
clear and explicit. It defined the offense and prescribed the penalty. The
the legislative body alone. So constitutionalism mandates, with its stress
doctrine announced in Lizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico 5 by Justice
on jurisdiction rather than guvernaculum.The judiciary as the dispenser of
Moreland, in categorical language comes to mind. Thus: "The first and
justice through law must be aware of the limitation on its own power.
fundamental duty of courts, in our judgment, is to apply the law.
Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated
that application is impossible or inadequate without them." 6 There is Such a concept calls for undiminished respect from the judiciary. For it is
relevance too to this excerpt from Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa the department by which the other branches are held to strict
Manila Railroad Company Credit Union Inc. v. Manila Railroad accountability. It sees to it, in propriate cases of course, that they are held
Company: 7 "The applicable provision of Republic Act. No. 2023 quoted within the bounds of their authority. Certainly, the judiciary is not devoid
earlier, speaks for itself. There is no ambiguity. As thus worded, it was so of discretion., It can, to paraphrase Cardozo, fill in the gap and clear the
applied. Petitioner-appellant cannot therefore raise any valid objection. ambiguities. To that extent. it is free but, to recall Cardozo anew, it "is still
For the lower court to view it otherwise would have been to alter the law. not wholly free. [A judge] is no to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-
That cannot be done by the judiciary. That is a function that properly errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own Ideal of beauty or of goodness.
appertains to the legislative branch. 8 He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles." 20

Nothing more appropriately appertains to the legislative branch than the Tersely stated, the judiciary administers justice according to law. This is by
definition of a crime and the prescription of the penalty to be imposed. no means to imply that in the case at hand, justice according to law is at
That is not a doctrine of recent vintage. It is traceable to United States v. war with the concept of justice viewed from the layman's standpoint. The
Wiltberger, 9 an 1820 America. Supreme Court opinion. No less than the system of criminal law followed in the Philippines, true to the ways of
eminent Chief Justice Marshall spoke for the Court. To quote his exact constitutionalism, has always leaned toward the milder form of
language: "The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly is perhaps responsibility, whether as to the nature of the offense or the penalty to be
not much less old than construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness incurred by the wrongdoer. 21Where, as in this case, the law speaks in clear
of the law for the rights of individuals; and on the plain principle that the and categorical language, such a principle is impressed with greater
power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial weight.
department. It is the legislature, not the court, which is to define a crime,
and ordain its punishment." 10 That ruling was followed in the Philippines
TEEHANKEE, J, concurring:
in a 1906 decision, United States v. Almond. 11

I concur with the judgment at bar which affirms the trial court's decision
So it has been in the Philippines since then. It was the same Justice
convicting the accused-appellant Timoteo Cabural alone of the crime of
Moreland who in United States v. Abad Santos 12 promulgated in 1917, gave
robbery with rape and imposing upon him the proper penalty of reclusion
expression to a variation of such a fundamental postulate in this wise:
perpetua under Article 294, par. 2 of the the Revised Penal Code. The
"Criminal statutes are to be strictly construed. No person should be
record and testimony of the victim of the rape show quite clearly that
brought within their terms who is not clearly within them, nor should any
Cabural alone was responsible for and committed the rape on the victim,
act be pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by the
so that his companions were likewise properly sentenced for the crime of
statute." 13 The same year, Justice Carson in United States v. Estapia 14 in
robbery alone. There is, therefore, no room for the application of my
rejecting the contention that the application of a penal provision even if
separate opinions in the cited cases of Perello, Carandang, Mabag etc., that
not covered by its terms should be viewed by the judiciary as
where robbery with rape is committed but the rape is qualified by the use
commendable, conducive as it is to the repression of a reprehensible
of a deadly weapon or is committed by two persons, either of these two
practice" pointed out: "To this it should be sufficient answer to say that
actors is singled out by the amendatory Act, R.A. 4111, as supplying the
neither the executive nor the judicial authorities are authorized to impose
controlling qualification and mandates he imposition of the death penalty
fines and prison sentences in cases wherein such fines and prison
for the crime of qualified rape under Art. 335 of the Penal Code (and not
sentences are not clearly authorized by law, and this without regard to the
the lesser penalty of perpetua under Art. 294 for the complex crime of
end sought to be attained by the enforcement of such unauthorized
robbery with rape).
penalties."15

Separate Opinions
It is to be admitted that from the standpoint of logic alone, there is much to
be said for the view that since rape under certain circumstances is
penalized with death, it is an affront to reason if robbery with rape carries FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
with it a lesser penalty. The latter offense is far more reprehensible, ergo it
must be punished at least with equal if not more severity. It is from that
My concurrence in the opinion of the Court penned by Justice Relova is full,
perspective that in People v. Carandang 16 while the penalty imposed is that
entire, and complete. Nonetheless, I wish to express my gratification that
of reclusion perpetua there were two separate opinions one from Justice
this Court by a decisive vote 1 sustains the basic postulate in both civil law
Teehankee and the other from the late Chief Justice, then Justice, Castro.
and common law jurisdictions, expressed in the maximum Nullum crimen
They would apply Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. Retired Chief
nulla poena sine lege. It is undoubted, therefore, that unless there be a
Justice Makalintal, now Speaker of the Batasan Pambansa, then Acting
radical change in the thinking of the Court, it is Article 294(2) not Article case, the uncertainty which has beclouded the issue of the appropriate
335 of the Revised Penal Code that calls for application in the crime of imposable penalty has been removed.
robbery with rape. 2 As noted in the opinion of the Court penned by Justice
Aquino in People v. Perello: 3 "Effective August 15, 1975 (or subsequent to
One last word. The maximum Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege has its
this case) Presidential Decree No. 767 imposes the penalty of reclusion
roots in history. It is in accordance with both centuries of civil law and
perpetua to death 'when the robbery accompanied with rape is committed
common law tradition. Moreover, it is an indispensable coronary to a
with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons.' That increased
regime of liberty enshrined in our Constitution. It is of the essence then
penalty cannot be retroactively applied to this case. 4 As such offense of
that while anti-social acts should be penalized, there must be a clear
robbery was committed before that date, it is Article 294(2), before its
definition of the punishable offense as well as the penalty that may be
amendment, that supplies the governing rule. The applicable law then is
imposed a penalty, to repeat, that can be fixed by the legislative body, and
clear and explicit. It defined the offense and prescribed the penalty. The
the legislative body alone. So constitutionalism mandates, with its stress
doctrine announced in Lizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico 5 by Justice
on jurisdiction rather than guvernaculum.The judiciary as the dispenser of
Moreland, in categorical language comes to mind. Thus: "The first and
justice through law must be aware of the limitation on its own power.
fundamental duty of courts, in our judgment, is to apply the law.
Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated
that application is impossible or inadequate without them." 6 There is Such a concept calls for undiminished respect from the judiciary. For it is
relevance too to this excerpt from Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa the department by which the other branches are held to strict
Manila Railroad Company Credit Union Inc. v. Manila Railroad accountability. It sees to it, in propriate cases of course, that they are held
Company: 7 "The applicable provision of Republic Act. No. 2023 quoted within the bounds of their authority. Certainly, the judiciary is not devoid
earlier, speaks for itself.1äwphï1.ñët There is no ambiguity. As thus of discretion., It can, to paraphrase Cardozo, fill in the gap and clear the
worded, it was so applied. Petitioner-appellant cannot therefore raise any ambiguities. To that extent. it is free but, to recall Cardozo anew, it "is still
valid objection. For the lower court to view it otherwise would have been not wholly free. [A judge] is no to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-
to alter the law. That cannot be done by the judiciary. That is a function errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own Ideal of beauty or of goodness.
that properly appertains to the legislative branch. 8 He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles." 20

Nothing more appropriately appertains to the legislative branch than the Tersely stated, the judiciary administers justice according to law. This is by
definition of a crime and the prescription of the penalty to be imposed. no means to imply that in the case at hand, justice according to law is at
That is not a doctrine of recent vintage. It is traceable to United States v. war with the concept of justice viewed from the layman's standpoint. The
Wiltberger, 9 an 1820 America. Supreme Court opinion. No less than the system of criminal law followed in the Philippines, true to the ways of
eminent Chief Justice Marshall spoke for the Court. To quote his exact constitutionalism, has always leaned toward the milder form of
language: "The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly is perhaps responsibility, whether as to the nature of the offense or the penalty to be
not much less old than construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness incurred by the wrongdoer. 21Where, as in this case, the law speaks in clear
of the law for the rights of individuals; and on the plain principle that the and categorical language, such a principle is impressed with greater
power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial weight.
department. It is the legislature, not the court, which is to define a crime,
and ordain its punishment." 10 That ruling was followed in the Philippines
TEEHANKEE, J, concurring:
in a 1906 decision, United States v. Almond. 11

I concur with the judgment at bar which affirms the trial court's decision
So it has been in the Philippines since then. It was the same Justice
convicting the accused-appellant Timoteo Cabural alone of the crime of
Moreland who in United States v. Abad Santos 12 promulgated in 1917, gave
robbery with rape and imposing upon him the proper penalty of reclusion
expression to a variation of such a fundamental postulate in this wise:
perpetua under Article 294, par. 2 of the the Revised Penal Code. The
"Criminal statutes are to be strictly construed. No person should be
record and testimony of the victim of the rape show quite clearly that
brought within their terms who is not clearly within them, nor should any
Cabural alone was responsible for and committed the rape on the victim,
act be pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by the
so that his companions were likewise properly sentenced for the crime of
statute." 13 The same year, Justice Carson in United States v. Estapia 14 in
robbery alone. There is, therefore, no room for the application of my
rejecting the contention that the application of a penal provision even if
separate opinions in the cited cases of Perello, Carandang, Mabag etc., that
not covered by its terms should be viewed by the judiciary as
where robbery with rape is committed but the rape is qualified by the use
commendable, conducive as it is to the repression of a reprehensible
of a deadly weapon or is committed by two persons, either of these two
practice" pointed out: "To this it should be sufficient answer to say that
actors is singled out by the amendatory Act, R.A. 4111, as supplying the
neither the executive nor the judicial authorities are authorized to impose
controlling qualification and mandates he imposition of the death penalty
fines and prison sentences in cases wherein such fines and prison
for the crime of qualified rape under Art. 335 of the Penal Code (and not
sentences are not clearly authorized by law, and this without regard to the
the lesser penalty of perpetua under Art. 294 for the complex crime of
end sought to be attained by the enforcement of such unauthorized
robbery with rape).
penalties."15

It is to be admitted that from the standpoint of logic alone, there is much to

be said for the view that since rape under certain circumstances is
penalized with death, it is an affront to reason if robbery with rape carries
with it a lesser penalty. The latter offense is far more reprehensible, ergo it
must be punished at least with equal if not more severity. It is from that
perspective that in People v. Carandang 16 while the penalty imposed is that
of reclusion perpetua there were two separate opinions one from Justice
Teehankee and the other from the late Chief Justice, then Justice, Castro.
They would apply Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. Retired Chief
Justice Makalintal, now Speaker of the Batasan Pambansa, then Acting
Chief Justice, concurred in the separate opinion of the late Chief Justice
Castro. Less than a year before, however, in September of 1972, Carandang
being a 1973 decision, he penned the unanimous opinion in People v.
Olden 17 affirming the joint judgment of a Court of First Instance of Davao
in two cases, one of which was robbery in band with multiple rape. It was
not the death sentence that was imposed but reclusion perpetua. 18 That
case is certainly later than People v. Obtinalia 19 decided in April of 1971,
where, in a per curiam opinion, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code was
applied, although the offense for which the accused were found guilty was
robbery with rape. It is, therefore, re-assuring that with the decision of this
 Republic of the Philippines Bantug, and Tecson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
SUPREME COURT reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The modification had the effect
Manila of lowering the criminal liability of Dizon from the crime of homicide, while
aggravating the verdict against Tecson et al. from slight physical injuries.
The CA Decision itself had modified the Decision of the Caloocan City
SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 121 finding all of the accused therein
guilty of the crime of homicide.3
G.R. No. 151258 December 1, 2014
Also, we upheld another CA Decision4 in a separate but related case
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner, docketed as CA-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 & 90153 and ruled that the CA did not
vs. commit grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the criminal case
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. against Manuel Escalona II (Escalona), Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos),
Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca), and Anselmo Adriano (Adriano) on the
ground that their right to speedy trial was violated. Reproduced below is
x-----------------------x
the dispositive portion of our Decision:5

G.R. No. 154954

WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgmentin G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner
Fidelito Dizon guilty of homicide is hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, PART. The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954 – finding Antonio
vs. Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, Tecson guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries – is also MODIFIED and
DALMACIO LIM, JR., JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE SET ASIDE IN PART. Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda,
MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO GENERAL, SANTIAGO Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are found
RANADA III, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in
MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI, VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE homicide defined and penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article 249
GUERRERO, JUDE FERNANDEZ, AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO of the Revised Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced to suffer an
SABBAN, PERCIVAL D. BRIGOLA, PAUL ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS KARL indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto
B. PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO, and mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
RONAN DE GUZMAN, Respondents. correccional, as maximum. In addition, accused are ORDERED jointly and
severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil indemnity ex delicto in the
amount of 50,000, and moral damages in the amount of 1,000,000, plus
x-----------------------x
legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 12% from the date of
the finality of this Decision until satisfaction. Costs de oficio.
G.R. No. 155101
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is
FIDELITO DIZON, Petitioner, hereby AFFIRMED. The appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080,
vs. dismissing the criminal case filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. Adriano, are likewise AFFIRMED. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the
Revised Penal Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed,
and the criminal case against Artemio Villareal deemed CLOSED and
x-----------------------x
TERMINATED.

G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives for possible consideration of the
GERARDA H. VILLA, Petitioner, amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and
vs. the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing
MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, as aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.
CRISANTO CRUZ SARUCA, JR., and ANSELMO ADRIANO, Respondents.
SO ORDERED.
RESOLUTION
To refresh our memories, we quote the factual antecedents surrounding
SERENO, CJ: the present case:6

We are asked to revisit our Decision in the case involving the death of In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila
Leonardo "Lenny" Villa due to fraternity hazing. While there is nothing University School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis
new in the arguments raised by the parties in their respective Motions for Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar "Bogs" Asuncion,
Clarification or Reconsideration, we find a few remaining matters needing Samuel "Sam" Belleza, Bienvenido "Bien" Marquez III, Roberto Francis
to be clarified and resobed. Sorne oJ' these matters include the effect of our "Bert" Navera, Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo
Decision on the finality of the Court of Appeals judgments insofar as "Lenny" Villa (neophytes).
respondents Antonio Mariano A!meda (Almeda), June] Anthony D. Arna
(Arna), Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug), and Vincent Tecson (Tecson) are
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some
concerned; the question of who are eligible to seek probation; and the issue
members of the Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law
of the validity of the probation proceedings and the concomitant orders of
School. They all proceeded to Rufo’s Restaurant to have dinner.
a court that allegedly had no jurisdiction over the case.
Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who
briefed the neophytes on what to expect during the initiation rites. The
Before the Court are the respective Motions for Reconsideration or latter were informed that there would be physical beatings, and that they
Clarification filed by petitioners People of the Philippines, through the could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for three
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), and Gerarda H. Villa (Villa); and by days. After their "briefing," they were brought to the Almeda Compound in
respondents Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson (collectively, Tecson et al.) Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation.
concerning the Decision of this Court dated 1 February 2012.1 The Court
modified the assailed judgments2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received
CR No. 15520 and found respondents Fidelito Dizon (Dizon), Almeda, Ama,
threats and insults from the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted
from the van and walked towards the pelota court of the Almeda 9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
compound, some of the Aquilans delivered physical blows to them. The
neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation
10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
rites." These rites included the "Indian Run," which required the neophytes
to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering
blows to the neophytes; the "Bicol Express," which obliged the neophytes 11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall and their legs
outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the
12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)
"Rounds," in which the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by
the "auxiliaries" (the Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance
to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were being hit with 13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
fist blows on their arms or withknee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans;
and the "Auxies’ Privilege Round," in which the auxiliaries were given the
14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During this time, the
neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They
survived their first day of initiation. 15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)

On the morning of their second day – 9 February 1991 – the neophytes 16. Antonio General (General)
were made to present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were
also required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternity’s principles.
17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their
arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites
proper and proceeded to torment them physically and psychologically. The 18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing that they endured
on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for the day 19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
officially ended.

20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)

After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito
Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be
reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), 21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he
reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and 22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional
rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which
was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard 23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last
session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be 24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day
was officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then
slept at the carport. 25. Adel Abas (Abas)

After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s 26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)
shivering and incoherent mumblings.1avvphi1Initially, Villareal and Dizon
dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting. When In Criminal Case No. C-38340
they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the
Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him
through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, 1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on
arrival. 2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)

Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
35 Aquilans:

4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)

In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)

5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)

1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)

6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)

2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)

7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)

3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)

8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)

4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)

9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)

5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)

Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were

6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda) jointly tried. On the other hand, the trial against the remaining nine
accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held in abeyance due to certain
7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug) matters that had to be resolved first.

8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)

On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case The OSG, in its Motion for Reconsideration9 of G.R. Nos. 155101 (Dizon v.
No. C-38340(91), holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt People) and 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals), agrees with the findings
of the crime of homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal under Article of this Court that accused Dizon and Tecson et al. had neither the felonious
249 of the Revised Penal Code. A few weeks after the trial court rendered intent to kill (animus interficendi) nor the felonious intent to injure
its judgment, or on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against (animus iniuriandi) Lenny Villa. In fact, it concedes that the mode in which
the remaining nine accused commenced anew. the accused committed the crime was through fault (culpa). However, it
contends that the penalty imposed should have been equivalent to that for
deceit (dolo) pursuant to Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code.
On 10 January 2002, the CAin (CA-G.R. No. 15520) set aside the finding of
It argues that the nature and gravity of the imprudence or negligence
conspiracy by the trial court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and
attributable to the accused was so gross that it shattered the fine
modified the criminal liability of each of the accused according to
distinction between dolo and culpaby considering the act as one
individual participation. Accused De Leon had by then passed away, so the
committed with malicious intent. It maintains that the accused conducted
following Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:
the initiation rites in such a malevolent and merciless manner that it
clearly endangered the lives of the initiates and was thus equivalent to
1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants– Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, malice aforethought.
Guerrero, Musngi, Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores,
Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima,
With respect to the 19 other accused, or Victorino et al., the OSG asserts
Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.) – were
that their acquittal may also be reversed despite the rule on double
acquitted,as their individual guilt was not established by proof
jeopardy, as the CA also committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its
beyond reasonable doubt.
assailed Decision (CA-G.R. No. 15520). The OSG insists that Victorino et al.
should have been similarly convicted like their other co-accused Dizon,
2. Four of the accused-appellants– Vincent Tecson, Junel Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson, since the former also participated in the
Anthony Ama, Antonio Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. hazing of Lenny Villa, and their actions contributed to his death.
(Tecson et al.) – were found guilty of the crime of slight physical
injuriesand sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They were
Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Tecson et al.
also ordered to jointly pay the heirs of the victim the sum of
₱30,000 as indemnity.
Respondents Tecson et al.,10 filed their respective motions pertaining to
G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals). They essentially seek a
3. Two of the accused-appellants– Fidelito Dizonand Artemio
clarification as to the effect of our Decision insofar as their criminal liability
Villareal– were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
and service of sentence are concerned. According to respondents, they
crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
immediately applied for probation after the CA rendered its Decision
Having found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA
(CAG.R. No. 15520) lowering their criminal liability from the crime of
sentenced them to an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of
homicide, which carries a non-probationable sentence, to slight physical
prision mayor to 17 years of reclusion temporal. They were also
injuries, which carries a probationable sentence. Tecson et al.contend that,
ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Lenny
as a result, they have already been discharged from their criminal liability
Villa in the sum of ₱50,000 and to pay the additional amount of
and the cases against them closed and terminated. This outcome was
₱1,000,000 by way of moral damages.
supposedly by virtue of their Applications for Probation on various dates
in January 200211 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended,
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the otherwise known as the Probation Law. They argue that Branch 130 of
charge against accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC) had already granted their
to speedy trial. Meanwhile, on different dates between the years 2003 and respective Applications for Probation on 11 October 200212 and, upon
2005, the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of accused their completion of the terms and conditions thereof, discharged them
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA- from probation and declared the criminal case against them terminated on
G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 90153 reversed the trial court’s Orders and dismissed various dates in April 2003.13
the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the
basis of violation of their right to speedy trial.
To support their claims, respondents attached14 certified true copies of
their respective Applications for Probation and the RTC Orders granting
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions these applications, discharging them from probation, and declaring the
were individually brought before this Court. (Citations omitted) criminal case against them terminated. Thus, they maintain that the
Decision in CA-G.R. No. 15520 had already lapsed into finality, insofar as
they were concerned, whenthey waived their right to appeal and applied
Motion for Partial Reconsideration
for probation.
filed by Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa

ISSUES
Petitioner Villa filed the present Motion for Partial Reconsideration7 in
connection with G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 (Villa v. Escalona) asserting
that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the I. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion
criminal case against Escalona, Ramos,Saruca, and Adriano (collectively, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the
Escalona et al.) in its assailed Decision and Resolution.8 Villa reiterates her case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for violation
previous arguments that the right to speedy trial of the accused was not of their right to speedy trial
violated, since they had failed to assert that right within a reasonable
period of time. She stresses that, unlike their co-accused Reynaldo
II. Whether the penalty imposed on Tecson et al. should have
Concepcion, respondents Escalona et al.did not timely invoke their right to
corresponded to that for intentional felonies
speedy trial during the time that the original records and pieces of
evidence were unavailable. She again emphasizes that the prosecution
cannot be faulted entirely for the lapse of 12 years from the arraignment III. Whether the completion by Tecson et al. of the terms and
until the initial trial, as there were a number of incidents attributable to the conditions of their probation discharged them from their
accused themselves that caused the delay of the proceedings. She then criminal liability, and closed and terminated the cases against
insists that we apply the balancing test in determining whether the right to them DISCUSSION
speedy trial of the accused was violated.
Findings on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa
As regards the first issue, we take note that the factual circumstances and On the other hand, intentional felonies concern those wrongs in which a
legal assertions raised by petitioner Villa in her Motion for Partial deliberate malicious intent to do an unlawful act is present. Below is our
Reconsideration concerning G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 have already been exhaustive discussion on the matter:20 Our Revised Penal Code belongs
thoroughly considered and passed uponin our deliberations, which led to tothe classical school of thought. x x x The identity of mens rea– defined as
our Decision dated 1 February 2012. We emphasize that in light of the a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent – is the
finding of violation of the right of Escalona et al. to speedy trial, the CA’s predominant consideration. Thus, it is not enough to do what the law
dismissal of the criminal case against them amounted to an acquittal,15 and prohibits. In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the
that any appeal or reconsideration thereof would result in a violation of act be committed by means of doloor "malice."
their right against double jeopardy.16 Though we have recognized that the
acquittal of the accused may be challenged where there has been a grave
The term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements of
abuse of discretion,17 certiorari would lie if it is convincingly established
freedom, intelligence, and intent. x x x x The element of intent – on which
that the CA’s Decision dismissing the case was attended by a whimsical or
this Court shall focus – is described as the state of mind accompanying an
capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must
act, especially a forbidden act. It refers to the purpose of the mind and the
be shown that the assailed judgment constitutes "a patent and gross abuse
resolve with which a person proceeds.It does not refer to mere will, for the
of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
latter pertains to the act, while intentconcerns the result of the act. While
refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or toact in contemplation of law;
motive is the "moving power" that impels one to action for a definite result,
an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
intent is the "purpose" of using a particular means to produce the result.
passion and hostility; or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and
On the other hand, the term "felonious"means, inter alia, malicious,
so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense
villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or purpose.With these
justice."18 Thus, grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court
elements taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony
simply because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the evidence.19
must refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of
mind accompanying a forbidden act. Stated otherwise, intentional felony
We have taken a second look at the court records, the CA Decision, and requires the existence of dolus malus– that the act or omission be done
petitioner’s arguments and found no basis to rule that the CA gravely "willfully," "maliciously," "with deliberate evil intent," and "with malice
abused its discretion in concluding that the right to speedy trial of the aforethought." The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea– a
accused was violated. Its findings were sufficiently supported by the crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act
records of the case and grounded in law. Thus, we deny the motion of complained of is innocent. As is required of the other elements of a felony,
petitioner Villa with finality. the existence of malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG xxxx

We likewise deny with finality the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital
OSG with respect to G.R. Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People) and 154954 ingredient in establishing the commission of the intentional felony of
(People v. Court of Appeals). Many of the arguments raised therein are homicide. Being mala in se, the felony of homicide requires the existence
essentially a mere rehash of the earlier grounds alleged in its original of malice or dolo immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction
Petition for Certiorari. of injuries. Intent to kill – or animus interficendi– cannot and should not be
inferred, unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent.
Furthermore, the victim’s death must not have been the product of
Furthermore, we cannot subscribe to the OSG’s theory that even if the act
accident, natural cause, or suicide. If death resulted from an act executed
complained of was born of imprudence or negligence, malicious intent can
without malice or criminal intent – but with lack of foresight, carelessness,
still be appreciated on account of the gravity of the actions of the accused.
or negligence – the act must be qualified as reckless or simple negligence
We emphasize that the finding of a felony committed by means of culpa is
or imprudence resulting in homicide.
legally inconsistent with that committed by means of dolo. Culpable
felonies involve those wrongs done as a result of an act performed without
malice or criminal design. The Revised Penal Code expresses thusly: xxxx

ARTICLE 365. Imprudence and Negligence. — Any person who, by reckless In order to be found guilty ofany of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to
imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would 266 of the Revised Penal Code, the employment of physical injuries must
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayorin its be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence of
maximum period toprisión correccional in its medium period; if it would malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state
have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its of the wrongdoer – iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no
minimum and medium periods shall be imposed. criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony.
Thus, incase of physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code, there must
be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act
the physical integrity or wellbeing of a person, so as to incapacitate and
which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty
deprive the victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond
of arresto mayorin its medium and maximum periods; if it would have
reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of
constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
inflicting physical injuries per semerely satisfies the elements of freedom
minimum period shall be imposed.
and intelligence in an intentional felony. The commission of the act does
not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions are.
xxxx
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances that the mere infliction of
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or physical injuries, absentmalicious intent, does not make a person
falling to do an act from which material damage results by reason of automatically liable for an intentional felony.x x x.
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or
failing to perform suchact, taking into consideration his employment or
xxxx
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however,
that the accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those
liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that are committed
cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor
by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when
the danger clearly manifest. (Emphases supplied)
the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or
lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done and their ultimate discharge therefrom. Hence, they argue that they can no
without malice, from which an immediate personal harm, injury or longer be convicted of the heavier offense of reckless imprudence resulting
material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution or in homicide.22 Respondents allude to our Decision in Tan v. People 23 to
advertence on the part of the person committing it. In this case, the danger support their contention that the CA judgment can no longer be reversed
is visible and consciously appreciated by the actor. In contrast, simple or annulled even by this Court.
imprudence or negligence comprises an act done without grave fault, from
which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack of
The OSG counters24 that the CA judgment could not have attained finality,
foresight or skill. Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and the
as the former had timely filed with this Court a petition for certiorari. It
danger is not openly visible.
argues that a Rule 65 petition is analogous to an appeal, or a motion for
new trial or reconsideration, in that a petition for certiorarialso prevents
The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an the case from becoming final and executory until after the matter is
act is as follows: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to ultimately resolved.
whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a
reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law
Indeed, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court speaks of the finality of a criminal
imposes on the doer the duty to take precaution against the mischievous
judgment once the accused applies for probation, viz:
resultsof the act. Failure to do so constitutes negligence.

SECTION 7. Modification of judgment. — A judgment of convictionmay,

As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with
upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes
recklessness, the degree of precaution and diligence required varies with
final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is
the degree of the danger involved. If, on account of a certain line of conduct,
imposed, a judgment becomes finalafter the lapse of the period for
the danger of causing harm to another person is great, the individual who
perfecting an appeal, or whenthe sentence has been partially or totally
chooses to follow that particular course of conduct is bound to be very
satisfied or served, or when the accusedhas waived in writing his right to
careful, inorder to prevent or avoid damage or injury. In contrast, if the
appeal, or has applied for probation. (7a) (Emphases supplied)
danger is minor, not much care is required. It is thus possible that there are
countless degrees of precaution or diligence that may be required of an
individual, "from a transitory glance of care to the most vigilant effort." The Coupled with Section 7 of Rule 11725 and Section 1 of Rule 122,26 it can be
duty of the person to employ more or less degree of care will depend upon culled from the foregoing provisions that only the accused may appeal the
the circumstances of each particular case. (Emphases supplied, citations criminal aspect of a criminal case, especially if the relief being sought is the
omitted) correction or review of the judgment therein. This rule was instituted in
order to give life to the constitutional edict27against putting a person twice
in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. It is beyond contention
We thus reiterate that the law requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of
that the accused would be exposed to double jeopardy if the state appeals
the existence of malicious intent or dolus malus before an accused can be
the criminal judgment in order to reverse an acquittal or even to increase
adjudged liable for committing an intentional felony.
criminal liability. Thus, the accused’s waiver of the right to appeal – as
when applying for probation – makes the criminal judgment immediately
Since the accused were found to have committed a felony by means of final and executory. Our explanation in People v. Nazareno is worth
culpa, we cannot agree with the argument of the OSG. It contends that the reiterating:28
imposable penalty for intentional felony can also be applied to the present
case on the ground that the nature of the imprudence or negligence of the
Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is likewise
accused was so gross that the felony already amounted to malice. The
barred because the government has already been afforded a complete
Revised Penal Code has carefully delineated the imposable penalties as
opportunity to prove the criminal defendant’s culpability; after failing to
regards felonies committed by means of culpaon the one hand and felonies
persuade the court to enter a final judgment of conviction, the underlying
committed by means of doloon the other in the context of the distinctions
reasons supporting the constitutional ban on multiple trials applies and
it has drawn between them. The penalties provided in Article 365
becomes compelling. The reason is not only the defendant’s already
(Imprudence and Negligence) are mandatorily applied if the death of a
established innocence at the first trial where he had been placed in peril of
person occurs as a result of the imprudence or negligence of another.
conviction, but also the same untoward and prejudicial consequences of a
Alternatively, the penalties outlined in Articles 246 to 261 (Destruction of
second trial initiated by a government who has at its disposal all the
Life) are automatically invoked if the death was a result of the commission
powers and resources of the State.
of a forbidden act accompanied by a malicious intent. These imposable
penalties are statutory, mandatory, and not subjectto the discretion of the
court. We have already resolved – and the OSG agrees – that the accused Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily result, as the government
Dizon and Tecson et al. had neither animus interficendi nor animus would then be allowed another opportunity to persuade a second trier of
iniuriandi in inflicting physical pain on Lenny Villa. Hence, we rule that the the defendant’s guilt while strengthening any weaknesses that had
imposable penalty is what is applicable to the crime of reckless attended the first trial, all in a process where the government’s power and
imprudence resulting in homicide as defined and penalized under Article resources are once again employed against the defendant’s individual
365 of the Revised Penal Code. means. That the second opportunity comesvia an appeal does not make the
effects any less prejudicial by the standards of reason, justice and
conscience. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted)
Ruling on the Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration

