February 23, 2016

G.R. No. 188720

QUEZON CITY PTCA FEDERATION, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, represented by SECRETARY JESLI A. LAPUS, Respondent.

DISSENTING OPINION

BRION, J.:

Background

On June 1, 2009, respondent Department of Education (DepEd), through then Secretary Jesli A.
Lapus, issued Department Order No. 54, series of 2009 (DO 54), entitled the "Revised Guidelines
Governing Parents-Teachers Associations (PTAs) at the School Level."

DO 54 aimed to address the "increasing reports of malpractices [of] officers or members of the
PTAs, such as but not limited to (1) [the absconding of officers] with contributions and membership
fees; (2) [the] nondisclosure of the status of funds and [the] non-submission of financial statements;
and (3) [the] misuse of funds."1

To address these issues, DO 54 required that before any PTA may be organized, the school
head's approval must first be secured. Arguing that this prerequisite undermines the
independence of the PT As, petitioner Quezon City PTCA Federation, Inc. (QC PTCA) directly filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court to nullify DO 54.

The ponencia and the dissent

In ruling for the DepEd, the ponencia holds that the grant of powers to the school heads to approve
or disapprove a PTA's organization is consistent with the mandate of Batas Pambansa
Blg. (BP) 2322 and Article 773 of Presidential Decree (PD) 603.4 Under these laws, elementary and
secondary schools are mandated to organize their own PTAs.5 Since DO 54 echoed the provisions
of these statutes on the functions of the PTAs, it effectively laid out the guidelines which the school
heads must observe in deciding whether or not to approve the organization of a PTA.6

Furthermore, the ponencia explains that the involvement of school heads is limited to the initial
stages of a PTA’s constitution. Once created, the school heads would only act as advisers and could
no longer intervene with the PTA’s affairs.7

Lastly, the ponencia asserts that while the law mandates the creation and organization of PTAs, no
such mandate extends to Parent‒Teacher Community Associations (PTCAs).

I disagree with the ponencia for the following reasons: first, the distinction made by
the ponencia between PTAs and PTCAs is immaterial to this case; second, the DepEd exceeded
its rule-making power when it mandated in DO 54 that the PTAs in elementary and secondary
schools may only be organized upon the school head’s approval; third and last, the approval
requirement is unreasonable and does not directly address the issue of mismanagement of PTA
funds.
I. The distinction between
PTCAs and PTAs is immaterial.

I disagree with the ponencia’s view that the law mandates the creation and organization of "Parent
and Teachers Associations" but not Parent‒ Teachers Community Associations (PTCAs), as neither
BP 232 nor PD 603 mentions PTCAs.8

A Parent‒Teacher Association is one whose purpose is to provide a forum for the discussion of
problems and solutions relating to the total school program, and ensure that parents and teachers
fully cooperate in the efficient implementation of such program.9 It may be organized by the parents
themselves, or by the parents with the teachers.10 An association that meets these criteria is a PTA in
the eyes of the law.

Hence, what makes an organization a Parent‒Teacher Association is its objective and composition,
and not its appellation.

Apparently, the ponencia discriminated against the petitioner QC PTCA when it assumed that the
latter is not a Parent‒Teacher Association without distinguishing PTAs from PTCA, and without
discussing QC PTCA’s distinct circumstances that would distinguish it from a PTA.

Contrary to the ponencia’s observations,11 no less than the respondent recognized that PTCAs stand
on equal footing with PTAs. On June 24, 2009, the DepEd issued Department Order No. 67, s. 2009
(DO 67)12 clarifying DO 54. It reads:

xxx xxx DepED Order No. 54 is hereby clarified: (omission supplied)

Whereas, DepED Order No. 54, s. 2009 (X. Transitory Provision) provides: "Existing and duly
recognized PTCAs and its Federations shall no longer be given recognition effective School Year
2009-2010. They shall cease operation at the end of School Year 2008-2009 and given until June
30, 2009 to dissolve, wind up their activities, submit their financial reports and turn over all
documents to the School Heads and Schools Division Superintendents, respectively;

