PFR Marriage
PFR Marriage
IV. MARRIAGE All things which are not outside the commerce of men, including future things, may be
the object of a contract. All rights which are not intransmissible may also be the object of
I. DEFINITION contracts.
No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by
Article 1. FAMILY CODE law.
Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the may likewise be the object of a contract. (1271a)
foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements Art. 1350. NCC
may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (52a) In onerous contracts the cause is understood to be, for each contracting party, the
prestation or promise of a thing or service by the other; in remuneratory ones, the service or
Art. 16. FAMILY CODE benefit which is remunerated; and in contracts of pure beneficence, the mere liberality of the
In the cases where parental consent or parental advice is needed, the party or parties benefactor. (1274)
concerned shall, in addition to the requirements of the preceding articles, attach a certificate
issued by a priest, imam or minister authorized to solemnize marriage under Article 7 of this
Code or a marriage counselor duly accredited by the proper government agency to the effect 2. PERMANENT UNION
that the contracting parties have undergone marriage counseling. Failure to attach said
certificates of marriage counseling shall suspend the issuance of the marriage license for a Art. 149. FC
period of three months from the completion of the publication of the application. Issuance of the The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public
marriage license within the prohibited period shall subject the issuing officer to administrative policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no
sanctions but shall not affect the validity of the marriage. custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect.
Should only one of the contracting parties need parental consent or parental advice, (216a, 218a)
the other party must be present at the counseling referred to in the preceding paragraph. (n)
Section 1. ART. XV 1987 CONST.
Article 14. P.D. 1083 The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
Nature. Marriage is not only a civil contract but a social institution. Its nature, consequences shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
and incidents are governed by this Code and the Shari'a and not subject to stipulation, except
that the marriage settlements may to a certain extent fix the property relations of the spouses. Section 2. ART. XV 1987 CONST.
Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
1. SPECIAL CONTRACT protected by the State.
Art. 1305.
A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, A. NULL AND VOID MARRIAGES
with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service. (1254a)
Art. 35. FC
Art. 1306. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions
as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, (1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents
public order, or public policy. (1255a) or guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such
Art. 1318. marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing
There is no contract unless the following requisites concur: officer had the legal authority to do so;
(1) Consent of the contracting parties; (3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered the preceding Chapter;
(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; (4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41;
(3) Cause of the obligation which is established. (1261) (5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; and
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
Art. 1319.
Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing Art. 36. FC
and the cause which are to constitute the contract. The offer must be certain and the acceptance A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
absolute. A qualified acceptance constitutes a counter-offer. psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
Acceptance made by letter or telegram does not bind the offerer except from the time it came to likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As
his knowledge. The contract, in such a case, is presumed to have been entered into in the place amended by Executive Order 227)
where the offer was made. (1262a)
Art. 37. FC (3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full
Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and
relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate: wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence,
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood. (81a) other as husband and wife;
Art. 38. FC (5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and
The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy: such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil (6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and
degree; appears to be incurable. (85a)
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely
B. ANNULLABLE MARRIAGES cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
Art. 45. FC (3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full
A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and
marriage: wife;
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years (4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence,
of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the
the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, other as husband and wife;
unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both
lived together as husband and wife; (5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate
appears to be incurable. (85a) visitation rights of the other parent. (n)
(3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal
of the marriage; or partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
(4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism existing In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be
at the time of the marriage. adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall Art. 51. FC
constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage. (86a) In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash,
Art. 47. FC property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had
The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and within already provided for such matters.
the periods indicated herein:
The children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for the
(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose parent or guardian did enforcement of the judgment.
not give his or her consent, within five years after attaining the age of twenty-one, or by the
parent or guardian or person having legal charge of the minor, at any time before such party has The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice
reached the age of twenty-one; the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either of both of the
parents; but the value of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or
(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the same spouse, who had no absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime. (n)
knowledge of the other's insanity; or by any relative or guardian or person having legal charge of
the insane, at any time before the death of either party, or by the insane spouse during a lucid Art. 52. FC
interval or after regaining sanity; The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses and the delivery of the children's presumptive
(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise,
the discovery of the fraud; the same shall not affect third persons. (n)
(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years from Art. 53. FC
the time the force, intimidation or undue influence disappeared or ceased; Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements
of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.
(5) For causes mentioned in number 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years
after the marriage. (87a) PD 1083 ARTS. 45-53 (DIVORCE IN ISLAM)
(1) A divorce by talaq may be affected by the husband in a single repudiation of his wife during (g) Any other cause recognized under Muslim law for the dissolution of marriage by faskh either
her non-menstrual period (tuhr) within which he has totally abstained from carnal relation with at the instance of the wife or the proper wali.
her. Any number of repudiations made during one tuhr shall constitute only one repudiation and
shall become irrevocable after the expiration of the prescribed 'idda. Article 53.
Faskh on the ground of unusual cruelty. A decree of faskh on the ground of unusual
(2) A husband who repudiates his wife, either for the first or second time, shall have the right to cruelty may be granted by the court upon petition of the wife if the husband:
take her back (ruju) within the prescribed 'idda by resumption of cohabitation without need of a
new contract of marriage. Should he fail to do so, the repudiation shall become irrevocable (a)Habitually assaults her or makes her life miserable by cruel conduct even if this does not
(Talaq bain sugra). result in physical injury;
Article 47. (b) Associates with persons of ill-repute or leads an infamous life or attempts to force the wife to
Divorce by Ila. Where a husband makes a vow to abstain from any carnal relations live an immoral life;
(ila) with his wife and keeps such ila for a period of not less than four months, she may be
granted a decree of divorce by the court after due notice and hearing. (c) Compels her to dispose of her exclusive property or prevents her from exercising her legal
rights over it;
Article 48.
Divorce by zihar. Where the husband has injuriously assimilated (zihar) his wife to any (d) Obstructs her in the observance of her religious practices; or
of his relatives within the prohibited degrees of marriage, they shall mutually refrain from having
carnal relation until he shall have performed the prescribed expiation. The wife may ask the (e) Does not treat her justly and equitably as enjoined by Islamic law.
court to require her husband to perform the expiationor to pronounce the a regular talaq should
he fail or refuse to do so, without prejudice to her right of seeking other appropriate remedies.
3. BETWEEN A MAN AND A WOMAN
Article 49.
Divorce by li'an. Where the husband accuses his wife in court of adultery, a decree of Section 1. ART. III 1987 CONST.
perpetual divorce may be granted by the court after due hearing and after the parties shall have No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
performed the prescribed acts of imprecation (li'an). shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Article 50.
4. ENTERED INTO IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW
Divorce by khul'. The wife may, after having offered to return or renounce her dower or
to pay any other lawful consideration for her release (khul') from the marriage bond, petition the
court for divorce. The court shall, in meritorious cases and after fixing the consideration, issue FAMILY CODE
the corresponding decree. 1987 CONSTITUTION
PD 1083
Article 51.
Divorce by tafwid. If the husband has delegated (tafwid) to the wife the right to effect a 5. FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONJUGAL AND FAMILY LIFE
talaq at the time of the celebration of the marriage or thereafter, she may repudiate the marriage
and the repudiation would have the same effect as if it were pronounced by the husband himself. Section 12. ART II 1987 CONST.
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
Article 52. family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and
Divorce by faskh. The court may, upon petition of the wife, decree a divorce by faskh the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
on any of the following grounds : rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the
support of the Government.
(a) Neglect or failure of the husband to provide support for the family for at least six consecutive
months; 6. INVIOLABLE SOCIAL INSTITUTION
(b) Conviction of the husband by final judgment sentencing him to imprisonment for at least one Section 2. ART XV 1987 CONST.
year; Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.
(c) Failure of the husband to perform for six months without reasonable cause his marital
obligation in accordance with this code; II. PRESUMPTION
(d) Impotency of the husband;
SECTION 3(aa) RULE 131 ROC
That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into
(e) Insanity or affliction of the husband with an incurable disease which would make the
a lawful contract of marriage;
continuance of the marriage relationship injurious to the family;
III. ESSENTIAL REQUISITES Art. 37. FC
Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether
Art. 2. FC relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and (1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. (2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood. (81a)
1. LEGAL CAPACITY OF PARTIES, WHO MUST BE MALE AND FEMALE
Article 1. FC
Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman Art. 38. FC
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:
foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements (1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil
may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (52a) degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;
Art. 2. FC
No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present: (3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. (4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
Art. 4. FC (5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void
ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2). (6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage
but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and (7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
administratively liable. (n)
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
Art. 5. FC
Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the (9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person's
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may contract marriage. spouse, or his or her own spouse.
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53. (2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full that the contracting parties have undergone marriage counseling. Failure to attach said
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and certificates of marriage counseling shall suspend the issuance of the marriage license for a
wife; period of three months from the completion of the publication of the application. Issuance of the
marriage license within the prohibited period shall subject the issuing officer to administrative
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, sanctions but shall not affect the validity of the marriage.
unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the Should only one of the contracting parties need parental consent or parental advice,
other as husband and wife; the other party must be present at the counseling referred to in the preceding paragraph.
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and Art. 35. FC
such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and (5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other;
appears to be incurable.
Art. 45. FC
Art. 52. FC A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the
The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and marriage:
distribution of the properties of the spouses and the delivery of the children's presumptive
legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, (1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years
the same shall not affect third persons. (n) of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of
the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order,
Art. 53. FC unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both
Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements lived together as husband and wife;
of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely
Art. 15. NCC cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity
of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and
Article 8. PD 1083 wife;
Legal capacity.
Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in (4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence,
every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the
acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost. other as husband and wife;
Art. 350. RPC (5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and
Marriage contracted against provisions of laws. — The penalty of prision correccional such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any person who, without being
included in the provisions of the next proceeding article, shall have not been complied with or (6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and
that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment.chanrobles virtual law library appears to be incurable.
If either of the contracting parties shall obtain the consent of the other by means of
violence, intimidation or fraud, he shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty Art. 1327. NCC
provided in the next preceding paragraph. The following cannot give consent to a contract:
IV. FORMAL REQUISITES In case either or both of the contracting parties are at the point of death, the marriage
may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license and shall remain valid even if the
Art. 3. FC ailing party subsequently survives. (72a)
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer; If the residence of either party is so located that there is no means of transportation to
enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar, the marriage may be
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and solemnized without necessity of a marriage license. (72a)
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties Art. 29. FC
before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as
husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. In the cases provided for in the two preceding articles, the solemnizing officer shall
state in an affidavit executed before the local civil registrar or any other person legally authorized
1. AUTHORITY OF SOLEMNIZING OFFICER to administer oaths that the marriage was performed in articulo mortis or that the residence of
either party, specifying the barrio or barangay, is so located that there is no means of
Art. 4. FC transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar and that
the officer took the necessary steps to ascertain the ages and relationship of the contracting
The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void parties and the absence of legal impediment to the marriage. (72a)
ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).
Art. 30. FC
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage
but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and The original of the affidavit required in the last preceding article, together with the
administratively liable. legible copy of the marriage contract, shall be sent by the person solemnizing the marriage to
the local civil registrar of the municipality where it was performed within the period of thirty days
Art. 7. FC after the performance of the marriage. (75a)
Art. 31. FC
Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members may also be
solemnized by a ship captain or by an airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the plane
is in flight, but also during stopovers at ports of call. (74a)
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by his
church or religious sect and registered with the civil registrar general, acting within the limits of
the written authority granted by his church or religious sect and provided that at least one of the Art. 32. FC
contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing officer's church or religious sect;
A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, shall likewise have
(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the case mentioned in Article 31; authority to solemnize marriages in articulo mortis between persons within the zone of military
operation, whether members of the armed forces or civilians. (74a)
(4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned, in the absence of the
Art. 33. FC
latter, during a military operation, likewise only in the cases mentioned in Article 32;
(5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided in Article 10. Marriages among Muslims or among members of the ethnic cultural communities may
be performed validly without the necessity of marriage license, provided they are solemnized in
accordance with their customs, rites or practices. (78a)
Art. 34. FC Art. 12. FC
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived The local civil registrar, upon receiving such application, shall require the presentation
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry of the original birth certificates or, in default thereof, the baptismal certificates of the contracting
each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any parties or copies of such documents duly attested by the persons having custody of the
person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath originals. These certificates or certified copies of the documents by this Article need not be
that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to sworn to and shall be exempt from the documentary stamp tax. The signature and official title of
the marriage. the person issuing the certificate shall be sufficient proof of its authenticity.
Art. 35. FC If either of the contracting parties is unable to produce his birth or baptismal certificate
or a certified copy of either because of the destruction or loss of the original or if it is shown by
The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: an affidavit of such party or of any other person that such birth or baptismal certificate has not
yet been received though the same has been required of the person having custody thereof at
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such least fifteen days prior to the date of the application, such party may furnish in lieu thereof his
marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing current residence certificate or an instrument drawn up and sworn to before the local civil
officer had the legal authority to do so; registrar concerned or any public official authorized to administer oaths. Such instrument shall
contain the sworn declaration of two witnesses of lawful age, setting forth the full name,
2. VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE residence and citizenship of such contracting party and of his or her parents, if known, and the
place and date of birth of such party. The nearest of kin of the contracting parties shall be
preferred as witnesses, or, in their default, persons of good reputation in the province or the
Art. 9. FC
locality.
A marriage license shall be issued by the local civil registrar of the city or municipality
The presentation of birth or baptismal certificate shall not be required if the parents of
where either contracting party habitually resides, except in marriages where no license is
the contracting parties appear personally before the local civil registrar concerned and swear to
required in accordance with Chapter 2 of this Title. (58a)
the correctness of the lawful age of said parties, as stated in the application, or when the local
civil registrar shall, by merely looking at the applicants upon their personally appearing before
Art. 11. FC
him, be convinced that either or both of them have the required age.
Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file Art. 13. FC
separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall
specify the following:
In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant
shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required in the last
(1) Full name of the contracting party; preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the
absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her
(2) Place of birth; previous marriage.
(3) Age and date of birth; In case the death certificate cannot be secured, the party shall make an affidavit
setting forth this circumstance and his or her actual civil status and the name and date of death
(4) Civil status; of the deceased spouse. (61a)
(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled; Art. 14. FC
(6) Present residence and citizenship; In case either or both of the contracting parties, not having been emancipated by a
previous marriage, are between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, they shall, in addition to
(7) Degree of relationship of the contracting parties; the requirements of the preceding articles, exhibit to the local civil registrar, the consent to their
marriage of their father, mother, surviving parent or guardian, or persons having legal charge of
(8) Full name, residence and citizenship of the father; them, in the order mentioned. Such consent shall be manifested in writing by the interested
party, who personally appears before the proper local civil registrar, or in the form of an affidavit
(9) Full name, residence and citizenship of the mother; and made in the presence of two witnesses and attested before any official authorized by law to
administer oaths. The personal manifestation shall be recorded in both applications for marriage
(10) Full name, residence and citizenship of the guardian or person having charge, in case the license, and the affidavit, if one is executed instead, shall be attached to said applications. (61a)
contracting party has neither father nor mother and is under the age of twenty-one years.
Art. 15. FC
The applicants, their parents or guardians shall not be required to exhibit their residence
certificates in any formality in connection with the securing of the marriage license. (59a) Any contracting party between the age of twenty-one and twenty-five shall be obliged
to ask their parents or guardian for advice upon the intended marriage. If they do not obtain such
advice, or if it be unfavorable, the marriage license shall not be issued till after three months
following the completion of the publication of the application therefor. A sworn statement by the Art. 21. FC
contracting parties to the effect that such advice has been sought, together with the written
advice given, if any, shall be attached to the application for marriage license. Should the parents When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens of a foreign country, it shall
or guardian refuse to give any advice, this fact shall be stated in the sworn statement. (62a) be necessary for them before a marriage license can be obtained, to submit a certificate of legal
capacity to contract marriage, issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officials.
Art. 16. FC
Stateless persons or refugees from other countries shall, in lieu of the certificate of
In the cases where parental consent or parental advice is needed, the party or parties legal capacity herein required, submit an affidavit stating the circumstances showing such
concerned shall, in addition to the requirements of the preceding articles, attach a certificate capacity to contract marriage. (66a)
issued by a priest, imam or minister authorized to solemnize marriage under Article 7 of this
Code or a marriage counselor duly accredited by the proper government agency to the effect Art. 22. FC
that the contracting parties have undergone marriage counseling. Failure to attach said
certificates of marriage counseling shall suspend the issuance of the marriage license for a The marriage certificate, in which the parties shall declare that they take each other as
period of three months from the completion of the publication of the application. Issuance of the husband and wife, shall also state:
marriage license within the prohibited period shall subject the issuing officer to administrative
sanctions but shall not affect the validity of the marriage. (1) The full name, sex and age of each contracting party;
Should only one of the contracting parties need parental consent or parental advice, (2) Their citizenship, religion and habitual residence;
the other party must be present at the counseling referred to in the preceding paragraph. (n)
(3) The date and precise time of the celebration of the marriage;
Art. 17. FC
(4) That the proper marriage license has been issued according to law, except in marriage
The local civil registrar shall prepare a notice which shall contain the full names and provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title;
residences of the applicants for a marriage license and other data given in the applications. The
notice shall be posted for ten consecutive days on a bulletin board outside the office of the local (5) That either or both of the contracting parties have secured the parental consent in
civil registrar located in a conspicuous place within the building and accessible to the general appropriate cases;
public. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. The marriage license shall be issued after the
(6) That either or both of the contracting parties have complied with the legal requirement
completion of the period of publication. (63a) regarding parental advice in appropriate cases; and
Art. 18. FC
(7) That the parties have entered into marriage settlement, if any, attaching a copy thereof. (67a)
In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his attention, Art. 23. FC
he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for marriage
license, but shall nonetheless issue said license after the completion of the period of publication,
It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the
unless ordered otherwise by a competent court at his own instance or that of any interest party.
contracting parties the original of the marriage certificate referred to in Article 6 and to send the
No filing fee shall be charged for the petition nor a corresponding bond required for the
duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to
issuances of the order. (64a)
the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be
issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage
Art. 19. FC
certificate. The solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage
certificate, the copy of the marriage certificate, the original of the marriage license and, in proper
The local civil registrar shall require the payment of the fees prescribed by law or cases, the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in place
regulations before the issuance of the marriage license. No other sum shall be collected in the other than those mentioned in Article 8. (68a)
nature of a fee or tax of any kind for the issuance of said license. It shall, however, be issued
free of charge to indigent parties, that is those who have no visible means of income or whose Art. 24. FC
income is insufficient for their subsistence a fact established by their affidavit, or by their oath
before the local civil registrar. (65a) chan robles virtual law library
It shall be the duty of the local civil registrar to prepare the documents required by this
Title, and to administer oaths to all interested parties without any charge in both cases. The
Art. 20. FC
documents and affidavits filed in connection with applications for marriage licenses shall be
exempt from documentary stamp tax. (n)
The license shall be valid in any part of the Philippines for a period of one hundred
twenty days from the date of issue, and shall be deemed automatically canceled at the Art. 25. FC
expiration of the said period if the contracting parties have not made use of it. The expiry date
shall be stamped in bold characters on the face of every license issued. (65a)
The local civil registrar concerned shall enter all applications for marriage licenses
filed with him in a registry book strictly in the order in which the same are received. He shall
record in said book the names of the applicants, the date on which the marriage license was
issued, and such other data as may be necessary.
Art. 27. In case either or both of the contracting parties are at the point of death, the marriage 3. MARRIAGE CEREMONY
may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license and shall remain valid even if the
ailing party subsequently survives. (72a) Art. 6. No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It
shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the
Art. 28. If the residence of either party is so located that there is no means of transportation to solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that
enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar, the marriage may be they take each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be contained in the marriage
solemnized without necessity of a marriage license. (72a) certificate which shall be signed by the contracting parties and their witnesses and attested by
the solemnizing officer.
Art. 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding articles, the solemnizing officer shall state
in an affidavit executed before the local civil registrar or any other person legally authorized to In case of a marriage in articulo mortis, when the party at the point of death is unable to sign the
administer oaths that the marriage was performed in articulo mortis or that the residence of marriage certificate, it shall be sufficient for one of the witnesses to the marriage to write the
either party, specifying the barrio or barangay, is so located that there is no means of name of said party, which fact shall be attested by the solemnizing officer.
transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar and that
the officer took the necessary steps to ascertain the ages and relationship of the contracting Article. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open
parties and the absence of legal impediment to the marriage. (72a) court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office the consul-general, consul or vice-consul,
as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of
Art. 30. The original of the affidavit required in the last preceding article, together with the legible death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both of the parties
copy of the marriage contract, shall be sent by the person solemnizing the marriage to the local request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a
civil registrar of the municipality where it was performed within the period of thirty days after the house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
performance of the marriage. (75a)
Art. 811. In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who
Art. 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members may also be knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the
solemnized by a ship captain or by an airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the plane signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such
is in flight, but also during stopovers at ports of call. (74a) witnesses shall be required.
Art. 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, shall likewise have In the absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding paragraph, and if the court
authority to solemnize marriages in articulo mortis between persons within the zone of military deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to. (619a)
operation, whether members of the armed forces or civilians. (74a)
Art. 812. In holographic wills, the dispositions of the testator written below his signature must be
Art. 33. Marriages among Muslims or among members of the ethnic cultural communities may dated and signed by him in order to make them valid as testamentary dispositions. (n)
be performed validly without the necessity of marriage license, provided they are solemnized in
accordance with their customs, rites or practices. (78a) Art. 813. When a number of dispositions appearing in a holographic will are signed without being
dated, and the last disposition has a signature and a date, such date validates the dispositions
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived preceding it, whatever be the time of prior dispositions. (n)
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry
each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any Art. 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will, the
person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath testator must authenticate the same by his full signature. (n)
that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to
the marriage. Art. 815. When a Filipino is in a foreign country, he is authorized to make a will in any of the
forms established by the law of the country in which he may be. Such will may be probated in
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: the Philippines. (n)
(3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered the preceding Chapter; Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes. (n)
marriage:
Art. 817. A will made in the Philippines by a citizen or subject of another country, which is
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen executed in accordance with the law of the country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which
years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without might be proved and allowed by the law of his own country, shall have the same effect as if
the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority executed according to the laws of the Philippines. (n)
over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party
freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife Art. 818. Two or more persons cannot make a will jointly, or in the same instrument, either for
their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person. (669)
Art. 819. Wills, prohibited by the preceding article, executed by Filipinos in a foreign country shall
not be valid in the Philippines, even though authorized by the laws of the country where they
may have been executed. (733a)
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;
SUBSECTION 4. - Witnesses to Wills (4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
Art. 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not bind, deaf (5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
or dumb, and able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in
Article 805 of this Code. (n) (6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
Art. 821. The following are disqualified from being witnesses to a will: (7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
(1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines; (8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
(2) Those who have been convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony. (9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person's
spouse, or his or her own spouse.
V. DIVORCE
PD 1083
Art. 15. Any contracting party between the age of twenty-one and twenty-five shall be obliged to
ask their parents or guardian for advice upon the intended marriage. If they do not obtain such Article 45.
advice, or if it be unfavorable, the marriage license shall not be issued till after three months
following the completion of the publication of the application therefor. A sworn statement by the Definition and forms. Divorce is the formal dissolution of the marriage bond in accordance with
contracting parties to the effect that such advice has been sought, together with the written this Code to be granted only after the exhaustion of all possible means of reconciliation between
advice given, if any, shall be attached to the application for marriage license. Should the parents the spouses. It may be effected by:
or guardian refuse to give any advice, this fact shall be stated in the sworn statement.
(a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq);
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this (b) Vow of continence by the husband (ila);
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)
(c) Injurious assanilation of the wife by the husband (zihar);
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the (d) Acts of imprecation (li'an);
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
(e) Redemption by the wife (khul');
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(f) Exercise by the wife of the delegated right to repudiate (tafwld); or
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of
parents or guardians (g) Judicial decree (faskh).
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was Article 46. Divorce by talaq.
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As (1) A divorce by talaq may be affected by the husband in a single repudiation of his wife during
amended by Executive Order 227) her non-menstrual period (tuhr) within which he has totally abstained from carnal relation with
her. Any number of repudiations made during one tuhr shall constitute only one repudiation and
Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether shall become irrevocable after the expiration of the prescribed 'idda.
relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(2) A husband who repudiates his wife, either for the first or second time, shall have the right to
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and take her back (ruju) within the prescribed 'idda by resumption of cohabitation without need of a
new contract of marriage. Should he fail to do so, the repudiation shall become irrevocable
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood. (81a) (Talaq bain sugra).
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy: Article 47. Divorce by Ila. Where a husband makes a vow to abstain from any carnal relations
(ila) with his wife and keeps such ila for a period of not less than four months, she may be
(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil granted a decree of divorce by the court after due notice and hearing.
degree;
Article 48. Divorce by zihar. Where the husband has injuriously assimilated (zihar) his wife to RULE 132 ROC
any of his relatives within the prohibited degrees of marriage, they shall mutually refrain from
having carnal relation until he shall have performed the prescribed expiation. The wife may ask Sec. 19 . Classes of Documents. — For the purpose of their presentation evidence, documents
the court to require her husband to perform the expiationor to pronounce the a regular talaq are either public or private.
should he fail or refuse to do so, without prejudice to her right of seeking other appropriate
remedies. Public documents are:
Article 49. Divorce by li'an. Where the husband accuses his wife in court of adultery, a decree of (a)The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies
perpetual divorce may be granted by the court after due hearing and after the parties shall have and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
performed the prescribed acts of imprecation (li'an).
(b)Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
Article 50. Divorce by khul'. The wife may, after having offered to return or renounce her dower
or to pay any other lawful consideration for her release (khul') from the marriage bond, petition (c)Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to the entered
the court for divorce. The court shall, in meritorious cases and after fixing the consideration, therein.
issue the corresponding decree.
All other writings are private.
Article 51. Divorce by tafwid. If the husband has delegated (tafwid) to the wife the right to effect a
talaq at the time of the celebration of the marriage or thereafter, she may repudiate the marriage Sec. 23 . Public documents as evidence. — Documents consisting of entries in public records
and the repudiation would have the same effect as if it were pronounced by the husband himself. made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact
Article 52. Divorce by faskh. The court may, upon petition of the wife, decree a divorce by faskh which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter. (24a)
on any of the following grounds :
Sec. 24 . Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a)
(a) Neglect or failure of the husband to provide support for the family for at least six consecutive of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
months; thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such
(b) Conviction of the husband by final judgment sentencing him to imprisonment for at least one officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in foreign country, the certificate
year; may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
(c) Failure of the husband to perform for six months without reasonable cause his marital country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
obligation in accordance with this code;
Sec. 29 . How judicial record impeached. — Any judicial record may be impeached by evidence
(d) Impotency of the husband; of: (a) want of jurisdiction in the court or judicial officer, (b) collusion between the parties, or (c)
fraud in the party offering the record, in respect to the proceedings.
(e) Insanity or affliction of the husband with an incurable disease which would make the
continuance of the marriage relationship injurious to the family; RULE 39 ROC
(f) Unusual cruelty of the husband as defined under the next succeeding article; or Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.
(g) Any other cause recognized under Muslim law for the dissolution of marriage by faskh either The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to
at the instance of the wife or the proper wali. render the judgment or final order is as follows:
Article 53. Faskh on the ground of unusual cruelty. A decree of faskh on the ground of unusual (a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is
cruelty may be granted by the court upon petition of the wife if the husband: conclusive upon the title to the thing; and
(a)Habitually assaults her or makes her life miserable by cruel conduct even if this does not (b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
result in physical injury; presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
(b) Associates with persons of ill-repute or leads an infamous life or attempts to force the wife to
live an immoral life; In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
(c) Compels her to dispose of her exclusive property or prevents her from exercising her legal
rights over it;
(e) Does not treat her justly and equitably as enjoined by Islamic law.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then
CASES sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and
his sex from "male" to "female."
3. BETWEEN MAN AND A WOMAN An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal Tonight, a
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the
FULL CASE: SILVERIO V REPUBLIC order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007 On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to
the petition was made.
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his
vs. American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions
read:
DECISION
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or
CORONA, J.: for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his
present sex.
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and
female. (Genesis 5:1-2) The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She
pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with
two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always
"Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s
Maganda) misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way
taken against him.
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the
changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the
sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-
certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery? awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fiancé] and the realization of their
dreams.
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change
of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition
The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to
respondent. interpose any [o]pposition.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil
Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner,
"Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was specifically for petitioner’s first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioner’s gender
registered as "male." from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for
acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.1 Feeling certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in
trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to
transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It
reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino ruled that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of
Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery.
certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic’s petition, set aside the decision of the trial
court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He
under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into
9048.10 through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil
status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.
The petition lacks merit. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may
only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and cause or any compelling reason justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will
sex. As found by the trial court: be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even
allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or
for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name
present sex. (emphasis supplied) was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the
local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also
entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree. filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila
where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and
official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.
identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 court must look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
of RA 9048 provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect,
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such
errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to entertain register.23
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general
concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the
law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until
and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently xxx xxx xxx
denied.15 It likewise lays down the corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the
remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in (3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical
nature, not judicial. work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and
innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed: the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to
other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; of the Rules of Court.
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the
and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24
(3) The change will avoid confusion. ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register: hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in
case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name. Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed
at the time of birth.29 Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that
those that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made
the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment. at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary
change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as
that serves as a substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws)
therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative
is necessary. intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure
and function that distinguish a male from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as female."33 Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that
legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female"
births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, in everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment.
annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning
recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary."36
These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and
capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable
In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be
Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly. included in the category "female."
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in
membership.27 the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or
change of the entries in his birth certificate.
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground
illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term status… include such matters of Equity
as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations,
and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice
and sometimes even succession.28 (emphasis supplied) and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to
anyone. This is wrong.
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s
legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides: The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most
special laws. sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. be a male and a female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially
This is fatal to petitioner’s cause. reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a
man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides: transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the
provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or midwife in Penal Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the
attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women
shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.
exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than
thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render
parent of the newborn child. judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a
license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret CASE DIGEST:
the law, not to make or amend it.
Facts:
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine
what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for
petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and
legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are
sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila
statute-based.
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction
acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.
or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked,
what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends
Feeling trapped in a man's body, he consulted several doctors in... the United States. He
to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name
underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His
and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines
attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent
in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.
sex reassignment surgery[2] in Bangkok, Thailand.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be
He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to
recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to
"Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."
fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law
exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government,
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Congress.
the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and
of Appeals.[6] It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate
[the] realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are
by reason of sex... alteration.
people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized
parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the
the Court of Appeals[7] rendered a decision[8] in favor of the Republic.
remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts.
Issues:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
Costs against petitioner.
Ruling:
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner's basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He
intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into
Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.
through surgery.
RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable
cause or any compelling reason justifying such change.[19] In addition, he must show that he
will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.[20] In this case, he failed to show, or
even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner's first name
was not within that court's primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the
local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an... improper remedy
because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also
filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila
where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit... since the use of his true and
official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly
dismissed petitioner's petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.
The birth certificate of petitioner... contained no error. All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts... and judicial
decrees
These acts, events and judicial decrees produce... legal consequences that touch upon the legal The change will avoid confusion.
capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws.
In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical
Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by... any law, expressly or impliedly. or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108
of the Rules of Court.
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed
at the time of birth.[29] Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the
attendant (the physician or midwife) by... examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:[24]
there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person's sex made
at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,[30] is immutable. ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the... correction
or change of the entries in his birth certificate. (1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
Principles: acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of...
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
identification.[11] A change of name is a privilege, not a right.[12] Petitions for change of name
are controlled by statutes.[13] In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides: The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even
those that occur after birth.[25] However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground... of sex reassignment.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 "Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of
of RA 9048 provides: capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family
membership.
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or... nickname which can be permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term... status… include such
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family
relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage,
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.[14] It vests the power and authority to entertain divorce, and sometimes even succession.[28] (emphasis supplied)
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general
concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications... for change of first name is A person's sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person's
now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103... and 108... f the
Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by
subsequently denied. special laws.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed: Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition for change of first SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. The declaration of the physician or midwife in
name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases: attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child,
shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the... civil register. Such declaration shall be
(1) exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than
thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either
The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or parent of the newborn child.
extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed
(2) at the time of birth.[29] Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant (the physician or midwife) by... examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that
The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person's sex made
he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,[30] is immutable.
(3)
FULL CASE: REPUBLIC V CAGANDAHAN underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen,
tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has
no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as
Republic of the Philippines
well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth
SUPREME COURT
certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name
Manila
be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
SECOND DIVISION
The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks
and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor General entered
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
his appearance and authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.
Petitioner,
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of
the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr.