It must be clarified, however, that the finality of judgment evinced in

filed by Tecson et al.
Section 7 of Rule 120 does not confer blanket invincibility on criminal
judgments. We have already explained in our Decision that the rule on
We clarify, however, the effect of our Decision in light of the motions of double jeopardy is not absolute, and that this rule is inapplicable to cases
respondents Tecson et al. vis-à-vis G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of in which the state assails the very jurisdiction of the court that issued the
Appeals). criminal judgment.29 The reasoning behind the exception is articulated in
Nazareno, from which we quote:30
The finality of a CA decision will not
bar the state from seeking the In such instance, however, no review of facts and law on the merits, in the
annulment of the judgment via a manner done in an appeal, actually takes place; the focus of the review is
Rule 65 petition. on whether the judgment is per sevoid on jurisdictional grounds, i.e.,
whether the verdict was rendered by a court that had no jurisdiction; or
where the court has appropriate jurisdiction, whether it acted with grave
In their separate motions,21 respondents insist that the previous verdict of
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In other
the CA finding them guilty of slight physical injuries has already lapsed into
words, the review is on the question of whether there has been a validly
finality as a result of their respective availments of the probation program
rendered decision, not on the question of the decision’s error or RTC.35 Neither the judge of Branch 130 in his Orders nor Tecson et al.in
correctness. Under the exceptional nature of a Rule 65 petition, the burden their pleadings have presented any explanation or shown any special
— a very heavy one — is on the shoulders of the party asking for the review authority that would clarify why the Applications for Probation had not
to show the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment been filed with or taken cognizance of by Caloocan City RTC Branch 121.
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or of a patent and gross abuse of While we take note that in a previous case, the CA issued a Decision
discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to ordering the inhibition of Branch 121 Judge Adoracion G. Angeles from
perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; or to an hearing and deciding Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), the ruling was made
exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion specifically applicable to the trial of petitioners therein, i.e. accused
and hostility. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted) While this Court’s Concepcion, Ampil, Adriano, and S. Fernandez.36
Decision in Tan may have created an impression of the unassailability of a
criminal judgment as soon as the accused applies for probation, we point
Tecson et al. thus committed a fatal error when they filed their probation
out that what the state filed therein was a mere motion for the modification
applications with Caloocan City RTC Branch 130, and not with Branch 121.
of the penalty, and not a Rule 65 petition. A petition for certiorari is a
We stress that applicants are not at liberty to choose the forum in which
special civil action that is distinct and separate from the main case. While
they may seek probation, as the requirement under Section 4 of the
in the main case, the core issue is whether the accused is innocent or guilty
Probation law is substantive and not merely procedural. Considering,
of the crime charged, the crux of a Rule 65 petition is whether the court
therefore, that the probation proceedings were premised on an
acted (a) without or in excess of its jurisdiction; or (b) with grave abuse of
unwarranted exercise of authority, we find that Caloocan City RTC Branch
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Hence, strictly
130 never acquired jurisdiction over the case.
speaking, there is nomodification of judgment in a petition for certiorari,
whose resolution does not call for a re-evaluation of the merits of the case
in order to determine the ultimate criminal responsibility of the accused. Second, the records of the casewere still with the CA when Caloocan City
In a Rule 65 petition, any resulting annulment of a criminal judgment is but RTC Branch 130 granted the probation applications. Jurisdiction over a
a consequence of the finding of lack of jurisdiction. case is lodged with the court in which the criminal action has been properly
instituted.37 If a party appeals the trial court’s judgment or final
order,38 jurisdiction is transferred to the appellate court. The execution of
In view thereof, we find that the proper interpretation of Section 7 of Rule
the decision is thus stayed insofar as the appealing party is
120 must be that it is inapplicable and irrelevant where the court’s
concerned.39 The court of origin then loses jurisdiction over the entire case
jurisdiction is being assailed through a Rule 65 petition. Section 7 of Rule
the moment the other party’s time to appeal has expired. 40 Any residual
120 bars the modification of a criminal judgment only if the appeal brought
jurisdiction of the court of origin shall cease – including the authority to
before the court is in the nature of a regular appeal under Rule 41, or an
order execution pending appeal – the moment the complete records of the
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, and if that appeal would put the
case are transmitted to the appellate court.41 Consequently, it is the
accused in double jeopardy. As it is, we find no irregularity in the partial
appellate court that shall have the authority to wield the power to hear, try,
annulment of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. No. 15520 in spite of its finality,
and decide the case before it, as well as to enforce its decisions and
as the judgment therein was issued with grave abuse of discretion
resolutions appurtenant thereto. That power and authority shall remain
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
with the appellate court until it finally disposes of the case. Jurisdiction
cannot be ousted by any subsequent event, even if the nature of the
The orders of Caloocan City RTC incident would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first
Branch 130 have no legal effect, as place.
they were issued without jurisdiction.
According to Article 78 of the Revised Penal Code, "[n]o penalty shall be
First, Tecson et al. filed their Applications for Probation with the wrong executed except by virtue of a final judgment." A judgment of a court
court. Part and parcel of our criminal justice system is the authority or convicting or acquitting the accused of the offense charged becomes final
jurisdiction of the court to adjudicate and decide the case before it. under any of the following conditions among others:42 after the lapse of the
Jurisdiction refers to the power and capacity of the tribunal to hear, try, period for perfecting an appeal; when the accused waives the right to
and decide a particular case or matter before it.31 That power and capacity appeal; upon the grant of a withdrawal ofan appeal; when the sentence has
includes the competence to pronounce a judgment, impose a already been partially or totally satisfied or served; or when the accused
punishment,32 and enforce or suspend33 the execution of a sentencein applies for probation. When the decision attains finality, the judgment or
accordance with law. final order is entered in the book of entries of judgments. 43 If the case was
previously appealed to the CA, a certified true copy of the judgment or final
order must be attached to the original record, which shall then be
The OSG questions34 the entire proceedings involving the probation
remanded to the clerk of the court from which the appeal was taken.44 The
applications of Tecson et al. before Caloocan City RTC Branch 130.
court of origin then reacquires jurisdiction over the case for appropriate
Allegedly, the trial court did not have competence to take cognizance of the
action. It is during this time that the court of origin may settle the matter
applications, considering that it was not the court of origin of the criminal
of the execution of penalty or the suspension of the execution
case. The OSG points out that the trial court that originally rendered the
thereof,45 including the convicts’ applications for probation.46
Decision in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) was Branch 121 of the Caloocan
City RTC.
A perusal of the case records reveals that the CA had not yet relinquished
its jurisdiction over the case when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 took
The pertinent provision of the Probation Law is hereby quoted for
cognizance of the Applications for Probation of Tecson et al. It shows that
reference:
the accused filed their respective applications47 while a motion for
reconsideration was still pending before the CA48 and the records were still
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the with that court.49 The CA settled the motion only upon issuing the
trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 denying it, or about seven months after
upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an Tecson et al. had filed their applications with the trial court.50 In September
appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on 2002, or almost a month before the promulgation of the RTC Order dated
probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may 11 October 2002 granting the probation applications, 51 the OSG had filed
deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be Manifestations of Intent to File Petition for Certiorari with the CA 52 and this
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the Court.53 Ultimately, the OSG assailed the CA judgments by filing before this
judgment of conviction. x x x x (Emphases supplied) Court a Petition for Certiorari on 25 November 2002. 54 We noted the
petition and then required respondents to file a comment thereon. 55 After
their submission of further pleadings and motions, we eventually required
It is obvious from the foregoing provision that the law requires that an
all parties to file their consolidated memoranda.56 The records of the case
application for probation be filed withthe trial court that convicted and
remained with the CA until they were elevated to this Court in 2008. 57
sentenced the defendant, meaning the court of origin. Here, the trial court
that originally convicted and sentenced Tecson et al.of the crime of
homicide was Branch 121 – not Branch 130 – of the Caloocan City
For the foregoing reasons, we find that RTC Branch 130 had no jurisdiction In deciding the case, this Court invoked the reasoning in Francisco and
to act on the probation applications of Tecson et al. It had neither the ruled that the accused was ineligiblefor probation, since they had filed an
power nor the authority to suspend their sentence, place them on appeal with the CA. In Francisco, we emphasized that Section 4 of the
probation, order their final discharge, and eventually declare the case Probation Law offers no ambiguity and does not provide for any
against them terminated. This glaring jurisdictional faux pasis a clear distinction, qualification, or exception. What is clearis that all offenders
evidence of either gross ignorance of the law oran underhanded one- who previously appealed their cases, regardless of their reason for
upmanship on the part of RTC Branch 130 or Tecson et al., or both – to appealing, are disqualified by the law from seeking probation. Accordingly,
which this Court cannot give a judicial imprimatur. this Court enunciated in Lagrosathat the accused are disallowed from
availing themselves of the benefits of probation if they obtain a genuine
opportunity to apply for probation only on appeal as a result of the
In any event, Tecson et al. were ineligible to seek probation at the time they
downgrading of their sentence from non-probationable to probationable.
applied for it. Probation58 is a special privilege granted by the state to
penitent qualified offenders who immediately admit their liability and thus
renounce their right to appeal. In view of their acceptance of their fate and While Lagrosa was promulgated three months after Caloocan City RTC
willingness to be reformed, the state affords them a chance to avoid the Branch 130 issued its various Orders discharging Tecson et al. from
stigma of an incarceration recordby making them undergo rehabilitation probation, the ruling in Lagrosa, however, was a mere reiteration of the
outside of prison. Some of the major purposes of the law are to help reasoning of this Court since the 1989 case Llamado v. Court of
offenders to eventually develop themselves into law-abiding and self Appeals63 and Francisco. The Applications for Probation of Tecson et al.,
respecting individuals, as well as to assist them in their reintegration with therefore, should not have been granted by RTC Branch 130, as they had
the community. appealed their conviction to the CA. We recall that respondents were
originally found guilty of homicide and sentenced to suffer 14 years, 8
months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Accordingly, even if
It must be reiterated that probation is not a right enjoyed by the accused.
the CA later downgraded their conviction to slight physical injuries and
Rather, it is an act of grace orclemency conferred by the state. In Francisco
sentenced them to 20 days of arresto menor, which made the sentence fall
v. Court of Appeals,59 this Court explained thus:
within probationable limits for the first time, the RTC should have
nonetheless found them ineligible for probation at the time.
It is a special prerogative granted by law to a person or group of persons
not enjoyed by others or by all. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests
The actions of the trial court must thus be adjudged as an arbitrary and
solely upon the discretion of the court which is to be exercised primarily
despotic use of authority, so gross that it divested the court of its very
for the benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of
power to dispense justice. As a consequence, the RTC Orders granting the
the accused. The Probation Law should not therefore be permitted to
Applications for Probation of Tecson et al. and thereafter discharging them
divest the state or its government of any of the latter’s prerogatives, rights
from their criminal liability must be deemed to have been issued with
or remedies, unless the intention of the legislature to this end is clearly
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
expressed, and no person should benefit from the terms of the law who is
not clearly within them. (Emphases supplied)
Whether for lack of jurisdiction orfor grave abuse of discretion, amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, we declare all orders, resolutions, and
The OSG questions the validity of the grant of the probation applications of
judgments of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 in relation to the probation
Tecson et al.60 It points out that when they appealed to the CA their
applications of Tecson et al. null and void for having been issued without
homicide conviction by the RTC, they thereby made themselves ineligible
jurisdiction. We find our pronouncement in Galman v.
to seek probation pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (the
Sandiganbayan64 applicable, viz:
Probation Law).

A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are

We refer again to the full text ofSection 4 of the Probation Law as follows:
divested. Through it, no rights can be attained. Being worthless, all
proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are
trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and void. (Emphasis supplied)
upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an
appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on
The ultimate discharge of Tecson et
probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may
al. from probation did not totally
deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be
extinguish their criminal liability.
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the
judgment of conviction.
Accused Bantug asserts65 that, in any event, their criminal liability has
already been extinguished as a result of their discharge from probation and
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of
the eventual termination of the criminal case against them by Caloocan City
imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall be filed
RTC Branch 130. To support his argument, he cites the following provision
with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver
of the Revised Penal Code:
of the right to appeal.

ARTICLE 89. How Criminal Liability is Totally Extinguished. — Criminal

An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.
liability is totally extinguished:
(Emphases supplied)

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and

Indeed, one of the legal prerequisites of probation is that the offender must
as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only
not have appealed the conviction.61 In the 2003 case Lagrosa v. Court of
when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
Appeals,62 this Court was faced with the issue of whether a convict may still
apply for probation even after the trial court has imposed a non
probationable verdict, provided that the CA later on lowers the original 2. By service of the sentence.
penalty to a sentence within the probationable limit. In that case, the trial
court sentenced the accused to a maximum term of eight years of prisión
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and
mayor, which was beyond the coverage of the Probation Law. They only
all its effects.
became eligible for probation after the CA reduced the maximum term of
the penalty imposed to 1 year, 8 months and 21 days of prisión
correccional. 4. By absolute pardon.
 5. By prescription of the crime. will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains that those who will
appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for
probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.
6. By prescription of the penalty.

xxxx
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in article
344 of this Code. (Emphasis supplied)
In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated
homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for
As previously discussed, a void judgment cannot be the source of legal
the first time imposes on him a probationable penalty. Had the RTC done
rights; legally speaking, it is as if no judgment had been rendered at all.
him right from the start, it would have found him guilty of the correct
Considering our annulment of the Orders of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130
offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four months
in relation to the probation proceedings, respondents cannot claim
maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.
benefits that technically do not exist.

The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to

In any event, Tecson et al.cannot invoke Article89 of the Revised Penal
probation through no fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation
Code, as we find it inapplicable to this case. One of the hallmarks of the
is one of liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is not served by a
Probation Law is precisely to "suspend the execution of the
harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions. As Justice
sentence,"66 and not to replace the original sentence with another, as we
Vicente V. Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the Probation Law
pointed out in our discussion in Baclayon v. Mutia:67
must not be regarded as a mere privilege to be given to the accused only
where it clearly appears he comes within its letter; to do so would be to
An order placing defendant on "probation" is not a "sentence" but is rather disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be
in effect a suspension of the imposition of sentence. It is not a final applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law but to
judgment but is rather an "interlocutory judgment"in the nature of a achieve its beneficent purpose.
conditional order placing the convicted defendant under the supervision
of the court for his reformation, to be followed by a final judgment of
xxxx
discharge, if the conditions of the probation are complied with, or by a final
judgment of sentence if the conditions are violated. (Emphases supplied)
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and
imposed on Arnel the correct penalty of two years and four months
Correspondingly, the criminal liability of Tecson et al.remains.
maximum, he would havehad the right to apply for probation. No one could
In light of our recent Decision in
say with certainty that he would have availed himself of the right had the
Colinares v. People, Tecson et al.
RTC doneright by him. The idea may not even have crossed his mind
may now reapply for probation.
precisely since the penalty he got was not probationable.

Very recently, in Colinares v. People,68 we revisited our ruling in

The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness.1âwphi1 Is it fair to
Franciscoand modified our pronouncements insofar as the eligibility for
deny Arnel the right to apply for probation when the new penalty that the
probation of those who appeal their conviction is concerned. Through a
Court imposes on him is, unlike the one erroneously imposed by the trial
majority vote of 9-6, the Court En Bancin effect abandoned Lagrosaand
court, subject to probation? (Emphases supplied)
settled the following once and for all:69

In our Decision, we set aside the RTC and the CA judgments and found
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals
Tecson et al.ultimately liable for the crime of reckless imprudence
"from the judgment of conviction" is disqualified from availing himself of
resulting in homicide. Pursuant to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code,
the benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction
the offense is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period (from 4
have been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by
months and 1 day to 6 months) to prisión correccional in its medium
the regional trial court,now set aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted
period (from 2 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).
homicide by the Supreme Court.
Considering that the new ruling in Colinares is more favorable to Tecson et
al., we rule that they are now eligible to apply for probation. Since Fidelito
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion’s hard position, it will Dizon (Dizon) was convicted of the same crime, we hereby clarify that
apply the probation law on Arnel based on the trial court’s annulled Dizon is also eligible for probation.
judgment against him. He will not be entitled to probation because of the
severe penalty that such judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme
While we cannot recognize the validityof the Orders of RTC Branch 130,
Court’s judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty
which granted the Applications for Probation, we cannot disregard the fact
will also have to bend over to the trial court’s judgment — even if this has
that Tecson et al. have fulfilled the terms and conditions of their previous
been found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also be made to pay for the
probation program and have eventually been discharged therefrom. Thus,
trial court’s erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for
should they reapply for probation, the trial court may, at its discretion,
probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw(the horse
consider their antecedent probation service in resolving whether to place
errs, the carabao gets the whip). Where is justice there?
them under probation at this time and in determining the terms,
conditions, and period thereof.
The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to
apply for probation would dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco v.
Final clarificatory matters
Court of Appealsthat the probation law requires that an accused must not
have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of probation. But
there is a huge difference between Franciscoand this case. We now take this opportunity to correct an unintentional typographical
error in the minimum term of the penalty imposed on the accused Dizon
and Tecson et al. While this issue was not raised by any of the parties
xxxx
before us, this Court deems it proper to discuss the matter ex proprio
motuin the interest of justice. In the first paragraph of the dispositive
Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have portion of our Decision dated 1 February 2012, the fourth sentence reads
allowed him to apply for probation. He did not have a choice between as follows:
appeal and probation. Hewas not in a position to say, "By taking this appeal,
I choose not to apply for probation." The stiff penalty that the trial court
They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison term of four
imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow
(4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years
Arnel to now seek probation under this Court’s greatly diminished penalty
and two (2) months of prisión correccional, as maximum.
As we had intended to impose on the accused the maximum term of the imposition of sentence. We held that the grant of probation to petitioner
"penalty next lower" than that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well
the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, in accordance as the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and from the
with the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL),70 the phrase "and one (1) day," right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
which had been inadvertently added, must be removed. Consequently, in disqualification from the right of suffrage. We thus deleted from the order
the first paragraph of the dispositive portion, the fourth sentence should granting probation the paragraph which required that petitioner refrain
now read as follows: from continuing with her teaching profession.

They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison term of four Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of
(4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or
months of prisión correccional, as maximum. In this instance, we further calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of
find it important to clarify the accessory penalties inherent to the principal suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
penalty imposed on Dizon and Tecson et al. to prision correccional in its minimum period imposed upon Moreno were
similarly suspended upon the grant of probation.
By operation of Articles 40 to 45 and 73 of the Revised Penal Code, a
corresponding accessory penalty automatically attaches every time a court It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not
lays down a principal penalty outlined in Articles 25 and 27 thereof. 71 The even disqualified from running for a public office because the accessory
applicable accessory penalty is determined by using as reference the penalty of suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration of
principal penaltyimposed by the court before the prison sentence is the probation. x x x x. During the period of probation, the probationer does
computed in accordance with the ISL.72 This determination is made in spite not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely
of the two classes ofpenalties mentioned in an indeterminate sentence. It required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in the probation
must be emphasized that the provisions on the inclusion of accessory order.
penalties specifically allude to the actual "penalty"73 imposed, not to the
"prison sentence"74 set by a court. We believe that the ISL did not intend to
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration
have the effect of imposing on the convict two distinct sets of accessory
of petitioner Gerarda H. Villa in connection with G.R. Nos. 178057 &
penalties for the same offense.75 The two penalties are only relevant
178080 is hereby DENIED. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
insofar as setting the minimum imprisonment period is concerned, after
Office of the Solicitor General concerning G.R. Nos. 155101 and 154954 is
which the convict may apply for parole and eventually seek the shortening
also DENIED.
of the prison term.76

The respective Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Antonio

Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed penalty for the
Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony D. Arna, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide is arresto mayor in its
Tecson are likewise DENIED. In light of the finding that Caloocan City
maximum period to prisión correccionalin its medium period. As this
Regional Trial Court Branch 130 acted without or in excess of its
provision grants courts the discretion tolay down a penalty without regard
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the aforementioned Applications for
to the presence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the
Probation, we hereby ANNUL the entire probation proceedings and SET
imposable penaltymust also be within the aforementioned range. 77 Hence,
ASIDE all orders, resolutions, or judgments issued in connection thereto.
before applying the ISL, we ultimately imposed on Dizon and Tecson et al.
We, however, CLARIFY that Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony D.
the actual (straight) penalty78 of four years and two months of prisión
Arna, Renato Bantug, Jr., Vincent Tecson, and Fidelito Dizon are eligible to
correccional.79 Pursuant to Article 43 of the Revised Penal Code, the
apply or reapply for probation in view of our recent ruling in Colinares v.
penalty of prisión correccional automatically carries with it80 the following
People of the Philippines,88 without prejudice to their remaining civil
accessory penalties: ARTICLE 43. Prisión Correccional— Its accessory
liability, if any.
penalties. — The penalty of prisión correccional shall carry with it that of
suspension from public office, from the right tofollow a profession or
calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of Furthermore, we issue a CORRECTION of the dispositive portion of our
suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen Decision dated 1 February 2012 and hereby delete the phrase "and one (1)
months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this day" located in the fourth sentence of the first paragraph thereof. The
article although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall sentence shall now read as follows: "They are hereby sentenced to suffer
have been expressly remitted in the pardon. an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisi6n correccional, as
maximum."
The duration of their suspension shall be the same as that of their principal
penalty sans the ISL; that is, for four years and two months 81 or until they
have served their sentence in accordance with law. Their suspension takes SO ORDERED.
effect immediately, once the judgment of conviction becomes final. 82

We further point out that if the length of their imprisonment exceeds 18

months, they shall furthermore suffer a perpetual special disqualification
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
from the right of suffrage. Under Article 32 of the RevisedPenal Code, if this
conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation
accessory penalty attaches, it shall forever deprive them of the exercise of
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
their right (a) to vote in any popular election for any public office; (b) to be
Division.
elected to that office; and (c) to hold any public office.83 Any public office
that they may be holding becomes vacant upon finality of the
judgment.84 The aforementioned accessory penalties can only be wiped MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
out if expressly remitted in a pardon.85 Chief Justice

Of course, the aforementioned accessory penalties are without prejudice

to a grant of probation, shouldthe trial court find them eligible therefor. As
we explained in Baclayon,86 the grant of probation suspends the execution
of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as that of the accessory
penalties. We have reiterated this point in Moreno v. Commission on
Elections:87

In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on

probation is not a sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the
EN BANC
"‘The movable furniture of value was removed before the fire.
[G.R. No. 9726. December 8, 1914. ]
"‘The full amount of the insurance was collected, and the conspiracy was
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CARSON a success.
TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant.
"‘The above is the gist of the sworn statements of Vicente Sotelo and
C. W O’Brien, for Appellant. Eugenio Martin in connection with the fire that destroyed house No. 2157
Calle O’Donnell on April 4.
Solicitor-General Corpus, for Appellee.
"‘The case in question is a sensational one to say .he least, and the court is
SYLLABUS being petitioned to set aside the ruling and cite the parties to show cause
why they should not be cited to answer charges of conspiracy to defraud.
1. LIBEL AND SLANDER; PUBLICATION; EDITOR, AUTHOR, PROPRIETOR,
MANAGER. — Section 6 of the Libel Law (Act No. 277) provides a "‘On April 4, 1913, the house located at 2157 Calle O’Donnell was
punishment only for the "author, editor, or proprietor," for the destroyed by fire. The house was insured for P5,000, the contents for an
publication of a libel in a newspaper. In the present case no person was additional P5,000, with the West of Scotland Insurance Association, of
represented to be either the "author, the editor, or the proprietor" of the which Lutz & Co. are the local agents, with an additional P1,500 with
newspaper in which the alleged libel was published. The proof shows that Smith, Bell & Co.
the defendant was the "manager." There was not a word of proof showing
that as "manager" he was the author of the article published or the editor "‘The full amount of the insurance on the property was paid by the agents
or the proprietor of the newspaper. The "manager" of a newspaper may of the insurance companies and the matter apparently dropped from the
be the author of the articles published or the editor or the publisher of records.
the newspaper. His exact relation to the newspaper or publication is a
matter of proof. He can not avoid responsibility as the "author, editor, or "‘Then there was internal trouble and information began to leak out
proprietor" by using some other term or word, when, as a matter of fact, which resulted in sensational statements to the effect that the destruction
he is the "author, editor, or proprietor." The "author, editor, or of the property had been an act of incendiarism in order to collect the
proprietor" of a newspaper or publication can not avoid responsibility by insurance. Then there was an investigation started and it resulted in
simply calling himself the "manager" or "printer." He can not wear the sworn statements of the three persons above mentioned.
toga of "author, editor, or proprietor" and hide his responsibility by
giving himself some other name. While the terms "author, editor, and "‘Notarial returns were made yesterday by the sheriff, based on the
proprietor" of a newspaper are terms well defined, the particular words sworn statements and the parties are cited to appear in court and show
"author, editor, or proprietor" are not material or important, further than cause.
they are words which are intended to show the relation of the
responsible party to the publication. That relation may as well exist under "‘The investigation also showed that the furniture, which was supposed
some other name or denomination. to be in the house at the time of the conflagration and which was paid for
by the insurance agents, sworn statements having been made that it was
destroyed in the fire, was in a certain house in Montalban, where it was
DECISION identified upon the sworn statements of the above mentioned. Implicated
in the charges of conspiracy and fraud is the name of the attorney for the
plaintiff who made affidavit as to the burning of the house and against
JOHNSON, J. : whom criminal proceedings will be brought as well as against the original
owners.

This was an action for criminal libel. "‘Attorney Burke, who represents Lutz & Co. in the proceedings, was seen
last night and asked for a statement as to the case. Mr. Burke refused to
The complaint alleged:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph talk on the case and stated that when it came to trial it would be time
enough to obtain the facts.
"That on the 25th day of September, 1913, the said Carson Taylor, being
then and there the acting editor and proprietor, manager, printer, and "‘The present action came before the court on a motion of Attorney Burke
publisher in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, of a certain daily to set aside the judgment, which, in the original case, gave the owners of
bilingual newspaper, edited in the English and Spanish languages, and the property judgment for the amount of the insurance.
known as the ’Manila Daily Bulletin,’ a paper of large circulation
throughout the Philippine Islands, as well as in the United States and "‘Attorney Burke filed the sworn statements with the court and the
other countries in all of which both languages are spoken and written, notarial returns to the same were made yesterday afternoon, the sworn
having as such the supervision and control of said newspaper, did then statements as to the burning of the house being in the hands of the
and there willfully, feloniously, maliciously, and with intent to impeach sheriff.
the honesty, virtue, and reputation of one Ramon Sotelo as member of the
bar of the Philippine Islands and as a private individual, and to expose "‘It was stated yesterday that a criminal action would follow the civil
him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, compose, print, edit, publish, proceedings instituted to recover the funds in the case entitled on the
and circulate and procure to be composed, printed, edited, published, and court records, Maria Mortera de Eceiza and Manuel Eceiza versus the
circulated in said newspaper’s issue of the above mentioned date, west of Scotland Association, Limited, No. 10191 on the court records.
September 25, 1913, a certain false and malicious defamation and libel in
the English language of and concerning the said Ramon Sotelo, which "‘It might be stated also that Eugenio Martin was one of the plaintiffs in
reads as follows. :jgc:chanrobles.com.ph the recent suit brought against Ex Governor W. Cameron Forbes for
lumber supplied for his Boston home.’
"‘OWNERS FIRED BUILDING TO COLLECT INSURANCE. — CRIMINAL
CHARGES FOLLOW CIVIL SUIT. "That in this article is contained the following paragraph. to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘Conspiracy divulged in three sworn statements made by members of the
party after a family disagreement. Sensational statement sworn to. "‘ . . .Implicated in the charges of conspiracy and fraud is the name of the
Mystery of Calle O’Donnell fire solved and papers served. attorney for the plaintiff who made affidavit as to the burning of the
house and against whom criminal proceedings will be brought as well as
"‘Conspiracy to defraud the insurance company. against the original owners,’ by which the said accused meant to refer and
did refer to the said Ramon Sotelo, who then and there was the attorney
"‘The building was fired to collect the amount of insurance. for the plaintiff in the case aforesaid, No. 10191 of the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila, and so was understood by the public who defendant had to it. That was the only proof presented by the prosecution
read the same; that the statements and allegations made in said to show the relation which the defendant had to the publication of the
paragraph are wholly false and untrue, thus impeaching the honesty, libel in question. From an examination of the editorial page of said
virtue and reputation of the said offended party as a member of the bar of exhibit, we find that it shows that the "Manila Daily Bulletin" is owned by
the Philippine Islands and as a private individual, and exposing him to the "Bulletin Publishing Company," and that the defendant was its
public hatred, contempt and ridicule. Contrary to law."cralaw virtua1aw manager. There is not a word of proof in the record which shows what
library relation the manager had to the publication of said newspaper. We might,
by a series of presumptions and assumptions, conclude that the manager
Upon said complaint the defendant was arrested, arraigned, plead not of a newspaper has some direct responsibility with its publication. We
guilty, was tried, found guilty of the crime charged, and sentenced by the believe, however, that such presumptions and assumptions, in the
Honorable George N. Hurd, judge, to pay a fine of P200. From that absence of a single letter of proof relating thereto, would be unwarranted
sentence the defendant appealed to this court and made the following and unjustified. The prosecuting attorney had an opportunity to present
assignment of error:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph proof upon that question. Either because he had no proof or because no
such proof was obtainable, he presented none. It certainly is not a difficult
"First. The court erred in finding that the defendant was responsible for matter to ascertain who is the real person responsible for the publication
and guilty of the alleged libel. of a newspaper which is published daily and has a wide circulation in a
particular community. No question was asked the defendant concerning
"Second. The court erred in finding that the defendant was the proprietor his particular relation to the publication of the newspaper in question.
and publisher of the ’Manila Daily Bulletin.’ We do not desire to be understood in our conclusions here as holding that
the "manager" or the "printer" may not, under certain conditions and
"Third. The court erred in finding that the alleged libelous article was proper proof, be held to be the "author, editor, or proprietor" of a
libelous per se. newspaper. He may denominate himself as "manager" or "printer"
simply, and be at the same time the "author, editor, or proprietor" of the
"Fourth. The court erred in holding that the article was libelous, while newspaper. He can not avoid responsibility by using some other term or
finding that there was no malice. word, indicating his relation to the newspaper or the publication, when,
as a matter of fact, he is the "author, the editor, or the proprietor" of the
"Fifth. The court erred in finding that the alleged libelous article referred same. His real relation to the said publication is a matter of proof. The
to attorney Ramon Sotelo. Solicitor-General, in his brief, says that the defendant used the word
"manager" with the hope of evading legal responsibility, as the Libel Law
"Sixth. The court erred in finding that Ramon Sotelo was attorney for the places the responsibility for publishing a libel, on "every author, editor, or
plaintiffs in case No. 10191, when the alleged libel was published."cralaw proprietor of any book, etc." Had the prosecuting attorney in the trial of
virtua1aw library the cause believed that the defendant, even though he called himself the
"manager" was, in fact, the "author, editor, or proprietor" of said
After a careful examination of the record and the arguments presented by publication, he should have presented some proof supporting that
the appellant, we deem it necessary to discuss only the first and second contention. Neither do we desire to be understood as holding that simply
assignments of error. because a person connected with the publication of a newspaper who
calls himself the "manager" or "printer" may not, in fact and at the same
In the Philippine Islands there exist no crimes such as are known in the time, be the "author, editor, or proprietor." The "author, editor, or
United States and England as common law crimes. No act constitutes a proprietor" can not avoid responsibility for the writing and publication of
crime here unless it is made so by law. Libel is made a crime here by Act a libelous article, by simply calling himself the "manager" or the "printer"
No. 277 of the United States Philippine Commission. Said Act (No. 277) of a newspaper. That, however, is a question of proof. The burden is upon
not only defines the crime of libel and prescribes the particular the prosecution to show that the defendant is, by whatever name he may
conditions necessary to constitute it, but it also names the persons who call himself, in truth and in fact, the "author, editor, or proprietor" of a
may be guilty of such crime. In the present case the complaint alleges that newspaper. The courts cannot assume, in the absence of proof, that one
the defendant was, at the time of the publication of said alleged article who called himself "manager" was in fact the "author, editor, or
"the acting editor, proprietor, manager, printer, publisher, etc. etc. of a proprietor." We might assume, perhaps, that the ’’manager" of a
certain bilingual newspaper, etc., known as the ’Manila Daily Bulletin,’ a newspaper plays an important part in the publication of the same by
paper of large circulation throughout the Philippine Islands, as well as in virtue of the general signification of the word "manager." Men can not,
the United States and other countries."cralaw virtua1aw library however, be sentenced upon the basis of a mere assumption. There must
be some proof. The word "manage" has been defined by Webster to mean
It will be noted that the complaint charges the defendant as "the acting "to have under control and direction; to conduct; to guide; to administer;
editor, proprietor, manager, printer, and publisher." From an examination to treat; to handle." Webster defines "manager" to be "one who manages;
of said Act No. 277, we find that section 6 provides that: "Every author, a conductor or director; as, the manager of a theater." A manager, as that
editor, or proprietor of any book, newspaper, or serial publication is word is generally understood, we do not believe includes the idea of
chargeable with the publication of any words contained in any part of ownership. Generally speaking it means one who is representing another
said book or number of each newspaper or serial as fully as if he were the as an agent. That being true, his powers and duties and obligations are
author of the same."cralaw virtua1aw library generally defined by contract. He may have expressed as well as implied
powers, but whatever his powers and duties are they must be dependent
By an examination of said article, with reference to the persons who may upon the nature of the business and the terms of his contract. There is no
be liable for the publication of a libel in a newspaper, we find that it only fixed rule which indicates particularly and definitely his duties, powers
provides for the punishment of "the author, editor, or proprietor." It and obligations. An examination into the character of the business and
would follow, therefore, that unless the proof shows that the defendant in the contract of his employment must be made for the purpose of
the present case is the "author, editor, or proprietor" of the newspaper in ascertaining definitely what his duties and obligations are. His exact
which the libel was published, he can not be held liable. relation is always a matter of proof. It is incumbent upon the prosecution
in a case like the present, to show that whatever title, name or
In the present case the Solicitor-General in his brief said that — "No designation the defendant may bear, he was, in fact, the "author, the
person is represented to be either the ’author, editor, or proprietor.’" editor, or the proprietor" of the newspaper. If he was in fact the "author,
That statement of the Solicitor-General is fully sustained by the record. editor, or proprietor," he can not escape responsibility by calling himself
There is not a word of proof in the record showing that the defendant was the "manager" or "printer." It is the relation which he bears to the
either the "author, the editor, or the proprietor." The proof shows that the publication and not the name or title which he has assumed, which is
defendant was the "manager." He must, therefore, be acquitted of the important in an investigation. He can not wear the toga of author or
crime charged against him, unless it is shown by the proof that he, as editor and hide his responsibility by giving himself some other name.
"manager" of the newspaper, was in some way directly responsible for While the terms "author, editor, and proprietor" of a newspaper are
the writing, editing, or publishing of the matter contained in said alleged terms well defined, the particular words "author, editor, or proprietor"
libelous article. The prosecution presented the newspaper, the "Manila are not material or important, further than that they are words which are
Daily Bulletin," for the purpose of showing the relation which the intended to show the relation of the responsible party to the publication.
That relation may as well exist under some other name or denomination.

For the foregoing reasons. therefore, there being no proof whatever in the
record showing that the defendant was the "author, the editor, or the
proprietor" of the newspaper in question, the sentence of the lower court
must be reversed, the complaint dismissed and the defendant discharged
from the custody of the law, with costs de officio. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Moreland, Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines On January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel,
SUPREME COURT entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
Baguio City
The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the lone
EN BANC testimony of Danilo Tangcoy. On the other hand, the defense presented
the lone testimony of petitioner, which can be summarized, as follows:
G.R. No. 180016 April 29, 2014
Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio
Balajadia, who is engaged in the financing business of extending loans to
LITO CORPUZ, Petitioner,
Base employees. For every collection made, they earn a commission.
vs.
Petitioner denied having transacted any business with private
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
complainant.

DECISION
However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989
for which he was made to sign a blank receipt. He claimed that the same
PERALTA, J.: receipt was then dated May 2, 1991 and used as evidence against him for
the supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of jewelry, which he did
not even see.
This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, dated November 5, 2007, of petitioner Lito Corpuz
(petitioner), seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated March After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
22, 2007 and Resolution2 dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of the crime charged in the Information. The dispositive portion of the
Appeals (CA), which affirmed with modification the Decision3 dated July decision states:
30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, San Fernando City,
finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised
doubt of the felony of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph one (1),
Penal Code.
subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code;

The antecedent facts follow.

there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary mitigating
circumstance/s to vary the penalty imposable;
Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral
Royale Casino in Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Private complainant
accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
was then engaged in the business of lending money to casino players and,
deprivation of liberty consisting of an imprisonment under the
upon hearing that the former had some pieces of jewelry for sale,
Indeterminate Sentence Law of FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS
petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered
of Prision Correccional in its medium period AS MINIMUM, to FOURTEEN
to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Private
(14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS of Reclusion Temporal in its
complainant agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner
minimum period AS MAXIMUM; to indemnify private complainant Danilo
the following items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet;
Tangcoy the amount of ₱98,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the
one (1) men's necklace and another men's bracelet, with an aggregate
costs of suit.
value of ₱98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even date. They both
agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if
unsold, to return the same items, within a period of 60 days. The period SO ORDERED.
expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning
the pieces of jewelry. When private complainant was able to meet
The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of
petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will pay the value of the
petitioner and affirmed the decision of the RTC, thus:
said items entrusted to him, but to no avail.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment dated

Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa,
July 30, 2004 of the RTC of San Fernando City (P), Branch 46, is hereby
which reads as follows:
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the imposable prison term, such that
accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2
That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City of Olongapo, months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years of prision mayor,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the as maximum, plus 1 year for each additional ₱10,000.00, or a total of 7
above-named accused, after having received from one Danilo Tangcoy, years. The rest of the decision stands.
one (1) men's diamond ring, 18k, worth ₱45,000.00; one (1) three-baht
men's bracelet, 22k, worth ₱25,000.00; one (1) two-baht ladies' bracelet,
SO ORDERED.
22k, worth ₱12,000.00, or in the total amount of Ninety-Eight Thousand
Pesos (₱98,000.00), Philippine currency, under expressed obligation on
the part of said accused to remit the proceeds of the sale of the said items Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, filed with
or to return the same, if not sold, said accused, once in possession of the this Court the present petition stating the following grounds:
said items, with intent to defraud, and with unfaithfulness and abuse of
confidence, and far from complying with his aforestated obligation, did
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate,
ADMISSION AND APPRECIATION BY THE LOWER COURT OF
misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the aforesaid
PROSECUTION EVIDENCE, INCLUDING ITS EXHIBITS, WHICH ARE MERE
jewelries (sic) or the proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite repeated
MACHINE COPIES, AS THIS VIOLATES THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE;
demands, the accused failed and refused to return the said items or to
remit the amount of Ninety- Eight Thousand Pesos (₱98,000.00),
Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of said Danilo Tangcoy B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
in the aforementioned amount. LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR
ESTAFA WAS NOT FATALLY DEFECTIVE ALTHOUGH THE SAME DID NOT
CHARGE THE OFFENSE UNDER ARTICLE 315 (1) (B) OF THE REVISED
CONTRARY TO LAW.
PENAL CODE IN THAT -
 1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally
WITHIN WHICH THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] defective Information filed against him. He contends that the Information
JEWELRY SHOULD BE RETURNED, IF UNSOLD, OR does not contain the period when the pieces of jewelry were supposed to
THE MONEY TO BE REMITTED, IF SOLD; be returned and that the date when the crime occurred was different
from the one testified to by private complainant. This argument is
untenable. The CA did not err in finding that the Information was
2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME
substantially complete and in reiterating that objections as to the matters
ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION AS OF 05 JULY
of form and substance in the Information cannot be made for the first
1991 WAS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE
time on appeal. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa under
ONE TESTIFIED TO BY THE PRIVATE
Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the
COMPLAINANT WHICH WAS 02 MAY 1991;
appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the
prejudice of the owner6 and that the time of occurrence is not a material
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE ingredient of the crime, hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong
LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT DEMAND TO RETURN THE SUBJECT date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not
[PIECES OF] JEWELRY, IF UNSOLD, OR REMIT THE PROCEEDS, IF SOLD – make the latter fatally defective. The CA ruled:
AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE – WAS PROVED;
x x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the
D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive
LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION'S CASE WAS thereof. Then Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that a
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT ALTHOUGH - complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused;

1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions
TWO (2) VERSIONS OF THE INCIDENT; complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party;
the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place
wherein the offense was committed. In the case at bar, a reading of the
2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER – ACCUSED IS
subject Information shows compliance with the foregoing rule. That the
MORE STRAIGHTFORWARD AND LOGICAL,
time of the commission of the offense was stated as " on or about the fifth
CONSISTENT WITH HUMAN EXPERIENCE;
(5th) day of July, 1991" is not likewise fatal to the prosecution's cause
considering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the
3. THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOT APPRECIATED precise time only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense.
IN AND APPLIED TO THIS CASE; The gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the appropriation or conversion of
money or property received to the prejudice of the offender. Thus, aside
4. PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED
from the fact that the date of the commission thereof is not an essential
AGAINST THE STATE.
element of the crime herein charged, the failure of the prosecution to
specify the exact date does not render the Information ipso facto
In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General defective. Moreover, the said date is also near the due date within which
(OSG) stated the following counter-arguments: accused-appellant should have delivered the proceeds or returned the
said [pieces of jewelry] as testified upon by Tangkoy, hence, there was
sufficient compliance with the rules. Accused-appellant, therefore, cannot
The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner failed to
now be allowed to claim that he was not properly apprised of the charges
object to their admissibility.
proferred against him.7

The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently established

It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of
the designation of the offense and the acts complained of.
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, which reads:

The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime

ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by
charged.
any of the means mentioned hereinbelow.