Whereas, there is a need to clarify the purpose and intent of such provision to mean that PTCAs
that do not conform to these guidelines shall no longer be given recognition but in no way to abolish
the PTCAs;

Wherefore, the same Transitory Provision of DepED Order No. 54, s. 2009 shall read as follows:

X. Transitory Provision

Existing PTCAs, whether SEC‒registered or not, may conform to these Guidelines effective
School Year 2009-2010 in order to be recognized as the duly constituted PTAs; provided, that
PTAs already existing and duly recognized at the time of the signing of this Order shall
continue to exist and operate as such subject to this Order and other existing rules and
regulations of the Department. (emphasis in the original, underscoring supplied)

Thus, the distinction between PTCAs and PTAs is more imagined than real, particularly for PTCAs
already in existence since they can be recognized as PTAs. Thus, I find it misplaced to generalize
and discriminate against all PTCAs simply because the law only mentions "Parent Teachers
Associations." In my view, for purposes of this case, the distinction the ponencia creates between
PTAs and PTCAs is insignificant and lacks materiality.
II. The DepEd exceeded its
rule-making power.

Delegation of powers is a rule that is widely recognized especially in the legislative branch of
government. With the increasing complexity of the government’s functions and the growing inability
of the legislature to address the myriad of problems demanding its attention, Congress found it
necessary to delegate its powers to administrative agencies. This is the power of subordinate
legislation.

"With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by
‘filling in’ the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to
provide."13 On this basis, administrative agencies may promulgate supplementary regulations which
have the force and effect of law.14

In the DepEd’s case, its rule-making power finds its legislative basis in Section 5715 of BP
232. Under this provision, the DepEd has the authority to "promulgate rules and regulations
1âwphi1

necessary for the administration, supervision and regulation of the educational system in
accordance with declared policy." Moreover, Section 7016 of this law, in relation to EO 11717 and
RA 9155,18 expressly grants the DepEd Secretary the authority to administer and enforce BP 232
and to promulgate its necessary implementing rules and regulations.

However, the power of subordinate legislation does not mean the absolute transmission of legislative
powers to administrative agencies such as the DepEd.

In order for a valid delegation to exist, two basic tests must be complied with: the completeness
test, and the sufficient standard test.

"Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature, such that, when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he would have to do is enforce it.
On the other hand, under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations
in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot. These two tests are both intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority
to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power
essentially legislative."19

Also, these two tests ensure that administrative agencies, in the exercise of their power of
subordinate legislation, create rules and regulations that are germane to the objects and
purposes of the law they implement; and are not in contradiction, but in full conformity with
the standards prescribed by this law.20

In Lokin v. Commission on Elections,21 the Court invalidated Section 13 of COMELEC Resolution No.
7804 for being contrary to RA 7941, the law governing our party list system. The Court explained:

The COMELEC, despite its role as the implementing arm of the Government in the enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, has neither the
authority nor the license to expand, extend, or add anything to the law it seeks to
implement thereby. The IRRs the COMELEC issues for that purpose should always accord
with the law to be implemented, and should not override, supplant, or modify the law. It is
basic that the IRRs should remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out.22[emphasis
supplied]
Guided by these rulings, I take the position that DO 54 is invalid insofar as it grants to the school
heads the power to approve or disapprove the organization of a PTA, viz:

II. Organization of PTAs at the School Level

xxx

2. Within fifteen (15) days from the start of the school year the Homeroom Adviser and the
Parents/Guardians shall organize the Homeroom PTA with the approval of the School Head.23

In my view, the approval requirement is contrary to the law and to the state policy on the creation of
PTAs, and transgresses the prohibition on further delegation of delegated powers.

A. The approval requirement is contrary

to law and to state policy.