- versus -
Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating that respondent’s condition is known as CAH. He
explained that genetically respondent is female but because her body secretes male hormones,
JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN,
her female organs did not develop normally and she has two sex organs – female and male. He
testified that this condition is very rare, that respondent’s uterus is not fully developed because
Respondent.
of lack of female hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He further testified that
respondent’s condition is permanent and recommended the change of gender because
G.R. No. 166676
respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change
would be advantageous to her.
Present:
The RTC granted respondent’s petition in a Decision dated January 12, 2005 which reads:
Quisumbing, J., Chairperson,
The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown that he is entitled to the reliefs
Carpio Morales,
prayed [for]. Petitioner has adequately presented to the Court very clear and convincing proofs
for the granting of his petition. It was medically proven that petitioner’s body produces male
Tinga,
hormones, and first his body as well as his action and feelings are that of a male. He has chosen
to be male. He is a normal person and wants to be acknowledged and identified as a male.
VELASCO, JR., and
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna is hereby ordered to
BRION, JJ.
make the following corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer Cagandahan upon payment of
the prescribed fees:
Promulgated:
a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and
September 12, 2008
b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
It is likewise ordered that petitioner’s school records, voter’s registry, baptismal certificate, and
DECISION
other pertinent records are hereby amended to conform with the foregoing corrected data.
QUISUMBING, J.:
SO ORDERED.[3]
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely questions of law
and seeking a reversal of the Decision[1] dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the
(RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in
abovementioned ruling.
Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of entries in
Cagandahan’s birth certificate: (1) the name "Jennifer Cagandahan" changed to "Jeff
The issues raised by petitioner are:
Cagandahan" and (2) gender from "female" to "male."
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION CONSIDERING THAT:
The facts are as follows.
I.
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of
Entries in Birth Certificate2 before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT HAVE NOT
BEEN COMPLIED WITH; AND,
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a
female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male
II.
characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a
condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She further
alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six,
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW CHANGE OF "SEX" OR Sec. 5. Judgment. – Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that
"GENDER" IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENT’S MEDICAL CONDITION, such order has been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the
i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE HER A "MALE."4 court shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the petitioner,
adjudge that such name be changed in accordance with the prayer of the petition.
Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the
birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground Sec. 6. Service of judgment. – Judgments or orders rendered in connection with this rule shall
of her medical condition known as CAH, and her name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff," under Rules 103 be furnished the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the court issuing the same is
and 108 of the Rules of Court. situated, who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 Rule 108
and 108 of the Rules of Court because while the local civil registrar is an indispensable party in a
petition for cancellation or correction of entries under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
respondent’s petition before the court a quo did not implead the local civil registrar.5 The OSG
further contends respondent’s petition is fatally defective since it failed to state that respondent is IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
a bona fide resident of the province where the petition was filed for at least three (3) years prior
to the date of such filing as mandated under Section 2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.6 The Section 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
OSG argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a
respondent’s claimed medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male.7 verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional
Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna
was not formally named a party in the Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless the Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and valid grounds, the
Local Civil Registrar was furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to publish on December 16, following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c)
2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the proceedings,8 respondent is deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring
actually a male person and hence his birth certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of
sex/gender,9 change of sex or gender is allowed under Rule 108,10 and respondent natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction;
substantially complied with the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.11 (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of
name.
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:
Sec. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the
Rule 103 civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby
shall be made parties to the proceeding.
CHANGE OF NAME
Sec. 4. Notice and publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix
Section 1. Venue. – A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given
Regional Trial Court of the province in which he resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a
and Domestic Relations Court]. week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
Sec. 2. Contents of petition. – A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by the Sec. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the
person desiring his name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth: entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for
at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing; Sec. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the proceedings is brought may make
orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought; of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
(c) The name asked for. Sec. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order
granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment
Sec. 3. Order for hearing. – If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the court, by shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.
an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof,
and shall direct that a copy of the order be published before the hearing at least once a week for The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103
three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general circulation published in the province, and 108 of the Rules of Court because respondent’s petition did not implead the local civil
as the court shall deem best. The date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior registrar. Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim
to an election nor within four (4) months after the last publication of the notice. any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceedings. Likewise,
the local civil registrar is required to be made a party in a proceeding for the correction of name
Sec. 4. Hearing. – Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition. in the civil registry. He is an indispensable party without whom no final determination of the case
The Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the can be had.[12] Unless all possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings,
Government of the Republic. the same shall be considered as falling much too short of the requirements of the rules.13 The
corresponding petition should also implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other
persons who may have or may claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby.14 Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most societies, intersex
Respondent, however, invokes Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which states that individuals have been expected to conform to either a male or female gender role.[23] Since the
courts shall construe the Rules liberally to promote their objectives of securing to the parties a rise of modern medical science in Western societies, some intersex people with ambiguous
just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the matters brought before it. We agree that there is external genitalia have had their genitalia surgically modified to resemble either male or female
substantial compliance with Rule 108 when respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the genitals.[24] More commonly, an intersex individual is considered as suffering from a "disorder"
local civil registrar. which is almost always recommended to be treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime
medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as possible into the category of either male
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the or female.
court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. "It has been suggested
that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a ‘no-man’s land’ for those individuals who
Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No. are neither truly ‘male’ nor truly ‘female’."[25] The current state of Philippine statutes apparently
9048[17] in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not
such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid
judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of classification.
Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and
corrections in entries in the civil register.18 In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a
change in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a and scientific development showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in
mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure the
is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.19
subject’s birth certificate entry is in order.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code: Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and categorically
female nor consistently and categorically male) composition. Respondent has female (XX)
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be chromosomes. However, respondent’s body system naturally produces high levels of male
recorded in the civil register. hormones (androgen). As a result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic
features of a male.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent,
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name. development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive.
It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even
those that occur after birth.20 Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to
arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or "inappropriate" that of a male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong
appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition produces too medication,[26] to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose
much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondent’s development to reveal
usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia more fully his male characteristics.
often appearing more male than female; (2) normal internal structures of the female reproductive
tract such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a
start to appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate at matter so innately private as one’s sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or
puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH. not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not
consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or
CAH is one of many conditions[21] that involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth century, remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take
medicine adopted the term "intersexuality" to apply to human beings who cannot be classified as medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender
either male or female.[22] The term is now of widespread use. According to Wikipedia, of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him
intersexuality "is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong
genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development
female. An organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an "incompetent"[27] and in the
sexes." absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of
society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and
justified the respondent’s position and his personal judgment of being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an
CASE DIGEST:
individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondent’s
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. CAGANDAHAN
congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary
Published by paul on August 12, 2013 | Leave a response
person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN
make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.
GR No. 166676, September 12, 2008
As for respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name
FACTS:
is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons
adduced and the consequences that will follow.[28] The trial court’s grant of respondent’s
Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a
change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name.
Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to
Considering the consequence that respondent’s change of name merely recognizes his
Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is
preferred gender, we find merit in respondent’s change of name. Such a change will conform
sufferingfrom Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted
with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.
persons possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with
secondary male characteristics. To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the
WHEREFORE, the Republic’s petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 12, 2005 of the
medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which
Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the
costs.
Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that “Cagandahan
genetically is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not
SO ORDERED.
develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female.” The lower court decided in her
favor but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the
same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did
not implead the local civil registrar.
ISSUE:
RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in deciding the case,
the Supreme Court considered “the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees
of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.” The Supreme Court
made use of the availale evidence presented in court including the fact that private respondent
thinks of himself as a male and as to the statement made by the doctor that Cagandahan’s body
produces high levels of male hormones (androgen), which is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being male.”
The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how
an individual deals with what nature has handed out. That is, the Supreme Court respects the
respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult
for the ordinary person. The Court added that a change of name is not a matter of right but of
judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons and the consequences that will
follow.
CASE DIGEST: OBERGEFELL V HODGES reputable studies on the effects of LGBT parenting. Id. at 59-60. APA's amicus briefs filed in the
Sixth Circuit urged this conclusion.
Obergefell v. Hodges
Plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. On Jan. 16,
Brief Filed: 5/1/2014
2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in all four cases on the following questions:
Court: 6th Circuit Court of Appeals
Year of Decision: 2014
Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two people of
the same sex?Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage
Read full-text amicus brief (PDF, 506KB)
between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed
out-of-state?
Issue
At issue is a federal challenge to the laws against same-sex marriage in Ohio.
Index Topics
Sexual Orientation (discrimination; same sex-marriage)
Facts
James Obergefell and John Arthur, a same-sex couple alleging that the state discriminates
against same-sex couples who have married lawfully out-of-state. Arthur, who was terminally ill
and suffering from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), sought to identify Obergefell as his
surviving spouse on his death certificate based on their July 11, 2013, Maryland marriage. The
couple was granted a temporary restraining order prohibiting state officials from listing Arthur as
unmarried on his death certificate, in the event he died before the court could consider the case.
Arthur died on Oct. 22, 2013.
On Dec. 23, 2013, U.S. District Judge Timothy Black ordered Ohio authorities to recognize
same-sex marriages on death certificates, saying the state's ban on such unions is
unconstitutional and that states cannot discriminate against same-sex couples simply because
some voters “don't like homosexuality.” The narrow ruling applied only to death certificates. But
the State of Ohio appealed that ruling to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
APA's Position
APA's amicus briefs present an accurate and comprehensive summary of the current state of
scientific and professional knowledge concerning sexual orientation, same-sex relationships,
and the children of same-sex couples. Drawing on the cumulative scientific knowledge in these
areas, APA makes four main arguments 1) that homosexuality is a normal expression of human
sexuality, is generally not chosen, and is highly resistant to change; 2) that same-sex
relationships are equivalent to heterosexual relationships in essential respects; and, that
excluding same-sex couples from the institution of marriage denies them social, psychological
and health benefits; 3) that there is no scientific basis for concluding that same-sex couples are
not fit parents or that children of same-sex couples are any less psychologically healthy and
well-adjusted than children of heterosexual couples; and 4) that denying same-sex couples
access to marriage is an instance of stigma.
Results
On Nov. 6, 2014, the court issued an opinion upholding the challenged laws in a 2-1 decision. In
doing so, it created a circuit split and became the first federal court of appeals to rule against
marriage equality in a post-Windsor case.
The Sixth Circuit's majority opinion did not address the APA's arguments. Judge Daughtrey's
dissent, however, focused on the negative effects of marriage bans on same-sex couples and
their children. See, e.g., Docket No. 130-2 at 45 (responding to “responsible procreation”
arguments and stating “[h]ow ironic that irresponsible, unmarried, opposite-sex couples in the
Sixth Circuit who produce unwanted offspring must be ‘channeled' into marriage and thus
rewarded with its many psychological and financial benefits, while same-sex couples who
become model parents are punished for their responsible behavior by being denied the right to
marry”). Like the Ohio district court below, Judge Daughtry found that the studies of Mark
Regnerus, Douglas Allen, and Loren Marks were “not credible” in contrast to other more
FULL CASE: BOLOS V BOLOS As earlier stated, the CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of
the RTC. The appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a
prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage
G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010
between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took
effect. It relied on the ruling of this Court in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli3 to the effect that
CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, Petitioner,
the "coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC] extends only to those marriages entered into during the
vs.
effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988."
DANILO T. BOLOS, Respondent.
Cynthia sought reconsideration of the ruling by filing her Manifestation with Motion for Extension
DECISION
of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Partial Reconsideration [of the
Honorable Court’s Decision dated December 10, 2008]. The CA, however, in its February 11,
MENDOZA, J.:
2009 Resolution,4 denied the motion for extension of time considering that the 15-day
reglementary period to file a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible, pursuant to Section 2,
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking a review of
Rule 40, 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure citing Habaluyas v. Japson, 142 SCRA 208. The motion
the December 10, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in an original action for certiorari
for partial reconsideration was likewise denied.
under Rule 65 entitled "Danilo T. Bolos v. Hon. Lorifel Lacap Pahimna and Cynthia S. Bolos,"
docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 97872, reversing the January 16, 2007 Order of the Regional Trial
Hence, Cynthia interposes the present petition via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the
Court of Pasig City, Branch 69 (RTC), declaring its decision pronouncing the nullity of marriage
following
between petitioner and respondent final and executory.
ISSUES
On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity
of her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code,
I
docketed as JDRC No. 6211.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED DECISION
After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment in a Decision, dated August
DATED DECEMBER 10, 2008 CONSIDERING THAT:
2, 2006, with the following disposition:
A. THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN ENRICO V. SPS.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between petitioner
MEDINACELI IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE CONSIDERING THAT THE
CYNTHIA S. BOLOS and respondent DANILO T. BOLOS celebrated on February 14, 1980 as
FACTS AND THE ISSUE THEREIN ARE NOT SIMILAR TO THE INSTANT CASE.
null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of both petitioner and
respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code with all the legal consequences provided by law.
B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT
IS APLLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE, ITS RULING IN ENRICO V. SPS. MEDINACELI IS
Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan as well as the National Statistics Office (NSO) copy
PATENTLY ERRONEOUS BECAUSE THE PHRASE "UNDER THE FAMILY CODE" IN A.M.
of this decision.
NO. 02-11-10-SC PERTAINS TO THE WORD "PETITIONS" RATHER THAN TO THE WORD
"MARRIAGES."
SO ORDERED.2
C. FROM THE FOREGOING, A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC ENTITLED "RULE ON DECLARATION
A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on August 25, 2006. He timely filed the Notice of
OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE
Appeal on September 11, 2006.
MARRIAGES" IS APPLICABLE TO MARRIAGES SOLEMNIZED BEFORE THE EFFECTIVITY
OF THE FAMILY CODE. HENCE, A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A
In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s
PRECONDITION FOR AN APPEAL BY HEREIN RESPONDENT.
failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.
D. CONSIDERING THAT HEREIN RESPONDENT REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH A
PRECONDITION FOR APPEAL, A RELAXATION OF THE RULES ON APPEAL IS NOT
On November 23, 2006, a motion to reconsider the denial of Danilo’s appeal was likewise
PROPER IN HIS CASE.
denied.
II
On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring its August 2, 2006 decision final and
executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION
DATED FEBRUARY 11, 2009 CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING AND THE FACTUAL
Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
the orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
in excess of jurisdiction, to wit: 1) the September 19, 2006 Order which denied due course to
III
Danilo’s appeal; 2) the November 23, 2006 Order which denied the motion to reconsider the
September 19, 2006 Order; and 3) the January 16, 2007 Order which declared the August 2,
THE TENETS OF JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY, THE NOVELTY AND IMPORTANCE OF THE
2006 decision as final and executory. Danilo also prayed that he be declared psychologically
ISSUE AND THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE JUSTIFY AND WARRANT A
capacitated to render the essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty
LIBERAL VIEW OF THE RULES IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER. MOREOVER, THE
of abandoning him, the family home and their children.
INSTANT PETITION IS MERITORIOUS AND NOT INTENDED FOR DELAY.5
substantial merit.11 As a corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for taking
From the arguments advanced by Cynthia, the principal question to be resolved is whether or certain proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to prevent needless delays and to
not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages orderly and promptly discharge judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," is applicable to the case at bench. as mandatory.12
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized before The appellate court was correct in denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a
the effectivity of the Family Code. According to Cynthia, the CA erroneously anchored its motion for reconsideration considering that the reglementary period for filing the said motion for
decision to an obiter dictum in the aforecited Enrico case, which did not even involve a marriage reconsideration is non-extendible. As pronounced in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of
solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code. Internal Revenue, 13
She added that, even assuming arguendo that the pronouncement in the said case constituted a The rule is and has been that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible.
decision on its merits, still the same cannot be applied because of the substantial disparity in the The Court has made this clear as early as 1986 in Habaluyas Enterprises vs. Japzon. Since
factual milieu of the Enrico case from this case. In the said case, both the marriages sought to then, the Court has consistently and strictly adhered thereto.1avvphil
be declared null were solemnized, and the action for declaration of nullity was filed, after the
effectivity of both the Family Code in 1988 and of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC in 2003. In this case, Given the above, we rule without hesitation that the appellate court’s denial of petitioner’s motion
the marriage was solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code and A.M. No. 02-11-10- for reconsideration is justified, precisely because petitioner’s earlier motion for extension of time
SC while the action was filed and decided after the effectivity of both. did not suspend/toll the running of the 15-day reglementary period for filing a motion for
reconsideration. Under the circumstances, the CA decision has already attained finality when
Danilo, in his Comment,6 counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable because his petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration. It follows that the same decision was already
marriage with Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980, years before its effectivity. He beyond the review jurisdiction of this Court.
further stresses the meritorious nature of his appeal from the decision of the RTC declaring their
marriage as null and void due to his purported psychological incapacity and citing the mere In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision which denied due
"failure" of the parties who were supposedly "remiss," but not "incapacitated," to render marital course to respondent’s appeal and denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a
obligations as required under Article 36 of the Family Code. motion for reconsideration.
The Court finds the petition devoid of merit. Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. Its purpose is to bring up for review a final
judgment of the lower court. The courts should, thus, proceed with caution so as not to deprive a
Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her stance is unavailing. The party of his right to appeal.14 In the recent case of Almelor v. RTC of Las Pinas City, Br. 254,15
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages the Court reiterated: While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is
as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is an essential part of our judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to
explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads: deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of
Section 1. Scope – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void technicalities.
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
In the case at bench, the respondent should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. merits of his appeal considering that what is at stake is the sacrosanct institution of marriage.
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage No less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution. This
extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took constitutional policy is echoed in our Family Code. Article 1 thereof emphasizes its permanence
effect on August 3, 1988.7 The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the and inviolability, thus:
Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.8
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman
The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase "under the entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the
Family Code" in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word "petitions" rather than to the word foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and
"marriages." incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements
may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or
ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application.9 This Court is not unmindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the
As the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.16
applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or
verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or "speech is the index of Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution
intention." Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or "from the words in which the State is vitally interested. The State finds no stronger anchor than on good, solid
of a statute there should be no departure."10 and happy families. The break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence,
their preservation is not the concern alone of the family members.17
There is no basis for petitioner’s assertion either that the tenets of substantial justice, the novelty
and importance of the issue and the meritorious nature of this case warrant a relaxation of the WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Rules in her favor. Time and again the Court has stressed that the rules of procedure must be
faithfully complied with and should not be discarded with the mere expediency of claiming
FULL CASE: LEUS V ST. SCHOLASTICA’S COLLEGE To us, pre-marital sex between two consenting adults without legal impediment to marry each
other who later on married each other does not fall within the contemplation of "disgraceful or
WESTGROVE immoral conduct" and "serious misconduct" of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools
and the Labor Code of the Philippines.
G.R. No. 187226 January 28, 2015
Your argument that what happened to our client would set a bad example to the students and
CHERYLL SANTOS LEUS, Petitioner, other employees of your school is speculative and is more imaginary than real. To dismiss her
vs. on that sole ground constitutes grave abuse of management prerogatives.
ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE WESTGROVE and/or SR. EDNA QUIAMBAO, OSB,
Respondents. Considering her untarnished service for two years, dismissing her with her present condition
would also mean depriving her to be more secure in terms of financial capacity to sustain
DECISION maternal needs.10
REYES, J.: In a letter11 dated June 6, 2003, SSCW, through counsel, maintained that pre-marital sexual
relations, evenif between two consenting adults without legal impediment to marry, is considered
Cheryll Santos Leus (petitioner) was hired by St. Scholastica's College Westgrove (SSCW), a a disgraceful and immoral conduct or a serious misconduct, which are grounds for the
Catholic educational institution, as a non-teaching personnel, engaged in pre-marital sexual termination of employment under the 1992 MRPS and the Labor Code. That SSCW, as a
relations, got pregnant out of wedlock, married the father of her child, and was dismissed by Catholic institution of learning, has the right to uphold the teaching of the Catholic Church and
SSCW, in that order. The question that has to be resolved is whether the petitioner's conduct expect its employees to abide by the same. They further asserted that the petitioner’s
constitutes a ground for her dismissal. indiscretion is further aggravated by the fact that she is the Assistant to the Director of the Lay
Apostolate and Community Outreach Directorate, a position of responsibility that the students
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking look up to as rolemodel. The petitioner was again directed to submit a written explanation on
to annul and set aside the Decision1 dated September 24, 2008 and Resolution2 dated March 2, why she should not be dismissed.
2009 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 100188, which affirmed the
Resolutions dated February 28, 20073 and May 21, 20074 of the National Labor Relations On June 9, 2003, the petitioner informed Sr. Quiambao that she adopts her counsel’s letter
Commission (NLRC)in NLRC CA No. 049222-06. dated June 4, 2003 as her written explanation.12
The Facts Consequently, in her letter13 dated June 11, 2003, Sr. Quiambao informed the petitioner that
her employment with SSCW is terminated on the ground of serious misconduct. She stressed
SSCW is a catholic and sectarian educational institution in Silang, Cavite. In May 2001, SSCW that pre-marital sexual relations between two consenting adults with no impediment to marry,
hired the petitioner as an Assistant to SSCW’s Director of the Lay Apostolate and Community even if they subsequently married, amounts to immoral conduct. She further pointed out that
Outreach Directorate. SSCW finds unacceptable the scandal brought about by the petitioner’s pregnancy out of
wedlock as it ran counter to the moral principles that SSCW stands for and teaches its students.
Sometime in 2003, the petitioner and her boyfriend conceived a child out of wedlock. When
SSCW learned of the petitioner’s pregnancy, Sr. Edna Quiambao (Sr. Quiambao), SSCW’s Thereupon, the petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Regional Arbitration
Directress, advised her to file a resignation letter effective June 1, 2003. In response, the Branch of the NLRC in Quezon City against SSCW and Sr. Quiambao (respondents). In her
petitioner informed Sr. Quiambao that she would not resign from her employment just because position paper,14 the petitioner claimed that SSCW gravely abused its management prerogative
she got pregnant without the benefit of marriage.5 as there was no just cause for her dismissal. She maintained that her pregnancy out of wedlock
cannot be considered as serious misconduct since the same is a purely private affair and not
On May 28, 2003, Sr. Quiambao formally directed the petitioner to explain in writing why she connected in any way with her duties as an employee of SSCW. Further, the petitioner averred
should not be dismissed for engaging in pre-marital sexual relations and getting pregnant as a that she and her boyfriend eventually got married even prior to her dismissal.
result thereof, which amounts to serious misconduct and conduct unbecoming of an employee of
a Catholic school.6 For their part, SSCW claimed that there was just cause to terminate the petitioner’s employment
with SSCW and that the same is a valid exercise of SSCW’s management prerogative. They
In a letter7 dated May 31, 2003, the petitioner explained that her pregnancy out of wedlock does maintained that engaging in pre-marital sex, and getting pregnant as a result thereof, amounts to
not amount to serious misconduct or conduct unbecoming of an employee. She averred that she a disgraceful or immoral conduct, which is a ground for the dismissal of an employee under the
is unaware of any school policy stating that being pregnant out of wedlock is considered as a 1992 MRPS.
serious misconduct and, thus, a ground for dismissal. Further, the petitioner requested a copy of
SSCW’s policy and guidelines so that she may better respond to the charge against her. On They pointed out that SSCW is a Catholic educational institution, which caters exclusively to
June 2, 2003, Sr. Quiambao informed the petitioner that, pending the promulgation of a "Support young girls; that SSCW would lose its credibility if it would maintain employees who do not live
Staff Handbook," SSCW follows the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (1992 up to the values and teachings it inculcates to its students. SSCW further asserted that the
MRPS) on the causes for termination of employments; that Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS petitioner, being an employee of a Catholic educational institution, should have strived to
cites "disgraceful or immoral conduct" as a ground for dismissal in addition to the just causes for maintain the honor, dignity and reputation of SSCW as a Catholic school.15
termination of employment provided under Article 282 of the Labor Code.8
The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
On June 4, 2003, the petitioner, through counsel, sent Sr. Quiambao a letter,9 which, in part,
reads: On February 28, 2006, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision,16 in NLRC Case No. 6-
17657-03-C which dismissed the complaint filed by the petitioner. The LA found that there was a
valid ground for the petitioner’s dismissal; that her pregnancy out of wedlock is considered as a
"disgraceful and immoral conduct." The LA pointed out that, as an employee of a Catholic The CA further held that the petitioner’s dismissal was a valid exercise of SSCW’s management
educational institution, the petitioner is expected to live up to the Catholic values taught by prerogative to discipline and impose penalties on erring employees pursuant toits policies, rules
SSCW to its students. Likewise, the LA opined that: and regulations. The CA upheld the NLRC’s conclusion that the petitioner’s pregnancy out of
wedlock is considered as a "disgraceful and immoral conduct" and, thus, a ground for dismissal
Further, a deep analysis of the facts would lead us to disagree with the complainant that she under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS. The CA likewise opined that the petitioner’s pregnancy
was dismissed simply because she violate[d] a Catholic [teaching]. It should not be taken in out of wedlock is scandalous per segiven the work environment and social milieu that she was
isolation but rather it should be analyzed in the lightof the surrounding circumstances as a in, viz:
whole. We must also take into [consideration] the nature of her work and the nature of her
employer-school. For us, it is not just an ordinary violation. It was committed by the complainant Under Section 94 (e) of the [MRPS], and even under Article 282 (serious misconduct) of the
in an environment where her strict adherence to the same is called for and where the reputation Labor Code, "disgraceful and immoral conduct" is a basis for termination of employment.
of the school is at stake. x x x.17
xxxx
The LA further held that teachers and school employees, both in their official and personal
conduct, must display exemplary behavior and act in a manner that is beyond reproach. Petitioner contends that her pre-marital sexual relations with her boyfriend and her pregnancy
prior to marriage was not disgraceful or immoral conduct sufficient for her dismissal because she
The petitioner appealed to the NLRC, insisting that there was no valid ground for the termination was not a member of the school’s faculty and there is no evidence that her pregnancy
of her employment. She maintained that her pregnancy out of wedlock cannot be considered as scandalized the school community.
"serious misconduct" under Article 282 of the Labor Code since the same was not of such a
grave and aggravated character. She asserted that SSCW did not present any evidence to We are not persuaded. Petitioner’s pregnancy prior to marriage is scandalous in itself given the
establish that her pregnancy out of wedlock indeed eroded the moral principles that it teaches its work environment and social milieu she was in. Respondent school for young ladies precisely
students.18 seeks to prevent its students from situations like this, inculcating in them strict moral values and
standards. Being part of the institution, petitioner’sprivate and public life could not be separated.
The Ruling of the NLRC Her admitted pre-marital sexual relations was a violation of private respondent’s prescribed
standards of conduct that views pre-marital sex as immoral because sex between a man and a
On February 28, 2007, the NLRC issued a Resolution,19 which affirmed the LA Decision dated woman must only take place within the bounds of marriage.
February 28, 2006. The NLRC pointed out that the termination of the employment of the
personnel of private schools is governed by the 1992 MRPS; that Section 94(e) thereof cites Finally, petitioner’s dismissal is a valid exercise of the employer-school’s management
"disgraceful or immoral conduct" as a just cause for dismissal, in addition to the grounds for prerogative to discipline and impose penalties on erring employees pursuant to its policies, rules
termination of employment provided for under Article 282 of the Labor Code. The NLRC held and regulations. x x x.25 (Citations omitted)
that the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock is a "disgraceful or immoral conduct" within the
contemplation of Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS and, thus, SSCW had a valid reason to The petitioner moved for reconsideration26 but it was denied by the CA in its Resolution27 dated
terminate her employment. March 2, 2009.
The petitioner sought reconsideration20 of the Resolution dated February 28, 2007 but it was Hence, the instant petition.
denied by the NLRC in its Resolution21 dated May 21, 2007.
Issues
Unperturbed, the petitioner filed a petition22 for certiorari with the CA, alleging that the NLRC
gravely abused its discretion in ruling that there was a valid ground for her dismissal. She Essentially, the issues set forth by the petitioner for this Court’s decision are the following: first,
maintained that pregnancy out of wedlock cannot be considered as a disgraceful or immoral whether the CA committed reversible error in ruling that it is the 1992 MRPS and not the Labor
conduct; that SSCW failed to prove that its students were indeed gravely scandalized by her Code that governs the termination of employment of teaching and non-teaching personnel of
pregnancy out of wedlock. She likewise asserted that the NLRC erred in applying Section 94(e) private schools; and second, whether the petitioner’spregnancy out of wedlock constitutes a
of the 1992 MRPS. valid ground to terminate her employment.
On September 24, 2008, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision,23 which denied the The Court grants the petition.
petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner. The CA held that it is the provisions of the 1992
MRPS and not the Labor Code which governs the termination of employment of teaching and First Issue: Applicability of the 1992 MRPS
non-teaching personnel of private schools, explaining that:
The petitioner contends that the CA, in ruling that there was a valid ground to dismiss her, erred
It is a principle of statutory construction that where there are two statutes that apply to a in applying Section 94 of the 1992 MRPS. Essentially, she claims that the 1992 MRPS was
particular case, that which was specially intended for the said case must prevail. Petitioner was issued by the Secretary of Education as the revised implementing rules and regulations of Batas
employed by respondent private Catholic institution which undeniably follows the precepts or Pambansa Bilang 232 (BP 232) or the "Education Act of 1982." That there is no provision in BP
norms of conduct set forth by the Catholic Church. Accordingly, the Manual of Regulations for 232, which provides for the grounds for the termination of employment of teaching and non-
Private Schools followed by it must prevail over the Labor Code, a general statute. The Manual teaching personnel of private schools. Thus, Section 94 of the 1992 MRPS, which provides for
constitutes the private schools’ Implementing Rules and Regulations of Batas Pambansa Blg. the causes of terminating an employment, isinvalid as it "widened the scope and coverage" of
232 or the Education Act of 1982. x x x.24 BP 232.
In ruling for legal correctness, the Court has to view the CA decision in the same context that the
The Court does not agree. petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it; the Court has to examine the CA decision
from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of
The Court notes that the argument against the validity of the 1992 MRPS, specifically Section 94 discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the
thereof, is raised by the petitioner for the first time in the instant petition for review. Nowhere in merits of the case was correct.33
the proceedings before the LA, the NLRC or the CA did the petitioner assail the validity of the
provisions of the 1992 MRPS. The phrase "grave abuse of discretion" is well-defined in the Court’s jurisprudence. It exists
where an act of a court or tribunal is performed with a capricious or whimsical exercise
"It is well established that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised in the ofjudgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.34 The determination of the presence or absence of
proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel. Points of law, theories, issues, and grave abuse of discretion does not include an inquiry into the correctness of the evaluation of
arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court ought not to be considered by a evidence, which was the basis of the labor agency in reaching its conclusion.35
reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. To consider the alleged
facts and arguments belatedly raised would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair Nevertheless, while a certiorari proceeding does not strictly include an inquiry as to the
play, justice, and due process."28 correctness of the evaluation of evidence (that was the basis of the labor tribunals in determining
their conclusion), the incorrectness of its evidentiary evaluation should not result in negating the
In any case, even if the Court were to disregard the petitioner’s belated claim of the invalidity of requirement of substantial evidence. Indeed, when there is a showing that the findings or
the 1992 MRPS, the Court still finds the same untenable. conclusions, drawn from the same pieces of evidence, were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard
of the evidence on record, they may be reviewed by the courts. In particular, the CA can grant
The 1992 MRPS, the regulation in force at the time of the instant controversy, was issued by the the petition for certiorariif it finds that the NLRC, in its assailed decision or resolution, made a
Secretary of Education pursuant to BP 232. Section 7029 of BP 232 vests the Secretary of factual finding not supported by substantial evidence. A decision that is not supported by
Education with the authority to issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions of BP substantial evidence is definitely a decision tainted with grave abuse of discretion.36
232. Concomitantly, Section 5730 specifically empowers the Department of Education to
promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the administration, supervision and regulation of The labor tribunals’ respective
the educational system in accordance with the declared policy of BP 232. conclusions that the petitioner’s
pregnancy is a "disgraceful or
The qualifications of teaching and non-teaching personnel of private schools, as well as the immoral conduct" were arrived at
causes for the termination of their employment, are an integral aspect of the educational system arbitrarily.
of private schools. Indubitably, ensuring that the teaching and non-teaching personnel of private
schools are not only qualified, but competent and efficient as well goes hand in hand with the The CA and the labor tribunals affirmed the validity of the petitioner’s dismissal pursuant to
declared objective of BP 232 – establishing and maintaining relevant quality education.31 It is Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS, which provides that:
thus within the authority of the Secretary of Education to issue a rule, which provides for the
dismissal of teaching and non-teaching personnel of private schools based on their Sec. 94. Causes of Terminating Employment – In addition to the just causes enumerated in the
incompetence, inefficiency, or some other disqualification. Labor Code, the employment of school personnel, including faculty, may be terminated for any
of the following causes:
Moreover, Section 69 of BP 232 specifically authorizes the Secretary of Education to "prescribe
and impose such administrative sanction as he may deem reasonable and appropriate in the xxxx
implementing rules and regulations" for the "[g]ross inefficiency of the teaching or non-teaching
personnel" of private schools.32 Accordingly, contrary to the petitioner’s claim, the Court sees e. Disgraceful or immoral conduct;
no reason to invalidate the provisions of the 1992 MRPS, specifically Section 94 thereof. Second
Issue: Validity of the Petitioner’s Dismissal xxxx
The validity of the petitioner’s dismissal hinges on the determination of whether pregnancy out of The labor tribunals concluded that the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock, per se, is
wedlock by an employee of a catholic educational institution is a cause for the termination of her "disgraceful and immoral"considering that she is employed in a Catholic educational institution.
employment. In arriving at such conclusion, the labor tribunals merely assessed the fact of the petitioner’s
pregnancy vis-à-visthe totality of the circumstances surrounding the same.