This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and
xxxx
carry even more weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial
court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of support
in the records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute (b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another,
grave abuse of discretion.4 Petitioner is of the opinion that the CA erred in money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in
affirming the factual findings of the trial court. He now comes to this trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
Court raising both procedural and substantive issues. obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same,
even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond;
or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property; x x x
According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial
court, admitting in evidence a receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked as
Exhibit "A" and its submarkings, although the same was merely a The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that
photocopy, thus, violating the best evidence rule. However, the records money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in
show that petitioner never objected to the admissibility of the said trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testified upon in court obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same;
by private complainant. The CA also correctly pointed out that petitioner (b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or
also failed to raise an objection in his Comment to the prosecution's property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that
formal offer of evidence and even admitted having signed the said receipt. such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely another; and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on
objection to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such the offender.8
objection shall be considered as waived.5
Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand
by the offended party on the offender, was not proved. This Court
disagrees. In his testimony, private complainant narrated how he was With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that
able to locate petitioner after almost two (2) months from the time he demand under this kind of estafa need not be formal or written. The
gave the pieces of jewelry and asked petitioner about the same items with appellate court observed that the law is silent with regard to the form of
the latter promising to pay them. Thus: demand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b), thus:

PROS. MARTINEZ When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written
demand be necessary, the law would have stated so. Otherwise, the word
"demand" should be interpreted in its general meaning as to include both
q Now, Mr. Witness, this was executed on 2 May 1991, and this
written and oral demand. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to present a
transaction could have been finished on 5 July 1991, the question is what
written demand as evidence is not fatal.
happens (sic) when the deadline came?

In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about

a I went looking for him, sir.
the money entrusted to the accused, we held that the query was
tantamount to a demand, thus:
q For whom?
x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the
a Lito Corpuz, sir. existence of the crime of embezzlement. It so happens only that failure to
account, upon demand for funds or property held in trust, is
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. The same way, however, be
q Were you able to look (sic) for him?
established by other proof, such as that introduced in the case at bar. 14

a I looked for him for a week, sir.

In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was
able to prove the existence of all the elements of the crime. Private
q Did you know his residence? complainant gave petitioner the pieces of jewelry in trust, or on
commission basis, as shown in the receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an
obligation to sell or return the same within sixty (60) days, if unsold.
a Yes, sir.
There was misappropriation when petitioner failed to remit the proceeds
of those pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale took place, failed to return the
q Did you go there? same pieces of jewelry within or after the agreed period despite demand
from the private complainant, to the prejudice of the latter.
a Yes, sir.
Anent the credibility of the prosecution's sole witness, which is
questioned by petitioner, the same is unmeritorious. Settled is the rule
q Did you find him?
that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, this Court gives great
respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique
a No, sir. opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their deportment
on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts, which
q Were you able to talk to him since 5 July 1991? merely rely on the records of the case.15 The assessment by the trial court
is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or
oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence, especially
a I talked to him, sir. when such finding is affirmed by the CA.16 Truth is established not by the
number of witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies, for in
q How many times? determining the value and credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to be
weighed not numbered.17

a Two times, sir.

As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating
on this case, the question of the continued validity of imposing on persons
q What did you talk (sic) to him? convicted of crimes involving property came up. The legislature
apparently pegged these penalties to the value of the money and property
a About the items I gave to (sic) him, sir. in 1930 when it enacted the Revised Penal Code. Since the members of
the division reached no unanimity on this question and since the issues
are of first impression, they decided to refer the case to the Court en banc
q Referring to Exhibit A-2? for consideration and resolution. Thus, several amici curiae were invited
at the behest of the Court to give their academic opinions on the matter.
a Yes, sir, and according to him he will take his obligation and I asked him Among those that graciously complied were Dean Jose Manuel Diokno,
where the items are and he promised me that he will pay these amount, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate
sir. President, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The parties
were later heard on oral arguments before the Court en banc, with Atty.
Mario L. Bautista appearing as counsel de oficio of the petitioner.
q Up to this time that you were here, were you able to collect from him
partially or full?
After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter,
this Court finds the following:
a No, sir.9
There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was penalties that the courts continue to impose on crimes against property
demand.10 Demand need not even be formal; it may be verbal.11 The committed today, based on the amount of damage measured by the value
specific word "demand" need not even be used to show that it has indeed of money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot modify
been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the the said range of penalties because that would constitute judicial
whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount legislation. What the legislature's perceived failure in amending the
to a demand.12 As expounded in Asejo v. People:13 penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be remedied through this
Court's decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the power of
another branch of the government. This, however, does not render the
whole situation without any remedy. It can be appropriately presumed There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against
that the framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) had anticipated this property be based on the current inflation rate or at the ratio of ₱1.00 is
matter by including Article 5, which reads: equal to ₱100.00 . However, it would be dangerous as this would result in
uncertainties, as opposed to the definite imposition of the penalties. It
must be remembered that the economy fluctuates and if the proposed
ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be
imposition of the penalties in crimes against property be adopted, the
repressed but which are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive
penalties will not cease to change, thus, making the RPC, a self-amending
penalties. - Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may
law. Had the framers of the RPC intended that to be so, it should have
deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall
provided the same, instead, it included the earlier cited Article 5 as a
render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive,
remedy. It is also improper to presume why the present legislature has
through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to
not made any moves to amend the subject penalties in order to conform
believe that said act should be made the subject of penal legislation.
with the present times. For all we know, the legislature intends to retain
the same penalties in order to deter the further commission of those
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through punishable acts which have increased tremendously through the years. In
the Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, fact, in recent moves of the legislature, it is apparent that it aims to
without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict broaden the coverage of those who violate penal laws. In the crime of
enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition Plunder, from its original minimum amount of ₱100,000,000.00
of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of plundered, the legislature lowered it to ₱50,000,000.00. In the same way,
malice and the injury caused by the offense.18 the legislature lowered the threshold amount upon which the Anti-Money
Laundering Act may apply, from ₱1,000,000.00 to ₱500,000.00.
The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts
bourne out of a case which is not punishable by law and the court finds it It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the present
proper to repress, the remedy is to render the proper decision and penalties do not seem to be excessive compared to the proposed
thereafter, report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of imposition of their corresponding penalties. In Theft, the provisions state
Justice, the reasons why the same act should be the subject of penal that:
legislation. The premise here is that a deplorable act is present but is not
the subject of any penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked to inform the
Art. 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
Chief Executive of the need to make that act punishable by law through
legislation. The second paragraph is similar to the first except for the
situation wherein the act is already punishable by law but the 1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium
corresponding penalty is deemed by the court as excessive. The remedy periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000
therefore, as in the first paragraph is not to suspend the execution of the pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, but if the value of the
sentence but to submit to the Chief Executive the reasons why the court thing stolen exceeds the latter amount the penalty shall be the
considers the said penalty to be non-commensurate with the act maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and
committed. Again, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive, this one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total
time, of the need for a legislation to provide the proper penalty. of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the
In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 19 Guillermo B.
other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed
Guevara opined that in Article 5, the duty of the court is merely to report
prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
to the Chief Executive, with a recommendation for an amendment or
modification of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh. Thus:
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than
This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla
6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
poena sige lege," that is, that there can exist no punishable act except
those previously and specifically provided for by penal statute.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods, if the value of the property stolen is more
No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not
than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.
deem it necessary to prohibit its perpetration with penal sanction, the
Court of justice will be entirely powerless to punish such act.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional
in its minimum period, if the value of the property stolen is
Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the
over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos.
execution of a sentence on the ground that the strict enforcement of the
provisions of this Code would cause excessive or harsh penalty. All that
the Court could do in such eventuality is to report the matter to the Chief 5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos
Executive with a recommendation for an amendment or modification of but does not exceed 50 pesos.
the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh. 20
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such
Anent the non-suspension of the execution of the sentence, retired Chief value does not exceed 5 pesos.
Justice Ramon C. Aquino and retired Associate Justice Carolina C. Griño-
Aquino, in their book, The Revised Penal Code, 21 echoed the above-cited
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft
commentary, thus:
is committed under the circumstances enumerated in
paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the value of the
The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the humanitarian thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds said
principle that justice must be tempered with mercy. Generally, the courts amount, the provision of any of the five preceding subdivisions
have nothing to do with the wisdom or justness of the penalties fixed by shall be made applicable.
law. "Whether or not the penalties prescribed by law upon conviction of
violations of particular statutes are too severe or are not severe enough,
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding
are questions as to which commentators on the law may fairly differ; but
50 pesos, when the value of the thing stolen is not over 5 pesos,
it is the duty of the courts to enforce the will of the legislator in all cases
and the offender shall have acted under the impulse of hunger,
unless it clearly appears that a given penalty falls within the prohibited
poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for the support
class of excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment." A petition for
of himself or his family.
clemency should be addressed to the Chief Executive. 22
In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is ₱6,000.00, the above- 3rd. ₱200.00 to ₱6,000.00 will become ₱20,000.00 to
provision states that the penalty is prision correccional in its minimum ₱600,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor maximum to prision
and medium periods (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). correccional minimum (4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4
Applying the proposal, if the value of the thing stolen is ₱6,000.00, the months).
penalty is imprisonment of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision
correccional minimum period (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4
4th. ₱200.00 will become ₱20,000.00, punishable by arresto
months). It would seem that under the present law, the penalty imposed
mayor maximum (4 months and 1 day to 6 months).
is almost the same as the penalty proposed. In fact, after the application
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law under the existing law, the minimum
penalty is still lowered by one degree; hence, the minimum penalty is An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our esteemed
arresto mayor in its medium period to maximum period (2 months and 1 amici curiae, is that the incremental penalty provided under Article 315
day to 6 months), making the offender qualified for pardon or parole after of the RPC violates the Equal Protection Clause.
serving the said minimum period and may even apply for probation.
Moreover, under the proposal, the minimum penalty after applying the
The equal protection clause requires equality among equals, which is
Indeterminate Sentence Law is arresto menor in its maximum period to
determined according to a valid classification. The test developed by
arresto mayor in its minimum period (21 days to 2 months) is not too far
jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness,27 which has four
from the minimum period under the existing law. Thus, it would seem
requisites:
that the present penalty imposed under the law is not at all excessive. The
same is also true in the crime of Estafa.23
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100, as suggested to the value of the
thing stolen in the crime of Theft and the damage caused in the crime of (2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
Estafa, the gap between the minimum and the maximum amounts, which
is the basis of determining the proper penalty to be imposed, would be
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
too wide and the penalty imposable would no longer be commensurate to
the act committed and the value of the thing stolen or the damage caused:
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. 28
I. Article 309, or the penalties for the crime of Theft, the value would be
modified but the penalties are not changed: According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR) does not
rest on substantial distinctions as ₱10,000.00 may have been substantial
in the past, but it is not so today, which violates the first requisite; the IPR
1. ₱12,000.00 to ₱22,000.00 will become ₱1,200,000.00 to
was devised so that those who commit estafa involving higher amounts
₱2,200,000.00, punished by prision mayor minimum to prision
would receive heavier penalties; however, this is no longer achieved,
mayor medium (6 years and 1 day to 10 years).
because a person who steals ₱142,000.00 would receive the same penalty
as someone who steals hundreds of millions, which violates the second
2. ₱6,000.00 to ₱12,000.00 will become ₱600,000.00 to requisite; and, the IPR violates requisite no. 3, considering that the IPR is
₱1,200,000.00, punished by prision correccional medium and limited to existing conditions at the time the law was promulgated,
to prision correccional maximum (2 years, 4 months and 1 day conditions that no longer exist today.
to 6 years).24
Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno and
3. ₱200.00 to ₱6,000.00 will become ₱20,000.00 to declares the incremental penalty in Article 315 unconstitutional for
₱600,000.00, punishable by prision correccional minimum to violating the equal protection clause, what then is the penalty that should
prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years be applied in case the amount of the thing subject matter of the crime
and 2 months). exceeds ₱22,000.00? It seems that the proposition poses more questions
than answers, which leads us even more to conclude that the appropriate
remedy is to refer these matters to Congress for them to exercise their
4. ₱50.00 to ₱200.00 will become ₱5,000.00 to ₱20,000.00,
inherent power to legislate laws.
punishable by arresto mayor medium to prision correccional
minimum (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).
Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares the IPR
unconstitutional, the remedy is to go to Congress. Thus:
5. ₱5.00 to ₱50.00 will become ₱500.00 to ₱5,000.00,
punishable by arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months).
xxxx
6. ₱5.00 will become ₱500.00, punishable by arresto mayor
minimum to arresto mayor medium. JUSTICE PERALTA:

x x x x. Now, your position is to declare that the incremental penalty should be

struck down as unconstitutional because it is absurd.
II. Article 315, or the penalties for the crime of Estafa, the value would
also be modified but the penalties are not changed, as follows: DEAN DIOKNO:

1st. ₱12,000.00 to ₱22,000.00, will become ₱1,200,000.00 to Absurd, it violates equal protection, Your Honor, and cruel and unusual
₱2,200,000.00, punishable by prision correccional maximum to punishment.
prision mayor minimum (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8
years).25
JUSTICE PERALTA:

2nd. ₱6,000.00 to ₱12,000.00 will become ₱600,000.00 to

Then what will be the penalty that we are going to impose if the amount
₱1,200,000.00, punishable by prision correccional minimum to
is more than Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.
prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years
and 2 months).26
DEAN DIOKNO:
Well, that would be for Congress to ... if this Court will declare the DEAN DIOKNO:
incremental penalty rule unconstitutional, then that would ... the void
should be filled by Congress.
Could not be.

JUSTICE PERALTA:
JUSTICE PERALTA:

But in your presentation, you were fixing the amount at One Hundred
The only remedy is to go to Congress...
Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos ...

DEAN DIOKNO:
DEAN DIOKNO:

Yes, Your Honor.

Well, my presen ... (interrupted)

JUSTICE PERALTA:
JUSTICE PERALTA:

... and determine the value or the amount.

For every One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos in excess of
Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos you were suggesting an
additional penalty of one (1) year, did I get you right? DEAN DIOKNO:

DEAN DIOKNO: Yes, Your Honor.

Yes, Your Honor, that is, if the court will take the route of statutory JUSTICE PERALTA:
interpretation.
That will be equivalent to the incremental penalty of one (1) year in
JUSTICE PERALTA: excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.

Ah ... DEAN DIOKNO:

DEAN DIOKNO: Yes, Your Honor.

If the Court will say that they can go beyond the literal wording of the JUSTICE PERALTA:
law...
The amount in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Thank you, Dean.
But if we de ... (interrupted)
DEAN DIOKNO:
DEAN DIOKNO:
Thank you.
....then....
x x x x29
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
Ah, yeah. But if we declare the incremental penalty as unsconstitutional, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Citing Solem v. Helm,30 Dean
the court cannot fix the amount ... Diokno avers that the United States Federal Supreme Court has expanded
the application of a similar Constitutional provision prohibiting cruel and
unusual punishment, to the duration of the penalty, and not just its form.
DEAN DIOKNO:
The court therein ruled that three things must be done to decide whether
a sentence is proportional to a specific crime, viz.; (1) Compare the nature
No, Your Honor. and gravity of the offense, and the harshness of the penalty; (2) Compare
the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, i.e.,
whether more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty or to less
JUSTICE PERALTA:
serious penalties; and (3) Compare the sentences imposed for
commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.
... as the equivalent of one, as an incremental penalty in excess of Twenty-
Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.
However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in the present case,
because in Solem what respondent therein deemed cruel was the penalty
DEAN DIOKNO: imposed by the state court of South Dakota after it took into account the
latter’s recidivist statute and not the original penalty for uttering a "no
account" check. Normally, the maximum punishment for the crime would
No, Your Honor.
have been five years imprisonment and a $5,000.00 fine. Nonetheless,
respondent was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of
JUSTICE PERALTA: parole under South Dakota’s recidivist statute because of his six prior
felony convictions. Surely, the factual antecedents of Solem are different
from the present controversy.
The Court cannot do that.
With respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it is true that the The said inequity is also apparent in the crime of Robbery with force
imposable penalty for the offense is high. Nevertheless, the rationale for upon things (inhabited or uninhabited) where the value of the thing
the imposition of a higher penalty against a domestic servant is the fact unlawfully taken and the act of unlawful entry are the bases of the
that in the commission of the crime, the helper will essentially gravely penalty imposable, and also, in Malicious Mischief, where the penalty of
abuse the trust and confidence reposed upon her by her employer. After imprisonment or fine is dependent on the cost of the damage caused.
accepting and allowing the helper to be a member of the household, thus
entrusting upon such person the protection and safekeeping of the
In Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited), if we
employer’s loved ones and properties, a subsequent betrayal of that trust
increase the value of the thing unlawfully taken, as proposed in the
is so repulsive as to warrant the necessity of imposing a higher penalty to
ponencia, the sole basis of the penalty will now be the value of the thing
deter the commission of such wrongful acts.
unlawfully taken and no longer the element of force employed in entering
the premises. It may likewise cause an inequity between the crime of
There are other crimes where the penalty of fine and/or imprisonment Qualified Trespass to Dwelling under Article 280, and this kind of robbery
are dependent on the subject matter of the crime and which, by adopting because the former is punishable by prision correccional in its medium
the proposal, may create serious implications. For example, in the crime and maximum periods (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years) and a fine
of Malversation, the penalty imposed depends on the amount of the not exceeding ₱1,000.00 (₱100,000.00 now if the ratio is 1:100) where
money malversed by the public official, thus: entrance to the premises is with violence or intimidation, which is the
main justification of the penalty. Whereas in the crime of Robbery with
force upon things, it is punished with a penalty of prision mayor (6 years
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of
and 1 day to 12 years) if the intruder is unarmed without the penalty of
malversation. — Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his
Fine despite the fact that it is not merely the illegal entry that is the basis
office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the
of the penalty but likewise the unlawful taking.
same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through
abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such
public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty Furthermore, in the crime of Other Mischiefs under Article 329, the
of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall highest penalty that can be imposed is arresto mayor in its medium and
suffer: maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months) if the value of the
damage caused exceeds ₱1,000.00, but under the proposal, the value of
the damage will now become ₱100,000.00 (1:100), and still punishable
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
by arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months). And, if the value of
maximum periods, if the amount involved in the
the damaged property does not exceed ₱200.00, the penalty is arresto
misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two
menor or a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not
hundred pesos.
more than ₱200.00, if the amount involved does not exceed ₱200.00 or
cannot be estimated. Under the proposal, ₱200.00 will now become
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium ₱20,000.00, which simply means that the fine of ₱200.00 under the
periods, if the amount involved is more than two hundred existing law will now become ₱20,000.00. The amount of Fine under this
pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos. situation will now become excessive and afflictive in nature despite the
fact that the offense is categorized as a light felony penalized with a light
penalty under Article 26 of the RPC.33 Unless we also amend Article 26 of
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to
the RPC, there will be grave implications on the penalty of Fine, but
reclusion temporal in its minimum period, if the amount
changing the same through Court decision, either expressly or impliedly,
involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than
may not be legally and constitutionally feasible.
twelve thousand pesos.

There are other crimes against property and swindling in the RPC that
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and
may also be affected by the proposal, such as those that impose
maximum periods, if the amount involved is more than twelve
imprisonment and/or Fine as a penalty based on the value of the damage
thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If
caused, to wit: Article 311 (Theft of the property of the National Library
the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion
and National Museum), Article 312 (Occupation of real property or
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
usurpation of real rights in property), Article 313 (Altering boundaries or
landmarks), Article 316 (Other forms of swindling), Article 317
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of (Swindling a minor), Article 318 (Other deceits), Article 328 (Special
perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the cases of malicious mischief) and Article 331 (Destroying or damaging
funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled. statues, public monuments or paintings). Other crimes that impose Fine
as a penalty will also be affected, such as: Article 213 (Frauds against the
public treasury and similar offenses), Article 215 (Prohibited
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds
Transactions),
or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such
missing funds or property to personal use. Article 216 (Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer), Article
218 (Failure of accountable officer to render accounts), Article 219
(Failure of a responsible public officer to render accounts before leaving
The above-provisions contemplate a situation wherein the Government
the country).
loses money due to the unlawful acts of the offender. Thus, following the
proposal, if the amount malversed is ₱200.00 (under the existing law),
the amount now becomes ₱20,000.00 and the penalty is prision In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes under the RPC. It will
correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years 4 months and also affect crimes which are punishable by special penal laws, such as
1 day to 6 years). The penalty may not be commensurate to the act of Illegal Logging or Violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705,
embezzlement of ₱20,000.00 compared to the acts committed by public as amended.34The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and possessing
officials punishable by a special law, i.e., Republic Act No. 3019 or the timber or other forest products without license as an offense as grave as
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, specifically Section 3,31 wherein the and equivalent to the felony of qualified theft.35 Under the law, the
injury caused to the government is not generally defined by any monetary offender shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309
amount, the penalty (6 years and 1 month to 15 years) 32 under the Anti- and 31036 of the Revised Penal Code, which means that the penalty
Graft Law will now become higher. This should not be the case, because in imposable for the offense is, again, based on the value of the timber or
the crime of malversation, the public official takes advantage of his public forest products involved in the offense. Now, if we accept the said
position to embezzle the fund or property of the government entrusted to proposal in the crime of Theft, will this particular crime of Illegal Logging
him. be amended also in so far as the penalty is concerned because the penalty
is dependent on Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC? The answer is in the
negative because the soundness of this particular law is not in question.
With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the Revised is apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a minimum
Penal Code and Special Laws, and other related provisions of these laws amount for awards of civil indemnity, which is ₱3,000.00. The law did not
affected by the proposal, a thorough study is needed to determine its provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount for the award
effectivity and necessity. There may be some provisions of the law that cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can
should be amended; nevertheless, this Court is in no position to conclude be validly modified and increased when the present circumstance
as to the intentions of the framers of the Revised Penal Code by merely warrants it. Corollarily, moral damages under Article 222039 of the Civil
making a study of the applicability of the penalties imposable in the Code also does not fix the amount of damages that can be awarded. It is
present times. Such is not within the competence of the Court but of the discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental anguish or the
Legislature which is empowered to conduct public hearings on the suffering of the private offended party. The amount of moral damages
matter, consult legal luminaries and who, after due proceedings, can can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not
decide whether or not to amend or to revise the questioned law or other exceed the award of civil indemnity.
laws, or even create a new legislation which will adopt to the times.
In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law for the offense
Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to amend the committed as tantamount to cruel punishment. However, all penalties are
Revised Penal Code. During the oral arguments, counsel for the Senate generally harsh, being punitive in nature. Whether or not they are
informed the Court that at present, fifty-six (56) bills are now pending in excessive or amount to cruel punishment is a matter that should be left to
the Senate seeking to amend the Revised Penal Code, 37 each one lawmakers. It is the prerogative of the courts to apply the law, especially
proposing much needed change and updates to archaic laws that were when they are clear and not subject to any other interpretation than that
promulgated decades ago when the political, socio-economic, and cultural which is plainly written.
settings were far different from today’s conditions.
Similar to the argument of Dean Diokno, one of Justice Antonio Carpio’s
Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such opinions is that the incremental penalty provision should be declared
a way that it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and unconstitutional and that the courts should only impose the penalty
that in the course of such application or construction, it should not make corresponding to the amount of ₱22,000.00, regardless if the actual
or supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation, modify, amount involved exceeds ₱22,000.00. As suggested, however, from now
revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a until the law is properly amended by Congress, all crimes of Estafa will no
construction which is repugnant to its terms.38 The Court should apply longer be punished by the appropriate penalty. A conundrum in the
the law in a manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit, regular course of criminal justice would occur when every accused
especially when the law is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly convicted of the crime of estafa will be meted penalties different from the
put, the Court should shy away from encroaching upon the primary proper penalty that should be imposed. Such drastic twist in the
function of a co-equal branch of the Government; otherwise, this would application of the law has no legal basis and directly runs counter to what
lead to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of powers by the law provides.
means of judicial legislation.
It should be noted that the death penalty was reintroduced in the
Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a dispensation of criminal justice by the Ramos Administration by virtue of
penalty or a Fine; hence, it can be increased by the Court when Republic Act No. 765940 in December 1993. The said law has been
appropriate. Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides: questioned before this Court. There is, arguably, no punishment more
cruel than that of death. Yet still, from the time the death penalty was re-
imposed until its lifting in June 2006 by Republic Act No. 9346, 41 the
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-
Court did not impede the imposition of the death penalty on the ground
delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have
that it is a "cruel punishment" within the purview of Section 19
been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1),42 Article III of the Constitution. Ultimately, it was through an act of
Congress suspending the imposition of the death penalty that led to its
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning non-imposition and not via the intervention of the Court.
capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the
heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be
Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court
assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on
cannot declare the provision of the law from which the proper penalty
account of permanent physical disability not caused by the
emanates unconstitutional in the present action. Not only is it violative of
defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
due process, considering that the State and the concerned parties were
not given the opportunity to comment on the subject matter, it is settled
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked collaterally
provisions of Article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called because constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not
to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate collaterally,43 more so in the present controversy wherein the issues
succession, may demand support from the person causing the never touched upon the constitutionality of any of the provisions of the
death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration Revised Penal Code.
to be fixed by the court;
Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and punishments is generally aimed at the form or character of the
ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and
mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. applies to punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or
obsolete, for instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the
pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and
In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a
the like. Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the
kind of monetary restitution or compensation to the victim for the
prohibition.44
damage or infraction that was done to the latter by the accused, which in
a sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in
a crime where a person dies, in addition to the penalty of imprisonment It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or
imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim a severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the
sum of money as restitution. Clearly, this award of civil indemnity due to punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel
the death of the victim could not be contemplated as akin to the value of a and unusual. Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come
thing that is unlawfully taken which is the basis in the imposition of the under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly
proper penalty in certain crimes. Thus, the reasoning in increasing the oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to
value of civil indemnity awarded in some offense cannot be the same shock the moral sense of the community."45
reasoning that would sustain the adoption of the suggested ratio. Also, it
Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend the Yeah, but ...
law and adapt it to our modern time.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by merely
adjusting the questioned monetary values to the present value of money
And I don’t think it is within the power of the Supreme Court to pass upon
based only on the current inflation rate. There are other factors and
and peg the value to One Hundred (₱100.00) Pesos to ...
variables that need to be taken into consideration, researched, and
deliberated upon before the said values could be accurately and properly
adjusted. The effects on the society, the injured party, the accused, its JUSTICE PERALTA:
socio-economic impact, and the likes must be painstakingly evaluated and
weighed upon in order to arrive at a wholistic change that all of us believe
Yeah.
should be made to our existing law. Dejectedly, the Court is ill-equipped,
has no resources, and lacks sufficient personnel to conduct public
hearings and sponsor studies and surveys to validly effect these changes PROFESSOR TADIAR:
in our Revised Penal Code. This function clearly and appropriately
belongs to Congress. Even Professor Tadiar concedes to this conclusion,
... One (₱1.00.00) Peso in 1930.
to wit:

JUSTICE PERALTA:
xxxx

That is legislative in nature.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yeah, Just one question. You are suggesting that in order to determine the
value of Peso you have to take into consideration several factors.
That is my position that the Supreme Court ...
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yes.
Yeah, okay.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Per capita income.
... has no power to utilize the power of judicial review to in order to
adjust, to make the adjustment that is a power that belongs to the
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
legislature.

Per capita income.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

JUSTICE PERALTA:
Thank you, Professor.

Consumer price index.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Thank you.46

Yeah.
Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno
echoes the view that the role of the Court is not merely to dispense
JUSTICE PERALTA: justice, but also the active duty to prevent injustice. Thus, in order to
prevent injustice in the present controversy, the Court should not impose
an obsolete penalty pegged eighty three years ago, but consider the
Inflation ...
proposed ratio of 1:100 as simply compensating for inflation.
Furthermore, the Court has in the past taken into consideration "changed
PROFESSOR TADIAR: conditions" or "significant changes in circumstances" in its decisions.

Yes. Similarly, the Chief Justice is of the view that the Court is not delving into
the validity of the substance of a statute. The issue is no different from the
Court’s adjustment of indemnity in crimes against persons, which the
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Court had previously adjusted in light of current times, like in the case of
People v. Pantoja.47 Besides, Article 10 of the Civil Code mandates a
... and so on. Is the Supreme Court equipped to determine those factors? presumption that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief
Justice and my Colleagues, all the proposals ultimately lead to prohibited
There are many ways by which the value of the Philippine Peso can be
judicial legislation. Short of being repetitious and as extensively discussed
determined utilizing all of those economic terms.
above, it is truly beyond the powers of the Court to legislate laws, such
immense power belongs to Congress and the Court should refrain from
JUSTICE PERALTA: crossing this clear-cut divide. With regard to civil indemnity, as
elucidated before, this refers to civil liability which is awarded to the
offended party as a kind of monetary restitution. It is truly based on the
value of money. The same cannot be said on penalties because, as earlier Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty prescribed
stated, penalties are not only based on the value of money, but on several by law for the estafa charge against petitioner is prision correccional
other factors. Further, since the law is silent as to the maximum amount maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would then
that can be awarded and only pegged the minimum sum, increasing the be prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
amount granted as civil indemnity is not proscribed. Thus, it can be
adjusted in light of current conditions.
Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be
anywhere from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.
Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present case, the CA
modified the ruling of the RTC. The RTC imposed the indeterminate
One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to perform its
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional in its
primordial duty of lawmaking. The Court should not pre-empt Congress
medium period, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months
and usurp its inherent powers of making and enacting laws. While it may
of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, as maximum. However, the
be the most expeditious approach, a short cut by judicial fiat is a
CA imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
dangerous proposition, lest the Court dare trespass on prohibited judicial
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision
legislation.
mayor, as maximum, plus one (1) year for each additional ₱10,000.00, or
a total of seven (7) years.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5,
2007 of petitioner Lito Corpuz is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the
In computing the penalty for this type of estafa, this Court's ruling in
Decision dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution dated September 5, 2007
Cosme, Jr. v. People48 is highly instructive, thus:
of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the Decision
dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San Fernando
With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the Revised Penal City, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Code provides: Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised
Penal Code, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty
imposed is the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from
ART. 315 Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by
THREE (3) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ELEVEN DAYS of prision
any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
correccional, as minimum, to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion temporal
as maximum.
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000
Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision
but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter
be furnished the President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the
sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
Department of Justice.
maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but
the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In
such case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case
may be.
SO ORDERED.

The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not three,
periods, in which case, Article 65 of the same Code requires the division
of the time included in the penalty into three equal portions of time
included in the penalty prescribed, forming one period of each of the
three portions. Applying the latter provisions, the maximum, medium and
minimum periods of the penalty prescribed are:

Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years

Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days

Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days 49

To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisión

correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum should be divided into
three equal portions of time each of which portion shall be deemed to
form one period in accordance with Article 6550 of the RPC.51 In the
present case, the amount involved is ₱98,000.00, which exceeds
₱22,000.00, thus, the maximum penalty imposable should be within the
maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision
mayor. Article 315 also states that a period of one year shall be added to
the penalty for every additional ₱10,000.00 defrauded in excess of
₱22,000.00, but in no case shall the total penalty which may be imposed
exceed 20 years.

