REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PIO R.

MARCOS object of cadastral proceedings' are granted the right to

G.R. No. L-32941 petition for a re-opening thereof if the other conditions
July 31, 1973 named therein are successfully met. It cannot admit of
doubt, therefore, that if the parcels of land were not
FACTS: the object of cadastral proceedings, then this statute
finds no application. Considering that as far back as
On November 12, 1966, respondents, the Carantes October 10, 1910, the then President of the United
heirs, filed under Civil Reservation Case No. 1 of the States, William H. Taft, issued an executive order
Court of First Instance of Baguio City a petition for the reserving for naval purposes the lots now disputed, they
re-opening of said proceeding to have them declared could not have been the object of the cadastral
owners, and for the registration in their favor of four proceedings involving the Baguio townsite reservation,
lots with a total area of 74,017 square meters. Then on decided only on November 13, 1922." It was then stated
December 14, 1966, respondent Judge issued an order in the opinion: "The Cadastral Act was enacted on
requiring the publication and posting of notices thereof. February 11, 1913, taking effect on its passage. As is
The Director of Lands duly opposed, as a report of an made clear in the first section thereof, when public
investigator of his office was that the area sought to be interest requires that titles to any land be settled and
registered is inside Camp John Hay in Baguio City. This adjudicated, in the opinion of the then executive, the
notwithstanding, on November 9, 1968, the respondent Governor General, he could order the Director of Lands,
Judge rendered his decision ordering the registration of to make a survey and plan of such lands. Clearly, it does
this parcel of land in the names of the petitioners, pro- not include the survey of lands declared as
indiviso, namely, [Alson Carantes], married to Monica reservations."
Pedro, [Eduardo Carantes], married to Jesusa Rosal, and
[Bill Carantes], married to Budaet Onias, all of legal An earlier act, enacted as far back as 1903, specifically
ages, Filipino citizens, with residence and postal governs the subject matter of reservations. As provided
addresses at Loakan, Baguio City, Philippines. therein: "All lands or buildings, or any interests therein,
within the Philippine Islands lying within the boundaries
The efforts exerted by the Director of Lands and the City of the areas now or hereafter set apart and declared to
of Baguio to appeal said decision, seasonably made, did be military reservations shall be forthwith brought
not prosper, respondent Judge being of the belief that under the operations of the Land Registration Act, and
"the proper party to appeal should be Camp John Hay." such of said lands, buildings, and interests therein as
Unfortunately, with the Solicitor-General not having shall not be determined to be public lands shall become
been informed of what did transpire, such denial went registered land in accordance with the provisions of said
unchallenged. It was not until August 22, 1969 that the Land Registration Act, under the circumstances
Solicitor-General entered his appearance in the case hereinafter stated.
and filed a motion to annul the decision based on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over the In Government v. Court of First Instance of Pampanga, a
subject matter of the proceedings as the land in 1926 decision, the court rules that: "The defendant's
question is part of a duly established military contention that the respondent court, in a cadastral
reservation. Such motion was denied by respondent case, has jurisdiction to order the registration portions
Judge on December 8, 1969. The location of the lot of a legally established military reservation cannot be
inside Camp John Hay is not a subject of dispute. sustained. The establishment of military reservations is
Apparently, the respondent Judge in refusing to set governed by Act No. 627 of the Philippine Commission
aside his decision was impressed by the claim that the and Section 1 of that Act provides that "All lands or
private respondents had been in possession "since the buildings, or any interest therein, within the Philippine
Spanish regime," and thus came within the protection Islands lying within the boundaries of the areas now or
of the words annotated on all survey plans of Camp hereafter set apart and declared to be military
John Hay, to wit: "subject to prior and existing private reservations shall be forthwith brought under the
rights." operations of the Land Registration Act.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Marcos lack jurisdiction This Court could conclude therefore that as contended
over the case. by petitioner Republic, respondent Judge in that case
was devoid "of jurisdiction to pass upon the claim of
RULING: private respondents invoking the benefits of Republic
Act No. 931." So it is in the present case. The absence of
Republic Act No. 931 speaks in a manner far from
jurisdiction is equally clear.
ambiguous. It is quite explicit and categorical. Only
persons "claiming to parcels of land that have been the
That Republic v. Marcos is likewise an insuperable bar of native title (definition:
to the re-opening sought by private respondents is lands held in private
made clear by the latter portion of the opinion. Thus: ownership since time
"This lack of jurisdiction on the part of respondent immemorial) do not diminish
Judge is made more patent by another specific the State’s ownership of
restriction of the right of a person to seek re-opening lands within the public
under this statute. For the power of the Court to order domain, because said
ancestral lands and domains
such re-opening is limited 'to such of said parcels of
are considered as private
land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased,
land, and never to have been
granted, or otherwise provisionally or permanently
part of the public domain,
disposed of by the Government. ... .' Included in the following the doctrine laid
petition is an executive order of then President Herbert down in Cariño v. Insular