The authority of administrative agencies to create rules and regulations such as DO 54 is not an
absolute authority. This is limited by the express legislative purpose of the law it implements, the
standards set out in this law, and the express wording of the provisions of the law. The rules and
regulations that administrative agencies promulgate should not be ultra vires or beyond the limits of
the authority conferred to them.24

Also, it is a settled rule that administrative agencies, in the exercise of their power of subordinate
legislation, should not enlarge, alter, or restrict the provisions of the law it administers and enforces,
and should not engraft additional non-contradictory requirements that the Congress did not
contemplate.25 Thus, in formulating rules and regulations, administrative agencies should not amend,
supplant, or modify the law which breathes life to it.

Under BP 232, the law which sets out the powers and functions of the DepEd, as well as the rights
and obligations of persons comprising the country’s educational community, the parents whose
children are enrolled in schools have "the right to organize by themselves and/or with teachers for
the purpose of providing a forum for the discussion of matters relating to the total school program,
and for ensuring the full cooperation of parents and teachers in the formulation and efficient
implementation of such programs."26

Consistent with this legal right, Section 77 of PD 603 requires every elementary and secondary
school to "organize a [PTA] for the purpose of providing a forum for the discussion of problems and
their solutions, relating to the total school program, and for insuring the full cooperation of parents in
the efficient implementation of such program."

The provisions of BP 232 and PD 603 emphasize the clear mandate of schools to form their own
PTAs consistent with the right of parents to be informed of the school programs affecting their
children, and to participate in the formulation and implementation of these programs.

Section 8 of BP 232 even went one step further when it provided that the parents may organize by
themselves when taking part in school matters that affect their children. In other words, the
parents, even without the school’s involvement, may organize and coordinate among themselves
in exercising their right to a meaningful and proactive participation in the school programs
concerning their children’s welfare.
The ponencia itself recognized the mandatory nature of the school’s PTA formation but justified the
validity of the approval requirement by explaining that the school head’s involvement would be
limited only to the initial stages of the PTA’s organization; that once the PTA is created, the
school head’s participation would merely be in an advisory capacity.

However, the ponencia lost sight of the glaring contradiction between the clear mandate of BP 232
and DO 54’s school head approval requirement. The initial stage that the ponencia referred to is a
crucial stage as it is the point when a PTA is organized. How could the parents exercise their
right to organized participation if in the first place, they could not form the medium by which they may
do so?

To my mind, DO 54 lessens the chances, if not totally precludes the organization of the PTA by
granting the school head the sole power to determine and approve its organization.

Moreover, the approval requirement is not only contrary to the rights of parents to organize and
involve themselves in school programs and matters affecting their children; it also contravenes the
declared policy of the State, as enunciated in Section 327 of BP 232, which is to establish a
complete, adequate, and integrated education system that would contribute to the achievement of an
accelerating rate of economic development and social progress, and would ensure the "maximum
participation of all the people in the attainment and enjoyment of the benefits of such growth."

B. The prohibition on the further

delegation of delegated powers

The general rule is that "what has been delegated may not be delegated." This is based on the
ethical principle that a delegated power is not only a right but a duty that the delegate must perform
through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of
another.28 This is embodied in the Latin maxim, potestas delegata non delegari potest.

The power to approve or disapprove PTAs is not a perfunctory or mechanical act but requires
the exercise of the school head’s discretion. Notably, however, DO 54 did not specify the
procedure or the guidelines that the school heads must observe in deciding whether to
approve the organization of a PTA.

For instance, if parents divide themselves into two or more factions, these factions might refuse to
cooperate with one another, and decide to organize separate PTAs. Since DO 54 states that "there
shall be only one PTA ... which shall be recognized by the School Head,"29 the latter will necessarily
have to approve only one of these PTAs.

In the same light, assuming a PTA is dissolved and a majority of the parents decides to organize a
new one, while the minority agrees to maintain the existing PTA, which PTA should the school head
approve?

Unfortunately, only the school heads can supply the answer to these questions because DO 54 does
not provide answers.

The danger in a broad grant of discretion is neither unlikely nor remote. In Ynot v. Intermediate
Appellate Court,30Justice Cruz had occasion to say:

It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in
vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said
officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are
1âwphi1

apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by
what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and
they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive
discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not
"canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore
invalid delegation of legislative powers.

