Heirs of Tappa v.

Heirs of Bacud,
Facts: On September 9, 1999, petitioners Delfin Tappa (Delfin) 5 and Maria Tappa (Spouses Tappa) filed a complaint 6 for
Quieting of Title, Recovery of Possession and Damages (Complaint) against respondents Jose Bacud (Bacud), 7 Henry
Calabazaron (Calabazaron), and Vicente Malupeng (Malupeng). 8 The property subject of the complaint is a parcel of land
identified as Lot No. 3341, Pls-793 with an area of 21,879 square meters, located in Kongcong, Cabbo, Peñablanca, Cagayan (Lot
No. 3341). 9

In their complaint, Spouses Tappa alleged that they are the registered owners of Lot No. 3341, having been issued an Original
Certificate of Title No. P-69103 (OCT No. P-69103) on September 18, 1992, by virtue of Free Patent No. 021519-92-3194. 10
Delfin allegedly inherited Lot No. 3341 from his father, Lorenzo Tappa (Lorenzo). Spouses Tappa claimed that both Delfin and
Lorenzo were in open, continuous, notorious, exclusive possession of the lot since time immemorial. 11

In their Answer, 12 respondents Bacud, Calabazaron and Malupeng claimed that the original owner of Lot No. 3341 was Genaro
Tappa (Genaro) who had two children, Lorenzo and Irene. Upon Genaro's death, the property passed on to Lorenzo and Irene
by operation of law; and they became ipso facto co-owners of the property. As co-owners, Lorenzo and Irene each owned
10,939 square meters of the lot as their respective shares. Lorenzo had children namely, Delfin, Primitiva, and Fermina. Upon
the death of Irene, her share in turn passed to her heirs, Demetria, Juanita, Pantaleon and Jose Bacud. 13

Respondents presented before the RTC a joint affidavit dated April 29, 1963 (1963 Affidavit) signed by Delfin, his sisters,
Primitiva and Fermina, and their mother, Modesta Angoluan. 14 The 1963 affidavit stated that Genaro originally owned Lot No.
3341. It further stated that one-half (1/2) of the property was owned by Lorenzo; but that the whole property was declared as
his, only for taxation purposes.

Calabazaron claimed that he became the owner of 2,520 square meters of Lot No. 3341 by virtue of two Deeds of Sale executed
in his favor, one dated October 12, 1970 executed by Demetria, and another dated August 22, 1971 executed by Juanita. 15
After the sale, Calabazaron entered into possession of his portion and paid the real property taxes. 16 He remains in possession
up to this date. 17

Malupeng, on the other hand, claimed that he became the owner of 210 square meters of Lot No. 3341 by virtue of a Deed of
Sale executed on November 30, 1970 by Pantaleon in his favor. 18 After the sale, Malupeng entered into possession of his
portion of property and paid the real property taxes. 19 He remains in possession up to this date. 20

Bacud claimed ownership over 1,690 square meters of Lot No. 3341 in his own right as heir of Irene. 21

Respondents started occupying their respective portions after the sale made to each of them. They continued to occupy them
despite several demands to vacate from Spouses Tappa. 22

Spouses Tappa claimed that the 1963 Affidavit was executed through force and intimidation. 23 Bacud and Malupeng denied
this allegation.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in dismissing Spouses Tappa's complaint for quieting of title against respondents

Whether the CA erred in finding that respondents have acquired the property through acquisitive prescription.

Held: The action for quieting of title should not prosper. From the foregoing provisions (Art 476, 477 CivCode), we reiterate
the rule that for an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or
complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite
its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. Spouses Tappa failed to meet these two requisites.

First, Spouses Tappa's claim of legal title over Lot No. 3341 by virtue of the free patent and the certificate of title, OCT No. P-
69103 issued in their name cannot stand. The certificate of title indicates that it was issued by virtue of Patent No. 021519-92-
3194. We agree with the CA that at the time of the application for free patent, Lot No. 3341 had already become private land by
virtue of the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession by respondents. Hence, Lot No. 3341 had been removed
from the coverage of the Public Land Act, 62 which governs public patent applications.
The settled rule is that a free patent issued over a private land is null and void, and produces no legal effects whatsoever.
Private ownership of land — as when there is a prima facie proof of ownership like a duly registered possessory information or
a clear showing of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, by present or previous occupants — is not affected
by the issuance of a free patent over the same land, because the Public Land Law applies only to lands of the public domain.
The Director of Lands has no authority to grant free patent to lands that have ceased to be public in character and have passed
to private ownership.

In view of the foregoing circumstances that show open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of Lot
No. 3341, the property had been segregated from the public domain. 73 At the time the patent and the certificate of title were
issued in 1992, Spouses Tappa and their predecessors-in-interest were already in possession, at least to the half of the lot, since
1934; and respondents were also in possession of the other half since 1963. Therefore, the free patent issued covers a land
already segregated from the public domain.

Records also show that Spouses Tappa were aware of respondents' possession of the disputed portions of Lot No. 3341. They
even admitted such possession (since 1963) by respondents in their complaint filed in 1999. Despite this, Spouses Tappa were
able to obtain a free patent of the whole property even if they were not in possession of some of its portions. Therefore, Free
Patent No. 021519-92-3194 and OCT No. P-69103 are void not only because it covers a private land, but also because they
fraudulently included 76 respondents' portion of the property. The second requisite for an action to quiet title is likewise
wanting. We find that although an instrument (the 1963 Affidavit) exists, and which allegedly casts cloud on Spouses Tappa's
title, it was not shown to be in fact invalid or ineffective against Spouses Tappa's rights to the property.

In an action to quiet title, legal title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means beneficial ownership. 79 As
discussed, the free patent and the certificate of title issued to Spouses Tappa could not be the source of their legal title.

The second requisite for an action to quiet title is likewise wanting. We find that although an instrument (the 1963 Affidavit)
exists, and which allegedly casts cloud on Spouses Tappa's title, it was not shown to be in fact invalid or ineffective against
Spouses Tappa's rights to the property.

A cloud on a title exists when (1) there is an instrument (deed, or contract) or record or claim or encumbrance or proceeding;
(2) which is apparently valid or effective; (3) but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, or
extinguished (or terminated) or barred by extinctive prescription; and (4) and may be prejudicial to the title

SPS. GALANG v. SPS. REYES

FACTS: Sometime in 1997, spouses Conrado S. Reyes and Fe de Kastro Reyes (the Reyeses) filed a case for the annulment of
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-928 against spouses Crispin and Caridad Galang (the Galangs) with the Regional Trial
Court, Antipolo, Rizal (RTC).

In their Complaint, the Reyeses alleged that they owned two properties: (1) a subdivision project known as Ponderosa Heights
Subdivision (Ponderosa), and (2) an adjoining property that the properties were separated by the Marigman Creek, which dried
up sometime in 1980 when it changed its course and passed through Ponderosa.

That the Galangs, by employing manipulation and fraud, were able to obtain a certificate of title over the dried up creek bed
from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), through its Provincial Office (PENRO), they discovered the
existence of the certificate of title when their caretaker, Federico Enteroso (Enteroso), informed them that the subject property
had been fraudulently titled in the names of the Galang.

The Galangs in their Answer denied that the land subject of the complaint was part of a creek and countered that the title was
issued to them after they had complied with the free patent requirements of the DENR, through the PENRO; that they and their
predecessor-in-interest had been in possession, occupation, cultivation, and ownership of the land for quite some time; that
the property belonged to Apolonio Galang, their predecessor-in-interest; that the property was transferred in the names of the
Reyeses through falsified document

ISSUE: W.O.N The abandoned river bed of the Marignan Creek rightfully belongs to the Reyeses?

RULING: NO,
 The law in this regard is covered by Article 461 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 461. River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the
owners whose lands are occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost. However, the owners of the lands adjoining
the old bed shall have the right to acquire the same by paying the value thereof, which value shall not exceed the value of the
area occupied by the new bed.

If indeed a property was the former bed of a creek that changed its course and passed through the property of the claimant,
then, pursuant to Article 461, the ownership of the old bed left to dry by the change of course was automatically acquired by
the claimant.

Before such a conclusion can be reached, the fact of natural abandonment of the old course must be shown must be proven
that the creek indeed changed its course without artificial or man-made intervention.

The Reyeses, must prove three key elements by clear and convincing evidence These are:

(1) the old course of the creek,

(2) the new course of the creek, and

(3) the change of course of the creek from the old location to the new location by natural occurrence.

In this regard, the Reyeses failed to adduce indubitable evidence to prove the old course, its natural abandonment and the new
course. In the face of a Torrens title issued by the government, which is presumed to have been regularly issued, the evidence
of the Reyeses was clearly wanting. Uncorroborated testimonial evidence will not suffice to convince the Court to order the
reconveyance of the property to them.

Green Acres Holdings Inc., v Cabral

Facts: Victoria Cabral was the original owner of a parcel of land in Barangay Pandayan, Meycauayan, Bulacan with an area of
11,432 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-73737 (M). The land was placed under the
coverage of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27.

On March 23, 1993, three Emancipation Patents were issued to the spouses Enrique Moraga and Victoria Soriano (Spouses
Moraga) as follows: EP No. 496039 with an area of 861 square

meters; EP No. 496040 with an area of 2,159 square meters; and EP No. 496041 with an area of 8,941 square meters. The
Spouses Moraga thereafter caused the cancellation of EP No. 496041 and its conversion to TCT No. 256260 (M).

On August 29, 1994, Cabral filed a complaint before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) seeking the
cancellation of the Emancipation Patents issued to the Spouses Moraga on the grounds that these were obtained through fraud
and that the land is not suitable for rice and corn production and has long been classified as residential, commercial, industrial
and nonagricultural land by the Zoning Administrator of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board.

On December 15, 1995, the PARAD rendered a decision denying the petition for cancellation of the Emancipation Patents and
dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. Cabral appealed the decision to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB).

While the appeal was pending, the Spouses Moraga subdivided the lot covered by TCT No. 256260 (M) into three smaller lots,
the properties subject of this case.

On June 19, 1996, the Spouses Moraga sold the lots to Filcon Ready Mixed Inc.

On April 29, 1999, Green Acres purchased five lots from Filcon including the three subject properties. Except for an already
cancelled annotation of a real estate mortgage in favor of Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCI Bank), the titles were
free from any annotations, liens, notices, claims or encumbrances.

