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Republic of The Philippines vs. Pio R. Marcos G.R. No. L-32941 July 31, 1973
Republic of The Philippines vs. Pio R. Marcos G.R. No. L-32941 July 31, 1973
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Marcos lack jurisdiction This Court could conclude therefore that as contended
over the case. by petitioner Republic, respondent Judge in that case
was devoid "of jurisdiction to pass upon the claim of
RULING: private respondents invoking the benefits of Republic
Act No. 931." So it is in the present case. The absence of
Republic Act No. 931 speaks in a manner far from
jurisdiction is equally clear.
ambiguous. It is quite explicit and categorical. Only
persons "claiming to parcels of land that have been the
That Republic v. Marcos is likewise an insuperable bar of native title (definition:
to the re-opening sought by private respondents is lands held in private
made clear by the latter portion of the opinion. Thus: ownership since time
"This lack of jurisdiction on the part of respondent immemorial) do not diminish
Judge is made more patent by another specific the State’s ownership of
restriction of the right of a person to seek re-opening lands within the public
under this statute. For the power of the Court to order domain, because said
ancestral lands and domains
such re-opening is limited 'to such of said parcels of
are considered as private
land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased,
land, and never to have been
granted, or otherwise provisionally or permanently
part of the public domain,
disposed of by the Government. ... .' Included in the following the doctrine laid
petition is an executive order of then President Herbert down in Cariño v. Insular
Hoover of June 19, 1929 declaring to be a naval Government.
reservation of the Government of the United States Section 3(a) does not confer
'that tract of land known as lot no. 141, residence or recognize any right of
Section D, Baguio naval reservation, heretofore ownership over the natural
reserved for naval purposes ... .' If there were still any resources to the ICCs/IPs. Its
lingering doubt, that ought to be removed by this purpose is definitional and
reaffirmation of a presidential determination, then not declarative of a right or
binding and conclusive as we were under American title.
sovereignty, that the lot in question should be a naval Section 57 only grants
reservation. “priority rights” to ICCs/IPs in
the utilization of natural
ISAGANI CRUZ VS. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND resources and not absolute
NATURAL RESOURCES ownership thereof. The State
G.R. No. 135385 retains full control over the
December 6, 2000 exploration, development
and utilization of natural
FACTS: resources through the
imposition of requirements
Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of
and conditions for the
the RA 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act on
the ground that the law amount to an unlawful utilization of natural
deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the resources under existing
public domain as well as minerals and other natural laws, such as the Small-
resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine Scale Mining Act of 1991 and
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. the Philippine Mining Act of
The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the 1995. Neither does the grant
indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may of said rights exclude non-
include natural resources. Cruz et al content that, by indigenous peoples from
providing for an all-encompassing definition of undertaking the same
“ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands” which might activities within the ancestral
even include private lands found within said areas,
domains upon authority
Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of
granted by the proper
private landowners.
governmental agency.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional. o Justice Puno: NO.
Ancestral lands and
RULING: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After ancestral domains are not
deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They part of the lands of the public
deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since domain. They are private and
there was no majority vote, Cruz’s petition was belong to the ICCs/IPs. The
dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, classification of lands in the
ancestral domains may include natural resources – public domain under Section
somehow against the regalian doctrine. 3, Article XII of the
Constitution does not include
o Justice Kapunan: NO.
ancestral lands nor ancestral
Said provisions affirming the
domains. The rights of
ownership by indigenous
ICCs/IPs to their ancestral
peoples of their ancestral
domains and ancestral lands
lands and domains by virtue
may be acquired in two resources found therein], and
modes: (1) by native title 3(b) [defines ancestral lands
over both ancestral lands as those possessed by
and domains; or (2) by ICCs/IPs since time
torrens title under the Public immemorial] contravene
Land Act and the Land Section 2, Article XII of the
Registration Act with respect Constitution, which declares
to ancestral lands only. Both that the State owns all lands
modes presume or recognize of the public domain,
the land as private and not minerals, and natural
public. resources – none of which,
The right of ownership to except agricultural lands, can
ancestral domain under be alienated. In addition,
Section 7(a) involves “lands, mere possession or
bodies of water traditionally utilization of land, however
and actually occupied by long, does not automatically
ICCs/IPs, sacred places, convert them into private
traditional hunting and fishing properties.
grounds, and all IPRA/RA 8371 does not
improvements made by them specify limits to ancestral
at any time within the lands and domains.
domains”, not “waters, IPRA/RA 8371 relinquishes
minerals, coal, petroleum, the State’s power under
and other mineral oils, all Section 2, Article XII of the
forces of potential energy, Constitution of full control of
fisheries, forests or timber, natural resources in
wildlife, flora and fauna, and ancestral lands and ancestral
other natural resources” domains in favor of ICCs/IPs,
enumerated in Section 2, who may exercise these
Article XII of the Constitution. rights without any time limit.