In resolving the foregoing question,the Court will assess the matter from a strictly neutral and
secular point of view – the relationship between SSCW as employer and the petitioner as an However, the Court finds no substantial evidence to support the aforementioned conclusion
employee, the causes provided for by law in the termination of suchrelationship, and the arrived at by the labor tribunals. The fact of the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock, without
evidence on record. The ground cited for the petitioner’s dismissal, i.e., pre-marital sexual more, is not enough to characterize the petitioner’s conduct as disgraceful or immoral. There
relations and, consequently, pregnancy outof wedlock, will be assessed as to whether the same must be substantial evidence to establish that pre-marital sexual relations and, consequently,
constitutes a valid ground for dismissal pursuant to Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS. pregnancy outof wedlock, are indeed considered disgraceful or immoral.
We cannot overemphasize that having an extra-marital affair is an afront to the sanctity of In this particular case, an "objective" and "rational evaluation" of the facts and circumstances
marriage, which is a basic institution of society. Even our Family Code provides that husband obtaining in this case would lead us to focus our attention x x x on the impact of the act
and wife must live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. This is rooted in the fact committed by the complainant. The act of the complainant x x x eroded the moral principles
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. being taught and project[ed] by the respondent [C]atholic school to their young lady students.48
Our laws, in implementing this constitutional edict on marriage and the family underscore their (Emphasis in the original)
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.47
On the other hand, the NLRC opined that:
The petitioner’s pregnancy out of
wedlock is not a disgraceful or In the instant case, when the complainant-appellant was already conceiving a child even before
immoral conduct since she and the she got married, such is considered a shameful and scandalous behavior, inimical to public
father of her child have no welfare and policy. It eroded the moral doctrines which the respondent Catholic school, an
impediment to marry each other. exclusive school for girls, is teaching the young girls. Thus, when the respondent-appellee
school terminated complainant-appellant’s services, it was a valid exercise of its management
In stark contrast to Santos, the Court does not find any circumstance in this case which would prerogative. Whether or not she was a teacher is of no moment. There is no separate set of
lead the Court to conclude that the petitioner committed a disgraceful or immoral conduct. It rules for non-teaching personnel. Respondents-appellees uphold the teachings of the Catholic
bears stressing that the petitioner and her boyfriend, at the time they conceived a child, had no Church on pre-marital sex and that the complainant-appellant as an employee of the school was
legal impediment to marry. Indeed, even prior to her dismissal, the petitioner married her expected to abide by this basic principle and to live up with the standards of their purely Catholic
boyfriend, the father of her child. As the Court held in Radam, there is no law which penalizes an values. Her subsequent marriage did not take away the fact that she had engaged in pre-marital
unmarried mother by reason of her sexual conduct or proscribes the consensual sexual activity sex which the respondent-appellee school denounces as the same is opposed to the teachings
between two unmarried persons; that neither does such situation contravene any fundamental and doctrines it espouses.49 (Emphasis ours)
state policy enshrined in the Constitution.
Contrary to the labor tribunals’ declarations, the Court finds that SSCW failed to adduce
Admittedly, the petitioner is employed in an educational institution where the teachings and substantial evidence to prove that the petitioner’s indiscretion indeed caused grave scandal to
doctrines of the Catholic Church, including that on pre-marital sexual relations, is strictly upheld SSCW and its students. Other than the SSCW’s bare allegation, the records are bereft of any
and taught to the students. That her indiscretion, which resulted in her pregnancy out of evidence that would convincingly prove that the petitioner’s conduct indeed adversely affected
wedlock, is anathema to the doctrines of the Catholic Church. However, viewed against the SSCW’s integrity in teaching the moral doctrines, which it stands for. The petitioner is only a
prevailing norms of conduct, the petitioner’s conduct cannot be considered as disgraceful or non-teaching personnel; her interaction with SSCW’s students is very limited. Itis thus quite
immoral; such conduct is not denounced by public and secular morality. It may be an unusual impossible that her pregnancy out of wedlock caused such a grave scandal, as claimed by
arrangement, but it certainly is not disgraceful or immoral within the contemplation of the law. SSCW, as to warranther dismissal.
To stress, pre-marital sexual relations between two consenting adults who have no impediment Settled is the rule that in termination cases, the burden of proving that the dismissal of the
to marry each other, and, consequently, conceiving a child out of wedlock, gauged from a purely employees was for a valid and authorized cause rests on the employer. It is incumbent upon the
public and secular view of morality, does not amount to a disgraceful or immoral conduct under employer to show by substantial evidence that the termination of the employment of the
Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS. employees was validly made and failure to discharge that duty would mean that the dismissal is
not justified and therefore illegal.50 "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of
Accordingly, the labor tribunals erred in upholding the validity of the petitioner’s dismissal. The evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequateto
labor tribunals arbitrarily relied solely on the circumstances surrounding the petitioner’s support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable mightconceivably opine
pregnancy and its supposed effect on SSCW and its students without evaluating whether the otherwise."51
petitioner’s conduct is indeed considered disgraceful or immoral in view of the prevailing norms
of conduct. In this regard, the labor tribunals’ respective haphazard evaluation of the evidence Indubitably, bare allegations do not amount to substantial evidence. Considering that the
amounts to grave abuse of discretion, which the Court will rectify. respondents failed to adduce substantial evidence to prove their asserted cause for the
petitioner’s dismissal, the labor tribunals should not have upheld their allegations hook, line and
sinker. The labor tribunals’ respective findings, which were arrived at sans any substantial
evidence, amounts to a grave abuse of discretion, which the CA should have rectified. "Security
of tenure is a right which may not be denied on mere speculation of any unclearand nebulous her continued presence as a teacher in the school "may well bemet with antipathy and
basis."52 antagonism by some sectors in the school community."59
The petitioner’s dismissal is not a In view of the particular circumstances of this case, it would be more prudent to direct SSCW to
valid exercise of SSCW’s pay the petitioner separation pay inlieu of actual reinstatement. The continued employment of
management prerogative. the petitioner with SSCW would only serve to intensify the atmosphere of antipathy and
antagonism between the parties. Consequently, the Court awards separation pay to the
The CA be labored the management prerogative of SSCW to discipline its employees. The CA petitioner equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service, with a fraction of at least six
opined that the petitioner’s dismissal is a valid exercise of management prerogative to impose (6) months considered as one (1) whole year, from the time of her illegal dismissal up to the
penalties on erring employees pursuant to its policies, rules and regulations. finality of this judgment, as an alternative to reinstatement.
The Court does not agree. Also, "employees who are illegally dismissed are entitled to full backwages, inclusive of
allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from the time their actual
The Court has held that "management is free to regulate, according to its own discretion and compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their actual reinstatement but if
judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working methods, reinstatement is no longer possible, the backwages shall be computed from the time of their
time, place and manner of work, processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working illegal termination up to the finality of the decision."60 Accordingly, the petitioner is entitled to an
regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay off of workers and discipline, dismissal award of full backwages from the time she was illegally dismissed up to the finality of this
and recall of workers. The exercise of management prerogative, however, is not absolute as it decision.
must beexercised in good faith and with due regard to the rights of labor." Management cannot
exercise its prerogative in a cruel, repressive, or despotic manner.53 Nevertheless, the petitioner is not entitled to moral and exemplary damages. "A dismissed
employee isentitled to moral damages when the dismissal is attended by bad faith or fraud or
SSCW, as employer, undeniably has the right to discipline its employees and, if need be, constitutes an act oppressive to labor, or is done in a manner contrary to good morals, good
dismiss themif there is a valid cause to do so. However, as already explained, there is no cause customs or public policy. Exemplary damages may be awarded if the dismissal is effected in a
to dismiss the petitioner. Her conduct is not considered by law as disgraceful or immoral. wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner."61
Further, the respondents themselves have admitted that SSCW, at the time of the controversy,
does not have any policy or rule against an employee who engages in pre-marital sexual "Bad faith, under the law, does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence.1âwphi1 It
relations and conceives a child as a result thereof. There being no valid basis in law or even in imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, or a
SSCW’s policy and rules, SSCW’s dismissal of the petitioner is despotic and arbitrary and, thus, breach of a known duty through some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of
not a valid exercise of management prerogative. fraud."62
In sum, the Court finds that the petitioner was illegally dismissed as there was no just cause for "It must be noted that the burden of proving bad faith rests on the one alleging it"63 since basic
the termination of her employment. SSCW failed to adduce substantial evidence to establish that is the principle that good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove
the petitioner’s conduct, i.e., engaging in pre-marital sexual relations and conceiving a child out the same.64 "Allegations of bad faith and fraud must be proved by clear and convincing
of wedlock, assessed in light of the prevailing norms of conduct, is considered disgraceful or evidence."65
immoral. The labor tribunals gravely abused their discretion in upholding the validity of the
petitioner’s dismissal as the charge against the petitioner lay not on substantial evidence, but on The records of this case are bereft of any clear and convincing evidence showing that the
the bare allegations of SSCW. In turn, the CA committed reversible error in upholding the validity respondents acted in bad faith or in a wanton or fraudulent manner in dismissing the petitioner.
of the petitioner’s dismissal, failing torecognize that the labor tribunals gravely abused their That the petitioner was illegally dismissed is insufficient to prove bad faith. A dismissal may be
discretion in ruling for the respondents. contrary to law but by itself alone, it does not establish bad faith to entitle the dismissed
employee to moral damages. The award of moral and exemplary damages cannot be justified
The petitioner is entitled to solely upon the premise that the employer dismissed his employee without cause.66
separation pay, in lieu of actual
reinstatement, full backwages and However, the petitioner is entitled to attorney’s fees in the amount of 10% of the total monetary
attorney’s fees, but not to moral and award pursuant to Article 11167 of the Labor Code. "It is settled that where an employee was
exemplary damages. forced to litigate and, thus, incur expenses to protect his rights and interest, the award of
attorney’s fees is legally and morally justifiable."68
Having established that the petitioner was illegally dismissed, the Court now determines the
reliefs thatshe is entitled to and their extent. Under the law and prevailing jurisprudence, "an Finally, legal interest shall be imposed on the monetary awards herein granted at the rate of six
illegally dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement as a matter of right."54 Aside from the percent (6%) per annumfrom the finality of this judgment until fully paid.69
instances provided under Articles 28355 and 28456 of the Labor Code, separation pay is,
however, granted when reinstatement is no longer feasible because of strained relations WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is GRANTED. The
between the employer and the employee. In cases of illegal dismissal, the accepted doctrine is Decision dated September 24, 2008 and Resolution dated March 2, 2009 of the Court of
that separation pay is available in lieu of reinstatement when the latter recourse is no longer Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100188 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
practical or in the best interest of the parties.57
The respondent, St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove, is hereby declared guilty of illegal
In Divine Word High School v. NLRC,58 the Court ordered the employer Catholic school to pay dismissal and is hereby ORDERED to pay the petitioner, Cheryll Santos Leus, the following: (a)
the illegally dismissed high school teacher separation pay in lieu of actual reinstatement since separation pay in lieu of actual reinstatement equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of
service, with a fraction of at least six (6) months considered as one (1) whole year from the time
of her dismissal up to the finality of this Decision; (b) full backwages from the time of her illegal
dismissal up to the finality of this Decision; and (c) attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent CASE DIGEST:
(10%) of the total monetary award. The monetary awards herein granted shall earn legal interest
at the rate of six percent (6%) per annumfrom the date of the finality of this Decision untilfully Facts:
paid. The case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for the computation of petitioner’s monetary
awards. petitioner) was hired by St. Scholastica's College Westgrove (SSCW), a Catholic educational
institution, as a non-teaching personnel, engaged in pre-marital sexual relations, got pregnant
SO ORDERED. out of wedlock... married the father of her child,... and was dismissed by SSCW, in that order.
petitioner and her boyfriend conceived a child out of wedlock. When SSCW learned of the
petitioner's pregnancy, Sr. Edna Quiambao... advised her to file a resignation letter effective
June 1, 2003. In response, the petitioner... informed Sr. Quiambao that she would not resign
from her employment just because she got pregnant... without the benefit of marriage.[
. Quiambao formally directed the petitioner to explain in writing why she should not be dismissed
for engaging in pre-marital sexual relations and getting pregnant as a result thereof, which
amounts to serious misconduct and conduct unbecoming of an employee... of a Catholic school.
In a letter[11] dated June 6, 2003, SSCW, through counsel, maintained that pre-marital sexual
relations, even if between two consenting adults without legal impediment to marry, is
considered a disgraceful and immoral conduct or a serious misconduct, which... are grounds for
the termination of employmen... petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
Issues:
The validity of the petitioner's dismissal hinges on the determination of whether pregnancy out of
wedlock by an employee of a catholic educational institution is a cause for the termination of her
employment.
The Ruling:
The fact of the petitioner's pregnancy out of wedlock, without more, is not enough to
characterize the petitioner's conduct as disgraceful or immoral.
There must be substantial evidence to establish that pre-marital sexual relations and,
consequently,... pregnancy out of wedlock, are indeed considered disgraceful or immoral
The totality of the circumstances... surrounding the conduct alleged to be... disgraceful or
immoral must be assessed... against the prevailing norms of conduct.
consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the conduct; and second, an
assessment of the said circumstances vis-à-vis the... prevailing norms of conduct, i.e., what the
society generally considers moral and respectable.
when the law refers to morality, it necessarily pertains to public and secular morality and not
religious morality. Thus, the proscription against "disgraceful or immoral conduct" under Section
94(e) of the 1992 MRPS, which is made as a cause for dismissal, must necessarily... refer to
public and secular morality.
FULL CASE: REPUBLIC V ALBIOS him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that
Fringer returned to the United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn,
she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The
G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013
RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the
establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
its inception.
vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying
DECISION
the motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared void because the
parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally
MENDOZA, J.:
bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the
September 29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring
the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from
Ruling of the CA
the beginning.
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found
The facts
that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not
understand the nature and consequence of getting married and that their case was similar to a
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia
marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage
I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a
contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their
Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3
purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for
Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her
marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and
Hence, this petition.
never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a
married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their
Assignment of Error
marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios
MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP
filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the
WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a
collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for
not make a determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they
knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the
being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter
hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits
being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
ensued.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest.
Ruling of the RTC
The parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were
otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her
marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of
Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review
consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent as
on certiorari.
she never acquired any right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the
wife of respondent.
Ruling of the Court
xxxx
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the
sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on
SO ORDERED.6
the ground of lack of consent?
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving
The Court resolves in the negative.
credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage
to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud
for the purposes of immigration. The Court now turns to the case at hand.
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered
of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States, into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce
marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific and should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for
benefits, have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the
marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child.12 Another, which is the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally
subject of the present case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned bound by it and used it only as a means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship.
with the intention of the couple at the time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held
who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status.14 that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in
the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,15 established the that the parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in
principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never
"marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.
they were married. "This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage
Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ supposed lack of consent.
the marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the
States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab
determining the intention of evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this initio.
standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the
legal validity or existence of a marriage. Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not
limited purpose of immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the
purpose marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence.24 Consent must also be
conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their
country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26
months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary
into permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real
wit: consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent
was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That
every contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring
the contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
true that a marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was
a marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the outside world and with the a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it
understanding that they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
have never really agreed to be married at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is
ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to
deceive others.18 a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered
into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,19 which declared conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not
as valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence
that a valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for a of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or
limited purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent
fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one. because the parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1âwphi1 Albios and
problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to
first necessary.22 At present, United States courts have generally denied annulments involving" allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married
limited purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and would allow them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly
have upheld such marriages as valid.23 support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the
actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent SO ORDERED.
was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish
CASE DIGEST:
a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real
FACTS:
intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered
into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and
Fringer and Liberty Albios got married on October 22, 2004, before the sala of Judge Calo in
incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus,
Mandaluyong City. 2 years after their marriage (December 6, 2006), Albios filed with the RTC a
only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that
petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer. According to her, the marriage was
declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law
a marriage in jest because she only wed the American to acquire US citizenship and even
declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential
arranged to pay him $2,000 in exchange for his consent. Adding that immediately after their
and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the
marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had
grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.28
any intention of entering into a married state and complying with their marital obligations. The
court even sent summons to the husband but he failed to file an answer.
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot
dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle
Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of Albios declaring that the marriage was void ab initio for
would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional
lack of consent because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had
questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in
no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American
almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.. However, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
one another or not, and so on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or
elevated the case to the SC. According to the OSG, the case do not fall within the concept of a
otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they
marriage in jest as the parties intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage.
comply with all the legal requisites,31 are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a
That the parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were
marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded
otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.
by law, may validly support a marriage.
ISSUE:
Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest
purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s marriage may be
Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration
considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and
of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
continues to be valid and subsisting.
RULING:
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of
the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may
NO. Both Fringer and Albios consented to the marriage. In fact, there was real consent because
constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude;
it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent.
(2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually
transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No
Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the
other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to
marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not
do so.
qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of
fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no
That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring
injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.
American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage
marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was
with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court
a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it
cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration
was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These
unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2)
schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience;
made in the presence of a solemnizing officer.
she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.
A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the
the marriage.
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.32 It must, therefore, be
safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the
Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the
impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and
vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation,
just as easily nullified when no longer needed.
and undue influence. None of these are present in the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of
Therefore, their marriage remains valid.
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED
for utter lack of merit.
FULL CASE: NAVARRO V DOMAGTOY was solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A.
Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C.
Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar. 3 The affidavit was not issued by the latter
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996
judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before him. In their affidavit,
the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D.
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant,
Peñaranda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five
children, Ida Peñaranda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not
vs.
returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that
she is already dead.
JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of
Ida Peñaranda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage
ceremony. We do not agree.
ROMERO, J.:p
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte,
Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by
A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends,
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A.
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence
Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his
of only two years shall be sufficient.
first wife.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos,
absent spouse. (Emphasis added.)
Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the
municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta.
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear
Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa,
and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
Surigao del Norte.
already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in
order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely
In his letter-comment to the office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that the
incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven
office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the
that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively
mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both as judge and as a private person.
dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
The same person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed
for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of
Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still pending.
his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida
Peñaranda. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having
judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of
solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and
the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family
Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial
Code, " The following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous . . .
Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen
marriages not falling under Article 41."
each other for almost seven years. 1 With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in
solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7,
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's
paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any
jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof
applies to the case in question.
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
were considered sufficient for a resolution of the case. 2
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not been
sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and respondent judge's
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers the judge or in open court,
answer thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed by themselves to prove the latter's
in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as
malfeasance.
the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of
death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga
states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony
request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying the law
house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect. and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his having IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby
solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in
remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at
the point of death or in the remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to CASE DIGEST:
the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario. 4
Facts:
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the
solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of
On September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the marriage between Gaspar A.
the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any
Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory
first wife. It is also alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador
provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the
Sumaylo and Gemma D. del Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. in
authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance
relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having
herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife ,
and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied in the affidavit issued by the Municipal trial
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is
Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his wife have not seen each
authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An
other for almost seven years. With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in
appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to
solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7,
solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied
paragraph I of the Family code which states that: “Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any
with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction”; and that Article 8 thereof
within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's
applies to the case in question.
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which
while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
Issue:
administrative liability. 5
Whether or not the acts of Judge Domagtoy exhibits gross misconduct, inefficiency in office and
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
ignorance of the law.
Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of
Held:
his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the
basic principles of civil law.
In the first allegation, Gaspar Tagdan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration
of his first wife’s presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal
Penaranda. Whether wittingly, or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent
principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated,
judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of
prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of
the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage.
comprehension of the law.
In as much as respondent judge’s jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the
Burgos, he was also not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in Dapa, Surigao del
law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and
Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced
competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with
authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles
basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant case. 6 It is not too much to expect them to
of civil law
know and apply the law intelligently. 7 Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky
foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While
Because of the respondent’s failure to apply the legal principles applicable in these cases, the
magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the
Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law because of this he is
respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has
suspended for a period of six months.
greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void,
there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-month
suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union
and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court
FULL CASE: ARANES V OCCIANO On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with
the Office of the Court Administrator. She attested that respondent judge initially refused to
solemnize her marriage due to the want of a duly issued marriage license and that it was
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390 April 11, 2002
because of her prodding and reassurances that he eventually solemnized the same. She
(Formerly IPI No. 01-1049-MTJ)
confessed that she filed this administrative case out of rage. However, after reading the
Comment filed by respondent judge, she realized her own shortcomings and is now bothered by
MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES, petitioner,
her conscience.
vs.
JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for
Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application that the marriage
PUNO, J.:
license shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Arañes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it has no
via a sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the
record of such marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000,
the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another Certification dated 7 May
respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the
2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract of the parties since it has no
requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial
record of their marriage.
jurisdiction.
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband
communicate with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the
passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner's right to inherit the "vast
issuance of her marriage license. Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua,
properties" left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the
Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal, informed
pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.1âwphi1.nêt
respondent judge that their office cannot issue the marriage license due to the failure of Orobia
to submit the Death Certificate of his previous spouse.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and
unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15 November
and sufferings.
2000, found the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued
marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00 was
On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting Court
recommended to be imposed on respondent judge.
Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of the Court
Administrator required respondent judge to comment.
We agree.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the regional trial
Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000.
court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial
Having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were complete, he agreed to
jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.1âwphi1.nêt
solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy,1 respondent judge held
could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from his
office and had jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del
residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in
Norte. However, he solemnized a wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao
Nabua, to which request he acceded.
del Norte which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
Burgos. We held that:
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined the
documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess
"A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is
the requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting
authorized to do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate
to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the
court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize
delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human
marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with.
compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical
However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only
condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the
within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's
necessity for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which
render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give
while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
the license to him in the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply, respondent
administrative liability."2 (Emphasis supplied.)
judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the
marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that his act of
Camarines Sur.
solemnizing a marriage outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We further
held that:
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is
valid despite the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and embarrassment
"The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the
suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.
law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and
competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with
basic legal principles like the ones involved in the instant case. x x x While magistrates may at
times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge
exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the
status of married persons."3
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of
Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua,
Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act
may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of
human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite
marriage license. In People vs. Lara,4 we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of
the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render
valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the
marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage.
Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of
petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.1âwphi1.nêt
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner.
This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does
not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action.
Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the discipline of court
personnel, would be undermined.5 Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely
private or personal matters. They can not be made to depend upon the will of every complainant
who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the
unilateral act of a complainant in a matter which involves the Court's constitutional power to
discipline judges. Otherwise, that power may be put to naught, undermine the trust character of
a public office and impair the integrity and dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority.6
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the
marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married.
What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years
already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. According to him,
had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry
again; otherwise, Manzano could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be
dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.
The Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law.
Respondent Judge alleges that he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance
with Article 34 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Ruling:
No. In Article 34 of the Family Code provides “No license shall be necessary for the marriage of
a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
without any legal impediment to marry each other. Respondent Judge cannot take refuge on the
Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as
husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with
another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage.
Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated
to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve
as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the
impediment of a prior existing marriage.
FULL CASE: REPUBLIC V DAYOT (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose.
Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the
Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and
G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008
Coordinating Board.6 The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and
immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
without emolument.7
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision8 dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by both parties,
this Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration.
G.R. No. 179474
Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].9
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated
vs.
between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Jose’s version of the
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
story as implausible, and rationalized that:
DECISION
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him or her sign
a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already detected that something was amiss, unusual,
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
as they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to
sign the pieces of paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect suggestion that
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions
could have put him on guard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her
for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and
brother would kill them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three
Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision1 of the
months to "discover" that the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage
Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the
contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be "taken in for
marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
a ride" by [Felisa.]
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay
[Jose’s] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he
City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.2 In lieu of a marriage
acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisa’s] name in the duly notarized
license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit,3 also dated 24 November 1986, attesting
statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the
that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived
marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D.,
together as husband and wife for at least five years.
wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of emergency. This Court does
not believe that the only reason why her name was written in his company I.D. was because he
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint4 for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
was residing there then. This is just but a lame excuse because if he really considers her not his
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage
lawfully wedded wife, he would have written instead the name of his sister.
with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he
did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for
When [Jose’s] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that she signed her
at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.
name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25,
November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the signature appearing over the name of Jose
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same.
Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract
According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live
(page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable
as a boarder in Felisa’s house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa
Court if indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered
requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a
yes. The testimony of his sister all the more belied his claim that his consent was procured
package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-
through fraud.10
arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They
were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa.
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose’s action had prescribed. It cited Article
He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get
8711 of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be
both of them killed by her brother who had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he
commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:
signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who immediately left. It was in February
1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by [Felisa] through
piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisa’s house. When he perused the same,
fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of
he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa,
marriage at the earliest possible opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham and
the latter feigned ignorance.
false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at the earliest
instance. x x x.12
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and defended the validity of their
marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a
legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with
Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The
him on account of their age difference.5 In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her
dispositive portion of the appellate court’s Decision reads:
marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual
In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without a marriage
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.13 license on the basis of their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that being
unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry each
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that the
circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article 8614 of the "x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from
Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of
by law. The Court of Appeals struck down Jose’s appeal in the following manner: the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning no
third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity – that is unbroken.
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to
consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the
(4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships
that the consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage
said party within four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly
time the force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
February, 1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for annulment is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded
of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element
his marriage to Felisa.15 as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from
securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose’s assertion that his marriage to Felisa was exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two
void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of
Article 7616 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the parties executing an any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
affidavit of marriage between man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license,
that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 save marriages of exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the
did not affect the validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the marriage between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a
statements contained therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good- marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because of the absence of a marriage license.21
faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further
noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court
solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the rendered a Resolution22 dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisa’s motion.
contracting parties and found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of
Appeals dismissed Jose’s argument that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 5617 of the filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of
Civil Code did not require that either one of the contracting parties to the marriage must belong Appeals’ Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of merit,
to the solemnizing officer’s church or religious sect. The prescription was established only in and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a
Article 718 of the Family Code which does not govern the parties’ marriage. separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate
court’s Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for
thereof.1avvphi1 His central opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the resolution.23
exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in
the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of its
have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage. Petition, to wit:
Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa
was false. I
The Court of Appeals granted Jose’s Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS
Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
reads:
II
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another
one entered declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio. RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD NOT
BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City.19
III
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Niñal v.
Bayadog,20 and reasoned that: RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR
LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.24
This is in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law,31 whereby the absence of a marriage license
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Niñal.25 She did not make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license
differentiates the case at bar from Niñal by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after
existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose. the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.32
Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal
case for bigamy and an administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid liability. Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III,
Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at
liability. the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular
marriages,33 (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5)
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.34
ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic
of the Philippines and Felisa. The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption
that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this Court’s ruling in the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.26 To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing
executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived together facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest
as husband and wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to
Republic’s position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing impediment to the marriage.
officer was not required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The
Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a
was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from
incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for legalizing their status.36
at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties’ marriage contract states that
their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature of It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage
the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of marriage. To license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that "they have attained the age of
further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the following documents: (1) Jose’s notarized maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisa’s name as his years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other."37 One of the central
wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation,
District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively
in said barangay; and (3) Jose’s company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisa’s name renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
as his wife.
We answer in the affirmative.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false
affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order. Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the
indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986, construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly38 but reasonably construed.39
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in
53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract: favor of the general provisions rather than the exception.40 Where a general rule is established
by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with: implication.41 For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man
and the woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties; lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
(2) Their consent, freely given; A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read
the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry
each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.) years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is
precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the
Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact
issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one
resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes
under Article 75.28 Article 80(3)29 of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed that the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts42 in an affidavit before any person
without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the
consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract.30
marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage. Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a
license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least
they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an
and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage
of their marriage.43 The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa’s testimony that Jose was license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period
introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to
the EDSA Revolution.44 The appellate court also cited Felisa’s own testimony that it was only in the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a
June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house.45 quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties
under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth
or falsehood of the alleged facts.46 Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity,
this Court’s review.47 It is already well-settled that: Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit
from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A for application where there is a law.54 There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation,
recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are
the administrative body, make contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage is without prejudice to their
every instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The criminal liability.55
factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are
supported by the record or based on substantial evidence.48 The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from
assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose’s subsequent marriage to
exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question. Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the
declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties’
affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.56 Jose and Felisa’s
complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except
marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and
license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they may be raised any time.
should have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from
the requirement of a marriage license. Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law
cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of
Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a
no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is marriage.57 It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by
with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years - and continuity
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.49 Restated more explicitly, that is unbroken.58
persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.50 The present case does not WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals,
involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to
question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if
hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of any. No costs.
Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.
SO ORDERED.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code51 that every intendment of law or fact leans
towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties’ marriage, and extricate them from
the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the
requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under
exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear
violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud
against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent
by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage.52 The protection of marriage as a
sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of
an invalid one as well.53 To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to
allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of
marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our
laws.
FULL CASE: SEVILLA V. CARDENAS defendant in the United States in 1981 and later secured a judicial separation of their conjugal
partnership in 1983.
Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the plaintiff, himself manifested that when his service was
G.R. No. 167684 July 31, 2006
engaged by plaintiff, and after the latter narrated to him the circumstances of his marriage, he
made inquiries with the Office of Civil Registry of San Juan where the supposed marriage
JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner,
license was obtained and with the Church of the Most Holy Redeemer Parish where the religious
vs.
wedding ceremony was celebrated. His request letters dated March 3, 1994 (Exh. "J"), March 7,
CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.
1994 (Exh. "L"), March 9, 1994 (Exh. "M") and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "K") were all sent to and
received by the Civil Registrar of San Juan, who in reply thereto, issued Certifications dated
DECISION
March 4, 1994 (Exh. "I"), and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") and September 20, 1994 (Exh. "C"),
that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that office." Upon his inquiry, the Holy
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Redeemer Parish Church issued him a certified copy of the marriage contract of plaintiff and
defendant (Exh. "F") and a Certificate of Marriage dated April 11, 1994 (Exh. "G"), wherein it
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
noted that it was a "purely religious ceremony, having been civilly married on May 19, 1969 at
in CA-G.R. CV No. 74416 dated 20 December 2004 which set aside the Decision2 of the
the City Hall, Manila, under Marriage License No. 2770792 issued at San Juan, Rizal on May 19,
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, in Civil Case No. 94-1285 dated 25 January 2002.
1969."