The ponencia disregards this possibility by relying on DO 54’s general policy which, to him,
provides ample standards to guide the school heads’ discretion:31

1. Every elementary and secondary school shall organize a Parents-Teachers Association (PTA) for
the purpose of providing a forum for the discussion of issues and their solutions related to the total
school program and to ensure the full cooperation of parents in the efficient implementation of
such program.

Every PTA shall provide mechanisms to ensure proper coordination with the members of the
community, provide an avenue for discussing relevant concerns, and provide assistance and
support to the school for the promotion of their common interest. Standing committees may be
created within the PTA organization to coordinate with community members. Regular fora may be
conducted with local government units, civic organizations and other stakeholders to foster unity and
cooperation. (emphasis in the ponencia)

2. As an organization operating in the school, the PTA shall adhere to all existing policies and
implementing guidelines issued or hereinafter may be issued by the Department of Education.

The PTA shall serve as support group and as a significant partner of the school whose relationship
shall be defined by cooperative and open dialogue to promote the welfare of the students. (emphasis
in the ponencia)

I disagree with this view.

The school head’s approval comes at the PTA’s inception. At that point, the PTA and its members
have yet to perform any act as the proposed PTA has yet to function. Thus, the school heads cannot
use the cited general policies unless the school heads operate based on a presumption of the
members’ future conduct. From this vantage point, it is clear that the cited general policies cannot
possibly guide the school heads at the point they decide.

In any case, even if these policies are assumed to be standards, they would still be insufficient as
there are simply no guidelines in DO 54 that would guide school heads in approving one PTA over
the other.

The absence of guidelines will consequently force school heads to either: first, disclose their
standards to interested parties, i.e., the parents, the teachers, and the students; or second, keep the
standards to themselves.

Should they keep the standards to themselves, the school heads would be accused of arbitrariness
because the interested parties are not informed of the standards for approval. Such arbitrariness
would authorize the school heads to approve a PTA according to whim, or in the opposite direction,
deny parents (whose PTA is disapproved) of the right to participate in the formation and
implementation of the total school program.32
Thus, to avoid any accusations ‒ and the appearance of ‒ arbitrariness, the school heads are more
likely disclose their standards; in which case, the disclosure to interested parties, whether oral or in
writing, is no different from the exercise of rule-making powers that – by force of the law that
Congress enacted – only the DepEd can exercise.

In other words, DO 54 gives the school heads a very broad, if not, an unbridled discretion in the
formation of the PTAs. By failing to provide the guidelines or even outline the rules that must be
considered in approving or disapproving PTAs, DO 54, in effect, grants the school heads the
authority to create their own rules and to substitute their discretion in place of the DepEd.

As I have earlier discussed, the DepEd through BP 232, received from Congress not only the power
to regulate but also the power to formulate rules that would implement BP 232’s mandate.33 This
authority belongs solely to the DepEd as the only recipient of the Congress’ delegated powers
under BP 232.

When the DepEd, through DO 54, passed on to the school heads the power to approve or
disapprove the organization of the PTAs, thus effectively devolving its regulatory powers to these
persons, the DepEd violated the administrative rule of nondelegation of delegated powers. To
repeat, "what has been delegated may not be delegated."

There is no express provision in law granting the DepEd the power to further delegate its regulatory
and rule-making powers, particularly to the school heads. The authority to issue rules that would
affect the PTAs rests only with the DepEd. On this basis, the school heads should not be allowed to
determine their own procedure and guidelines in approving or disapproving the organization of a
PTA.

III. The approval requirement is unreasonable

and does not directly address the issue
of mismanagement of PTA funds.

To be valid, implementing rules and regulations (IRRs) must be reasonable. Administrative

authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of their IRRs, but must ensure
that their IRRs are reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view.34 If the IRRs are shown
to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they were authorized to be issued,
they must be held to be invalid and should be struck down.35

DO 54 was issued primarily to address the problem of mismanagement of the PTA funds by
its members and officers. Unfortunately, the school head approval requirement does not address
this problem.

