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India's Grand Strategy
India's Grand Strategy
Air Vice Marshal Kapil Kak (Retd) is former Additional Director, Centre for Air Power
Studies, New Delhi.
that the government was unlikely to take military action, powerful pressures
got generated for India to accord diplomatic recognition to Tajuddin’s émigré’
Bangladesh provisional government that was also pressing for recognition. But
Indira Gandhi was firm: “Unless Bangladeshis established effective control in
some areas and proved to the world through their own struggle that the people
were with them, recognition by India would only create the impression that
India was trying to divide Pakistan by setting up a puppet regime in Bangladesh”,
further adding “when the time comes, we will do it.”7 Here was one clear-headed
move on the strategic chessboard.
There were sharp variations in the perceptions of the Indian elites. A strong
lobby projected the thought in the media that the break-up of Pakistan was not
in India’s national interest. Another perspective was that actions to snatch away
East Bengal from Pakistan would only strengthen the latter, by taking away “its
economic and military liability.” A powerful consideration “influencing Indian
public opinion was the conviction that India must necessarily be on the side of
a people struggling to be free.”8 In the first phase of the crisis, as stated earlier, it
was perceived that national interest would be best served by bringing diplomatic
pressure to bear on Pakistan through the influence of international opinion.
Propositions were also put forth on whether it would not be more prudent to
absorb the pressure of refugees, obtain international aid for this purpose and
reconcile to the domination of the West Pakistani military over East Bengal than
to react militarily. This view is said to have got traction among some in the Union
Cabinet itself, to be expectedly ruled out as an option by Indira Gandhi. But as
K Subrahmanyam perceptively argued, “One must be clear when diplomacy of
persuasion must end and diplomacy of threat of force and force itself should be
considered”.9
A close look at the Indian response from March 25 to December 3, 1971,
reveals that diplomatic efforts and military preparations were undertaken
simultaneously and in tandem. Having run out of all diplomatic options,
Indira Gandhi and her key advisers assessed that India was faced with security
compulsions when it would be unable to protect its national interests without
resorting to a possible war. In the public domain, K Subrahmanyam convincingly
projected the argument, subsequently to resonate in important world capitals,
that it would be more economical to fight a war to solve the problem of Bangladesh
than to feed millions of refugees indefinitely. This calculation was not based
purely on economic considerations but took into account the political, social and
international relations cost-benefits for India. He provided numerous instances
called, we’ll be in trouble.”13 One key dimension on which the Soviets seemingly
‘yielded’ was to caution India against annexing West Pakistan or at least retake
Pakistan-occupied Kashmir—an option that in any case was not a component of
the Indian strategy.
a nuclear aircraft carrier task force to the Bay of Bengal did, however, have
an impact on Indian policy-makers. It led to an acceleration of the Indian
nuclear programme and eventually to the testing of a nuclear device two and
a half years later, in May 1974.16
latter rejoined “that it had not prevented the The credit is due,
Chinese army from crossing the Yalu River in most of all, to
the dead of winter during the Korean War.”20 Indira Gandhi, a
The Indian government’s Inter- master strategist
departmental Group, assessing Chinese and resolute
intentions, seems to have also drawn the leader, who
aforementioned conclusions, based on “little reposed utmost
or no increased military along the northern faith in the armed
borders and a less negative public stance forces leadership
toward India than during the 1965 War.”21 and gave them a
The Indian strategy was rightly anchored in free hand to deal
the assessment that the Chinese support to with the military
Pakistan, even in its challenging moments, situation as it
would be confined to verbal and moral developed.
encouragement. This was quite unlike Nixon
and Kissinger, who reached the opposite conclusion. They incorrectly expected
the Chinese to intervene militarily, based on a misinterpretation of Chinese
perspectives and communications, and their pronounced anti-India obsession.
Military Campaign
India’s grand strategy for management of the serious Pakistan-created crisis in
1971 and the war that followed depended critically on an early and successful
conclusion of the military campaign. Here was that rare moment in India’s history
when it took the military initiative and achieved success. The credit is due, most
of all, to Indira Gandhi, a master strategist and resolute leader, who reposed
utmost faith in the armed forces leadership and gave them a free hand to deal
with the military situation as it developed. Unambiguous political goal setting
for the armed forces, high quality of joint planning—at the strategic, operational
and tactical levels—and excellent tri-Service coordination were the hallmarks of
the military campaign.