In a Complaint3 dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that
Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of San Juan, identified the
on 19 May 1969, through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by
Certificates dated March 4, 1994, March 11, 1994 and September 20, 1994 issued by Rafael
Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed
Aliscad, Jr., the Local Civil Registrar, and testified that their office failed to locate the book
forces of the Philippines, he and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were
wherein marriage license no. 2770792 may have been registered (TSN, 8-6-96, p. 5).
introduced to a certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the
said date, the father of Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before
Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she and plaintiff had a steady romantic relationship
the said Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for
after they met and were introduced to each other in October 1968. A model, she was compelled
his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage license from any
by her family to join the Mutya ng Pilipinas beauty pageant when plaintiff who was afraid to lose
Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.
her, asked her to run away with him to Baguio. Because she loved plaintiff, she turned back on
her family and decided to follow plaintiff in Baguio. When they came back to Manila, she and
For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that she and Jaime were
plaintiff proceeded to the latter's home in Brixton Hills where plaintiff's mother, Mrs. Sevilla, told
married civilly on 19 May 1969,4 and in a church ceremony thereafter on 31 May 19695 at the
her not to worry. Her parents were hostile when they learned of the elopement, but Mrs. Sevilla
Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both marriages were registered with the local civil
convinced them that she will take care of everything, and promised to support plaintiff and
registry of Manila and the National Statistics Office. He is estopped from invoking the lack of
defendant. As plaintiff was still fearful he may lose her, he asked her to marry him in civil rites,
marriage license after having been married to her for 25 years.
without the knowledge of her family, more so her father (TSN, 5-28-98, p. 4) on May 19, 1969,
before a minister and where she was made to sign documents. After the civil wedding, they had
The trial court made the following findings:
lunch and later each went home separately. On May 31, 1969, they had the church wedding,
which the Sevilla family alone prepared and arranged, since defendant's mother just came from
In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime] testified that on May 19, 1969, he and defendant
hospital. Her family did not participate in the wedding preparations. Defendant further stated that
[Carmelita] appeared before a certain Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales, a Minister of the Gospel, at the
there was no sexual consummation during their honeymoon and that it was after two months
city hall in Manila where they executed a Marriage Contract (Exh. "A") in civil rites. A certain
when they finally had sex. She learned from Dr. Escudero, plaintiff's physician and one of their
Godofredo Occena who, plaintiff alleged, was an aide of defendant's father accompanied them,
wedding sponsors that plaintiff was undergoing psychiatric therapy since age 12 (TSN, 11-2-98,
and who, together with another person, stood as witness to the civil wedding. That although
p. 15) for some traumatic problem compounded by his drug habit. She found out plaintiff has
marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly issued in San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969 was
unusual sexual behavior by his obsession over her knees of which he would take endless
indicated in the marriage contract, the same was fictitious for he never applied for any marriage
pictures of. Moreover, plaintiff preferred to have sex with her in between the knees which she
license, (Ibid., p. 11). Upon verifications made by him through his lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Abola,
called "intrafemural sex," while real sex between them was far and between like 8 months,
with the Civil Registry of San Juan, a Certification dated March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") was issued
hence, abnormal. During their marriage, plaintiff exhibited weird sexual behavior which
by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that "no marriage license no.
defendant attributed to plaintiff's drug addiction (TSN, 11-5-98, pp. 5-8). A compulsive liar,
2770792 was ever issued by said office." On May 31, 1969, he and defendant were again wed,
plaintiff has a bad temper who breaks things when he had tantrums. Plaintiff took drugs like
this time in church rites, before Monsignor Juan Velasco at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish
amphetamines, benzedrine and the like, "speed" drugs that kept him from sleep and then would
Church in Brixton Hills, Quezon City, where they executed another marriage contract (Exh. "F")
take barbiturates or downers, like "mogadon." Defendant tried very hard to keep plaintiff away
with the same marriage license no. 2770792 used and indicated. Preparations and expenses for
from drugs but failed as it has become a habit to him. They had no fixed home since they often
the church wedding and reception were jointly shared by his and defendant's parents. After the
moved and partly lived in Spain for about four and a half years, and during all those times, her
church wedding, he and defendant resided in his house at Brixton Hills until their first son, Jose
mother-in-law would send some financial support on and off, while defendant worked as an
Gabriel, was born in March 1970. As his parents continued to support him financially, he and
English teacher. Plaintiff, who was supposed to be studying, did nothing. Their marriage became
defendant lived in Spain for some time, for his medical studies. Eventually, their marital
unbearable, as plaintiff physically and verbally abused her, and this led to a break up in their
relationship turned bad because it became difficult for him to be married he being a medical
marriage. Later, she learned that plaintiff married one Angela Garcia in 1991 in the United
student at that time. They started living apart in 1976, but they underwent family counseling
States.
before they eventually separated in 1978. It was during this time when defendant's second son
was born whose paternity plaintiff questioned. Plaintiff obtained a divorce decree against
Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified that he was not aware of the civil wedding of his therefore just presume that the marriage license specified in the parties' marriage contract was
daughter with the plaintiff; that his daughter and grandson came to stay with him after they not issued for in the end the failure of the office of the local civil registrar of San Juan to produce
returned home from Spain and have lived with him and his wife ever since. His grandsons a copy of the marriage license was attributable not to the fact that no such marriage license was
practically grew up under his care and guidance, and he has supported his daughter's expenses issued but rather, because it "failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is
for medicines and hospital confinements (Exhs. "9" and "10"). registered." Simply put, if the pertinent book were available for scrutiny, there is a strong
possibility that it would have contained an entry on marriage license no. 2720792.
Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister, testified and corroborated that it was plaintiff's
family that attended to all the preparations and arrangements for the church wedding of her xxxx
sister with plaintiff, and that she didn't know that the couple wed in civil rites some time prior to
the church wedding. She also stated that she and her parents were still civil with the plaintiff Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the parties' marriage on the basis of a mere
inspite of the marital differences between plaintiff and defendant. perception of plaintiff that his union with defendant is defective with respect to an essential
requisite of a marriage contract, a perception that ultimately was not substantiated with facts on
As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff testified that because of irreconcilable differences record.8
with defendant and in order for them to live their own lives, they agreed to divorce each other;
that when he applied for and obtained a divorce decree in the United States on June 14, 1983 Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which the Court of Appeals
(Exh. "13"), it was with the knowledge and consent of defendant who in fact authorized a certain denied in a Resolution dated 6 April 2005.
Atty. Quisumbing to represent her (TSN, 12-7-2000, p. 21). During his adverse testimony,
plaintiff identified a recent certification dated July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") issued by the Local Civil This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.
Registrar of San Juan, that the marriage license no. 2770792, the same marriage license
appearing in the marriage contract (Exh. "A"), is inexistent, thus appears to be fictitious.6 He raises the following issues for Resolution.
In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the nullity of the marriage of the parties, the trial 1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to the parties
court made the following justifications: herein prior to the celebration of the marriages in question;
Thus, being one of the essential requisites for the validity of the marriage, the lack or absence of 2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied and relied on the presumption of
a license renders the marriage void ab initio. It was shown under the various certifications (Exhs. regularity of officials acts, particularly the issuance of a marriage license, arising solely from the
"I", "E", and "C") earlier issued by the office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of San contents of the marriage contracts in question which show on their face that a marriage license
Juan, and the more recent one issued on July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") that no marriage license no. was purportedly issued by the Local Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, and
2770792 was ever issued by that office, hence, the marriage license no. 2770792 appearing on
the marriage contracts executed on May 19, 1969 (Exh. "A") and on May 31, 1969 (Exh. "F") 3. Whether or not respondent could validly invoke/rely upon the presumption of validity of a
was fictitious. Such a certification enjoys probative value under the rules on evidence, marriage arising from the admitted "fact of marriage."9
particularly Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, x x x.
At the core of this controversy is the determination of whether or not the certifications from the
xxxx Local Civil Registrar of San Juan stating that no Marriage License No. 2770792 as appearing in
the marriage contract of the parties was issued, are sufficient to declare their marriage as null
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil marriage between Jaime O. Sevilla and and void ab initio.
Carmelita N. Cardenas solemnized by Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales at the Manila City Hall on May 19,
1969 as well as their contract of marriage solemnized under religious rites by Rev. Juan B. We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.
Velasco at the Holy Redeemer Parish on May 31, 1969, NULL and VOID for lack of the requisite
marriage license. Let the marriage contract of the parties under Registry No. 601 (e-69) of the Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law in force at the time of the marriage of
registry book of the Local Civil Registry of Manila be cancelled. the parties are Articles 53,10 5811 and 80.12
Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an essential requisite for the validity of
accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code. Likewise, let a copy hereof be forwarded the marriage. The marriage between Carmelita and Jaime is of no exception.
Office of the Solicitor General for its record and information.7
At first glance, this case can very well be easily dismissed as one involving a marriage that is
Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 20 December 2004, the null and void on the ground of absence of a marriage license based on the certifications issued
Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court and held: by the Local Civil Registar of San Juan. As ruled by this Court in the case of Cariño v. Cariño13:
In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994), the Supreme Court explained [A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of
that: "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a certification is
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of
by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys
rebutted, it becomes conclusive." probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all date relative to
the issuance of a marriage license.
In this case, We note that a certain Perlita Mercader of the local civil registry of San Juan
testified that they "failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered," Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has
for the reason that "the employee handling is already retired." With said testimony We cannot been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage
is valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was declared in This is to certify that no marriage license Number 2770792 were ever issued by this Office with
default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the regards to Marriage License Number 2880792, we exert all effort but we cannot find the said
absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But number.
petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that
will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand. Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the San Juan, Metro Manila
deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one
of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio. September 20, 1994
The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the certifications issued by the Local Civil (SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Registrar should be read in line with the decision in the earlier case of Republic v. Court of Local Civil Registrar
Appeals,14 where it was held that:
The third Certification,18 issued on 25 July 2000, states:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a
particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public
officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required This is to certify that according to the records of this office, no Marriage License Application was
to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the filed and no Marriage License No. 2770792 allegedly dated May 19, 1969 was issued by this
marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. (Emphasis supplied.) Office to MR. JAIME O. SEVILLA and MS. CARMELITA CARDENAS-SEVILLA.
Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the This is to further certify that the said application and license do not exist in our Local Civil
document does not exist in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the register Registry Index and, therefore, appear to be fictitious.
despite diligent search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as
stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court: This certification is being issued upon the request of the interested party for whatever legal intent
it may serve.
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – a written statement signed by an officer having the custody of
an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified San Juan, Metro Manila
tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above
provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry. July 25, 2000
We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the certifications by the Local Civil Registrar of San (SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Juan in connection with Marriage License No. 2770792 complied with the foregoing Local Civil Registrar
requirements and deserved to be accorded probative value.
Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that "hope and understand our loaded
The first Certification15 issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, was dated work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem." It could be easily implied from
11 March 1994. It reads: the said statement that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to
locate and determine the existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due to its "loaded work."
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: Likewise, both certifications failed to state with absolute certainty whether or not such license
was issued.
No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by this Office. With regards (sic)
to Marriage License Number 2880792,16 we exert all effort but we cannot find the said number. This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate the
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem. logbook due to the fact that the person in charge of the said logbook had already retired.
Further, the testimony of the said person was not presented in evidence. It does not appear on
San Juan, Metro Manila record that the former custodian of the logbook was deceased or missing, or that his testimony
could not be secured. This belies the claim that all efforts to locate the logbook or prove the
March 11, 1994 material contents therein, had been exerted.
May I see that book and the portion marked by the witness. Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social
institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social
xxxx institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on
good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric;
COURT hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family members alone.29
Why don't you ask her direct question whether marriage license 2880792 is the number issued "The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x marriage. Marriage in this
by their office while with respect to license no. 2770792 the office of the Local Civil Registrar of jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of
San Juan is very definite about it it was never issued. Then ask him how about no. 2880792 if which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
the same was ever issued by their office. Did you ask this 2887092, but you could not find the legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
record? But for the moment you cannot locate the books? Which is which now, was this issued absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The
or not? reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus
hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of
A The employee handling it is already retired, sir.19 law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.'
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage."30
exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the
presumption of regularity of performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a
the certifications, is effectively rebutted. man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage.31
According to Section 3(m),20 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the presumption that official duty
has been regularly performed is among the disputable presumptions. By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are not trifling with his emotion or deepest
sentiments. As we have said in Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,32 regrettably, there are
In one case, it was held: situations like this one, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every
individual problem.
A disputable presumption has been defined as a species of evidence that may be accepted and
acted on where there is no other evidence to uphold the contention for which it stands, or one WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court
which may be overcome by other evidence. One such disputable/rebuttable presumption is that of Appeals dated 20 December 2004 and the Resolution dated 6 April 2005 are AFFIRMED.
an official act or duty has been regularly performed. x x x.21 Costs against the petitioner.
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of SO ORDERED.
irregularity or failure to perform a duty.22
The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is disputable and can be overcome
by other evidence as in the case at bar where the presumption has been effectively defeated by
the tenor of the first and second certifications.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage
License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook
just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook,
FULL CASE: MARTINEZ V TAN one occasion the plaintiff had gone to church unaccompanied. The testimony of this witness
loses its force when the testimony of Pacita Ballori is considered. She says that at the request of
the defendant on the day named, about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, she went to the store of a
G.R. No. L-4904 February 5, 1909 Chinese named Veles; that there she met the plaintiff and her mother; that she asked the mother
of the plaintiff to allow the plaintiff to accompany her, the witness, to her own house for the
ROSALIA MARTINEZ, plaintiff-appellant, purpose of examining some dress patterns; that the mother gave her consent and the two rights
vs. left the store, but instead of going to the house of the witness they went directly to the office of
ANGEL TAN, defendant-appellee. the justice of the peace where the ceremony took place; that after the ceremony had taken
place, one came advising them that the mother was approaching, and that they thereupon
Domingo Franco, for appellant. hurriedly left the office of the justice and went to the house of Pacita Ballori, where the mother
Doroteo Karagdag, for appellee. later found them.
WILLARD, J.: The other testimony of the plaintiff relating to certain statements made by the justice of the
peace, who died after the ceremony was performed and before the trial, and certain statements
The only question in this case is whether or not the plaintiff and the defendant were married on made by Pacita Ballori, is not sufficient to overcome the positive testimony of the witnesses for
the 25th day of September, 1907, before the justice of the peace, Jose Ballori, in the town of the defendant.
Palompon in the Province of Leyte.
The other testimony of Pacita Ballori is severely criticized by counsel for the appellant in his
There was received in evidence at the trial what is called an expediente de matrimonio civil. It is brief. It appears that during her first examination she was seized with an hysterical attack and
written in Spanish and consists, first, of a petition directed to the justice of the peace, dated on practically collapsed at the trial. Her examination was adjourned to a future day and was
the 25th of September, 1907, signed by the plaintiff and the defendant, in which they state that completed in her house where she was sick in bed. It is claimed by counsel that her collapse
they have mutually agreed to enter into a contract of marriage before the justice of the peace, was due to the fact that she recognized that she testified falsely in stating the office of the justice
and ask that the justice solemnize the marriage. Following this is a document dated on the same of the peace was at the time in the municipal building, when, in fact, it was in a private house.
day, signed by the justice of the peace, by the plaintiff, by the defendant, and by Zacarias We do not think that the record justifies the claim of the appellant. The statement as to the
Esmero and Pacita Ballori. It states the presentation of the petition above mentioned; that the location of the office of the justice of the peace was afterwards corrected by the witness and we
persons who signed it where actually present in the office of the justice on the same day named; are satisfied that she told the facts substantially as they occurred.
that they ratified under oath the contents of the petition, and that they insisted in what they had
there asked for. It also stated that being required to produce witnesses of the marriage, the There is, moreover, in the case written evidence which satisfies us that the plaintiff was not
presented Zacarias Esmero as a witness for the husband and Pacita Ballori as a witness for the telling the truth when she said she did not appear before the justice of the peace. This evidence
wife. Following this is a certificate of marriage signed by the justice of the peace and the consists of eight letters, which the defendant claims were all written by the plaintiff. The plaintiff
witnesses Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, dated the 25th day of September, 1907, in which admits that she wrote letters numbered 2 and 9. The authenticity of the others was proven. No. 9
it is stated that the plaintiff and the defendant were legally married by the justice of the peace in is as follows:
the presence of the witnesses on that day.
ANGEL: Up to this time I did not see my father; but I know that he is very angry and if he be
The court below decided the case in favor of the defendant, holding that the parties were legally informed that we have been married civilly, I am sure that he will turn me out of the house.
married on the day named. The evidence in support of that decision is: First. The document
itself, which the plaintiff admits that she signed. Second. The evidence of the defendant, who Do what you may deem convenient, as I don't know what to do.
testifies that he and said plaintiff appeared before the justice of the peace at the time named,
together with the witness Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, and that they all signed the Should I be able to go to-morrow to Merida, I shall do so, because I can not remain here.
document above mentioned. Third. The evidence of Zacarias Esmero, one of the above-named
witnesses, who testifies that the plaintiff, the defendant, and Pacita Ballori appeared before the Yours, ROSAL.
justice at the time named and did sign the document referred to. Fourth. The evidence of Pacita
Ballori, who testified to the same effect. Fifth. The evidence of Jose Santiago, the bailiff of the Letter No. 6, which bears no date, but which undoubtedly was written on the morning of the 25th
court of the justice of the peace, who testified that the plaintiff, the defendant, the two witnesses of September, is as follows:
above-named, and the justice of the peace were all present in the office of the justice of the
peace at the time mentioned. Sr. D. ANGEL, TAN.
The only direct evidence in favor of the plaintiff is her own testimony that she never appeared ANGEL: It is impossible for me to go to the house of Veles this morning because my sister in law
before the justice of the peace and never was married to the defendant. She admits that she will not let me go there; if it suits you, I believe that this afternoon, about 5 or 6 o'clock, is the
signed the document in question, but says that she signed it in her own home, without reading it, best hour.
and at the request of the defendant, who told her that it was a paper authorizing him to ask the
consent of her parents to the marriage. Arrange everything, as I shall go there only for the purpose of signing, and have Pacita wait for
me at the Chinese store, because I don't like to go without Pacita.
There is some indirect evidence which the plaintiff claims supports her case, but which we think,
when properly considered, is not entitled to much weight. The plaintiff at the time was visiting, in The house must be one belonging to prudent people, and no one should know anything about it.
the town of Palompon, her married brother and was there for about two weeks. The wife of her
brother, Rosario Bayot, testified that the plaintiff never left the house except in her company. But Yours, ROSAL.
she admitted on cross-examination that she herself went to school every morning and that on
It will be noticed that this corroborates completely the testimony of Pacita Ballori as to her mortgage took place as shown by the certificate of the justice of the peace, signed by both
meeting the plaintiff in the afternoon at the store of the Chinese, Veles. Letter No. 7 is also contracting parties, which certificates gives rise to the presumption that the officer authorized the
undated, but was evidently written after the marriage before the justice of the peace. It is as marriage in due form, the parties before the justice of the peace declaring that they took each
follows: other as husband and wife, unless the contrary is proved, such presumption being corroborated
in this case by the admission of the woman to the effect that she had contracted the marriage
Sr. D. ANGEL, TAN. certified to in the document signed by her, which admission can only mean the parties mutually
agreed to unite in marriage when they appeared and signed the said document which so states
ANGEL: If you want to speak to my mother, who is also yours, come here by and by, at about 9 before the justice of the peace who authorized the same. It was proven that both the plaintiff and
or 10, when you see that the tide is high because my brother will have to go to the boat for the the defendant were able to read and write the Spanish language, and that they knew the
purpose of loading lumber. contents of the document which they signed; and under the circumstances in this particular case
were satisfied, and so hold, that what took place before the justice of the peace on this occasion
Don't tell her that we have been civilly married, but tell her at first that you are willing to celebrate amounted to a legal marriage.
the marriage at this time, because I don't like her to know to-day that we have been at the court-
house, inasmuch as she told me this morning that she heard that we would go to the court, and The defendant's original answer was a general denial of the allegations contained in the
that we must not cause her to be ashamed, and that if I insist on being married I must do it right. complaint. Among these allegations was a statement that the parties had obtain previously the
consent of the plaintiff's parents. The defendant was afterwards allowed to amend his answer so
Tell her also that you have asked me to carry you. that it was a denial of the allegations of the complaint except that relating to the condition in
regard to the consent of the parents. The plaintiff objected to the allowance of this amendment.
I send you herewith the letter of your brother, in order that you may do what he wishes. After the trial had commenced the defendant was again allowed to amend his answer so that it
should be an admission of paragraphs 2 and 3 of the complaint, except that part which related to
Yours, ROSAL. the consent of the parents. It will be seen that this second amendment destroyed completely the
first amendment and the defendants lawyer stated that what he intended to allege in his first
Letter No. 8 was also evidently written after the marriage and is in part as follows: amendment, but by reason of the haste with which the first amendment was drawn he had
unintentionally made it exactly the opposite of what he had intended to state. After argument the
Sr. D. ANGEL TAN. court allowed the second amendment. We are satisfied that in this allowance there was no
abuse of discretion and we do not see how the plaintiff was in any way prejudiced. She
ANGEL: I believe it is better for you to go to Ormoc on Sunday of the steamer Rosa, for the proceeded with the trial of the case without asking for a continuance.
purpose of asking my father's permission for our marriage, and in case he fails to give it, then we
shall do what we deem proper, and, if he does not wish us to marry without his permission, you The judgment of the court below acquitting the defendant of the complaint is affirmed, with the
must request his consent. costs of this instance against the appellant.
Tell me who said that my sister in law knows that we are civilly married; my brother ill treatment Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, and Carson, JJ., concur.
is a matter of no importance, as every thing may be carried out, with patience.
It was proven at the trial that the defendant did go to Ormoc on the steamer Rosa as indicated in
this letter, and that the plaintiff was on the same boat. The plaintiff testified, however, that she
had no communication with the defendant during the voyage. The plaintiff and the defendant
never lived together as husband and wife, and upon her arrival in Ormoc, after consulting with
her family, she went to Cebu and commenced this action, which was brought for the purpose of
procuring the cancellation of the certificate of marriage and for damages. The evidence strongly
preponderates in favor of the decision of the court below to the effect that the plaintiff appeared
before the justice of the peace at the time named.
It is claimed by the plaintiff that what took place before the justice of the peace, even admitting
all that the witnesses for the defendant testified to, did not constitute a legal marriage. General
orders, No. 68, section 6, is as follows:
No particular form from the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must declare in the
presence of the person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as husband and
wife.
Zacarias Esmero, one of the witnesses, testified that upon the occasion in question the justice of
the peace said nothing until after the document was signed and then addressing himself to the
plaintiff and the defendant said, "You are married." The petition signed the plaintiff and
defendant contained a positive statement that they had mutually agreed to be married and they
asked the justice of the peace to solemnize the marriage. The document signed by the plaintiff,
the defendant, and the justice of the peace, stated that they ratified under oath, before the
justice, the contents of the petition and that witnesses of the marriage were produced. A
FULL CASE: MORIGO V PEOPLE On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information5 filed by the City
Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.6
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for
G.R. No. 145226 February 06, 2004 judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case.
His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
vs. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as
follows:
DECISION
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty
QUISUMBING, J.: of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6)
Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision1 dated October 21, 1999 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment2 dated August 5, SO ORDERED.7
1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial
court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioner’s claim that his first marriage
and sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months of prision correccional as minimum to to Lucia was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,8 the trial court ruled
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a
resolution3 of the appellate court, dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigo’s motion for marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but
reconsideration. must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed
to marry again.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,9 which
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at held that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or
Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978). both spouses may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to
determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other. entitled to recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucio’s defense of good faith in contracting the
second marriage, the trial court stressed that following People v. Bitdu,10 everyone is presumed
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The to know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the
former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts. law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
Canada, they maintained constant communication. 20700.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the
Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage
de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol. between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually took place. No
appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and executory.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio
behind. On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on
February 17, 1992. SO ORDERED.11
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago4 at the Virgen sa In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the subsequent
Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol. declaration of nullity of Lucio’s marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio.
The reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article 34912 of the Revised Penal Code is
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence,
the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in
among others, the declaration of nullity of accused’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no a bigamy case.
marriage ceremony actually took place.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the
Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 1513 of the
Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of
1714 of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
Before we delve into petitioner’s defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must first
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision, contending that the determine whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v.
doctrine in Mendiola v. People,15 allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the Bobis,20 we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith.
(1) the offender has been legally married;
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit.16 However, the
denial was by a split vote. The ponente of the appellate court’s original decision in CA-G.R. CR (2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the
No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P. absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;
Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly declared void ab initio,
then there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of (3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
the first marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he
cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. (4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution: Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR
No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case No.
A. 6020, to wit:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the annulment of
THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in
AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation
APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONER’S LACK OF CRIMINAL of the marriage contract.
INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.
SO ORDERED.21
B.
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage
PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR. contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that
the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 322 and 423 of the Family Code. As the
C. dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This simply means that there
was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the
THAT EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first
ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.17 marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married."24 The records show that
no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if decision had long become final and executory.
so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete.
decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage
and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner further being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." The contract of
argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or acquittal in the instant case. marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal
The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria
se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the
stresses that there is a difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where
perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant
marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy. charge.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.25 In the
instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling in latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the
Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,18 which held that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:
the elements concur, stressing that under Article 4019 of the Family Code, a judicial declaration
of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can
Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such
petitioner’s contention that he was in good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is
characterized by statutes as "void."26
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just
CASE DIGEST:
once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again
Morigo v. People
six months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared
G.R. No. 145226, 6 February 2004
to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
FACTS:
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own.
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a while but
The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and
after receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts.
thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to
They got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she filed petition
constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless
for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He
he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no
marriage ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in
arraignment since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo
favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to
pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner contented
ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner
he contracted second marriage in good faith.
has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the
validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.
ISSUE:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999
Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete before his
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate
second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case.
court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the
RULING:
charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.
No. considering that the first marriage was void ab initio makes Morigo acquitted in the Bigamy
SO ORDERED.
case.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
As provided by Art. 3, part 3 of the Family Code “A marriage ceremony which takes place with
the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age”. “The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render
the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in
Article 45.” As provided by Art. 4. Given these 2 articles, Morigo’s first marriage is considered
void ab initio.
Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual marriage
ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a
marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage
when he contracted his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and
is acquitted in the case filed.
FULL CASE: RONULO V PEOPLE petitioner’s act of giving a blessing constitutes a marriage ceremony as he made an official
church recognition of the cohabitation of the couple as husband and wife.11 It further ruled that
in performing a marriage ceremony without the couple’s marriage license, the petitioner violated
G.R. No. 182438 July 2, 2014
Article 352 of the RPC which imposes the penalty provided under Act No. 3613 or the Marriage
Law. The MTC applied Section 44 of the Marriage Law which pertinently states that a violation of
RENE RONULO, Petitioner,
any of its provisions that is not specifically penalized or of the regulations to be promulgated,
vs.
shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment of not more
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
than one month, or both, in the discretion of the court.
DECISION
The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and provides the penalty for violation of the
latter law. Applying these laws, the MTC imposed the penalty of a fine in the amount of
BRION, J.:
₱200.00.12
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Fr. Rene Ronulo
The RTC Ruling
challenging the April 3, 2008 decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, (RTC) Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte.
The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the circumstances surrounding the act
of the petitioner in "blessing" the couple unmistakably show that a marriage ceremony had
The Factual Antecedents
transpired. It further ruled that the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses deserve
more credence than the petitioner’s negative statements.13 The RTC, however, ruled that the
The presented evidence showed that3 Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to
basis of the fine should be Section 39, instead of Section 44, of the Marriage Law.
marry each other on March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario
The CA Decision
Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed to secure a
marriage license. As a recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong tagalong,and Claire,
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. The CA observed that although there is no
clad in a wedding gown, together with their parents, sponsors and guests, proceeded to the
prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage, the law provides minimum
Independent Church of Filipino Christians, also known as the Aglipayan Church. They requested
standards in determining whether a marriage ceremony has been conducted, viz.: (1) the
the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed despite
contracting parties must appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and (2) they should
having been informed by the couple that they had no marriage certificate.
declare that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of at least two witnesses
of legal age.14 According to the CA, the prosecution duly proved these requirements. It added
The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the same date. He
that the presence of a marriage certificate is not a requirement in a marriage ceremony.15
conducted the ceremony in the presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and
secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited guests.4
The CA additionally ruled that the petitioner’s criminal liability under Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, is not dependent on whether Joey or Claire were charged or found guilty under Article
An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, was
350 of the same Code.16
filed against the petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for
allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony.5
The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the imposition of the fine is Section 44 of
the Marriage Law since it covers violation of regulations to be promulgated by the proper
The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" to the crime charged on arraignment.
authorities such as the RPC.
The prosecution’s witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere, testified on the incidents of the
The Petition
ceremony. Joseph was the veil sponsor while Mary Anne was the cord sponsor in the wedding.
Mary Anne testified that she saw the bride walk down the aisle. She also saw the couple
The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following grounds: First, Article 352 of the RPC,
exchange their wedding rings, kiss each other, and sign a document.6 She heard the petitioner
as amended, is vague and does not define what constitutes "an illegal marriage ceremony."
instructing the principal sponsors to sign the marriage contract. Thereafter, they went to the
Assuming that a marriage ceremony principally constitutes those enunciated in Article 55 of the
reception, had lunch and took pictures. She saw the petitioner there. She also identified the
Civil Code and Article 6 of the Family Code, these provisions require the verbal declaration that
wedding invitation given to her by Joey.7
the couple take each other as husband and wife, and a marriage certificate containing the
declaration in writing which is duly signed by the contracting parties and attested to by the
Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple declare during the
solemnizing officer.17 The petitioner likewise maintains that the prosecution failed to prove that
ceremony that they take each other as husband and wife.8 Days after the wedding, she went to
the contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.18
the municipal local civil registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr.
Second, under the principle of separation of church and State, the State cannot interfere in
where she was given a certificate that no marriage license was issued to the couple.9
ecclesiastical affairs such as the administration of matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot
convert the "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony."19
The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the
couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law.10
Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the "blessing" in good faith for
purposes of giving moral guidance to the couple.20
The MTC Judgment
Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the couple in violating Article 350 of the RPC, as
The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, and
amended, should preclude the filing of the present case against him.21
imposed on him a ₱200.00 fine pursuant to Section 44 of Act No. 3613. It held that the
testimony of Joey disowning their declaration as husband and wife cannot overcome these clear
Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide for a penalty. The present case is and convincing pieces of evidence. Notably, the defense failed to show that the prosecution
not covered by Section 44 of the Marriage Law as the petitioner was not found violating its witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne, had any ill-motive to testify against the petitioner.
provisions nor a regulation promulgated thereafter.22
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of church and State
THE COURT’S RULING: precludes the State from qualifying the church "blessing" into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to
the petitioner’s allegation, this principle has been duly preserved by Article 6 of the Family Code
We find the petition unmeritorious. when it provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage is
required. This pronouncement gives any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in conducting its
The elements of the crime punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, were proven respective marital rites, subject only to the requirement that the core requirements of law be
by the prosecution observed.
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall We emphasize at this point that Article 1529 of the Constitution recognizes marriage as an
perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows: inviolable social institution and that our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a
(1) authority of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony. mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State has
In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to solemnize a marriage. paramount interest in the enforcement of its constitutional policies and the preservation of the
Hence, the only issue to be resolved is whether the alleged "blessing" by the petitioner is sanctity of marriage. To this end, it is within its power to enact laws and regulations, such as
tantamount to the performance of an "illegal marriage ceremony" which is punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which penalize the commission of acts resulting in the
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. disintegration and mockery of marriage.
While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a "marriage ceremony" From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner conducted was a marriage
and what constitutes its "illegal" performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on ceremony, as the minimum requirements set by law were complied with. While the petitioner
these matters. These provisions were taken from Article 5523 of the New Civil Code which, in may view this merely as a "blessing," the presence of the requirements of the law constitutive of
turn, was copied from Section 324 of the Marriage Law with no substantial amendments. Article a marriage ceremony qualified this "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony" as contemplated by
625 of the Family Code provides that "[n]o prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization Article 3(3) of the Family Code and Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear
personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by the petitioner of this marriage
witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife."26 Pertinently, Article ceremony was illegal.
3(3)27 mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and particularly defines a marriage ceremony as that
which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the presence
and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of of a valid marriage certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he knew that the
not less than two witnesses of legal age. couple had no marriage license, yet he conducted the "blessing" of their relationship.
Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, the rule was Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the
clear that no prescribed form of religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. essential and formal requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony,
However, as correctly found by the CA, the law sets the minimum requirements constituting a therefore, was illegal. The petitioner’s knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates
marriage ceremony: first, there should be the personal appearance of the contracting parties his defense of good faith.
before a solemnizing officer; and second, heir declaration in the presence of not less than two
witnesses that they take each other as husband and wife. We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage certificate negates his
criminal liability in the present case. For purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony has
As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared before him and this been conducted, a marriage certificate is not included in the requirements provided by Article
fact was testified to by witnesses. On the second requirement, we find that, contrary to the 3(3) of the Family Code, as discussed above.
petitioner’s allegation, the prosecution has proven, through the testimony of Florida, that the
contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife. Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple negate criminal liability of
the petitioner. Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not make this an element of the crime.
The petitioner’s allegation that the court asked insinuating and leading questions to Florida fails The penalty imposed is proper
to persuadeus. A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory
questions to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, this provision
relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or rebut the position clearly provides that it shall be imposed in accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law.
taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questions he The penalty provisions of the Marriage Law are Sections 39 and 44 which provide as follows:
propounds happen to reveal certain truths that tend to destroy the theory of one party.28 Section 39 of the Marriage Law provides that:
At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the judge objectionable, its failure to Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage – Any priest or minister solemnizing marriage
timely register this bars it from belatedly invoking any irregularity. without being authorized by the Director of the Philippine National Library or who, upon
solemnizing marriage, refuses to exhibit the authorization in force when called upon to do so by
In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even the petitioner’s admission the parties or parents, grandparents, guardians, or persons having charge and any bishop or
regarding the circumstances of the ceremony, support Florida’s testimony that there had indeed officer, priest, or minister of any church, religion or sect the regulations and practices whereof
been the declaration by the couple that they take each other as husband and wife. The require banns or publications previous to the solemnization of a marriage in accordance with
section ten, who authorized the immediate solemnization of a marriage that is subsequently CASE DIGEST:
declared illegal; or any officer, priest or minister solemnizing marriage in violation of this act,
shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than two years, or by a
RENE RONULO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
fine of not less than two hundred pesos nor more than two thousand pesos. [emphasis ours]
G.R. No. 182438, 2 July 2014.