The school heads’ approval comes at the PTA’s inception, i.e., even before the PTA is established
and becomes operational. At that point, the members of the proposed PTA have yet to perform any
act, much less, handle PTA funds. On the other hand, mismanagement only happens when the PTA
is already organized, and not during its inception. There are no funds to be handled when the PTA is
yet to be formed.

In this sense, the approval requirement is unreasonable since it has no relation to the
mismanagement of PT A funds, and unduly restricts the organization of the PT As even before any
irregularity has arisen.

More importantly, the problem of PTA fund mismanagement had already been adequately
addressed in Part VIII36(Financial Matters) of DO 54, which outlined what the PT As may or may not
do with their financial collections. Accordingly, there is no necessity for the DepEd to transgress the
law.

Under these circumstances, I opine that the approval requirement does not deal with the evils that
DO 54 aims to address. Thus, this requirement is not only irrelevant to DO 54's policy and purpose,
but also to the mandate and policy of BP 232 and PD 603 - the statutes which DO 54 seeks to
implement.

As a final remark, I caution that this dissent is not intended to grant the PTAs unrestrained powers in
the exercise of their rights under the law. As the ponencia does, I am aware that the approval
requirement is part of DepEd' s efforts to recognize only those organizations that conduct
themselves in a lawful manner. I am not against DO 54' s lofty ideals. My disagreement with
the ponencia 's ruling stems from the fact that DO 54, insofar as it mandates the school head's
approval before any PTA may be organized, is invalid due to its violation of recognized
administrative law doctrines that the Court must uphold.

If the DepEd deems it best to completely overhaul the PT A system, it can study, recommend, and
propose the adoption of appropriate legislation.37 It cannot, however, shortcut procedure by the mere
issuance of a Department Order.

In these lights, I vote that DO 54 should be nullified insofar as it provides that a PT A may only be
organized after the approval of the school head.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

Footnotes

1
Ponencia, p. 2.

2
Education Act of 1982.

3
Article 77. Parent-Teacher Associations. - Every elementary and secondary school shall
organize a parent-teacher association for the purpose of providing a forum for the discussion
of problems and their solutions, relating to the total school program, and for insuring the full
cooperation of parents in the efficient implementation of such program. All parents who have
children enrolled in a school are encouraged to be active members of its PT A, and to
comply with whatever obligations and responsibilities such membership entails.

Parent-Teacher Associations all over the country shall aid the municipal and other
local authorities and school officials in the enforcement of juvenile delinquency
control measures, and in the implementation of programs and activities to promote
child welfare.

4
The Child and Youth Welfare Code.

5
Ponencia, p. 25.
6
Id.

7
Id.

8
As is evident from PD 603’s use of the word ‘shall,’ it is mandatory for parent-teachers
associations to be organized in elementary and secondary schools. As against this, Pres.
Dec. 603 is silent on the creation of parent-teachers community associations or PTCAs.
Batas Pambansa 232 is equally silent on this. From this, while the creation and/or
organization of PTAs are statutorily mandates, the same could not be said of
PTCAs. Ponencia, p. 20.

9
PD 603 Art. 77. Parent-Teacher Associations. – Every elementary and secondary school
shall organize a parent-teacher association for the purpose of providing a forum for the
discussion of problems and their solutions, relating to the total school program, and
for insuring the full cooperation of parents in the efficient implementation of such
program. All parents who have children enrolled in a school are encouraged to be active
members of its PTA, and to comply with whatever obligations and responsibilities such
membership entails. (emphasis and omissions supplied)

10
PD 603 is complemented by Section 8 of BP 232, which states that parents have the "right
to organize by themselves and/or with teachers for the purpose of providing a forum for the
discussion of matters relating to the total school program, and for ensuring the full
cooperation of parents and teachers in the formulation and efficient implementation of such
programs."

11
"Petitioner is in error for asserting that the assailed Department Order is contrary to the
statutes it aims to put into effect by failing to put PTCAs on the same footing as
PTAs"; ponencia, p. 25.