Hoover of June 19, 1929 declaring to be a naval Government.
reservation of the Government of the United States  Section 3(a) does not confer
'that tract of land known as lot no. 141, residence or recognize any right of
Section D, Baguio naval reservation, heretofore ownership over the natural
reserved for naval purposes ... .' If there were still any resources to the ICCs/IPs. Its
lingering doubt, that ought to be removed by this purpose is definitional and
reaffirmation of a presidential determination, then not declarative of a right or
binding and conclusive as we were under American title.
sovereignty, that the lot in question should be a naval  Section 57 only grants
reservation. “priority rights” to ICCs/IPs in
the utilization of natural
ISAGANI CRUZ VS. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND resources and not absolute
NATURAL RESOURCES ownership thereof. The State
G.R. No. 135385 retains full control over the
December 6, 2000 exploration, development
and utilization of natural
FACTS: resources through the
imposition of requirements
Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of
and conditions for the
the RA 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act on
the ground that the law amount to an unlawful utilization of natural
deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the resources under existing
public domain as well as minerals and other natural laws, such as the Small-
resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine Scale Mining Act of 1991 and
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. the Philippine Mining Act of
The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the 1995. Neither does the grant
indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may of said rights exclude non-
include natural resources. Cruz et al content that, by indigenous peoples from
providing for an all-encompassing definition of undertaking the same
“ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands” which might activities within the ancestral
even include private lands found within said areas,
domains upon authority
Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of
granted by the proper
private landowners.
governmental agency.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional. o Justice Puno: NO.
 Ancestral lands and
RULING: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After ancestral domains are not
deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They part of the lands of the public
deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since domain. They are private and
there was no majority vote, Cruz’s petition was belong to the ICCs/IPs. The
dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, classification of lands in the
ancestral domains may include natural resources – public domain under Section
somehow against the regalian doctrine. 3, Article XII of the
Constitution does not include
o Justice Kapunan: NO.
ancestral lands nor ancestral
 Said provisions affirming the
domains. The rights of
ownership by indigenous
ICCs/IPs to their ancestral
peoples of their ancestral
domains and ancestral lands
lands and domains by virtue
 may be acquired in two resources found therein], and
modes: (1) by native title 3(b) [defines ancestral lands
over both ancestral lands as those possessed by
and domains; or (2) by ICCs/IPs since time
torrens title under the Public immemorial] contravene
Land Act and the Land Section 2, Article XII of the
Registration Act with respect Constitution, which declares
to ancestral lands only. Both that the State owns all lands
modes presume or recognize of the public domain,
the land as private and not minerals, and natural
public. resources – none of which,
 The right of ownership to except agricultural lands, can
ancestral domain under be alienated. In addition,
Section 7(a) involves “lands, mere possession or
bodies of water traditionally utilization of land, however
and actually occupied by long, does not automatically
ICCs/IPs, sacred places, convert them into private
traditional hunting and fishing properties.
grounds, and all  IPRA/RA 8371 does not
improvements made by them specify limits to ancestral
at any time within the lands and domains.
domains”, not “waters,  IPRA/RA 8371 relinquishes
minerals, coal, petroleum, the State’s power under
and other mineral oils, all Section 2, Article XII of the
forces of potential energy, Constitution of full control of
fisheries, forests or timber, natural resources in
wildlife, flora and fauna, and ancestral lands and ancestral
other natural resources” domains in favor of ICCs/IPs,
enumerated in Section 2, who may exercise these
Article XII of the Constitution. rights without any time limit.
Ownership therefore of In addition, they are also
natural resources remain given the right to negotiate
with the State. directly the terms and
 Small-scale utilization of conditions for the exploration
resources in Section 7(b) is of natural resources under
also allowed under Section 7(b), a right vested
paragraph 3, section 2, by the Constitution only to
Article XII of the Constitution. the State.
 Finally, the large-scale o Justice Vitug: YES. Sections 7 and
utilization of natural 57 go beyond the context of the
resources in Section 57 of fundamental law and virtually
RA 8371/IPRA is allowed amount to an undue delegation, if
under paragraphs 1 and 4, not an unacceptable abdication, of
section 2, Article XII of the State authority over a significant
Constitution since only area of the country and its patrimony
“priority rights” (which does  WoN Sections 51 to 53, 59, 52(i), 63, 65,
not necessarily mean and 66 of RA 8371/IPRA, defining the
ownership rights) are given powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and
to ICCs/IPs. making customary law applicable to the
 However, by including settlement of disputes involving ancestral
“natural resources”, Section domains and ancestral lands, violate the
1, Part II, Rule III of the due process clause of the Constitution
Implementing Rules goes o Justice Kapunan: NO. The fact the
beyond Section 7(a) and NCIP is composed wholly of
therefore unconstitutional. indigenous peoples does not mean
o Justice Panganiban: YES. that it is incapable of being impartial.