On January 17, 2001, the DARAB resolved Cabral's appeal and rendered judgment ordering the cancellation of the titles issued
in the names of the Spouses Moraga and those of Filcon for having been illegally acquired.
When Green Acres learned about the DARAB decision, it sent a letter to Filcon on March 15, 2001 advising the latter that it
learned that the properties it bought from Filcon were the subject of an adverse decision of the DARAB. Fearing that its titles
and possession might be disturbed by the DARAB decision, Green Acres reminded Filcon of its warranties under the deed of
sale.

On April 19, 2001, Green Acres filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title, Damages with Application for Preliminary Injunction and
Writ of Preliminary Attachment before the RTC. After Green Acres presented its evidence, Cabral filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff's
Evidence arguing that Green Acres failed to prove that it is a purchaser in good faith and for value. She maintains that the
complaint is not appropriate for quieting of title since it omitted to assail her titles over the subject property but instead
questioned the proceedings held at the DARAB.

On November 3, 2004, the trial court granted the demurrer and ordered the case dismissed. In the meantime, the DARAB
decision became final and executory on April 13, 2005.

On July 8, 2005, Cabral filed with the PARAD a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution of the DARAB decision.

On January 25, 2006, the PARAD issued a Resolution denying the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution for lack of merit.
Cabral filed a Motion for Recusation and a Motion for Reconsideration. The PARAD, however, denied Cabral's motions on
September 11, 2006. Thus, on November 7, 2006, Cabral filed with the PARAD a Notice of Appeal.

In the meantime, the CA, on November 24, 2006, rendered a decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85766 dismissing Green Acres' appeal.
The appellate court held that the trial court had no authority to interfere with the proceedings of a court of equal jurisdiction,
much less to annul the final judgment of a co-equal court. The appellate court further held that the only issue in an action to
quiet title is whether there is a cloud in a title to real property because of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or a
proceeding that has a prima facie appearance of validity and the DARAB decision does not fall within said enumeration.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the DARAB decision may be enforced against Petitioner Green Acres. 


2. Whether or not the DARAB decision constitutes a cloud on Petitioner Green Acre’s 
 title.

Held:
 1. No.
 In Muñoz v. Yabut, Jr., this Court ruled:

No man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment
rendered by the court. In the same manner, a writ of execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did
not have his day in court. Only real parties in interest in an action are bound by the judgment therein and by writs of execution
issued pursuant thereto.

It is beyond dispute that Green Acres was not made a party in the DARAB case. Consequently, the January 17, 2001 DARAB
decision cannot bind Green Acres. Likewise, the binding effect of the DARAB decision cannot be extended to Green Acres by the
mere issuance of a writ of execution against it. No one shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and
strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner, a writ of execution can be
issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. Only real parties in interest in an action are
bound by the judgment therein and by writs of execution and demolition issued pursuant thereto.

2. Yes.
 Article 476 of the Civil Code provides:

Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.

Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real
property. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest in real property by reason of any instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the
title.

For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or
equitable title or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding
claimed to be casting a cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy.

There is no dispute as to the first requisite since Green Acres has legal title over the subject properties. The issue lies in the
second requisite.

A cloud on title consists of (1) any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding; (2) which is apparently valid or
effective; (3) but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable; and (4) may be prejudicial to the title
sought to be quieted.

This Court holds that the DARAB decision in favor of Cabral satisfies all four elements of a cloud on title.

As Green Acres correctly points out, the DARAB decision, a final one at that, is both an "instrument" and a "record."

Black's Law Dictionary defines an instrument as a document or writing which gives formal expression to a legal act or
agreement, for the purpose of creating, securing, modifying or terminating a right.

A record, on the other hand, is defined as a written account of some act, court proceeding, transaction or instrument drawn up
under authority of law, by a proper officer, and designed to remain as a memorial or permanent evidence of the matters to
which it relates.

It is likewise a "claim" which is defined as a cause of action or a demand for money or property since Cabral is asserting her
right over the subject lots.

More importantly, it is a "proceeding" which is defined as a regular and orderly progress in form of law including all possible
steps in an action from its commencement to the execution of judgment and may refer not only to a complete remedy but also
to a mere procedural step that is part of a larger action or special proceeding.

Also, the DARAB decision is apparently valid and effective. It is a final decision that has not been reversed, vacated or nullified.
It is likewise apparently effective and may be prejudicial to Green Acres' titles since it orders the cancellation of the titles of the
Spouses Moraga and Filcon all from which Green Acres derived its titles. However, as discussed above, it is ineffective and
unenforceable against Green Acres because Green Acres was not properly impleaded in the DARAB proceedings nor was there
any notice of lis pendens annotated on the title of Filcon so as to serve notice to Green Acres that the subject properties were
under litigation. As such, Green Acres is an innocent purchaser for value.

Heirs of Pocdo v. Avila

Facts: Pocdo Pool, who died in 1942, began his occupation and claim on three lots that were eventually surveyed in his name as
Lot 43, Lot 44, and Lot 45, Baguio City. These lots were the subject of a petition to reopen judicial proceedings filed by the Heirs
of Pocdo Pool. The registration of the lots in the names of the petitioners were granted in October 1964, but since the decision
was not implemented within the 10 years prescribed period, the Heirs filed their ancestral land claims with the DENR. In August
1991, Certificates of Ancestral Lands Claims (CALS) were issued by the DENR for Lots 44 and 45, but Lot 43 was not approved
due to Memorandum Order 98-15 issued by the DENR Secretary in September 199[8].

In the meantime, on September 14, 1960, Polon Pocdo, an heir of Pocdo Pool, ceded his rights over the three lots to Pacifico
Pocdo in exchange for a one-hectare lot to be taken from Lot 43.

(A little fight between Pacifico and Polon because Pacifico gave a portion of the land that belonged to Polon to other people,
but they settled it and Polon owns the 1 hectare of lot 43 again)

On April 18, 1981, Polon entered into a Catulagan with Arsenia Avila authorizing the latter to undertake the segregation of his
one-hectare land from Lot 43; in exchange, Polon would award to her 2,000 square meters from the 1-hectare lot. After
spending time, money and effort in the execution of the survey, Avila gave the survey results to Polon prompting Polon to
execute a Waiver of Rights.

On March 10, 2000, finding the amicable settlement, the Catulagan and Waiver of Rights in order, the CENRO of Baguio City
issued in favor of Avila a Certificate of Exclusion of 993 square meters from the Ancestral Land Claim of the Heirs of Pocdo Pool
over Lot 43.

(The Heirs filed an administrative case to cancel Certificate of Exclusion of Avila; then after exhausting all administrative
remedies, the Heirs appealed to the RTC with Avila winning)

In a Resolution dated January 2008, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court held that
the DENR had already declared the disputed property as public land, which the State, through the DENR, has the sole power to
dispose. Thus, the claim of petitioners to quiet title is not proper since they do not have title over the disputed property.

The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners, in raising the issue of quieting of title, failed to allege any legal or equitable title to
quiet.

On the validity of the Catulagan and the Waiver of Rights, the Court of Appeals held that petitioners have no right to question
these since they were not parties to said documents had not participated in any manner in their execution.

Issues: Whether or not the Petitioner’s action to quiet title should prosper.

Held: No.

In the administrative case involving the disputed property, which forms part of Lot 43, the DENR ruled that Lot 43 is public land.
Having established that the disputed property is public land, the trial court was therefore correct in dismissing the complaint to
quiet title for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court had no jurisdiction to determine who among the parties have better right over
the disputed property which is admittedly still part of the public domain.|||

Under Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, the two indispensable requisites in an action to quiet title are: (1) that the plaintiff
has a legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) that there is a cloud on his title by
reason of any instrument, record, deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity.

In this case, petitioners, claiming to be owners of the disputed property, allege that respondents are unlawfully claiming the
disputed property by using void documents, namely the "Catulagan" and the Deed of Waiver of Rights. However, the records
reveal that petitioners do not have legal or equitable title over the disputed property, which forms part of Lot 43, a public land.
It is clear from the facts of the case that petitioners' predecessors-in- interest, the heirs of Pocdo Pool, were not even granted a
Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim over Lot 43, which remains public land. Thus, the trial court had no other recourse but to
dismiss the case.

TITLE 3- CO OWNERSHIP

Del Blanco vs IAC

Facts: In a document executed in the Municipality of San Rafael, Bulacan, on February 11, 1859, three brothers, Benedicto
Pansacola, Jose Pansacola and Manuel Pansacola (known as Fr. Manuel Pena) entered into an agreement which provided,
among others:

(1) That they will purchase from the Spanish Government the lands comprising the Island of Cagbalite which is located within
the boundaries of the Municipality of Mauban, Province of Tayabas (now Quezon) and has an approximate area of 1,600
hectares;

(2) That the lands shall be considered after the purchase as their common property;

(3) That the co-ownership includes Domingo Arce and Baldomera Angulo, minors at that time represented by their father,
Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena) who will contribute for them in the proposed purchase of the Cagbalite Island;
(4) That whatever benefits may be derived from the Island shall be shared equally by the co- owners in the following
proportion: Benedicto Pansacola-1/4 share; Jose Pansacola-1/4 share;

and, Domingo Arce and Baldomera Angulo-2/4 shares which shall be placed under the care of their father, Manuel Pansacola
(Fr. Manuel Pena).

On August 14, 1866, co-owners entered into the actual possession and enjoyment of the Island purchased by them from the
Spanish Government. On April 11, 1868 they agreed to modify the terms and conditions of the agreement entered into by them
on February 11, 1859. The new agreement provided for a new sharing and distribution of the lands, comprising the Island of
Cagbalite and whatever benefits may be derived therefrom, as follows:

(a) The first one-fourth (1/4) portion shall belong to Don Benedicto Pansacola;

(b) The second one-fourth (1/4) portion shall belong to Don Jose Pansacola;

(c) The third one-fourth(1/4) portion shall henceforth belong to the children of their deceased brother, Don Eustaquio
Pansacola, namely: Don Mariano Pansacola,- Maria Pansacola and Don Hipolito Pansacola;

(d) The fourth and last one-fourth (1/4) portion shall belong to their nephews and nieces (1) Domingo Arce, (2) Baldomera
Angulo, (3) Marcelina Flores, (4) Francisca Flores, (5) Candelaria dela Cruz, and (6) Gervasio Pansacola who, being all minors, are
still under the care of their brother, Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena). The latter is the real father of said minors.

About one hundred years later, on November 18, 1968, private respondents brought a special action for partition in the Court
of First Instance of Quezon, under the provisions of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, including as parties the heirs and successors-
in-interest of the co-owners of the Cagbalite Island in the second contract of co-ownership dated April 11, 1968.