Considering that the amount of ₱98,000.00 is ₱76,000.00 more than the

₱22,000.00 ceiling set by law, then, adding one year for each additional
₱10,000.00, the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8
years of prision mayor minimum would be increased by 7 years. Taking
the maximum of the prescribed penalty, which is 8 years, plus an
additional 7 years, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty is 15 years.
December 5, 2017 the Disbursing Officer of the Department of Transportation and
Communications, Baguio City, and as such an accountable officer,
entrusted with and responsible for the amount of ₱1 1,300.00 which
G.R. No. 217874
accused received and collected for the DOTC, and intended for deposit
under the account of DOTC with the Land Bank of the Philippines-Baguio
OPHELIA HERNAN, Petitioner, City, by reason of her position, while in the performance of her official
vs. functions, taking advantage of her position, did then and there, wilfully,
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN,, Respondent feloniously, and unlawfully misappropriate or consent, or through
abandonment or negligence, permit other persons to take such amount of
₱11,300.00 to the damage and prejudice of the government.
DECISION

CONTRARY TO LAW.11
PERALTA, J.:

Upon arraignment on July 31, 1998, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the
Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
offense charged. Hence, trial on the merits ensued.
Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolution1 dated
February 2, 2015 and Decision2 dated November 13, 2009 of the
Sandiganbayan 2nd Division which affirmed, with modification, the To establish its case, the prosecution presented the testimonies of two (2)
Decision dated June 28, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),Branch 7, COA auditors, namely, Maria Lopez and Sherelyn Narag as well as three (3)
Baguio City convicting petitioner of the crime of malversation of public LBP employees, namely, Rebecca Sanchez, Catalina Ngaosi, and Nadelline
funds in Criminal Case No. 15722-R. Orallo.12 In response, the defense presented the lone testimony of
petitioner, which can be summarized as follows:
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On September 19, 1996, petitioner and her supervisor, Cecilia Paraiso,
went to the LBP Baguio branch and personally deposited the exact amount
In October 1982, petitioner Ophelia Hernan joined the Department of
of ₱11,300.00 with accomplished deposit slips in six (6) copies. 13 Since
Transportation and Communication (DOTC),Cordillera Administrative
there were many clients who came ahead of her, she decided to go with her
Region (CAR) in Baguio City wherein she served as an accounting clerk. In
usual arrangement of leaving the money with the teller and telling her that
September 1984, she was promoted to the position of Supervising Fiscal
she would just come back to retrieve the deposit slip. Thus, she handed the
Clerk by virtue of which she was designated as cashier, disbursement and
money to Teller No. 2, whom she identified as Catalina Ngaosi. Upon her
collection officer.3 As such, petitioner received cash and other collections
return at around 3 o'clock in the afternoon, she retrieved four (4) copies of
from customers and clients for the payment of telegraphic transfers, toll
the deposit slip from Ngaosi. She noticed that the same had no
foes, and special message fees. The collections she received were deposited
acknowledgment mark on it. Being contented with the initials of the teller
at the bank account of the DOTC at the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP),
on the deposit slips, she returned to her office and kept them in her vault.
Baguio City Branch.4
It was only during the cash count conducted by auditor Lopez when she
found out that the said amount was not remitted to the account of the LBP.
On December 17, 1996, Maria Imelda Lopez, an auditor of the Commission When demand was made on her to return the amount, she requested that
on Audit (COA), conducted a cash examination of the accounts handled by she be allowed to pay only after investigation of a complaint of Estafa that
petitioner as instructed by her superior, Sherelyn Narag. As a result, Lopez she would file with the National Bureau of Investigation against some
came across deposit slips dated September 19, 1996 and November 29, personnel of the bank, particularly Catalina Ngaosi. 14 The complaint,
1996 bearing the amounts of ₱11,300.00 and ₱81,348.20, however, was eventually dismissed.15
rcspectively.5 Upon close scrutiny, she noticed that said deposit slips did
not bear a stamp of receipt by the LBP nor was it machine validated.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
Suspicious about what she found, she and Narag verified all the reports and
crime charged in the Information. The dispositive portion of the decision
other documents turned-over to them by petitioner.6 On the basis of said
states:
findings, Narag sent a letter to the LBP to confirm the remittances made by
petitioner. After adding all the deposits made and upon checking with the
teller's blotter, Nadelline Orallo, the resident auditor of LBP, found that no WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
deposits were made by petitioner for the account of DOTC on September convicting accused Ophelia Hernan of Malversation and hereby sentences
19, 1996 for the amount of ₱11,300.00 and November 29, 1996 for the her, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to suffer
amount of ₱81,340.20.7 imprisonment from 7 years, 4 months, and 1 day of prision mayor medium
period, as minimum, to 11 years, 6 months and 21 days of prision mayor as
maximum period to reclusion temporalmaximum period, as maximum, and
Thereafter, the LBP's officer-in-charge, Rebecca R. Sanchez, instructed the
to pay a fine of ₱11,300.00.
bank's teller, Catalina Ngaosi, to conduct their own independent inquiry. It
was discovered that on September 19, 1996, the only deposit in favor of
the DOTC was that made by its Ifugao office in the Lagawe branch of the Accused Ophelia Hernan is further sentenced to suffer the penalty of
LBP.8 This prompted Lopez to write to petitioner informing her that the perpetual special disqualification.
two (2) aforesaid remittances were not acknowledged by the bank. The
auditors then found that petitioner duly accounted for the ₱81,348.20
Likewise, accused Ophelia Hernan is hereby ordered to pay back to the
remittance but not for the ₱11,300.00. Dissatisfied with petitioner's
government the amount of ₱11,300.00 plus legal interest thereon at the
explanation as to the whereabouts of the said remittance, Narag reported
rate of 12% per annum to be computed from the date of the filing of the
the matter to the COA Regional Director who, in turn wrote to the LBP for
Information up to the time the same is actually paid.
confirmation. The LBP then denied receiving any ₱11,300.00 deposit on
September 19, 1996 from petitioner for the account of the DOTC. 9 Thus,
the COA demanded that she pay the said amount. Petitioner, however, Costs against the accused.
refused. Consequently, the COA filed a complaint for malversation of public
funds against petitioner with the Office of the Ombudsman for Luzon
SO ORDERED.16
which, after due investigation, recommended her indictment for the loss of
₱11,300.00.10 Accordingly, petitioner was charged before the RTC of
Baguio City in an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads: Erroneously, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which
affirmed her conviction but modified the penalty imposed. Upon motion,
however, the CA set aside its decision on the finding that it has no appellate
That on or about September 16, 1996, or sometime prior or subsequent
jurisdiction over the case. Instead, it is the Sandiganbayan which has
thereto, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over petitioner occupying a position lower
Honourable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then
than Salary Grade 27.17 Petitioner's new counsel, Atty. Leticia Gutierrez
Hayes-Allen, then appealed the case to the Sandiganbayan. In a Decision PRESENTED BY PETITIONER SHOULD HER MOTTON FOR REOPENING BE
dated November 13, 2009, the Sandiganbayan affirmed the RTC's GRANTED, WAS PASSED UPON BY THE TRIAL COURT.
judgment of conviction but modified the penalty imposed, the dispositive
opinion of which reads:
III.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby

THE SANDIGANBA YAN GRAVELY ERRED AS IT ACTED WITH GRAVE
AFFIRMED, with the modifications that the indeterminate penalty to be
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
imposed on the accused should be from 6 years and 1 day of prision
JURISDICTION IN PRONOUNCING THAT THE MOTION TO REOPEN AND
mayor as minimum, to 11 years, 6 months, and 21 days of prision mayor as
THE PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY PETITIONER ARE
maximum, together with the accessory penalties under Article 42 of the
CONSIDERED AS THE SECOND AND THIRD MOTIONS TO THE DENIAL OF
Revised Penal Code, and that interest of only 6% shall be imposed on the
THE DECISION.
amount of ₱11,300.00 to be restored by the accused.

Petitioner posits that her counsel, Atty. Hayes-Allen, never received the
SO ORDERED.18
August 31, 2010 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying her Motion for
Reconsideration. This is because notice thereof was erroneously sent to
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated December 21, 2009 said counsel's previous office at Poblacion, La Trinidad, Benguet, despite
alleging that during the trial before the RTC, her counsel was unable to the fact that it was specifically indicated in the Motion for Reconsideration
elicit many facts which would show her innocence. Said counsel principally that the new office is at the Public Attorney's Office of Tayug, Pangasinan,
failed to present certain witnesses and documents that would supposedly following her counsel's appointment as public attorney. Thus, since her
acquit her from the crime charged. The Sandiganbayan, however, denied counsel was not properly notified of the subject resolution, the entry of
the motion in a Resolution dated August 31, 2010 on the ground that judgment is premature.26 In support of her assertion, she cites Our ruling
evidence not formally offered before the court below cannot be considered in People v. Chavez,27 wherein We held that an entry of judgment without
on appeal.19 receipt of the resolution is premature.

On June 26, 2013, the Resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Petitioner also claims that during trial, she could not obtain the necessary
Reconsideration became final and executory and was recorded in the Book evidence for her defense due to the fact that the odds were against her.
of Entries of Judgments.20 On July 26, 2013, petitioner's new counsel, Atty. Because of this, she asks the Court to relax the strict application of the rules
Meshack Macwes, filed an Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case with Leave of and consider remanding the case to the lower court for further reception
Court and with Prayer to Stay the Execution.21 In a Resolution22 dated of evidence.28 In particular, petitioner seeks the reception of an affidavit of
December 4, 2013, however, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion and a certain John L. Ziganay, an accountant at the Depaiiment of Science and
directed the execution of the judgment of conviction. It noted the absence Technology (DOST), who previously worked at the DOTC and COA, as well
of the following requisites for the reopening of a case: (1) the reopening as two (2) deposit slips. According to petitioner, these pieces of evidence
must be before finality of a judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued would show that the ₱11,300.00 deposited at the Lagawe branch of the
by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued LBP was actually the deposit made by petitioner and not by a certain Lanie
only after a hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a Cabacungan, as the prosecution suggests. This is because the ₱11,300.00
miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of additional and/or deposit made by Cabacungan consists of two (2) different amounts, which,
further evidence should be terminated within thirty (30) days from the if proper accounting procedure is followed, shall be recorded in the bank
issuance of the order.23 statement as two (2) separate amounts and not their total sum of
₱11,300.00.29 Thus, the Sandiganbayan's denial of petitioner's motion to
reopen the case is capricious, despotic, and whimsical since the admission
Unfazed, petitioner filed on January 9, 2014 a Petition for Reconsideration
of her additional evidence will prevent a miscarriage.
with Prayer for Recall of Entry of Judgment in lieu of the Prayer for Stay of
Execution of Judgment praying for a reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan'
s recent Resolution, that the case be reopened for further reception of Finally, petitioner denies the Sandiganbayan's ruling that her motion to
evidence, and the recall of the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013.24 In reopen and petition for reconsideration are considered as a second and
a Resolution dated February 2, 2015, the Sandiganbayan denied the third motion for reconsideration, and are thus, prohibited pleadings. This
petition for lack of merit. According to the said court, the motion is clearly is because the additional evidence she seeks to introduce were not
a third motion for reconsideration, which is a prohibited pleading under available during the trial of her case.
the Rules of Court. Also, the grounds raised therein were merely a rehash
of those raised in the two previous motions. The claims that the accused
The petition is devoid of merit.
could not contact her counsel on whom she merely relied on for
appropriate remedies to be filed on her behalf, and that she has additional
evidence to present, were already thoroughly discussed in the August 31, At the outset, the Court notes that as pointed out by respondent Office of
2010 and December 4, 2013 Resolutions. Moreover, the cases relied upon the Special Prosecutor, petitioner's resort to a petition for certiorari under
by petitioner are not on point.25 Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is an improper remedy. In determining the
appropriate remedy or remedies available, a party aggrieved by a cou1i
order, resolution or decision must first correctly identify the nature of the
On May 14, 2015, petitioner filed the instant petition invoking the
order, resolution or decision he intends to assail.30 It bears stressing that
following arguments:
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari can be availed of only if there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
I. course of law.31 If the Order or Resolution sought to be assailed is in the
nature of a final order, the remedy of the aggrieved party would be to file
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
THE SANDIGANBA YAN GRAVELY ERRED AS IT ACTED WITH GRAVE
Otherwise, the appropriate remedy would be to file a petition
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
for certiorari under Rule 65.32 Petitioner, in the instant case, seeks to assail
JURISDICTION IN CONCLUDING THAT THE MOTION TO REOPEN WAS
the Sandiganbayan's Resolutions dated December 4, 2013 and February 2,
FILED OUT OF TIME CONSIDERING TI-IE EXTRAORDINARY AND
2015 wherein said court denied her motion to reopen the malversation
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CASE.
case against her. Said resolutions are clearly final orders that dispose the
proceedings completely. The instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65
II. is, therefore, improper.

THE SANDIGANBA YAN GRAVELY ERRED AS IT ACTED WITH GRAVE Even if We assume the propriety of petitioner's chosen action, the Court
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF still cannot grant the reliefs she prays for, specifically: (1) the reversal of
JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE INTENDED TO BE the Sandiganbayan's December 4, 2013 and February 2, 2015 Resolutions
denying her motion to reopen and petition for reconsideration; (2) the Court.42 On this inexcusable negligence alone, the Court finds sufficient
reopening of the case for further reception of evidence; and (3) the recall basis to deny the instant petition.
of the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013.33
Second of all, petitioner's claim that the Sandiganbayan's denial of her
First of all, there is no merit in petitioner's claim that since her counsel was motion to reopen the case is capricious, despotic, and whimsical since the
not properly notified of the August 31, 2010 Resolution as notice thereof admission of her additional evidence will prevent a miscarriage has no
was erroneously sent to her old office address, the entry of judgment is legal nor factual leg to stand on. Section 24, Rule 119 and existing
premature. As the Court sees it, petitioner has no one but herself to blame. jurisprudence provide for the following requirements for the reopening a
Time and again, the Court has held that in the absence of a proper and case: (l) the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of
adequate notice to the court of a change of address, the service of the order conviction; (2) the order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or
or resolution of a court upon the parties must be made at the last address upon motion; (3) the order is issued only after a hearing is conducted; (4)
of their counsel on record.34 It is the duty of the party and his counsel to the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and (5) the
device a system for the receipt of mail intended for them, just as it is the presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be terminated
duty of the counsel to inform the court officially of a change in his within thirty days from the issuance of the order. 43
address.35 If counsel moves to another address without informing the
court of that change, such omission or neglect is inexcusable and will not
But as the Sandiganbayan ruled, the absence of the first requisite that the
stay the finality of the decision. The court cannot be expected to take
reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction already
judicial notice of the new address of a lawyer who has moved or to
cripples the motion.1âwphi1 The records of the case clearly reveal that the
ascertain on its own whether or not the counsel of record has been changed
August 3l, 2010 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying petitioner's
and who the new counsel could possibly be or where he probably resides
Motion for Reconsideration had already become final and executory and,
or holds office.36
in fact, was already recorded in the Entry Book of Judgments on June 26,
2013. Moreover, petitioner's supposed predicament about her former
Here, it is undisputed that petitioner's counsel failed to inform the court of counsel failing to present witnesses and documents should have been
the change in her office address from Poblacion, La Trinidad, Benguet, to advanced before the trial court.44 It is the trial court, and neither the
the Public Attorney's Office in Tayug, Pangasinan. The fact that said new Sandiganbayan nor the Court, which receives evidence and rules over
address was indicated in petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration does not exhibits formally offered.45 Thus, it was, indeed, too late in the day to
suffice as "proper and adequate notice" to the court. As previously stated, advance additional allegations for petitioner had all the opportunity to do
courts cannot be expected to take notice of every single time the counsel of so in the lower court. An appellate court will generally not disturb the trial
a party changes address. Besides, it must be noted that petitioner even court's assessment of factual matters except only when it clearly
expressly admitted having received the subject resolution "sometime in overlooked certain facts or where the evidence fails to substantiate the
September or October 2010."37 Easily, she could have informed her counsel lower court's findings or when the disputed decision is based on a
of the same. As respondent posits, it is not as if petitioner had no misapprehension of facts.46
knowledge of the whereabouts of her counsel considering that at the time
of the filing of her Motion for Reconsideration, said counsel was already
Ultimately, it bears stressing that the Court does not find that the
with the PA0.38 Moreover, the Court cannot permit petitioner's reliance on
Sandiganbayan acted in a capricious, despotic, or whimsical manner when
the Chavez case because there, petitioner did not receive the resolution of
it denied petitioner's motion to reopen especially in view of the fact that
the Court of Appeals through no fault or negligence on his paii.39 Here,
the rulings it seeks to refute are legally sound and appropriately based on
however, petitioner's non-receipt of the subject resolution was mainly
the evidences presented by the parties. On this score, the elements of
attributable not only to her counsel's negligence but hers, as well. Thus, the
malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Court deems it necessary to remind litigants, who are represented by
Code (RPC) are: (1) that the offender is a public officer; (2) that he had the
counsel, that they should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax
custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;
and await the outcome of their case. They should give the necessary
(3) that those funds or property were public funds or prope1iy for which
assistance to their counsel for what is at stake is their interest in the case.
he was accountable; and (4) that he appropriated, took, misappropriated
It is, therefore, their responsibility to check the status of their case from
or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another
time to time.40
person to take them. This article establishes a presumption that when a
public officer fails to have duly forthcoming any public funds with which
To recall, petitioner, on December 21, 2009, filed her Motion for he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, it shall
Reconsideration seeking a reversal of the Sandiganbayan's November 13, be prima facieevidence that he has put such missing funds to personal
2009 Decision which affirmed the RTC's ruling convicting her of the crime uses.47
of malversation. In a Resolution dated August 31, 2010, the Sandiganbayan
denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Said resolution became
As duly found by the trial court, and affinned by the Sandiganbayan,
final in the absence of any pleading filed thereafter, and hence, was
petitioner's defense that she, together with her supervisor Cecilia Paraiso,
recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments on June 26, 2013.
went to the LBP and handed the subject ₱11,300.00 deposit to the teller
Subsequently, on July 12, 2013, petitioner, through her new counsel, filed
Ngaosi and, thereafter, had no idea as to where the money went failed to
an Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case with Leave of Court and with Prayer to
overcome the presumption of law. For one, Paraiso was never presented
Stay the Execution, which was denied through the Sandiganbayan's
to corroborate her version. For another, when questioned about the
Resolution dated December 4, 2013.41 Undeterred, petitioner filed
subject deposit, not only did petitioner fail to make the same readily
her Petition for Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of Entry of Judgment
available, she also could not satisfactorily explain its whereabouts. Indeed,
in lieu of the Prayer for the Stay of Execution of Judgement on January 9,
in the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is sufficient
2014 which was likewise denied in the Sandiganbayan's February 2, 2015
proof that the accountable officer had received public funds, that she did
Resolution.
not have them in her possession when demand therefor was made, and
that she could not satisfactorily explain her failure to do so.48 Thus, even
It seems, therefore, that petitioner waited almost an entire three (3) year if it is assumed that it was somebody else who misappropriated the said
period from the denial of her Motion for Reconsideration to act upon the amount, petitioner may still be held liable for malversation. The Comi
malversation case against her through the filing of her urgent motion to quotes, with approval, the trial court's ruling, viz.:
reopen. In fact, her filing of said motion may very well be prompted only
by her realization that the case has finally concluded by reason of the entry
Even if the claim of Hernan, i.e., that she actually left the amount of
of judgment. Stated otherwise, the Court is under the impression that had
₱11,300.00 and the corresponding deposit slip with the Bank Teller
she not heard of the recording of the August 31, 2010 Resolution in the
Ngaosi and she came back to retrieve the deposit slip later, is to be
Book of Entries of Judgments on June 26, 2013, petitioner would not even
believed and then it came out that the said ₱11,300.00 was not
have inquired about the status of her case. As respondent puts it, the urgent
credited to the account of DOTC with the Land Bank and was in fact
motion to reopen appears to have been filed as a substitute for the lost
missing, still accused Hernan should be convicted of malversation
remedy of an appeal via a petition for review on certioraribefore the
because in this latter situation she permits through her inexcusable
negligence another person to take the money. And this is still questions of law are acted upon by the Court en bane. To the Court, the
malversation under Article 217.49 recent passage of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10951 entitled An Act Adjusting
the Amount or the Value of Property and Damage on which a Penalty is Based
and the Fines Imposed Under the Revised Penal Code Amending for the
Said ruling was, in fact, duly reiterated by the Sandiganbayan in its
Purpose Act No. 3815 Otherwise Known as the "Revised Penal Code" as
Decision, thus:
Amended which accordingly reduced the penalty applicable to the crime
charged herein is an example of such exceptional circumstance. Section 40
Shifting our gaze to the possibility that it was the bank teller Catalina of said Act provides:
Ngaosi who misappropriated the amount and should therefore be held
liable, as the accused would want to poltray, the Court doubts the tenability
SEC. 40. Article 217 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act. No. 1060,
of that position. As consistently ruled by jurisprudence, a public officer
is hereby further amended to read as follows:
may be held liable for malversation even if he does not use public property
or funds under his custody for his personal benefit, but consents to the
taking thereof by another person, or, through abandonment or negligence, ART. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of
permitted such taking. The accused, by her negligence, simply created malversation. - Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office,
the opportunity for the misappropriation. Even her justification that is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or
her deposits which were not machine-validated were nonetheless shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or
acknowledged by the bank cannot fortify her defense. On the negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or
contrary, it all the more emphasizes her propensity for negligence property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the
each time that she accepted deposit slips which were not misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:
machinevalidated, her only proof of receipt of her deposits. 50
1. The penalty of pnswn correccional in its medium and maximum
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan's finding periods, if the amount involved in the misappropriation or
that petitioner's motion to reopen and petition for reconsideration are malversation docs not exceed Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000.00).
practically second and third motions for reconsideration from its Decision
dated November 13, 2009. Under the rules, the motions are already
xxxx
prohibited pleadings under Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court due to
the fact that the grounds raised in the petition for reconsideration are
merely a rehash of those raised in the two (2) previous motions filed before In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of
it. These grounds were already thoroughly discussed by the perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the
Sandiganbayan in its subject resolutions. Hence, as duly noted by the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.
Sandiganbayan, in the law of pleading, courts are called upon to pierce the
form and go into the substance, not to be misled by a false or wrong name
Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, therefore, We have here a novel
given to a pleading because the title thereof is not controlling and the court
situation wherein the judgment convicting the accused, petitioner herein,
should be guided by its averments.51 Thus, the fact that the pleadings filed
has already become final and executory and yet the penalty imposed
by petitioner are entitled Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case with Leave of
thereon has been reduced by virtue of the passage of said law. Because of
Court and with Prayer to Stay Execution and Petition for Reconsideration
this, not only must petitioner's sentence be modified respecting the settled
with Prayer for Recall of Entry of Judgment in lieu of the Prayer for Stay of
rule on the retroactive effectivity of laws, the sentencing being favorable to
Execution of Judgment does not exempt them from the application of the
the accused,56 she may even apply for probation,57 as long as she does not
rules on prohibited pleadings.
possess any ground for disqualification,58 in view of recent legislation on
probation, or R.A. No. 10707 entitled An Act Amending Presidential Decree
Let it be remembered that the doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded No. 968, otherwise known as the "Probation Law of 1976," As
on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that, at Amended. allowing an accused to apply for probation in the event that she
the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi- is sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of not more than
judicial agencies must become final on some definite date fixed by law. The six (6) years when a judgment of conviction imposing a non-probationable
only exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the penalty is appealed or reviewed, and such judgment is modified through
so-called nunc pro tune entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void the imposition of a probationable penalty.59
judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the
decision which render its execution unjust and inequitable.52 None of the
Thus, in order to effectively avoid any injustice that petitioner may suffer
exceptions is present in this case.
as well as a possible multiplicity of suits arising therefrom, the Court
deems it proper to reopen the instant case and recall the Entry of Judgment
Indeed, every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes dated June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan, which imposed the penalty of
final, executory and unappealable. Just as a losing party has the right to file six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to eleven (11)
an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the years, six (6) months, and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor, as
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the maximum. Instead, since the amount involved herein is ₱11,300.00, which
execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which is the "life of the law." To does not exceed ₱40,000.00, the new penalty that should be imposed
frustrate it by dilatory schemes on the part of the losing party is to frustrate is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, which has a
all the efforts, time and expenditure of the courts. It is in the interest of prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day, to six (6)
justice that this Court should write finis to this litigation.53 years. The Court, however, takes note of the presence of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender appreciated by the Sandiganbayan in
favor of petitioner.60 Hence, taking into consideration the absence of any
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds that it is still necessary to
aggravating circumstance and the presence of one (1) mitigating
reopen the instant case and recall the Entry of Judgment dated June 26,
circumstance, the range of the penalty that must be imposed as the
2013 of the Sandiganbayan, not for further reception of evidence, however,
maximum term should be prision correccional medium to prision
as petitioner prays for, but in order to modify the penalty imposed by said
correccional maximum in its minimum period, or from two (2) years, four
court. The general rule is that a judgment that has acquired finality
(4) months, and one (1) day, to three (3) years, six (6) months, and twenty
becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
(20) days, in accordance with Article 6461 of the RPC. Applying the
respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the range of the minimum term that should
of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or
be imposed upon petitioners is anywhere within the period of arresto
by the highest court of the land.54 When, however, circumstances transpire
mayor, maximum to prision correccional minimum with a range of four (4)
after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and
months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. Accordingly,
inequitable, the Court may sit en bane and give due regard to such
petitioner is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6)
exceptional circumstance warranting the relaxation of the doctrine of
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months,
immutability. The same is in line with Section 3(c),55 Rule II of the Internal
and twenty (20) days prision correccional, as maximum.
Rules of the Supreme Court, which provides that cases raising novel
On a final note, judges, public prosecutors, public attorneys, private
counsels, and such other officers of the law are hereby advised to similarly
apply the provisions of RA No. 10951 whenever it is, by reason of justice
and equity, called for by the facts of each case. Hence, said recent legislation
shall find application in cases where the imposable penalties of the affected
crimes such as theft, qualified theft, estafa, robbery with force upon things,
malicious mischief, malversation, and such other crimes, the penalty of
which is dependent upon the value of the object in consideration thereof,
have been reduced, as in the case at hand, taking into consideration the
presence of existing circumstances attending its commission. For as long
as it is favorable to the accused, said recent legislation shall find application
regardless of whether its effectivity comes after the time when the
judgment of conviction is rendered and even if service of sentence has
already begun. The accused, in these applicable instances, shall be entitled
to the benefits of the new law warranting him to serve a lesser sentence,
or to his release, if he has already begun serving his previous sentence, and
said service already accomplishes the term of the modified sentence. In the
latter case, moreover, the Court, in the interest of justice and expediency,
further directs the appropriate filing of an action before the Court that
seeks the reopening of the case rather than an original petition filed for a
similar purpose.

Indeed, when exceptional circumstances exist, such as the passage of the

instant amendatory law imposing penalties more lenient and favorable to
the accused, the Court shall not hesitate to direct the reopening of a final
and immutable judgment, the objective of which is to correct not so much
the findings of guilt but the applicable penalties to be imposed.

Henceforth: (1) the Directors of the National Penitentiary and Correctional

Institution for Women are hereby ordered to determine if there are
accused serving final sentences similarly situated as the accused in this
particular case and if there are, to coordinate and communicate with the
Public Attorney's Office and the latter, to represent and file the necessary
pleading before this Court in behalf of these convicted accused in light of
this Court's pronouncement; (2) For those cases where the accused are
undergoing preventive imprisonment, either the cases against them are
non-bailable or cannot put up the bail in view of the penalties imposable
under the old law, their respective counsels are hereby ordered to file the
necessary pleading before the proper courts, whether undergoing trial in
the RTC or undergoing appeal in the appellate courts and apply for bail, for
their provisional liberty; (3) For those cases where the accused are
undergoing preventive imprisonment pending trial or appeal, their
respective counsels are hereby ordered to file the necessary pleading if the
accused have already served the minimum sentence of the crime charged
against them based on the penalties imposable under the new law, R.A. No.
10951, for their immediate release in accordance with A.M. No. 12-11-2-SC
or the Guidelines For Decongesting Holding Jails By Enforcing The Rights Of
Accused Persons To Bail And To Speedy Trial; 62 and (4) Lastly, all courts,
including appellate courts, are hereby ordered to give priority to those
cases covered by R.A. No. 10951 to avoid any prolonged imprisonment.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The

Resolution dated February 2, 2015 and Decision dated November 13, 2009
of the Sandiganbayan 2nd Division
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.Petitioner is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum term, to three (3) years, six (6) months, and twenty (20)
days prision correccional, as maximum term.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Court

Administrator (OCA) for dissemination to the First and Second Level
courts, and also to the Presiding Justices of the appellate courts, the
Department of Justice, Office of the Solicitor General, Public Attorney's
Office, Prosecutor General's Office, the Directors of the National
Penitentiary and Correctional Institution for Women, and the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for their information, guidance, and appropriate
action.

Likewise, let the Office of the President, the Senate of the Philippines, and
the House of Representatives, be furnished copies of this Decision for
their information.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines This Act is attacked on account of the amendments that it introduces in
SUPREME COURT General Orders No. 58, the defense arguing that the Philippine Legislature
Manila was, and is, not authorized to amend General Orders No. 58, as it did by
amending section 2 thereof because its provisions have the character of
constitutional law. Said section 2 provides as follows:
EN BANC

All prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of the

G.R. No. 17584 March 8, 1922
United States against the persons charged with the offenses. (G.
O. No. 58, sec. 2 ).
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
Act No. 2886, which amends it, by virtue of which the People of the
GREGORIO SANTIAGO, defendant-appellant.
Philippine Island is made the plaintiff in this information, contains the
following provisions in section 1:
L. Porter Hamilton for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
SECTION 1. Section two of General Orders, Numbered Fifty-
eight, series of nineteen hundred, is hereby amended to read as
ROMUALDEZ, J.: follows:

Having caused the death of Porfirio Parondo, a boy 7 years old, by striking "SEC. 2. All prosecutions for public offenses shall be
him with automobile that he was driving, the herein appellant was in the name of the People of the Philippine Islands
prosecuted for the crime of homicide by reckless negligence and was against the persons charged with the offense."
sentenced to suffer one year and one day of prision correccional, and to pay
the costs of the trial.
Let us examine the question.

Not agreeable with that sentence he now comes to this court alleging that
For practical reasons, the procedure in criminal matters is not
the court below committed four errors, to wit:
incorporated in the Constitutions of the States, but is left in the hand of the
legislatures, so that it falls within the realm of public statutory law.
1. The trial court erred in not taking judicial notice of the fact
that the appellant was being prosecuted in conformity with Act
As has been said by Chief Justice Marshall:
No. 2886 of the Philippine Legislature and that the Act is
unconstitutional and gave no jurisdiction in this case.
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the
Subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the
2. The lower court erred in not dismissing the complaint after
means by which they may be carried into execution, would
the presentation of the evidence in the case, if not before, for the
partake of a prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be
reason that said Act No. 2886 is unconstitutional and the
embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be
proceedings had in the case under the provisions of the Act
understood by the public. (M'Culloch vs. Maryland [1819], 4
constitute a prosecution of appellant without due process of
Wheat., 316, 407; 4 L. ed., 579.)
law.

That is why, in pursuance of the Constitution of the United States, each

3. The court a quo erred in not finding that it lacked jurisdiction
States, each State has the authority, under its police power, to define and
over the person of the accused and over the subject- matter of
punish crimes and to lay down the rules of criminal procedure.
the complaint.

The states, as a part of their police power, have a large measure

4. The trial court erred in finding the appellant guilty of the
of discretion in creating and defining criminal offenses. . . .
crime charged and in sentencing him to one year and one day
of prison correccional and to the payment of costs.
A Statute relating to criminal procedure is void as a denial of the
equal protection of the laws if it prescribes a different procedure
With regard to the questions of fact, we have to say that we have examined
in the case of persons in like situation. Subject to this limitation,
the record and find that the conclusions of the trial judge, as contained in
however, the legislature has large measure of discretion in
his well-written decision, are sufficiently sustained by the evidence
prescribing the modes of criminal procedure. . . . (12 C.J., 1185,
submitted.
1186. See Collins vs. Johnston, 237 U.S., 502; 35 s. Ct. Rep. 649;
59 L. ed., 1071; Shevlin-Carpenter Co. vs. Minnesota, 218 U.S.,
The accused was driving an automobile at the rate of 30 miles an hour on 57; 30 S. Ct. Rep., 663; 54 L. ed., 930; Lynn vs. Flancders, 141 Ga.,
a highway 6 meter wide, notwithstanding the fact that he had to pass a 500; 81 S.E., 205.)
narrow space between a wagon standing on one side of the road and a heap
of stones on the other side where the were two young boys, the appellant
This power of the States of the North American Union was also granted to
did not take the precaution required by the circumstances by slowing his
its territories such as the Philippines:
machine, and did not proceed with the vigilant care that under the
circumstances an ordinary prudent man would take in order to avoid
possible accidents that might occur, as unfortunately did occur, as his The plenary legislative power which Congress possesses over
automobile ran over the boy Porfirio Parondo who was instantly killed as the territories and possessions of the United States may be
the result of the accident. exercised by that body itself, or, as is much more often the case,
it may be delegated to a local agency, such as a legislature, the
organization of which proceeds upon much the same lines as in
These facts are so well established in the records that there cannot be a
the several States or in Congress, which is often taken as a
shade of doubt about them.
model, and whose powers are limited by the Organic Act; but
within the scope of such act is has complete authority to
Coming now to the other assignments of error, it will be seen that they deal legislate, . . . and in general, to legislate upon all subjects within
with the fundamental questions as to whether or not Act No. 2886, under the police power of the territory. (38 Cyc., 205-207.)
which the complaint in the present case was filed, is valid and
constitutional.
 The powers of the territorial legislatures are derived from These amendments repeatedly made by the Philippine Commission as well
Congress. By act of Congress their power extends "to all rightful as by our present Legislature are perfectly within the scope of the powers
subjects of legislation not inconsistent with the Constitution and of the said legislative bodies as the successors of the Military Government
laws of the United States;" and this includes the power to define that promulgated General Orders No. 58.
and punish crimes. (16 C. J., 62.)
No proof is required to demonstrate that the present Legislature had, and
And in the exercise of such powers the military government of the army of had, the power to enact and amend laws. (U.S. vs. Bull. 15 Phil., 7.) That it
occupation, functioning as a territorial legislature, thought it convenient to has the power to legislate on criminal matters is very evident from the
establish new rules of procedure in criminal matters, by the issuance of wording of section 7 of the Jones Law which says:
General Orders No. 58, the preamble of which reads:
That the legislative authority herein provided shall have power,
In the interests of justice, and to safeguard the civil liberties of when not inconsistent with this Act, by due enactment to amend,
the inhabitants of these Islands, the criminal code of procedure alter, modify, or repeal any law, civil or criminal, continued in
now in force therein is hereby amended in certain of its important force by this Act as it may from time to time see fit.
provisions, as indicated in the following enumerated sections.
(Emphasis ours.)
It is urged the right to prosecute and punish crimes is an attributed of
sovereignty. This assertion is right; but it is also true that by reason of the
Its main purpose is, therefore, limited to criminal procedure and its principle of territoriality as applied in the supression, of crimes, such
intention is to give to its provisions the effect of law in criminal matters. power is delegated to subordinate government subdivisions such as
For that reason it provides in section 1 that: territories. As we have seen in the beginning, the territorial legislatures
have the power to define and punish crimes, a power also possessed by the
Philippine Legislature by virtue of the provisions of sections 7, already
The following provisions shall have the force and effect of law in
quoted, of the Jones Law. These territorial governments are local agencies
criminal matters in the Philippine Islands from and after the
of the Federal Government, wherein sovereignty resides; and when the
15th day of May, 1900, but existing laws on the same subjects
territorial government of the Philippines prosecutes and punishes public
shall remain valid except in so far as hereinafter modified or
crimes it does so by virtue of the authority delegated to it by the supreme
repealed expressly or by necessary implication.
power of the Nation.

From what has been said it clearly follows that the provisions of this
This delegation may be made either expressly as in the case of the several
General Order do not the nature of constitutional law either by reason of
States of the Union and incorporated territories like Porto Rico and Hawaii,
its character or by reason of the authority that enacted it into law.
or tacitly as is the case with the Philippines, which is an organized territory
though not incorporated with the Union. (Malcolm, Philippine
It cannot be said that it has acquired this character because this order was Constitutional Law, 181-205.)
made its own by the Congress of the United States for, as a mater of fact,
this body never adopted it as a law of its own creation either before the
This tacit delegation to our Government needs no demonstration. As a
promulgation of Act No. 2886, herein discussed, or, to our knowledge, to
matter of fact, the crimes committed within our territory, even before
this date.
section 2 of General Orders No. 58 was amended, were prosecuted and
punished in this jurisdiction as is done at present; but then as now the
Since the provisions of this General Order have the character of statutory repression of crimes was done, and is still done, under the sovereign
law, the power of the Legislature to amend it is self-evident, even if the authority of the United States, whose name appears as the heading in all
question is considered only on principle. Our present Legislature, which pleadings in criminal causes and in other judicial papers and notarial acts.
has enacted Act No. 2886, the subject of our inquiry, is the legal successor
to the Military Government as a legislative body.
The use of such a heading is prescribed for civil cases in form 1 of section
784 of the Code of Civil Procedure; in criminal causes the constant practice
Since the advent of the American sovereignty in the Philippines the followed in this jurisdiction established its use; and in notarial matters its
legislative branch of our government has undergone transformations and use is provided by section 127 of Act No. 496. This long continued practice
has developed itself until it attained its present form. Firstly, it was the in criminal matters and the legal provision relating to civil cases and
Military Government of the army of occupation which, in accordance with notarial acts have not been amended by any law, much less by Act No.
international law and practice, was vested with legislative functions and in 2886, the subject of the present inquiry.
fact did legislate; afterwards, complying with the instructions of President
McKinley which later were ratified by Congress (sec. 1 of the Act of July 1,
There is not a single constitutional provision applicable to the Philippines
1902) the legislative powers of the Military Government were transferred
prescribing the name to be used as party plaintiff in criminal cases.
to the Philippine Commission; then, under the provisions of section 7 of the
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, the Philippine Assembly was created and it
functioned as a colegislative body with the Philippine Commission. Finally, The fact that the political status of this country is as yet undetermined and
by virtue of the provisions of sections 12 of the Act of Congress of August in a transitory stage, is, in our opinion, responsible for the fact that there is
29, 1916, known as the Jones Law, the Philippine Commission gave way to no positive provision in our constitutional law regarding the use of the
the Philippine Senate, the Philippine Assembly became the House of name of the People of the Philippine Islands, as party plaintiff, in criminal
Representatives, and thus was formed the present Legislature composed prosecutions, as is otherwise the case in the respective constitutional
of two Houses which has enacted the aforesaid Act No. 2886. charters of the States of the Union and incorporated territories — a
situation which must not be understood as depriving the Government of
the Philippines of its power, however delegated, to prosecute public
As a matter of fact, Act No. 2886 is not the first law that amends General
crimes. The fact is undeniable that the present government of the
Orders No. 58. The Philippine Commission, at various times, had amended
Philippines, created by the Congress of the United States, is autonomous.
it by the enactment of laws among which we may cite Act No. 194,
regarding preliminary investigation, Act No. 440 relating to counsels de
oficio and Act No. 590 about preliminary investigations by justices of the This autonomy of the Government of the Philippines reaches all judicial
peace of provincial capitals. Later on, and before the enactment of Act No. actions, the case at bar being one of them; as an example of such autonomy,
2886, herein controverted, the Legislature had also amended this General this Government, the same as that of Hawaii and Porto Rico (People of
Orders No. 58 by the enactment of Act No. 2677 regarding appeals to the Porto Rico vs. Rosaly y Castillo [1913], 227 U.S., 270; 57 L. ed., 507; 33 Sup.
Supreme Court of causes originating in the justice of the peace courts and Ct. Rep., 352) cannot be sued without its consent. (Merritt vs. Government
by Act No. 2709 which deals with the exclusion of accused persons from of the Philippine Islands, 34 Phil., 311; L. S. Moon & Co. vs. Harrison, p.
the information in order to be utilized as state's witnesses. 27, ante.) The doctrine, laid down in these cases, acknowledges the
prerogative of personality in the Government of the Philippines, which, if
it is sufficient to shield it from any responsibility in court in its own name Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña and Villamor, JJ., concur.
unless it consents thereto, it should be also, as sufficiently authoritative in Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur in the result.
law, to give that government the right to prosecute in court in its own name
whomsoever violates within its territory the penal laws in force therein.