On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states that:
BRION, J.:
Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically
penalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished by
Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry on 29 March 2003 at the Sta. Rosa
a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or
Catholic Parish Church in Ilocos Norte. But on the day of the wedding, the church's officiating
both, in the discretion of the court. [emphasis ours]
priest refused to solemnize the marriage because of lack of a marriage license.
From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit in the ruling of the CA and the MTC
With the couple and the guests already dressed for the wedding, they headed to an Aglipayan
that the penalty imposable in the present case is that covered under Section 44, and not Section
Church. The Aglipayan priest, herein petitioner Ronulo, conducted a ceremony on the same day
39, of the Marriage Law.
where the couple took each other as husband and wife in front of the guests. This was despite
Petitioner's knowledge of the couple's lack of marriage license.
The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not include the present case.1âwphi1
As correctly found by the MTC, the petitioner was not found violating the provisions of the
Petitioner was eventually charged of violating Article 352 of the RPC for performing an illegal
Marriage Law but Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. It is only the imposition of the penalty for
marriage ceremony.
the violation of this provision which is referred to the Marriage Law. On this point, Article 352
falls squarely under the provision of Section 44 of Act No. 3613 which provides for the penalty
The MTC did not believe Petitioner's defense that what he did was an act of blessing and was
for any violation of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities; Article 352 of the
not tantamount to solemnization of marriage and was found guilty.
RPC, as amended, which was enacted after the Marriage Law, is one of such regulations.
The decision was affirmed by both the RTC and the CA.
Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of fine of ₱200.00 pursuant to Section 44 of
the Marriage Law.
ISSUE: W/N Petitioner committed an illegal marriage.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April
RULING: Yes.
3, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028.
Article 352 of the RPC penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or
SO ORDERED.
authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are:
authority of the solemnizing officer; and
his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
The first element is present since Petitioner himself admitted that he has authority to solemnize
a marriage.
The second element is present since the alleged "blessing" by Petitioner is tantamount to the
performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
There is no prescribed form or rite for the solemnization of a marriage. However, Article 6 of the
Family Code provides that it shall be necessary:
for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and
declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as
husband and wife.
The first requirement is present since petitioner admitted to it. The second requirement is
likewise present since the prosecution, through the testimony of its witnesses, proved that the
contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.
The penalty for violating Article 352 of the RPC is in accordance with the provision of the
Marriage Law, specifically Article 44, which states that:
Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically
penalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished by
a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or
both, in the discretion of the court.
As such, Petitioner was held guilty of violating Article 352 and was fined P200 as penalty.
FULL CASE: VDA CHUA V CA Alonzo Chua who was born in Davao City on August 30, 1978. A xerox copy of the birth
certificate of each child is hereto attached as annex "A" and "B", respectively.
G.R. No. 116835 March 5, 1998
3. That the aforementioned children who are still minors today are both staying with
herein petitioner at her address at Quezon Avenue, Cotabato City;
ANTONIETTA GARCIA VDA. DE CHUA, petitioner,
vs.
4. That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the above-mentioned minors, died intestate on May
COURT OF APPEALS (Special Eight Division), HON. JAPAL M. GUIANI, RTC, Branch 14, 12th
28, 1992 in Davao City.
Judicial Region, Cotabato City, and FLORITA A. VALLEJO, as Administratrix of the Estate of the
late Roberto L. Chua, respondents.
5. That the aforementioned deceased left properties both real and personal worth
P5,000,000.00 consisting of the following:
KAPUNAN, J.:
a) Lot in Kakar, Cotabato City covered by TCT
No. T-12835 with an area of 290 sq. m. estimated at P50,000.00
Assailed before us in this Appeal by Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR Sp. No. 33101, promulgated on 19 April 1994
b) Lot in Kakar, Cotabato City covered by TCT
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, of Cotabato City in Special
No. T-12834 with an area of 323 sq. m. 50,000.00
Procedure Case No. 331.
c) Lot in Davao City covered by TCT
As culled from the records, the following facts have been established by evidence:
No. T-126583 with an area of 303 sq. m. 50,000.00
During his lifetime, Roberto Lim Chua lived out of wedlock with private respondent Florita A.
d) Lot in Davao City covered by TCT
Vallejo from 1970 up to 1981. Out of this union, the couple begot two illegitimate children,
No. T-126584 with an area of 303 sq. m. 50,000.00
namely, Roberto Rafson Alonzo and Rudyard Pride Alonzo.
e) Residential house in Cotabato City valued at 30,000.00
On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City.
f) Residential house in Davao City valued at 600,000.00
On 2 July 1992, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City a
Petition1 which is reproduced hereunder:
g) Car, Colt Lancer with Motor No. 4G33-3 AF6393 210,000.00
IN RE: PETITION FOR DECLARATION
h) Colt, Galant Super Saloon with Motor
No. 4G37-GB0165 545,000.00
OF HEIRSHIP, GUARDIANSHIP OVER
i) Car, Colt Galant with Motor No. 4G52-52D75248 110,000.00
THE PERSONS AND PROPERTIES OF
j) Reo Isuzu Dump Truck with Motor
MINORS ROBERT RAFSON ALONZO SP. PROC. NO/ 331
No. DA640-838635 350,000.00
and RUDYARD PRIDE ALONZO, all
k) Hino Dump Truck with Motor No. ED100-T47148 350,000.00
surnamed CHUA and ISSUANCE OF
l) Stockholdings in various corporations with par value
estimated at 3,335,000.00
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.
Total P5,000,000.00
FLORITA ALONZO VALLEJO,
6. That deceased Roberto Lim Chua died single and without legitimate descendants or
Petitioner
ascendants, hence, the above named minors Robert Rafson Alonzo Chua and Rudyard Pride
Alonzo Chua, his children with herein petitioner shall succeed to the entire estate of the
PETITION
deceased. (Article 988 of the Civil Code of the Philippines).
COMES NOW the petitioner assisted by counsel and unto this Honorable Court most
7. That the names, ages and residences of the relatives of said minors are the following,
respectfully states:
to wit:
1. That she is of legal age, Filipino, married but separated from her husband and residing at
Names Relationship Ages Residence
Quezon Avenue, Cotabato City, Philippines;
1. Carlos Chua Uncle 60 Quezon Avenue,
2. That sometime from 1970 up to and until late 1981 your petitioner lived with Roberto
Cotabato City
Lim Chua as husband and wife and out of said union they begot two (2) children, namely, Robert
Rafson Alonzo Chua who was born in General Santos City on April 28, 1977 and Rudyard Pride
2. Aida Chua Auntie 55 Rosary Heights, (1) That this petition is for the guardianship of the minor children of the petitioner who are
Cotabato City heirs to the estate of the late Roberto L. Chua and under Section 1, Rule 92 of the Rules of
Court the venue shall be at the place where the minor resides;
3. Romulo Uy Uncle 40 c/o Overseas
Fishing Exporation (2) That the above-named minors are residents of Cotabato City:
Co. Inc., Matina,
Davao City (3) That the movant in this case has no personality to intervene nor oppose in the
granting of this petition for the reason that she is a total stranger to the minors Robert Rafson
6. That considering the fact that the aforementioned minors by operation of law are to Alonzo and Rudyard Pride Alonzo, all surnamed Chua.
succeed to the entire estate of Roberto Lim Chua under the provisions of Article 988 of the New
Civil Code of the Philippines, it is necessary that for the protection of the rights and interest of (4) That deceased Roberto L. Chua died a bachelor. He is the father of the above-named
Robert Rafson Alonzo Chua and Rudyard Pride Alonzo Chua, both minors and heirs of minors with the petitioner in this case;
deceased Roberto Lim Chua, a guardian over the persons and properties of said minors be
appointed by this Honorable Court. (5) That movant/oppositor Antonietta Chua is not the surviving spouse of the late Roberto
L. Chua but a pretender to the estate of the latter since the deceased never contracted marriage
7. That herein petitioner being the mother and natural guardian of said minors is also with any woman until he died.
competent and willing to act as the guardian of minors Robert Rafson Alonzo Chua and Rudyard
Pride Alonzo Chua both staying and living with her; that petitioner possesses all the On 6 August 1992, private respondent Vallejo filed a Motion for Admission of an Amended
qualifications and none of the disqualifications of a guardian. Petition4 "in order that the designation of the case title can properly and appropriately capture or
capsulize in clear terms the material averments in the body of the pleadings; thus avoiding any
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed: confusion or misconception of the nature and real intent and purpose of this petition." The
amended petition5 contained identical material allegations but differed in its title, thus:.
1. That, upon proper notice and hearing, an order be issued declaring minors ROBERTO
RAFSON ALONZO CHUA and RUDYARD PRIDE ALONZO CHUA as heirs to the intestate IN RE: PETITION FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF ROBERTO L.
estate of deceased ROBERTO LIM CHUA; CHUA, DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIP, GUARDIANSHIP OVER THE PERSONS AND
PROPERTIES OF MINORS ROBERT AND RUDYARD, all surnamed CHUA and ISSUANCE
2. That Letters of Administration be issued to herein petitioner for the administration of OF LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.
the estate of the deceased ROBERTO LIM CHUA;
FLORITA ALONZO VALLEJO,
3. That the petitioner be also appointed the guardian of the persons and estate of minors Petitioner.
ROBERT RAFSON ALONZO CHUA and RUDYARD PRIDE ALONZO CHUA;
Paragraph 4 of the original petition was also amended to read as follows:
4. That after all the property of deceased Roberto Lim Chua have been inventoried and
expenses and just debts, have been paid, the intestate estate of Roberto Lim Chua be 4. That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the abovementioned minors is a resident of
distributed to its rightful heirs, the minors in this case, pursuant to the provisions of Article 988 of Cotabato City and died intestate on May 28, 1992 at Davao City.
the New Civil Code of the Philippines.
The petition contained exactly the same prayers as the original petition.
5. And for such other reliefs and remedies this Honorable Court may consider fit and
proper in the premises. Petitioner opposed the motion to amend petition alleging that at the hearing of said motion on 24
July 1992, private respondent's counsel allegedly admitted that the sole intention of the original
Cotabato City, Philippines, June 29, 1992. petition was to secure guardianship over the persons and property of the minors.6
(Sgd.) FLORITA ALONZO VALLEJO On 21 August 1992, the trial court issued an Order7 denying the motion to dismiss for lack of
(Petitioner) merit. The court ruled that Antonietta Garcia had no personality to file the motion to dismiss not
having proven her status as wife of the decedent. Further, the court found that the actual
The trial court issued an order setting the hearing of the petition on 14 August 1992 and directed residence of the deceased was Cotabato City, and even assuming that there was concurrent
that notice thereof be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province of venue among the Regional Trial Courts where the decedent had resided, the R.T.C. of Cotabato
Maguindanao and Cotabato City and or Davao City. had already taken cognizance of the settlement of the decedent's estate to the exclusion of all
others. The pertinent portions of the order read:
On 21 July 1992, herein petitioner Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua, representing to be the
surviving spouse of Roberto Chua, filed a Motion to Dismiss2 on the ground of improper venue. At the hearing of the motion to dismiss on August 19, 1992, counsel for movant Antonietta G.
Petitioner alleged that at the time of the decedent's death Davao City was his residence, hence, Chua presented 18 Exhibits in support of her allegation that she was the lawful wife of the
the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is the proper forum. decedent and that the latter resides in Davao City at the time of his death. Exh. "1" was the
xerox copy of the alleged marriage contract between the movant and the petitioner. This cannot
Private respondent filed an opposition to the Motion to Dismiss3 dated July 20, 1992 based on be admitted in evidence on the ground of the timely objection of the counsels for petitioner that
the following grounds: the best evidence is the original copy or authenticated copy which the movant cannot produce.
Further, the counsels for petitioner in opposition presented the following: a certification from the
Local Civil Registrar concerned that no such marriage contract was ever registered with them; a
letter from Judge Augusto Banzali, the alleged person to have solemnized the alleged marriage mistrial. Both motions were denied by the trial court in its Order dated 22 November 1993. 12
that he has not solemnized such alleged marriage. Exhibit "2" through "18" consist among others Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the order was denied by the trial court in an Order
of Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta dated 13 December 1993.13
Garcia, and a resident of Davao City; Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at
Davao City indicating that he was married and was born in Cotabato City; Income Tax Returns Assailing the last two orders of the trial court, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and
for 1990 and 1991 filed in Davao City where the status of the decedent was stated as married; prohibition (Rule 65) with the respondent Court of Appeals, docketed as CA G.R. No. Sp. 33101,
passport of the decedent specifying that he was married and his residence was Davao City. alleging that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in:
Petitioner through counsels, objected to the admission in evidence of Exhibits "2" through "18" if
the purpose is to establish the truth of the alleged marriage between the decedent and (1) unilaterally and summarily converting, if not treating, the guardianship proceedings
Antonietta Garcia. The best evidence they said is the marriage contract. They do not object to into an intestate proceeding;
the admission of said exhibit if the purpose is to show that Davao City was the business
residence of the decedent. (2) summarily hearing the intestate proceedings without jurisdiction and without any
notice to herein petitioner whatsoever; and
Petitioner through counsels, presented Exhibit "A" through "K" to support her allegation that the
decedent was a resident of Cotabato City; that he died a bachelor; that he begot two illegitimate (3) issuing the questioned order (sic) on the alleged pretension that herein petitioner has
children with the petitioner as mother. Among these exhibits are Income Tax Returns filed in no personality to intervene in SPL Proc. No. 331 questioning the highly anomalous orders
Cotabato City from 1968 through 1979 indicating therein that he was single; birth certificates of precipitately issued ex-parte by the public respondent R.T.C. without notice to the petitioners.
the alleged two illegitimate children of the decedent; Resident Certificates of the decedent
issued in Cotabato City; Registration Certificate of Vehicle of the decedent showing that his Petitioner in the main argued that private respondent herself admitted in her opposition to
residence is Cotabato City. petitioner's motion to dismiss filed in the trial court and in open court that the original petition she
filed is one for guardianship; hence, the trial court acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued
It is clear from the foregoing that the movant failed to establish the truth of her allegation that she letters of administration over the estate of Roberto L. Chua, thereby converting the petition into
was the lawful wife of the decedent. The best evidence is a valid marriage contract which the an intestate proceeding, without the amended petition being published in a newspaper of
movant failed to produce. Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports and general circulation as required by Section 3, Rule 79.
other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when the petitioner has submitted
a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage was not The Court of Appeals, in its decision promulgated on 19 April 1994,14 denied the petition
registered and a letter from the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he has not ratiocinating that the original petition filed was one for guardianship of the illegitimate children of
solemnized said alleged marriage. Consequently, she has no personality to file the subject the deceased as well as for administration of his intestate estate. While private respondent may
motion to dismiss. have alleged in her opposition to the motion to dismiss that petition was for guardianship, the
fact remains that the very allegations of the original petition unmistakably showed a twin
On the issue of the residence of the decedent at the time of his death, the decedent as a purpose: (1) guardianship; and (2) issuance of letters of administration. As such, it was
businessman has many business residences from different parts of the country where he usually unnecessary for her to republish the notice of hearing through a newspaper of general
stays to supervise and pursue his business ventures. Davao City is one of them. It cannot be circulation in the province. The amended petition was filed for the only reason stated in the
denied that Cotabato City is his actual residence where his alleged illegitimate children also motion for leave: so that the "case title can properly and appropriately capture or capsulize in
reside. clear terms the material averments in the body of the pleadings; thus avoiding any confusion or
misconception of the nature and real intent and purpose of this petition," which was for
The place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of guardianship over the persons and properties of her minor children and for the settlement of the
letters of administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It intestate estate of the decedent who was their father. In other words, there being no change in
is merely constitutive of venue (Fule vs. CA, L-40502, November 29, 1976). Even assuming that the material allegations between the original and amended petitions, the publication of the first in
there is concurrent venue among the Regional Trial Courts of the places where the decedent a newspaper of general circulation sufficed for purposes of compliance with the legal
has residences, the Regional Trial Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of requirements of notice.
the decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts (Section 1, Rule 73).
It was this Court which first took cognizance of the case when the petition was filed on July 2, Moreover, the appellate court ruled that the petitioner's remedy is appeal from the orders
1992, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 331 and an order of publication issued by this Court complained of under Section 1(f), Rule 109 of the Rules of Court, not certiorari and prohibition.
on July 13, 1992.
Not satisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner comes to this Court contending
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is hereby denied for lack of merit. that the appellate court committed the following errors:
On 31 August 1992, upon motion of private respondent, the trial court issued an order appointing I
Romulo Lim Uy, a first cousin of the deceased, as special administrator of the decedent's
estate.8 THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY AND SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE ORIGINAL PETITION (Annex F, Petition) WAS FOR A TWIN PURPOSE,
On the same day, the trial court, likewise, issued an Order appointing Florita Vallejo as guardian TO WIT: FOR GUARDIANSHIP AND FOR INTESTATE ESTATE PROCEEDINGS;
over the persons and properties of the two minor children.9
II
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion dated 25 October 199310 praying that the letters of
administration issued to Vallejo be recalled and that new letters of administration be issued to THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
her. She, likewise, filed a Motion dated 5 November 199311 to declare the proceedings a THERE IS NO NEED TO PUBLISH THE AMENDED PETITION FOR ADMINISTRATION OF
THE INTESTATE ESTATE THEREBY CONTRAVENING THE RULES OF COURT AND THE The original petition also contains the jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the issuance of
RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT. letters of administration. Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court reads:
III Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration — A petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT petitioner:
NULLIFYING THE ORDERS (Annex "P" to "T") PRECIPITATELY ISSUED EX-PARTE BY THE
PUBLIC RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN THE INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS (a) jurisdictional facts;
WITHOUT PRIOR HEARING OR NOTICE TO HEREIN PETITIONER THEREBY DEPRIVING
THE LATTER (ANTONIETTA GARCIA VDA. DE CHUA ) OF DUE PROCESS AND (b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs and the names and residences of the
OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD. creditors, of the decedent'
IV (c) The probative value and character of the property of the estate;.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SWEEPINGLY (d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed;
HOLDING THAT PETITIONER'S REMEDY IS APPEAL.15
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration. (emphasis
In support of her first assignment of error, petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals' ours).
conclusion that the original petition was one for guardianship and administration of the intestate
estate is contradicted by the evidence on hand, asserting that the original petition failed to allege The jurisdictional facts required in a petition for issuance of letters of administration are: (1) the
and state the jurisdictional facts required by the Rules of Court in petitions for administration of a death of the testator; (2) residence at the time of death in the province where the probate court is
decedent's estate, such as: (a) the last actual residence of the decedent at the time of his death; located; and (3) if the decedent was a non-resident, the fact of being a resident of a foreign
(b) names, ages and residences of the heirs; and (c) the names and residences of the creditors country and that the decedent has left an estate in the province where the court is sitting.19
of the decedent. Petitioner also reiterates her argument regarding private respondent's alleged
admission that the original petition was one for guardianship and not for issuance of letters of While paragraph 4 of the original petition stating:
administration, pointing to the Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss dated 20 July 1992, where the
private respondent alleged. (4) That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the above mentioned minors, died intestate on May
28, 1992 in Davao City.
1. That this petition is for guardianship of the minor children of the petitioner who are
heirs to the estate of the late Roberto L. Chua and under Section 1, Rule 92 of the Rules of failed to indicate the residence of the deceased at the time of his death, the omission was cured
Court the venue shall be at the place where the minor resides.16 by the amended petitions wherein the same paragraph now reads:
as well as to the statements made by counsel for the private respondent during the 24 July 1992 (4) That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the abovementioned minors is a resident of
hearing on the motion to dismiss: Cotabato City and died intestate on May 28, 1992 at Davao City.20 (Emphasis in the original.)
ATTY. RENDON: All told the original petition alleged substantially all the facts required to be stated in the petition
for letters of administration. Consequently, there was no need to publish the amended petition as
We filed our opposition to the motion to dismiss the petition because this is a petition for petitioner would insist in her second assignment of errors.
guardianship of minors, not for intestate proceedings. So this is a case where the mother wanted
to be appointed as guardian because she is also the litigant here. Because whenever there is an Be that as it may, petitioner has no legal standing to file the motion to dismiss as she is not
intestate proceedings, she has to represent the minors, and under the Rules of Court in any related to the deceased, nor does she have any interest in his estate as creditor or otherwise.
guardianship proceedings, the venue is at the place where the minor is actually residing.17 The Rules are explicit on who may do so:
The petition is devoid of merit. Sec. 4. Opposition to petition for administration — Any interested person, may by filing a
written opposition, contest the petition on the ground of incompetency of the person for whom
The title alone of the original petition clearly shows that the petition is one which includes the letters of administration are prayed therein, or on the ground of the contestant's own right to the
issuance of letters of administration. The title of said petition reads: administration, and may pray that letters issue to himself, or to any competent person or persons
named in the opposition..
IN RE: PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIPS, GUARDIANSHIP OVER THE
PERSON AND PROPERTIES OF MINORS ROBERTO ALONZO AND RUDYARD ALONZO, all Only an interested person may oppose the petition for issuance of letters of administration. An
surnamed CHUA and ISSUANCE OF LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.18 interested person is one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir, or one who has a
claim against the estate, such as a creditor; his interest is material and direct, and not one that is
Likewise, the prayer of the petition states: only indirect or contingent.21
2. That Letters of Administration be issued to herein petition for the administration of the Petitioner was not able to prove her status as the surviving wife of the decedent. The best proof
estate of the deceased ROBERTO LIM CHUA. of marriage between man and wife is a marriage contract which Antonietta Chua failed to
produce. The lower court correctly disregarded the photostat copy of the marriage certificate
which she presented, this being a violation of the best evidence rule, together with other The distribution of the residue of the estate of the deceased is a function pertaining property not
worthless pieces of evidence. The trial court correctly ruled in its 21 August 1992 Order that: to the guardianship proceedings, but to another proceeding which the heirs are at liberty to
initiate.
. . . Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports and other similar documents
cannot prove marriage especially so when the petitioner has submitted a certification from the Petitioner's reliance on said case is misplaced. In the Gomez case, the action before the lower
Local Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from court was merely one for guardianship. Therefore said court did not have the jurisdiction to
the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he has not solemnized said alleged distribute the estate of the deceased. While in the case at bar, the petition filed before the court
marriage. . . .22 was both for guardianship and settlement of estate.
Under her third assignment of error, petitioner claims that the trial court issued its orders, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition of petitioner Antonietta Chua is hereby denied.
Annexes "P" to "T" without prior hearing or notice to her, thus, depriving her of due process.
SO ORDERED.
The orders referred to by petitioner are: Order dated 31 August 1992 appointing Romulo Lim Uy,
first cousin of the deceased, as special administrator of the estate; Order dated 31 August 1992
appointing private respondent as guardian over the person and property of the minors; Order
dated 5 August 1993, directing the transfer of the remains of the deceased from Davao City to
Cotabato City; Order dated 6 September 1993 directing petitioner to turn over a Mitsubishi
Gallant car owned by the estate of the deceased to the special administrator; and Order dated
28 September 1993, authorizing the sheriff to break open the deceased's house for the purpose
of conducting an inventory of the properties found therein, after the sheriff was refused entry to
the house by the driver and maid of petitioner.
Apart from the fact that petitioner was not entitled to notice of the proceedings of the trial court,
not being able to establish proof of her alleged marriage to the deceased, or of her interest in the
estate as creditor or otherwise, petitioner categorically stated in the instant petition that on 25
October 1993 she filed a motion praying for the recall of the letters of administration issued by
the trial court and another motion dated 5 August 1993 praying that the proceedings conducted
by the trial court be declared as a mistrial and the court orders relative thereto be set aside and
nullified. Petitioner further stated that her motions were denied by the trial court in its Order
dated 22 November 21, 1993 and that on 30 November 1993 she filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of denial which in turn was denied by the trial court on 13 December
1993.
Due process was designed to afford opportunity to be heard, not that an actual hearing should
always and indispensably be held.23 The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard.24 Here, even granting that the petitioner was not notified of the orders of the trial court
marked as Exhibits "P" to "T," inclusive, nonetheless, she was duly heard in her motions to recall
letters of administration and to declare the proceedings of the court as a "mistrial," which
motions were denied in the Order dated 22 November 1993.25 A motion for the reconsideration
of this order of denial was also duly heard by the trial court but was denied in its Order of 13
December 1993.26
Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to
be heard on his motion for reconsideration.27
As to the last assignment of errors, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the proper remedy
of the petitioner in said court was an ordinary appeal and not a special civil action for certiorari;
which can be availed of if a party has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Except for her bare allegation that an ordinary appeal would be inadequate,
nothing on record would indicate that extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition is
warranted.
Finally, petitioner further argues as supplement to her memorandum that the ruling of the Court
of Appeals treating the Special Proceeding No. 331 as one for both guardianship and settlement
of estate is in contravention of our ruling in Gomez vs. Imperial,28 which the petitioner quotes:
FULL CASE: TENCHAVEZ V ESCANO
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and Pastor knew it. She
G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965 fondly accepted her being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her parents from
communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escaño"), but her letters became less frequent as the days
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant, passed. As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were already estranged (Exh. "2-Escaño"). Vicenta
vs. had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred
VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees. in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel
Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant. dismissed without prejudice because of her non-appearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-4").
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her
REYES, J.B.L., J.: application that she was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu
City, and that she intended to return after two years. The application was approved, and she left
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of for the United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the
Cebu, in its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County
Tenchavez, for legal separation and one million pesos in damages against his wife and parents- of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21 October
in-law, the defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena,1 all surnamed "Escaño," 1950, a decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.
respectively.2
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their
The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following: daughter's marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal
dispensation of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu
City, where she was then enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta Escaño, 27 On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now
years of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and lives with him in California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American
a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an citizenship on 8 August 1958.
engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her parents,
before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court
The marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with the local of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her
civil register. parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño, whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged
Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the couple were Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and
deeply in love. Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, they had asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce
planned out their marital future whereby Pacita would be the governess of their first-born; they from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while
started saving money in a piggy bank. A few weeks before their secret marriage, their her parents denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter's acts, and
engagement was broken; Vicenta returned the engagement ring and accepted another suitor, counterclaimed for moral damages.
Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This
time they planned to get married and then elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting
brought some of her clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual his wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of
trysting place. Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees
against the plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this
Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not, however, Court.
materialize because when Vicente went back to her classes after the marriage, her mother, who
got wind of the intended nuptials, was already waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:
home where she admitted that she had already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escaño
were surprised, because Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicente, and were disgusted 1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escaño liable for
because of the great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. damages and in dismissing the complaint;.
1105-06). The following morning, the Escaño spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes
suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the 2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doña Mena
standpoint of the Church, due to the lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest for Escaño liable for damages;.
the officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did not take place, because
on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escaño was handed by a maid, whose name he claims he does 3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the defendant
not remember, a letter purportedly coming from San Carlos college students and disclosing an parents on their counterclaims; and.
amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter
to her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day 4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff.
in the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while
Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee,
of her husband's welfare, was not as endearing as her previous letters when their love was Vicenta Escaño, were validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly
aflame. established by the record before us. Both parties were then above the age of majority, and
otherwise qualified; and both consented to the marriage, which was performed by a Catholic For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of
priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that absolute divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public
said priest was not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages. policy of the state, specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that
prescribes the following:
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and the
Ordinary, as required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object
separation of Church and State but also because Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature (which public order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
was the marriage law in force at the time) expressly provided that — promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in
contracting parties and consent. (Emphasis supplied) effect, give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the
detriment of those members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement, and, and obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.
therefore, not essential to give the marriage civil effects,3 and this is emphasized by section 27
of said marriage act, which provided the following: From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in
the Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of
SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be declared invalid private parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally, because the mere appearance of
because of the absence of one or several of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it was a non-resident consort cannot confer jurisdiction where the court originally had none (Area vs.
performed, the spouses or one of them believed in good faith that the person who solemnized Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
the marriage was actually empowered to do so, and that the marriage was perfectly legal.
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their marriage) will be this jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as
presumed until the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco valid; for her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and
vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of
authority of the solemnizing priest arose only after the marriage, when Vicenta's parents consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault,
consulted Father Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither
abandoning her original action for annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter charging immorality against the
admission that her marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding. husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and
cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not her husband"
Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she contracted the marriage she was under the from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of
undue influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with appellant "legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
Tenchavez. Even granting, for argument's sake, the truth of that contention, and assuming that
Vicenta's consent was vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such vices did not render her The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid divorce are in
marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable, and the marriage remained valid until annulled by a accord with the previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject, particularly those that
competent civil court. This was never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in the were rendered under our laws prior to the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the
Court of First Instance of Misamis was dismissed for non-prosecution. Philippine Legislature). As a matter of legal history, our statutes did not recognize divorces a
vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective; and the present Civil Code of the
It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Philippines, in disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies on the
Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree subject prevailing before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to
of absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second the Act above-mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of these, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur,
Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, 42 Phil. 855, is of particular interest. Said this Court in that case:
entirely mental in character." At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her
husband, was still a Filipino citizen.4 She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that the marriage of Dr.
the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly Mory and Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations; and the
provided: circumstance that they afterwards passed for husband and wife in Switzerland until her death is
wholly without legal significance. The claims of the very children to participate in the estate of
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons Samuel Bishop must therefore be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated
are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. and acknowledged natural children. The children of adulterous relations are wholly excluded.
The word "descendants" as used in Article 941 of the Civil Code cannot be interpreted to include
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo illegitimates born of adulterous relations. (Emphasis supplied)
matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on
the matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage
adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present to Leo Moran after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, the Gmur case is
Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that authority for the proposition that such union is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore,
case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. justifies an action for legal separation on the part of the innocent consort of the first marriage,
1). that stands undissolved in Philippine law. In not so declaring, the trial court committed error.
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a person (whether frequently been applied in the case of advice given to a married daughter, but it is equally
divorced or not) would depend on the territory where the question arises. Anomalies of this kind applicable in the case of advice given to a son.
are not new in the Philippines, and the answer to them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58
Phil. 667: Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination
and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce,
The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well known to the unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. While this
members of the Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written suit may not have been impelled by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the
by Legislature if they are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict face of the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to give
or too liberal. (p. 72) vent to their prejudices or spleen.
The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained. In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from
defendant Vicente Escaño, it is proper to take into account, against his patently unreasonable
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and his claim for a million pesos in damages, that (a) the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its
wife, the late Doña Mena Escaño, alienated the affections of their daughter and influenced her failure was not characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that the
conduct toward her husband are not supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor parties never lived together; and (c) that there is evidence that appellant had originally agreed to
Tenchavez about the Escaño's animosity toward him strikes us to be merely conjecture and the annulment of the marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid, being against public
exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor's own letters written before this suit was begun (Exh. "2- policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this fact is a
Escaño" and "Vicenta," Rec. on App., pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly apologized to consequence of the indissoluble character of the union that appellant entered into voluntarily
the defendants for "misjudging them" and for the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive and with open eyes rather than of her divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of the
blunders" and "sinful pride," "effrontery and audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escaño opinion that appellant should recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney's
house to visit and court Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove that he would not have fees.
been accepted to marry Vicente had he openly asked for her hand, as good manners and
breeding demanded. Even after learning of the clandestine marriage, and despite their shock at With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and
such unexpected event, the parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be Mena Escaño, by the court below, we opine that the same are excessive. While the filing of this
recelebrated in strict conformity with the canons of their religion upon advice that the previous unfounded suit must have wounded said defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the
one was canonically defective. If no recelebration of the marriage ceremony was had it was not same could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them,
due to defendants Mamerto Escaño and his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has
That the spouses Escaño did not seek to compel or induce their daughter to assent to the been correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that said defendants were not
recelebration but respected her decision, or that they abided by her resolve, does not constitute guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the
in law an alienation of affections. Neither does the fact that Vicenta's parents sent her money damages awarded to P5,000 only.
while she was in the United States; for it was natural that they should not wish their daughter to
live in penury even if they did not concur in her decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130- Summing up, the Court rules:
132).
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the
present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce,
original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently, entitled to validity in the country;
and being of age, she was entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be
respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections in (2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful
the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith being husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;
always presumed until the contrary is proved.