The lightning tri-Service campaign, in which the Bangladeshi liberation
force Mukti Bahini made a pivotal contribution, has been considered the fastest
land forces advance since the North Africa campaign in World War II. The focus
remained on fighting a defensive war in the West while simultaneously seeking
a successful end-game in the East through a creative and innovative offensive
strategy. An early clincher was the Indian Air Force achieving air dominance
through mastery of the skies over East Pakistan in just two days. This effectively
created the much-desired operational space for the five-division strong land force
to advance from three directions, bypassing Pakistani fortifications, heading for
ferries, crossings and bridges in the rear to secure choke points, unhindered by
the Pakistan Air Force.
In the East, innovative and creative armed forces actions in different sectors
contributed to the overall military triumph. Air dominance ensured enforcement
of a naval blockade and a successful amphibious assault at Cox’s Bazaar. Para-
dropping the battalion-group at Tangail effectively altered the military arithmetic
on the ground. In an incredible feat, 12 small Mi4 helicopters of the air force
ferried a brigade-strong force across the 2-km-wide Meghna river inflicting ‘shock
and awe’ on the Pakistani defenders. Sylhet was captured through a heliborne
operation. The resolute local support of the Mukti Bahini was invaluable. A
highly-accurate rocket attack on the Governor’s House in Dhaka compelled him
to resign and hasten the surrender of the 93,000-strong garrison at Dhaka.
With all energies focussed on the Eastern front, both sides played a waiting
game in the West. Indian successes in Punjab, Shakargarh, Akhnoor and the
thrust toward Naya Chor were substantial even as there were territorial losses
at Chhamb and Fazilka. The missile boat attack on Karachi harbour was a bold
master-stroke as was the IAF’s role in blunting the Pakistani armour offensive
at Longewala. Key outposts in the Kargil sector and large areas in Partapur and
Turtuk were also captured and retained. Decades after the war, the view that
India did not drive a hard bargain at Shimla to compel Pakistan to at least agree
to the resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir issue is perhaps justifiable. Perhaps
a more objective and rigorous analysis of the narratives at Shimla may bring out
the strategic factors that underpinned the outcome.
Notes
1. TN Kaul, Diplomacy in Peace and War: Recollections and Reflections (New Delhi: Vikas
Publishing House, 1979), p.179.
2. US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, South Asia
Crisis, Vol. 11, 1971.
3. Writing for a syndicated column published in various newspapers, K Subrahmanyam
analytically put forth the strategic implications of developments arising from the
refugee influx; also see, Bangladesh and India’s Security (Dehradun: Palit and Dutt
Publishers, 1972), p. 99.
4. Robert Jackson, South Asian Crisis: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh (New Delhi: Vikas
Publishing House, 1978), p. 37.
5. JN Dixit, Across Borders: Fifty Years of India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Sangam Books
Ltd, 1998), p. 105.
6. History of Indo-Pak War 1971, Part II (History Division of the Ministry of Defence, New
Delhi,1992), p. 275.
7. For more details, see Kaul, n. 1, p. 181.
8. For more details, see Jackson, n. 4, p 37.
9. For more details, see Subrahmanyam, n. 3, p. 72.
10. TN Kaul, Ambassadors Need Not Lie: Some Aspects of India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi:
Lancers International, 1988), p. 107.
11. For more details see, n. 6, p. 268.
12. Notes on discussions between Chairman AN Kosygin and Prime Minister AA Gromyko
with DP Dhar, special representative of India’s prime minister, at Moscow on August
5, 1971; PN Haksar Papers, (Top Secret, Declassified), Nehru Memorial Museum and
Library, New Delhi.
13. For more details see, n. 2, Document 266, (Declassified).
14. Ibid., Document 199, (Declassified).
15. PN Dhar, Indira Gandhi: The Emergency and Indian Democracy (New Delhi: Oxford
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