Republic of the Philippines with the lower court that no cause of action was

SUPREME COURT shown to compel recognition of a child as yet unborn,

Manila nor for its support, but decreed that the complaint did
state a cause of action for damages, premised on
EN BANC Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
prescribing as follows:
G.R. No. L-18630 December 17, 1966
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is
APOLONIO TANJANCO, petitioner, contrary to morals, good customs or public
vs. policy shall compensate the latter for the
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI damage.
SANTOS, respondents.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, entered judgment
P. Carreon and G. O. Veneracion, Jr. for petitioner. setting aside the dismissal and directing the court of
Antonio V. Bonoan for respondents. origin to proceed with the case.

REYES, J.B.L., J.: Defendant, in turn, appealed to this Court, pleading

that actions for breach of a promise to marry are not
Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals (in its permissible in this jurisdiction, and invoking the
Case No. 27210-R) revoking an order of the Court of rulings of this Court in Estopa vs. Piansay, L-14733,
First Instance of Rizal (in Civil Case No. Q-4797) September 30, 1960; Hermosisima vs. Court of
dismissing appellant's action for support and Appeals, L-14628, January 29, 1962; and De Jesus
damages. vs. SyQuia, 58 Phil. 886.

The essential allegations of the complaint are to the We find this appeal meritorious.
effect that, from December, 1957, the defendant
(appellee herein), Apolonio Tanjanco, courted the In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action
plaintiff, Araceli Santos, both being of adult age; that for damages, under Article 21 above mentioned, the
"defendant expressed and professed his undying love Court of Appeals relied upon and quoted from the
and affection for plaintiff who also in due time memorandum submitted by the Code Commission to
reciprocated the tender feelings"; that in consideration the Legislature in 1949 to support the original draft of
of defendant's promise of marriage plaintiff consented the Civil Code. Referring to Article 23 of the draft (now
and acceded to defendant's pleas for carnal Article 21 of the Code), the Commission stated:
knowledge; that regularly until December 1959,
through his protestations of love and promises of
marriage, defendant succeeded in having carnal But the Code Commission has gone farther
access to plaintiff, as a result of which the latter than the sphere of wrongs defined or
conceived a child; that due to her pregnant condition, determined by positive law. Fully sensible
to avoid embarrassment and social humiliation, that there are countless gaps in the statutes,
plaintiff had to resign her job as secretary in IBM which leave so many victims of moral
Philippines, Inc., where she was receiving P230.00 a wrongs helpless, even though they have
month; that thereby plaintiff became unable to support actually suffered material and moral injury,
herself and her baby; that due to defendant's refusal the Commission has deemed it necessary, in
to marry plaintiff, as promised, the latter suffered the interest of justice, to incorporate in the
mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded proposed Civil Code the following rule:
feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation. The
prayer was for a decree compelling the defendant to "ART. 23. Any person who wilfully
recognize the unborn child that plaintiff was bearing; causes loss or injury to another in a
to pay her not less than P430.00 a month for her manner that is contrary to morals,
support and that of her baby, plus P100,000.00 in good customs or public policy shall
moral and exemplary damages, plus P10,000.00 compensate the latter for the
attorney's fees. damage."

Upon defendant's motion to dismiss, the court of first An example will illustrate the purview of the
instance dismissed the complaint for failure to state a foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-
cause of action. year old daughter of "X". A promise of
marriage either has not been made, or can
Plaintiff Santos duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant.
and the latter ultimately decided the case, holding Under the present laws, there is no crime, as
 the girl is above eighteen years of age. Bearing these principles in mind, let us examine the
Neither can any civil action for breach of complaint. The material allegations there are as
promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, follows:
though the grievous moral wrong has been
committed, and though the girl and her I. That the plaintiff is of legal age, single, and
family have suffered incalculable moral residing at 56 South E. Diliman, Quezon
damage, she and her parents cannot bring City, while defendant is also of legal age,
any action for damages. But under the single and residing at 525 Padre Faura,
proposed article, she and her parents would Manila, where he may be served with
have such a right of action. summons;

The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that II. That the plaintiff and the defendant
the example set forth in the Code Commission's became acquainted with each other
memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who has sometime in December, 1957 and soon
been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that thereafter, the defendant started visiting and
in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a courting the plaintiff;
breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes
essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior
power or abuse of confidence on the part of the III. That the defendant's visits were regular
seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. and frequent and in due time the defendant
Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. expressed and professed his undying love
595). and affection for the plaintiff who also in due
time reciprocated the tender feelings;
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra)
that — IV. That in the course of their engagement,
the plaintiff and the defendant as are wont of
young people in love had frequent outings
To constitute seduction there must in all and dates, became very close and intimate
cases be some sufficient promise or to each other and sometime in July, 1958, in
inducement and the woman must yield consideration of the defendant's promises of
because of the promise or other inducement. marriage, the plaintiff consented and
If she consents merely from carnal lust and acceded to the former's earnest and
the intercourse is from mutual desire, there repeated pleas to have carnal knowledge
is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, with him;
par. 56). She must be induced to depart from
the path of virtue by the use of some species
of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are V. That subsequent thereto and regularly
calculated to have and do have that effect, until about July, 1959 except for a short
and which result in her ultimately submitting period in December, 1958 when the
her person to the sexual embraces of her defendant was out of the country, the
seducer (27 Phil. 123). defendant through his protestations of love
and promises of marriage succeeded in
having carnal knowledge with the plaintiff;
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
VI. That as a result of their intimate
On the other hand, in an action by the relationship, the plaintiff started conceiving
woman, the enticement, persuasion or which was confirmed by a doctor sometime
deception is the essence of the injury; and a in July, 1959;
mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to
warrant a recover.
VII. That upon being certain of her pregnant
condition, the plaintiff informed the defendant
Accordingly it is not seduction where the and pleaded with him to make good his
willingness arises out of sexual desire or promises of marriage, but instead of
curiosity of the female, and the defendant honoring his promises and righting his
merely affords her the needed opportunity wrong, the defendant stopped and refrained
for the commission of the act. It has been from seeing the plaintiff since about July,
emphasized that to allow a recovery in all 1959 has not visited the plaintiff and to all
such cases would tend to the demoralization intents and purposes has broken their
of the female sex, and would be a reward for engagement and his promises.
unchastity by which a class of adventuresses
would be swift to profit." (47 Am. Jur. 662)
Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts
stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959,
the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age,
maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant,
with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is
incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there
is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the
appellant been deceived, had she surrendered
exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions
and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again
yielded to his embraces, much less for one year,
without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged
promises of marriage, and would have cut chart all
sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not
intend to fulfill his promises. Hence, we conclude that
no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code,
and no other cause of action being alleged, no error
was committed by the Court of First Instance in
dismissing the complaint.

Of course, the dismissal must be understood as

without prejudice to whatever actions may correspond
to the child of the plaintiff against the defendant-
appellant, if any. On that point, this Court makes no
pronouncement, since the child's own rights are not
here involved.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision of

the Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the Court
of First Instance is affirmed. No costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal,

Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro,
JJ., concur.

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