12
Entitled Clarification to DepEd Order No. 54, s. 2009 (Revised Guidelines Governing
Parents-Teachers Associations (PTAs) at the School Level)
http://www.deped.gov.ph/orders/do-67-s-2009, Last accessed January 2, 2016.

13
Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA, G.R. No. L-76633, October 18, 1988, 166 SCRA 533.

14
Id.

15
Section 57. Functions and Powers of the Ministry - The Ministry shall:

1. Formulate general education objectives and policies, and adopt long-range

educational plans;

2. Plan, develop and implement programs and projects in education and culture;

3. Promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the administration, supervision

and regulation of the educational system in accordance with declared policy;

4. Set up general objectives for the school system;

5. Coordinate the activities and functions of the school system and the various
cultural agencies under it;
 6. Coordinate and work with agencies concerned with the educational and cultural
development of the national cultural communities; and

7. Recommend and study legislation proposed for adoption.

16
Section 70. Rule-making Authority - The Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports charged
with the administration and enforcement of this Act, shall promulgate the necessary
implementing rules and regulations.

17
Reorganization Act of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports.

18
Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001.

19
Vivas v. The Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 191424, August
7, 2013, 703 SCRA 290, 312, citing Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA, supra note 13.

20
Gerochi v. Department of Energy, G.R. No. 159796, July 17, 2007, 554 Phil. 563, 585.

21
635 Phil. 372, 380 (2010).

22
Id. at 399.

23
Department of Education Order No. 54, series of 2009.

24
Supra note 21, at 393-394.

25
Id.

26
Section 8, BP 232.

27
Section 3. Declaration of Basic Policy - It is the policy of the State to establish and
maintain a complete, adequate and integrated system of education relevant to the goals of
national development. Toward this end, the government shall ensure, within the context of a
free and democratic system, maximum contribution of the educational system to the
attainment of the following national developmental goals:

1. To achieve and maintain an accelerating rate of economic development and social

progress;

2. To ensure the maximum participation of all the people in the attainment and
enjoyment of the benefits of such growth; and

3. To achieve and strengthen national unity and consciousness and preserve,

develop and promote desirable cultural, moral and spiritual values in a changing
world.

Gerochi v. Department of Energy, 554 Phil. 563, 584 citing Abakada Guro Party List v.
28

Ermita, G.R. Nos. 168056, 168207, 168461, 168463 and 168730, September 1, 2005, 469
SCRA 10, 115-116.
29
Par IV (1) (e) of DO 54.

30
232 Phil. 615, 630 (1987).

31
Ponencia, p. 25

32
Section 8, Batas Pambansa Blg. 232.

33
Under Section 54 of BP 232, the DepEd is granted the powers of supervision and
regulation of educational institutions, as well as the administration over the education system
which includes the parents of students enrolled in schools.

Supra note 21, at 400 citing Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, No. L-77372, April 29, 1988,
34

160 SCRA 848, 858-859.

35
Id. at 858-859.

36
DO 54 's Paragraph VIII ensures. among others, that: (i) PT A collections and contributions
shall be remitted to the school, the student government, to the student organization
concerned, on the same day they were collected; (ii) PT A contributions shall be reasonable;
(iii) non-contribution shall not be a basis for non-admission or non-issuance of clearances to
the students; (iv) contributions shall be on a per-parent basis; (v) no PTA contributions are
collected during enrolment period; (vi) teachers, school personnel and officials are not
involved in collecting, or in safekeeping or disbursing PT A funds; (vii) contributions or
proceeds of fund raising activities shall be deposited in reputable banking institutions; (viii)
disbursements shall be in accord with generally accepted accounting and auditing rules and
regulations; (ix) disbursements shall be covered by appropriate PTA resolutions; (x) the PT
A's financial records are made available for inspection at any time; (xi) PT As submit and
post in bulletin boards annual and midyear audited financial statements, including approved
resolutions.

37
Section 57 (7), Batas Pambansa Blg. 232.