However, limiting ourselves to the question relative to the form of the

complaint in criminal matters, it is within the power of the Legislature to
prescribe the form of the criminal complaint as long as the constitutional
provision of the accused to be informed of the nature of the accusation is
not violated.

Under the Constitution of the United States and by like

provisions in the constitutions of the various states, the accused
is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him . . .

It is within the power of the legislatures under such a

constitutional provision to prescribe the form of the indictment
or information, and such form may omit averments regarded as
necessary at common law. (22 Cyc., 285.)

All these considerations a priori are strengthened a posteriori by the

important reason disclosed by the following fact — that the Congress has
tacitly approved Act No. 2886. Both the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
section 86, and the Jones Law, last paragraph of section 19, provide that all
the laws enacted by the Government of the Philippines or its Legislature
shall be forwarded to the Congress of the United States, which body
reserves the right and power to annul them. And presuming, as legally we
must, that the provisions of these laws have been complied with, it is
undisputed that the Congress of the United States did not annul any of
those acts already adverted to — Nos. 194, 440, 490 (of the Philippine
Commission), and 2677, 2709 and the one now in question No. 2886 (of
the present Legislature) — all of which were amendatory of General
Orders No. 58. The Act now under discussion (No. 2886) took effect on
February 24, 1920, and the criminal complaint in this case was filed on May
10, 1920. The silence of Congress regarding those laws amendatory of the
said General Order must be considered as an act of approval.

If Congress fails to notice or take action on any territorial

legislation the reasonable inference is that it approves such act.
(26 R.C.L., 679; vide Clinton vs. Englebrcht, 13 Wall., 434; 20 [L.
ed.] 659; Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S., 549; 33 S. Ct. Rep., 585; 57
[L. ed.], 960; Nixon vs. Reid, 8 S.d., 507; 67 N.W., 57; 32 L.R.A.,
315.)

Furthermore, supposing for the sake of argument, that the mention of the
People of the Philippine Islands as plaintiff in the title of the information
constitutes a vice or defect, the same is not fatal when, as in the present
case, it was not objected to in the court below.

An indictment must, in many states under express statutory or

constitutional provision, show by its title or by proper recitals
in the caption or elsewhere that the prosecution is in the name
and by the authority of the state, the commonwealth, or the
people of the state, according to the practice in the particular
jurisdictions; but omissions or defects in this respect may be
supplied or cured by other parts of the records, and the
omissions of such a recital or defects therein, even when
required by the constitution or by statute, is a defect of form
within a statute requiring exceptions for defect of form to be
made before trial. (23 Cyc., 237, 238.)

We hold that the provisions of sections 2 of General Orders No. 58, as

amended by Act No. 2886, do not partake of the same character as the
provisions of a constitution; that the said Act No. 2886 is valid and is not
violative of any constitutional provisions and that the court a quo did not
commit any of the errors assigned.

The sentence appealed from is hereby affirmed, the appellant being

furthermore sentenced to the accessory penalties prescribed in article 61
of the Penal Code, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
P1,000 and to the payment of the costs of both instances. So ordered.
Republic of the Philippines under the provisions of section 3 of Act No. 1697. The following is an
SUPREME COURT extract from the complaint:
Manila
That on or about November 6, 1915, in the municipality of
EN BANC Balanga, Bataan, P.I., and within the jurisdiction of this court, the
said accused, Andres Pablo, during the hearing in the justice of
the peace court of Balanga of the criminal cause No. 787, entitled
G.R. No. L-11676 October 17, 1916
the United States vs. Antonio Rodrigo and Maximo Malicsi, for
violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 5 of the municipality of
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, Balanga, did, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously affirm and
vs. swear in legal form before the justice of the peace court as
ANDRES PABLO, defendant-appellant. follow: `We did not there overtake the accused Antonio Rodrigo
and Maximo Malicsi, nor did we even see them run,' the said
statement being utterly false, as the accused well knew that it
Alfonso E. Mendoza for appellant.
was, and material to the decision of the said criminal cause No.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
787, United States vs. Antonio Rodrigo and Maximo Malicsi. An
act committed with violation of law.
TORRES, J.:
The case came to trial and on December 28, 1915, the court rendered
At about noon of the 21st of October, 1915, Andres Pablo, a policeman of judgment therein sentencing the defendant to the penalty of two years'
the municipality of Balanga, went by order of his chief to the barrio of Tuyo imprisonment, to pay a fine of P100 and, in case of insolvency, to the
to raid a jueteng game which, according to the information lodged, was corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay the costs. The
being conducted in that place; but before the said officer arrived there the defendant was also disqualified from thereafter holding any public office
players, perhaps advised of his approach by a spy, left and ran away; and from testifying in the courts of the Philippine Islands until the said
however, on his arrival at a vacant lot the defendant there found Francisco disqualification should be removed. From this judgment he appealed.
Dato and, at a short distance away, a low table. After a search of the
premises he also found thereon a tambiolo (receptacle) and
Francisco Dato, on testifying as a witness, said that when the policemen
37 bolas (balls). Notwithstanding that the officer had seen the men Maximo
Andres Pablo and Tomas de Leon arrived at the place where
Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo leave the said lot, yet, as at first he had seen
the jueteng was being played, they found the defendant gamblers, Malicsi
no material proof that the game was being played, he refrained from
and Rodrigo; that, prior to the hearing of the case in the justice of the peace
arresting them, and on leaving the place only arrested Francisco Daro, who
court, Malicsi and Rodrigo ordered him to call Andres Pablo, who, together
had remained there.
with witness, went to the house of Valentin Sioson, where they held a
conference; that witness pleaded guilty in the justice of the peace court, in
In reporting to his chief what had occurred, the policeman presented a fulfillment of his part of an agreement made between himself and his two
memorandum containing the following statement: "In the barrio of Tuyo I coaccused, Malicsi and Rodrigo, who promised him that they would
raided a jueteng na bilat game, seized a tambiolo and bolas, and saw support his family during the time he might be a prisoner in jail; that
the cabecillas Maximo MAlicsi and Antonio Rodrigo and the gambler Andres Pablo did not know that they were gamblers, because he did not
Francisco Dato. I saw the two cabecillas escape." find them in the place where the game was in progress, but that when
witness was being taken to the municipal building by the policemen he told
them who the gamblers were who had run away and whom Andres Pablo
In consequence, chief of police Jose D. Reyes, on October 22, 1915, filed a
could have seen.
complaint in the court of justice of the peace charging the said Rodrigo,
Malicsi, and Dato with having gambled at jueteng, in violation of municipal
ordinance No. 5. As a result of this complaint the accused were arrested, Maximo Malicsi corroborated the foregoing testimony and further stated
but were afterwards admitted to bail. that, on the arrival of the policemen who made the arrest and while they
were looking for the tambiolo, he succeeded in escaping; that Andres Pablo
had known him for a long time and could have arrested him had he wished
At the hearing of the case Francisco Dato pleaded guilty. The other two
to do so; that prior to the hearing he and his codefendants, ROdrigo and
accused, Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo, pleaded not guilty;
Dato, did in fact meet in the house of Valentin Sioson, on which occasion
therefore, during the trial the chief of police presented the memorandum
they agreed that they would give the policemen Andres Pablo P20,
exhibited by the policeman Andres Pablo, who testified under oath that on
provided witness and Rodrigo were excluded from the charge; and that
the date mentioned he and Tomas de Leon went to the said barrio to raid
only P15 was delivered to the said Pablo, through Gregorio Ganzon. This
a jueteng game, but that before they arrived there they saw from afar that
statement was corroborated by the latter, though he said nothing about
some persons started to run toward the hills; that when witness and his
what amount of money he delivered to the policeman Pablo.
companion arrived at a vacant lot they saw Francisco Dato and a low table
there, and the table caused them to suspect that a jueteng game was being
carried on; that in fact they did find on one side of the lot a tambiolo and The defendant Andres Pablo testified under oath that, on his being asked
37 bolas, but that they did not see the accused Rodrigo and Malicsi on the by the justice of the peace how he could have seen Maximo Malicsi and
said lot, nor did they see them run; and that only afterwards did the Antonio Rodrigo, he replied that he did not see them at the place where the
witness learn that these latter were the cabecillas or ringleaders in game was being conducted nor did he see them run away from there, for
the jueteng game, from information given him by an unknown person. In he only found the table, the tambiolo, the bolas, and Francisco Dato; that he
view of this testimony by the police officer who made the arrest and of the did not surprise the game because the players ran away before he arrived
other evidence adduced at the trial the court acquitted the defendants on the lot where, after fifteen minutes' search, he found only
Antonio Rodrigo and Maximo Malicsi and sentenced only Francisco Dato, the tambiolo and the bolas; that on arriving at the place where the game
as a gambler. was played, they found only Francisco Dato and some women in the Street,
and as Dato had already gone away, witness' companion, the policeman
Tomas de Leon, got on his bicycle and went after him; and that he found
Before the case came to trial in the justice of the peace court the policeman
the tambiolo at a distance of about 6 meters from a low table standing on
Andres Pablo had an interview and conference with the accused Malicsi
the lot.
and ROdrigo in the house of Valentin Sioson. On this occasion he was
instructed not to testify against Malicsi and Rodrigo, and in fact received
through Gregorio Ganzon the sum of P5. From the facts above related, it is concluded that the defendant Andres
Pablo, who pleaded not guilty, falsely testified under oath in the justice of
the peace court of Balanga, Bataan, in saying he had not seen the alleged
By reason of the foregoing and after making a preliminary investigation the
gamblers Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo in the place where,
provincial fiscal, on December 1, 1915, filed an information in the Court of
according to the complaint filed, the game of jueteng was being played and
First Instance of Bataan charging Andres Pablo with the crime of perjury,
where the defendant and his companion, the policeman Tomas de Leon, There certainly are laws which deal with perjury or false testimony, like
had found a table, tambiolo and bolas, used in the game of jueteng, while it Law 7 et seq. of Title 2, third Partida.
was proved at the trial that he did not them and did overtake them while
they were still in the place where the game was being played. But
However, since the Penal Code went into force, the crime of false testimony
notwithstanding his having seen them there, upon testifying in the cause
has been punished under the said articles of the said Code, which as we
prosecuted against these men and another for gambling, he stated that he
have already said, have not been specifically repealed by the said Act No.
had not seen them there, knowing that he was not telling the truth and was
1697, but since its enactment, have not been applied, by the mere
false to the oath he had taken, and he did so willfully and deliberately on
interpretation given to them by this court in its decisions; yet, from the
account of his agreement with the men, Malicsi and Rodrigo, and in
moment that Act was repealed by the Administrative Code, the needs of
consideration of a bribe of P15 which he had received in payment for his
society have made it necessary that the said articles 318 to 324 should be
false testimony he afterwards gave.
deemed to be in force, inasmuch as the Administrative Code, in repealing
the said Act relating to perjury, has not explicitly provided that the said
Francisco Dato and Gregorio Ganzon corroborated the assertion that the articles of the Penal Code have likewise been repealed.
policeman Andres Pablo undertook to exclude the gamblers, Malicsi and
Rodrigo, from the charge and from his testimony in consideration for P15
This manner of understanding and construing the statutes applicable to
which he received through Gregorio Ganzon.
the crime of false testimony or perjury is in harmony with the provision of
Law 11, Title 2, Book 3, of the Novisima Recopilacion which says::
Andres Pablo was charged with the crime of perjury and was afterwards
convicted under Act No. 1697, which (according to the principle laid down
All the laws of the kingdom, not expressly repealed by other
by this court in various decisions that are already well-settled rules of law)
subsequent laws, must be literally obeyed and the excuse that
repealed the provisions contained in articles 318 to 324 of the Penal Code
they are not in use cannot avail; for the Catholic kings and their
relative to false testimony.
successors so ordered in numerous laws, and so also have I
ordered on different occasions, and even though they were
By the second paragraph of the final section of the last article of the repealed, it is seen that they have been revived by the decree
Administrative Code, or Act No. 2657, there was repealed, among the other which I issued in conformity with them although they were not
statutes therein mentioned, the said Act No. 1697 relating to perjury, and expressly designated. The council will be informed thereof and
the repealing clause of the said Administrative Code does not say under will take account of the importance of the matter.
what other penal law in force the crime of false testimony, at least, if not
that of perjury, shall be punished.
It is, then, assumed that the said articles of the Penal Code are in force and
are properly applicable to crimes of false testimony. Therefore, in
Under these circumstances, may the crime of perjury or of false testimony consideration of the fact that in the case at bar the evidence shows it to
go unpunished, and is there no penal sanction whatever in this country for have been duly proven that the defendant, Andres Pablo, in testifying in the
this crime? May the truth be freely perverted in testimony given under cause prosecuted for gambling at jueteng, perverted the truth, for the
oath and which, for the very reason that it may save a guilty person from purpose of favoring the alleged gamblers, Maximo Malicsi and Antonio
punishment, may also result in the conviction and punishment of an Rodrigo, with the aggravating circumstance of the crime being committed
innocent person? If all this is not possible and is not right before the law through bribery, for it was also proved that the defendant Pablo received
and good morals in a society of even mediocre culture, it must be P15 in order that he should make no mention of the said two gamblers in
acknowledged that it is imperatively necessary to punish the crime of his sworn testimony, whereby he knowingly perverted the truth, we hold
perjury or of false testimony — a crime which can produce incalculable that, in the commission of the crime of false testimony, there concurred the
and far-reaching harm to society and cause infinite disturbance of social aggravating circumstance of price or reward, No. 3 of article 10 of the Code,
order. with no mitigating circumstance to offset the effects of the said aggravating
one; wherefore the defendant has incurred the maximum period of the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum degree to prision correccional in
The right of prosecution and punishment for a crime is one of the attributes
its medium degree, and a fine.
that by a natural law belongs to the sovereign power instinctively charged
by the common will of the members of society to look after, guard and
defend the interests of the community, the individual and social rights and For the foregoing reasons, we hereby reverse the judgment appealed from
the liberties of every citizen and the guaranty of the exercise of his rights. and sentence Andres Pablo to the penalty of two years four months and
one day of prision correccional, to pay a fine of 1,000 pesetas, and, in case
of insolvency, to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, which
The power to punish evildoers has never been attacked or challenged, as
shall not exceed one-third of the principal penalty. He shall also pay the
the necessity for its existence has been recognized even by the most
costs of both instances. So ordered.
backward peoples. At times the criticism has been made that certain
penalties are cruel, barbarous, and atrocious; at other, that they are light
and inadequate to the nature and gravity of the offense, but the imposition Johnson, Carson, Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur.
of punishment is admitted to be just by the whole human race, and even Moreland, J., concurs in the result .
barbarians and savages themselves, who are ignorant of all civilization, are
no exception.lawphil.net

Notwithstanding that the said Act No. 1697 (which, as interpreted by this
court in its decisions, was deemed to have repealed the aforementioned
article of the Penal Code relating to false testimony, comprised within the
term of perjury) did not expressly repeal the said articles of the Penal Code;
and as the said final article of the Administrative Code, in totally repealing
Act No. 1697, does not explicitly provide that the mentioned articles of the
Penal Code are also repealed, the will of the legislation not being expressly
and clearly stated with respect to the complete or partial repeal of the said
articles of the Penal Code, in the manner that it has totally repealed the said
Act No. 1697 relating its perjury; and, furthermore, as it is imperative that
society punish those of its members who are guilty of perjury or false
testimony, and it cannot be conceived that these crimes should go
unpunished or be freely committed without punishment of any kind, it
must be conceded that there must be in this country some prior,
preexistent law that punishes perjury or false testimony.
EN BANC NASSCO sold, transferred and conveyed to the
BASECO its ownership and all its titles and interests
over all equipment and facilities including structures,
G.R. No. 152259 July 29, 2004
buildings, shops, quarters, houses, plants and
expendable and semi-expendable assets, located at
ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner, the Engineer Island known as the Engineer Island
vs. Shops including some of its equipment and
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division) and the PEOPLE machineries from Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte
of the PHILIPPINES, respondents. needed by BASECO in its shipbuilding and ship repair
program for the amount of P5,000,000.00.
DECISION
'Contrary to law.'
PANGANIBAN, J.:
"On December 27, 1996, the accused filed his first 'MOTION TO
DISMISS AND TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT' claiming that no valid
Repetitive motions to invalidate or summarily terminate a criminal
preliminary investigation was conducted in the instant case. He
indictment prior to plea and trial, however they may be named or
asserts that if a preliminary investigation could be said to have
identified -- whether as a motion to quash or motion to dismiss or by any
been conducted, the same was null and void having been
other nomenclature -- delay the administration of justice and unduly
undertaken by a biased and partial investigative body.
burden the court system. Grounds not included in the first of such
repetitive motions are generally deemed waived and can no longer be used
as bases of similar motions subsequently filed. "On January 9, 1997, [the Sandiganbayan], through the First
Division, issued an order giving the accused fifteen days to file a
Motion for Reinvestigation with the Office of the Special
Section 5 of the Anti-Graft Law is constitutional. It penalizes certain
Prosecutor.
presidential relatives who "intervene, directly or indirectly, in any
business, transaction, contract or application with the Government." This
provision is not vague or "impermissibly broad," because it can easily be "[Petitioner] questioned said order before the Supreme Court
understood with the use of simple statutory construction. Neither may the via a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for
constitutionality of a criminal statute such as this be challenged on the temporary restraining order. On January 21, 1998, the Supreme
basis of the "overbreadth" and the "void-for-vagueness" doctrines, which Court dismissed the petition for failure to show that [the
apply only to free-speech cases. Sandiganbayan] committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the assailed order.
The Case
"On November 9, 1998, the [petitioner] filed with the Office of
the Special Prosecutor a Motion to Quash.
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari1 under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to set aside the November 20, 20012 and the March 1,
20023 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 13736. The "On September 22, 1999, x x x Special Prosecution Officer (SPO)
first Resolution disposed thus: III Victorio U. Tabanguil, manifested that the prosecution had
already concluded the reinvestigation of the case. He
recommended the dismissal of the instant case. Both the Deputy
"WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby
Special Prosecutor and the Special Prosecutor approved the
DENIED. The arraignment of the accused and the pre-trial of the
recommendation. However, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto
case shall proceed as scheduled."4
disagreed and directed the prosecutors to let the [petitioner]
present his evidence in Court.
The second Resolution denied reconsideration.
"Subsequently, [petitioner] filed on October 8, 1999 his second
The Facts 'MOTION TO QUASH AND TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT'.

The facts of the case are narrated by the Sandiganbayan as follows: "On February 9, 2000, the [Sandiganbayan] denied the motion
for lack of merit.
"[The People of the Philippines], through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed on July 12, 1989 "On June 19, 2001, [the] accused filed a 'MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
an information before [the anti-graft court] charging the FILE MOTION TO DISMISS'. On June 29, 2001, the
accused [with] violation of Section 5, Republic Act No. 3019, 5 as [Sandiganbayan] admitted the motion and admitted the
amended. The Information reads: attached (third) Motion to Dismiss.

'That on or about and during the period from July 16, "The [Motion to Dismiss] raise[d] the following grounds:
1975 to July 29, 1975, in Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of [the Sandiganbayan],
'I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
said [petitioner], brother-in-law of Ferdinand E.
OF LAW OF [PETITIONER] WAS VIOLATED DURING
Marcos, former President of the Philippines, and
THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION STAGE IN THE
therefore, related to the latter by affinity within the
FOLLOWING WAYS:
third civil degree, did then and there wil[l]fully and
unlawfully, and with evident bad faith, for the
purpose of promoting his self-interested [sic] and/or 'A. NO VALID PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION WAS
that of others, intervene directly or indirectly, in a CONDUCTED IN THE INSTANT CASE; AND
contract between the National Shipyard and Steel
Corporation (NASSCO), a government-owned and
'B. THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION WAS
controlled corporation and the Bataan Shipyard and
CONDUCTED BY A BIASED AND PARTIAL
Engineering Company (BASECO), a private
INVESTIGATOR
corporation, the majority stocks of which is owned by
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, whereby the
 'II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF [PETITIONER] [ii] The preliminary investigation was
TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF conducted by a biased and partial
THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM WAS VIOLATED investigator.

'III. PURSUANT TO ARTICLE VII, SECTION 17 OF THE E. The criminal action or liability has been
1973 CONSTITUTION, [PETITIONER] IS IMMUNE extinguished by prescription; and
FROM CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
F. Pursuant to Article VII, Section 17 of the 1973
'IV. THE CRIMINAL ACTION OR LIABILITY HAS BEEN Constitution, petitioner x x x is immune from criminal
EXTINGUISHED BY PRESCRIPTION'"6 prosecution.

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan And

The Sandiganbayan explained that all the grounds invoked by petitioner, II. In light of the foregoing, in denying petitioner['s] x x x right to
except the third one, had already been raised by him and passed upon in equal protection of the laws."12
its previous Resolutions.7 In resolving the third ground, the anti-graft court
pointed out that Section 17 of the 1973 Constitution became effective only
Simply stated, the issues are as follows: (1) whether Section 5 of Republic
in 1981 when the basic law was amended. Since his alleged illegal
Act 3019 is unconstitutional; (2) whether the Information is vague; (3)
intervention had been committed on or about 1975, the amended
whether there was a valid preliminary investigation; (4) whether the
provision was inapplicable to him.8
criminal action or liability has been extinguished by prescription; and (5)
whether petitioner is immune from criminal prosecution under then
In denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner, the Section 17 of Article VII of the 1973 Constitution.
Sandiganbayan passed upon the other grounds he had raised. It ruled that
his right to a preliminary investigation was not violated, because he had
The Court's Ruling
been granted a reinvestigation.9 It further held that his right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation was not trampled upon, either,
inasmuch as the Information had set forth the essential elements of the The Petition has no merit.
offense charged.10
First Issue:
Hence, this Petition.11 Constitutionality of Section 5,
Republic Act 3019
The Issues
Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Section 5 of RA 3019 for the
first time in the Sandiganbayan through a Supplemental Motion to Dismiss.
In his Memorandum, petitioner assigns the following errors for our
Attached to his December 7, 2001 Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
consideration:
denying his Motion to Dismiss was this Supplemental Motion which was,
in effect, his third motion to quash.13 We note that the Petition for
"Whether or not the Honorable Sandiganbayan erred and Certiorari before us challenges the denial of his original, not his
gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of, or in excess Supplemental, Motion to Dismiss.
of jurisdiction –
Upon the denial of his original Motion to Quash on February 9, 2000,
I. In not dismissing and/or quashing Criminal Case No. 13736 petitioner could have filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial. Had
despite clear and incontrovertible evidence that: reconsideration been turned down, the next proper remedy would have
been either (1) a petition for certiorari 14 -- if there was grave abuse of
discretion -- which should be filed within 60 days from notice of the
A. Section 5 of Republic Act No. 3019 is
assailed order;15 or (2) to proceed to trial without prejudice to his right, if
unconstitutional because its vagueness violates the
final judgment is rendered against him, to raise the same questions before
due process right of an individual to be informed of
the proper appellate court.16 But instead of availing himself of these
the nature and the cause of the accusation against
remedies, he filed a "Motion to Dismiss" on June 19, 2001.
him;

Impropriety of
B. Section 5 of Republic Act No. 3019 is
Repetitive Motions
unconstitutional because it violates the due process
right of an individual to be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved; There is no substantial distinction between a "motion to quash" and a
"motion to dismiss." Both pray for an identical relief, which is the dismissal
of the case. Such motions are employed to raise preliminary objections, so
C. The constitutional right of petitioner x x x to be
as to avoid the necessity of proceeding to trial. A motion to quash is
informed of the nature and the cause of the
generally used in criminal proceedings to annul a defective indictment. A
accusation against him was violated;
motion to dismiss, the nomenclature ordinarily used in civil proceedings,
is aimed at summarily defeating a complaint. Thus, our Rules of Court use
D. The constitutional right to due process of law of the term "motion to quash" in criminal,17 and "motion to dismiss" in civil,
petitioner x x x was violated during the preliminary proceedings.18
investigation stage in the following ways:
In the present case, however, both the "Motion to Quash" and the "Motion
[i] No valid preliminary investigation was to Dismiss" are anchored on basically the same grounds and pray for the
con-ducted for Criminal Case No. 13736; same relief. The hairsplitting distinction posited by petitioner does not
and really make a difference.

By filing a Motion to Dismiss, petitioner submitted in effect a prohibited

second motion to quash. A party is not permitted to raise issues, whether
similar or different, by installment. The Rules abhor repetitive motions. Comelec26 held that a portion of RA 6735 was unconstitutional
Otherwise, there would be no end to preliminary objections, and trial because of undue delegation of legislative powers, not because
would never commence. A second motion to quash delays the of vagueness.
administration of justice and unduly burdens the courts. Moreover, Rule
117 provides that grounds not raised in the first motion to quash are
Indeed, an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes would result in a
generally deemed waived.19 Petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss" violates this
mass acquittal of parties whose cases may not have even reached the
rule.
courts. Such invalidation would constitute a departure from the usual
requirement of "actual case and controversy" and permit decisions to be
Constitutionality of made in a sterile abstract context having no factual concreteness.
the Challenged Provision In Younger v. Harris, this evil was aptly pointed out by the U.S. Supreme
Court in these words:27
If only for the foregoing procedural lapses, the Petition deserves to be
dismissed outright. However, given the importance of this case in "[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its
curtailing graft and corruption, the Court will nevertheless address the deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies
other issues on their merit. Petitioner challenges the validity of Section 5 before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an
of Republic Act 3019, a penal statute, on the ground that the act appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the
constituting the offense is allegedly vague and "impermissibly broad." relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the
legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the
speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line
It is best to stress at the outset that the overbreadth20 and the
analysis of detailed statutes, x x x ordinarily results in a kind of
vagueness21 doctrines have special application only to free-speech cases.
case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional
They are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes. Mr.
questions, whichever way they might be decided."
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza explained the reason as follows:

For this reason, generally disfavored is an on-its-face invalidation of

"A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and
statutes, described as a "manifestly strong medicine" to be employed
to one which is overbroad because of possible 'chilling effect'
"sparingly and only as a last resort." In determining the constitutionality of
upon protected speech. The theory is that '[w]hen statutes
a statute, therefore, its provisions that have allegedly been violated must
regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent
be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant has been
construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the
charged.28
statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all
society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to
justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no As conduct -- not speech -- is its object, the challenged provision must be
requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate examined only "as applied" to the defendant, herein petitioner, and should
that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn not be declared unconstitutional for overbreadth or vagueness.
with narrow specificity.' The possible harm to society in
permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is
The questioned provision reads as follows:
outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of
others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester
because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. "Section 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. — It shall be
unlawful for the spouse or for any relative, by consanguinity or
affinity, within the third civil degree, of the President of the
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes
Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, the President
have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very
of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to
existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone,
intervene, directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction,
the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against
contract or application with the Government: Provided, That
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law
this section shall not apply to any person who, prior to the
cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
assumption of office of any of the above officials to whom he is
related, has been already dealing with the Government along the
xxxxxxxxx same line of business, nor to any transaction, contract or
application already existing or pending at the time of such
assumption of public office, nor to any application filed by him
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and
the approval of which is not discretionary on the part of the
vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their
official or officials concerned but depends upon compliance
faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in
with requisites provided by law, or rules or regulations issued
American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to
pursuant to law, nor to any act lawfully performed in an official
do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With
capacity or in the exercise of a profession."
respect to such statute, the established rule is that 'one to whom
application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to
attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be Petitioner also claims that the phrase "to intervene directly or indirectly,
taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which in any business, transaction, contract or application with the Government"
its application might be unconstitutional.' As has been pointed is vague and violates his right to be informed of the cause and nature of the
out, 'vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like accusation against him.29 He further complains that the provision does not
overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, specify what acts are punishable under the term intervene, and thus
while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically transgresses his right to be presumed innocent.30 We disagree.
are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular
defendant.'"22(underscoring supplied)
Every statute is presumed valid.31 On the party challenging its validity
weighs heavily the onerous task of rebutting this presumption.32 Any
"To this date, the Court has not declared any penal law reasonable doubt about the validity of the law should be resolved in favor
unconstitutional on the ground of ambiguity."23 While of its constitutionality.33 To doubt is to sustain, as tersely put by Justice
mentioned in passing in some cases, the void-for-vagueness George Malcolm. In Garcia v. Executive Secretary,34 the rationale for the
concept has yet to find direct application in our jurisdiction. presumption of constitutionality was explained by this Court thus:
In Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad,24 the Bookkeeping Act was found
unconstitutional because it violated the equal protection clause,
"The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional
not because it was vague. Adiong v. Comelec25 decreed as void a
questions and to presume that the acts of the political
mere Comelec Resolution, not a statute. Finally, Santiago v.
departments are valid in the absence of a clear and
 unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. Applicability of
This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of Statutory Construction
powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming
respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that
As to petitioner's claim that the term intervene is vague, this Court agrees
as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines,
with the Office of the Solicitor General that the word can easily be
a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in
understood through simple statutory construction. The absence of a
accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally
statutory definition of a term used in a statute will not render the law "void
enacted."35
for vagueness," if the meaning can be determined through the judicial
function of construction.43 Elementary is the principle that words should
In the instant case, petitioner has miserably failed to overcome such be construed in their ordinary and usual meaning.
presumption. This Court has previously laid down the test for determining
whether a statute is vague, as follows:
"x x x. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely
because general terms are used therein, or because of the
"x x x [A] statute establishing a criminal offense must define the employment of terms without defining them;44 much less do we
offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive
intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to
statute. It can only be invoked against that species of legislation define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not
that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to
clarified either by a saving clause or by construction. so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily
result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the
legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the
"A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
whole act x x x.
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its
application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the "x x x [I]t is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that
Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process for words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, ordinary acceptation and signification,45 unless it is evident that
fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes those words.46 The intention of the lawmakers - who are,
an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.36 But the ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use
doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed."47
couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a
standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are
The term intervene should therefore be understood in its ordinary
apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of
acceptation, which is to "to come between."48Criminally liable is anyone
activities. The first may be 'saved' by proper construction, while
covered in the enumeration of Section 5 of RA 3019 -- any person who
no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever
intervenes in any manner in any business, transaction, contract or
directed against such activities.37 With more reason, the
application with the government. As we have explained, it is impossible for
doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear
the law to provide in advance details of how such acts of intervention could
and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
be performed. But the courts may pass upon those details once trial is
concluded. Thus, the alleged vagueness of intervene is not a ground to
"The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for quash the information prior to the commencement of the trial.
uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently
definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured
In sum, the Court holds that the challenged provision is not vague, and that
by common understanding and practice.38 It must be stressed,
in any event, the "overbreath" and "void for vagueness" doctrines are not
however, that the 'vagueness' doctrine merely requires a
applicable to this case.
reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not
absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner
seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, Second Issue:
is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are Allegedly Vague Information
clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because
it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in
Other than arguing on the alleged intrinsic vagueness of intervene,
its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act,
petitioner further contends that the Information itself is also
it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in
unconstitutionally vague, because it does not specify the acts of
all other statutes."39
intervention that he supposedly performed.49 Again, we disagree.

A simpler test was decreed in Dans v. People,40 in which the Court said that
When allegations in the information are vague or indefinite, the remedy of
there was nothing vague about a penal law that adequately answered the
the accused is not a motion to quash, but a motion for a bill of
basic query "What is the violation?"41 Anything beyond -- the hows and the
particulars.50 The pertinent provision in the Rules of Court is Section 9 of
whys -- are evidentiary matters that the law itself cannot possibly disclose,
Rule 116, which we quote:
in view of the uniqueness of every case.42

"Section 9. Bill of particulars. -- The accused may, before

The question "What is the violation?" is sufficiently answered by Section 5
arraignment, move for a bill of particulars to enable him
of RA 3019, as follows:
properly to plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall specify
the alleged defects of the complaint or information and the
1. The offender is a spouse or any relative by consanguinity or details desired."
affinity within the third civil degree of the President of the
Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, the President
The rule merely requires the information to describe the offense with
of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives;
sufficient particularity as to apprise the accused of what they are being
and
charged with and to enable the court to pronounce judgment. 51 The
particularity must be such that persons of ordinary intelligence may
2. The offender intervened directly or indirectly in any business, immediately know what is meant by the information.52
transaction, contract or application with the government.
While it is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged "Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
in the information,53 matters of evidence -- as distinguished from the facts commission of the violation of the law, and if the same not be
essential to the nature of the offense -- need not be averred.54 Whatever known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
facts and circumstances must necessarily be alleged are to be determined institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
by reference to the definition and the essential elements of the specific punishment.
crimes.55
"The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are
In the instant case, a cursory reading of the Information shows that the instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again
elements of a violation of Section 5 of RA 3019 have been stated if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
sufficiently. Likewise, the allegations describe the offense committed by jeopardy."
petitioner with such particularity as to enable him to prepare an intelligent
defense. Details of the acts he committed are evidentiary matters that need
Consistent with the provision quoted above, this Court has previously
not be alleged in the Information.
reckoned the prescriptive period of cases involving RA 3019 (committed
prior to the February 1986 EDSA Revolution) from the discovery of the
Third Issue: violation.66 In Republic v. Desierto, the Court explained:
Preliminary Investigation
"This issue confronted this Court anew, albeit in a larger scale,
Clearly, petitioner already brought the issue of lack of preliminary in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans
investigation when he questioned before this Court in GR No. 128317 the v. Desierto. In the said recent case, the Board of Directors of the
Sandiganbayan's Order giving him 15 days to file a Motion for Philippine Seeds, Inc. and Development Bank of the Philippines
Reinvestigation with the Office of the Special were charged with violation of paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section
Prosecutor.56 Citing Cojuangco v. Presidential Commission on Good 3 of RA No. 3019, by the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Government,57 he undauntedly averred that he was deprived of his right to Committee on Behest Loans, created by then President Fidel V.
a preliminary investigation, because the PCGG acted both as complainant Ramos to investigate and to recover the so-called 'Behest
and as investigator.58 Loans', where the Philippine Government guaranteed several
foreign loans to corporations and entities connected with the
former President Marcos. x x x In holding that the case had not
In the case cited above, this Court declared that while PCGG had the power
yet prescribed, this Court ruled that:
to conduct a preliminary investigation, the latter could not do so with the
"cold neutrality of an impartial judge" in cases in which it was the agency
that had gathered evidence and subsequently filed the complaint. 59 On that 'In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for
basis, this Court nullified the preliminary investigation conducted by PCGG the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the
and directed the transmittal of the records to the Ombudsman for violations of RA No. 3019 at the time the questioned
appropriate action. transactions were made because, as alleged, the
public officials concerned connived or conspired with
the 'beneficiaries of the loans.' Thus, we agree with
It is readily apparent that Cojuangco does not support the quashal of the
the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for the
Information against herein petitioner. True, the PCGG initiated the present
offenses with which the respondents in OMB-0-96-
Complaint against him; hence, it could not properly conduct the
0968 were charged should be computed from the
preliminary investigation. However, he was accorded his rights -- the
discovery of the commission thereof and not from the
Sandiganbayan suspended the trial and afforded him a reinvestigation by
day of such commission.
the Ombudsman. The procedure outlined in Cojuangco was thus followed.

xxx xxx xxx

The Sandiganbayan's actions are in accord also with Raro v.
Sandiganbayan,60 which held that the failure to conduct a valid preliminary
investigation would not warrant the quashal of an information. If the 'People v. Duque is more in point, and what was
information has already been filed, the proper procedure is for the stated there stands reiteration: In the nature of
Sandiganbayan to hold the trial in abeyance while the preliminary things, acts made criminal by special laws are
investigation is being conducted or completed.61 frequently not immoral or obviously criminal in
themselves; for this reason, the applicable statute
requires that if the violation of the special law is not
Fourth Issue:
known at the time, the prescription begins to run only
Prescription
from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the
unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts.' (Italics
The issue of prescription was the principal basis of the Motion to Quash supplied)
filed by petitioner with the Sandiganbayan on October 8, 1999.62 Such issue
should be disregarded at this stage, since he failed to challenge its ruling
"There are striking parallelisms between the said Behest Loans
debunking his Motion within the 60-day period for the filing of a petition
Case and the present one which lead us to apply the ruling of the
for certiorari. A party may not circumvent this rule by filing a subsequent
former to the latter. First, both cases arose out of seemingly
motion that raises the same issue and the same arguments.
innocent business transactions; second, both were 'discovered'
only after the government created bodies to investigate these
Furthermore, it is easy to see why this argument being raised by petitioner anomalous transactions; third, both involve prosecutions for
is utterly unmeritorious. He points out that according to the Information, violations of RA No. 3019; and, fourth, in both cases, it was
the offense was committed "during the period from July 16, 1975 to July sufficiently raised in the pleadings that the respondents
29, 1975." He argues that when the Information was filed on July 12, conspired and connived with one another in order to keep the
1989,63 prescription had already set in, because the prescriptive period for alleged violations hidden from public scrutiny.
a violation of Republic Act No. 3019 is only ten (10) years from the time
the offense was allegedly committed. The increase of this prescriptive
"This Court's pronouncement in the case of Domingo v.
period to fifteen (15) years took effect only on March 16, 1982, upon the
Sandiganbayan is quite relevant and instructive as to the date
enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195.64
when the discovery of the offense should be reckoned, thus:

Act No. 3326, as amended,65 governs the prescription of offenses penalized

'In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for
by special laws. Its pertinent provision reads:
the government, the aggrieved party, to have known
the violations committed at the time the questioned
 transactions were made because both parties to the SO ORDERED.
transactions were allegedly in conspiracy to
perpetuate fraud against the government. The
Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales,
alleged anomalous transactions could only have been
Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
discovered after the February 1986 Revolution when
Puno, Ynares-Santiago, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., in the result.
one of the original respondents, then President
Corona, J., on leave.
Ferdinand Marcos, was ousted from office. Prior to
Tinga, J., in the result. Please see separate opinion.
said date, no person would have dared to question
Chico-Nazario, J., no part. Ponente of assailed SB Resolutions.
the legality or propriety of those transactions.
Hence, the counting of the prescriptive period would
commence from the date of discovery of the offense, x-------------------------------------------------------------------x
which could have been between February 1986 after
the EDSA Revolution and 26 May 1987 when the
initiatory complaint was filed.'"67

The above pronouncement is squarely applicable to the present case. The

SEPARATE OPINION
general rule that prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the crime cannot apply to the present case. It is not legally
prudent to charge the State, the aggrieved party, with knowledge of the
violation of RA 3019 at the time the alleged intervention was made. The
accused is the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos' brother-in-law. He was
charged with intervening in a sale involving a private corporation, the
TINGA, J.:
majority stocks of which was allegedly owned by President Marcos.