Issue: whether or not Cagbalite Island is still undivided property owned in common by the heirs and successors-in-interest of
the brothers, Benedicto, Jose and Manuel Pansacola.

Held: Yes. There is nothing in all four agreements that suggests that actual or physical partition of the Island had really been
made by either the original owners or their heirs or successors-in-interest. It is not disputed that some of the private
respondents and some of the petitioners at the time the action for partition was filed in the trial court have been in actual
possession and enjoyment of several portions of the property in question (Rollo, p. 148). This does not provide any proof that
the Island in question has already been actually partitioned and co-ownership terminated. A co-owner cannot, without the
conformity of the other co- owners or a judicial decree of partition issued pursuant to the provision of Rule 69 of the Rules of
Court adjudicate to himself in fee simple a determinate portion of the lot owned in common, as his share therein, to the
exclusion of other co-owners. It is not enough that the co-owners agree to subdivide the property. They must have a
subdivision plan drawn in accordance with which they take actual and exclusive possession of their respective portions in the
plan and titles issued to each of them accordingly.

Furthermore, no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. Co-owners cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a
clear repudiation of the co- ownership clearly communicated to the other co-owners

An action for partition does not prescribe. Article 403 of the Old Civil Code, now Article 497, provides that the assignees of the
co-owners may take part in the partition of the common property, and Article 400 of the Old Code, now Article 494 provides
that each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property, a provision which implies that the action to
demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches (Budlong vs. Pondoc, 79 SCRA 24 [1977]). An action for
partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co- owner

Dela Rosa vs Batongbacal

Facts: The subject property consists of a 3, 750 square meter-portion of the 15,00 l square meters parcel of land under the
names of Reynaldo Dela Rosa (Reynaldo), Eduardo Dela Rosa (Eduardo), Araceli Dela Rosa (Araceli) and Zenaida Dela Rosa
(Zenaida). Sometime in 1984, Reynaldo offered to sell the subject property to Guillermo Batongbacal (Guillermo) and Mario
Batongbacal (Mario) for P50.00 per square meter or for a total of P187,500.00. Pursuant to the agreement, Reynaldo received
an advance payment of P31,500.00 leaving a balance of P156,000.00. As shown in the document denominated as Resibo and
signed by Reynaldo on 18 February 1987, the parties agreed that the amount of P20,000.00 as part of the advance payment
shall be paid upon the delivery of the Special Power-of-Attorney (SPA), which would authorize Reynaldo to alienate the subject
property on behalf of his co-owners and siblings namely, Eduardo, Araceli and Zenaida.

Mario and Guillermo thereafter made several demands from Reynaldo to deliver the SP A as agreed upon, but such demands all
went unheeded. Consequently, Guillermo and Mario initiated an action for Specific Performance or Rescission and Damages
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, seeking to enforce their Contract to Sell. Mario and Guillermo
asserted that they have a better right over the subject property and alleged that the subsequent sale thereof effected by
Reynaldo to third persons is void as it was done in bad faith. It was prayed in the Complaint that Reynaldo be directed to deliver
the SPA and, in case of its impossibility, to return the amount of P31,500.00 with legal interest and with damages in either case.
In refuting the allegations of Mario and Guillermo in their Complaint. Reynaldo in his Answer8 countered that the purported
Contract to Sell is void, because he never gave his consent thereto. Reynaldo insisted that he was made to understand that the
contract between him and the Batongbacals was merely an equitable mortgage whereby it was agreed that the latter will loan
to him the amount of P3 l ,500.00 payable once he receives his share in the proceeds of the sale of the land. Reynaldo failed to
convince the court a quo that the contract he entered into with Mario was an equitable mortgage. It was held by the trial court,
however, that the supposed Contract to Sell denominated as Resibo is unenforceable under Article 1403 of the New Civil Code
because Reynaldo cannot bind his co- owners into such contract without an SPA authorizing him to do so. As such, Reynaldo
cannot be compelled to deliver the subject property. The CA brushed aside the claim of equitable mortgage and held that the
sale effected by Reynaldo of his undivided share in the property is valid and enforceable. According to the appellate court, no
SPA is necessary for Reynaldo's disposition of his undivided share as it is limited to the portion that may be allotted to him upon
the termination of the co-ownership. The Batongbacals could have validly demanded from Reynaldo to deliver the subject
property pursuant to the Contract to Sell but such option is no longer feasible because the entire property has already been
sold to third persons to whom a new title was issued.

Issue: WON THERE IS A CONTRACT OF SALE BETWEEN REYNALDO DELA ROSA AND GUILLERMO BATONGBACAL;

Held: Yes. There is no equitable mortgage. A perusal of the contract denominated as Resibo reveals the utter frailty of
petitioners' position because nothing therein suggests, even remotely, that the subject property was given to secure a
monetary obligation. The terms of the contract set forth in no uncertain terms that the instrument was executed with the
intention of transferring the ownership of the subject prope1iy to the buyer in exchange for the price. Nowhere in the deed is it
indicated that the transfer was merely intended to secure a debt obligation. On the contrary, the document clearly indicates
the intent of Reynaldo to sell his share in the property.

As a co-owner of the subject property, Reynaldo's right to sell, assign or mortgage his ideal share in the property held in
common is sanctioned by law. The applicable law is Article 493 of the New Civil Code, which spells out the rights of co-owners
over a co-owned property, to wit:

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the foll ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

Pursuant to this law, a co-owner has the right to alienate his proindiviso share in the co- owned property even without the
consent of his coowners.23 This right is absolute and in accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a co-owner has a full
ownership of his pro- indiviso share and has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute another person for its
enjoyment.24 In other words, the law does not prohibit a co-owner from selling, alienating, mortgaging his ideal share in the
property held in common. In the same breadth, a co-owner cannot be compelled by the court to give their consent to the sale
of his share in a co-owned property.

Thus, even if the impression of the Court of Appeals were true, i.e., that the entire property has been sold to thirds persons,
such sale could not have affected the right of Mario and Guillermo to recover the property from Reynaldo. In view of the nature
of co-ownership, the Comi of Appeals correctly ruled that the terms in the Contract to Sell, which limited the subject to
Reynaldo's ideal share in the property held in common is perfectly valid and binding. In fact, no authority from the other co-
owners is necessary for such disposition to be valid as he is afforded by the law fullownership of his paii and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto. J\ condition set forth in a sale contract requiring a co-owner to secure an authority from his co-
owners for the alienation of his share, as seemingly indicated in this case, should be considered mere surplusage and docs not,
in any way, affect the validity or the enforceability of the contract.
ARAMBULO v. NOLASCO
FACTS: Petitioners Raul V. Arambulo and Teresita A. Dela Cruz, along with their mother Rosita Vda. de Arambulo, and siblings
Primo V. Arambulo, Ma. Lorenza A. Lopez, Ana Maria V. Arambulo, Maximiano V. Arambulo, Julio V. Arambulo and Iraida
Arambulo Nolasco (Iraida) are co-owners of two (2) parcels of land located in Tondo, Manila, with an aggregate size of 233
square meters.

When Iraida passed away, she was succeeded by her husband, respondent Genaro Nolasco and their children, Iris Abegail
Nolasco, Ingrid Aileen Arambulo and respondent Jeremy Spencer Nolasco.

On 8 January 1999, petitioners filed a petition for relief under Article 491 of the Civil Code with the RTC of Manila, alleging that
all of the co-owners, except for respondents, have authorized petitioners to sell their respective shares to the subject
properties; that only respondents are withholding their consent to the sale of their shares that the sale of subject properties
constitutes alteration; and that under Article 491 of the Civil Code, if one or more co-owners shall withhold their consent to the
alterations in the thing owned in common, the courts may afford adequate relief.

The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered respondents to give their consent to the sale. Going along with
petitioners' reliance on Article 491 of the Civil Code, the trial court found that respondents' withholding of their consent to the
sale of their shares is prejudicial to the common interest of the co-owners.

The Court of Appeals granted the appeal and reversed the trial court's decision. The Court of Appeals held that the respondents
had the full ownership of their undivided interest in the subject properties, thus, they cannot be compelled to sell their
undivided shares in the properties.

It referred to the provisions of Article 493 of the Civil Code. However, the Court of Appeals, implying applicability of Article 491
also observed that petitioners failed to show how respondents' withholding of their consent would prejudice the common
interest over the subject properties.

Petitioners refute the appellate court's finding that they failed to show how the withholding of consent by respondents
becomes prejudicial to their common interest, they assert that one of the two subject properties has an area of 122 square
meters and if they decide to partition, instead of selling the same, their share would be reduced to a measly 30-square meter
lot each. The other property was testified to as measuring only 111 square meters. Petitioners reiterate that all the other co-
owners are willing to sell the property and give respondents their share of the proceeds of the sale.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents, as co-owners, can be compelled by the court to give their consent to the sale of their
shares in the co-owned properties.

RULING: No, Article 491 does not apply to the problem arising out of the proposed sale of the property co-owned by the parties
in this case. The Court of Appeals correctly applied the provision of Article 493 of the Civil Code.

While a sale constitutes an alteration as mentioned in Article 491 is an established jurisprudence. Alienation of the thing by sale
of the property is an act of strict dominion. However, the ruling that alienation is alteration does not mean that a sale of
commonly owned real property is covered by the second paragraph of Article 491.

Pertinent to this case, Article 493 dictates that each one of the parties herein as co-owners with full ownership of their parts
can sell their fully owned part. The sale by the petitioners of their parts shall not affect the full ownership by the respondents of
the part that belongs to them. Their part which petitioners will sell shall be that which may be apportioned to them in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership. With the full ownership of the respondents remaining unaffected by
petitioners' sale of their parts, the nature of the property, as co-owned, likewise stays. In lieu of the petitioners, their vendees
shall be co- owners with the respondents.

Co-owners such as respondents have over their part, the right of full and absolute ownership. Such right is the same as that of
individual owners which is not diminished by the fact that the entire property is co-owned with others. That part which ideally
belongs to them, or their mental portion, may be disposed of as they please, independent of the decision of their co- owners.
So we rule in this case. The respondents cannot be ordered to sell their portion of the co-owned properties. Insofar as the sale
of co-owned properties is concerned, there is no common interest that may be prejudiced should one or more of the co-owners
refuse to sell the co-owned property, which is exactly the factual situation in this case. When respondents disagreed to the sale,
they merely asserted their individual ownership rights. Without unanimity, there is no common interest.