Ownership therefore of In addition, they are also
natural resources remain given the right to negotiate
with the State. directly the terms and
Small-scale utilization of conditions for the exploration
resources in Section 7(b) is of natural resources under
also allowed under Section 7(b), a right vested
paragraph 3, section 2, by the Constitution only to
Article XII of the Constitution. the State.
Finally, the large-scale o Justice Vitug: YES. Sections 7 and
utilization of natural 57 go beyond the context of the
resources in Section 57 of fundamental law and virtually
RA 8371/IPRA is allowed amount to an undue delegation, if
under paragraphs 1 and 4, not an unacceptable abdication, of
section 2, Article XII of the State authority over a significant
Constitution since only area of the country and its patrimony
“priority rights” (which does WoN Sections 51 to 53, 59, 52(i), 63, 65,
not necessarily mean and 66 of RA 8371/IPRA, defining the
ownership rights) are given powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and
to ICCs/IPs. making customary law applicable to the
However, by including settlement of disputes involving ancestral
“natural resources”, Section domains and ancestral lands, violate the
1, Part II, Rule III of the due process clause of the Constitution
Implementing Rules goes o Justice Kapunan: NO. The fact the
beyond Section 7(a) and NCIP is composed wholly of
therefore unconstitutional. indigenous peoples does not mean
o Justice Panganiban: YES. that it is incapable of being impartial.
Section 3(a) [whose Moreover, the use of customary laws
definition of ancestral domain is sanctioned by paragraph 2,
encompasses natural
Section 5 of Article XII of the o Justice Kapunan filed an opinion,
Constitution. which the Chief Justice and Justices
o Justice Puno: Not discussed. Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago
o Justice Panganiban: Not join, sustaining the validity of the
discussed. It is best to await specific challenged provisions of R.A. 8371.
cases filed by those whose rights o Justice Puno also filed a separate
may have been injured by these opinion sustaining all challenged
provisions. provisions of the law with the
o Justice Vitug: YES, but only on exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule
making customary law applicable to III of NCIP Administrative Order No.
the settlement of disputes involving 1, series of 1998, the Rules and
ancestral domains and ancestral Regulations Implementing the IPRA,
lands. The second paragraph of and Section 57 of the IPRA which he
Section 5 of Article XII of the contends should be interpreted as
Constitution allows Congress to dealing with the large-scale
provide for the applicability of exploitation of natural resources and
customary laws governing property should be read in conjunction with
rights or relations in determining the Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
ownership and extent of ancestral Constitution.
domains. I do not see this statement o Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss
as saying that Congress may enact the petition solely on the ground that
a law that would simply express that it does not raise a justiciable
customary laws shall govern and controversy and petitioners do not
end it there. No discussion on the have standing to question the
powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP. constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
WoN Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Seven Justices voted to grant the
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, petition
which provides that the administrative o Justice Panganiban filed a separate
relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the opinion expressing the view that
President is characterized as a lateral but Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8,
autonomous relationship for purposes of and related provisions of R.A. 8371
policy and program coordination, infringes are unconstitutional. He reserves
upon the Presidents power of control over judgment on the constitutionality of
executive departments under Section 17, Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the
Article VII of the Constitution law, which he believes must await
o Justice Kapunan: NO, since said the filing of specific cases by those
provision as well as Section 40 of whose rights may have been
the IPRA expressly places the NCIP violated by the IPRA.
under the Office of the President, o Justice Vitug also filed a separate
and therefore under the President’s opinion expressing the view that
control and supervision with respect Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A.
to its administrative 8371 are unconstitutional. Justice
functions. However, insofar as the Vitug also mentioned that the
decisions of the NCIP in the exercise petitioners have standing to raise the
of its quasi-judicial powers are issue, as it is of transcendental
concerned, the same are reviewable importance.
by the Court of Appeals, like those of o Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena,
the NLRC and the SEC. Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join
o Justice Puno: Not discussed. in the separate opinions of Justices
o Justice Panganiban: Not Panganiban and Vitug.
discussed. It is best to await specific
cases filed by those whose rights
Oposa vs Factoran
may have been injured by these
GR No. 101083; July 30 1993
provisions.
o Justice Vitug: Not discussed.
FACTS:
NOTES: A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio
Oposa, et al., representing their generation and
Seven Justices voted to dismiss the generations yet unborn, and represented by their
petitions parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of
DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering
the defendant, his agents, representatives and other
persons acting in his behalf to:
ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing
a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or
impairment of Philippine rainforests?”
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations to come. The
Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation, and for the succeeding
generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in
behalf of succeeding generations is based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and
harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter
alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country’s forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas
and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development, and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as the future
generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to
the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the
full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put
a little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to
a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the
protection of that right for the generations to come.