Gilbert Dee Vs CA Montero

Gilber Dee vs CA
GR 111153
Nov 21,1994
Facts:
On March 21, 1990, spouses Jose and Betty Chua (hereinafter referred to as the Chuas) filed a
Joint Affidavit/Complaint with the Office of the Prosecutor of Pasay City accusing petitioner herein, et al.
of the crime of estafa through falsification of a commercial document alleging that the latter fraudulently
made it appear that they signed a promissory note. After several months of investigation, the Assistant
City Prosecutor issued a resolution finding a prima facie case for the filing of an information for estafa.
Consequently, the corresponding information was filed before the Regional Trial Court in Pasay
City. The accused filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice but the same was denied by
the Assistant Chief State Prosecutor. However, on reconsideration, the petition for review was granted by
then Acting Secretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III who set aside the resolution dated September 30, 1991
and directed the City Prosecutor of Pasay to move for the dismissal of the information in Criminal Case.
On February 3, 1992, the Chuas filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above-mentioned directive but
the same was denied on September 2, 1992. On September 15, 1992, the subject information was ordered
withdrawn by the trial court upon manifestation of Assistant City Prosecutor that the same has to be
withdrawn per the directive of the Acting Department of Justice Secretary. A Motion for
Reconsideration of the above order was filed by the Chuas on September 29, 1992 but the resolution of
the same was suspended because they filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. Finding
that respondent Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the withdrawal
of the information. On February 10, 1993, a manifestation with motion was filed by the Chuas with the
conformity of the City Prosecutor informing the trial court of the decision. The City Prosecutor likewise
prayed for immediate arraignment of the accused and hearing of the case. The trial court granted the
motion and ordered the reinstatement of the information. A Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of
Appeals decision was filed by the Dees, et al., as private respondents. The same was however denied in a
resolution of the appellate court. Public respondents did not move for reconsideration. Hence, the instant
petition for review.
Issue: Whether or not the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
withdrawal of the information.
Ruling: No. The dismissal was based merely on the findings of the Acting Secretary of Justice that no
libel was committed. The trial judge did not make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits
of the case. Reliance was placed solely on the conclusion of the prosecution that "there is no sufficient
evidence against the said accused to sustain the allegation in the information" and on the supposed lack of
objection to the motion to dismiss, this last premise being, however, questionable, the prosecution having
failed, as observed, to give private complainant a copy of the motion to dismiss.
In other words, the grant of the motion to dismiss was based upon considerations other than the
judge's own personal individual conviction that there was no case against the accused. Whether to
approve or disapprove the stand taken by the prosecution is not the exercise of discretion required in cases
like this. The trial judge must himself be convinced that there was indeed no sufficient evidence against
the accused, and this conclusion can be arrived at only after an assessment of the evidence in the
possession of the prosecution. What was imperatively required was the trial judge's own assessment of
such evidence, it not being sufficient for the valid and proper exercise of judicial discretion merely to
accept the prosecution's word for its supposed insufficiency. In the case at bench, the vacillation of the
officials of the Department of Justice with respect to the disposition of the petition for review of the city
prosecutor's action is apparent. As borne out by the records, when the prosecutor's finding of probable
cause was first brought before the Department of Justice for review, the petition was denied, only
resolutions of prosecutors dismissing a criminal complaint are cognizable for review by this Office. While
there may be exceptions to the rule, there is no showing that the case subject of your appeal falls within
the excepted cases where there appears that manifest error or grave abuse of discretion has been
committed.” On motion for reconsideration, however, the same petition for review was granted by then
Acting Secretary of Justice who directed the city prosecutor of Pasay to move for the dismissal of the
information; Such ambivalence does not serve the best interest of justice especially so when there
exists prima facie case against the petitioners in the case at bar. the instant petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.

Gilbert Dee Vs CA Montero

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