I concur in the result of the ponencia and the proposition that Section 5 of
Prior to February 1986, no person was expected to have seriously dared
the Anti-Plunder Law is constitutional. The validity of the provision has
question the legality of the sale or would even have thought of
been passed upon by the Court before in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.1 I also
investigating petitioner's alleged involvement in the transaction. It was
agree with the ponencia's reiteration of the ruling in Estrada that Section 5
only after the creation68of PCGG69 and its exhaustive investigations that the
is receptive to the basic principle in statutory construction that words
alleged crime was discovered. This led to the initiation on November 29,
should be construed in their ordinary and usual meaning. 2
1988 of a Complaint against former President Marcos and petitioner for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Consequently, the
filing of the Information on July 12, 1989 was well within the prescriptive However, with all due respect, I raise serious objections to
period of ten years from the discovery of the offense. the ponencia's holding that the so-called "void for vagueness" doctrine has
special application only to free speech cases,3 and the undeclared
proposition that penal
Fifth Issue
Immunity from Prosecution
laws may not be stricken down on the ground of ambiguity. 4 I am aware
that the assertions rely upon the separate opinions of the
Petitioner argues that he enjoys derivative immunity, because he allegedly
herein ponente5 and Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza6 in Estrada. I am also
served as a high-ranking naval officer -- specifically, as naval aide-de-camp
aware that the critical portion of Mr. Justice Mendoza's separate opinion
-- of former President Marcos.70 He relies on Section 17 of Article VII of the
in Estrada was cited with approval by Mr. Justice
1973 Constitution, as amended, which we quote:
Bellosillo's ponencia therein.7

"The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure.

The incontrovertible reality though is that the majority's pronouncement
Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for official acts done by
in Estrada that penal statutes cannot be challenged on vagueness grounds
him or by others pursuant to his specific orders during his
did not form part of the ratio decidendi. The ratio, in the words of Justice
tenure.
Bellosillo, was: "as it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable
standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused
"x x x xxx x x x" to determine the nature of his violation,"8 and thus the law does not suffer
from unconstitutionality. The discussion on the vagueness aspect was not
decisive of the main issue and, therefore, clearly obiter dictum. I submit
As the Sandiganbayan aptly pointed out, the above provision is not
that it is erroneous to resolve the present petition on the basis of
applicable to petitioner because the immunity amendment became
that dictum in Estrada.
effective only in 1981 while the alleged crime happened in 1975.

As the obiter dictum in Estrada is needlessly made a ratio in the present

In Estrada v. Desierto,71 this Court exhaustively traced the origin of
case, the ponencia herein has even unwittingly elevated to doctrinal level
executive immunity in order to determine the extent of its applicability. We
the proposition that the constitutionality of penal laws cannot be
explained therein that executive immunity applied only during the
challenged on the ground of vagueness. I humbly submit that the stance is
incumbency of a President. It could not be used to shield a non-sitting
flawed and contrary to fundamental principles of due process.
President from prosecution for alleged criminal acts done while sitting in
office. The reasoning of petitioner must therefore fail, since he derives his
immunity from one who is no longer sitting as President. Verily, the The Bill of Rights occupies a position of primacy in the fundamental law.9 It
felonious acts of public officials and their close relatives "are not acts of the is thus sacrosanct in this jurisdiction that no person shall be deprived of
State, and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands on life, liberty or property without due process of law. 10
the same footing as any other trespasser."
A challenge to a penal statute premised on the argument that the law is
In sum, petitioner utterly fails to show that the Sandiganbayan gravely vague is a proper invocation of the due process clause. A statute that lacks
abused its discretion in issuing the assailed Resolutions.72 On the contrary, comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
it acted prudently, in accordance with law and jurisprudence. necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the
due process clause, for failure to accord persons fair notice of the conduct
to avoid.11 As held by the Court in People v. Dela Piedra:12
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED, and the questioned Resolutions
of the Sandiganbayan AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
 Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be under the statute was vague, and the statute void for vagueness. It was of
sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what no moment that the information against the accused described the offense
conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties. A with particularity.
criminal statute that "fails to give a person of ordinary
intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is
If on its face the challenged provision is repugnant to the due
forbidden by the statute," or is so indefinite that "it encourages
process clause, specification of details of the offense intended to
arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions," is void for
be charged would not serve to validate it. (United States v.
vagueness. The constitutional vice in a vague or indefinite
Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221; Czarra v. Board of Medical Supervisors,
statute is the injustice to the accused in placing him on trial for
25 App.D.C. 443, 453.) It is the statute, not the accusation
an offense, the nature of which he is given no fair warning.13
under it, that prescribes the rule to govern conduct and
warns against transgression. (See Stromberg v.
It should also be reckoned that the Bill of Rights likewise guarantees that California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 , 51 S.Ct. 532, 535, 73 A.L. R. 1484;
no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 , 58 S.Ct. 666.) No one may be
process of law,14 and that the accused enjoys the right to be informed of the required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the
nature and cause of the accusation against him or her. 15 The Bill of Rights meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to
ensures the fullest measure of protection to an accused. If a particular what the State commands or forbids.21 (Emphasis supplied)
mode of constitutional challenge, such as one predicated on the "void for
vagueness" doctrine, is available to an ordinary person deprived of
In Bouie v. City of Columbia,22 civil rights protesters were charged with
property or means of expression, then more so should it be accessible to
violating a criminal trespass statute proscribing entry upon the lands of
one who is in jeopardy of being deprived of liberty or of life. 16
another after notice prohibiting such entry. A state court construed the
statute as applicable to the act of remaining on the premises of another
"Vagueness" and "Overbreadth" Are Distinct Concepts after receiving notice to leave. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, applying
again the "void for vagueness" doctrine. Said Court admitted that "typical
applications of the principle, the uncertainty as to the statute's prohibition
A fundamental flaw, to my mind, in the analysis employed by
resulted from vague or overbroad language in the statute itself."23 Yet the
the ponencia and some of the separate opinions in Estrada is the notion
Court noted that "[t]here can be no doubt that a deprivation of the right of
that the "vagueness" and "overbreadth" doctrines are the same and should
fair warning can result not only from vague statutory language but also
be accorded similar treatment. This is erroneous.
from an unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expansion of narrow and
precise statutory language."24 Accordingly, the Court overturned the
Mr. Justice Kapunan, in his dissenting opinion in Estrada, offers a correct convictions, holding that "the crime for which [they] were convicted was
distinction between "vagueness" and "overbreadth": not enumerated in the statute at the time of their conduct," thus denying
the accused due process of law.25
A view has been proferred that "vagueness and overbreadth
doctrines are not applicable to penal laws." These two concepts, In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,26 a statute penalizing vagrancy was
while related, are distinct from each other. On one hand, the voided by the U.S. Supreme Court, again for being vague:
doctrine of overbreadth applies generally to statutes that
infringe upon freedom of speech. On the other hand, the
This ordinance is void for vagueness, both in the sense that it
"void-for-vagueness" doctrine applies to criminal laws, not
"fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his
merely those that regulate speech or other fundamental
contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute," (United
constitutional right. (not merely those that regulate speech
States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617), and because it encourages
or other fundamental constitutional rights.) The fact that a
arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions (Thornhill v.
particular criminal statute does not infringe upon free speech
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242).27
does not mean that a facial challenge to the statute on vagueness
grounds cannot succeed.17
Kolender v. Lawson28 involves another affirmation of the well-established
doctrine. There, the US Supreme Court invalidated a loitering statute
This view should be sustained, especially in light of the fact that the "void
requiring a loiterer to produce credible and reliable identification when
for vagueness" doctrine has long been sanctioned as a means to invalidate
requested by a peace officer. It elucidated:
penal statutes.

Although the doctrine focuses on both actual notice to citizens

"Void For Vagueness" Invalidation of Penal Statutes has Long-Standing
and arbitrary enforcement, we have recognized recently that
Jurisprudential History
the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine "is not
actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine-the
As early as 1926, the United States Supreme Court held in Connally v. requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to
General Construction Co., thus: 18 govern law enforcements. Where the legislature fails to provide
such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit "a
standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors and
That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be
juries to pursue their personal predilections.29
sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what
conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties is a
well- recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary In the fairly recent case of City of Chicago v. Morales,30 the U.S. Supreme
notions of fair play and the settled rules of law; and a statute Court affirmed a lower court ruling invalidating as void for vagueness an
which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so ordinance prohibiting "criminal street gang members" from loitering in
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess public places, as well as the conviction based on the invalidated ordinance.
at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first The US Court again asserted:
essential of due process of law.
For it is clear that the vagueness of this enactment makes a facial
Thus in Connally, a statute prescribing penalties for violation of an eight- challenge appropriate. This is not an ordinance that "simply
hour workday law was voided, presenting as it did, a "double uncertainty, regulates business behavior and contains a scienter
fatal to its validity as a criminal statute."19 requirement." (See Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates,
Inc., 455 U. S. 489, 499 (1982)). It is a criminal law that contains
no mens rea requirement (see Colautti v. Franklin , 439 U. S. 379,
In Lanzetta v. State of New Jersey,20 a challenge was posed to a statute
395 (1979)), and infringes on constitutionally protected rights
defining a "gangster" and prescribing appropriate penalties, for being void
for vagueness. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the definition of a "gang"
 (see id. , at 391). When vagueness permeates the text of such a actions are themselves protected by the First Amendment
law, it is subject to facial attack. or other constitutional provision, or if the statute does not
fairly warn that it is proscribed, he may not be convicted.
But it would be unavailing for him to claim that although he
Vagueness may invalidate a criminal law for either of two
knew his own conduct was unprotected and was plainly enough
independent reasons. First, it may fail to provide the kind of
forbidden by the statute, others may be in doubt as to whether
notice that will enable ordinary people to understand what
their acts are banned by the law.33 (Emphasis supplied)
conduct it prohibits; second, it may authorize and even
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
(See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S., at 357).31 Still, the quoted dissenting opinion concedes the applicability of the "void
for vagueness" rule in striking infirm criminal statutes. It just enunciates a
greater demand for "specificity" in statutes which may infringe on free
Given the wealth of jurisprudence invalidating penal statutes for suffering
speech protections.
from vagueness, it is mystifying why the notion that the doctrine applies
only to "free-speech" cases has gained a foothold in this Court. It might be
argued that the above-cited cases are foreign jurisprudence, inapplicable Moreover, Mr. Justice Mendoza likewise invoked American jurisprudence
to this jurisdiction. Yet it is submitted that the rule is applicable here, not in support of his view that the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines apply
because of its repeated affirmation by American courts, but because such only to free speech cases.34 He cites, among others, U.S. v. Salerno35
rule is lucidly consistent with our own fundamental notions of due process,
as enunciated in our own Constitution.
and Broadrick v. Oklahoma.36 In Salerno, the US Supreme Court notes that
the "overbreadth" doctrine was inapplicable outside the context of the
What then is the standard of due process which must exist both First Amendment.37 Notably though, the US Court did not make the same
as a procedural and as substantive requisite to free the assertion as to the "vagueness" doctrine. Had it done so in Salerno, it would
challenged ordinance, or any government action for that matter, have been incongruent with its previous rulings, as well as with its
from the imputation of legal infirmity; sufficient to spell its subsequent ones.
doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason,
obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness
Broadrick v. Oklahoma did not pertain to a challenge to a penal statute, but
is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process
rather an Oklahoma law restricting the political activities of that state's
requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not
classified civil servants.38 Again, Broadrick may advert to a correct
outrun the bounds of reasons and result in sheer oppression.
interpretation of the "overbreadth" doctrine. However, in the face of
Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack
numerous jurisprudence affirming the "vagueness" challenge of American
of reasonableness. Correctly has it been identified as freedom
penal laws neither Broadrick nor Salerno can be utilized to assert a
from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of
converse rule.
fair play. It exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and
judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch" in the light of
reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect Mr. Justice Mendoza's opinion also cites from the American constitutional
[democratic] traditions of legal and political thought." It is not a law textbook of Sullivan and Gunther, to assert that "vagueness challenges
narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges, typically
time, place and circumstances," decisions based on such a clause produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due
requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental process typically are invalidated only as
principles of our society."32
applied to a particular defendant."39 This may be a correct restatement of
The dissent of Justice White, joined by Justice Rehnquist, in Kolender v. the American rule. Yet, it does not necessarily mean that penal laws are not
Lawson finds some kinship with Mr. Justice Mendoza's views in Estrada, susceptible to a "void for vagueness" challenge. In fact, in the same page
insofar as they point out a distinction between the "vagueness" doctrine, cited in Mr. Justice Mendoza's opinion, Sullivan and Gunther cite cases
as applied to criminal statutes, on one hand, and as applied to US First wherein American penal laws were stricken down for being vague, such
Amendment cases, on the other. as Connally v. General Construction Co., Kolender v.
Lawson, and Papachristou v. Jacksonville.40
The usual rule is that the alleged vagueness of a criminal statute
must be judged in light of the conduct that is charged to be The same citation likewise refers to the odd situation wherein unlike in
violative of the statute. If the actor is given sufficient notice that First Amendment cases, due process invalidations for vagueness apply
his conduct is within the proscription of the statute, his only to a particular defendant. Sullivan and Gunther posit that the broader
conviction is not vulnerable on vagueness grounds, even if as protection afforded in First Amendment cases follow from "a special
applied to other conduct, the law would be unconstitutionally concern about the 'chilling effect' of vague statutes on protected
vague. None of our cases "suggests that one who has received speech."41 However, the ponencia latches onto this distinction in order to
fair warning of the criminality of his own conduct from the foist the bugaboo of "mass acquittal" of criminals due to the facial
statute in question is nonetheless entitled to attack it because invalidation of criminal statutes.42 Moreover, the ponencia asserts that
the language would not give similar fair warning ;with respect such invalidation would constitute a departure from the usual requirement
to other conduct which might be within its broad and literal of actual case and controversy and permit decisions to be made in a sterile
ambit. One to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not abstract context having no factual concreteness.43
successfully challenge it for vagueness." The correlative rule is
that a criminal statute is not unconstitutionally vague on its face
Such concerns are overwrought. In this jurisdiction, judicial review over
unless it is "impermissibly vague in all of its applications."
the constitutionality of statutes, penal or otherwise, avails only upon the
concurrence of (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest
These general rules are equally applicable to cases where First personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question;
Amendment or other "fundamental" interests are involved. The (3) a plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4)
Court has held that in such circumstances "more precision in a necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to
drafting may be required because of the vagueness doctrine in decide the case.44Challenges to the validity of laws are not lightly
the case of regulation of expression, a "greater degree of undertaken, and the non-existence of any of the four conditions precedent
specificity" is demanded than in other contexts. But the bar a successful challenge. Surely, not just anybody picked off the street
difference in such cases "relates to how strict a test of vagueness prepossesses the requisite standing, nor could just any case present itself
shall be applied in judging a particular criminal statute." It does as the proper vehicle for a constitutional attack.
not permit the challenger of the statute to confuse vagueness
and overbreadth by attacking the enactment as being vague as
These conditions precedent successfully weigh the concerns of the State,
applied to conduct other than his own. Of course, if his own
fearful of instabilities brought by frequent invalidations of the laws it
passes, and with the basic component of justice that a person to whom a
wrong is done by the State can seek vindication from the courts. Our basic
jurisprudential barrier has shielded this Court for generations from
exercising unwarranted and unmitigated judicial review. There is no need
to further raise the bar for review, especially on such flimsy foundations,
lest we insulate ourselves from the pleas of the truly prejudiced, truly
injured, truly violated.

At the same time, the ponencia raises the concern that the invalidation of a
void law will unnecessarily benefit those without actual cases or
controversies. It must be remembered though that the Court will not
unhesitatingly strike down a statute if a narrower alternative affording the
same correct relief is available. Within the confines of this discretion, all
the tools of searching inquiry are at the Court's disposal to carve as narrow
a rule as necessary.

Still and all, if there is no alternative but to strike down a void law, there
should be no hesitation on the part of this Court in ruling it so, no matter
the effective scope and reach of the decision. The State has no business
promulgating void laws, which stick out like a cancer infecting our
constitutional order. When faced with the proper opportunity, it is the
Court's duty to excise the tumor no matter how painful. Unfortunately, the
solution advocated by the ponencia barring penal statutes from "void for
vagueness" assaults hides the patient from the doctor.

People v. Dela Piedra, earlier cited,45 did not invalidate the statute
questioned therein on the "void for vagueness" ground. Yet it affirms that
the "void for vagueness" challenge to a penal law may be sustained if the
statute contravenes due process. The circumstance, as the ponencia herein
points out, that no penal law has been declared unconstitutional on the
ground of ambiguity, does not mean that no penal law can ever be
invalidated on that ground.

As long as the due process clause remains immanent in our Constitution,

its long reach should be applied to deter and punish unwarranted
deprivations of life, liberty or property. Violations of due process are
myriad, ranging as they do from the simple to the complicated, from the
isolated to the intermittent, from the abashed to the brazen. No advance
statement can outrightly cast an act as beyond the ambit of the due process
clause, especially when applied to the lot of an accused, for such is simply
presumptuous and anathema to the spirit of fair play.

I may disagree with the eventual conclusions of Justices Kapunan, Ynares-

Santiago and Sandoval-Gutierrez in the Estrada case that Section 5 of the
Anti-Plunder Law is void for vagueness. Yet, I submit that their inquiry as
to whether the said criminal statute was void for being vague is a juristic
exercise worth pursuing. If the ponenciaaffirms the earlier erroneous
pronouncement as asserted in the main by Mr. Justice Mendoza in Estrada,
then I express the same fear articulated by Mr. Justice Kapunan in his
dissent, that "such stance is tantamount to saying that no criminal law can
be challenged however repugnant it is to the constitutional right to due
process."46
Republic of the Philippines OF CIVIL DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE ARMED
SUPREME COURT FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), THE ANTI-MONEY
Manila LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC), THE PHILIPPINE CENTER ON
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE GEN. OSCAR CALDERON, THE PNP, including its intelligence
EN BANC
and investigative elements, AFP CHIEF GEN. HERMOGENES
ESPERON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 178552 October 5, 2010
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., on behalf of
the South-South Network (SSN) for Non-State Armed Group
G.R. No. 178890
Engagement, and ATTY. SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE KARAPATAN, ALLIANCE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PEOPLE'S
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE RIGHTS, represented herein by Dr. Edelina de la Paz, and
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF THE representing the following organizations: HUSTISYA, represented by
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, Evangeline Hernandez and also on her own behalf; DESAPARECIDOS,
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE represented by Mary Guy Portajada and also on her own behalf,
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE CHIEF OF THE SAMAHAN NG MGA EX-DETAINEES LABAN SA DETENSYON AT PARA
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents. SA AMNESTIYA (SELDA), represented by Donato Continente and also
on his own behalf, ECUMENICAL MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE
(EMJP), represented by Bishop Elmer M. Bolocon, UCCP, and
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
PROMOTION OF CHURCH PEOPLE'S RESPONSE, represented by Fr.
Gilbert Sabado, OCARM, Petitioners,
G.R. No. 178554 vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as President and
Commander-in-Chief, EXECUTIVE SECRETARTY EDUARDO ERMITA,
KILUSANG MAYO UNO (KMU), represented by its Chairperson Elmer
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ,
Labog, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO,
UNO (NAFLU-KMU), represented by its National President Joselito V.
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ACTING SECRETARY
Ustarez and Secretary General Antonio C. Pascual, and CENTER FOR
NORBERTO GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
TRADE UNION AND HUMAN RIGHTS, represented by its Executive
GOVERNMENT SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO, DEPARTMENT OF
Director Daisy Arago, Petitioners,
FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO TEVES, NATIONAL SECURITY
vs.
ADVISER NORBERTO GONZALES, THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary,
COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA), THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF
NORBERTO GONZALES, in his capacity as Acting Secretary of National
INVESTIGATION (NBI), THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, THE OFFICE
Defense, HON. RAUL GONZALES, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice,
OF CIVIL DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE ARMED
HON. RONALDO PUNO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Interior and
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), THE ANTI-MONEY
Local Government, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, in his capacity as
LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC), THE PHILIPPINE CENTER ON
AFP Chief of Staff, and DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR CALDERON, in his
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
capacity as PNP Chief of Staff, Respondents.
POLICE GEN. OSCAR CALDERON, THE PNP, including its intelligence
and investigative elements, AFP CHIEF GEN. HERMOGENES
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x ESPERON, Respondents.

G.R. No. 178581 x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN), GENERAL ALLIANCE G.R. No. 179157

BINDING WOMEN FOR REFORMS, INTEGRITY, EQUALITY,
LEADERSHIP AND ACTION (GABRIELA), KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG
THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), represented by
PILIPINAS (KMP), MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR CIVIL
Atty. Feliciano M. Bautista, COUNSELS FOR THE DEFENSE OF LIBERTY
LIBERTIES (MCCCL), CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION
(CODAL), SEN. MA. ANA CONSUELO A.S. MADRIGAL and FORMER
AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE),
SENATORS SERGIO OSMEÑA III and WIGBERTO E.
KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY), SOLIDARITY
TAÑADA, Petitioners,
OF CAVITE WORKERS, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS),
vs.
ANAKBAYAN, PAMBANSANG LAKAS NG KILUSANG MAMAMALAKAYA
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA AND THE MEMBERS OF
(PAMALAKAYA), ALLIANCE OF CONCERNED TEACHERS (ACT),
THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL (ATC), Respondents.
MIGRANTE, HEALTH ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY (HEAD), AGHAM,
TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR., DR. BIENVENIDO LUMBERA, RENATO
CONSTANTINO, JR., SISTER MARY JOHN MANANSAN OSB, DEAN x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
CONSUELO PAZ, ATTY. JOSEFINA LICHAUCO, COL. GERRY CUNANAN
(ret.), CARLITOS SIGUION-REYNA, DR. CAROLINA PAGADUAN-
G.R. No. 179461
ARAULLO, RENATO REYES, DANILO RAMOS, EMERENCIANA DE LESUS,
RITA BAUA, REY CLARO CASAMBRE, Petitioners,
vs. BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN-SOUTHERN TAGALOG (BAYAN-
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as President and ST), GABRIELA-ST, KATIPUNAN NG MGA SAMAHYANG MAGSASAKA-
Commander-in-Chief, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, TIMOG KATAGALUGAN (KASAMA-TK), MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL GONZALES, CITIZENS FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES (MCCCL), PEOPLES MARTYRS,
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, ANAKBAYAN-ST, PAMALAKAYA-ST, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY,
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ACTING SECRETARY RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
NORBERTO GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL (COURAGE-ST), PAGKAKAISA'T UGNAYAN NG MGA MAGBUBUKID SA
GOVERNMENT SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO. DEPARTMENT OF LAGUNA (PUMALAG), SAMAHAN NG MGA MAMAMAYAN SA TABING
FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO TEVES, NATIONAL SECURITY RILES (SMTR-ST), LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), BAYAN
ADVISER NORBERTO GONZALES, THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MUNA-ST, KONGRESO NG MGA MAGBUBUKID PARA SA REPORMANG
COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA), THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF AGRARYO KOMPRA, BIGKIS AT LAKAS NG MGA KATUTUBO SA TIMOG
INVESTIGATION (NBI), THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, THE OFFICE KATAGALUGAN (BALATIK), SAMAHAN AT UGNAYAN NG MGA
MAGSASAKANG KABABAIHAN SA TIMOG KATAGALUGAN On August 29, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Counsels
(SUMAMAKA-TK), STARTER, LOSÑOS RURAL POOR ORGANIZATION for the Defense of Liberty (CODAL),6Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S.
FOR PROGRESS & EQUALITY, CHRISTIAN NIÑO LAJARA, TEODORO Madrigal, Sergio Osmeña III, and Wigberto E. Tañada filed a petition for
REYES, FRANCESCA B. TOLENTINO, JANNETTE E. BARRIENTOS, OSCAR certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 179157.
T. LAPIDA, JR., DELFIN DE CLARO, SALLY P. ASTRERA, ARNEL SEGUNE
BELTRAN, Petitioners,
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog (BAYAN-ST), other
vs.
regional chapters and organizations mostly based in the Southern Tagalog
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as President and
Region,7 and individuals8 followed suit by filing on September 19, 2007 a
Commander-in-Chief, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA,
petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 179461 that
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ,
replicates the allegations raised in the BAYAN petition in G.R. No. 178581.
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO,
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ACTING SECRETARY
NORBERTO GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism
GOVERNMEN T SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO, DEPARTMENT OF Council9 composed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions, Executive
FINCANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO TEVES, NATIONAL SECURITY Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales
ADVISER NORBERTO GONZALES, THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting
COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA), THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF Defense Secretary and National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales,
INVESTIGATION (NBI), THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, THE OFFICE Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance
OF CIVIL DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE ARMED Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All the petitions, except that of the
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), THE ANTI-MONEY IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff
LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC), THE PHILIPPINE CENTER ON Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen.
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL Oscar Calderon.
POLICE GEN. OSCAR CALDERON, THE PNP, including its intelligence
and investigative elements, AFP CHIEF GEN. HERMOGENES
The Karapatan, BAYAN and BAYAN-ST petitions likewise impleaded
ESPERON, Respondents.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the support agencies for the Anti-
Terrorism Council like the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency,
DECISION National Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Immigration, Office of Civil
Defense, Intelligence Service of the AFP, Anti-Money Laundering Center,
Philippine Center on Transnational Crime, and the PNP intelligence and
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
investigative elements.

Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of

The petitions fail.
Republic Act No. 9372 (RA 9372), "An Act to Secure the State and Protect
our People from Terrorism," otherwise known as the Human Security Act
of 2007,1signed into law on March 6, 2007. Petitioners’ resort to certiorari is improper

Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15, 2007,2 petitioner Southern Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not
Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., a non-government organization, exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules
and Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr., a concerned citizen, taxpayer and lawyer, filed of Court is clear:
a petition for certiorari and prohibition on July 16, 2007 docketed as G.R.
No. 178552. On even date, petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), National
Section 1. Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or
Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), and Center
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functionshas acted without or
for Trade Union and Human Rights (CTUHR), represented by their
in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
respective officers3 who are also bringing the action in their capacity as
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any
citizens, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No.
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
178554.
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling
The following day, July 17, 2007, organizations Bagong Alyansang or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and
Makabayan (BAYAN), General Alliance Binding Women for Reforms, granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. (Emphasis
Integrity, Equality, Leadership and Action (GABRIELA), Kilusang and underscoring supplied)
Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), Movement of Concerned Citizens for Civil
Liberties (MCCCL), Confederation for Unity, Recognition and Advancement
Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of
of Government Employees (COURAGE), Kalipunan ng Damayang
particularity how respondents acted without or in excess of their
Mahihirap (KADAMAY), Solidarity of Cavite Workers (SCW), League of
respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
Filipino Students (LFS), Anakbayan, Pambansang Lakas ng Kilusang
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Mamamalakaya (PAMALAKAYA), Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT),
Migrante, Health Alliance for Democracy (HEAD), and Agham, represented
by their respective officers,4 and joined by concerned citizens and The impropriety of certiorari as a remedy aside, the petitions fail just the
taxpayers Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Dr. Bienvenido Lumbera, Renato same.
Constantino, Jr., Sister Mary John Manansan, OSB, Dean Consuelo Paz, Atty.
Josefina Lichauco, Retired Col. Gerry Cunanan, Carlitos Siguion-Reyna, Dr.
In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four
Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes, Danilo Ramos, Emerenciana de
exacting requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b)
Jesus, Rita Baua and Rey Claro Casambre filed a petition for certiorari and
petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality
prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178581.
must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case. 10
On August 6, 2007, Karapatan and its alliance member organizations
Hustisya, Desaparecidos, Samahan ng mga Ex-Detainees Laban sa
In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which
Detensyon at para sa Amnestiya (SELDA), Ecumenical Movement for
are the most essential, renders the discussion of the last two superfluous.
Justice and Peace (EMJP), and Promotion of Church People’s Response
(PCPR), which were represented by their respective officers5who are also
bringing action on their own behalf, filed a petition for certiorari and Petitioners lack locus standi
prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178890.
Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. 11 requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the
Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary12 summarized
jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may
the rule on locus standi, thus:
be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said
that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not
substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of
challenged. The gist of the question on standing is whether a party alleges accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy
such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that cannot reasonably be questionable.
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial matters
questions.
coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary
experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted
[A] party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned
and personal interest. It must show not only that the law or any demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may
governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in immediate be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and noticed, provided, they are of such universal notoriety and so generally
not merely that it suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must show that understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common
it has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which it is knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far
lawfully entitled or that it is about to be subjected to some burdens or and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as
penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial
notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-
existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive
For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it
knowledge.16 (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
must show that (1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened
injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2) the
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of judicial
to be redressed by a favorable action. (emphasis and underscoring notice. Petitioners’ apprehension is insufficient to substantiate their plea.
supplied.) That no specific charge or proscription under RA 9372 has been filed
against them, three years after its effectivity, belies any claim
of imminence of their perceived threat emanating from the so-called
Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being
tagging.
suspected "communist fronts" by the government, especially the military;
whereas individual petitioners invariably invoke the "transcendental
importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers. The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR in G.R. No.
178554, who merely harp as well on their supposed "link" to the CPP and
NPA. They fail to particularize how the implementation of specific
While Chavez v. PCGG13 holds that transcendental public importance
provisions of RA 9372 would result in direct injury to their organization
dispenses with the requirement that petitioner has experienced or is in
and members.
actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury, cases involving the
constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an altogether different
genus of constitutional litigation. Compelling State and societal interests in While in our jurisdiction there is still no judicially declared terrorist
the proscription of harmful conduct, as will later be elucidated, necessitate organization, the United States of America17 (US) and the European
a closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi. Union18 (EU) have both classified the CPP, NPA and Abu Sayyaf Group as
foreign terrorist organizations. The Court takes note of the joint statement
of Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales
Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the outcome of the
that the Arroyo Administration would adopt the US and EU classification
controversy. None of them faces any charge under RA 9372.
of the CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations. 19 Such statement
notwithstanding, there is yet to be filed before the courts an application to
KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP and PCR, petitioners declare the CPP and NPA organizations as domestic terrorist or outlawed
in G.R. No. 178890, allege that they have been subjected to "close security organizations under RA 9372. Again, RA 9372 has been in effect for three
surveillance by state security forces," their members followed by years now. From July 2007 up to the present, petitioner-organizations
"suspicious persons" and "vehicles with dark windshields," and their have conducted their activities fully and freely without any threat of, much
offices monitored by "men with military build." They likewise claim that less an actual, prosecution or proscription under RA 9372.
they have been branded as "enemies of the [S]tate."14
Parenthetically, the Fourteenth Congress, in a resolution initiated by Party-
Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office of the Solicitor list Representatives Saturnino Ocampo, Teodoro Casiño, Rafael Mariano
General (OSG) correctly points out that petitioners have yet to show and Luzviminda Ilagan,20 urged the government to resume peace
any connection between the negotiations with the NDF by removing the impediments thereto, one of
purported "surveillance" and the implementation of RA 9372. which is the adoption of designation of the CPP and NPA by the US and EU
as foreign terrorist organizations. Considering the policy statement of the
Aquino Administration21 of resuming peace talks with the NDF, the
BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS,
government is not imminently disposed to ask for the judicial proscription
Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD and Agham, petitioner-
of the CPP-NPA consortium and its allied organizations.
organizations in G.R. No. 178581, would like the Court to take judicial
notice of respondents’ alleged action of tagging them as militant
organizations fronting for the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) More important, there are other parties not before the Court with direct
and its armed wing, the National People’s Army (NPA). The tagging, and specific interests in the questions being raised.22 Of recent
according to petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of proscription development is the filing of the first case for proscription under Section
without following the procedure under the law. 15 The petition of BAYAN- 1723 of RA 9372 by the Department of Justice before the Basilan Regional
ST, et al. in G.R. No. 179461 pleads the same allegations. Trial Court against the Abu Sayyaf Group.24 Petitioner-organizations do not
in the least allege any link to the Abu Sayyaf Group.
The Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged "tagging" of petitioners.
Some petitioners attempt, in vain though, to show the imminence of a It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the
prosecution under RA 9372 by alluding to past rebellion charges against assertion of a public right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence of a direct
them. and personal interest is key.