Petitioners who project themselves as prejudiced co-owners may bring a suit for partition, which is one of the modes of
extinguishing co-ownership.

Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co- ownership, and that each co-owner
may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned.

Corollary to this rule, Article 498 of the Civil Code states that whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners
cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly
distributed. This is resorted to (a) when the right to partition the property is invoked by any of the co-owners but because of
the nature of the property, it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the interests of the co-owners, and (b) the
co-owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or assigned the entire property upon proper
reimbursement of the co-owners.

QUINTOS v. NICOLAS
FACTS: Petitioners Vilma Quintos, Florencia Dancel, and Catalino Ibarra, and respondents Pelagia Nicolas, Noli Ibarra, Santiago
Ibarra, Pedro Ibarra, David Ibarra, Gilberto Ibarra, and the late Augusto Ibarra are siblings.

Their parents, Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra, were the owners of the subject property, a 281 sq.m. parcel of land situated
along Quezon Ave., Poblacion C, Camiling, Tarlac.

By 1999, both Bienvenido and Escolastica had already passed away, leaving to their ten (10) children ownership over the
subject property. Subsequently, sometime in 2002, respondent siblings brought an action for partition against petitioners which
was dismissed due to non- appearance of the parties, neither set of parties appealed, the ruling of the trial court became final.

Having failed to secure a favorable decision for partition, respondent siblings instead resorted to executing a Deed of
Adjudication 6 on September 21, 2004 to transfer the property in favor of the ten (10) siblings. As a result, TCT No. 318717 was
canceled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 390484 was issued in its place by the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac in the names of the ten
(10) heirs of the Ibarra spouses.

Respondent siblings sold their 7/10 undivided share over the property in favor of their co- respondents, the spouses Candelario
by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale and and an Agreement of Subdivision purportedly executed by them and petitioners.

On June 1, 2009, petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages against respondents wherein they alleged that
during their parents' lifetime, the couple distributed their real and personal properties in favor of their ten (10) children. Upon
distribution, petitioners alleged that they received the subject property and the house constructed thereon as their share.

They likewise averred that they have been in adverse, open, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the property for over
four (4) decades and are, thus, entitled to equitable title thereto. They also deny any participation in the execution of the
aforementioned Deed of Adjudication dated September 21, 2004 and the Agreement of Subdivision.

Respondents countered that petitioners' cause of action was already barred by estoppel when sometime in 2006, one of
petitioners offered to buy the 7/10 undivided share of the respondent siblings. They point out that this is an admission on the
part of petitioners that the property is not entirely theirs. In addition, they claimed that Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra
mortgaged the property but because of financial constraints, respondent spouses Candelario had to redeem the property in
their behalf. Not having been repaid by Bienvenido and Escolastica, the Candelarios accepted from their co-respondents their
share in the subject property as payment. Lastly, respondents sought, by way of counterclaim, the partition of the property.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the respondents' counterclaim for partition is already barred by laches or res judicata?

RULING: NO, In the case at bar, respondent siblings admit that they filed an action for partition which the RTC dismissed for the
failure of the parties to attend the scheduled hearings. Respondents likewise admitted that since they no longer appealed the
dismissal, the ruling attained finality. Moreover, it cannot be disputed that the subject property in Partion Case and in the
present controversy are one and the same, and that in both cases, respondents raise the same action for partition. And lastly,
although respondent spouses Candelario were not party-litigants in the earlier case for partition, there is identity of parties not
only when the parties in the case are the same, but also between those in privity with them, such as between their successors-
in-interest.

There is res judicata when the following requisites are present: (1) the formal judgment or order must be final; (2) it must be a
judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the
parties at the trial of the case; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of
action.

However, dismissal with prejudice under Rules of Court cannot defeat the right of a co-owner to ask for partition at any time,
provided that there is no actual adjudication of ownership of shares yet.

Article 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.

From the above-quoted provision, it can be gleaned that the law generally does not favor the retention of co-ownership as a
property relation, and is interested instead in ascertaining the co-owners' specific shares so as to prevent the allocation of
portions to remain perpetually in limbo. Thus, the law provides that each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of
the thing owned in common.

Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and the right granted to co-owners under Art. 494 of the Civil Code, the
latter must prevail. To construe otherwise would diminish the substantive right of a co-owner through the promulgation of
procedural rules.

Article 496. Partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. Partition shall be governed
by the Rules of Court insofar as they are consistent with this Code.

Thus, for the Rules to be consistent with statutory provisions, We hold that Art. 494, as cited, is an exception to Rule 17, Sec. 3
of the Rules of Court to the effect that even if the order of dismissal for failure to prosecute is silent on whether or not it is with
prejudice, it shall be deemed to be without prejudice.

This is not to say, however, that the action for partition will never be barred by res judicata. There can still be res judicata in
partition cases concerning the same parties and the same subject matter once the respective shares of the co-owners have
been determined with finality by a competent court with jurisdiction or if the court determines that partition is improper for co-
ownership does not or no longer exists.

Apique v. Fahnenstich
Dominador and Evangeline are siblings who used to live with their parents at Babak, Island Garden City of Samal, Davao, until
Evangeline left for Germany to work sometime in 1979. 5 On August 2, 1995, Evangeline executed-General 6 and Special
Powers of Attorney 7 constituting Dominador as her attorney-in-fact to purchase real property for her, and to manage or
supervise her business affairs in the Philippines. 8

As Evangeline was always in Germany, she opened a joint savings account on January 18, 1999 with Dominador at the Claveria
Branch of the Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCI Bank) in Davao City, which later became Equitable PCI Bank
(EPCIB), and now Banco de Oro, under Savings Account No. 1189-02819-5 (subject account). 9

On February 11, 2002, Dominador withdrew the amount of P980,000.00 from the subject account and, thereafter, deposited
the money to his own savings account with the same bank, under Savings Account No. 1189-00781-3. It was only on February
23, 2003 that Evangeline learned of such withdrawal from the manager of EPCIB. Evangeline then had the passbook updated,
which reflected the said withdrawal. She likewise discovered that Dominador had deposited the amount withdrawn to his own
account with the same bank and that he had withdrawn various amounts from the said account.

Evangeline demanded the return of the amount withdrawn from the joint account, but to no avail.

In her complaint, 12 Evangeline claimed to be the sole owner of the money deposited in the subject account, and that
Dominador has no authority to withdraw the same. On the other hand, she alleged that EPCIB violated its banking rules when it
allowed the withdrawal without the presentation of the passbook. She also prayed for a TRO to enjoin EPCIB from allowing any
withdrawal from the subject account, which was granted by the Executive Judge on May 7, 2002. 13

In his answer, 14 Dominador asserted, among others, that he was authorized to withdraw funds from the subject account to
answer for the expenses of Evangeline's projects, considering: (a) that it was a joint account, and (b) the general and special
powers of attorney executed by Evangeline in his favor. By way of counterclaim, he sought payment of moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit. EPCIB, for its part, denied having violated its own banking rules
and regulations, contending that the account in question was an "OR" account such that any of the account holders may
transact without the signature of the other. It also pointed out that "no passbook" transactions were allowed if the following
could be verified, namely: (a) technicalities of documents, (b)

identity of payee, (c) authenticity of signature/s, and (d) sufficiency of funds. 15 In the course of the proceedings, Evangeline
and EPCIB filed a joint motion to drop the latter as party defendant, which the RTC granted in an Order 16 dated April 5, 2004.

During the trial, Dominador claimed that the money withdrawn from the subject account belonged to him, explaining that he
had contributed an initial deposit of P100,000.00 18 and that Evangeline's common-law husband, Holgar Schwarzfeller (Holgar),
had also deposited a total amount of P900,000.00 19 pursuant to the latter's verbal promise to compensate him for his services
as administrator/manager of the couple's business and properties in the amount of P1,000,000.00, 20 which his sister, Marietta
Apique (Marietta), corroborated.

Issue: The essential issue for the Court's resolution is WON Evangeline is entitled to the return of the amount of P980 000.00
Dominador withdrew from their joint savings account with EPCIB, plus legal interest thereon.

Held: The petition is partly meritorious.

At the outset, the Court notes that the arguments raised herein necessarily require a reevaluation of the parties' submissions
and the CA's factual findings, which is generally proscribed in a petition for review on certiorari because: (a) a Rule 45 petition
resolves only questions of law, not questions of fact; and (b) factual findings of the CA are generally conclusive on the parties
and are, therefore, not reviewable by this Court. By way of exception, however, the Court resolves factual issues when the
findings of the RTC differ from those of the CA, 30 as in this case.

A joint account is one that is held jointly by two or more natural persons, or by two or more juridical persons or entities. 31
Under such setup, the depositors are joint owners or co- owners of the said account, 32 and their share in the deposits shall be
presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved, pursuant to Article 485 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges, shall be proportional to their respective interests.
Any stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall be void.

The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved.

The common banking practice is that regardless of who puts the money into the account, each of the named account holder
has an undivided right to the entire balance, 33 and any of them may deposit and/or withdraw, partially or wholly, the funds
without the need or consent of the other, 34 during their lifetime. 35 Nevertheless, as between the account holders, their right
against each other may depend on what they have agreed upon, and the purpose for which the account was opened and how it
will be operated. 36

In this case, there is no dispute that the account opened by Evangeline and Dominador under Savings Account No. 1189-02819-
5 with EPCIB was a joint "OR" account. It is also admitted that: (a) the account was opened for a specific purpose, i.e., to
facilitate the transfer of

needed funds for Evangeline's business projects; 37 and (b) Dominador may withdraw funds therefrom "if" 38 there is a need to
meet Evangeline's financial obligations arising from said projects. 39 Hence, while Dominador is a co-owner of the subject
account as far as the bank is concerned — and may, thus, validly deposit and/or withdraw funds without the consent of his co-
depositor, Evangeline — as between him and Evangeline, his authority to withdraw, as well as the amount to be withdrawn, is
circumscribed by the purpose for which the subject account was opened.

Under the foregoing circumstances, Dominador's right to obtain funds from the subject account was, thus, conditioned on the
necessity of funds for Evangeline's projects. Admittedly, at the time he withdrew the amount of P980,000.00 from the subject
account, there was no project being undertaken for Evangeline. 40 Moreover, his claim that the said amount belonged to him,
as part of the compensation promised by Holgar for his services as administrator of the business affairs of Evangeline, was
correctly rejected by the CA, 41 considering the dearth of competent evidence showing that Holgar: (a) undertook to pay
Dominador the amount of P1,000,000.00 for his services as administrator of Evangeline's various projects; and (b) remitted
such amount to the subject account for the benefit of Dominador. Having failed to justify his right over the amount withdrawn,
Dominador is liable for its return, as correctly adjudged by the CA.