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to
recover damages;
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. — The law distinguishes between the
right of a parent to interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a (4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the
stranger to intermeddle in such affairs. However, such distinction between the liability of parents absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
and that of strangers is only in regard to what will justify interference. A parent isliable for
alienation of affections resulting from his own malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully entices WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
his son or daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless he acts maliciously,
without justification and from unworthy motives. He is not liable where he acts and advises his (1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from
defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
child in good faith with respect to his child's marital relations in the interest of his child as he
sees it, the marriage of his child not terminating his right and liberty to interest himself in, and be (2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of
extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare and happiness, even where his conduct and advice P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
suggest or result in the separation of the spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or
where he acts under mistake or misinformation, or where his advice or interference are (3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of
indiscreet or unfortunate, although it has been held that the parent is liable for consequences his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
resulting from recklessness. He may in good faith take his child into his home and afford him or
Neither party to recover costs.
her protection and support, so long as he has not maliciously enticed his child away, or does not
maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay away, from his or her spouse. This rule has more
FULL CASE: VAN DORN V ROMILLO For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations
between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985 community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The
pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs. The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction
National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents. over private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco,
California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the
divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\ property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed
in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside in the divorce proceedings:
the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by
respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for xxx xxx xxx
Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private behalf and do an things necessary and proper to represent me, without further contesting,
respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, subject to the following:
after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two
children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were 1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada,
this time to Theodore Van Dorn. 2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of 3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita,
Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that xxx xxx xxx 4
petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be
declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance,
the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is
community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same
mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the being contrary to local law and public policy.
Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari
proceeding. It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain
appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As
Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed.
committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie 794, 799:
since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider
the petition filed in this case within the exception, and we have given it due course. The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to one party,
property in the Philippines. ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the
law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again,
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.
property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American
Court that they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment. would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is
prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged
and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, conjugal property.
divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered CASE DIGEST:
still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et.
seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not
Facts:
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
Petitioner Alicia Reyes Van is citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton
is a citizen of the United States, were married on 1972 at Hongkong. On 1982, they got divorced
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the
in Nevada, United States; and the petitioner remarried to Theodore Van Dorn.
Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.
On July 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner, asking that the petitioner be
Without costs.
ordered to render an accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila, and be declared with right to
manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the
SO ORDERED.
cause of action is barred by previous judgement in the divorce proceeding before Nevada Court
where respondent acknowledged that they had no community property. The lower court denied
Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.
the motion to dismiss on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines, that
the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. Respondent avers that Divorce Decree abroad
cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the divorce obtained the spouse valid to each of them.
(2) Whether or not Richard Upton may assert his right on conjugal properties.
Held:
As to Richard Upton the divorce is binding on him as an American Citizen. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Only Philippine Nationals are covered by
the policy against absolute divorce the same being considered contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality. Alicia Reyes under our National law is still considered married to private
respondent. However, petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her
heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.
FULL CASE: PILAPIL V. IBAY-SOMERA On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the
aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8
A similar petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and
directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to
vs.
elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for review. 9
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to
ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
suspend further proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset
the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such
REGALADO, J.:
scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension
of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce,
review then pending before the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the
only to be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the
same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the respondent
opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved
judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of
jurisdictional question.
both accused therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty
while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of
ordered detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent
Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The
entered a plea of not guilty. 14
marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate,
Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a
prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a
denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is
separation de facto between them.
without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that
cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private
qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior
respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg
to his filing the criminal complaint." 15
Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they
had been living apart since April, 1982. 2
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents
from implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of
Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A.
property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where
Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations,
the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3
issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the
complaints against the petitioner. 16
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany,
promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.
custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law said
court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other
dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that
crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the
foreign jurisdiction. 4
offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that
compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private
point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law,
respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while
the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that
still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as
complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot
1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto
exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the
cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person
fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for
who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the
adultery against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually
offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the
raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the
prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian
Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was
of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first
assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the
four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that
Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went
while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal
to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court. 7
Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in
the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her
parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and reason for this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse
concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to must be such when the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
initiate the action therefor.
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in
necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as
so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an
in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time
determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition. of the filing of the complaint.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
that the same requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized
found necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality
State, through the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted
de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a
assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain United States court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter
therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option. filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property
and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated
the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently the error of such stance, thus:
argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital
relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance,
the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. ...
the filing of the criminal case. 21
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
commence the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
capacity to bring the action would be determined by his status before or subsequent to the to their national law. ...
commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or
was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
without the legal capacity to do so. control over conjugal assets. ... 25
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband
as to when precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he
criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
possessed of such status. Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the inquiry
;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree
marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this
of the institution of the action by the former against the latter. case. When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there
would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is
with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there
has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that the would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had
innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would
however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can not affect or cast obloquy on the other.
have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that — respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333
of the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or wife.' declared void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the
Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to appear that
been committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually
insists that his status was not such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred
said that the offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such
declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There of the husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still
being no marriage from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of valid under her national law, it would seem that under our law existing before the new Family
nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both with
and within the purview of the decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for respect to the American husband and the Filipino wife.
adultery was filed before the termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab
initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the marriage The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact
was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce. that the husband was an American can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of
the divorce insofar as the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must
suffer the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended
spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was
raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not Separate Opinions
involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of the controversy
herein. PARAS, J., concurring:
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce
another one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of as valid also in the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of
jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby his obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party
made permanent. in case his former wife actually has carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he
already implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling
SO ORDERED. would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman
of the same privilege.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the
absolute divorce between the American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in
the Philippines on the theory that their status and capacity are governed by their National law,
namely, American law. There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of
such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then two
Separate Opinions (2) different nationalities would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely
because of the National law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the
PARAS, J., concurring: American husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in
what he calls a "socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man
It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned that very likely the
as valid also in the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of opposite expresses the correct view. While under the national law of the husband the absolute
his obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one of
in case his former wife actually has carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the people or
already implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part
would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman of the husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still
of the same privilege. valid under her national law, it would seem that under our law existing before the new Family
Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both with
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the respect to the American husband and the Filipino wife.
absolute divorce between the American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in
the Philippines on the theory that their status and capacity are governed by their National law, The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact
namely, American law. There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of that the husband was an American can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of
such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then two the divorce insofar as the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.
(2) different nationalities would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely
because of the National law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the
American husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in
what he calls a "socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man
who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned that very likely the
opposite expresses the correct view. While under the national law of the husband the absolute
divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one of
the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the people or
residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part
FULL CASE: QUITA V DANDAN in the aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947, their
marriage was clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage
G.R. No. 124862. December 22, 1998 to petitioner.
FE D. QUITA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN,* Respondents. In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of the errors
allegedly committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case was decided without a
DECISION hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which provides that if there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
BELLOSILLO, J.: distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard
and decided as in ordinary cases.
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May
1941. They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their relationship Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on
soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted 11 September 1995 it declared null and void the 27 November 1987 decision and 15 February
in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to 1988 order of the trial court, and directed the remand of the case to the trial court for further
live separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 proceedings.8 On 18 April 1996 it denied reconsideration.9cräläwvirtualibräry
she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix
Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Petitioner insists that
married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont. there is no need because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains for resolution either as to the
heirship of the Padlan children or as to their respective shares in the intestate estate of the
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a decedent; and, second, the issue as to who between petitioner and private respondent is the
petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration proper heir of the decedent is one of law which can be resolved in the present petition based on
concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina established facts and admissions of the parties.
Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo
Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If there is a
named in the petition as surviving children of Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition and prayed for controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Cabasal, which was resolved in favor of the latter. distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard
Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. and decided as in ordinary cases.
On 30 April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and the Padlan children) submitted certified
photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final judgment of divorce between We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children
petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by
deceased Arturo, intervened. him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan;10 nor as to their
respective hereditary shares. But controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and spouse of Arturo. The trial court, after the parties other than petitioner failed to appear during the
the distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987, private respondent scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the motion for immediate declaration of heirs and
as well as the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice. On the distribution of estate, simply issued an order requiring the submission of the records of birth of
same day, the trial court required the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on documents, the issue on declaration of heirs would be deemed submitted for resolution.
the declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period
lapsed without the required documents being submitted. We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among others, the
issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that she
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escao1 which held that "a foreign divorce between Filipino had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the above
citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not quoted procedural rule.11 To this, petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such
entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction,"2 disregarded the divorce between petitioner remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained.12 Reading between the
and Arturo. Consequently, it expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death of lines, the implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce
Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of conjugal properties from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her
due to lack of judicial approval.3 On the other hand, it opined that there was no showing that citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid
marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown that the of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either
alleged Padlan children had been acknowledged by the deceased as his children with her. As supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in
regards Ruperto, it found that he was a brother of Arturo. On 27 November 19874 only petitioner her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escao.
and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equal adjudication of the
net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two intestate heirs.5cräläwvirtualibräry Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's decision she
stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v.
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present proofs Romillo Jr.13 that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
that the recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis who Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. She prayed therefore that the
was recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made in their respective records of birth. Thus case be set for hearing.14 Petitioner opposed the motion but failed to squarely address the issue
on 15 February 19886 partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with on her citizenship.15 The trial court did not grant private respondent's prayer for a hearing but
the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino
petitioner to the other half.7 Private respondent was not declared an heir. Although it was stated citizens and were married in the Philippines."16 It maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954
in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the CASE DIGEST:
finding on their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not
supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their divorce. The doubt December 22, 1998
persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial
court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Facts:
Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner
could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo. Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on May 18,
1941. No children were born out of their marriage. On July 23, 1954, petitioner obtained a final
Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship;17 it did not merit judgment of divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. On April 16, 1972, Arturo died leaving
enlightenment however from petitioner.18 In the present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is no will. On August 31, 1972, Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the RTC for issuance of
brought anew to the fore by private respondent. She even furnishes the Court with the transcript letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company.
of stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing for the reconstitution of the Respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Dandan and the
original of a certain transfer certificate title as well as the issuance of new owner's duplicate copy surviving children, all surnamed Padlan, opposed the petition. The RTC expressed that the
thereof before another trial court. When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner marriage between Antonio and petitioner subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972, that the
answered that she was since 1954.19 Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo was clearly void since it was celebrated
was obtained in the same year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner. The Court of Appeals remanded the
erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring case to the trial court for further proceedings.
hearings to be conducted by the trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err
in ordering the case returned to the trial court for further proceedings. Issues:
We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited 1. Should the case be remanded to the lower court?
only to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent's
claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 2. Who between the petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent?
1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a
bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Held:
Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes
a legitimate relationship.20cräläwvirtualibräry If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person
or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy
As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and her counsel to be declared in shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
contempt of court and that the present petition be dismissed for forum shopping,21 the same
lacks merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must involve the same transactions and No dispute exists as to the right of the six Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because
same essential facts and circumstances. There must also be identical causes of action, subject there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even
matter and issue.22 The present petition deals with declaration of heirship while the subsequent recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan, nor as to their respective hereditary shares.
petitions filed before the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate
copies of titles of certain properties belonging to the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no Private respondent is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes
reason to declare the existence of forum shopping. a legitimate relationship. Her marriage to Arturo being a bigamous marriage considered void ab
inito under Articles 80 and 83 of the Civil Code renders her not a surviving spouse.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering
the remand of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void The decision of the Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case is affirmed.
its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is
AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court modifying its previous decision by granting one-half
(1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel,
Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's
brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that the
reception of evidence by the trial court should be limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as
the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.
The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the present
petition for forum shopping is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
FULL CASE: LLORENTE V CA represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. On November
27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of San Diego found all
G.R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000 factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce.11
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.12
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents. In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.
DECISION On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.13 Apparently, Alicia had no
knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not
PARDO, J.: oppose the marriage or cohabitation.14
The Case From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife.15 Their twenty-five
(25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.16
The case raises a conflict of laws issue.
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by
What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals1 modifying that of the Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco
Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City2 declaring respondent Alicia F. Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to
Llorente (herinafter referred to as "Alicia"), as co-owners of whatever property she and the Alicia and their three children, to wit:
deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Lorenzo") may have acquired during
the twenty-five (25) years that they lived together as husband and wife. "(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential house and
lot, located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, including ALL the personal
The Facts properties and other movables or belongings that may be found or existing therein;
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from "(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children, Raul F.
March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957.3 Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my real properties
whatsoever and wheresoever located, specifically my real properties located at Barangay Aro-
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Paula") Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras,
were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur.4 Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines
Sur;
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed
in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.5 "(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my
children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, my real
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern 188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
District of New York.6 Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal, Philippines;
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an "(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or personal
accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines.7 He discovered properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other persons, but could
that his wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and having an adulterous relationship with only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and among themselves;
his brother, Ceferino Llorente.8
"(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my Last Will and
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Testament, and in her default or incapacity of the latter to act, any of my children in the order of
Nabua as "Crisologo Llorente," with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and age, if of age;
the line for the father’s name was left blank.9
"(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should served (sic)
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple drew without bond;
a written agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the United States
Navy as part of Lorenzo’s salary and all other obligations for Paula’s daily maintenance and "(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions heretofore
support would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with executed, signed, or published, by me;
judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal
property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her "(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in the Llorente’s
adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo Side should ever bother and disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and
peacefully. The agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by my children with respect to any real or personal properties I gave and bequeathed respectively
Paula’s father and stepmother. The agreement was notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.10 to each one of them by virtue of this Last Will and Testament."17
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the
Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a
petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision.28
Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate.18
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicia’s motion for reconsideration but modified its
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator Lorenzo earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children "legitimate or otherwise" of
was still alive.19 Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by him.29 Amending its decision of May 18, 1987,
the trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate.30
probate.20
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.31
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died.21
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with modification the
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition22 for letters of administration decision of the trial court in this wise:
over Lorenzo’s estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzo’s surviving
spouse, (2) that the various property were acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzo’s will "WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her legitime and Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever properties she and the deceased may have acquired
1/2 share in the conjugal property.23 during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation.
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition "SO ORDERED."32
for the issuance of letters testamentary.24
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due decision.33
course to Paula’s petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.25
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,34 denied the motion for lack of merit.
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper "Bicol Star".26
Hence, this petition.35
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:
The Issue
"Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to the late
Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments raised,36 the
with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition of issue is simple. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled
to receive any share from the estate even if the will especially said so her relationship with We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to the trial court
Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1). for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.
"On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so The Applicable Law
declares the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void
and declares her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the
and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate and time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death,
then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surname (sic) is duly established, admitted and undisputed.
Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also entitled to the remaining free portion in
equal shares. Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.
"Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased, The Civil Code clearly provides:
Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the corresponding letters of administration issue in her favor upon
her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00 conditioned for her to make a return to the "Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
court within three (3) months a true and complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to the possession of any
other person for her, and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies and "Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
charges on the same, or such dividends thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to situated.
render a true and just account of her administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any
other time when required by the court and to perform all orders of this court by her to be "However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession
performed. and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
"On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not be whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property
granted. may be found." (emphasis ours)
"SO ORDERED."27
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized The Civil Code provides:
to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.37
"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where
the case was "referred back" to the law of the decedent’s domicile, in this case, Philippine law. "When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the
Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in shall be observed in their execution." (underscoring ours)
the same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that "American law
follows the ‘domiciliary theory’ hence, Philippine law applies when determining the validity of The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is
Lorenzo’s will.38 glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a
foreigner, not covered by our laws on "family rights and duties, status, condition and legal
First, there is no such thing as one American law.1ªwph!1 The "national law" indicated in Article capacity."44
16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law
governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State of the union Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved
has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It can therefore refer by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance
to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a resident.39 Second, there is with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly
no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State probated.
law.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the
Alice, who in the trial court’s opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of successional rights to
leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing. the decedent's national law.45
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.
whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines. The Fallo
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP
as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.
the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and
Validity of the Foreign Divorce RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N.
Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego,
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.40 we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article made final on December 4, 1952.
15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic
same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid validity of Lorenzo N. Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights
according to their national law. allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate
dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,41 that once proven that
respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the No costs.
ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right to
inherit" from him. SO ORDERED.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,42 we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects
may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed.43
We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and
recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the
succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial
court.
Going over plaintiff’s testimony which is decidedly credible, the Court finds that the defendant In his Comment19 to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that Fely’s psychological
had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of such psychological incapacity to comply with her incapacity was clearly established after a full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
marital obligations. These are her excessive disposition to material things over and above the Family Code of the Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of respondent Crasus and
marital stability. That such incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question is Fely, because the latter had already become an American citizen. He further questioned the
shown by defendant’s own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff. And for these reasons there personality of petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute
is a legal ground to declare the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the
Rosal Iyoy null and void ab initio.15 prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene on
behalf of the State, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.
Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law
and evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, this
Decision, dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible Court finds the instant Petition to be meritorious.
error therein. It even offered additional ratiocination for declaring the marriage between
respondent Crasus and Fely null and void, to wit – I
Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has remarried, and is now The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding of
permanently residing in the United States. Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this as one of psychological incapacity of Fely.
his reasons for seeking the declaration of nullity of their marriage…
Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the Family Code of the
… Philippines, reads –
Article 26 of the Family Code provides: ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological incapacity. In a series of
cases, this Court laid down guidelines for determining its existence.
"WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY
CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE In Santos v. Court of Appeals,20 the term psychological incapacity was defined, thus –
ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE
SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW." ". . . [P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision is to avoid the absurd be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68
and unjust situation of a Filipino citizen still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he or she has obtained a divorce fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
abroad. In the case at bench, the defendant has undoubtedly acquired her American husband’s has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
citizenship and thus has become an alien as well. This Court cannot see why the benefits of Art. personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
26 aforequoted can not be extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually embraces and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
another citizenship and thus becomes herself an alien. marriage is celebrated…21
It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances, plaintiff would still be The psychological incapacity must be characterized by –
considered as married to defendant, given her total incapacity to honor her marital covenants to
the former. To condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage that in truth and in fact does (a) Gravity – It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out
not exist and to remain married to a spouse who is incapacitated to discharge essential marital the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
covenants, is verily to condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage which this Court finds
abhorrent and will not countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief by affirming the (b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
trial court’s declaration of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.16 although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002,17 denied its Motion for (c) Incurability – It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the instant Petition before this Court, based on the means of the party involved.22
following arguments/grounds –
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code of with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
the Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,23 from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
which, although quite lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be reproduced below – shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.24
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,25 further clarified that there is no requirement that the
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and evidence presented during the trial.
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this Court finds that the
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity. psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage
null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not testimony, which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the absence of any
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must other corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an Certification on the recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, respondent Crasus and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the
could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem husband’s surname. Even considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its respondent Crasus’s Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that prevented her from assuming the essential
and clinical psychologists. obligations of marriage.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. spouse.26 Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not the said Article.27
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 "is not to be confused
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job… with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume."28
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed respondent
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element Crasus and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment
in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and of respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her American
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. family and her American surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to
comply with her marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified. If the
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same psychological or mental defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable. While the personal
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration
of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in Court’s ruling in Marcos v. Marcos,29 respondent Crasus must still have complied with the
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts… requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina30 that the root cause of the
incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its incapacitating nature be fully
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to explained.
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.31 No less than defender of the land, then his intervention in such proceedings could only serve and contribute
the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social to the realization of such intent, rather than thwart it.
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.32
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized to bring or defend
II actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought
before this Court or the Court of Appeals.35 While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar. actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of
nullity of marriage before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines – is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be eventually responsible for
taking the case to the appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is and practical that even while the proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the Office of the
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Solicitor General can already exercise supervision and control over the conduct of the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee the protection of the interests of the
State.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple
getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the Solicitor General in several
celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case cases for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages that were appealed before it,
of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was summarized as follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta36 –
still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her
Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this Court laid down the
she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which
the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle counsel for the State:
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws
on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
Crasus. his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
III from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for [Id., at 213]
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)] reiterated its
Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent Crasus argued that only pronouncement in Republic v. Court of Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the prosecuting
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State…37
proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages; hence, the Office of the Solicitor
General had no personality to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48 provides – Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,38 which became effective on 15 March 2003,
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall should dispel any other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority of the Solicitor General
order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. The Rule recognizes the authority of the
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not Solicitor General to intervene and take part in the proceedings for annulment and declaration of
fabricated or suppressed. nullity of marriages before the RTC and on appeal to higher courts. The pertinent provisions of
the said Rule are reproduced below –
That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office
from intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. –
Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor
General as the principal law officer and legal defender of the Government.33 His Office is tasked …
to represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its
officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of (4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of
lawyers. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the
and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers.34 date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the same period.
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the …
State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of Sec. 18. Memoranda. – The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in
evidence; and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda in support
of their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of
the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State.
No other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the On her Answer, Fely alleged that while she did file for divorce from respondent Crasus, she
period herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the denied having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed
memoranda. divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American
husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her American
Sec. 19. Decision. – husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her status shall be governed by the
law of her present nationality. Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to respondent
… Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she
advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served with litigation expenses.
copies of the decision personally or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by
publication failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be published The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Crasus and Fely null and void ab ignition on
once in a newspaper of general circulation. the ground of psychological incapacity. One factor considered by the RTC is that Fely obtained a
divorce decree in the United States of America and married another man and has established
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the parties. another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife
Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by who is already married to another man in another country. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
any of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General. trial court’s decision.
(2) Notice of Appeal. – An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the decision 1. Whether or not abandonment and sexual infidelity constitute psychological incapacity.
by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for
reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the 2. Whether or not the divorce instituted by Fely abroad was valid.
adverse parties.
RULING:
Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and the
Court of Appeals, and sustains the validity and existence of the marriage between respondent 1st issue:
Crasus and Fely. At most, Fely’s abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent
Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, The totality of evidence presented during the trial is insufficient to support the finding of
but not for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court psychological incapacity of Fely. Using the guidelines established by the cases of Santos,
commiserates with respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is now a Molina and Marcos, this Court found that the totality of evidence presented by respondent
hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of those situations where neither law nor society can Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely;
provide the specific answer to every individual problem.39 therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code of the Philippines. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological
Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED and SET incapacity under the said Article.
ASIDE.
2nd issue:
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and
subsisting. As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple
getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was
SO ORDERED. celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case
of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was
still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her
CASE DIGEST: Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after
she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In
FACTS: the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time
she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle
Crasus Iyoy married Fely on December 16, 1961 in Cebu City. They begot five children. After embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws
the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was “hot-tempered, a on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already
nagger and extravagant.” In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce
(U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children to the care of respondent Crasus. Sometime in 1985, between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent
respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got Crasus.
married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. Fely had five visits in Cebu City
but never met Crasus. Also, she had been openly using the surname of her American husband The Supreme Court held that the marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-
in the Philippines and in the USA. Crasus filed a declaration of nullity of marriage on March 25, Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.
1997.
FULL CASE: REPUBLIC V ORBECIDO governs respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of
judicial determination.6
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry,
vs. he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent. Constitution.7
DECISION At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually
constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
QUISUMBING, J.: Court provides:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a RULE 63
foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the
Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law? DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law. written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution2 dated July 4, validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein
respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision ...
reads:
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party
and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial
given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law. determination.8
IT IS SO ORDERED.3 This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two
Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows. remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner
representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief,
of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination
daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of
his second marriage.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years
later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply
to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?
and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at
5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California. Brief Historical Background
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209,
2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof
granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General states:
(OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law: country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY
CODE4 On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227
was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a
petition for annulment or for legal separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they
come within its spirit or intent.12
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied) spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife 26 as follows:
was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her
capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A. 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops’
Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
Article 26:
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the capacitating the latter to remarry.
spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the
those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly,
divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law only after the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case.
more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.) Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
Legislative Intent We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is
to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal
Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by
Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is
Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine evidence.13
law.
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be
parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
naturalization? demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.14 Such foreign law must also be proved
as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.11 In Quita, alleged and proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows
the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no
naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no
longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry. Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried,
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence
time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed CASE DIGEST:
Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE. Republic v. Orbecido
G.R. No. 154380, 5 October 2005
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. FACTS:
Orbecido filed a petition for authority to remarry under the Article 26 (2) of the
Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the lower
court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
ISSUE:
RULING:
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007 Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner, exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in
vs. New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent. presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus,
DECISION she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13
Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12, paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate
1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3 Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in
134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners’ motion for derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.
reconsideration.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted
three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration.
born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the
Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. petition and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed
moot and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.
Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even
(U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on date, Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for
December 14, 1973. 6 reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it was based.
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition.
Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but lived with
her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992. On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position
papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his
settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their
administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M- position papers on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the
decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in
that the decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters
marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It
and exclusive, valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not
unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that
letters of administration be issued to her. paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would
impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first
marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
said motions were denied. 28 administration.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has
trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states: legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby The petition lacks merit.
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are
REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the
proceedings. 29 estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he
resides at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of the doctrinal rule for determining the residence – as contradistinguished from domicile – of the
residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a
person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo [T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic
Thus, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City. and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even
of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence"
validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed
capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus – or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual
With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an
enactment of E.O. No. 227, — there is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view — inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an
sweeping statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though;
contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts however, the residence must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to the
express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the
December 14, 1992, 32 the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and
Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the deceased and petitioner should not Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless
be denominated as "a bigamous marriage. to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence"
for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one
institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33 has the intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of
Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which were denied by residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile
the Court of Appeals. provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a
person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari. 35
Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was granted. 36 In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale
petition for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death, 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She
Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in also presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General
Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38 "residence" is synonymous Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100
with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of
return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47
never changed his domicile, the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased’s children to him at his Alabang
Sta. Cruz, Laguna. address, and the deceased’s calling cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at "100 San
Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in "Provincial
Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
because it was performed during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage to Merry Lee. They
argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes
rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of
administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by
over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on
Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code
Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in provisions were still in effect.
Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was
validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the
Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition for letters of between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a
administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien
spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner
to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in
Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis relation to Article 26. 61
allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and legislative intent
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:
wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the
latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that Brief Historical Background
his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court,
however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209,
the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus: otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof
states:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799: country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227
free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second
bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party,
as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage." ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
conjugal property. 53
xxxx
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be Legislative Intent
considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her
marital duties and obligations. It held: Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo,
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 54 (Emphasis held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines,
added) and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. 63
(Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized the
validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly
proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2,
severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial
hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56 precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A.,
of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family
obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with
possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws
marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien as they must be alleged and proved. 73
spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Court’s rulings in the
cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless,
country if the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of
the Court stated: administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties
that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by
its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted
judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in
should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the part:
legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of
the legislature, is to render justice. SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of administration
must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law
and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as
while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be
peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75
functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do
instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in
law is obeyed. the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by
petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she
worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs
"Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit
Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them." of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired
by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
xxxx governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property
be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions
render every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77
and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of
its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the
presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article
justice. 69 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as
husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took
Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the property regime under this provision as
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records follows:
show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee
as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally
Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies
divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-
proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or
132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody be presumed to be equal.
of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign xxxx
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the
seal of his office. 71 In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-
ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna.
property is essential. x x x
Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal
pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her
competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and
not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x 81 marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. The Court
of Appeals reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court, and,
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for
letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-
hence, the case before the Supreme Court.
owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
Issue:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and
affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’
motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for
reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further letters of administration
proceedings.
SO ORDERED. Held:
CASE DIGEST: Respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct
interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the
G.R. No. 133743. February 6, 2007. existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the
validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to
Facts: prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws
of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property
San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of relations between parties who live together as husband and wife
Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the
The first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of
which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall
Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co- ownership, it is not
Felicisimo. The second was Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor,
son, Tobias; and Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, with efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima
whom he had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.
years from the time of their marriage up to his death. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed
equal, unless the contrary is proven.
Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, Morover, the Supreme Court founnd that respondent’s legal capacity
1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before the to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 146. her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co- owner under
Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
Thereater, the heirs of Virginia Sulit filed a motion to dismiss on the
grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. But The order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion
the trial court issued an order denying the two motions to dismiss. On to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed
September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is affirmed. It was also
administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
FULL CASE: YASIN V SHARIA DISTRICT COURT provisions of Rule 103, Rules of Court on change of name is necessary if the petition is to be
granted as it would result in the resumption of the use of petitioner's maiden name and surname.
G.R. No. 94986 February 23, 1995
Hence, this petition alleging that respondent court erred in applying Rule 103 of the Rules of
HATIMA C. YASIN, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, HADJI HASAN S. CENTI, petitioner, Court to the instant case.
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT THIRD SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT, In his Comment dated June 14, 1991, the respondent court, among others, contends:
Zamboanga City, respondent.
5. . . . (R)espondent court is of the honest opinion that the said petition is substantially
RESOLUTION one for change of name, particularly of surname — Hatima C. Yasin to Hatima Centi y Saul, the
latter being her maiden name and surname. Her reasons: The (1) dissolution of her marriage,
and (2) her legal right to resume the use of her maiden name and surname. In effect, if petition is
BIDIN, J.: granted, it will result in the resumption of the use of her surname.
On May 5, 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a "Petition Moreover, the use of surnames is governed by law (Arts. 364-380, Title XIII, New Civil Code).
to resume the use of maiden name" (Sp. Proc. No. 06-3). The petition reads: This is the substantive requirements. And as to procedural requirements, no person can change
his name or surname without judicial authority (Art. 376, Civil Code of the Philippines) (Emphasis
1. That she is of legal age, a divorcee, a Muslin Filipino and a resident of Suterville, supplied). Change of name under judicial authorization is governed by Rule 103 of the Revised
Zamboanga City, Philippines, and is duly represented in this act by her elder brother and Rules of Court. Under Sec. 1 of said rule: "a person desiring to change his name shall present
attorney-in-fact, HADJI HASAN S. CENTI by virtue of an instrument of a Special Power of the petition to the Court of First Instance of the province (now RTC) in which he resides, or in the
Attorney, original copy of which is hereto attached and marked as Annex "A" hereof; City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court." The State has an interest in the
names borne by individual and entities for purposes of identification. A change of name is a
2. That she was formerly married to a certain Hadji Idris Yasin, also a Muslim Filipino in privilege and not a matter of right. Therefore, before a person can be authorized to change his
accordance with Muslim rites and customs, and who is now residing at Barangay Recodo, name (given him either in his birth certificate or civil registry), he must show proper or compelling
Zamboanga City, but sometime on March 13, 1984, they were granted a decree of divorce by reason, which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied (Ong Peng
the Mindanao Islamic Center Foundation, Inc., in accordance with Islamic Law, the divorce rites Oan v. Republic, 102 Phil. 468) (See: Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, Vol. I, 8th
was officiated by Ustadz Sharif Jain Jali as evidenced by his Certification, dated march 13, 1984, Ed., 1978, pp. 739-740). (Rollo, pp. 46-47)
copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "B" to form an integral part hereof;
The basic issue to be resolved is: whether or not in the case of annulment of marriage, or
3. That, thereafter the former husband Hadji Idris Yasin contracted another marriage to divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and the husband is married
another woman; again to another woman and the former desires to resume her maiden name or surname, is she
required to file a petition for change of name and comply with the formal requirements of Rule
WHEREFORE, invoking the provisions of Article 143, par. 1(c) of Presidential Decree No. 1083 103 of the Rules of Court.
in relation to Article 371 (2) of the New Civil Code, and after due notice and hearing, it is most
respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that petitioner be allowed to resume the use of her Stated otherwise, the issue is: whether or not a petition for resumption of maiden name and
maiden name Hatima Centi y Saul. surname is also a petition for change of name.
On July 4, 1990, the respondent court issued an order which reads as follows: The Court rules in the negative.
It patently appearing that the petition filed is not sufficient in form and substance in accordance The true and real name of a person is that given to him and entered in the civil register (Chomi v.
with Section 2(a) and 3, Rule 103, Rules of Court, regarding the residence of petitioner and the Local Civil Register of Manila, 99 Phil. 1004 [1956]; Ng Yao Siong v. Republic, 16 SCRA 483
name sought to be adopted is not properly indicated in the title thereof which should include all [1966]; Rendora v. Republic, 35 SCRA 262 [1970]; Pabellar v. Republic, 70 SCRA 16 [1976]).
the names by which the petitioner has been known (Ng Yao Siong v. Republic of the Philippines,
L-20306, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA [483]; Go v. Republic of the Philippines, L-31760, May 25, While it is true that under Article 376 of the Civil Code, no person can change his name or
1977; Pabellar v. Republic, L-27298, march 4, 1976), the pleading must be rectified accordingly. surname without judicial authority, nonetheless, the only name that may be changed is the true
and official name recorded in the Civil Register. Thus, this Court in Ng Yao Siong v. Republic (16
WHEREFORE, petitioner is hereby ordered to effect the necessary amendment of the petition SCRA 483 [1966]), held:
within one (1) week from receipt hereof so as to reflect the formal requirements adverted to.
(Rollo, p. 9) In a proceeding for a change of name the following question may crop up: What is the name to
be changed? By Article 408 of the Civil Code a person's birth must be entered in the civil
Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order alleging that the petition filed is register. So it is, that the civil register records his name. That name in the civil register, for legal
not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but is merely a petition to resume the use of her purposes, is his real name. And correctly so, because the civil register is an official record of the
maiden name and surname after the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of civil status of persons. A name given to a person in the church record or elsewhere or by which
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (P.D. No. 1083), and after marriage of her former he is known in the community — when at variance with that entered in the civil register — is
husband to another woman. unofficial and cannot be recognized as his real name.