In Ladlad v. Velasco,25 the Court ordered the dismissal of rebellion charges Petitioners fail to present an actual case or controversy
filed in 2006 against then Party-List Representatives Crispin Beltran and
Rafael Mariano of Anakpawis, Liza Maza of GABRIELA, and Joel Virador,
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual
Teodoro Casiño and Saturnino Ocampo of Bayan Muna. Also named in the
case or controversy.
dismissed rebellion charges were petitioners Rey Claro Casambre,
Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes, Rita Baua, Emerencia de Jesus
and Danilo Ramos; and accused of being front organizations for the Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
Communist movement were petitioner-organizations KMU, BAYAN, such lower courts as may be established by law.
GABRIELA, PAMALAKAYA, KMP, KADAMAY, LFS and COURAGE. 26
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
The dismissed rebellion charges, however, do not save the day for controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
petitioners. For one, those charges were filed in 2006, prior to the enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
enactment of RA 9372, and dismissed by this Court. For another, rebellion of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
is defined and punished under the Revised Penal Code. Prosecution for branch or instrumentality of the Government. 30(emphasis and
rebellion is not made more imminent by the enactment of RA 9372, nor underscoring supplied.)
does the enactment thereof make it easier to charge a person with
rebellion, its elements not having been altered.
As early as Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 the Court ruled that the
power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies to be
Conversely, previously filed but dismissed rebellion charges bear no exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties. Any attempt at
relation to prospective charges under RA 9372. It cannot be abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to
overemphasized that three years after the enactment of RA 9372, none of sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
petitioners has been charged.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that
Petitioners IBP and CODAL in G.R. No. 179157 base their claim of locus is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory,
standi on their sworn duty to uphold the Constitution. The IBP zeroes in on lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. 32
Section 21 of RA 9372 directing it to render assistance to those arrested or
detained under the law.
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v.
COMELEC33 cannot be more emphatic:
The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not,
however, suffice to clothe the IBP or any of its members with
[C]ourts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy
standing.27 The IBP failed to sufficiently demonstrate how its mandate
scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy
under the assailed statute revolts against its constitutional rights and
must be justiciable—definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations
duties. Moreover, both the IBP and CODAL have not pointed to even a
of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings
single arrest or detention effected under RA 9372.
must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand,
and a denial thereof on the other hand; that is, it must concern a real and
Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal, who claims to have been the not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and
subject of "political surveillance," also lacks locus standi. Prescinding from substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree
the veracity, let alone legal basis, of the claim of "political surveillance," the conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the
Court finds that she has not shown even the slightest threat of being law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. (Emphasis and
charged under RA 9372. Similarly lacking in locus standi are former underscoring supplied)
Senator Wigberto Tañada and Senator Sergio Osmeña III, who cite their
being respectively a human rights advocate and an oppositor to the
Thus, a petition to declare unconstitutional a law converting the
passage of RA 9372. Outside these gratuitous statements, no concrete
Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City was held to be
injury to them has been pinpointed.
premature as it was tacked on uncertain, contingent events. 34 Similarly, a
petition that fails to allege that an application for a license to operate a
Petitioners Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network and Atty. Soliman radio or television station has been denied or granted by the authorities
Santos Jr. in G.R. No. 178552 also conveniently state that the issues they does not present a justiciable controversy, and merely wheedles the Court
raise are of transcendental importance, "which must be settled early" and to rule on a hypothetical problem.35
are of "far-reaching implications," without mention of any specific
provision of RA 9372 under which they have been charged, or may be
The Court dismissed the petition in Philippine Press Institute v.
charged. Mere invocation of human rights advocacy has nowhere been held
Commission on Elections36 for failure to cite any specific affirmative action
sufficient to clothe litigants with locus standi. Petitioners must show an
of the Commission on Elections to implement the assailed resolution. It
actual, or immediate danger of sustaining, direct injury as a result of the
refused, in Abbas v. Commission on Elections, 37 to rule on the religious
law’s enforcement. To rule otherwise would be to corrupt the settled
freedom claim of the therein petitioners based merely on a perceived
doctrine of locus standi, as every worthy cause is an interest shared by the
potential conflict between the provisions of the Muslim Code and those of
general public.
the national law, there being no actual controversy between real litigants.

Neither can locus standi be conferred upon individual petitioners as

The list of cases denying claims resting on purely hypothetical or
taxpayers and citizens. A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an
anticipatory grounds goes on ad infinitum.
exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress, 28 whereas citizen
standing must rest on direct and personal interest in the proceeding.29
The Court is not unaware that a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of
a perceived threat to any constitutional interest suffices to provide a basis
RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation
for mounting a constitutional challenge. This, however, is qualified by the
from Congress for its implementation, while none of the individual
requirement that there must be sufficient facts to enable the Court to
petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and personal interest in the
intelligently adjudicate the issues.38
implementation of the law.
Very recently, the US Supreme Court, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law At issue in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan was whether the word "intervene"
Project,39 allowed the pre-enforcement review of a criminal statute, in Section 549 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was intrinsically
challenged on vagueness grounds, since plaintiffs faced a "credible threat vague and impermissibly broad. The Court stated that "the overbreadth
of prosecution" and "should not be required to await and undergo a and the vagueness doctrines have special application only to free-speech
criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief."40 The plaintiffs cases," and are "not appropriate for testing the validity of penal
therein filed an action before a federal court to assail the constitutionality statutes."50 It added that, at any rate, the challenged provision, under
of the material support statute, 18 U.S.C. §2339B (a) (1), 41 proscribing the which the therein petitioner was charged, is not vague.51
provision of material support to organizations declared by the Secretary of
State as foreign terrorist organizations. They claimed that they intended to
While in the subsequent case of Romualdez v. Commission on
provide support for the humanitarian and political activities of two such
Elections,52 the Court stated that a facial invalidation of criminal statutes is
organizations.
not appropriate, it nonetheless proceeded to conduct a vagueness analysis,
and concluded that the therein subject election offense53 under the Voter’s
Prevailing American jurisprudence allows an adjudication on the merits Registration Act of 1996, with which the therein petitioners were charged,
when an anticipatory petition clearly shows that the challenged is couched in precise language.54
prohibition forbids the conduct or activity that a petitioner seeks to do, as
there would then be a justiciable controversy.42
The two Romualdez cases rely heavily on the Separate Opinion55 of Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza in the Estradacase, where the Court found the Anti-
Unlike the plaintiffs in Holder, however, herein petitioners have failed to Plunder Law (Republic Act No. 7080) clear and free from ambiguity
show that the challenged provisions of RA 9372 forbid constitutionally respecting the definition of the crime of plunder.
protected conduct or activity that they seek to do. No demonstrable threat
has been established, much less a real and existing one.
The position taken by Justice Mendoza in Estrada relates these two
doctrines to the concept of a "facial" invalidation as opposed to an "as-
Petitioners’ obscure allegations of sporadic "surveillance" and supposedly applied" challenge. He basically postulated that allegations that a penal
being tagged as "communist fronts" in no way approximate a credible statute is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity.
threat of prosecution. From these allegations, the Court is being lured to The pertinent portion of the Concurring Opinion of Justice Mendoza, which
render an advisory opinion, which is not its function. 43 was quoted at length in the main Estrada decision, reads:

Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which
declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech.
again, declaratory actions characterized by "double contingency," where The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no
both the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating
reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of
review for lack of ripeness.44 constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks
on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the
attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail
statute drawn with narrow specificity." The possible harm to society in
to take the present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely
permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by
imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of
the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and
any power granted by law may be abused.45 Allegations of abuse must be
perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of
anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle actual
overly broad statutes.
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have
general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial
A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases,
challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented
wherein certain rules of constitutional litigation are rightly excepted
from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal
law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the
definition of the crime of terrorism46under RA 9372 in that terms like
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application
"widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace" and
only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal
"coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand" are nebulous,
statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice
leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the
Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the
prohibited acts.
limited context of the First Amendment." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the
Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in
Respondents, through the OSG, counter that the doctrines of void-for- cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken
vagueness and overbreadth find no application in the present case since words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been
these doctrines apply only to free speech cases; and that RA 9372 regulates curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to
conduct, not speech. be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a
facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of
For a jurisprudentially guided understanding of these doctrines, it is
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." As for the
imperative to outline the schools of thought on whether the void-for-
vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are equally applicable grounds to
face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who
assail a penal statute.
engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the
vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."
Respondents interpret recent jurisprudence as slanting toward the idea of
limiting the application of the two doctrines to free speech cases. They
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are
particularly cite Romualdez v. Hon. Sandiganbayan47 and Estrada v.
analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free
Sandiganbayan.48
speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment
cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a
The Court clarifies. criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that
"one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to
attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as
applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might
be unconstitutional." As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus
First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either
facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process vagueness or overbreadth grounds.
typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant."
Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review
The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the
the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
aim to avert the "chilling effect" on protected speech, the exercise of which
should not at all times be abridged.62 As reflected earlier, this rationale is
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down inapplicable to plain penal statutes that generally bear an "in
entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the terrorem effect" in deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the
Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It constitutes a legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered
departure from the case and controversy requirement of the Constitution innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading
and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.63
sterile abstract contexts. But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out
in Younger v. Harris
The Court reiterated that there are "critical limitations by which a criminal
statute may be challenged" and "underscored that an ‘on-its-face’
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and invalidation of penal statutes x x x may not be allowed."64
requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into
effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The
[T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech,
combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on
religious freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially
the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative
challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a
and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed
facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal
statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory
statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No
for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be
prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against employing a
decided.
facial challenge in the case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would
effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described and concrete controversy before judicial power may be appropriately
as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous
last resort," and is generally disfavored. In determining the and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third
constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to parties who are not before it. As I have said in my opposition to the
have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test will
with which the defendant is charged.56 (Underscoring supplied.) impair the State’s ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there would be
nothing that can hinder an accused from defeating the State’s power to
prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal
The confusion apparently stems from the interlocking relation of the
statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the law is clear as
overbreadth and vagueness doctrines as grounds for a facial or as-applied
applied to him.65 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
challenge against a penal statute (under a claim of violation of due process
of law) or a speech regulation (under a claim of abridgement of the
freedom of speech and cognate rights). It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth
doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given
rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases.
To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do
not operate on the same plane.
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial
type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
almost always under situations not before the court, that are
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process
overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the litigants.
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair
notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks
of the Government muscle.57 The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, an exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation.
decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as
constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper
protected freedoms.58 applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not
permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own
interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are
As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine
permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the
assumes that individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will
entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the
accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is
overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court
protected.59
construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart
from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;"
A "facial" challenge is likewise different from an "as-applied" challenge. deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous
enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad law’s "very
existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers
constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is
only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facialinvalidation is an
designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third
examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only
parties.66 (Emphasis in the original omitted; underscoring supplied.)
on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the
assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not
before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in
activities.60 at least two cases,67 observed that the US Supreme Court has not
recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment,68and that claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained
Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle61 in his concurring
in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate
opinion that the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a
only spoken words.69 In Virginia v. Hicks,70 it was held that rarely, if ever,
will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is that the prohibition on discrimination in hiring on the basis of race will
not specifically addressed to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on require an employer to take down a sign reading "White Applicants Only"
overly broad statutes are justified by the "transcendent value to all society hardly means that the law should be analyzed as one regulating speech
of constitutionally protected expression."71 rather than conduct.

Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the
petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of "terrorism" in criminal conduct alter neither the intent of the law to punish socially
RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent an actual or imminent harmful conduct nor the essence of the whole act as conduct and not
chargeagainst them speech. This holds true a fortiori in the present case where the expression
figures only as an inevitable incident of making the element of coercion
perceptible.
While Estrada did not apply the overbreadth doctrine, it did not preclude
the operation of the vagueness test on the Anti-Plunder Law as applied to
the therein petitioner, finding, however, that there was no basis to review [I]t is true that the agreements and course of conduct here were as in most
the law "on its face and in its entirety."72 It stressed that "statutes found instances brought about through speaking or writing. But it has never been
vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated only 'as applied' deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of
to a particular defendant."73 conduct illegal merely because the conduct was, in part,
initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken,
written, or printed. Such an expansive interpretation of the constitutional
American jurisprudence74 instructs that "vagueness challenges that do not
guaranties of speech and press would make it practically impossible ever
involve the First Amendment must be examined in light of the specific
to enforce laws against agreements in restraint of trade as well as many
facts of the case at hand and not with regard to the statute's facial validity."
other agreements and conspiracies deemed injurious to society. 79 (italics
and underscoring supplied)
For more than 125 years, the US Supreme Court has evaluated defendants’
claims that criminal statutes are unconstitutionally vague, developing a
Certain kinds of speech have been treated as unprotected conduct, because
doctrine hailed as "among the most important guarantees of liberty under
they merely evidence a prohibited conduct.80 Since speech is not involved
law."75
here, the Court cannot heed the call for a facial analysis.1avvphi1

In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the due

IN FINE, Estrada and the other cited authorities engaged in a vagueness
process clause has been utilized in examining the constitutionality of
analysis of the therein subject penal statute as applied to the therein
criminal statutes. In at least three cases,76 the Court brought the doctrine
petitioners inasmuch as they were actually charged with the pertinent
into play in analyzing an ordinance penalizing the non-payment of
crimes challenged on vagueness grounds. The Court in said cases, however,
municipal tax on fishponds, the crime of illegal recruitment punishable
found no basis to review the assailed penal statute on its face and in its
under Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and the vagrancy provision under
entirety.
Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. Notably, the petitioners in these
three cases, similar to those in the two Romualdez and Estrada cases, were
actually charged with the therein assailed penal statute, unlike in the In Holder, on the other hand, the US Supreme Court allowed the pre-
present case. enforcement review of a criminal statute, challenged on vagueness
grounds, since the therein plaintiffs faced a "credible threat of
prosecution" and "should not be required to await and undergo a criminal
There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to permit
prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief."
a facial analysis of its validity

As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge

From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3
nor a credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited
of RA 9372, the following elements may be culled: (1) the offender commits
vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of "terrorism" is thus legally
an act punishable under any of the cited provisions of the Revised Penal
impermissible. The Court reminds litigants that judicial power neither
Code, or under any of the enumerated special penal laws; (2) the
contemplates speculative counseling on a statute’s future effect on
commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a condition of
hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be used as an extension of
widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; and (3)
a failed legislative lobbying in Congress.
the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give in
to an unlawful demand.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.
In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law
penalizes speech, petitioners contend that the element of "unlawful SO ORDERED.
demand" in the definition of terrorism77 must necessarily be transmitted
through some form of expression protected by the free speech clause.

The argument does not persuade. What the law seeks to penalize
is conduct, not speech.

Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first
be a predicate crime actually committed to trigger the operation of the key
qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the
coercion of the government to accede to an "unlawful demand." Given the
presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or highlighting
the communicative component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the
unprotected conduct into a protected speech.

Petitioners’ notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate,

as it unduly focuses on just one particle of an element of the crime. Almost
every commission of a crime entails some mincing of words on the part of
the offender like in declaring to launch overt criminal acts against a victim,
in haggling on the amount of ransom or conditions, or in negotiating a
deceitful transaction. An analogy in one U.S. case 78 illustrated that the fact
Republic of the Philippines We hold that the said executive order should not be enforced against the
SUPREME COURT Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted, it is a penal
Manila regulation published more than two months later in the Official Gazette
dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as
provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised
SECOND DIVISION
Administrative Code.

G.R. No. L-64279 April 30, 1984

The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes
circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is
ANSELMO L. PESIGAN and MARCELINO L. PESIGAN, petitioners, necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make
vs. the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. (People vs. Que
JUDGE DOMINGO MEDINA ANGELES, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Lim Hoa Ting vs. Central Bank of the Phils., 104 Phil.
City Branch 129, acting for REGIONAL TRIAL COURT of Camarines 573; Balbuna vs. Secretary of Education, 110 Phil. 150.)
Norte, now presided over by JUDGE NICANOR ORIÑO, Daet Branch 40;
DRA. BELLA S. MIRANDA, ARNULFO V. ZENAROSA, ET AL., respondents.
The Spanish Supreme Court ruled that "bajo la denominacion generica de
leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos,
Quiazon, De Guzman Makalintal and Barot for petitioners. Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordenes dictadas de conformidad con las
mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad (1 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th
Ed., p. 146.)
The Solicitor General for respondents.

Thus, in the Que Po Lay case, a person, convicted by the trial court of having
AQUINO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
violated Central Bank Circular No. 20 and sentenced to six months'
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P1,000, was acquitted by this Court
At issue in this case is the enforceability, before publication in the Official because the circular was published in the Official Gazette three months
Gazette of June 14, 1982, of Presidential Executive Order No. 626-A after his conviction. He was not bound by the circular.
dated October 25, 1980, providing for the confiscation and forfeiture by the
government of carabaos transported from one province to another.
That ruling applies to a violation of Executive Order No. 626-A because
its confiscation and forfeiture provision or sanction makes it a penal
Anselmo L. Pesigan and Marcelo L. Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported statute. Justice and fairness dictate that the public must be informed of that
in an Isuzu ten-wheeler truck in the evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six provision by means of publication in the Gazette before violators of the
carabaos and a calf from Sipocot, Camarines Sur with Padre Garcia, executive order can be bound thereby.
Batangas, as the destination.
The cases of Police Commission vs. Bello, L-29960, January 30, 1971, 37
They were provided with (1) a health certificate from the provincial SCRA 230 and Philippine Blooming Mills vs. Social Security System, 124 Phil.
veterinarian of Camarines Sur, issued under the Revised Administrative 499, cited by the respondents, do not involve the enforcement of any penal
Code and Presidential Decree No. 533, the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of regulation.
1974; (2) a permit to transport large cattle issued under the authority of
the provincial commander; and (3) three certificates of inspection, one
Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all Presidential executive orders
from the Constabulary command attesting that the carabaos were not
having general applicability should be published in the Official Gazette. It
included in the list of lost, stolen and questionable animals; one from the
provides that "every order or document which shag prescribe a penalty
LIvestock inspector, Bureau of Animal Industry of Libmanan, Camarines
shall be deemed to have general applicability and legal effect."
Sur and one from the mayor of Sipocot.

Indeed, the practice has always been to publish executive orders in the
In spite of the permit to transport and the said four certificates, the
Gazette. Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that even
carabaos, while passing at Basud, Camarines Norte, were confiscated by
bureau "regulations and orders shall become effective only when approved
Lieutenant Arnulfo V. Zenarosa, the town's police station commander, and
by the Department Head and published in the Official Gazette or otherwise
by Doctor Bella S. Miranda, provincial veterinarian. The confiscation was
publicly promulgated". (See Commissioner of Civil Service vs. Cruz, 122
basis on the aforementioned Executive Order No. 626-A which provides
Phil. 1015.)
"that henceforth, no carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical condition or
purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to
another. The carabaos or carabeef transported in violation of this In the instant case, the livestock inspector and the provincial veterinarian
Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and of Camarines Norte and the head of the Public Affairs Office of the Ministry
forfeiture by the government to be distributed ... to deserving farmers of Agriculture were unaware of Executive Order No. 626-A. The Pesigans
through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case could not have been expected to be cognizant of such an executive order.
of carabaos" (78 OG 3144).
It results that they have a cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos.
Doctor Miranda distributed the carabaos among twenty-five farmers of The summary confiscation was not in order. The recipients of the carabaos
Basud, and to a farmer from the Vinzons municipal nursery (Annex 1). should return them to the Pesigans. However, they cannot transport the
carabaos to Batangas because they are now bound by the said executive
order. Neither can they recover damages. Doctor Miranda and Zenarosa
The Pesigans filed against Zenarosa and Doctor Miranda an action for
acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of the carabaos.
replevin for the recovery of the carabaos allegedly valued at P70,000 and
damages of P92,000. The replevin order could not be executed by the
sheriff. In his order of April 25, 1983 Judge Domingo Medina Angeles, who WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal and the confiscation and
heard the case at Daet and who was later transferred to Caloocan City, dispersal of the carabaos are reversed and set aside. Respondents Miranda
dismissed the case for lack of cause of action. and Zenarosa are ordered to restore the carabaos, with the requisite
documents, to the petitioners, who as owners are entitled to possess the
same, with the right to dispose of them in Basud or Sipocot, Camarines Sur.
The Pesigans appealed to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
No costs.
and section 25 of the Interim Rules and pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440,
a 1968 law which superseded Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines Proclamation No. 2476, as published, but this time excluded Lots 1 and 2
SUPREME COURT of Western Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and
Manila declared the said lots open for disposition under the provisions of R.A. 274
and 730.
FIRST DIVISION
Memorandum Order No. 119, implementing Proclamation No. 172, was
issued on the same day.
G.R. No. 187587 June 5, 2013

Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied some areas of
NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC., Petitioner,
Fort Bonifacio including portions of the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Thus,
vs.
Brigadier General Fredelito Bautista issued General Order No. 1323
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS
creating Task Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to prevent further
OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent.
unauthorized occupation and to cause the demolition of illegal structures
at Fort Bonifacio.
x-----------------------x
On 27 August 1999, members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio
G.R. No. 187654 Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) filed a Petition with the Commission on
Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP), where it was docketed as COSLAP
Case No. 99-434. The Petition prayed for the following: (1) the
WESTERN BICUTAN LOT OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by
reclassification of the areas they occupied, covering Lot 3 of SWO-13-000-
its Board of Directors, Petitioner,
298 of Western Bicutan, from public land to alienable and disposable land
vs.
pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476; (2) the subdivision of the subject lot
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS
by the Director of Lands; and (3) the Land Management Bureau’s
OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent.
facilitation of the distribution and sale of the subject lot to its bona fide
occupants.4
DECISION
On 1 September 2000, petitioner Western Bicutan Lot Owners Association,
SERENO, CJ.: Inc. (WBLOAI) filed a Petition-in-Intervention substantially praying for the
same reliefs as those prayed for by NMSMI with regard to the area the
former then occupied covering Lot 7 of SWO-00-001302 in Western
Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules
Bicutan.5
of Court assailing the Decision1promulgated on 29 April 2009 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97925.
Thus, on 1 September 2006, COSLAP issued a Resolution6 granting the
Petition and declaring the portions of land in question alienable and
THE FACTS
disposable, with Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar-General
dissenting.7
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos
On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos P. was an integral part of Proclamation No. 2476, and was therefore,
Garcia reserved parcels of land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, controlling. The intention of the President could not be defeated by the
Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for a military reservation. The negligence or inadvertence of others. Further, considering that
military reservation, then known as Fort William McKinley, was later on Proclamation
renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio).
No. 2476 was done while the former President was exercising legislative
On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) issued powers, it could not be amended, repealed or superseded, by a mere
Proclamation No. 208, amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a executive enactment. Thus, Proclamation No. 172 could not have
certain area of Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for a national shrine. The superseded much less displaced Proclamation No. 2476, as the latter was
excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga Bayani, which is under the issued on October 16, 1987 when President Aquino’s legislative power had
administration of herein respondent Military Shrine Services – Philippine ceased.
Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-PVAO).
In her Dissenting Opinion, Associate Commissioner Lina AguilarGeneral
Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476, stressed that pursuant to Article 2 of the Civil Code, publication is
further amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded barangaysLower indispensable in every case. Likewise, she held that when the provision of
Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of the law is clear and unambiguous so that there is no occasion for the court
Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for disposition under the to look into legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of
provisions of Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730. judicial addition or subtraction.8 Finally, she maintained that the
Commission had no authority to supply the addendum originally omitted
in the published version of Proclamation No. 2476, as to do so would be
At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a
tantamount to encroaching on the field of the legislature.
handwritten addendum, which reads:

Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 which

"P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan
was denied by the COSLAP in a Resolution dated 24 January 2007.10

(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos"2

MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to reverse the
COSLAP Resolutions dated 1 September 2006 and 24 January 2007.
The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476 was
published in the Official Gazette3 on 3 February 1986, without the above-
Thus, on 29 April 2009, the then Court of Appeals First Division rendered
quoted addendum.
the assailed Decision granting MSS-PVAO’s Petition, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
Years later, on 16 October 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino (President
Aquino) issued Proclamation No. 172 which substantially reiterated
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. However, it is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not
The Resolutions dated September 1, 2006 and January 24, 2007 issued by included when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official
the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems in COSLAP Case No. Gazette.
99-434 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the petitions
of respondents in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are DISMISSED, for lack of
The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as reclassified
merit, as discussed herein. Further, pending urgent motions filed by
and disposable lies in the determination of whether the handwritten
respondents are likewise
addendum of President Marcos has the force and effect of law. In relation
thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
DENIED. SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis in the original)
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
Both NMSMI12 and WBLOAI13 appealed the said Decision by filing their their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.
respective Petitions for Review with this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.
of Court.
Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is indispensable
THE ISSUES to give effect to the law, unless the law itself has otherwise provided. The
phrase "unless otherwise provided" refers to a different effectivity date
other than after fifteen days following the completion of the law’s
Petitioner NMSMI raises the following issues:
publication in the Official Gazette, but does not imply that the requirement
of publication may be dispensed with. The issue of the requirement of
I publication was already settled in the landmark case Tañada v. Hon.
Tuvera,16 in which we had the occasion to rule thus:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 DID NOT INCLUDE Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its
ANY PORTION OF WESTERN BICUTAN AS THE HANDWRITTEN discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or
NOTATION BY PRESIDENT MARCOS ON THE SAID PROCLAMATION WAS extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his
NOT PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE. separate concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil Code which did
not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official
Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not
II
apply because it was "otherwise provided."

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be
ERRED IN RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 172 LIKEWISE EXCLUDED
dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend
THE PORTION OF LAND OCCUPIED BY MEMBER OF HEREIN PETITIONER.
due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that
are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide
III that a law shall become effective immediately upon its approval
notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short
period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a
CONSIDERING THAT THE HON. COSLAP HAS BROAD POWERS TO
failure to comply with it but simply because they did not know of its
RECOMMEND TO THE PRESIDENT >INNOVATIVE MEASURES TO
existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly
RESOLVE EXPEDITIOUSLY VARIOUS LAND CASES.14
supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on
prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may
On the other hand, petitioner WBLOAI raises this sole issue: affect before they can begin to operate.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN xxxx

HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS NOT DECLARED
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE BY VIRTUE OF PROCLAMATION NO. 2476
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general
BECAUSE THE HANDWRITTEN ADDENDUM OF PRESIDENT FERDINAND
application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general
E. MARCOS INCLUDING WESTERN BICUTAN IN PROCLAMATION NO. 2476
albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a
WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE PUBLICATION.15
law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of
President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot
Both Petitions boil down to the principal issue of whether the Court of be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably
Appeals erred in ruling that the subject lots were not alienable and does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter
disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 2476 on the ground that the of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in
handwritten addendum of President Marcos was not included in the the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice.
publication of the said law. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an
intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the
legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest
THE COURT’S RULING
even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the
people only, and not to the public as a whole.
We deny the Petitions for lack of merit.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and
Considering that petitioners were occupying Lots 3 and 7 of Western private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which
Bicutan (subject lots), their claims were anchored on the handwritten shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date
addendum of President Marcos to Proclamation No. 2476. They allege that is fixed by the legislature.
the former President intended to include all Western Bicutan in the
reclassification of portions of Fort Bonifacio as disposable public land
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
when he made a notation just below the printed version of Proclamation
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
No. 2476.
whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
xxxx

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding

that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects
only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be
published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored
individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements.
The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are
meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank
Act which that body is supposed to enforce.

xxxx

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all

since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As
correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number
of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g.,
"with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere
supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication
requirement.1âwphi1 This is not even substantial compliance. This was
the manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY
1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and
interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. The evident
purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.

xxxx

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of
skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious
pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding
unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication
intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The
furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless
the naked blade is drawn. (Emphases supplied)

Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot rely on
a handwritten note that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as
published. Without publication, the note never had any legal force and
effect.

Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative

Code, "the publication of any law, resolution or other official documents in
the Official Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority." Thus,
whether or not President Marcos intended to include Western Bicutan is
not only irrelevant but speculative. Simply put, the courts may not
speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words
appearing in the law.17 This Court cannot rule that a word appears in the
law when, evidently, there is none. In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Hon.
Trajano,18 we ruled that "under Article 8 of the Civil Code, 'judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form
a part of the legal system of the Philippines.' This does not mean, however,
that courts can create law. The courts exist for interpreting the law, not for
enacting it. To allow otherwise would be violative of the principle of
separation of powers, inasmuch as the sole function of our courts is to
apply or interpret the laws, particularly where gaps or lacunae exist or
where ambiguities becloud issues, but it will not arrogate unto itself the
task of legislating." The remedy sought in these Petitions is not judicial
interpretation, but another legislation that would amend the law ‘to
include petitioners' lots in the reclassification.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are hereby

DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 97925 dated 29 April 2009 is AFFIRMED in toto.
Accordingly, this Court's status quo order dated 17 June 2009 is hereby
LIFTED. Likewise, all pending motions to cite respondent in contempt is
DENIED, having been rendered moot. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines (5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies
SUPREME COURT only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a
Manila right for something which when done was lawful; and

EN BANC (6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some

lawful protection to which he has become entitled,
such as the protection of a former conviction or
G.R. No. L-32485 October 22, 1970
acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.3

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF THE

From the aforesaid definition as well as classification of ex post facto laws,
PETITIONER'S RIGHTS AND DUTIES UNDER SEC. 8 OF R.A. No. 6132.
the constitutional inhibition refers only to criminal laws which are given
retroactive effect.4
KAY VILLEGAS KAMI, INC., petitioner.
While it is true that Sec. 18 penalizes a violation of any provision of R.A. No.
6132 including Sec. 8(a) thereof, the penalty is imposed only for acts
committed after the approval of the law and not those perpetrated prior
thereto. There is nothing in the law that remotely insinuates that Secs. 8(a)
MAKASIAR, J.:.
and 18, or any other provision thereof, shall apply to acts carried out prior
to its approval. On the contrary, See. 23 directs that the entire law shall be
This petition for declaratory relief was filed by Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., effective upon its approval. It was approved on August 24, 1970.
claiming to be a duly recognized and existing non-stock and non-profit
corporation created under the laws of the land, and praying for a
WHEREFORE, the prayer of the petition is hereby denied and paragraph 1
determination of the validity of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6132 and a declaration of
of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is not unconstitutional. Without costs.
petitioner's rights and duties thereunder. In paragraph 7 of its petition,
petitioner avers that it has printed materials designed to propagate its
ideology and program of government, which materials include Annex B;
and that in paragraph 11 of said petition, petitioner intends to pursue its
purposes by supporting delegates to the Constitutional Convention who
will propagate its ideology.

Petitioner, in paragraph 7 of its petition, actually impugns because it

quoted, only the first paragraph of Sec. 8(a) on the ground that it violates
the due process clause, right of association, and freedom of expression and
that it is an ex post facto law.

The first three grounds were overruled by this Court when it held that the
questioned provision is a valid limitation on the due process, freedom of
expression, freedom of association, freedom of assembly and equal
protection clauses; for the same is designed to prevent the clear and
present danger of the twin substantive evils, namely, the prostitution of
electoral process and denial of the equal protection of the laws. Moreover,
under the balancing-of-interests test, the cleansing of the electoral process,
the guarantee of equal change for all candidates, and the independence of
the delegates who must be "beholden to no one but to God, country and
conscience," are interests that should be accorded primacy.1

The petitioner should therefore be accordingly guided by the

pronouncements in the cases of Imbong and Gonzales.2

The claim of petitioner that the challenged provision constitutes an ex post

facto law is likewise untenable.

An ex post facto law is one which:.

(1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of

the law and which was innocent when done, and
punishes such an act;

(2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it

was, when committed;

(3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater

punishment than the law annexed to the crime when
committed;

(4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes

conviction upon less or different testimony than the
law required at the time of the commission of the
offense;
Republic of the Philippines The city court has original jurisdiction over the case because the
SUPREME COURT penultimate paragraph or section 87 of the Judiciary Law, as amended by
Manila Republic Acts Nos. 2613 and 3828, provides that "judges of city courts shall
have like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged
with an offense committed within their respective jurisdictions, in which
SECOND DIVISION
the penalty provided by law does not exceed prision correccional or
imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding six
G.R. No. L-46228 January 17, 1978 thousand pesos or both."

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, As section 87 itself shows, that jurisdiction is concurrent with the court of
vs. First Instance which is empowered to try "all criminal cases in which the
HON. ROLANDO R. VILLARAZA (as City Judge of Cagayan de Oro City), penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a
and CAESAR PUERTO, respondents. fine of more than two hundred pesos" (Sec. 44[f], Judiciary Law. See People
vs. Nazareno, L-40037, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA 531).
Francisco P. Rabanes, Edgardo Y. Raagas, Casiano A. Gamotin, Jr., Office of
the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City for petitioner. It was not necessary for the city court to have conducted the preliminary
investigation of the case. The filing of the information by the fiscal
presupposes that he had conducted the requisite preliminary investigation
Eric Menchavez for respondent Caesar Puerto.
pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Republic Act No. 5180, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 77.

WHEREFORE, the order of the Court of First Instance, returning the case to
AQUINO, J.: the city court, is affirmed and the two orders of the respondent city judge,
elevating the case to the Court of First Instance, are set aside. The city court
is directed to try the case. No costs.
This case is about the jurisdiction of a city court in estafa cases.

SO ORDERED.
On December 3, 1975 an assistant city fiscal charged Caesar Puerto with
estafa in the city court of Cagayan de Oro City for having issued on October
16, 1974 two bouncing checks for the total sum of P4, 966. 63 (Criminal Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio and Concepcion Jr., JJ., concur.
Case No. 32140).
Santos, J., is on leave.
City Judge Rolando R. Villaraza in his order March 31, 1976 noted that the
accused had waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. He
directed that the case be elevated, for trial, to the court of First Instance or
the Circuit Criminal Court.

Upon petition of the prosecution, the Court of first Instance of Misamis

Oriental, Cagayan de Oro Branch VIII, in its order of February 3, 1977
returned the case to the city court because in its opinion the case falls
within the concurrent jurisdiction of the two courts and, the city court, as
the first court which took cognizance of the case, should try it.

Disagreeing with the Court of First Instance, respondent city judge in his
order of April 21, 1977 directed the re-elevation of the case. His view is
that the case falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance because estafa committed by the accused is punishable
by prision mayor medium under Presidential Decree No. 818 which took
effect on October 22, 1975 and which amended article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code.

That order of respondent judge is assailed in the petition for certiorari filed
in this Court on May 27, 1977 by the office of the city fiscal of Cagayan de
Oro City.

We hold that the case was properly filed with the city court which has
original jurisdiction over it. The estafa imputed to Caesar Puerto is
punishable under article 315 of the Revised Penal Code by arresto
mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum or four months and one
day to two years and four months.

The penalty of prision mayor medium, or eight years and one day to ten
years, imposed by Presidential Decree No. 818, applies only to swindling
by means of issuing bouncing checks which was committed or after
October 22, 1975.