Nonetheless, the Court deems it proper to modify the amount to be returned to Evangeline, considering: (a) the unrefuted
claim that Dominador contributed the amount of P100 000.00 to the joint account at the time it was opened; and (b) the
absence of controverting proof showing that the same had been withdrawn prior to February 11, 2002, when the contested
withdrawal was made. Consequently, Dominador is entitled to the said amount which should be, therefore, deducted from
amount to be returned.

Catedrilla v. Lauron
Facts: On February 12, 2003, petitioner Rey Castigador Catedrilla filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Lambunao, Iloilo
a Complaint 4 for ejectment against the spouses Mario and Margie Lauron alleging as follows: that Lorenza Lizada is the owner
of a parcel of land

known as Lot 183, located in Mabini Street, Lambunao, Iloilo, which was declared for taxation purposes in her name under Tax
Declaration No. 0363; 5 that on February 13, 1972, Lorenza died and was succeeded to her properties by her sole heir Jesusa
Lizada Losañes, who was married to Hilarion Castigador (Castigador); that the spouses Jesusa and Hilarion Castigador had a
number of children, which included Lilia Castigador (Lilia), who was married to Maximo Catedrilla (Maximo); that after the
death of the spouses Castigador, their heirs agreed among themselves to subdivide Lot 183 and, pursuant to a consolidation
subdivision plan 6 dated January 21, 1984, the parcel of lot denominated as Lot No. 5 therein was to be apportioned to the
heirs of Lilia since the latter already died on April 9, 1976; Lilia was succeeded by her heirs, her husband Maximo and their
children, one of whom is herein petitioner; that petitioner filed the complaint as a co-owner of Lot No. 5; that sometime in
1980, respondents Mario and Margie Lauron, through the tolerance of the heirs of Lilia, constructed a residential building of
strong materials on the northwest portion of Lot No. 5 covering an area of one hundred square meters; that the heirs of Lilia
made various demands for respondents to vacate the premises and even exerted earnest efforts to compromise with them but
the same was unavailing; and that petitioner reiterated the demand on respondents to vacate the subject lot on January 15,
2003, but respondents continued to unlawfully withhold such possession.

In their Answer, respondents claimed that petitioner had no cause of action against them, since they are not the owners of the
residential building standing on petitioner's lot, but Mildred Kascher (Mildred), sister of respondent Margie, as shown by the tax
declaration in Mildred's name; 8 that in 1992, Mildred had already paid P10,000.00 as downpayment for the subject lot to
Teresito Castigador; 9 that there were several instances that the heirs of Lilia offered the subject Lot 183 for sale to
respondents and Mildred and demanded payment, however, the latter was only interested in asking money without any
intention of delivering or registering the subject lot; that in 1998, Maximo, petitioner's father, and respondent Margie entered
into an amicable settlement 10 before the Barangay Lupon of Poblacion Ilawod, Lambunao, Iloilo wherein Maximo offered the
subject lot to the spouses Alfons and Mildred Kascher in the amount of P90,000.00 with the agreement that all documents
related to the transfer of the subject lot to Maximo and his children be prepared by Maximo, but the latter failed to comply;
and that the amicable settlement should have the force and effect of a final judgment of a court, hence, the instant suit is
barred by prior judgment. Respondents counterclaimed for damages.

The MTC found that from the allegations and evidence presented, it appeared that petitioner is one of the heirs of Lilia
Castigador Catedrilla, the owner of the subject lot and that respondents are occupying the subject lot; that petitioner is a party
who may bring the suit in accordance with Article 487 13 of the Civil Code; and as a co-owner, petitioner is allowed to bring this
action for ejectment under Section 1, Rule 70 14 of the Rules of Court; that respondents are also the proper party to be sued as
they are the occupants of the subject lot which they do not own; and that the MTC assumed that the house standing on the
subject lot has been standing thereon even before 1992 and only upon the acquiescence of the petitioner and his predecessor-
in-interest.

The MTC found that respondents would like to focus their defense on the ground that Mildred is an indispensable party,
because she is the owner of the residential building on the subject

lot and that there was already a perfected contract to sell between Mildred and Maximo because of an amicable settlement
executed before the Office of the Punong Barangay

Issue: Whether or not petitioner can file an action without his co-owners

Held:Yes. Petitioner can file the action for ejectment without impleading his co-owners. In Wee v. De Castro, 22 wherein
petitioner therein argued that the respondent cannot maintain an action for ejectment against him, without joining all his co-
owners, we ruled in this wise:

Article 487 of the New Civil Code is explicit on this point:

ART. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. —

A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is
deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession
for himself and not for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper.

In this case, although petitioner alone filed the complaint for unlawful detainer, he stated in the complaint that he is one of the
heirs of the late Lilia Castigador, his mother, who inherited the subject lot, from her parents. Petitioner did not claim exclusive
ownership of the subject lot, but he filed the complaint for the purpose of recovering its possession which would redound to
the benefit of the co-owners. Since petitioner recognized the existence of a co- ownership, he, as a co-owner, can bring the
action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs.

Petitioner contends that the CA committed a reversible error in finding that Mildred Kascher is an indispensable party and that
her non-inclusion as a party defendant in the ejectment case made the complaint fatally defective, thus, must be dismissed.

We agree with petitioner.

The CA based its findings that Mildred is an indispensable party because it found that petitioner knew all along that Mildred is
the owner of the house constructed on the subject lot as shown in the affidavits 24 of Maximo and petitioner stating that
petitioner's co-owners had offered for sale the subject lot to Mildred, and that Maximo, petitioner's father, and Mildred had
previously settled before the Barangay the matter regarding the sale of the subject lot to the latter as contained in the amicable
settlement.

In ejectment cases, the only issue to be resolved is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property
involved, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the party-litigants. 31 In an action for unlawful detainer,
the real party-in-interest as party-defendant is the person who is in possession of the property without the benefit of any
contract of lease and only upon the tolerance and generosity of its owner. 32 Well settled is the rule that a person who
occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is bound by an
implied promise that he will vacate the same upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy
against him. 33 His status is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy
continued by tolerance of the owner.

Here, records show that the subject lot is owned by petitioner's mother, and petitioner, being an heir and a co-owner, is
entitled to the possession of the subject lot. On the other hand, respondent spouses are the occupants of the subject lot which
they do not own. Respondents' possession of the subject lot was without any contract of lease is they failed to present any,
thus lending credence to petitioner's claim that their stay in the subject lot is by mere tolerance of petitioner and his
predecessors. It is indeed respondents spouses who are the real parties-in-interest who were correctly impleaded as
defendants in the unlawful detainer case filed by petitioner.

Pardell v. Bartolome
Facts: 
 
 Counsel for the spouses Ricardo Pardell y Cruz and Vicenta Ortiz y Felin de Pardell, the first of whom absent in Spain
by reason of his employment, conferred upon the second sufficient and ample powers to appear before the courts of justice, on
June 8, 1905, in his written complaint, alleged that the plaintiff, Vicenta Ortiz, and the defendant, Matilde Ortiz, are the duly
recognized natural daughters of the spouses Miguel Ortiz and Calixta Felin y Paula who died in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, in 1875 and
1882, respectively; that Calixta Felin, prior to her death, executed, on August 17, 1876, a nuncupative will in Vigan, whereby she
made her four children, named Manuel, Francisca, Vicenta, and Matilde, surnamed Ortiz y Felin, her sole and universal heirs of
all her property.

That, on or about the first months of the year 1888, the defendants, without judicial authorization, nor friendly or extrajudicial
agreement, took upon themselves the administration and enjoyment of the said properties and collected the rents, fruits, and
products thereof, to the serious detriment of the plaintiffs' interest; that, notwithstanding the different and repeated demands
extrajudicially made upon Matilde Ortiz to divide the aforementioned properties with the plaintiff Vicenta and to deliver to the
latter the one-half of the same which rightly belonged to her, or the value thereof, together with one-half of the fruits and rents
collected therefrom, the said defendant and her husband, the said defendant and her husband, the self-styled administrator of
the properties mentioned, had been delaying the partition and delivery of the said properties by means of unkempt promises
and other excuses; and that the plaintiffs, on account of the extraordinary delay in the delivery of one-half of said properties, or
their value in cash, as the case might be, had suffered losses and damages in the sum of P8,000. In a special defense said
counsel alleged that the defendant had never refused to divide the said property and had in fact several years before solicited
the partition of the same; that, from 1886 to 1901, inclusive, there was collected from the property on Calle Escolta the sum of
288 pesos, besides a few other small amounts derived from other sources, which were delivered to the plaintiffs with other
larger amounts, in 1891, and from the property on Calle Washington, called La Quinta, 990.95 pesos, which proceeds, added
together, made a total of 1,278.95 pesos, saving error or omission; that, between the years abovementioned, 765.38 pesos
were spent on the house situated on Calle Escolta, and on that on Calle Washington, La Quinta, 376.33, which made a total of
1,141.71, saving error or omission; that, in 1897, the work of reconstruction was begun of the house on

Calle Escolta, which had been destroyed by an earthquake, which work was not finished until 1903.

Issue: whether the defendant Matilde Ortiz, as coowner of the house on Calle Escolta, was entitled, with her husband, to reside
therein, without paying to her coowner, Vicenta Ortiz, who, during the greater part of the time,lived with her husband abroad,
one-half of the rents which the upper story would have produced, had it been rented to a stranger

Held: Notwithstanding the above statements relative to the joint-ownership rights which entitled the defendants to live in the
upper story of the said house, yet, in view of the fact that the record shows it to have been proved that the defendant Matilde's
husband, Gaspar de Bartolome, occupied for four years a room or a part of the lower floor of the same house on Calle Escolta,
using it as an office for the justice of the peace, a position which he held in the capital of that province, strict justice requires
that he pay his sister-in-law, the plaintiff, one- half of the monthly rent which the said quarters could have produced, had they
been leased to another person. The amount of such monthly rental is fixed at P16 in appearance with the evidence shown in
the record. This conclusion as to Bartolome's liability results from the fact that, even as the husband of the defendant coowner
of the property, he had no right to occupy and use gratuitously the said part of the lower floor of the house in question, where
he lived with his wife, to the detriment of the plaintiff Vicenta who did not receive one-half of the rent which those quarters
could and should have produced, had they been occupied by a stranger, in the same manner that rent was obtained from the
rooms on the lower floor that were used as stores. Therefore, the defendant Bartolome must pay to the plaintiff Vicenta P384,
that is, one-half of P768, the total amount of the rents which should have been obtained during four years from the quarters
occupied as an office by the justice of the peace of Vigan.