The motion was denied by the respondent court in an order dated August 10, 1990, on the
ground that the petition is substantially for change of name and that compliance with the
We therefore rule that for the purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376 of
the Civil Code, the only name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the According to Tolentino:
civil register.
. . . Under the present article of our Code, however, the word "may" is used, indicating that the
Petitioner's registered name is Hatima Centi Y. Saul. In the instant petition, petitioner does not use of the husband's surname by the wife is permissive rather than obligatory. We have no law
seek to change her registered maiden name but, instead, prays that she be allowed to resume which provides that the wife shall change her name to that of the husband upon marriage. This
the use of her maiden name in view of the dissolution of her marriage to Hadji Idris Yasin, by is in consonance with the principle that surnames indicate descent. It seems, therefore, that a
virtue of a decree of divorce granted in accordance with Muslim law. married woman may use only her maiden name and surname. She has an option, but not a duty,
to use the surname of the husband in any of the ways provided by this Article. (Tolentino, Civil
Divorce (talaq) is defined in PD 1086, the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, as Code of the Philippines, Vol. I, p. 724, 1983 ed.)
follows:
When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her
Art. 45. Definition and forms. — Divorce is the formal dissolution of the marriage bond in husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by adding her
accordance with this Code to be granted only after exhaustion of all possible means of husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil
reconciliation between the spouses. It may be effected by: Code). Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of
the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek
(a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq); judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the
use of her former husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her (Tolentino, Civil Code, p.
xxx xxx xxx 725, 1983 ed.; Art. 373, Civil Code). When petitioner married her husband, she did not change
her name but only her civil status. Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use
(c) Judicial decree ( faskh). the surname of her husband after the marriage as no law requires it.
Divorce (talaq or faskh) severs the marriage bond. Thus, Article 54 of PD 1086 provides: In view of the foregoing considerations, We find the petition to resume the use of maiden name
filed by petitioner before the respondent court a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since
Art. 54. Effects of irrevocable talaq or faskh. — A talaq or faskh, as soon as it become the law requires her to do so as her former husband is already married to another woman after
irrevocable, shall have the following effects: obtaining a decree of divorce from her in accordance with Muslim laws.
(a) The marriage bond shall be severed and the spouses may contract another marriage Although there is no legal prohibition against obtaining a judicial confirmation of a legal right,
in accordance with this Code; nevertheless, no law or rule provides for the procedure by which such confirmation may be
obtained. In view of such circumstances, the onerous requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of
The divorce becomes irrevocable after observance of a period of waiting called idda (Art. 56, PD Court on change of name should not be applied to judicial confirmation of the right of a divorced
1086) the duration of which is 3 monthly courses after termination of the marriage by divorce woman to resume her maiden name and surname. In the absence of a specific rule or provision
(Art. 57[b], PD 1083). Under Article 187, PD 1083, the Civil Code of the Philippines, the Rules of governing such a proceeding, where sufficient facts have been alleged supported by competent
Court and other existing laws, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this proof as annexes, which appear to be satisfactory to the court, such petition for confirmation of
Code (the Code of Muslim Personal Laws), shall be applied suppletorily. change of civil status and/or to resume the use of maiden name must be given due course and
summarily granted as in fact it is a right conferred by law.
Even under the Civil Code, the use of the husband's surname during the marriage (Art. 370, Civil
Code), after annulment of the marriage (Art. 371, Civil Code) and after the death of the husband While the petition filed in the instant case leaves much to be desired in matters of form and
(Art. 373, Civil Code) is permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation (Art. averment of concise statements of ultimate facts constituting the petitioner's cause of action,
372, Civil Code). Thus, Articles 370 and 371 of the Civil Code provides: nevertheless, giving it a most liberal construction, the petition suffices to convey the petitioner's
desire and prayer to resume her maiden surname on grounds of her divorce from her former
Art. 370. A married woman may use: husband and subsequent marriage of the latter to another woman.
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or The remand of this case to the trial court would only delay the final disposition of this case and
would not serve the public interest. We have consistently ruled that the remand of the case to a
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary if this Court can already resolve the
dispute on the basis of the records before it (Dimayuga v. PCIB, 200 SCRA 143 [1991]; Board of
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as Liquidators v. Zulueta, 115 SCRA 548 [1982]: Quisumbing v. CA, 120 SCRA 703 [1983]).
"Mrs."
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the orders of respondent court dated July 4, 1990
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her and August 10, 1990 are hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioner is authorized to resume her maiden
maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name name and surname.
and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname,
unless: SO ORDERED.
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno,
Kapunan, Mendoza, and Francisco, JJ., concur.
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Separate Opinions In recognition of the increasing clamor of women worldwide for equality, the 1987 Constitution
laid down the basic policy with respect to the standing of women and men in the eyes of the law,
thus:
ROMERO, J., concurring: Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
From birth, a person's identity is established by his name. Although oftener used by others in
addressing him, he identifies himself with this name, such that in his mind, he not only has a If it means anything at all, it signifies that women, no less than men, shall enjoy the same rights
name but he is that name. accorded by law and this includes the freedom of choice in the use of names upon marriage. To
give substance and meaning to the policy, laws have been enacted by Congress, and rules and
Thus, to set him apart from the rest of mankind, he makes certain that people know him by the regulations issued by administrative agencies, notably Republic Act No. 7192 "promoting the
name his parents have given him from birth. Recognizing the implications of confused identities, integration of women as full and equal partners of men in development and nation building. . . ."
the law requires the registration of a newly-born infant's name along with the fact of birth
reflective of his civil status. As a badge of identity, one's name is protected by law from Whatever rights or opportunities used to be denied to women in categorical language or due to
usurpation1 or unauthorized or unlawful use by others. 2 Not only this, a person is prohibited by ambiguity or implied from long-continued practice or custom, are now clearly granted to them,
law from using different names and surnames. 3 An alias or assumed name may be used for such as the right to "enter into contracts which shall in every respect be equal to that of men
business purposes provided this is duly registered. 4 In the event that one employs pen names under similar circumstance,"7 equal membership in clubs,8 admission to military schools,9
or stage names, this must be done in good faith and there should be no injury to third persons.5 voluntary PAG-IBIG, GSIS and SSS Coverage 10 and others.
During elections, only votes bearing names registered by a candidate are to be counted in his
favor. Indeed, the man of law parts ways with the poet who rhetorically asks: Now that doors hitherto closed to them have been flung open with the approbation and active
collaboration of men, should we refuse to recognize their right to the continued used of their
What's in a name? (maiden) name and surname even after marriage, without doubt a comparatively minor
concession? Other than the bruising of the male ego, there can hardly be any legal injury or
A rose by any other name smells as sweet. damage resulting to personal, property or contractual rights of the husbands.
So fraught with complications is the use of an individual of another name that, in case he In many countries, the trend is for married women to retain their maiden names. Even in the
decides to change it, the law requires him to seek judicial permission to do so, even if it be Philippines, the use of the title "Ms." to refer to women in general, whether single, married,
merely to rectify an error committed in one's birth or baptismal records, unless it be an widowed or separated, has gained acceptance.
innocuous clerical error.6
Where, however, a woman voluntarily assumes her husband's family name upon marriage, the
On instance where tradition or custom, even more than law, sanctions the use of another or an dissolution of the matrimonial bonds consequent upon the granting of absolute divorce or the
additional name is the adoption by a woman who gets married of her husband's name. In certain declaration of nullity of marriage or its annulment, provides legal ground for the automatic
cultures, this signifies her formal joining of her husband's family, on the one hand, and on the dropping of said family name and the resumption of the use of her maiden name. This is but in
other, her acceptance therein. recognition of the change of her civil status from "married" to "unmarried." Such right should not
be begrudged her, whether her former husband contracts another union or not.
Conceding the importance of laying down rules as regards the use of names resulting from the
contracting of marriage, or its breakup, the Civil Code has provided for each eventuality. For I could not agree more with the enlightened ponencia of my respected colleague who, being a
instance, Art. 370 gives a married woman certain options with respect to the change of name Muslim like the petitioner, is in the best position to understand the customs, mores and
reflective of the change of her civil status, without need of recourse to judicial process: practices, as well as the feelings of the men and women of his faith.
Art. 370. A married woman may use: I concur with my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Abdulwahid A. Bidin, on his well-written
ponencia. Allow me, nonetheless, to express my views, in general, on the use of surnames by
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or married women.
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or The accepted rule is that a person may only use his own name and surname. One exception
involves a married woman. When a woman marries, the law, or what I believe to be its
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as intendment, would appear to mandate, in brief outline, thusly —
"Mrs." (Emphasis supplied)
A. During the existence of the marriage, she may choose to use any of the following
It is to be noted that the introductory sentences uses the directory "may" instead of the names:
mandatory "shall." Its obvious intendment is that the married woman, if she chooses to, need not
use her husband's surname. Clearly, no law prohibits her from continuing to use her maiden (1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
name and surname if she wishes to; or for that matter, to resume the same even as she uses
her husband's family name during matrimony, as long as there is disclosure and no fraudulent (2) Her maiden first name and husband's surname, or
intent.
(3) Her husband's full name but must prefix a word to indicate that she is his wife (Art. ROMERO, J., concurring:
370, Civil Code).
From birth, a person's identity is established by his name. Although oftener used by others in
Notes: addressing him, he identifies himself with this name, such that in his mind, he not only has a
name but he is that name.
(1) It is mandatory that the husband's surname should, in any of the above options, be
somehow used. Thus, to set him apart from the rest of mankind, he makes certain that people know him by the
name his parents have given him from birth. Recognizing the implications of confused identities,
Interestingly, in one of the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee at the U.P. Law the law requires the registration of a newly-born infant's name along with the fact of birth
Center (participated in by Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, Justice Ricardo C. Puno, Justice Eduardo reflective of his civil status. As a badge of identity, one's name is protected by law from
Caguioa, Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Atty. Ofelia Calcetes-Santos, Dean Fortunato Gupit and usurpation1 or unauthorized or unlawful use by others. 2 Not only this, a person is prohibited by
Dean Jose C. Vitug), a proposal to allow a married woman to use her maiden name and law from using different names and surnames. 3 An alias or assumed name may be used for
surname (after noting the provision of Sec. 14, Article II, of the Constitution which expresses the business purposes provided this is duly registered. 4 In the event that one employs pen names
"fundamental equality before the law of women and men") was turned down by the Committee. or stage names, this must be done in good faith and there should be no injury to third persons.5
During elections, only votes bearing names registered by a candidate are to be counted in his
(2) In case of legal separation, the wife must continue using her name and surname favor. Indeed, the man of law parts ways with the poet who rhetorically asks:
employed before the decree of legal separation (Art. 372, Civil Code), i.e., she may not at will
revert to her maiden name and surname (Laperal vs. Republic, 6 SCRA 357). What's in a name?
B. In the event of annulment of marriage — A rose by any other name smells as sweet.
(1) If the wife is adjudged to be the guilty party, she must resume her maiden name and So fraught with complications is the use of an individual of another name that, in case he
surname, but decides to change it, the law requires him to seek judicial permission to do so, even if it be
merely to rectify an error committed in one's birth or baptismal records, unless it be an
(2) If the wife is the innocent party — innocuous clerical error.6
(i) She may resume her maiden name and surname, or On instance where tradition or custom, even more than law, sanctions the use of another or an
additional name is the adoption by a woman who gets married of her husband's name. In certain
(ii) She may choose o continue using her husband's surname unless — cultures, this signifies her formal joining of her husband's family, on the one hand, and on the
other, her acceptance therein.
(a) The court decrees otherwise, or
Conceding the importance of laying down rules as regards the use of names resulting from the
(b) She or he remarries (Art. 371, Civil Code). contracting of marriage, or its breakup, the Civil Code has provided for each eventuality. For
instance, Art. 370 gives a married woman certain options with respect to the change of name
C. In case of death of the husband — The widow may use her husband's surname (Art. reflective of the change of her civil status, without need of recourse to judicial process:
373, Civil Code), or resume her maiden name and surname (pursuant to the general rule).
It provides:
D. In case of divorce —
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
The rule has been held to be akin to Item C (death of husband), i.e., she may use her husband's
surname (Tolentino vs. Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 66) or resume her maiden name and (1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
surname (general rule).
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or
Note: It would seem preferable to have this situation governed instead by the rules on annulment
where we would distinguish between a case where the wife gives cause for divorce (annulment) (3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as
and the instance when she is the innocent party. "Mrs." (Emphasis supplied)
E. In case of declaration of nullity of marriage — No marriage having, or being deemed to It is to be noted that the introductory sentences uses the directory "may" instead of the
have, technically existed, the general rule, i.e., that she may only use her own name and mandatory "shall." Its obvious intendment is that the married woman, if she chooses to, need not
surname, should apply, but if she has, in fact, theretofore used the husband's surname, she use her husband's surname. Clearly, no law prohibits her from continuing to use her maiden
obviously should cease from such use upon the finality of the decree of nullity. name and surname if she wishes to; or for that matter, to resume the same even as she uses
her husband's family name during matrimony, as long as there is disclosure and no fraudulent
intent.
In recognition of the increasing clamor of women worldwide for equality, the 1987 Constitution
laid down the basic policy with respect to the standing of women and men in the eyes of the law,
Separate Opinions thus:
Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the (1) It is mandatory that the husband's surname should, in any of the above options, be
fundamental equality before the law of women and men. somehow used.
If it means anything at all, it signifies that women, no less than men, shall enjoy the same rights Interestingly, in one of the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee at the U.P. Law
accorded by law and this includes the freedom of choice in the use of names upon marriage. To Center (participated in by Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, Justice Ricardo C. Puno, Justice Eduardo
give substance and meaning to the policy, laws have been enacted by Congress, and rules and Caguioa, Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Atty. Ofelia Calcetes-Santos, Dean Fortunato Gupit and
regulations issued by administrative agencies, notably Republic Act No. 7192 "promoting the Dean Jose C. Vitug), a proposal to allow a married woman to use her maiden name and
integration of women as full and equal partners of men in development and nation building. . . ." surname (after noting the provision of Sec. 14, Article II, of the Constitution which expresses the
"fundamental equality before the law of women and men") was turned down by the Committee.
Whatever rights or opportunities used to be denied to women in categorical language or due to
ambiguity or implied from long-continued practice or custom, are now clearly granted to them, (2) In case of legal separation, the wife must continue using her name and surname
such as the right to "enter into contracts which shall in every respect be equal to that of men employed before the decree of legal separation (Art. 372, Civil Code), i.e., she may not at will
under similar circumstance,"7 equal membership in clubs,8 admission to military schools,9 revert to her maiden name and surname (Laperal vs. Republic, 6 SCRA 357).
voluntary PAG-IBIG, GSIS and SSS Coverage 10 and others.
B. In the event of annulment of marriage —
Now that doors hitherto closed to them have been flung open with the approbation and active
collaboration of men, should we refuse to recognize their right to the continued used of their (1) If the wife is adjudged to be the guilty party, she must resume her maiden name and
(maiden) name and surname even after marriage, without doubt a comparatively minor surname, but
concession? Other than the bruising of the male ego, there can hardly be any legal injury or
damage resulting to personal, property or contractual rights of the husbands. (2) If the wife is the innocent party —
In many countries, the trend is for married women to retain their maiden names. Even in the (i) She may resume her maiden name and surname, or
Philippines, the use of the title "Ms." to refer to women in general, whether single, married,
widowed or separated, has gained acceptance. (ii) She may choose o continue using her husband's surname unless —
Where, however, a woman voluntarily assumes her husband's family name upon marriage, the (a) The court decrees otherwise, or
dissolution of the matrimonial bonds consequent upon the granting of absolute divorce or the
declaration of nullity of marriage or its annulment, provides legal ground for the automatic (b) She or he remarries (Art. 371, Civil Code).
dropping of said family name and the resumption of the use of her maiden name. This is but in
recognition of the change of her civil status from "married" to "unmarried." Such right should not C. In case of death of the husband — The widow may use her husband's surname (Art.
be begrudged her, whether her former husband contracts another union or not. 373, Civil Code), or resume her maiden name and surname (pursuant to the general rule).
I could not agree more with the enlightened ponencia of my respected colleague who, being a D. In case of divorce —
Muslim like the petitioner, is in the best position to understand the customs, mores and
practices, as well as the feelings of the men and women of his faith. The rule has been held to be akin to Item C (death of husband), i.e., she may use her husband's
surname (Tolentino vs. Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 66) or resume her maiden name and
VITUG, J., concurring: surname (general rule).
I concur with my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Abdulwahid A. Bidin, on his well-written Note: It would seem preferable to have this situation governed instead by the rules on annulment
ponencia. Allow me, nonetheless, to express my views, in general, on the use of surnames by where we would distinguish between a case where the wife gives cause for divorce (annulment)
married women. and the instance when she is the innocent party.
The accepted rule is that a person may only use his own name and surname. One exception
involves a married woman. When a woman marries, the law, or what I believe to be its D. In case of declaration of nullity of marriage — No marriage having, or being deemed to
intendment, would appear to mandate, in brief outline, thusly — have, technically existed, the general rule, i.e., that she may only use her own name
and surname, should apply, but if she has, in fact, theretofore used the husband's
A. During the existence of the marriage, she may choose to use any of the following surname, she obviously should cease from such use upon the finality of the decree of
names: nullity.
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(3) Her husband's full name but must prefix a word to indicate that she is his wife (Art.
370, Civil Code).
Notes:
FULL CASE: GARCIA V RECIO Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon,
Rizal, on March 1, 1987. 4 They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18,
1989, 5 a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian
family court.
G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001
DECISION
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were
PANGANIBAN, J.: divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.
9cräläwvirtualibräry
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage 10 in the
the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our court a quo, on the ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondents
the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
law on evidence.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his
The Case prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution. 11 He contended that his first marriage to an
Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989;
12 thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the
January 7, 1999 Decision 1 and the March 24, 1999 Order 2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026AF. The assailed Decision disposed as On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couples wedding and while the suit for the
follows: declaration of nullity was pending -- respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a
family court in Sydney, Australia because the marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down.
13cräläwvirtualibräry
WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A.
Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can
now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties.3cräläwvirtualibräry Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it stated
no cause of action. 14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent. 15 The court
marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both parties. 16 After they submitted their
respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution. 17cräläwvirtualibräry
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
The Facts
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two
Issues pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and
(2) whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our
ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the
respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to
contract a second marriage with the petitioner. First Issue:
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha
legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioners Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 20 petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like
marriage to the respondent any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the
existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree
itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages
solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case. celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the
conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the marriage
was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion.
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. 21 A
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad,
the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case. because of Articles 15 22 and 17 23 of the Civil Code. 24 In mixed marriages involving a Filipino
and a foreigner, Article 26 25 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry. 26 A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens presumptive
27cräläwvirtualibräry legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise,
the same shall not affect their persons.
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can
be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document -
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. 28 - a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its
Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it authenticity and due execution.
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 29
Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply
with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These
articles read as follows: Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven
as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested 33 by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept
in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 34cräläwvirtualibräry
specify the following:
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one
xxx issued by an Australian family court. 35 However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with
the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;
Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in
evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had
not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. 36 The trial court ruled that it
xxx was admissible, subject to petitioners qualification. 37 Hence, it was admitted in evidence and
accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to object properly rendered the divorce
decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. 38cräläwvirtualibräry
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant
shall be required to
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary;
respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian
citizenship in 1992. 39 Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with
the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. 40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant
protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an
shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required in the last
Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had
preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the
tied him to Philippine personal laws.
absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her
previous marriage. x x x.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a
fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. 41 In civil cases, plaintiffs 1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the
have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy.48cräläwvirtualibräry
the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer
when they introduce new matters. 42 Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the
burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national
law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. 43 Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondents capacity to remarry despite the paucity of
Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among evidence on this matter.
those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. 44 The
power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the
subject should be resolved in the negative.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption
or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39 49 of the Rules of
Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce
Second Issue: Respondents Legal Capacity to Remarry decree obtained under Australian laws.
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
incapacitated to marry her in 1994. Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence, was not submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its
adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law. absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
Respondents contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of
dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been
types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly
or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the
leaves the bond in full force. 45 There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was part of the alien applicant for a marriage license. 50cräläwvirtualibräry
procured by respondent.
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or provisional marry petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits
judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit A Complaint; 51 (b) Exhibit B
absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia
reconciliation is effected. 46cräläwvirtualibräry (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija; 52 (c) Exhibit C Certificate of
Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1,
1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila; 53 (d) Exhibit D Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City
Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson May 16, 1996: In accordance to the Statutory Declarations secured in Australia, their
was in its records; 54 and (e) Exhibit E Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio; conjugal assets were divided
55 (2) for respondent: (a) Exhibit 1 -- Amended Answer; 56 (b) Exhibit 2 Family Law Act 1975 March 3, 1998: Garcia-Recio filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia; 57 (c) Exhibit 3 Certificate
on the ground of bigamy claiming she only learned of the prior marriage in November,
of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio; 58 (d) Exhibit 4 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of
Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate; 59 and Exhibit 5 -- Statutory Declaration of 1997
the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, Recio prayed in his answer that it be dismissed for no cause of action
1995. 60cräläwvirtualibräry RTC: marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid
and recognized in the Philippines
ISSUE: W/N the divorce between Recio and Samson was valid and proven
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized
Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree HELD: NO. Remand the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence
with petitioners contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto
which conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in
clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient
evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy
his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Divorces:
1. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce
obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code.
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on 2. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family
the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is
capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry."
the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, 3. A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized
which show petitioners legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo
may declare a nullity of the parties marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in
in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.
evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it
Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
12, 1994. allowing it
o legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party
concerned
o A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself
WHEREFORE , in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the § The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an officially body or
case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show tribunal of a foreign country
respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties
o Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document
marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either:
1. an official publication; or
2. a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document.
SO ORDERED. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:
1. accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer
CASE DIGEST: in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept; and
FACTS: 2. authenticated by the seal of his office
Grace J. Garcia-Recio (2nd mariage) ----- Rederick A. Recio à Editha Samson (Wife) Since the divorce was a defense raised by Recio, the burden of proving the pertinent
Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him
March 1, 1987: Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a
Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types:
May 18, 1989: a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued 1. absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii - terminates the marriage
by an Australian family court 2. limited divorce or a mensa et thoro - suspends it and leaves the bond in full force
June 26, 1992: Recio became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Recio presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree – a conditional or provisional
Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government judgment of divorce
January 12, 1994: Recio married Grace j. Garcia, a Filipino, in Cabanatuan City. o On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
Recio declared himself as "single" and "Filipino." "1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute
October 22, 1995: Recio and Grace J. Garcia ak.a. Garcia-Recio begun to live (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy."
separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage
FULL CASE: ROEHR V RODRIGUEZ In view of said decree, petitioner filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on May 20, 1999 on the
ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or suit as a
WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, decree of divorce had already been promulgated dissolving the marriage of petitioner and
vs. private respondent.
MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding
Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondents. On July 14, 1999, Judge Guevara-Salonga issued an order granting petitioner’s motion to
dismiss. Private respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the
QUISUMBING, J.: case proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the
distribution of the properties between petitioner and private respondent.
At the core of the present controversy are issues of (a) grave abuse of discretion allegedly
committed by public respondent and (b) lack of jurisdiction of the regional trial court, in matters On August 18, 1999, an Opposition to the Motion for Partial Reconsideration was filed by the
that spring from a divorce decree obtained abroad by petitioner. petitioner on the ground that there is nothing to be done anymore in the instant case as the
marital tie between petitioner Wolfgang Roehr and respondent Ma. Carmen D. Rodriguez had
In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner assails (a) the order1 dated September 30, already been severed by the decree of divorce promulgated by the Court of First Instance of
1999 of public respondent Judge Josefina Guevara-Salonga, Presiding Judge of Makati Hamburg, Germany on December 16, 1997 and in view of the fact that said decree of divorce
Regional Trial Court,2 Branch 149, in Civil Case No. 96-1389 for declaration of nullity of had already been recognized by the RTC in its order of July 14, 1999, through the
marriage, and (b) the order3 dated March 31, 2000 denying his motion for reconsideration. The implementation of the mandate of Article 26 of the Family Code,10 endowing the petitioner with
assailed orders partially set aside the trial court’s order dismissing Civil Case No. 96-1389, for the capacity to remarry under the Philippine law.
the purpose of resolving issues relating to the property settlement of the spouses and the
custody of their children. On September 30, 1999, respondent judge issued the assailed order partially setting aside her
order dated July 14, 1999 for the purpose of tackling the issues of property relations of the
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private spouses as well as support and custody of their children. The pertinent portion of said order
respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Germany. Their provides:
marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental.4 Out of
their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine on November 18, 1981 and October 25, Acting on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Order dated July 14, 1999 filed by
1987, respectively. petitioner thru counsel which was opposed by respondent and considering that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code was included as an amendment thru Executive Order
On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition5 for declaration of nullity of marriage 227, to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as being still married to his or her alien spouse
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. On February 6, 1997, petitioner filed a though the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he/she had obtained a
motion to dismiss,6 but it was denied by the trial court in its order7 dated May 28, 1997. divorce abroad which is recognized by his/her national law, and considering further the effects of
the termination of the marriage under Article 43 in relation to Article 50 and 52 of the same
On June 5, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was also denied in an order8 Code, which include the dissolution of the property relations of the spouses, and the support and
dated August 13, 1997. On September 5, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the custody of their children, the Order dismissing this case is partially set aside with respect to
Court of Appeals. On November 27, 1998, the appellate court denied the petition and remanded these matters which may be ventilated in this Court.
the case to the RTC.
SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis supplied.)
Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-
Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997. Petitioner filed a timely motion for reconsideration on October 19, 1999, which was denied by
respondent judge in an order dated March 31, 2000.12
The decree provides in part:
Petitioner ascribes lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and grave abuse of discretion on the part
[T]he Court of First Instance, Hamburg-Blankenese, Branch 513, has ruled through Judge van of respondent judge. He cites as grounds for his petition the following:
Buiren of the Court of First Instance on the basis of the oral proceedings held on 4 Nov. 1997:
1. Partially setting aside the order dated July 14, 1999 dismissing the instant case is not allowed
The marriage of the Parties contracted on 11 December 1980 before the Civil Registrar of by 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.13
Hamburg-Altona is hereby dissolved.
2. Respondent Maria Carmen Rodriguez by her motion for Partial Reconsideration had
The parental custody for the children recognized and admitted the Divorce Decision obtained by her ex-husband in Hamburg,
Germany.14
Carolynne Roehr, born 18 November 1981
3. There is nothing left to be tackled by the Honorable Court as there are no conjugal assets
Alexandra Kristine Roehr, born on 25 October 1987 alleged in the Petition for Annulment of Marriage and in the Divorce petition, and the custody of
the children had already been awarded to Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr.15
is granted to the father.
Pertinent in this case before us are the following issues:
The litigation expenses shall be assumed by the Parties.9
1. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing her order dated
September 30, 1999, which partially modified her order dated July 14, 1999; and
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Relevant
2. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she assumed and to the present case is Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,22 where this Court specifically recognized the
retained jurisdiction over the present case despite the fact that petitioner has already obtained a validity of a divorce obtained by a German citizen in his country, the Federal Republic of
divorce decree from a German court. Germany. We held in Pilapil that a foreign divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law
On the first issue, petitioner asserts that the assailed order of respondent judge is completely on the status of persons.
inconsistent with her previous order and is contrary to Section 3, Rule 16, Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides: In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court dated December 16, 1997 has not
been challenged by either of the parties. In fact, save for the issue of parental custody, even the
Sec. 3. Resolution of motion - After the hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny trial court recognized said decree to be valid and binding, thereby endowing private respondent
the motion, or order the amendment of the pleading. the capacity to remarry. Thus, the present controversy mainly relates to the award of the custody
of their two children, Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine, to petitioner.
The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground relied upon
is not indubitable. As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in
our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children,
In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. (Emphasis must still be determined by our courts.23 Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to
supplied.) a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be
shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on
Petitioner avers that a court’s action on a motion is limited to dismissing the action or claim, grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48,
denying the motion, or ordering the amendment of the pleading. 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:
Private respondent, on her part, argues that the RTC can validly reconsider its order dated July SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country,
14, 1999 because it had not yet attained finality, given the timely filing of respondent’s motion for having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
reconsideration.
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the
Pertinent to this issue is Section 3 in relation to Section 7, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil thing;
Procedure, which provides:
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as
Sec. 3. Action upon motion for new trial or reconsideration.—The trial court may set aside the between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may
judgment or final order and grant a new trial, upon such terms as may be just, or may deny the be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
motion. If the court finds that excessive damages have been awarded or that the judgment or clear mistake of law or fact.
final order is contrary to the evidence or law, it may amend such judgment or final order
accordingly. It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for
the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of
Sec. 7. Partial new trial or reconsideration.—If the grounds for a motion under this Rule appear Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in
to the court to affect the issues as to only a part, or less than all of the matters in controversy, or rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a
only one, or less than all, of the parties to it, the court may order a new trial or grant party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.24
reconsideration as to such issues if severable without interfering with the judgment or final order
upon the rest. (Emphasis supplied.) In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to
challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as
It is clear from the foregoing rules that a judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that res judicata with regard to the rights of petitioner to have parental custody of their two children.
has not yet attained finality. Considering that private respondent filed a motion for The proceedings in the German court were summary. As to what was the extent of private
reconsideration within the reglementary period, the trial court's decision of July 14, 1999 can still respondent’s participation in the proceedings in the German court, the records remain unclear.
be modified. Moreover, in Sañado v. Court of Appeals,16 we held that the court could modify or The divorce decree itself states that neither has she commented on the proceedings25 nor has
alter a judgment even after the same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire she given her opinion to the Social Services Office.26 Unlike petitioner who was represented by
rendering its decision unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying two lawyers, private respondent had no counsel to assist her in said proceedings.27 More
or requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and importantly, the divorce judgment was issued to petitioner by virtue of the German Civil Code
executory17 and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when provision to the effect that when a couple lived separately for three years, the marriage is
supervening events warrant it.18 In our view, there are even more compelling reasons to do so deemed irrefutably dissolved. The decree did not touch on the issue as to who the offending
when, as in this case, judgment has not yet attained finality. spouse was. Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children,
the trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental
Anent the second issue, petitioner claims that respondent judge committed grave abuse of custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the children. This is in
discretion when she partially set aside her order dated July 14, 1999, despite the fact that consonance with the provision in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that the child’s welfare is
petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg, always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody. 28
Germany.
On the matter of property relations, petitioner asserts that public respondent exceeded the
In Garcia v. Recio,19 Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.,20 and Llorente v. Court of Appeals,21 we bounds of her jurisdiction when she claimed cognizance of the issue concerning property
consistently held that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our relations between petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent herself has admitted in
Par. 14 of her petition for declaration of nullity of marriage dated August 26, 1996 filed with the CASE DIGEST:
RTC of Makati, subject of this case, that: "[p]etitioner and respondent have not acquired any
conjugal or community property nor have they incurred any debts during their marriage."29
Herein petitioner did not contest this averment. Basic is the rule that a court shall grant relief
warranted by the allegations and the proof.30 Given the factual admission by the parties in their Roehr v. Rodriguez
pleadings that there is no property to be accounted for, respondent judge has no basis to assert G.R. No. 142820, 20 June 2003
jurisdiction in this case to resolve a matter no longer deemed in controversy.
FACTS:
In sum, we find that respondent judge may proceed to determine the issue regarding the custody
of the two children born of the union between petitioner and private respondent. Private Wife Rodriguez filed for declaration of nullity of marriage, which was subsequently moved for
respondent erred, however, in claiming cognizance to settle the matter of property relations of dismissal by husband Roehr, a German national. Pending decision, the husband obtained a
the parties, which is not at issue. decree of divorce from a German Court, providing for (1) the dissolution of their marriage and (2)
the grant of parental custody of the children to Roehr.
WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, issued on
September 30, 1999 and March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We hereby Thereafter, wife moved for partial reconsideration with a prayer that the case proceed for the
declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the properties
parental custody, including the care, support and education of the children, namely Carolynne between the Roehr and Rodriguez. Motion was granted and thus challenged by Roehr.
and Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial
court for continuation of appropriate proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs. ISSUE:
SO ORDERED. W/N there is nothing left to be tackled by the Court since there are no conjugal properties
alleged in the annulment and the divorce decree provides for the finality of the custody of
children.
RULING:
No. As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are
recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of
the children, must be determined by our courts. The Court held that before our courts can give
the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the
German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample
opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court.
Pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code, where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)
Moreover, Section 50 of the Rules of Court states that the effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a
foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the
thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may
be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.