 Section 3(a) [whose Moreover, the use of customary laws
definition of ancestral domain is sanctioned by paragraph 2,
encompasses natural
 Section 5 of Article XII of the o Justice Kapunan filed an opinion,
Constitution. which the Chief Justice and Justices
o Justice Puno: Not discussed. Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago
o Justice Panganiban: Not join, sustaining the validity of the
discussed. It is best to await specific challenged provisions of R.A. 8371.
cases filed by those whose rights o Justice Puno also filed a separate
may have been injured by these opinion sustaining all challenged
provisions. provisions of the law with the
o Justice Vitug: YES, but only on exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule
making customary law applicable to III of NCIP Administrative Order No.
the settlement of disputes involving 1, series of 1998, the Rules and
ancestral domains and ancestral Regulations Implementing the IPRA,
lands. The second paragraph of and Section 57 of the IPRA which he
Section 5 of Article XII of the contends should be interpreted as
Constitution allows Congress to dealing with the large-scale
provide for the applicability of exploitation of natural resources and
customary laws governing property should be read in conjunction with
rights or relations in determining the Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
ownership and extent of ancestral Constitution.
domains. I do not see this statement o Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss
as saying that Congress may enact the petition solely on the ground that
a law that would simply express that it does not raise a justiciable
customary laws shall govern and controversy and petitioners do not
end it there. No discussion on the have standing to question the
powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP. constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
 WoN Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP  Seven Justices voted to grant the
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, petition
which provides that the administrative o Justice Panganiban filed a separate
relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the opinion expressing the view that
President is characterized as a lateral but Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8,
autonomous relationship for purposes of and related provisions of R.A. 8371
policy and program coordination, infringes are unconstitutional. He reserves
upon the Presidents power of control over judgment on the constitutionality of
executive departments under Section 17, Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the
Article VII of the Constitution law, which he believes must await
o Justice Kapunan: NO, since said the filing of specific cases by those
provision as well as Section 40 of whose rights may have been
the IPRA expressly places the NCIP violated by the IPRA.
under the Office of the President, o Justice Vitug also filed a separate
and therefore under the President’s opinion expressing the view that
control and supervision with respect Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A.
to its administrative 8371 are unconstitutional. Justice
functions. However, insofar as the Vitug also mentioned that the
decisions of the NCIP in the exercise petitioners have standing to raise the
of its quasi-judicial powers are issue, as it is of transcendental
concerned, the same are reviewable importance.
by the Court of Appeals, like those of o Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena,
the NLRC and the SEC. Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join
o Justice Puno: Not discussed. in the separate opinions of Justices
o Justice Panganiban: Not Panganiban and Vitug.
discussed. It is best to await specific
cases filed by those whose rights
Oposa vs Factoran
may have been injured by these
GR No. 101083; July 30 1993
provisions.
o Justice Vitug: Not discussed.
FACTS:
NOTES: A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio
Oposa, et al., representing their generation and
 Seven Justices voted to dismiss the generations yet unborn, and represented by their
petitions parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of
DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering
the defendant, his agents, representatives and other
persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing

Agreements (TLA) in the country;
2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and

equitable under the premises.” They alleged that they
have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the
State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore,
they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA
holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests
constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of
the natural resources property he holds in trust for the
benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding
generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against

him;
2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a
political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing
a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or
impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations to come. The
Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation, and for the succeeding
generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in
behalf of succeeding generations is based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and
harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter
alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country’s forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas
and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development, and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as the future
generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to
the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the
full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put
a little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to
a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the
protection of that right for the generations to come.