Caro vs. CA
Facts: Alfredo Benito, Mario Benito and Benjamin Benito were the original co-owners of two parcels of land covered by
separate certificates of title. After Mario died sometime in January, 1957, his surviving wife, Basilia Lahorra and his father,
Saturnino Benito, were subsequently judicially appointed as joint administrators of the deceased's estate. On August 26, 1959,
one of the co-owners, Benjamin Benito, sold his one-third undivided portion over said parcels of land in favor of herein
petitioner, Luz Caro. In 1960, with the consent of Saturnino Benito, the co-owned lots were subdivided and a subdivision title
was issued to petitioner user the lot she had bought. When private respondent learned of the said purchase in May, 1966, she
sought to redeem the property in a written offer dated August 25, 1966, but this was refused. Eventually, she filed a complaint
with the trial court claiming that as a joint administrator of the estate of Mario Benito, she had not been notified of the sale as
required by Article 1620 in connection with Article 1623 of the New Civil Code. The trial court dismissed the case. On appeal,
however, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's judgment, found that there was absence of due notice to private
respondent, and ordered petitioner to execute a deed of redemption. Hence, this petition.

Issue: whether or not private respondent complied with the notice requirements for the exercise of the right of legal
redemption under Article 1623 of the New Civil Code
 


Held: In refutation, private respondent argues that petitioner Luz Caro acted in bad faith and in fraud of the rights of the heirs
of the deceased Mario Benito in obtaining a subdivision title over the one-third portion of the land in question which she
brought from Benjamin Benito, and for this reason, she is deemed to hold said property in trust for said heirs. The rule,
however, is that fraud in securing the registration of titles to the land should be supported by clear and convincing evidence.
(Jaramil vs. Court of Appeals, 78 SCRA 420). As private respondent has not shown and proved the circumstances constituting
fraud, it cannot be held to exist in this case.

As aforesaid, a subdivision title has been issued in the name of petitioner on the lot ceded to her. Upon the expiration of the
term of one year from the date of the entry of the subdivision title, the Certificate of Title shall be incontrovertible (Section 38,
Act 496). Since the title of petitioner is now indefeasible, private respondent cannot, by means of the present action, indirectly
attack the validity thereof.

Even on the assumption that there still is co-ownership here and that therefore, the right of legal redemption exists, private
respondent as administratrix, has no personality to exercise said right for and in behalf of the intestate estate of Mario Benito.
She is on the same footing as co-administrator Saturnino Benito. Hence, if Saturnino's consent to the sale of the one- third
portion to petitioner cannot bind the intestate estate of Mario Benito on the ground that the right of redemption was not
within the powers of administration, in the same manner, the private respondent as co-administrator has no power to exercise
the right of redemption — the very power which the Court of Appeals ruled to be not within the powers of administration.

Since We have ruled that the right of legal redemption does not exist nor apply in this case because admittedly a subdivision
title (T.C.T. No. T-4978) has already been issued in the name of the petitioner on Lot I-C sold to her, it becomes moot and
academic, if not unnecessary to decide whether private respondent complied with the notice requirements for the exercise of
the right of legal redemption under Article 1623 of the New Civil Code

Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals,

Facts: The petitioners herein filed a case for recovery of property and damages with against, Celestino Afable. The parcel of
land involved in this case, with an area of 48,849 square meters, is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1771 issued on
June 12, 1931, in the names of Rosalia, Gaudencio, Sabina, Bernabe, Nenita and Delia, all surnamed Bailon, as co- owners, each
with a 1/6 share.

It appears that on August 23, 1948, Rosalia Bailon and Gaudencio Bailon sold a portion of the said land consisting of 16,283
square meters to Donato Delgado. On May 13, 1949, Rosalia Bailon alone sold the remainder of the land consisting of 32,566
square meters to Ponciana V. Aresgado de Lanuza. On the same date, Lanuza acquired from Delgado the 16,283 square meters
of land which the latter had earlier acquired from Rosalia and Gaudencio. On December 3, 1975, John Lanuza, acting under a
special power of attorney given by his wife, Ponciana V. Aresgado de Lanuza, sold the two parcels of land to Celestino Afable,
Sr.

In his answer to the complaint filed by the herein petitioners, Afable claimed that he had acquired the land in question through
prescription and contended that the petitioners were guilty of laches. He later filed a third-party complaint against Rosalia
Bailon for damages allegedly suffered as a result of the sale to him of the land.

Issues: Whether or not the defense of prescription of respondent stands Whether or not petitioners are barred from instituting
a case due to laches. Held: No in both cases
 Prescription

Defendant-appellee's defense of prescription is a vain proposition. In Budlong v. Bondoc [G.R. No. L-27702, September 9, 1977,
79 SCRA 241, this Court has interpreted said provision of law to mean that the action for partition is imprescriptible or cannot
be barred by prescription. For Article 494 of the Civil Code explicitly declares: "No prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or
co-heir so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co- ownership."

It is argued however, that as to the petitioners Emma, Luz and Nelda who are not the registered co-owners but merely
represented their deceased mother, the late Nenita Bailon, prescription lies. The ruling therein applies only against transferees
other than direct issues or heirs or to complete strangers. The rationale is clear:

If prescription is unavailing against the registered owner, it must be equally unavailing against the latter's hereditary
successors, because they merely step into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law. Prescription is unavailing not only
against the registered owner but also against his hereditary successors, because they merely step into the shoes of the
decedent by operation of law and are merely the continuation of the personality of their predecessor-in- interest
Laches is likewise unavailing as a shield against the action of herein petitioners.

Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that which by exercising due
diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

The doctrine of 'laches' or of 'stale demands' is based upon grounds of public policy which requires for the peace of society, the
discouragement of stale claims and unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question
of inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted,"

Well-stated in this jurisdiction are the four basic elements of laches, namely:

(1) conduct on the part of the defendant or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is
made and for which the complainant seeks a remedy;

(2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct and
having been afforded an opportunity to institute suit;

(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his
suit; and,

(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred
[Go Chi Gun, et al. v. Co Cho, et al., 96 Phil. 622 (1955)].

While the first and last elements are present in this case, the second and third elements are missing.

The second element speaks of delay in asserting the complainant's rights. However, the mere fact of delay is insufficient to
constitute, laches. It is required that (1) complainant must have had knowledge of the conduct of defendant or of one under
whom he claims and (2) he must have been afforded an opportunity to institute suit. This court has pointed out that laches is
not concerned with the mere lapse of time.

It must be noted that while there was delay in asserting petitioners' rights, such delay was not attended with any knowledge of
the sale nor with any opportunity to bring suit. In the first place, petitioners had no notice of the sale made by their eldest
sister.

In the second place, they were not afforded an opportunity to bring suit inasmuch as until 1981, they were kept in the dark
about the transactions entered into by their sister. It was only when Delia Bailon-Casilao returned to Sorsogon in 1981 that she
found out about the sales and immediately, she and her co-petitioners filed the present action for recovery of property. In view
of the lack of knowledge by the petitioners of the conduct of Rosalia in selling the land without their consent in 1975 and the
absence of any opportunity to institute the proper action until 1981, laches may not be asserted against the petitioners.

The third element of laches is likewise absent. There was no lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the
complainants would assert the right on which they base the suit. On the contrary, private respondent is guilty of bad faith in
purchasing the property as he knew that the property was co-owned by six persons and yet, there were only two signatories to
the deeds of sale and no special authorization to sell was granted to the two sellers by the other co-owners.

Moreover, the undisputed fact is that petitioners are relatives of his wife. As a genuine

gesture of good faith, he should have contacted the petitioners who were still listed as co- owners in the certificate of title
which was already in his possession even before the sale. In failing to exercise even a minimum degree of ordinary prudence
required by the situation, he is deemed to have bought the lot at his own risk. Hence any prejudice or injury that may be
occasioned to him by such sale must be borne by him.

It may be gleaned from the foregoing examination of the facts that Celestino Afable is not a buyer in good faith. Laches being
an equitable defense, he who invokes it must come to the court with clean hands.
Roque v. Intermediate Appellate Court
Facts: The controversy here involves a 312 square meter parcel of land situated in San Juan, Malolos, Bulacan and designated
as Lot No. 1549 of the Cadastral Survey of Malolos. The property was registered originally in the name of Januario Avendaño, a
bachelor who died intestate and without issue on 22 October 1945.

On 21 September 1959, the intestate heirs of Januario Avendaño executed a document entitled "Paghahati at Pagtagabuyan ng
Mana sa Labas ng Hukuman." Through this instrument, extrajudicial partition of Lot No. 1549 was effected among the intestate
heirs as follows:

a. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to Illuminada Avendaño.
 b. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to Gregorio Avendaño
and Miguel Avendaño.

c. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to Bernardino, Bienvenido, Numeriano and Rufina, all surnamed Avendaño.

d. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to respondent Ernesto Roque and Victor Roque.

On 28 September 1959, co-owners Illuminada, Gregorio, Miguel, Bernardino, Bienvenido, Numeriano and Rufina, all surnamed
Avendaño, in consideration of the aggregate amount of P500.00, transferred their collective and undivided three-fourths (3/4)
share in Lot No. 1549 to respondent Ernesto Roque and Victor Roque, thereby vesting in the latter full and complete ownership
of the property. The transactions were embodied in two (2) separate deeds of sale both entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihang
Patuluyan" and both duly notarized. Subsequently, in an unnotarized "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan dated 27 November 1961,
Ernesto and Victor Roquepurportedly sold a three-fourths (3/4) undivided portion of Lot No. 1549 to their half-sister, petitioner
Concepcion Roque, for the same amount. The property, however, remained registered in the name of the decedent, Januario
Avendaño.

*Summary of Transactions:

Januario Avendano property divided -> Avendano family members & Respondents Roque

Avendano Family sold land to Respondents (Respondents Roque now own all lands), P500

Unnotarized Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan, Respondents sold 3⁄4 undivided lad to half- sister, petitioner Concepcion Roque for
P500, but still in the name of Januario Avendano

Upon the instance of petitioner Concepcion Roque and allegedly of respondent Ernesto Roque, Lot No. 1549 was surveyed on
20 September 1975. Consequent thereto, a Subdivision Plan was drawn up by the Geodetic Engineer identifying and delineating
a one-fourth (1/4) portion of the property as belonging to respondent Ernesto Roque and Victor Roque (who had died on 14
April 1962), upon the one hand, and a three-fourths (3/4) portion of the same property as belonging to petitioner Concepcion
Roque. Respondents Ernesto Roque and the legal heirs of Victor Roque, however, refused to acknowledge petitioner's claim of
ownership of any portion of Lot No. 1549 and rejected the plan to divide the land.