Since the proceedings in the German court were summary, the wife was not given opportunity to
challenge said judgment. Therefore, the divorce decree did not provide for the finality of the
custody of children.
FULL CASE: BAYOT V CA improvements and personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang,
Muntinlupa."11
G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008
Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of Civil Decree No.
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner, 362/96, Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a petition12 dated January 26, 1996, with
vs. attachments, for declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondents. however, later moved13 and secured approval14 of the motion to withdraw the petition.
x-------------------------------------------x On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment15 stating under oath that
she is an American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and
G.R. No. 163979 November 7, 2008 that she is carrying a child not of Vicente.
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner, On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for
vs. declaration of absolute nullity of marriage16 on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondent. incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094 and entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot
v. Vicente Madrigal Bayot, the petition was eventually raffled to Branch 256 of the court. In it,
DECISION Rebecca also sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for
support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a
VELASCO, JR., J.: permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.
The Case On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss17 on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause
of action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001,
Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot Rebecca filed and moved for the allowance of her application for support pendente lite.
impugning certain issuances handed out by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
68187. To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship,
as affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to
In the first, a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 and docketed as G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca speak of.
assails and seeks to nullify the April 30, 2002 Resolution2 of the CA, as reiterated in another
Resolution of September 2, 2002,3 granting a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of private Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, and Rebecca
respondent Vicente Madrigal Bayot staving off the trial court's grant of support pendente lite to commenced several criminal complaints against each other. Specifically, Vicente filed adultery
Rebecca. and perjury complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other hand, charged Vicente with
bigamy and concubinage.
The second, a petition for review under Rule 45,4 docketed G.R. No. 163979, assails the March
25, 2004 Decision5 of the CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case No. 01-094, a suit for declaration of Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss
absolute nullity of marriage with application for support commenced by Rebecca against Vicente and Motion for Support Pendente Lite
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside certain orders
and a resolution issued by the RTC in the said case. On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order18 denying Vicente's motion to dismiss Civil Case
No. 01-094 and granting Rebecca's application for support pendente lite, disposing as follows:
Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of both cases.
Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed by the respondent is DENIED.
The Facts Petitioner's Application in Support of the Motion for Support Pendente Lite is hereby GRANTED.
Respondent is hereby ordered to remit the amount of TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY
Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills, THOUSAND PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a month to Petitioner as support for the duration of the
Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage Certificate6 identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, proceedings relative to the instant Petition.
to be an American citizen7 born in Agaña, Guam, USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay,
American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American. SO ORDERED.19
On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to
Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of defense best taken up
soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic. during actual trial. As to the grant of support pendente lite, the trial court held that a mere
Before the Court of the First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca allegation of adultery against Rebecca does not operate to preclude her from receiving legal
personally appeared, while Vicente was duly represented by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the support.
Dominican court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96,8 ordering the dissolution of the couple's
marriage and "leaving them to remarry after completing the legal requirements," but giving them Following the denial20 of his motion for reconsideration of the above August 8, 2001 RTC order,
joint custody and guardianship over Alix. Over a year later, the same court would issue Civil Vicente went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
Decree No. 406/97,9 settling the couple's property relations pursuant to an Agreement10 they restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.21 His petition was docketed as CA-
executed on December 14, 1996. Said agreement specifically stated that the "conjugal property G.R. SP No. 68187.
which they acquired during their marriage consist[s] only of the real property and all the
Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA applied for and eventually secured an American passport on January 18, 1995, or a little over a
year before she initiated the first but later withdrawn petition for nullity of her marriage (Civil
On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO.22 On April 30, 2002, the appellate court Case No. 96-378) on March 14, 1996.
granted, via a Resolution, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the decretal portion of
which reads: (5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a purportedly Filipino father in Guam,
USA which follows the jus soli principle, Rebecca's representation and assertion about being an
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of the petition at bar, let the Writ of American citizen when she secured her foreign divorce precluded her from denying her
Preliminary Injunction be ISSUED in this case, enjoining the respondent court from implementing citizenship and impugning the validity of the divorce.
the assailed Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001, and
from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 01-094, upon the posting of an injunction Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Decision, but this recourse
bond in the amount of P250,000.00. was denied in the equally assailed June 4, 2004 Resolution.29 Hence, Rebecca's Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed under G.R. No. 163979.
SO ORDERED.23
The Issues
Rebecca moved24 but was denied reconsideration of the aforementioned April 30, 2002
resolution. In the meantime, on May 20, 2002, the preliminary injunctive writ25 was issued. In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of errors as grounds for the allowance
Rebecca also moved for reconsideration of this issuance, but the CA, by Resolution dated of her petition, all of which converged on the proposition that the CA erred in enjoining the
September 2, 2002, denied her motion. implementation of the RTC's orders which would have entitled her to support pending final
resolution of Civil Case No. 01-094.
The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September 2, 2002 are presently being
assailed in Rebecca's petition for certiorari, docketed under G.R. No. 155635. In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed CA decision submitting as
follows:
Ruling of the CA
I
Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated March 25, 2004, effectively
dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094, and set aside incidental orders the RTC issued in relation to THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MENTIONING AND NOT TAKING
the case. The fallo of the presently assailed CA Decision reads: INTO CONSIDERATION IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS THE FACT OF
PETITIONER'S FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY STATED AND ALLEGED IN
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Omnibus Order dated August 8, HER PETITION BEFORE THE COURT A QUO.
2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 01-094, for failure to state a cause of action. No II
pronouncement as to costs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ONLY ON ANNEXES TO THE
SO ORDERED.26 PETITION IN RESOLVING THE MATTERS BROUGHT BEFORE IT.
To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss on the basis of the III
following premises:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT
(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the hypothetical- RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT HIS MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER
admission rule applies in determining whether a complaint or petition states a cause of action.27 HAD ALREADY BEEN DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS SUBSEQUENT AND CONCURRENT
Applying said rule in the light of the essential elements of a cause of action,28 Rebecca had no ACTS.
cause of action against Vicente for declaration of nullity of marriage.
IV
(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her marriage with Vicente
declared void, the union having previously been dissolved on February 22, 1996 by the foreign THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS ABUSE OF
divorce decree she personally secured as an American citizen. Pursuant to the second DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT, MUCH LESS A GRAVE ABUSE.30
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, such divorce restored Vicente's capacity to contract
another marriage. We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its outcome being determinative of the
success or failure of the petition in G.R. No. 155635.
(3) Rebecca's contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a Filipino citizen at the time the
foreign divorce decree was rendered, was dubious. Her allegation as to her alleged Filipino Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce obtained abroad by
citizenship was also doubtful as it was not shown that her father, at the time of her birth, was still an alien married to a Philippine national may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the
a Filipino citizen. The Certification of Birth of Rebecca issued by the Government of Guam also decree of divorce is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.31 Second, the reckoning
did not indicate the nationality of her father. point is not the citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad. And third, an absolute divorce secured
(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship, having professed to have by a Filipino married to another Filipino is contrary to our concept of public policy and morality
that nationality status and having made representations to that effect during momentous events and shall not be recognized in this jurisdiction.32
of her life, such as: (a) during her marriage; (b) when she applied for divorce; and (c) when she
Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, i.e., the Official Receipt No. 5939988
propriety of the granting of the motion to dismiss by the appellate court, resolves itself into the issued at Manila
questions of: first, whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000
judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996; and second, whether
the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects? From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material facts and dates may be
deduced: (1) Bureau Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued the Order of Recognition on
The Court's Ruling October 6, 1995; (2) the 1st Indorsement of Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming
Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen was issued on June 8, 2000 or almost five years from
The petition is bereft of merit. the date of the order of recognition; and (3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778 was purportedly issued
on October 11, 1995 after the payment of the PhP 2,000 fee on October 10, 1995 per OR No.
Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case 5939988.
There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained her What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate could have been issued by the
divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an Bureau on October 11, 1995 when the Secretary of Justice issued the required affirmation only
effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following are compelling circumstances indicative on June 8, 2000. No explanation was given for this patent aberration. There seems to be no
of her American citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaña, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli error with the date of the issuance of the 1st Indorsement by Secretary of Justice Tuquero as
is followed in this American territory granting American citizenship to those who are born there; this Court takes judicial notice that he was the Secretary of Justice from February 16, 2000 to
and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder of an American passport.33 January 22, 2001. There is, thus, a strong valid reason to conclude that the certificate in
question must be spurious.
And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and represented
herself as an American citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as shown in the marriage Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino citizenship require the
certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3) when she secured the divorce from the affirmation by the DOJ of the Order of Recognition issued by the Bureau. Under Executive Order
Dominican Republic. Mention may be made of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment34 in which she No. 292, also known as the 1987 Administrative Code, specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec.
stated being an American citizen. 3(6), it is the DOJ which is tasked to "provide immigration and naturalization regulatory services
and implement the laws governing citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens." Thus, the
It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau) of Identification confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued by the Bureau
(ID) Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its face, ID Certificate No. RC 9778 is required.
would tend to show that she has indeed been recognized as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-
emphasized, however, that such recognition was given only on June 8, 2000 upon the Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-00235 on Recognition as a Filipino Citizen
affirmation by the Secretary of Justice of Rebecca's recognition pursuant to the Order of clearly provides:
Recognition issued by Bureau Associate Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.
The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall automatically furnish the
For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No. RC 9778: Department of Justice an official copy of its Order of Recognition within 72 days from its date of
approval by the way of indorsement for confirmation of the Order by the Secretary of Justice
To Whom It May Concern: pursuant to Executive Order No. 292. No Identification Certificate shall be issued before the date
of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice and any Identification Certificate issued by the
This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT* whose photograph and Bureau pursuant to an Order of Recognition shall prominently indicate thereon the date of
thumbprints are affixed hereto and partially covered by the seal of this Office, and whose other confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. (Emphasis ours.)
particulars are as follows:
Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine passport only on June 13,
Place of Birth: Guam, USA Date of Birth: March 5, 1953 2000, or five days after then Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued the 1st Indorsement confirming
the order of recognition. It may be too much to attribute to coincidence this unusual sequence of
Sex: female Civil Status: married Color of Hair: brown close events which, to us, clearly suggests that prior to said affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca
was not yet recognized as a Filipino citizen. The same sequence would also imply that ID
Color of Eyes: brown Distinguishing marks on face: none Certificate No. RC 9778 could not have been issued in 1995, as Bureau Law Instruction No.
RBR-99-002 mandates that no identification certificate shall be issued before the date of
was - r e c o g n i z e d - as a citizen of the Philippines as per pursuant to Article IV, Section 1, confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. Logically, therefore, the affirmation or confirmation of
Paragraph 3 of the 1935 Constitution per order of Recognition JBL 95-213 signed by Associate Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen through the 1st Indorsement issued only on June 8,
Commissioner Jose B. Lopez dated October 6, 1995, and duly affirmed by Secretary of Justice 2000 by Secretary of Justice Tuquero corresponds to the eventual issuance of Rebecca's
Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1st Indorsement dated June 8, 2000. passport a few days later, or on June 13, 2000 to be exact.
Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for travel purposes. When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a
Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One
Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of October, 1995
The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen. But from the
(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was
ASSO. COMMISSIONER not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of
divorce from the Dominican Republic.
American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in
The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that Rebecca voluntarily withdrew her any of the States of the Union,40 the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly
original petition for declaration of nullity (Civil Case No. 96-378 of the Makati City RTC) obviously authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.
because she could not show proof of her alleged Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of
that petition shows that, while bearing the date January 26, 1996, it was only filed with the RTC It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied, but in fact
on March 14, 1996 or less than a month after Rebecca secured, on February 22, 1996, the admitted by both parties. And neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce court nor
foreign divorce decree in question. Consequently, there was no mention about said divorce in challenge the validity of its proceedings on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact
the petition. Significantly, the only documents appended as annexes to said original petition or law, albeit both appeared to have the opportunity to do so. The same holds true with respect
were: the Vicente-Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex "A") and Birth Certificate of Alix (Annex to the decree of partition of their conjugal property. As this Court explained in Roehr v.
"B"). If indeed ID Certificate No. RC 9778 from the Bureau was truly issued on October 11, 1995, Rodriguez:
is it not but logical to expect that this piece of document be appended to form part of the petition,
the question of her citizenship being crucial to her case? Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment [of divorce] x x x, it
must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to
As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Civil Case No. do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section
01-094, like the withdrawn first petition, also did not have the ID Certificate from the Bureau as 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:
attachment. What were attached consisted of the following material documents: Marriage
Contract (Annex "A") and Divorce Decree. It was only through her Opposition (To Respondent's SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.--The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country,
Motion to Dismiss dated 31 May 2001)36 did Rebecca attach as Annex "C" ID Certificate No. having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
RC 9778.
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the
At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had sufficient basis to dismiss the thing;
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage as said petition, taken together with
Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition to motion, with their respective (b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as
attachments, clearly made out a case of lack of cause of action, which we will expound later. between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may
be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
Validity of Divorce Decree clear mistake of law or fact.
Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97 valid. It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for
the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of
First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized, Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in
assuming for argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but rem, a foreign judgment |merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a
represented herself in public documents as an American citizen. At the very least, she chose, party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.41
before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital
relationship. Second, she secured personally said divorce as an American citizen, as is evident As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the foreign divorce
in the text of the Civil Decrees, which pertinently declared: while Vicente was duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in said
proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce decrees rendered and issued by the
IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly submit to the jurisdiction of this Dominican Republic court are valid and, consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.
court, by reason of the existing incompatibility of temperaments x x x. The parties MARIA
REBECCA M. BAYOT, of United States nationality, 42 years of age, married, domiciled and Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the
residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Philippines, x x x, who personally June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order
appeared before this court, accompanied by DR. JUAN ESTEBAN OLIVERO, attorney, x x x of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by
and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, of Philippine nationality, of 43 years of age, married and Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in
domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the
before this court represented by DR. ALEJANDRO TORRENS, attorney, x x x, revalidated by country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at
special power of attorney given the 19th of February of 1996, signed before the Notary Public the time a valid divorce is obtained.42
Enrico L. Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized and authorizing him to subscribe all the
acts concerning this case.37 (Emphasis ours.) Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce
Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res
of America, a country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the marital
Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their Agreement38 executed on December 14, 1996 vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed; they are both freed from the
after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to
Decree No. 406/97 issued on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca each other. As the divorce court formally pronounced: "[T]hat the marriage between MARIA
was valid. REBECCA M. BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x x leaving them
free to remarry after completing the legal requirements."43
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can
be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the
national law of the alien spouse.39 Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an
Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that Rebecca lacks, under
husband's obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with, the premises, cause of action. Philippine Bank of Communications v. Trazo explains the concept
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca.44 and elements of a cause of action, thus:
The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the other. A
Family Code, providing as follows: motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the
allegations in the complaint. The allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of
Art. 26. x x x x action against the defendants if, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a
valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exists if
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is the following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
E.O. 227) defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the
defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.49
In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicability of the second
paragraph of Art. 26, thus: One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying petition before the RTC, Vicente's
motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition thereof, with the documentary evidence attached
x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of action for declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which
presupposes the existence of a marriage.
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must show that the claim
for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous,
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. indefinite, or uncertain.50 With the valid foreign divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more
marital tie binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be dissolved or nullified.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to
capacitating the latter to remarry.45 support the needs of their daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly show how he had
discharged his duty, albeit Rebecca alleged that the support given had been insufficient. At any
Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further the fact of marriage of rate, we do note that Alix, having been born on November 27, 1982, reached the majority age on
Vicente and Rebecca, their citizenship when they wed, and their professed citizenship during the November 27, 2000, or four months before her mother initiated her petition for declaration of
valid divorce proceedings. nullity. She would now be 26 years old. Hence, the issue of back support, which allegedly had
been partly shouldered by Rebecca, is best litigated in a separate civil action for reimbursement.
Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No. 406/97 and the Agreement In this way, the actual figure for the support of Alix can be proved as well as the earning capacity
executed on December 14, 1996 bind both Rebecca and Vicente as regards their property of both Vicente and Rebecca. The trial court can thus determine what Vicente owes, if any,
relations. The Agreement provided that the ex-couple's conjugal property consisted only their considering that support includes provisions until the child concerned shall have finished her
family home, thus: education.
9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property which they acquired during their marriage Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve into the issue tendered in
consists only of the real property and all the improvements and personal properties therein G.R. No. 155635, that is, Rebecca's right to support pendente lite. As it were, her entitlement to
contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, covered by TCT No. 168301 dated that kind of support hinges on the tenability of her petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for
Feb. 7, 1990 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati, Metro Manila registered in the name of declaration of nullity of marriage. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-094 by the CA veritably
Vicente M. Bayot, married to Rebecca M. Bayot, x x x.46 (Emphasis ours.) removed any legal anchorage for, and effectively mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.
This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was affirmed by the divorce court which, WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is hereby DISMISSED on the
per its second divorce decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97 dated March 4, 1997, ordered that, ground of mootness, while the petition for review in G.R. No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for lack
"THIRD: That the agreement entered into between the parties dated 14th day of December 1996 of merit. Accordingly, the March 25, 2004 Decision and June 4, 2004 Resolution of the CA in
in Makati City, Philippines shall survive in this Judgment of divorce by reference but not merged CA-G.R. SP No. 68187 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
and that the parties are hereby ordered and directed to comply with each and every provision of
said agreement."47 SO ORDERED.
Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the Agreement. She is thus
estopped by her representation before the divorce court from asserting that her and Vicente's
conjugal property was not limited to their family home in Ayala Alabang.48
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage
certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the
Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized
by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6 The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void15 and voidable16
marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand,
of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage.17 Our
responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.18
offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case
herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien,
she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s. President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code
In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that to its present wording, as follows:
Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign
divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,8 in order for the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads: country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the into the law this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights after
a foreign court’s divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
v. Orbecido III;10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to (b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
[the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render subsequent title.
support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
ends of justice are to be served.22 want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the
no longer married to the Filipino spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by
spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to
Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse his or her national law.27
a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved,
capacitating him or her to remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that
Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained
precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered
significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of by a tribunal of another country."28 This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity
severing the marital bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable
divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.29 The recognition
the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a
and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
and his or her alien spouse.
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody
likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be
make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.26 Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as
for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the the required certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under law on divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for
this provision. insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to
the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal
interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests
that will be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. A
We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and
Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of
conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every
the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata32 between the
divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.33
alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of
Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states: foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce
serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order of a spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
follows: Code provides.
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has
already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the
mere presentation of the decree.34 We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the
need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done. Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court
recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil No. 181, series of 198237 – both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine
status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but
registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a person’s legal it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration
capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or produce any legal effect.1avvphi1
illegitimate, or his being married or not."35
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person’s legal Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil
capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding,
Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry: contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or
which shall be entered: corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code
by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry
(a) births; may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the
jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
(b) deaths; authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires,
among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the
(c) marriages; corresponding civil registry is located;38 that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim
any interest must be made parties to the proceedings;39 and that the time and place for hearing
(d) annulments of marriages; must be published in a newspaper of general circulation.40 As these basic jurisdictional
requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert
(e) divorces; filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
(f) legitimations; We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two
separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry – one for
(g) adoptions; recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
(h) acknowledgment of natural children; 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule
(i) naturalization; and 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding41 by which the
applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional
(j) changes of name. infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
xxxx WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30,
2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17,
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in
following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar
status of persons: General. No costs.
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also
divorces and dissolved marriages.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the
submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration.
The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign
judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial
order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the
foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
FULL CASE: VDA DE CATALAN V CATALAN-LEE Finally, the trial court found that, in the first place, petitioner had never been married to Eusebio
Bristol.
G. R. No. 183622 February 8, 2012
On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed the Petition for the
MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN, Petitioner, issuance of letters of administration filed by petitioner and granted that of private respondent.
vs. Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the marriage between
LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE, Respondent. petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when she married Orlando. Without
expounding, it reasoned further that her acquittal in the previous bigamy case was fatal to her
RESOLUTION cause. Thus, the trial court held that petitioner was not an interested party who may file a petition
for the issuance of letters of administration.4
SERENO, J.:
After the subsequent denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to
Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 and the Court of Appeals (CA) via her Petition for Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
Resolution2 regarding the issuance of letters of administration of the intestate estate of Orlando part of the RTC in dismissing her Petition for the issuance of letters of administration.
B. Catalan.
Petitioner reiterated before the CA that the Petition filed by respondent should have been
The facts are as follows: dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia. She also insisted that, while a petition for letters of
administration may have been filed by an "uninterested person," the defect was cured by the
Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in the appearance of a real party-in-interest. Thus, she insisted that, to determine who has a better
United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage with petitioner right to administer the decedent’s properties, the RTC should have first required the parties to
herein. present their evidence before it ruled on the matter.
On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines. On 18 October 2007, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision. First, it held that petitioner
undertook the wrong remedy. She should have instead filed a petition for review rather than a
Thereafter, on 28 February 2005, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan petition for certiorari. Nevertheless, since the Petition for Certiorari was filed within the fifteen-
City a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix day reglementary period for filing a petition for review under Sec. 4 of Rule 43, the CA allowed
of the intestate estate of Orlando. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings (Spec. Proc.) the Petition and continued to decide on the merits of the case. Thus, it ruled in this wise:
No. 228.
As to the issue of litis pendentia, we find it not applicable in the case. For litis pendentia to be a
On 3 March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, ground for the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as
one of the children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC to represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for,
docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 232. the relief being founded on the same acts, and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such
that the judgment which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful,
The two cases were subsequently consolidated. amount to res judicata in the other. A petition for letters of administration is a special proceeding.
A special proceeding is an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 232 on the ground of litis pendentia, a particular fact. And, in contrast to an ordinary civil action, a special proceeding involves no
considering that Spec. Proc. No. 228 covering the same estate was already pending. defendant or respondent. The only party in this kind of proceeding is the petitioner of the
applicant. Considering its nature, a subsequent petition for letters of administration can hardly be
On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person barred by a similar pending petition involving the estate of the same decedent unless both
qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Orlando. In petitions are filed by the same person. In the case at bar, the petitioner was not a party to the
support of her contention, respondent alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against petition filed by the private respondent, in the same manner that the latter was not made a party
petitioner before Branch 54 of the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan, and docketed as Crim. Case to the petition filed by the former. The first element of litis pendentia is wanting. The contention
No. 2699-A. of the petitioner must perforce fail.
Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for bigamy, alleging that petitioner contracted a Moreover, to yield to the contention of the petitioner would render nugatory the provision of the
second marriage to Orlando despite having been married to one Eusebio Bristol on 12 Rules requiring a petitioner for letters of administration to be an "interested party," inasmuch as
December 1959. any person, for that matter, regardless of whether he has valid interest in the estate sought to be
administered, could be appointed as administrator for as long as he files his petition ahead of
On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy.3 The trial court ruled that since any other person, in derogation of the rights of those specifically mentioned in the order of
the deceased was a divorced American citizen, and since that divorce was not recognized under preference in the appointment of administrator under Rule 78, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of
Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between him and petitioner was not valid. Court, which provides:
Furthermore, it took note of the action for declaration of nullity then pending action with the trial xxx xxx xxx
court in Dagupan City filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner. It considered
the pending action to be a prejudicial question in determining the guilt of petitioner for the crime The petitioner, armed with a marriage certificate, filed her petition for letters of administration. As
of bigamy. a spouse, the petitioner would have been preferred to administer the estate of Orlando B.
Catalan. However, a marriage certificate, like any other public document, is only prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein. The fact that the petitioner had been charged with bigamy
and was acquitted has not been disputed by the petitioner. Bigamy is an illegal marriage In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country,
committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be
dissolved or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by a judgment recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality
rendered in a proper proceedings. The deduction of the trial court that the acquittal of the principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
petitioner in the said case negates the validity of her subsequent marriage with Orlando B.
Catalan has not been disproved by her. There was not even an attempt from the petitioner to For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. We
deny the findings of the trial court. There is therefore no basis for us to make a contrary finding. hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and
Thus, not being an interested party and a stranger to the estate of Orlando B. Catalan, the recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. xxx
dismissal of her petition for letters of administration by the trial court is in place.
Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven as we have enunciated in Garcia v.
xxx xxx xxx Recio,9 to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
pronouncement as to costs. evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce
obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment
SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis supplied) is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official
body or tribunal of a foreign country.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Decision.6 She alleged that the reasoning of the
CA was illogical in stating, on the one hand, that she was acquitted of bigamy, while, on the Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven
other hand, still holding that her marriage with Orlando was invalid. She insists that with her as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
acquittal of the crime of bigamy, the marriage enjoys the presumption of validity. thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
On 20 June 2008, the CA denied her motion. diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Hence, this Petition.
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one
At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the finding of issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
the RTC in Crim. Case No. 2699-A that petitioner was never married to Eusebio Bristol. Thus, aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
the trial court concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the first
marriage with Bristol still existed and was valid. By failing to take note of the findings of fact on Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in
the nonexistence of the marriage between petitioner and Bristol, both the RTC and CA held that evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had
petitioner was not an interested party in the estate of Orlando. not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it
was admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and
Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in Crim. Case No. 2699-A was accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce
dismissed, we had already ruled that under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.
valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was established as early
as 1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.7 wherein we said: Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary;
respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces[,] the same being political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had
to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the tied him to Philippine personal laws.
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. xxx
Burden of Proving Australian Law
We reiterated this principle in Llorente v. Court of Appeals,8 to wit:
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner,
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that
of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital
the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time.
case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may
to their national law. take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that once proven that We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a
respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have
ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right to the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the
inherit" from him. answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer
when they introduce new matters. Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the CASE DIGEST:
burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
DOCTRINE:
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which maybe recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid ac-cording to their
laws.1âwphi1 Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are national law.
not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.
The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon FACTS:
the subject should be resolved in the negative. (Emphasis supplied) Orlando B. Catalan, a naturalized American citizen,allegedly obtained a divorce in the United States from his first wife, Felicitas
Amor. He then contracted a second marriage with petitioner.
It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlando’s
When Orlando died intestate in the Philippines, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration
divorce under the laws of the United States and the marriage between petitioner and the for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate. While the case was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee,
deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for further reception one of the children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC. The two cases were consolidated.
of evidence to establish the fact of divorce.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition filed by the respondent on the ground of litis pendentia. Respondent alleged
that petitioner was not considered an interested person qualified to file the petition. Respondent further alleged that a criminal
Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage, she has the case for bigamy was filed against petitioner by Felicitas Amor contending that petitioner contracted a second marriage to
preferential right to be issued the letters of administration over the estate. Otherwise, letters of Orlando despite having been married to one Eusebio Bristol.
administration may be issued to respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or next of kin of However, the RTC acquitted petitioner of bigamy and ruled that since the deceased was a divorced American citizen, and that
the deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. divorce was not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between him and petitioner was not valid. The RTC took
note of the action for declaration of nullity then pending filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner. It considered
the pending action to be a prejudicial question in determining the guilt of petition-er for the crime of bigamy. The RTC also found
This is consistent with our ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,10 in which we said: that petitioner had never been married to Bristol.
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry The RTC subsequently dismissed the Petition for the issuance of letters of administration filed by petitioner and granted that of
private respondent. Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the marriage between petitioner and
Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when she married Orlando. The RTC held that petitioner was not an interested party
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo's surviving spouse. However, the records who may file said petition. The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court.
show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee
ISSUES:
as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v.
Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and 1. Whether the acquittal of petitioner in the crim. case for bigamy meant that the marriage with Bristol was still valid.
divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that
2. Whether the divorce obtained abroad by Orlando may be recognized under Philippine jurisdiction.
proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by HELD:
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody
It is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters
of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied of administration over the estate of Orlando. Petition is partially granted. Case is remanded to RTC.
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the 1. No. The RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the finding of the RTC in Crim. Case that petitioner was never
married to Eusebio Bristol. It concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the first marriage with
seal of his office. Bristol still existed and was valid.
With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., 2. Yes. Under the principles of comity, Philippine jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of for-eign
nationality. Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law their national law. Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven by the divorce decree itself. The best evidence of a
Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the judgment is the judgment itself. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued
they must be alleged and proved. by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on
Moreover, the burden of proof lies with the “party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or
the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. defense of an action.” In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are
(Emphasis supplied) denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce
new matters. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts,
they must be alleged and proved.
Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain
the rightful party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan. It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlando’s divorce under the laws of the United
States and the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court
for further reception of evidence to establish the fact of divorce.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Decision dated 18 October 2007 and the Resolution dated 20 June 2008 of the Court of Appeals
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to Branch 70 of the
Regional Trial Court of Burgos, Pangasinan for further proceedings in accordance with this
Decision.
SO ORDERED.
FULL CASE: FUJIKI V MARINAY (a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife.
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
xxxx
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs. Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or
QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS. election of the petitioner. x x x
DECISION The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above
provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which
CARPIO, J.: provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband
The Case or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage
void, and not Fujiki.
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon
City, through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
question of law. The petition assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus,
No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special
Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil action
(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."10
of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition. In other words, the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights
of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese
The Facts Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the
ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to
Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with recognition by Philippine courts.12
petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually,
they lost contact with each other. In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages
under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy
Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical would be absurd because only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of
abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3 Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous
marriage declared a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, had material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law
recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy
initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to of the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or
direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment annulled marriage was solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil
on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring
the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office marriages void from the beginning" are subject to cancellation or correction.18 The petition in
(NSO).6 the RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the
certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred"
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC
petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following may be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of
provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v.
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC): Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s
prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case."20
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. – Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the
petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied with the
provision.
concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In its also affected the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect,
prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record
dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as
No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the proceeding because required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil
he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and
now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its status x x x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a
ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited by
the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24 Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void
marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v. Bayadog40 which
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked."41
Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a
special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them
in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x."26 Braza to comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she
emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned was previously married to Fujiki.43 Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on
only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition.45
such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] x x x."27 She would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause
misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.46
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between
Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the The Issues
petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition was
not authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
and Maekara
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on
review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator the ground of bigamy.
and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor General.
Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion.31 (3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s "pronouncement that
the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the The Ruling of the Court
case be reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that
Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the We grant the petition.
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-
Llave v. Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained: Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not
had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."48
marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void
and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the I.
one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous
marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where
but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign
always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment
sanctity is protected by the Constitution.34 may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by
judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign
held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular
itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.50
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."37 While Corpuz
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would
mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and II.
contents of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the public
prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be
absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under
judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special
RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact."
explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State
would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such
concluded litigation."59 as birth, death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the
Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign or right of a party or a particular fact."67
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the
Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a
judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional
condition and legal capacity of such citizen. Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and
capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no
against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil
successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the
that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law
exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a the moment he contracts marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to
foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property
only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the regime of the marriage.71
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the
policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution,72 but a spouse’s
jurisdiction of other states.62 right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and
Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his
decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right
of evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.
divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the
rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to
however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when
Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
a divorce decree abroad.65 filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting
marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under
Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the
While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a)
with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is
accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is
of Court. a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an
interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action which remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v.
leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26
personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
not only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the
interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage. laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only
authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial
and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that
burden to the prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign
order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the
a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The
judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which
to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry. is already effective in the country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code is based on this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that
III. the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice
are to be served."91
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that
a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a
correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy.
can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of
dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because
between Marinay and Maekara. the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry
under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines,
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment the Filipino spouse will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino
nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. spouse cannot remarry.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to
proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical
spouses and children,84 the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a
spouses,85 and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with
action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition
(Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy
may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located."87 In available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment
other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family
based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a
a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to
safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the
No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide
for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in
which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC Article 15 of the Civil Code.
does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
jurisdiction of the foreign court. inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party
is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither
foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts
the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section
that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right
becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of The... petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code
entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage of the Philippines[11] on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.[12]
is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected
Issues:
in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the
effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines.1âwphi1 Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without
prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The Ruling:
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of
criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of
its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign
of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must... determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with
the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago." domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.[60] Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating
to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are... binding upon citizens
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus,
questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign
respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. judgment... affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition
and legal capacity of such citizen.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a
dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q- Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts
11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the... foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot
REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision. substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the
jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact
SO ORDERED. according to... the rules of evidence.
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment
CASE DIGEST nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no
divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully... consistent with Philippine public policy, as
Facts: bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a
crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay Family Court judgment... in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
(Marinay) in the Philippines[2] on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner's parents.
48(b) of the Rules of Court.
Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition.
Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
Principles:
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being
dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought
Civil Law
Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.[3] its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must... determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.[60] Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating
Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are... binding upon citizens
Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.[4] On
of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus,
the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign
14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or judgment... affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition
Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be
and legal capacity of such citizen.
recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a
Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;[5] and
Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts
(3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the... foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot
judgment on the Certificate of
substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the
jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact
Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and according to... the rules of evidence.
Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).
The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void