That increased penalty does not apply to the estafa committed by Puerto
on October 16, 1974. To apply it to Puerto would make the decree an ex
post facto law. Its retroactive application is prohibited by articles 21 and
22 of the Revised Penal Code and section 12, Article IV of the Constitution.
Republic of the Philippines of the constitution which prohibit the adoption of a law "impairing the
SUPREME COURT obligation of contract." (8 Cyc., 996; 12 Corpus Juris, 1058-1059.)
Manila
The obligation of the contract is the law which binds the parties to perform
EN BANC their agreement if it is not contrary to the law of the land, morals or public
order. That law must govern and control the contract in every aspect in
which it is intended to bear upon it, whether it affect its validity,
G.R. No. L-18208 February 14, 1922
construction, or discharge. Any law which enlarges, abridges, or in any
manner changes the intention of the parties, necessarily impairs the
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, contract itself. If a law impairs the obligation of a contract, it is prohibited
vs. by the Jones Law, and is null and void. The laws in force in the Philippine
VICENTE DIAZ CONDE and APOLINARIA R. DE CONDE, defendants- Islands prior to any legislation by the American sovereignty, prohibited the
appellants. Legislature from giving to any penal law a retroactive effect unless such
law was favorable to the person accused. (Articles 21 and 22, Penal Code.)
Araneta & Zaragoza for appellants.
Attorney-General Villareal for appellee. A law imposing a new penalty, or a new liability or disability, or giving a
new right of action, must not be construed as having a retroactive effect. It
is an elementary rule of contract that the laws in force at the time the
JOHNSON, J.:
contract was made must govern its interpretation and application. Laws
must be construed prospectively and not retrospectively. If a contract is
It appears from the record that on the 6th day of May, 1921, a complaint legal at its inception, it cannot be rendered illegal by any subsequent
was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, charging legislation. If that were permitted then the obligations of a contract might
the defendants with a violation of the Usury Law (Act No. 2655). Upon said be impaired, which is prohibited by the organic law of the Philippine
complaint they were each arrested, arraigned, and pleaded not guilty. The Islands. (U.S. vs. Constantino Tan Quingco Chua, 39 Phil., 552; Aguilar vs.
cause was finally brought on for trial on the 1st day of September, 1921. At Rubiato and Gonzales Vila, 40 Phil., 570.)
the close of the trial, and after a consideration of the evidence adduced, the
Honorable M. V. del Rosario, judge, found that the defendants were guilty
Ex post facto laws, unless they are favorable to the defendant, are
of the crime charged in the complaint and sentenced each of them to pay a
prohibited in this jurisdiction. Every law that makes an action, done before
fine of P120 and, in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment
the passage of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal, and
in accordance with the provisions of the law. From that sentence each of
punishes such action, is an ex post facto law. In the present case Act No.
the defendants appealed to this court.
2655 made an act which had been done before the law was adopted, a
criminal act, and to make said Act applicable to the act complained of
The appellants now contend: (a) That the contract upon which the alleged would be to give it an ex post facto operation. The Legislature is prohibited
usurious interest was collected was executed before Act No. 2655 was from adopting a law which will make an act done before its adoption a
adopted; (b) that at the time said contract was made (December 30, 1915), crime. A law may be given a retroactive effect in civil action, providing it is
there was no usury law in force in the Philippine Islands; (c) that said Act curative in character, but ex post facto laws are absolutely prohibited
No. 2655 did not become effective until the 1st day of May, 1916, or four unless its retroactive effect is favorable to the defendant.
months and a half after the contract in question was executed; (d) that said
law could have no retroactive effect or operation, and (e) that said law
For the reason, therefore, that the acts complained of in the present case
impairs the obligation of a contract, and that for all of said reasons the
were legal at the time of their occurrence, they cannot be made criminal by
judgment imposed by the lower court should be revoked; that the
any subsequent or ex post facto legislation. What the courts may say,
complaint should be dismissed, and that they should each be discharged
considering the provisions of article 1255 of the Civil Code, when a civil
from the custody of the law.
action is brought upon said contract, cannot now be determined. A contract
may be annulled by the courts when it is shown that it is against morals or
The essential facts constituting the basis of the criminal action are not in public order.
dispute, and may be stated as follows: (1) That on the 30th day of
December, 1915, the alleged offended persons Bartolome Oliveros and
For all of the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion, and so decide, that
Engracia Lianco executed and delivered to the defendants a contract
the acts complained of by the defendants did not constitute a crime at the
(Exhibit B) evidencing the fact that the former had borrowed from the
time they were committed, and therefore the sentence of the lower court
latter the sum of P300, and (2) that, by virtue of the terms of said contract,
should be, and is hereby, revoked; and it is hereby ordered and decreed
the said Bartolome Oliveros and Engracia Lianco obligated themselves to
that the complaint be dismissed, and that the defendants be discharged
pay to the defendants interest at the rate of five per cent (5%) per month,
from the custody of the law, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
payable within the first ten days of each and every month, the first payment
to be made on the 10th day of January, 1916. There were other terms in
the contract which, however, are not important for the decision in the Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ.,
present case. concur.

The lower court, in the course of its opinion, stated that at the time of the
execution and delivery of said contract (Exhibit B), there was no law in
force in the Philippine Islands punishing usury; but, inasmuch as the
defendants had collected a usurious rate of interest after the adoption of
the Usury Law in the Philippine Islands (Act No. 2655), they were guilty of
a violation of that law and should be punished in accordance with its
provisions.

The law, we think, is well established that when a contract contains an

obligation to pay interest upon the principal, the interest thereby becomes
part of the principal and is included within the promise to pay. In other
words, the obligation to pay interest on money due under a contract, be it
express or implied, is a part of the obligation of the contract. Laws adopted
after the execution of a contract, changing or altering the rate of interest,
cannot be made to apply to such contract without violating the provisions
Republic of the Philippines Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed
SUPREME COURT with the same court, sharing the respondent Nilo Tayag and five
Manila others with subversion. After preliminary investigation was had,
an information was filed, which, as amended, reads:
EN BANC
The undersigned provincial Fiscal of Tarlac and State Prosecutors
duly designated by the Secretary of Justice to collaborate with the
G.R. Nos. L-32613-14 December 27, 1972
Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac, pursuant to the Order dated June 5,
above entitled case, hereby accuse Nilo S. Tayag, alias Romy Reyes
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, alias TABA, ARTHUR GARCIA, RENATO (REY) CASIPE, ABELARDO
vs. GARCIA, MANUEL ALAVADO, BENJAMIN BIE alias COMMANDER
HON. SIMEON. FERRER (in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First MELODY and several JOHN DOES, whose identities are still
Instance of Tarlac, Branch I), FELICIANO CO alias LEONCIO CO alias unknown, for violation of REPUBLIC ACT No. 1700, otherwise
"Bob," and NILO S. TAYAG alias Romy Reyes alias "Taba," respondents. known as the Anti-Subversion Law, committed as follows:

Solicitor R. Mutuc for respondent Feliciano Co. That in or about March 1969 and for sometime prior thereto and
thereafter, in the Province of Tarlac, within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, and elsewhere in the Philippines, the above-
Jose W. Diokno for respondent Nilo Tayag.
named accused knowingly, willfully and by overt acts organized,
joined and/or remained as offices and/or ranking leaders, of the
KABATAANG MAKABAYAN, a subversive organization as defined
in Republic Act No. 1700; that BENJAMIN BIE and COMMANDER
MELODY, in addition thereto, knowingly, willfully and by over acts
CASTRO, J.:p
joined and/or remained as a member and became an officer
and/or ranking leader not only of the Communist Party of the
I. Statement of the Case Philippines but also of the New People's Army, the military arm of
the Communist Party of the Philippines; and that all the above-
named accused, as such officers and/or ranking leaders of the
Posed in issue in these two cases is the constitutionality of the Anti-
aforestated subversive organizations, conspiring, confederating
Subversion
and mutually helping one another, did then and there knowingly,
Act,1 which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines and other
willfully and feloniously commit subversive and/or seditious acts,
"subversive associations," and punishes any person who "knowingly,
by inciting, instigating and stirring the people to unite and rise
willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a
publicly and tumultuously and take up arms against the
member" of the Party or of any other similar "subversive" organization.
government, and/or engage in rebellious conspiracies and riots to
overthrow the government of the Republic of the Philippines by
On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti- force, violence, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal means
Subversion Act was filed against the respondent Feliciano Co in the Court among which are the following:
of First Instance of Tarlac. On March 10 Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted
a preliminary investigation and, finding a prima facie case against Co,
1. On several occasions within the province of Tarlac, the accused
directed the Government prosecutors to file the corresponding
conducted meetings and/or seminars wherein the said accused
information. The twice-amended information, docketed as Criminal Case
delivered speeches instigating and inciting the people to unite, rise
No. 27, recites:
in arms and overthrow the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, by force, violence, deceit, subversion and/or other
That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the illegal means; and toward this end, the said accused organized,
Municipality of Capas, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within among others a chapter of the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN in barrio
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, Motrico, La Paz, Tarlac for the avowed purpose of undertaking or
feloniously became an officer and/or ranking leader of the promoting an armed revolution, subversive and/or seditious
Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal propaganda, conspiracies, and/or riots and/or other illegal means
organization aimed to overthrow the Government of the to discredit and overthrow the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion, or any Philippines and to established in the Philippines a Communist
other illegal means for the purpose of establishing in the regime.
Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing the government
under the control and domination of an alien power, by being an
2. The accused NILO TAYAG alias ROMY REYES alias TABA,
instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University, the training school of
together with FRANCISCO PORTEM alias KIKO Gonzales and
recruits of the New People's Army, the military arm of the said
others, pursued the above subversive and/or seditious activities in
Communist Party of the Philippines.
San Pablo City by recruiting members for the New People's Army,
and/or by instigating and inciting the people to organize and unite
That in the commission of the above offense, the following for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Republic
aggravating circumstances are present, to wit: of the Philippines through armed revolution, deceit, subversion
and/or other illegal means, and establishing in the Philippines a
Communist Government.
(a) That the crime has been committed in contempt of or with
insult to public authorities;
That the following aggravating circumstances
(b) That the crime was committed by a band; and afford impunity. attended the commission of the offense: (a) aid of
armed men or persons to insure or afford impunity;
and (b) craft, fraud, or disguise was employed.
(c) With the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford
impunity.
On July 21, 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the
statute on the grounds that (1) it is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it
Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a embraces more than one subject not expressed in the title thereof; and (4)
bill of attainder. it denied him the equal protection of the laws.
Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in its resolution governing body of any labor organization. As the Supreme Court of the
of September 15, 1970, declared the statute void on the grounds that it is a United States pointed out:
bill of attainder and that it is vague and overboard, and dismissed the
informations against the two accused. The Government appealed. We
Under the line of cases just outlined, sec. 504 of the Labor
resolved to treat its appeal as a special civil action for certiorari.
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act plainly constitutes a bill
of attainder. Congress undoubtedly possesses power under the
II. Is the Act a Bill of Attainder? Commerce Clause to enact legislation designed to keep from
positions affecting interstate commerce persons who may use of
such positions to bring about political strikes. In section 504,
Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder
however, Congress has exceeded the authority granted it by the
or ex port facto law shall be enacted."2 A bill of attainder is a legislative act
Constitution. The statute does not set forth a generally applicable
which inflicts punishment without trial.3 Its essence is the substitution of
rule decreeing that any person who commits certain acts or
a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. 4 The constitutional ban
possesses certain characteristics (acts and characteristics which, in
against bills of attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of
Congress' view, make them likely to initiate political strikes) shall
powers 5 by confining legislatures to
not hold union office, and leaves to courts and juries the job of
rule-making 6 and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial
deciding what persons have committed the specified acts or
function.7 History in perspective, bills of attainder were employed to
possessed the specified characteristics. Instead, it designates in no
suppress unpopular causes and political minorities, 8 and it is against this
uncertain terms the persons who possess the feared
evil that the constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling out of a
characteristics and therefore cannot hold union office without
definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent,
incurring criminal liability — members of the Communist Party.
suffice to stigmatizea statute as a bill of attainder. 9

Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 US 1, 6

In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act was condemned by the court a
L ed 2d 625, 81 S CT 1357, lend a support to our conclusion. That
quo as a bill of attainder because it "tars and feathers" the Communist
case involved an appeal from an order by the Control Board
Party of the Philippines as a "continuing menace to the freedom and
ordering the Communist Party to register as a "Communist-action
security of the country; its existence, a 'clear, present and grave danger to
organization," under the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950,
the security of the Philippines.'" By means of the Act, the trial court said,
64 Stat 987, 50 USC sec. 781 et seq. (1958 ed). The definition of
Congress usurped "the powers of the judge," and assumed "judicial
"Communist-action organization" which the Board is to apply is set
magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CCP without any of the forms or
forth in sec. 3 of the Act:
safeguards of judicial trial." Finally, according to the trial court, "if the only
issue [to be determined] is whether or not the accused is a knowing and
voluntary member, the law is still a bill of attainder because it has [A]ny organization in the United States ... which (i)is substantially
expressly created a presumption of organizational guilt which the accused directed, dominated, or controlled by the foreign government or
can never hope to overthrow." foreign organization controlling the world Communist movement
referred to in section 2 of this title, and(ii) operates primarily to
advance the objectives of such world Communist movement... 64
1. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does
Stat 989, 50 USC sec. 782 (1958 ed.)
not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof
for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party
to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the A majority of the Court rejected the argument that the Act was a bill
purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4, against membership in the of attainder, reasoning that sec. 3 does not specify the persons or
outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party of the Philippines" groups upon which the deprivations setforth in the Act are to be
issued solely for definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to imposed, but instead sets forth a general definition. Although the
the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any other organization Board has determined in 1953 that the Communist Party was a
having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on "Communist-action organization," the Court found the statutory
individuals but on conduct. 10 definition not to be so narrow as to insure that the Party would
always come within it:
This feature of the Act distinguishes it from section 504 of the U.S. Federal
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 11 which, in U.S. In this proceeding the Board had found, and the Court of Appeals
vs. Brown, 12 was held to be a bill of attainder and therefore has sustained its conclusion, that the Communist Party, by virtud of
unconstitutional. Section 504 provided in its pertinent parts as follows: the activities in which it now engages, comes within the terms of the
Act. If the Party should at anytime choose to abandon these
activities, after it is once registered pursuant to sec. 7, the Act
(a) No person who is or has been a member of the
provides adequate means of relief. (367 US, at 87, 6 L ed 2d at 683)
Communist
Party ... shall serve —
Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally
unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without
(1) as an officer, director, trustee, member of any
more, would suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is
executive board or similar governing body, business
that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The Government has
agent, manager, organizer, or other employee (other
yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly,
than as an employee performing exclusively clerical
willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its
or custodial duties) of any labor organization.
subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic objective,
i.e., to overthrow the existing Government by force deceit, and other illegal
during or for five years after the termination of his means and place the country under the control and domination of a foreign
membership in the Communist Party.... power.

(b) Any person who willfully violates this section As to the claim that under the statute organizationl guilt is nonetheless
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned imputed despite the requirement of proof of knowing membership in the
for not more than one year, or both. Party, suffice it to say that is precisely the nature of conspiracy, which has
been referred to as a "dragneet device" whereby all who participate in the
criminal covenant are liable. The contention would be correct if the statute
This statute specified the Communist Party, and imposes disability and
were construed as punishing mere membership devoid of any specific
penalties on its members. Membership in the Party, without more, ipso
intent to further the unlawful goals of the Party. 13 But the statute
facto disqualifies a person from becoming an officer or a member of the
specifically required that membership must be knowing or active, with
specific intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party. That is what
section 4 means when it requires that membership, to be unlawful, must secret. But we hear no complaint against them regarding
be shown to have been acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt violation of the peace or interfering with the rights of others."
acts." 14 The ingredient of specific intent to pursue the unlawful goals of the Another of the courts said: "It is a matter of common knowledge
Party must be shown by "overt acts." 15 This constitutes an element of that the association or organization of which the relator is
"membership" distinct from the ingredient of guilty knowledge. The concededly a member exercises activities tending to the
former requires proof of direct participation in the organization's unlawful prejudice and intimidation of sundry classes of our citizens. But
activities, while the latter requires proof of mere adherence to the the legislation is not confined to this society;" and later said of
organization's illegal objectives. the other class: "Labor unions have a recognized lawful purpose.
The benevolent orders mentioned in the Benevolent Orders Law
have already received legislative scrutiny and have been
2. Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not
granted special privileges so that the legislature may well
activities, this feature is not enough to render it a bill of attainder. A statute
consider them beneficial rather than harmful agencies." The
prohibiting partners or employees of securities underwriting firms from
third court, after recognizing "the potentialities of evil in secret
serving as officers or employees of national banks on the basis of a
societies," and observing that "the danger of certain
legislative finding that the persons mentioned would be subject to the
organizations has been judicially demonstrated," — meaning in
temptation to commit acts deemed inimical to the national economy, has
that state, — said: "Benevolent orders, labor unions and college
been declared not to be a bill of attainder. 16 Similarly, a statute requiring
fraternities have existed for many years, and, while not immune
every secret, oath-bound society having a membership of at least twenty
from hostile criticism, have on the whole justified their
to register, and punishing any person who becomes a member of such
existence."
society which fails to register or remains a member thereof, was declared
valid even if in its operation it was shown to apply only to the members of
the Ku Klux Klan. 17 We assume that the legislature had before it such information
as was readily available including the published report of a
hearing, before a committee of the House of Representatives of
In the Philippines the validity of section 23 (b) of the Industrial Peace
the 57th Congress relating to the formation, purposes and
Act, 18 requiring labor unions to file with the Department of Labor
activities of the Klu Klux Klan. If so it was advised — putting
affidavits of union officers "to the effect that they are not members of the
aside controverted evidence — that the order was a revival of
Communist Party and that they are not members of any organization which
the Ku Klux Klan of an earlier time with additional features
teaches the overthrow of the Government by force or by any illegal or
borrowed from the Know Nothing and the A. P. A. orders of
unconstitutional method," was upheld by this Court. 19
other periods; that its memberships was limited to native-born,
gentile, protestant whites; that in part of its constitution and
Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to printed creed it proclaimed the widest freedom for all and full
easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict adherence to the Constitution of the United States; in another
punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of exacted of its member an oath to shield and preserve "white
attainder. 20 It is upon this ground that statutes which disqualified those supremacy;" and in still another declared any person actively
who had taken part in the rebellion against the Government of the United opposing its principles to be "a dangerous ingredient in the body
States during the Civil War from holding office, 21 or from exercising their politic of our country and an enemy to the weal of our national
profession, 22 or which prohibited the payment of further compensation to commonwealth;" that it was conducting a crusade against
individuals named in the Act on the basis of a finding that they had engages Catholics, Jews, and Negroes, and stimulating hurtful religious
in subversive activities, 23 or which made it a crime for a member of the and race prejudices; that it was striving for political power and
Communist Party to serve as an officer or employee of a labor assuming a sort of guardianship over the administration of local,
union, 24 have been invalidated as bills of attainder. state and national affairs; and that at times it was taking into its
own hands the punishment of what some of its members
conceived to be crimes. 27
But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally
acknowledged to be certain as to be "judicially noticeable," the legislature
may apply its own rules, and judicial hearing is not needed fairly to make In the Philippines the character of the Communist Party has been the object
such determination. 25 of continuing scrutiny by this Court. In 1932 we found the Communist
Party of the Philippines to be an illegal association. 28 In 1969 we again
found that the objective of the Party was the "overthrow of the Philippine
In New York ex rel. Bryant vs. Zimmerman, 26 the New York legislature
Government by armed struggle and to establish in the Philippines a
passed a law requiring every secret, oath-bound society with a
communist form of government similar to that of Soviet Russia and Red
membership of at least twenty to register, and punishing any person who
China." 29 More recently, in Lansang vs. Garcia, 30 we noted the growth of
joined or remained a member of such a society failing to register. While the
the Communist Party of the Philippines and the organization of Communist
statute did not specify the Ku Klux Klan, in its operation the law applied to
fronts among youth organizations such as the Kabataang Makabayan (KM)
the KKK exclusively. In sustaining the statute against the claim that it
and the emergence of the New People's Army. After meticulously
discriminated against the Ku Klux Klan while exempting other secret, oath-
reviewing the evidence, we said: "We entertain, therefore, no doubts about
bound organizations like masonic societies and the Knights of Columbus,
the existence of a sizeable group of men who have publicly risen in arms to
the United States Supreme Court relied on common knowledge of the
overthrow the government and have thus been and still are engaged in
nature and activities of the Ku Klux Klan. The Court said:
rebellion against the Government of the Philippines.

The courts below recognized the principle shown in the cases

3. Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that
just cited and reached the conclusion that the classification was
it may fall within the ambit of the prohibition against bills of attainder. It is
justified by a difference between the two classes of associations
also necessary that it must apply retroactively and reach past conduct. This
shown by experience, and that the difference consisted (a) in a
requirement follows from the nature of a bill of attainder as a legislative
manifest tendency on the part of one class to make the secrecy
adjudication of guilt. As Justice Frankfurter observed, "frequently a bill of
surrounding its purpose and membership a cloak for acts and
attainder was ... doubly objectionable because of its ex post facto features.
conduct inimical to personal rights and public welfare, and (b)
This is the historic explanation for uniting the two mischiefs in one
in the absence of such a tendency on the part of the other class.
clause — 'No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.' ...
In pointing out this difference one of the courts said of the Ku
Therefore, if [a statute] is a bill of attainder it is also an ex post facto law.
Klux Klan, the principal association in the included class: "It is a
But if it is not an ex post facto law, the reasons that establish that it is not
matter of common knowledge that this organization functions
are persuasive that it cannot be a bill of attainder." 31
largely at night, its members disguised by hoods and gowns and
doing things calculated to strike terror into the minds of the
people;" and later said of the other class: "These organizations Thus in Gardner vs. Board of Public Works, 32 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
and their purposes are well known, many of them having been the validity of the Charter of the City of Los Angeles which provided:
in existence for many years. Many of them are oath-bound and
 ... [N]o person shall hold or retain or be eligible for such renunciationshall operate to exempt such persons from
any public office or employment in the service of the penalliability. 34 The penalties prescribed by the Act are thereforenot
City of Los Angeles, in any office or department inescapable.
thereof, either elective or appointive, who has within
five (5) years prior to the effective date of this section
III. The Act and the Requirements of Due Process
advised, advocated, or taught, or who may, after this
section becomes effective, become a member of or
affiliated with any group, society, association, 1. As already stated, the legislative declaration in section 2 of the Act that
organization or party which advises, advocates or the Communist Party of the Philippinesis an organized conspiracy for the
teaches or has within said period of five (5) years overthrow of theGovernment is inteded not to provide the basis for a
advised, advocated, or taught the overthrow by force legislativefinding of guilt of the members of the Party butrather to justify
or violence of the Government of the United States of the proscription spelled out in section 4. Freedom of expression and
America or of the State of California. freedom of association are sofundamental that they are thought by some
to occupy a"preferred position" in the hierarchy of constitutional
values. 35 Accordingly, any limitation on their exercise mustbe justified by
In upholding the statute, the Court stressed the prospective application of
the existence of a substantive evil. This isthe reason why before enacting
the Act to the petitioner therein, thus:
the statute in question Congressconducted careful investigations and then
stated itsfindings in the preamble, thus:
... Immaterial here is any opinion we might have as to
the charter provision insofar as it purported to apply
... [T]he Communist Party of the Philippines
restrospectively for a five-year period to its effective
althoughpurportedly a political party, is in fact an organized
date. We assume that under the Federal Constitution
conspiracyto overthrow the Government of the Republic of
the Charter Amendment is valid to the extent that it
the Philippinesnot only by force and violence but also by
bars from the city's public service persons who,
deceit, subversionand other illegal means, for the purpose of
subsequently to its adoption in 1941, advise,
establishing in thePhilippines a totalitarian regime subject to
advocate, or reach the violent overthrow of the
alien dominationand control;
Government or who are or become affiliated with any
group doing so. The provisions operating thus
prospectively were a reasonable regulation to ... [T]he continued existence and activities of the
protect the municipal service by establishing an CommunistParty of the Philippines constitutes a clear,
employment qualification of loyalty to the State and present andgrave danger to the security of the Philippines;
the United States.
... [I]n the face of the organized, systematice and
... Unlike the provisions of the charter and ordinance persistentsubversion, national in scope but international in
under which petitioners were removed, the statute in direction,posed by the Communist Party of the Philippines
the Lovett case did not declare general and and its activities,there is urgent need for special legislation to
prospectively operative standards of qualification cope withthis continuing menace to the freedom and security
and eligibility for public employment. Rather, by its of the country.
terms it prohibited any further payment of
compensationto named individuals or employees.
In truth, the constitutionality of the Act would be opento question if,
Under these circumstances, viewed against the
instead of making these findings in enactingthe statute, Congress omitted
legislative background, the statutewas held to have
to do so.
imposed penalties without judicial trial.

In saying that by means of the Act Congress has assumed judicial

Indeed, if one objection to the bill of attainder is thatCongress thereby
magistracy, the trial courd failed to takeproper account of the distinction
assumed judicial magistracy, them it mustbe demonstrated that the statute
between legislative fact and adjudicative fact. Professor Paul Freund
claimed to be a bill of attainderreaches past conduct and that the penalties
elucidatesthe crucial distinction, thus:
it imposesare inescapable. As the U.S. Supreme Court observedwith
respect to the U.S. Federal Subversive Activities ControlAct of 1950:
... A law forbidding the sale of beverages containingmore than
3.2 per cent of alcohol would raise a question of
Nor is the statute made an act of "outlawry" or of
legislativefact, i.e., whether this standard has a reasonable
attainderby the fact that the conduct which it
relationto public health, morals, and the enforcement
regulates is describedwith such particularity that, in
problem. Alaw forbidding the sale of intoxicating beverages
probability, few organizationswill come within the
(assuming itis not so vague as to require supplementation by
statutory terms. Legislatures may act tocurb
rule-making)would raise a question of adjudicative fact, i.e.,
behaviour which they regard as harmful to the public
whether thisor that beverage is intoxicating within the
welfare,whether that conduct is found to be engaged
meaning of the statuteand the limits on governmental action
in by manypersons or by one. So long as the incidence
imposed by the Constitution. Of course what we mean by fact
of legislation issuch that the persons who engage in
in each case is itselfan ultimate conclusion founded on
the regulated conduct, bethey many or few, can
underlying facts and oncriteria of judgment for weighing
escape regulation merely by altering thecourse of
them.
their own present activities, there can be no
complaintof an attainder. 33
A conventional formulation is that legislative facts — those
facts which are relevant to the legislative judgment — will not
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of theAnti-Subversion Act.
be canvassed save to determine whether there is a
Section 4 thereof expressly statesthat the prohibition therein applies only
rationalbasis for believing that they exist, while
to acts committed"After the approval of this Act." Only those who
adjudicativefacts — those which tie the legislative enactment
"knowingly,willfully and by overt acts affiliate themselves with,become or
to the litigant — are to be demonstrated and found according
remain members of the Communist Party of thePhilippines and/or its
to the ordinarystandards prevailing for judicial trials. 36
successors or of any subversive association"after June 20, 1957, are
punished. Those whowere members of the Party or of any other subversive
associationat the time of the enactment of the law, weregiven the The test formulated in Nebbia vs. new York, 37 andadopted by this Court
opportunity of purging themselves of liability byrenouncing in writing and in Lansang vs. Garcia, 38 is that 'if laws are seen to have a reasonable
under oath their membershipin the Party. The law expressly provides that relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial contemplated is "overthrow not only by forceand violence but also be
determination to that effect renders a court functus officio." The recital of deceit, subversion and other illegalmeans." The absence of this qualificatio
legislative findings implements this test. in section 2 appearsto be due more to an oversight rather than to
deliberateomission.
With respect to a similar statement of legislative findingsin the U.S. Federal
Subversive Activities Control Actof 1950 (that "Communist-action Moreover, the word "overthrow' sufficiently connotesthe use of violent
organizations" are controlledby the foreign government controlling the and other illegal means. Only in a metaphoricalsense may one speak of
worldCommunist movement and that they operate primarily to"advance peaceful overthrow ofgovernments, and certainly the law does not speak
the objectives of such world Communist movement"),the U.S. Supreme in metaphors.In the case of the Anti-Subversion Act, the use ofthe word
Court said: "overthrow" in a metaphorical sense is hardlyconsistent with the clearly
delineated objective of the "overthrow,"namely, "establishing in the
Philippines a totalitarianregime and place [sic] the Government under
It is not for the courts to reexamine the validity of theselegislative
thecontrol and domination of an alien power." What thisCourt once said in
findings and reject them....They are the productof extensive
a prosecution for sedition is appropos: "The language used by the appellant
investigation by Committes of Congress over morethan a decade
clearly imported anoverthrow of the Government by violence, and it
and a half. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.502, 516, 530. We
should beinterpreted in the plain and obvious sense in which it
certainly cannot dismiss them as unfoundedirrational
wasevidently intended to be understood. The word 'overthrow'could not
imaginings. ... And if we accept them, as we mustas a not
have been intended as referring to an ordinarychange by the exercise of
unentertainable appraisal by Congress of the threatwhich
the elective franchise. The useof the whip [which the accused exhorted his
Communist organizations pose not only to existing governmentin
audience to useagainst the Constabulary], an instrument designed toleave
the United States, but to the United States as asovereign,
marks on the sides of adversaries, is inconsistentwith the mild
independent Nation. ...we must recognize that thepower of
interpretation which the appellant wouldhave us impute to the
Congress to regulate Communist organizations of thisnature is
language." 45
extensive. 39

IV. The Act and the Guaranty of Free Expression

This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of thelegislative findings
articulated in the Anti-Subversion Act.
As already pointed out, the Act is aimed against conspiracies to overthrow
the Government by force, violence orother illegal means. Whatever
That the Government has a right to protect itself againstsubversion is a
interest in freedom of speechand freedom of association is infringed by the
proposition too plain to require elaboration.Self-preservation is the
prohibitionagainst knowing membership in the Communist Party ofthe
"ultimate value" of society. It surpasses and transcendes every other value,
Philippines, is so indirect and so insubstantial as to beclearly and heavily
"forif a society cannot protect its very structure from armedinternal attack,
outweighed by the overriding considerationsof national security and the
...no subordinate value can be protected" 40 As Chief Justice Vinson so aptly
preservartion of democraticinstitutions in his country.
said in Dennis vs. United States: 41

The membership clause of the U.S. Federal Smith Actis similar in many
Whatever theoretical merit there may be to the
respects to the membership provision ofthe Anti-Subversion Act. The
argumentthat there is a 'right' to rebellion against
former provides:
dictatorial governmentsis without force where the existing
structure of government provides for peaceful and orderly
change. We rejectany principle of governmental Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize
helplessness in the face of preparationfor revolution, which anysociety, group, or assembly of persons who teach,
principle, carried to its logical conclusion,must lead to advocate, orencourage the overthrow or destruction of any
anarchy. No one could conceive that it isnot within the such governmentby force or violence; or becomes or is a
power of Congress to prohibit acts intended tooverthrow member of, or affiliatedwith, any such society, group or
the government by force and violence. assembly of persons, knowingthe purpose thereof —

2. By carefully delimiting the reach of the Act to conduct (as explicitly Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned notmore
described in sectin 4 thereof), Congressreaffirmed its respect for the rule than twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible for
that "even throughthe governmental purpose be legitimate and emplymentby the United States or any department or
substantial,that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly agencythereof, for the five years next following his
stiflefundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly conviction.... 46
achieved." 42 The requirement of knowing membership,as distinguished
from nominal membership, hasbeen held as a sufficient basis for
In sustaining the validity of this provision, the "Court said in Scales vs.
penalizing membershipin a subversive organization. 43 For, as has been
United States: 47
stated:

It was settled in Dennis that advocacy with which we

Membership in an organization renders aid and
arehere concerned is not constitutionally protected speech,
encouragement to the organization; and when membership
and itwas further established that a combination to promote
is acceptedor retained with knowledge that the
suchadvocacy, albeit under the aegis of what purports to be
organization is engaged inan unlawful purpose, the one
a politicalparty, is not such association as is protected by the
accepting or retaining membershipwith such knowledge
firstAmendment. We can discern no reason why
makes himself a party to the unlawfulenterprise in which it
membership, whenit constitutes a purposeful form of
is engaged. 44
complicity in a group engagingin this same forbidden
advocacy, should receive anygreater degree of protection
3. The argument that the Act is unconstitutionallyoverbroad because from the guarantees of that Amendment.
section 2 merely speaks of "overthrow"of the Government and overthrow
may be achieved by peaceful means, misconceives the function of the
Moreover, as was held in another case, where the problemsof
phrase"knowingly, willfully and by overt acts" in section 4. Section 2 is
accommodating the exigencies of self-preservationand the values of liberty
merely a legislative declaration; the definitionsof and the penalties
are as complex and intricate as inthe situation described in the legislative
prescribed for the different acts prescribedare stated in section 4 which
findings stated inthe U.S. Federal Subversive Activities Control Act of
requires that membershipin the Communist Party of the Philippines, to be
1950,the legislative judgment as to how that threat may best bemet
unlawful, must be acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts."
consistently with the safeguards of personal freedomsis not to be set aside
Indeed, the first "whereas" clause makes clear thatthe overthrow
merely because the judgment of judgeswould, in the first instance, have
chosen other methods. 48 For in truth, legislation, "whether it restrains (2) In the case of the Communist Party of the Philippines,(a) that the CPP
freedom tohire or freedom to speak, is itself an effort at continues to pursue the objectiveswhich led Congress in 1957 to declare it
compromisebetween the claims of the social order and individual to be an organizedconspiracy for the overthrow of the Government by
freedom,and when the legislative compromise in either case isbrought to illegalmeans for the purpose of placing the country under thecontrol of a
the judicial test the court stands one step removedfrom the conflict and its foreign power; (b) that the accused joined theCPP; and (c) that he did so
resolution through law." 49 willfully, knowingly and byovert acts.

V. The Act and its Title We refrain from making any pronouncement as to thecrime or remaining
a member of the Communist Party ofthe Philippines or of any other
subversive association: weleave this matter to future determination.
The respondent Tayag invokes the constitutional commandthat "no bill
which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which
shall be expressed in the title of the bill." 50 ACCORDINGLY, the questioned resolution of September15, 1970 is set
aside, and these two cases are herebyremanded to the court a quo for trial
on the merits. Costs de oficio.
What is assailed as not germane to or embraced in thetitle of the Act is the
last proviso of section 4 which reads:
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
And provided, finally, That one who conspires with anyother
person to overthrow the Government of the Republic ofthe Concepcion, C.J., concurs in the result.
Philippines, or the government of any of its political
subdivisionsby force, violence, deceit, subversion or illegal
Makasiar and Antonio, JJ., took no part.
means,for the purpose of placing such Government or
political subdivisionunder the control and domination of any
lien power, shallbe punished by prision
correccional to prision mayor with allthe accessory penalties
provided therefor in the same code.

It is argued that the said proviso, in reality, punishes notonly membership

in the Communist Party of the Philippinesor similar associations, but as
well "any conspiracyby two persons to overthrow the national or any local
governmentby illegal means, even if their intent is not to establisha
totalitarian regime, burt a democratic regime, evenif their purpose is not
to place the nation under an aliencommunist power, but under an alien
democratic power likethe United States or England or Malaysia or even an
anti-communistpower like Spain, Japan, Thailand or Taiwanor Indonesia."

The Act, in addition to its main title ("An Act to Outlawthe Communist Party
of the Philippines and SimilarAssociations, Penalizing Membership
Therein, and forOther Purposes"), has a short title. Section 1 providesthat
"This Act shall be known as the
Anti-Subversion Act."Together with the main title, the short title of the
statuteunequivocally indicates that the subject matter is subversionin
general which has for its fundamental purpose the substitutionof a foreign
totalitarian regime in place of theexisting Government and not merely
subversion by Communistconspiracies..

The title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an indexof its contents, and
need not recite the details of the Act. 51 It is a valid title if it indicates in
broad but clear termsthe nature, scope, and consequences of the proposed
lawand its operation. 52 A narrow or technical construction isto be avoided,
and the statute will be read fairly and reasonablyin order not to thwart the
legislative intent. We holdthat the Anti-Subversion Act fully satisfies these
requirements.

VI. Conclusion and Guidelines

In conclusion, even as we uphold the validity of theAnti-Subversion Act, we

cannot overemphasize the needfor prudence and circumspection in its
enforcement, operatingas it does in the sensitive area of freedom of
expressionand belief. Accordingly, we set the following basic guidelines to
be observed in any prosecution under the Act.The Government, in addition
to proving such circumstancesas may affect liability, must establish the
following elementsof the crime of joining the Communist Party of the
Philippinesor any other subversive association:

(1) In the case of subversive organizations other thanthe Communist Party

of the Philippines, (a) that thepurpose of the organization is to overthrow
the presentGovernment of the Philippines and to establish in thiscountry a
totalitarian regime under the domination of aforeign power; (b) that the
accused joined such organization;and (c) that he did so knowingly, willfully
and byovert acts; and