Attempts at amicable settlement having fallen through, petitioner Concepcion Roque, on 6 December 1977, filed a Complaint
for "Partition with Specific Performance”.

RTC- Petitioner, CA – Respondent, but dismissed both petition of petitioner and appeal of respondent hence case

On the matter of dismissal of petitioner's complaint, the Intermediate Appellate Court stated in its decision:

"While the action filed by the plaintiff is for partition, the defendants, after denying plaintiff's assertion of co-ownership,
asserted that they are the exclusive and sole owners of the 3/4 portion of the parcel of land claimed by the plaintiff.

Upon the issue thus joined by the pleadings, it is obvious that the case has become one of ownership of the disputed portion of
the subject lot.

Issues: Whether or not an action for partition should be dismissed once one of the parties allege exclusive and absolute
ownership of the property
Whether or not respondents own the 3⁄4 property in possesion by the petitioner

Held: No in both cases

Action for partition

An action for partition — which is typically brought by a person claiming to be co-owner of a specified property against a
defendant or defendants whom the plaintiff recognizes to be co- owners — may be seen to present simultaneously two
principal issues. First, there is the issue of whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned.
Second, assuming that the plaintiff successfully hurdles the first issue, there is the secondary issue of how the property is to be
divided between plaintiff and defendant(s).

Should the trial court find that the defendants do not dispute the status of the plaintiff as co- owner, the court can forthwith
proceed to the actual partitioning of the property involved. In case the defendants assert in their Answer exclusive title in
themselves adversely to the plaintiff, the court should not dismiss the plaintiff's action for partition but, on the contrary and in
the exercise of its general jurisdiction, resolve the question of whether the plaintiff is co-owner or not. Should the trial court
find that the plaintiff was unable to sustain his claimed status as co-owner, or that the defendants are or have become the sole
and exclusive owners of the property involved, the court will necessarily have to dismiss the action for partition. This result
would be reached, not because the wrong action was commenced by the plaintiff, but rather because the plaintiff having been
unable to show co-ownership rights in himself, no basis exists for requiring the defendants to submit to partition the property
at stake. If, upon the other hand, the court after trial should find the existence of co-ownership among the parties litigant, the
court may and should order the partition of the property in the same action. Judgment for one or the other party being on the
merits, the losing party (respondents in this case) may then appeal the same. In either case, however, it is quite unnecessary to
require the plaintiff to file another action, separate and independent from that for partition originally instituted. Functionally,
an action for partition may be seen to be at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance
of a determinate portion of the property involved. This is the import of our jurisprudence on the matter and is sustained by the
public policy which abhors multiplicity of actions.

Action for Partition does not prescribe

The question of prescription also needs to be addressed in this connection. It is sometimes said that "the action for partition of
the thing owned in common (actio communi dividendo or actio familiae erciscundae) does not prescribe." This statement bears
some refinement. In the words of Article 494 of the Civil Code, "each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the
thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned." No matter how long the co- ownership has lasted, a co-owner can
always opt out of the co-ownership, and provided the defendant co-owners or co-heirs have theretofore expressly or impliedly
recognized the co- ownership, they cannot set up as a defense the prescription of the action for partition. But if the defendants
show that they had previously asserted title in themselves adversely to the plaintiff and for the requisite period of time, the
plaintiffs right to require recognition of his status as a co-owner will have been lost by prescription and the court cannot issue
an order requiring partition.

Ownership of Land

The facts on record clearly show that petitioner Concepcion Roque had been in actual, open and continuous possession of a
three-fourths (3/4) portion of Lot No. 1549 ever since execution of the "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan". The Court notes that it was
only in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim filed with the trial court in December of 1977 — more than sixteen (16)
years later — that respondents first questioned the genuineness and authenticity of the "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan." Not once
during those sixteen (16) years did respondents contest petitioner's occupation of a three-fourths (3/4) portion of Lot No. 1549.
Furthermore, if indeed it is true that respondents are the absolute owners of the whole, it is most unusual that respondents
would have allowed or tolerated such prolonged occupation by petitioner of a major portion (3/4) of the land while they, upon
the other hand, contented themselves with occupation of only a fourth thereof. This latter circumstance, coupled with the
passage of a very substantial length of time during which petitioner all the while remained undisturbed and uninterrupted in
her occupation and possession, places respondents here in laches: respondents may no longer dispute the existence of the co-
ownership between petitioner and themselves nor the validity of petitioner's claim of a three-fourths (3/4) interest in Lot No.
1549, as they are deemed, by their unreasonably long inaction, to have acquiesced in the co- ownership.
DELIMA vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:During his lifetime, Lino Delima acquired Lot No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate in Cebu by sale on
installments from the government. Lino Delima later died in 1921 leaving as his only heirs three brothers and a sister namely:
Eulalio Delima, Juanita Delima, Galileo Delima and Vicente Delima. After his death, TCT No. 2744 of the property in question
was issued on August 3, 1953 in the name of "The Legal Heirs of Lino Delima, deceased, represented by Galileo Delima.”On
September 22, 1953, Galileo Delima, now substituted by respondents, executed an affidavit of "Extra-judicial Declaration of
Heirs." Based on this affidavit, TCT No. 2744 was cancelled and TCT No. 3009 was issued on February 4, 1954 in the name of
Galileo Delima alone to the exclusion of the other heirs.Galileo Delima declared the lot in his name for taxation purposes and
paid the taxes thereon from 1954 to 1965.On February 29, 1968, petitioners, filed With the Court of First Instance action for
reconveyance and/or partition of property and for the annulment of TCT No. 3009.On January 16, 1970, the trial court rendered
a decision in favor of petitioners.Respondent appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and upheld the claim of Galileo
Delima that all the other brothers and sister of Lino Delima, namely Eulalio, Juanita and Vicente, had already relinquished and
waived their rights to the property in his favor, considering that he (Galileo Delima) alone paid the remaining balance of the
purchase price of the lot and the realty taxes thereon.

Issue: whether or not petitioners' action for partition is already barred by the statutory period provided by law which shall
enable Galileo Delima to perfect his claim of ownership by acquisitive prescription to the exclusion of petitioners from their
shares in the disputed property.

Held: YES.

As a rule, possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to be adverse to the others, but will be held to benefit all. It is
understood that the co-owner or co-heir who is in possession of an inheritance pro-indiviso for himself and in representation of
his co-owners or co-heirs, if, as such owner, he administers or takes care of the rest thereof with the obligation of delivering it
to his co-owners or co-heirs, is under the same situation as a depository, a lessee or a trustee.

No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes
the co-ownership. However, from the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the
properties and denies the others any share therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition but of ownership. In
such case, the imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be invoked or applied when one of the co-owners has
adversely possessed the property as exclusive owner for a period sufficient to vest ownership by prescription.

Evidence shows that TCT No. 2744 in the name of the legal heirs of Lino Delima, represented by Galileo Delima, was cancelled
by virtue of an affidavit executed by Galileo

Delima and that on February 4, 1954, Galileo Delima obtained the issuance of a new title in his name numbered TCT No. 3009
to the exclusion of his co-heirs. The issuance of this new title constituted an open and clear repudiation of the trust or co-
ownership, and the lapse of (10) years of adverse possession by Galileo Delima from February 4, 1954 was sufficient to vest title
in him by prescription. As the certificate of title was notice to the whole world of his exclusive title to the land, such rejection
was binding on the other heirs and started as against them the period of prescription. Hence, when petitioners filed their action
for reconveyance and/or to compel partition on February 29, 1963, such action was already barred by prescription.

AGUILAR vs. COURT OF APPEALS.

Facts: On 28 October 1969, the two brothers purchased a house and lot in Parañaque where their father could spend and enjoy
his remaining years in a peaceful neighborhood. Initially, the brothers agreed that Virgilio's share in the co-ownership was two-
thirds while that of Senen was one-third. By virtue of a written memorandum dated 23 February 1970, Virgilio and Senen
agreed that henceforth their interests in the house and lot should be equal, with Senen assuming the remaining mortgage
obligation of the original owners with the Social Security System (SSS) in exchange for his possession and enjoyment of the
house together with their father.

Since Virgilio was then disqualified from obtaining a loan from SSS, the brothers agreed that the deed of sale would be
executed and the title registered in the meantime in the name of Senen. It was further agreed that Senen would take care of
their father and his needs since Virgilio and his family were staying in Cebu.
After Maximiano Aguilar died in 1974, petitioner demanded from private respondent that the latter vacate the house and that
the property be sold and proceeds thereof divided among them. Because of the refusal of respondent to give in to petitioner's
demands, the latter filed on 12 January 1979 an action to compel the sale of the house and lot so that they could divide the
proceeds between them. Petitioner prayed that the proceeds of the sale be divided on the basis of two-thirds (2/3) in his favor
and one-third (1/3) to respondent. Petitioner also prayed for monthly rentals for the use of the house by respondent after their
father died.

Respondent alleged that he had no objection to the sale as long as the best selling price could be obtained; that if the sale
would be effected, the proceeds thereof should be divided equally; and, that being a co-owner, he was entitled to the use and
enjoyment of the property.

On 26 July 1979, rendering judgment by default against defendant, the trial court found him and plaintiff to be co-owners of
the house and lot in equal shares on the basis of their written agreement. However, it ruled that plaintiff has been deprived of
his participation in the property by defendant's continued enjoyment of the house and lot, free of rent, despite demands for
rentals and continued maneuvers of defendant to delay partition. The trial court likewise ordered defendant to vacate the
property and pay plaintiff P1,200.00 as rentals 2 from January 1975 up to the date of decision plus interest from the time the
action was filed.

Issue: whether or not the trial court correctly rendered the default judgment against respondent with respect to the payment
of rent

Held: NO.

We uphold the trial court in ruling in favor of petitioner, except as to the effectivity of the payment of monthly rentals by
respondent as co-owner which we here declare to commence only after the trial court ordered respondent to vacate in
accordance with its order of 26 July 1979.

Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and that each co-owner
may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. Corollary to this rule, Art.
498 of the Code states that whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to
one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly distributed. This is resorted to (1)
when the right to partition the property is invoked by any of the co-owners but because of the nature of the property it cannot
be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the interests of the co-owners, and (b) the co-owners are not in agreement as
to who among them shall be allotted or assigned the entire property upon proper reimbursement of the co-owners.

Being a co-owner respondent has the right to use the house and lot without paying any compensation to petitioner, as he may
use the property owned in common so long as it is in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in a manner not
injurious to the interest of the other co-owners.

Each co-owner of property held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with
no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners, the reason being that until a division is made, the
respective share of each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his co- participants joint ownership
over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.

When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial court granted the petition and ordered the
ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership was deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the possession jointly also ceased.
Thereafter, the continued stay of respondent and his family in the house prejudiced the interest of petitioner as the property
should have been sold and the proceeds divided equally between them. To this extent and from then on, respondent should be
held liable for monthly rentals until he and his family vacate.

Tomas Claudio vs. CA

Facts: private respondents filed an action for Partition before the Regional Trial Court of Morong, Rizal. They alleged that their
predecessor-in-interest, Juan De Castro, died intestate in 1993 and they are his only surviving and legitimate heirs. They also
alleged that their father owned a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 3010 located at Barrio San Juan, Morong, Rizal, with an
area of two thousand two hundred sixty nine (2,269) square meters more or less. They further claim that in 1979, without their
knowledge and consent,
said lot was sold by their brother Mariano to petitioner. The sale was made possible when Mariano represented himself as the
sole heir to the property. It is the contention of private respondents that the sale made by Mariano affected only his undivided
share to the lot in question but not the shares of the other co-owners equivalent to four fifths (4/5) of the property. Petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss contending, as its special defense, lack of jurisdiction and prescription and/or laches. The trial court,
after hearing the motion, dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

Issue: 1.) Whether or not the sale affected only the undivided share of Mariano 2.) Whether or not the action to file for
partition has already prescribed.

Held:

(1)Yes. The Court rule that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not
those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. 8Under Article 493 of the Civil Code, the sale or other disposition
affects only the seller's share pro indiviso, and the transferee gets only what corresponds to his grantor's share in the partition
of the property owned in common. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one
co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner/seller are
transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner ofthe property. The proper action in a case like this, is not for the
nullification of the sale, or for the recovery of possession of the property owned in common from the third person, but for
division or partition of the entire property if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and
administered it. 9 Such partition should result in segregating the portion belonging to the seller and its delivery to the buyer

(2) No. petitioner's defense of prescription against an action for partition is a vain proposition. Pursuant to Article 494 of the
Civil Code, "no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand at anytime the partition
of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned." the Court has interpreted said provision of law to mean that
the action for partition is imprescriptible. It cannot be barred by prescription. For Article 494 of the Civil Code explicitly
declares: "No prescription shall lie in favor of a co- owner or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership.

Robles vs. CA
Facts: "There seems to be no dispute that Leon Robles primitively owned the land situated in Kay Taga, Lagundi, Morong, Rizal
with an area of 9,985 square meters. He occupied the same openly and adversely. He also declared the same in his name for
taxation purposes as early as 1916 covered by Tax Declaration No. 17865 and paid the corresponding taxes thereon. When
Leon Robles died, his son Silvino Robles inherited the land, who took possession of the land, declared it in his name for taxation
purposes and paid the taxes thereon. Upon the death of Silvino Robles in 1942, his widow Maria de la Cruz and his children
inherited the property. They took adverse possession of said property and paid taxes thereon. The task of cultivat[ing] the land
was assigned to plaintiff Lucio Robles who planted trees and other crops. He also built a nipa hut on the land. The plaintiffs
entrusted the payment of the land taxes to their co-heir and half-brother, Hilario Robles. In 1962, for unknown reasons, the tax
declaration of the parcel of land in the name of Silvino Robles was canceled and transferred to one Exequiel Ballena, father of
Andrea Robles who is the wife of defendant Hilario Robles.

Thereafter, Exequiel Ballena secured a loan from the Antipolo Rural Bank, using the tax declaration as security. Somehow, the
tax declaration was transferred [to] the name of Antipolo Rural Bank and later on, was transferred [to] the name of defendant
Hilario Robles and his wife. In 1996, Andrea Robles secured a loan from the Cardona Rural Bank, Inc., using the tax declaration
as security. Andrea Robles testified without contradiction that somebody else, not her husband Hilario Robles, signed the loan
papers because Hilario Robles was working in Marinduque at that time as a carpenter. For failure to pay the mortgage debt,
foreclosure proceedings were had and defendant Rural Bank emerged as the highest bidder during the auction sale in October
1968. The spouses Hilario Robles failed to redeem the property and so the tax declaration was transferred in the name of
defendant Rural Bank. On September 25, 1987, defendant Rural Bank sold the same to the Spouses Vergel Santos and Ruth
Santos. In September 1987, plaintiff discovered the mortgage and attempted to redeem the property, but was unsuccessful. On
May 10,1988, defendant spouses Santos took possession of the property in question and was able to secure Free Patent No. IV-
1-010021 in their names." the plaintiff alleged, among other matters, that it was only in September of 1987 that they came to
know of the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage constituted thereon by the half-brother, Hilario Robles, in favor of
defendant Rural Bank; and that they likewise learned upon further inquiry, that the latter had already sold the self-same parcel
in favor of the Santos spouses. Twice amended to implead Hilario Robles and, upon subsequent discovery of the issuance of
Free Patent No. IV-I-010021 in favor of the defendant spouses, the Director of Lands and the District Land Officer of the Bureau
of Lands as parties- defendants. The plaintiffs complaint sought the following reliefs on the theory that the encumbrance of
their half-brother, constituted on the land.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have the appropriate title that is essential for them to avail themselves of the remedy of
quieting of title.

Held: Article 476 of the Civil Code provides:

"Whenever there is cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet title.

"An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein."

an action to quiet title is a common-law remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the title to real
property.[9] It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property
which is the subject matter of the action.[10] Also, the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged as a cloud
on plaintiffs title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy. Therefore, there is merit to the contention of the petitioners that Hilario mortgaged the disputed property to the Rural
Bank of Cardona in his capacity as a mere co-owner thereof. Clearly, the said transaction did not divest them of title to the
property at the time of the institution of the Complaint for

quieting of title. Contrary to the disquisition of the Court of Appeals, Hilario effected no clear and evident repudiation of the co-
ownership. It is a fundamental principle that a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners,
absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other
co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is
clear and convincing. In the present case, Hilario did not have possession of the subject property; neither did he exclude the
petitioners from the use and the enjoyment thereof, as they had indisputably shared in its fruits.[13] Likewise, his act of
entering into a mortgage contract with the bank cannot be construed to be a repudiation of the co-ownership. As absolute
owner of his undivided interest in the land, he had the right to alienate his share, as he in fact did.[14] Neither should his
payment of land taxes in his name, as agreed upon by the co-owners, be construed as a repudiation of the co-ownership. The
assertion that the declaration of ownership was tantamount to repudiation was belied by the continued occupation and
possession of the disputed property by the petitioners as owners.

LIM v. MOLDEX

FACTS:

On July 21, 2012 Condocor (Condominium Corporation) a non-stock, non-profit corporation, which is the registered
condominium corporation for the Golden Empire Tower held its annual general membership meeting. Moldex became a
member of Condocor on the basis of its ownership of the 220 unsold units in the Golden Empire Tower.

During the meeting, an existence of a quorum was declared even though only 29 of the 108 unit buyers were present. The
declaration was based on the presence of the majority of the voting rights, including those pertaining to the 220 unsold units
held by Moldex through its representatives. Lim, through her attorney-in-fact, objected to the validity of the meeting. The
objection was denied. Thus, Lim and all the other unit owners present, except for one, walked out and left the meeting.

Despite the walkout, the individual respondents and the other unit owner proceeded with the meeting and elected the new
members of the Board of Directors for 2012-2013. All four (4) individual respondents (JAMINOLA, MACALINTAL, MILANES, and
ROMAN) were voted as members of the board, together with other 3 members.

Consequently, Lim filed an election protest before the RTC. Lim claimed that herein respondents are not entitled to be
members of the Board of Directors because they are non-unit buyers. However, said court ruled in favor for the respondents.
Not in conformity, Lim filed the present petition.

ISSUES:

2) Whether or not Moldex can be deemed a member of Condocor.

3) Whether or not representatives of Moldex who are non-members can be elected as a member of the Board of Directors of
Condocor.

HELD:

II

Yes. Moldex can be deemed a member of Condocor.

Lim asserted that only unit buyers are entitled to become members of Condocor. Respondents, for their part, countered that a
registered owner of a unit in a condominium project or the holders of duly issued condominium certificate of title (CCT),
automatically becomes a member of the condominium corporation, relying on Sections 2 and 10 of the Condominium Act, the
Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions, as well as the By-Laws of Condocor. For said reason, respondents averred that as
Moldex is the owner of 220 unsold units and the parking slots and storage areas attached thereto, it automatically became a
member of Condocor upon the latter's creation.

On this point, respondents are correct. Section 2 of the Condominium Act states:

Sec. 2. A condominium is an interest in real property consisting of separate interest in a unit in a residential, industrial or
commercial building and an undivided interest in common, directly or indirectly, in the land on which it is located and in other
common areas of the building. A condominium may include, in addition, a separate interest in other portions of such real
property. Title to the common areas, including the land, or the appurtenant interests in such areas, may be held by a
corporation specially formed for the purpose (hereinafter known as the "condominium corporation") in which the holders of
separate interest shall automatically be members or shareholders, to the exclusion of others, in proportion to the appurtenant
interest of their respective units in the common areas

It is erroneous to argue that the ownership must result from a sale transaction between the owner-developer and the
purchaser. Such interpretation would mean that persons who inherited a unit, or have been donated one, and properly
transferred title in their names cannot become members of a condominium corporation.

III

No. Representatives of Moldex who are non-members cannot be elected as a member of the Board of Directors of Condocor.

A corporation can act only through natural persons duly authorized for the purpose or by a specific act of its board of
directors.45 Thus, in order for Moldex to exercise its membership rights and privileges, it necessarily has to appoint its
representatives. However, individual respondents who are non-members cannot be elected as directors and officers of the
Condocor.

While Moldex may rightfully designate proxies or representatives, the latter, however, cannot be elected as directors or
trustees of Condocor. First, the Corporation Code clearly provides that a director or trustee must be a member of record of the
corporation. Further, the power of the proxy is merely to vote. If said proxy is not a member in his own right, he cannot be
elected as a director or proxyndominium corporation.